



European Parliament

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# Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide

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## Normandy Index 2022

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## STUDY

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# Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide

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## Normandy Index 2022

With war having returned to the European continent, measuring the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world – as the 'Normandy Index' does – is more important than ever. The annual Index was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2022 exercise, which draws on data compiled in 2021, and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 60 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

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The Normandy Index is also available in an [online version](#). The present paper was finalised in July 2022. It updates and expands the [2019](#), [2020](#) and [2021](#) Normandy Index, also available on the European Parliament's Think Tank website.

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## Foreword



The year 2022 has been a painful reminder that peace and democracy should never be taken for granted. The images coming out of Ukraine every day since 24 February stand in strong contrast to the long-lasting expectation of the peace that we had all come to enjoy in Europe. And, while perhaps closest to home here in Europe, this war is not the only one ravaging peoples' lives around the world. In our neighbourhood and beyond, lives, homes and futures are victims of violent conflict. Elsewhere, the deterioration or absence of democracy contributes to the violation of human rights and prosperity depriving people of their future. Women's basic rights are being put in question and decades of progress are being rolled-back in the blink of an eye. In the absence of peace and democracy, human suffering increases exponentially. Nothing good comes of war. Nothing good comes of oppression.

Europe has learnt this hard lesson across its tumultuous history, most painfully during two world wars that saw the loss of millions of human lives and created unbearable hate and suffering.

But war and the call 'Never again!' also put in place a much more positive dynamic, that supported European unity. As Robert Schuman stated in the Paris Declaration, the basis of conflict was rooted in deep distrust and strategic competition between the powers at the time: 'A united Europe was not achieved and we had war'. With war in Ukraine and several conflicts brewing, global peace is again in jeopardy, requiring not only a precise assessment of the threats to peace but also appropriate policy responses to mitigate those threats, to prevent further deterioration of peace and security and to end ongoing conflicts.

This is why I welcome the Normandy Index. Now in its fourth edition, the Normandy Index is a tool for policy-makers to easily obtain a global overview of key threats to individual countries. Its eleven indicators bring together geopolitical analysis; security; political and economic factors; human development; but also vulnerability to threats such as climate change and cyber-attacks. These are precisely some of the key areas that we continue to work on – in our internal and external policies – in the European Union and the European Parliament.

The tragedy of war, as manifested in Ukraine, as well as long-standing threats such as terrorist networks in sub-Saharan Africa, civil war in Syria and social unrest in Libya, which are displacing millions of people, not only attract global attention but continue to necessitate our policy responses. A big component of our response, hand in hand with our partners, is to provide financial and military support, as well as tangible solidarity to countries under threat, in line with our values. Some external observers have questioned the European Union's capacity to act in the area of peace and security. However, the last few months have demonstrated our collective conviction and unity on matters of

peace and democracy. They have also demonstrated our creative capacity to use the tools that our Treaties put at our disposal in the most effective way and to create new tools if needed. This is the case with the European Peace Facility, for example. But our policies are also tools for peace: enlargement is one of them. When we welcome new and potential candidate countries, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, we are making Europe stronger by broadening not only the common normative space, but also the space for peace and prosperity.

The Normandy Index reveals certain weak and critical spots, but it also demonstrates some positive evolution, in particular the sustainable convergence of some countries in the European neighbourhood, such as the Western Balkans, indicating that their European integration is ongoing and is transforming their economies and societies even before their EU accession. Therefore, we should not fall into the traps of pessimism and self-doubt. In our political action, we should rather remember that our creative efforts to safeguard peace must be proportionate to the dangers threatening it.

With the war on Ukraine, the risk that the economic and energy crises pose to global peace has increased. Combined with significant dependence on Russia, under-investment in energy infrastructure and renewables, but also more intense competition for natural resources and energy, the war has put commodities markets – as well as the social cohesion of some countries – under pressure. Unrest and political changes observed today are at risk of rising, making international relations even more complex and fragile. Historically, economic recession has nurtured political crises and the emergence of authoritarian regimes, often with nationalist rhetoric and expansionary ambitions.

This is why the European Parliament should continue to vigilantly monitor and tackle the root causes of threats – in Europe, in our neighbourhood and in the world. Understanding threats as early as possible and pre-empting their destructive implications with foresight is a key ingredient in the recipe of peace and democracy. I am confident that this edition of the Normandy Index will provide useful insight and remain a trustworthy source of information and inspiration.

**Roberta Metsola**

President of the European Parliament

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# 1. Pursuing peace in a more connected, contested and complex world

The European Union's [foreign policy](#) has long been the subject of varied and contested academic debate – on subjects ranging from the Union's capacity and legitimacy to act, to its need for a strategy, vision and objectives. In response, in part, to some of those questions, the 2016 [Global Strategy](#), launched by the then High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini, set out a structured and coherent vision for European Union (EU) foreign policy in an increasingly complex geopolitical and socioeconomic global environment. Building on the provisions of the founding Treaties of the EU – and more specifically the [Treaty of Lisbon](#) – the Global Strategy raises the EU's level of ambition as a foreign policy actor in pursuit of the objectives defined in the Treaty. Key among those is the pursuit of peace, both in the EU and globally.

While the Global Strategy is not a classic [threat assessment](#) exercise, it captures in its approach a number of threats to global peace and security and goes beyond traditional understandings of security by including in those threats traditional and emerging issues that challenge peace. It also draws on the crucial links between developments that hold the potential to exacerbate, catalyse and magnify the threats identified. Thus, with regard to health security – without doubt the most notable security threat of 2020-2021 – while the strategy did not analyse the EU's approach to pandemic preparedness explicitly, it did state that the EU will redouble efforts 'on prevention, monitoring root causes, such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change – which is a threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement'. It also committed to working 'more effectively for the prevention, detection and response to global pandemics' through global governance structures.

In 2020, the EU's 27 Member States undertook the challenge of carrying out the first ever independent [joint analysis](#) of 'the full range of threats and challenges the EU currently faces or might face in the near future' as the first part of the two-year [Strategic Compass](#) process. The Compass, which was adopted by the Council and endorsed by the European Council in March 2022, under the shadow of Russia's war on Ukraine, aims to guide the EU's strategic culture and sets out an ambitious plan of action with concrete deliverables, aiming to strengthen the EU's security and defence policy by 2030. The threat analysis currently in the Compass sets out the range of threats and challenges the EU will face in the next five to ten years (in the Compass, Member States commit to return to the threat analysis periodically, at least every three years). The presentation of threats is formulated in four sections: the first describes the return of power politics and the contested multipolar world; the second identifies threats and challenges linked to specific geographical focal points in the world – from China to Latin America; the third lays out emerging and transnational threats; and the fourth and final part concludes with the strategic implications for the EU. Interestingly, the third part, which is the one whose substance goes concretely into the types of threats, coincides largely with the categories identified in the Global Strategy while adding emphasis on emerging and disruptive technologies; health; maritime; and space as domains of pronounced threats. It also identifies the weaponisation of natural resources as a threat. As the Global Strategy before it, the threat analysis carried out in the Strategic Compass highlights the interconnectedness of threats and the hybridity of the threat environment.

