## Cryptography: Homework 6

(Deadline: 10am, 2022/11/4)

- 1. (20 points) Let F be a length-preserving PRF. Show that the following MACs are not EUF-CMA secure. (Let  $\langle i \rangle$  denote the n/2-bit encoding of an integer i.)
  - (a) A fixed-length MAC that authenticates messages of 3n/2 bits.
    - Gen(1<sup>n</sup>): choose  $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$  uniformly as the secret key.
    - $\mathsf{Mac}(k,m)$ : To authenticate a message  $m=m_1m_2m_3$ , where  $m_i\in\{0,1\}^{n/2}$  for every  $i\in\{1,2,3\}$ , compute and output the tag

$$t = F_k(\langle 1 \rangle || m_1) \oplus F_k(\langle 2 \rangle || m_2) \oplus F_k(\langle 3 \rangle || m_3).$$

- Vrfy(k, m, t): for a message  $m = m_1 m_2 m_3 \in \{0, 1\}^{3n/2}$  and a tag  $t \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , output 1 if and only if  $t = F_k(\langle 1 \rangle || m_1) \oplus F_k(\langle 2 \rangle || m_2) \oplus F_k(\langle 3 \rangle || m_3)$ .
- (b) A fixed-length MAC that authenticates messages of n/2 bits.
  - $Gen(1^n)$ : choose  $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$  uniformly as the secret key.
  - $\mathsf{Mac}(k,m)$ : To authenticate a message  $m \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ , choose  $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$  uniformly, compute  $s = F_k(r) \oplus F_k(\langle 1 \rangle || m)$ , output the tag t = (r,s).
  - Vrfy(k, m, t): for a message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$  and a tag t = (r, s), output 1 if and only if  $s = F_k(r) \oplus F_k(\langle 1 \rangle || m)$ .
- 2. (30 points) Let F be a length-preserving PRF. Define a MAC  $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Mac}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$  for messages of n bits as below:
  - $Gen(1^n)$ : choose  $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ ;
  - $\mathsf{Mac}(k,m)$ : for  $m \in \{0,1\}^n$ , output  $t = F_k(m) \in \{0,1\}^n$ .
  - Vrfy(k, m, t): output 1 if  $t = F_k(m)$  or  $t = F_k(m) \oplus 1^n$ .

Determine if  $\Pi$  is EUF-CMA secure or sEUF-CMA secure. Prove your answers.