Following the logic of the interconnectedness of threats, the Normandy Index, a product of a 2018 memorandum of understanding between the region of Normandy and the European Parliament, aims to provide a holistic picture of the world – regions and countries – through the prism of the pursuit of peace, measured against threats explicitly defined in the Global Strategy. Its objective is

to provide a tool to help EU policy-makers design targeted external action instruments. It is deliberately framed to be concise and easy to understand, in order to serve as a communication tool for the wider public – in terms both of understanding threats across the world, and also of providing information about EU external action. It complements the annual [Peace and Security Outlook](#) produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service.

## 1.1. Measuring peace

The modern definition of peace [refers](#) not only to 'an absence of war', but also includes elements of well-being: people demand and expect more from peace. This positive dimension of peace is difficult to measure as it is a continuum, stretching from inter-state war to positive public perceptions. This [continuum](#) includes international violence (i.e. wars, hybrid conflicts) and intra-national violence (i.e. gang or police violence, forced displacements). Therefore, any measure of peace has to take numerous dimensions into account.

Another way to measure peace is to consider the level of threats to peace, in order to address them and avoid possible deterioration. To be sure, several states in the world are faced with multiple threats that not only affect peace individually but can also merge to create new challenges – and hybrid threats. The coronavirus pandemic is an [example](#) of such a threat: a health security threat in essence, the pandemic brought about economic insecurity, offered grounds for a considerable increase in disinformation and cyber-attacks, exacerbated food scarcity in parts of the developing world and threatened democracy by giving authoritarian regimes around the world justification for further control and surveillance. According to a [report](#) by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the pandemic had a negative impact on most of the indicators used to calculate rankings such as the Global Peace Index and the Positive Peace Index. In May 2022, two new variants of SARS-CoV-2 virus, the Omicron BA.4 and BA.5 variants, were [declared](#) to be 'variants of concern' by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. This decision, together with the World Health Organization (WHO) view that 'SARS-CoV-2 virus had not yet established its ecological niche and that the implications of a pandemic caused by a novel respiratory virus may not be fully understood' ([WHO](#), July 2022), indicate that the pandemic is not yet a threat of the past. New cases of Covid-19 reported in the first weeks of July 2022, [increased](#) 30 % globally. Furthermore, new health threats, such as outbreaks of the [monkeypox](#) virus and [Marburg](#) virus are of certain concern and should be monitored.

Recognising the interconnectedness of threats, the rationale behind the Normandy Index is twofold. First, the Index focuses on the realm of EU external action, by selecting and measuring those threats perceived as such by the EU, and that EU action aims to tackle, prevent, resolve or address. Second, the Normandy Index aims to monitor the probability (or existence) of conflict (or destabilisation of peace and security) in a given country on the basis of the aggregate level of these threats.

## 1.2. Identifying threats and shaping policy: Indices and policy-making

Indices can be [used](#) as early-warning systems and are designed to give policy-makers insights into potential risks and developments in economic, social, environmental, security and political factors. Depending on their make-up, indices can quantify possibilities of an event occurring in the near/foreseeable future, thus acting as foresight tools. Foresight, as defined in the [Global Trends to 2030](#) report from the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) is 'an intellectual exercise where we imagine different alternatives of the future ... tracing how we end up there'. In that sense, foresight is a tool to help determine and choose a path for action; it is 'an organising yet

selective principle'. Part of the European Commission's [stated](#) rationale for embedding strategic foresight into policy-making is 'to build and use collective intelligence to anticipate developments and prepare for new opportunities and challenges earlier and more effectively'. Composite indicators (or indices) can bring together this collective intelligence to provide policy-makers with '[the big picture](#)', crucial in shaping policy.

An index can also offer a comprehensive overview of a situation made up of a basket of contributing factors. Existing indices relating to peace and security present differing versions of such baskets, taking selected variables into account to build their measurements of conflict and peace. Some function as [conflict trackers](#), focusing specifically on the prevention of deadly violence and its particular relevance for a region or country's foreign policy. [Others](#) aim to be broadly informative about the levels of a multitude of factors, such as societal safety and security, domestic and international conflict and degree of militarisation. A third category, including the [Fragile States Index](#) (FSI), highlights areas of vulnerability contributing to the risk of state fragility.

The limits to policy implementation are naturally marked in terms of resources, time and politics. Yet, even in hindsight, indices can provide an understanding of the elements that contributed to a policy response's adequacy to face critical events. For example, the [Global Health Security Index](#) indicated limited global capacity to deal with a large scale epidemic or pandemic, and that all countries had important gaps to address in health security. Successful mitigation of risks involves a continuous learning process, as the best crisis response systems institute feedback loops for learning before disaster strikes, to lower the odds that a crisis will occur and improve the response when one does.

Overall, these data-sets and indicators aim to measure the comparative level of pre-defined variables across a region or the world; to make [political risk](#) assessments for the future; and to contribute to the work of policy-makers and other foreign policy actors. The vision of the Normandy Index is to perform these functions in the service of EU foreign policy, in a way that is consistent with its objectives and aims. This is particularly timely, given new challenges and opportunities, such as requests by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, to become EU members, and consequent [designation](#) of new candidate and pre-candidate countries in June 2022. In addition, knowledge of the countries in the EU's immediate neighbourhood provides additional information for decision-makers and can certainly facilitate European integration of these countries and further cooperation with Southern and Eastern neighbours. Beyond the EU neighbourhood, the Normandy Index provides a clear and strategic vision of global policy developments, using cross-cutting geographic and sectoral approaches.

## 2. The Normandy Index

The Normandy Index differs from other indices in that it adopts an approach tailored by and to the action of the EU. It also defines conflict and the numerous stages between perfect peace and total war (*conflictualité*) as a product of factors linked to the main threats identified by the EU in its external action strategy. As described in EPoS's [2021 Peace and Security Outlook](#), the [EU Global Strategy](#) identifies the following 11 threats as the main current challenges to peace and security.

terrorism	hybrid threats	economic crises	climate change
energy insecurity	violent conflicts	cybersecurity	disinformation
fragile states	trans-border crime	weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)	


The index uses 9 of these 11 threats as factors assigned equal weight in the final result for 137 United Nations (UN) countries (with the EU-27 counted as one). A major innovation of the Index is to blend geopolitical indicators with economic and social data. In 2021 and 2022, in light of new threats to peace, three new sub-indicators were added, measuring the impact of inflation, public debt and energy consumption. Rising inflation, following unconventional monetary policy decisions, as well as a historically high level of public debt, are compounding concerns on the rise of global borrowing costs, a balance of payments crisis and the potential for a flurry of new defaults, following the technical default of Russia, Belarus and [Sri Lanka](#) in 2022. In June 2022, credit rating agency Fitch, which monitors over 100 countries, [confirmed](#) that Russia's war on Ukraine was accelerating problems such as inflation, trade and energy disruptions, and weaker emerging market economies, which all have a negative impact on sovereign credit conditions.

Thus, the Normandy Index now includes three composite indicators: energy insecurity, economic crisis and crime. On crime, while no solid dataset measuring trans-border crime on a global scale is currently available, the level of criminality in the 137 entities measured is assessed by means of a component indicator consisting of a global measurement of organised crime: the number of homicides (75 % of the composite indicator) and an indicator on perceptions of criminality (25 %). The threat category [hybrid threats](#) is excluded from the Normandy Index, as hybrid threats are, by their very nature, multi-faceted, comprising a combination of factors (see Figure 1).

The index therefore assesses hybrid threats indirectly by examining the accumulation of their various dimensions (energy insecurity, economic crises, disinformation, cyber-attacks) but, to avoid duplication, does not explicitly include a 'hybrid threat' category. In its [online version](#), the Normandy Index allows the user to view a ranking of the 137 entities based on the basket of threats that together constitute 'hybrid'. Quantifying or even estimating the level of [disinformation](#) in a given country remains a contentious issue among specialists, as new knowledge about this field continues to be generated. For this reason, the initial version of the Normandy Index used a measure of 'press freedom' in its place, in spite of the recognition that the media landscape is merely one of many factors affecting resilience to disinformation. Data on the spread of misleading views and false information by governments and political parties have become available through the [VDEM](#) (Varieties of Democracy) project. While not exhaustive of all sources of disinformation, the data collected by VDEM has been used for the measurement of the disinformation threat in the Normandy Index.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Note that the 2022 Normandy Index has been retroactively calculated to include new indicators on economic crises (inflation and public debt to GDP) as well as a more precise calculation of other indicators, such as energy insecurity

Figure 1 – Means of hybrid warfare



Source: [CEPA, 2021](#)

To the above 10 factors, the Normandy Index adds the quality of the democratic process, as democracy support is a core dimension of EU external action. In addition, there is a strong correlation between weak democratic processes and threats to peace and security. Given the complex and multidimensional nature of the domains, the methodology chosen for the Normandy Index is based on the selection of key representative indicator(s) for each domain, based on current academic and policy literature and the data available.

(through calculation of annual electric power consumption per capita). Retroactive calculations have been used in all graphics included in this publication. For more on the methodological approach, see the annex to this study. For the revised data, visit the [Normandy Index website](#).

**Table 1 – Summary of domains, indicators and sources**

<b>Domain</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Number of countries covered</b>	<b>Latest year of data</b>
Climate Change	INFORM Global Risk index	INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters.	United Nations	191	2022
Cybersecurity	Cybersecurity Index	The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a survey measure capturing the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity in order to raise awareness. It is the only open source Cybersecurity Index available.	International Telecommunication Union	194	2020
Democratic Processes	Participatory democracy index	A measure of the extent that the ideal of participatory democracy achieved within a country.	VDEM	179	2021
Economic Crises	Financial Vulnerability – Non-performing loans as % of total loans	Nonperforming loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of nonperforming loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.	World Bank	143	2021
	Central government debt, total (% of GDP)	Central government debt, total (% of GDP)	International Monetary Fund	135	2022
Energy Insecurity	Energy imports	Energy imports, net (% of energy use). Banded to be 0 if country is a net exporter of energy.	World Bank, Enerdata	143	2019
	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	World Bank	142	2019
Fragile States	Fragile States Index	The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data – quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation – are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI.	Fund For Peace	179	2021
Crime	Homicide rate per 100 000 people	Homicide rate per 100 000 people – used as a proxy for crime	UNODC	192	2018
	Perceptions of criminality banded	Responses to the Gallup question 'Do you feel safe walking alone'	Gallup/ Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2022
Resilience to disinformation	Resilience to disinformation	A measure of how often domestic and foreign governments and political parties use social media and advertising to spread disinformation within the country.	VDEM	179	2021
Terrorism	Global Terrorism Index	A composite score to provide an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by terrorism.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2022
Violent conflict	Conflict sub-indicators of the Global Peace Index	Worst score of the following indicators from the Global Peace Index: (1) Intensity of internal conflict, (2) Deaths from internal conflict (3) Number of internal conflicts,	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2022

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)	Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Indicator from the Global Peace Index.	(4) Intensity of external conflict, (5) Deaths from external conflict  This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries that are signatories to non-proliferation treaties are scored better in this indicator  The Nuclear Threat Index assesses countries' progress on nuclear security, highlights security gaps, and recommends actions for governments to better protect nuclear materials and facilities and build an effective global nuclear security architecture.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2022
	Nuclear Threat Index	Economist Intelligence Unit			

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace and EPRS, 2022.

The Normandy Index is therefore a tool to be used by EU policy-makers to assess countries most at risk in the world according to the EU's Global Strategy, and to target EU action. It is not a ranking of countries according to their peacefulness but a ranking of specific threats to peace per country. As new data become available, the expectation is that the Normandy Index will evolve in accuracy, geographical spread and precision, thus serving policy-makers and analysts ever more effectively in their work. In addition, events such as the coronavirus crisis or eruption of new armed conflicts in Europe's east may cause security strategists around the world to reconsider policy tools when it comes security and peace. As events unfold, the Normandy Index will adapt as the EU's strategic approach to peace and security evolves, with the potential inclusion of new threats in future versions.


As mentioned earlier, the endorsement of the Strategic Compass and, even more recently, a new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [Strategic Concept](#) will bolster European states' capacity in security and defence. However, not all threats can be confronted with military means alone. Beyond classic defence strategies, the EU consistently aims to develop capabilities to promote peace, security and resilience internally and abroad through an array of policies. The pandemic and war in Ukraine have demonstrated the tools for the preservation of peace go far beyond traditional understandings of security, to include, for example, progress towards a [European Health Union](#), and the [European Green Deal](#) to counter climate-related security threats, such as energy security, among other things. An additional value of the Normandy Index, lies in its potential to pinpoint the key threats for each country and region it assesses, providing understanding for the policy mix needed to support peace and security in that given area.

The comparisons across regions, countries and time offered by the online version of the Normandy Index will enable EU policy-makers to grasp which areas need to be given greater consideration when assisting partners all over the world at national and regional levels, while also potentially monitoring improvement (or absence of improvement) in resilience to those threats in countries where the EU is already engaged.

## 2.1. The Normandy Index 2022: Findings and functions


For each of the 136 countries and the EU-27, the Normandy Index uses the 11 threats to peace and compares them to the same 11 dimensions for other countries in the same region (or to the world), as regional environment is assumed to play a major role in countries' resilience to threats.

**Figure 2 – EU-27 Peace profile for 2021 and 2022**



Source: Normandy Index 2021 and 2022

**Figure 3 – World average, 2019-2022**



For each dimension, 10 represents no risk and 0 a major threat. In the examples shown above, in 2021 and 2022, the EU appears less at risk in 9 out of 11 dimensions, while being more at risk in the area of energy security than the rest of the world and equally threatened by WMDs to the world average. The comparison between the two years indicates that for the EU-27, as opposed to other countries and regions, there is no significant change in the peace profile between the two years.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, the global peace profile (5.83 average in 2022) remains almost unchanged between 2019 and 2022.

The [online version](#) of the Normandy Index also offers the possibility for comparison between countries, individual countries and regions and across time. In addition, rankings of countries on the basis of one or more threats are also available, using the source indicators.

The results of the 2022 Normandy Index (Figure 3) indicate a stable average of around 6 (on a scale of 0 to 10) of world threats, suggesting that the threats to peace and security included in the dataset have not changed, despite the coronavirus pandemic and other crises including rising inflation and the energy crisis. As data in the present edition reflect the situation before the launch of Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Normandy Index cannot assess the impact of this war on global security and peace. Furthermore, in focusing on the top 10 and lowest 10 scoring countries (Figure 4), it is

<sup>2</sup> Note that health security is not included in the Normandy Index, as the threat is not explicitly referred to in the EU Global Strategy.

evident that change is absent or marginal for the highest and lower performers. This indicates that the process of transformation in peace and security takes place across a generally longer interval than the single-year period observed here. An additional observation is that there is no significant evolution or change among those countries scoring lowest compared to those that demonstrate high levels of peace and security. However, the explanation could differ: high scorers are by default more resilient and build on their success in a process of positive reinforcement, whereas low scorers may remain stable due to a negative feedback loop that is difficult to overcome through internal reform or external aid. This observation further justifies the EU's focus on building resilience, both internally, in its neighbourhood, and beyond.

Figure 4 – Highest and lowest scoring countries in 2022

Top 10				Lowest 10			
country	rank 2021	rank 2022	rank change	country	rank 2021	rank 2022	rank change
Switzerland	1	1	0	Iraq	128	128	0
Norway	2	2	0	Chad	129	129	0
Iceland	4	3	1	Central African Republic	131	130	1
Australia	5	4	1	North Korea	129	131	-2
Singapore	3	5	-2	Democratic Republic of the Congo	133	132	1
New Zealand	6	6	0	South Sudan	132	133	-1
Canada	7	7	0	Somalia	134	134	0
South Korea	9	8	1	Yemen	135	135	0
Uruguay	8	9	-1	Syria	136	136	0
Costa Rica	10	10	0	Afghanistan	137	137	0


Data source: Normandy Index 2021 and 2022

It is perhaps even more interesting to focus on those countries that exhibit the biggest positive or negative movement in their ranking. In the 2022 ranking, Myanmar and Belarus are notable for falling by 23 and 22 places respectively, while Ecuador and Bolivia's change in ranking, rising 15 and 13 places respectively, indicates positive developments. An examination of the individual factors that lead to these changes in position (for example a stark change in a specific indicator or merely a relative lack of change compared to other countries), can be carried out through a meticulous deconstruction of the component indicators on the Normandy Index website, as well as qualitatively through the production of individual country studies, such as the 60 examples included in this study.

Figure 5 – Rising or falling behind? Main changes in the 2022 ranking

country	rank 2021	rank 2022	rank change	country	rank 2021	rank 2022	rank change
Ecuador	72	57	15	Algeria	91	99	-8
Bolivia	67	54	13	Armenia	17	27	-10
Kazakhstan	49	37	12	Turkmenistan	61	71	-10
Laos	60	48	12	Honduras	71	82	-11
Benin	77	65	12	Burkina Faso	97	109	-12
Moldova	32	21	11	Cambodia	62	77	-15
Dominican Republic	33	22	11	Uganda	80	96	-16
Zambia	79	69	10	Tunisia	42	59	-17
Madagascar	83	73	10	Belarus	53	75	-22
Equatorial Guinea	95	85	10	Myanmar	101	124	-23

Figure 6 – Normandy Index, 2022



### 3. The Normandy Index and its relevance for the European Parliament

According to a Eurobarometer [survey](#) conducted in 2016 and then [repeated](#) in 2018, the majority of European citizens would like to see increased EU involvement in all policy areas relating to peace and security. The most recent Eurobarometer (May 2022) [indicates](#) that 59 % of Europeans see the defence of common European values such as freedom and democracy as a priority, even if that were to affect prices and the cost of living. The increasing economic worries are also reflected in the political priorities on which citizens want the European Parliament to focus: The fight against poverty and social exclusion is mentioned first (38 %). The perception of the war and what it means for the European Union becomes also visible in the core values which citizens want the European Parliament to defend as a matter of priority: Democracy again tops the list, with an increase of six points compared to autumn 2021 (38 %, +6pp).

While EU foreign and security policy remain in the intergovernmental sphere to a much larger extent than other policy areas, the Lisbon Treaty has contributed to a considerable increase in the supranational EU institutions' [contribution](#) in this area. For the European Parliament, the most relevant provisions relate to consultation, oversight, accountability and budgetary functions. Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), obliges the HR/VP to consult Parliament regularly on the main aspects and choices relating to common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) and to keep Parliament [informed](#) of policy developments, requiring that Parliament's views be taken 'duly into consideration'. The European Parliament therefore holds annual debates on the state of play of the CFSP and of the CSDP, on the basis of annual progress reports on the implementation of these policies. Parliament also votes on two annual own-initiative reports (INI) on the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP respectively, asks questions of the HR/VP, and makes recommendations to the HR/VP and to the Council on related matters. Parliament exercises authority in security and defence matters through its function as budgetary authority. Most notably perhaps, the Parliament oversees civilian aspects of CSDP that are financed by the EU budget ([Article 41 TEU](#)).

The Normandy Index aims to contribute to the European Parliament's role in foreign policy oversight. It offers Members of the European Parliament a measure of threats to peace throughout the world that is consistent with the EU's Global Strategy and, as has been shown, the Strategic Compass. Consequently, it serves as a tool in response to increased demand for accountability from actors involved in CFSP and CSDP, as well as an empirical argument in support of demand for attention to be paid to regions and countries at risk. At a time of growing demand for EU institutions to demonstrate greater legitimacy and transparency, the gradually growing involvement of the European Parliament in CFSP has helped increase democratic accountability in this policy area. Although Parliament's formal powers in CFSP are relatively limited, it nonetheless has growing influence as a '[norm entrepreneur](#)' in human rights and democracy, both through its relationship with the HR/VP and as a diplomatic player through its delegations, mediation activity and parliamentary diplomacy. Importantly, in other areas of policy-making that are increasingly linked to peace, such as research (for example on defence or energy technologies) and climate, the European Parliament has the full power to co-legislate.

Finally, the Conference on the Future of Europe, which concluded its work on 9 May 2022, has provided a unique opportunity to engage with European citizens. Their [recommendations](#) in foreign policy demonstrated citizens' desire for the EU to assert itself as a geopolitical actor by fostering political dialogue, multilateralism, human rights and international cooperation to address issues of common interest, to strengthen the security, stability and prosperity of the European continent.

## 4. The added value of case studies



To illustrate the use and potential of the Normandy Index, 60 case studies have been set out in the following pages. For each case study, the reader will find an analysis of traditional sources of instability and threats to peace, a graphic representation of the situation in the country compared with other countries from the same region, and notable points of interest regarding the country's performance in the index. In addition, there is a focus on new sources of insecurity, and an analysis of the EU's contribution and assistance in building [resilience](#) through its involvement with the country in question. The latter can take many different forms (development cooperation, support for democracy and human rights, cooperation within the European Neighbourhood or regional cooperation, pre-accession assistance, peacekeeping, trade agreements and now also the provision of military equipment) and varies from country to country, depending on the degree and type of cooperation put in place with the country concerned. The case studies have been chosen to represent key EU partners (strategic partners or trade partners); countries in which the EU operates military or civilian missions; countries that are part of the G20; and countries with notable vulnerabilities or achievements in one or more of the Normandy Index variables. New case studies have been added, the aim being to increase their number every subsequent year. All case studies are made available in interactive form on the [Normandy Index website](#). The website provides users with the possibility to produce comparative graphs for each of the 137 entities studied.

## Afghanistan

Afghanistan ranks 137th in the Normandy Index. Following the Taliban takeover in August 2021, and the subsequent withdrawal of United States and NATO troops, there are fears that 97 % of Afghans could fall into poverty in 2022. The political situation is compounded by the effects of climate change, and the country is at risk of widespread famine.

## Background and key issues

The Cold War period saw an unsuccessful and protracted invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, which ended in Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989, after 10 years of war. Nevertheless, the conflict between the Soviet-backed Afghan government and the Mujahedeen continued, leading to the [rise of the Taliban](#), who took power in 1995, on the promise of bringing peace. The events of 11 September 2001 and the Taliban's response to this attack, reignited an intensely violent conflict in the country, as United States (US) forces invaded in a bid to oust the Taliban. For 20 years, US-backed governments ruled Afghanistan, but following a renewed Taliban takeover of the capital Kabul in August 2021, US and allied NATO forces left Afghanistan. No country has recognised the Taliban government, and large sums of Afghan government funds abroad remain frozen. The Afghan economy is in freefall and the political situation has led to a humanitarian crisis considered the worst in the world, with 24 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Some 55 % of the population regularly go hungry.



## New security and hybrid threats

Afghanistan is increasingly suffering from the effects of climate change, which exacerbate existing tensions. It is the eighth most vulnerable country to climate change on the [2021 Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index](#). Since 2018, the country has faced several climate-related disasters such as [extreme drought](#) and [flash floods](#), both significant drivers of displacement and food insecurity. Extreme weather and conflict have led to the [internal displacement](#) of more than 5.8 million people since 2012, including 710 000 people in 2021 alone. In 2020, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimated that [80 %](#) of conflict in Afghanistan concerned land, water and resources. Afghanistan also continues to be the country suffering the highest impact from [terrorism](#) in the world. In 2021, deaths from terrorism increased by 14 % to 1 426.

## EU involvement


The EU has [supported](#) Afghanistan with large amounts of development and humanitarian aid for decades. In October 2021, in response to the Taliban takeover, the European Commission [announced](#) a further support package worth around €1 billion for the Afghan people and neighbouring countries. This includes €300 million in humanitarian aid, as well as aid to sustain basic services and livelihoods and improve food security. The EU coordinates with international partners, in particular the UN and its agencies, to ensure that aid reaches vulnerable populations. In September 2021, the EU [decided](#) to engage with the Taliban, but to make the degree of engagement conditional on the behaviour of the new Afghan government, to be measured according to five benchmarks, including the commitment of the Afghan government that Afghanistan would not serve as a basis for the export of terrorism to other countries; and respect for human rights, in particular women's rights, the rule of law and freedom of the media.

## Albania

Albania ranks 26th in the Normandy Index. Since the end of the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s, the country has made significant progress on political and economic reforms, to the extent that it joined NATO in April 2009, and opened talks with the EU on accession in March 2020. Albania is a clear example of religious tolerance and diversity. Despite this, the country still faces significant economic and democratic hurdles, as well as challenges linked to irregular migration.

## Background and key issues

Enmeshed in the Balkan Wars of 1990 to 1993, Albania continued to suffer from [domestic civil unrest](#), which erupted in 1997 in the 'pyramid crisis', alongside military involvement in the Kosovo conflict against Serbia. Albania is also a hub for organised crime, with one of the highest human trafficking rates in Europe. The clandestine nature of human trafficking, however, means that Albania lacks reliable [data](#). Nevertheless, Albania has been ranked by Eurostat among the top 10 countries in terms of numbers of trafficking victims for several years in a row. More recently, the scale of [drug trafficking](#) in Albania was estimated to be so high that the value of marijuana trafficking alone, US\$4 billion a year, is equal to about half of Albania's gross domestic product (GDP).



## New security and hybrid threats

Albania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. According to the [World Bank](#), the Albanian economy grew by 8.5 % in 2021, following a contraction of 3.5 % in 2020, due to the compounded consequences of the November 2019 earthquake and the Covid-19 pandemic, resulting in increased unemployment and an expected rise in poverty. [Democratic backsliding](#) has been evident since elections held in 2017 were deemed fraudulent, leading to outbreaks of anti-government protest throughout 2018 and 2019. In 2022, the main obstacles remain flaws in the functioning of the Albanian judiciary, in the fight against corruption, and in safeguarding media freedoms and minority rights.

## EU involvement


Albania was identified as a potential [candidate](#) for EU membership as early as the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003. Albania has been an EU candidate country since June 2014. On 25 March 2020, political agreement was reached to [open accession negotiations](#) after the country had made progress towards meeting the political criteria and the five key priorities that need to be fulfilled to become an EU Member State. Negotiations [started](#) on 19 July 2022. Albania takes part in the EU-Western Balkans Summits, most recently in June 2022. The EU is the largest provider of [financial assistance](#) to the country. Following the coronavirus outbreak, the European Commission [announced](#) over €3.3 billion of EU financial support on 29 April 2020, [mobilised](#) jointly with the European Investment Bank for the benefit of Western Balkan citizens, including citizens of Albania. On 6 October 2020, the Commission approved a comprehensive [Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans](#), with a budget of €9 billion.

## Algeria


Algeria ranks 99th in the Normandy Index, with a score below the average for Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries in the field of terrorism and crime. Nevertheless, Algeria is the wealthiest country in the region by [GDP per capita](#). An Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member since 1967, Algeria is one of Africa's largest hydrocarbon producers, with oil and gas revenues historically comprising about half of the national budget and 90 % of export earnings.

## Background and key issues

Algeria has suffered from internal political instability and deteriorating bilateral relations with several countries, in particular Morocco. In November 2020, the Algerian Presidency [announced](#) that the 2020 constitutional referendum was successful, with an approval rate of 66.8 %. Although constitutional reform was one of the key demands of the 'Hirak' [protest movement](#), the perceived lack of consultation with protesters' representatives, many of whom remain detained, is likely to reinforce protesters' perception of the government's unwillingness and inability to meet their demands of wholesale change to the political system.



## New security and hybrid threats



Standard and Poor's Global [noted](#) that Algeria's oil and gas production in 2020 was 143 million tons of oil equivalent, a decline of 8 % since 2019. Algeria, a major supplier of oil and gas to Europe, has exhausted nearly 62 % of its proven reserves, and the remainder will only be enough to cover internal demand until 2040. On 30 October 2021, Algeria's President Abdelmadjid Tebboune [ordered](#) the cessation of commercial relations between Algeria's Sonatrach and the Moroccan Office for Electricity and Drinking Water (ONEE) and announced plans to terminate the agreement on the Europe-Maghreb gas pipeline with Morocco. In April 2022, Algeria officially threatened to [withdraw](#) its gas export deal with Spain in retaliation to Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez's endorsement of Morocco's Western Sahara autonomy plan. Since then, Algeria has reduced its gas supplies to Spain by 25 %. Following these tensions, Russia became the second-largest gas supplier to Spain in June 2022, with a 24.4 % market share. Due to its geographical position and climatic characteristics, Algeria is highly vulnerable to climate change. National authorities have [launched](#) several initiatives to combat desertification, including the 'green dam' – a green belt to halt its advance.

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## EU involvement

The EU-Algeria [Association Agreement](#) (AA) entered into force in 2005. The EU and Algeria adopted new [Partnership Priorities](#) on 13 March 2017, in the framework of the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy. Together with the joint assessment of the implementation of the AA, the Partnership Priorities identify the joint areas of cooperation and guide dialogue between the EU and its Member States and Algeria up to 2020. The EU and Algeria also continue high-level dialogue on energy and security sectors, as well as an informal dialogue on migration. A revised strategy for the [Southern Neighbourhood](#) was adopted on 9 February 2021, accompanied by an [Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours](#); the plan will support Algeria in the area of climate and energy efficiency. Together with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the EU has [supported](#) Algeria's efforts to curb Covid-19. The EU has funded three projects under its [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#) (IcSP) in Algeria, including in the area of counter-terrorism.



## Armenia

Armenia ranks 27th in the Normandy Index. The country continues to be in conflict with its neighbour Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region and is increasingly faced with hybrid threats.

## Background and key issues

[Armenia](#) has been in [conflict](#) with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, ever since the end of the Cold War, in the [longest-running](#) conflict in the post-Soviet space. This [frozen conflict](#) has featured deadly incidents and intense fighting occurring on an intermittent basis. Fighting was particularly intense during April [2016](#), until a fully-fledged war broke out once again, lasting 44 days in September 2020. A Russian brokered [ceasefire](#) ended the war, with Armenia returning the Aghdam, Kelbajar and Lachin regions to Azerbaijan under the [agreement](#). The agreement also stated that Russian Federation peacekeeping troops are to remain in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone for a period of five years, with an automatic extension for the following five-year periods.

In March 2022, an ethnic Armenian-populated village in the region was seized by Azerbaijani forces. Tensions thus remain very [high](#), which is also reflected in Armenia's rank at 83rd when it comes to the risk of violent conflict.



## New security and hybrid threats

The 2020 war highlighted the increasing role of hybrid threats in conflict, particularly in the information [space](#). Armenia has been subject to significant [disinformation](#) campaigns, especially on [Twitter](#) from more than 500 000 bot accounts. The war is also increasingly being fought in the cyber space, with Armenia subjected to coordinated distributed denial of service (DDoS) [strikes](#) and data hacks. This increasing cyber-risk is reflected in the country's cyber threats rank (92nd), its score is also much lower than the Eastern Partnership average. Armenia ranks

particularly low when it comes to its energy security (121st), and is heavily [dependent](#) on Russian energy, with Gazprom Armenia holding a monopoly on gas imports and the country often experiencing price shocks. However Armenia scores highly (and above the Eastern Partnership average) when it comes to its economic resilience and resilience to terrorism threat. Furthermore, Armenia scores highly on democratic process (15th globally) compared to other Eastern Partnership countries, with a 2021 EU [report](#) noting that Armenia 'maintains a relatively good record of human rights and democracy'. The country scores highly when it comes to resilience against terrorism, ranking 93rd, beside several other countries on which terrorism had no impact in 2021 in the [2021 Global Terrorism Index](#).

## EU involvement



The EU has a strong interest in a politically stable Southern Caucasus region, including Armenia, which is part of the EU's [Eastern Partnership](#). It continues to express [support](#) for the efforts of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group Co-Chairs to find a lasting peaceful conflict settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU [Special Representative](#) for the South Caucasus and Georgia region also seeks to contribute to such a settlement. On 22 May 2022, European Council President Charles Michel [hosted](#) the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, during which they agreed to 'advance discussions' on a future peace treaty. Armenia's relations with the EU are based on the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement ([CEPA](#)) which entered into force in 2021. It has now been ratified by the Republic of Armenia, all EU Member States and the European Parliament.

## Australia

Australia ranks 4th in the Normandy Index, indicating low levels of risk. It performs particularly well in energy security, state resilience and the management of economic crises, thanks to its abundant natural resources and strong management of the pandemic.

## Background and key issues

Australia has a long-standing democratic tradition in the form of a parliamentary system, enhanced by strong levels of education and a high GDP per capita. In the 2019 [Human Development Index](#), it ranked 8th out of the 189 countries measured, on a par with the Netherlands. In the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2021 [Democracy Index](#), Australia ranks ninth overall, alongside Switzerland, and scores the highest mark for electoral process and pluralism. In addition, it is the world's sixth most stable country according to the Normandy Index, as measured by the fragile states' indicator. This is largely due to strong perceptions of state legitimacy, effective public services and low levels of external intervention. Australia performs well on most indicators of traditional conflict. However, it experienced its [fourth-warmest year](#) on record in 2020, following severe 'black summer' bushfires around the turn of that year, signalling the increasing threat from climate change.



## New security and hybrid threats

Thanks to its resilient democratic institutions, high standard of living and public services, and relative remoteness from the world's most densely populated regions, Australia has long been somewhat insulated from traditional security and hybrid threats. However, climate change is [exacerbating](#) resource stress and fire risks in an already-arid climate. In addition, relations with its largest trade partner, China, have grown more confrontational in recent years, and there are concerns that growing US-China strategic [rivalry](#) could spill over into the South Pacific, making Australia's strategic near environment less benign.

## EU involvement



The EU's bilateral political relationship with Australia is based on the 2017 EU Australia Framework Agreement (currently under provisional application). It builds on existing scientific, technical, trade, air travel and customs cooperation to enable the further expansion of relations. In 2018, the EU launched negotiations with Australia on a bilateral [free trade agreement](#), the twelfth round of which was held in February 2022. The EU is Australia's third largest [trade partner](#) after China and Japan, and the third biggest investor in Australia. There is a [Mutual Recognition Agreement](#) between the EU and Australia to facilitate trade in industrial products by reducing technical barriers. The agreement creates mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures, thus reducing the cost of testing and certifying of exports and imports. Australia has [contributed](#) to the EU Maritime Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP NESTOR – now EUCAP Somalia), an EU-led maritime capacity building mission in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean, and the EU Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq). Australia is mentioned as a regional partner in the [EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific](#). There is also cooperation between the European and Australian Parliaments.

## Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan ranks 45th in the Normandy Index. Azerbaijan remains embroiled in a conflict with neighbour Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region and increasingly suffers hybrid attacks.

## Background and key issues

[Azerbaijan](#) has been embroiled in a [conflict](#) with its neighbour Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region since the break-up of the Soviet Union. By the time a Russian-brokered ceasefire ended the war in 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh and several adjacent parts of Azerbaijan were occupied by Armenia. Since then, the area has been in a [frozen](#) conflict, with intermittent deadly incidents occurring. In September 2020 a full-blown war erupted once again, lasting 44 days. As the result of a further Russian-brokered ceasefire, Azerbaijan emerged as the clear victor and regained control of several districts previously under Armenian control for 26 years. Azerbaijan now holds a part of Nagorno-Karabakh, while Russian peacekeepers patrol the remaining part of the region. The ceasefire is very [fragile](#) and a spate of flare-ups continue to test it to breaking point – Azerbaijan [seized](#) an ethnic Armenian-populated village in March 2022. This long history of conflict is reflected in Azerbaijan's ranking in the risk of violent conflict index (92nd). However, as the EU has stepped in to replace Russia as a mediator, for the [first](#) time in years, the parties now have some space to negotiate peace.



## New security and hybrid threats

The return to fully fledged war in September 2020 accentuated the increasing use of hybrid war tactics in conflict. Azerbaijan has suffered [disinformation campaigns](#), primarily through the use of Twitter as a tool for information [warfare](#). The conflict also increasingly involves cyber-attacks. For instance, in September 2020, hackers took [down](#) a plethora of Azerbaijani government sites and also [hacked](#) Azerbaijani government officials. The situation pertaining to human rights and democratic freedoms in Azerbaijan continues to be of concern, as

[detailed](#) in the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World. Accordingly, the country scores very low, at 0.81 in terms of democratic processes (122nd globally). However, as is to be expected, due to its vast energy [sources](#), Azerbaijan scores perfectly on energy security. The country also scores highly when it comes to resilience against terrorism, ranking 93rd, alongside several other countries in the [2021 Global Terrorism Index](#) on which terrorism had no impact in 2021.

## EU involvement



The EU actively works towards achieving peace in the Southern Caucasus region, including Azerbaijan, which is an EU [Eastern Partnership](#) country. It continues to express [support](#) for the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs to find a lasting peaceful conflict settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU [Special Representative](#) for the South Caucasus actively contributes to efforts in reaching a peace deal and the EU facilitates talks on the matter. On 22 May 2022, European Council President Charles Michel met the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Brussels. They [stated](#) that they would 'advance discussions' on a future peace treaty. Relations between the EU and Azerbaijan are based on the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation [Agreement](#) that entered into force in 1999. In 2017, the EU and Azerbaijan began negotiations on a new agreement, encompassing further areas of mutual cooperation. In 2018, joint Partnership [Priorities](#) were agreed by the EU and Azerbaijan. On 18 July 2022, the European Commission [signed](#) a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan to double imports of Azeri natural gas to at least 20 billion cubic metres a year by 2027.

## Belarus

Belarus ranks 75th in the Normandy Index. The country's involvement in Russia's war on Ukraine, preceded by the brutal crackdown against its citizens protesting against electoral fraud, as well as the regime's dependency on Russia's support, are some of the key factors of its peace profile.

## Background and key issues

Belarus gained independence in 1991, when it signed the treaty dissolving the Soviet Union. In 1994, Alexandre Lukashenko was elected President for the first time. With a poor human rights record over many years, the August 2020 falsified [presidential elections](#), were followed by a brutal [crack-down](#) against protesters, costing lives. Continued and increasing repression against Belarusian civil society and independent [media](#), as well as the Lukashenko regime's [support](#) for Russia's war in Ukraine, led to a high risk of violent conflict and an extremely poor assessment for democratic processes in the country. With Belarusian state media repeating governmental propaganda, frequently aligned with Russia, the country also scores poorly in the resilience to disinformation category. Belarus' geographical location in the northern part of Europe means that this landlocked country scores high in resilience to climate change.



## New security and hybrid threats

Belarus's involvement in Russia's war on Ukraine includes granting permission for the firing of ballistic missiles from Belarusian territory and the transport of Russian troops and military equipment, which enabled Russia to attack Kyiv from the north. However, successful anti-war [railway sabotage](#) and [cyber activities](#), as well as the existence of a rebel [Belarusian battalion](#) fighting alongside the Ukrainians, means that the effect of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on Belarus' internal situation is unclear. The constitutional [referendum](#) of 27 February 2022, among other [changes](#), [renounced a paragraph](#) stating that 'The Republic of Belarus aims at making its territory a nuclear-free zone, and the state neutral'.

## EU involvement



The EU does [not recognise](#) the results of the August 2022 elections. Consequently, the EU has gradually [sanctioned](#) Belarus for the increasing human rights abuses following the elections. The EU [condemned](#) the country's participation in Russia's war in Ukraine and has imposed further, much stronger, [economic](#) sanctions. The EU [supports](#) Belarusian civil society, with an [outline](#) €3 billion [economic support package](#) announced in May 2021, for a future democratic Belarus, available upon the country's democratic transition. Under this condition, the package's flagship initiatives are also included in the [Eastern Partnership](#) (EaP) post-2020 agenda (Belarus suspended its participation in the EaP in June 2021). A February 2022 statement by the HR/VP [criticises](#) the deletion of reference to Belarus's non-nuclear status from its constitution as a further worrying element. The [European Parliament](#) has called on the EU institutions to support in international prosecution against the Lukashenka regime for war crimes and crimes against humanity relating to the Russian war on Ukraine.

## Bolivia

Bolivia ranks 54th in the Normandy Index. The country has been challenged by instability, political and social polarisation, in particular since 2019, when the results of presidential elections were nullified, following significant social unrest. Demonstrations and protests continued long after new elections in 2020, which saw the victory of Evo Morales' party candidate Luis Arce. Levels of violence remain high, particularly against vulnerable people, including indigenous communities and women.

## Background and key issues

Bolivia remains strongly polarised, both politically and 'ethnically' between its indigenous population, peasant farmers, and those considered of Spanish colonial descent, including rich agro-business owners. Land and natural resources rights and tenure have remained drivers of conflict, linked with power and identity issues. The marginalisation of Bolivia's [36 groups of indigenous inhabitants](#) has a long history; indigenous rights were not formally recognised until [1994](#). This changed with the election of Evo Morales in 2005, the first indigenous democratic president in South America. Morales introduced land redistribution and rights reforms, provoking clashes, as land was reallocated away from non-indigenous Bolivians and [commercial farmers](#).



## New security and hybrid threats

Presidential elections held in October 2019 were marred by [contested](#) accusations of fraud. New elections were held peacefully on 18 October 2020 and won by the Morales party candidate [Luis Arce](#). In March 2021, the government detained Jeanine Áñez, who proclaimed herself the country's interim president in November 2019. On pre-trial detention until 10 June 2022, a Bolivian Court found Jeanine Áñez, guilty of organising a coup against Morales and sentenced her to [10 years'](#) imprisonment. [Human Rights Watch](#) has found no evidence for these accusations. Like much of the region,

Bolivia [demonstrates](#) high vulnerability to cyber-attack, and faces [disinformation](#) challenges. The country ranks 135th in the 2022 [Climate Vulnerability Index](#). From 1 January to 15 October 2021, over three million hectares were affected by [forest fires](#), with indigenous communities hard-hit by [fires set by farmers](#) that often spread to indigenous land. Despite the second-largest reserves of natural gas in South America, long-standing tensions over their exploitation and export persist.

## EU involvement



The EU has become one of the [country's main donors](#), having assisted with €281 million in 2014-2020. Bolivia also benefits from the EU's regional cooperation programmes, with a focus on the [security-development nexus](#). It is also a beneficiary of the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+). The EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) has funded four ongoing projects in Bolivia (€10 800 000 in total funding, shared with other countries), three of which are related to migrants and the Covid-19 response. Under the Global Europe Instrument, the current Multi-annual indicative programme (MIP) for Bolivia sets out an allocation for 2021-2024 of €104 million, split between: environment, climate change and inclusive economic development focusing on working with women and young people (€83 million, 80 %), and governance and human rights (€14 million, 13.5 %). (Support measures: €7 million, 6.73 %). After the interruption of regular bilateral meetings in 2018, the [8th High Level Dialogue](#) between Bolivia and the EU resumed in La Paz on 31 May 2022.

## Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 48th in the Normandy Index, remaining considerably more at risk than the European average. It performs significantly less well than the European average in democratic processes and fragile states, but nevertheless scores well in energy security.

## Background and key issues

Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced armed conflict between 1992 and 1995, triggering several international peacekeeping missions. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement resulted in a decentralised government system, dividing the country into two semi-independent federal units, Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This decentralised governance is partly the reason for Bosnia and Herzegovina having the second lowest [Fragile States Index](#) score in Europe. Efficient cooperation among the country's constitutional entities is impeded by mistrust among ethnic groups and political parties and also differing foreign policy orientation. The country is [heavily dependent on coal](#), at 54 % total electricity production, but is investing in renewable energies, with vast hydro and non-hydro renewable energy potential.



## New security and hybrid threats

Bosnia and Herzegovina has some vulnerabilities to new security threats, owing to resources still being allocated to rebuilding following the conflict and a highly decentralised state structure. On 8 October 2021, Milorad Dodik, the Serbian member of Bosnia's tripartite presidency, and leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) party, [threatened](#) to withdraw Bosnian Serbs from the country's key institutions. On 10 December 2021, the Parliament of Republika Srpska [took](#) legislative steps to initiate this withdrawal, through a 49-3 vote, and including a declaration

that called for the drafting of a new constitution for the Republika Srpska. The EU [declared](#) it would impose sanctions against Republika Srpska representatives if the situation worsened. In 2022, the main risk is related to the unaccomplished [electoral and constitutional reforms](#). The country ranked 118th out of 175 countries on cyber-defence, as its constitutional entities lack the expertise and resources to build a coherent and solid [cybersecurity](#) strategy. The country is also highly vulnerable to disinformation and ranks 67th out of 180 countries in the [2022 Press Freedom Index](#). [Undocumented migration](#) has put local and state authorities under stress, especially in the areas that have been shouldering most of the burden of migration management.

## EU involvement



Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential EU membership [candidate](#). Since 2004, the EUFOR [Althea](#) mission has been supporting the country's efforts to secure peace, following the [Dayton Peace Agreement](#). In its opinion on Bosnia's May 2019 EU membership application, the European Commission recommended moving towards opening EU accession negotiations. Other priorities include the need to ensure effective coordination of border management and migration management capacity, and to ensure the functioning of the asylum system. The EU is [assisting](#) with a number of building and twinning programmes. The EU is also supporting environmental and climate transition through the [Pre-accession Instrument](#). The EU has committed [over €80 million](#) to tackle pandemic-related challenges in the country, including disinformation. During 2021-2022, the EU [contributed](#) to military and medical capabilities, financed through the European Peace Facility.

## Brazil

Brazil ranks 63rd in the Normandy Index, deteriorating somewhat from its 2021 position. The country performs lower than the South American average for the indicators measuring climate change, crime and disinformation.

## Background and key issues

Brazil's profound economic recession from 2014 to 2017 exacerbated deep-rooted social inequalities, translating into a steep rise in homicides: the country has the 12th highest [homicide rate](#) globally, with 29.53 deaths per 100 000 people. This is more than four times the global average of around 7 deaths per 100 000 people. The high levels of homicide and violent crime are also connected with [organised crime](#), with most homicides occurring near the main drug-smuggling routes. Brazil scores well on democratic processes, with the 29th highest score globally, although its ranking has slightly deteriorated compared to the previous exercise



## New security and hybrid threats

At global level, Brazil's performance is above average, in particular for cybersecurity. Recognising the [high level](#) of cybercrime and cyber threats, Brazil adopted its [first cybersecurity strategy](#) in February 2020, but experts believe it lacks effectiveness. A [2018 law](#), inspired by the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), entered into force in [September 2020](#) and should further enhance national cybersecurity by addressing concerns about digital privacy; penalties for non-compliance with this law entered into force in August 2021. While the spread of [disinformation](#) in the country has been under parliamentary investigation, a draft for a new

[disinformation](#) and 'fake news' bill has raised concerns among both human rights groups and the business community. [Amazon deforestation](#) also poses a risk, as it would induce climate change, increasing the burdens on Brazil's armed forces and endangering Brazil's energy and water security; Human Rights Watch recently [pointed out](#) that the current administration is responsible for the [highest annual deforestation](#) of the Brazilian Amazon rainforest of the past 15 years.

## EU involvement



The EU and Brazil entered a strategic partnership in 2007. Through a large array of [sector dialogues](#), the EU [supports](#) Brazil in addressing the pervasive social inequalities that fuel the country's high homicide rate. EU projects are aimed, among other things, at strengthening the protection of [human rights defenders](#) and the human rights of particularly vulnerable groups including the [homeless](#), and at countering violence, notably [domestic violence](#) against [women](#). To enhance Brazilians' resilience to disinformation, the EU provides funding for [projects on fake news](#). The EU also fosters transparency in areas such as [public procurement](#). The EU's [Partnership Instrument](#) funds a wide variety of sustainability projects in Brazil. Moreover, Brazil benefits from the EU programme for Latin America [EUROCLIMA+](#), addressing climate change. In June 2019, the EU and the four founding members of Mercosur, including Brazil, reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive [trade agreement](#). However, there are concerns that the agreement could negatively affect climate and land use change.

## Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso ranks 109th in the Normandy Index. It faces significant threats from Islamist extremist activity, as regional terrorist groups infiltrate the country taking advantage of local grievances. This has led to Burkina Faso being ranked the 4th most impacted by terrorism in the world, according to the 2022 [Global Terrorism Index](#).

## Background and key issues

Burkina Faso enjoyed a period of relative security and stability under the authoritarian leadership of Blaise Compaoré between 1987 and 2014. Compaoré played a key role in negotiating peace deals in neighbouring countries (for example between the Tuaregs and Malian government in 2012) and kept armed groups at bay. The country's stability came at the [price](#) of a narrow democratic space and widespread security sector abuses that eventually boiled over into popular protest and the overthrow of the dictator in 2014. In March 2022, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who replaced former president Roch Marc Christian Kaboré (in office 2015-2022), [appointed](#) Albert Ouédraogo as Prime Minister of the Transition Government and composed a Government of 25 Ministers. Some changes have taken place, such as the creation of a Ministry of Religious and Customary Affairs, and a Ministry of Women and Gender separate from the Ministry of National Solidarity and Humanitarian Action.



## New security and hybrid threats

Burkina Faso faces an overwhelming threat of violent [extremism](#). [Jihadist groups](#) based in Mali, such as the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims – an umbrella coalition of al-Qaeda-affiliated movements, and domestic terror groups such as Ansar ul Islam, flourish and perpetrate an increasing number of attacks. From March 2020 to March 2021 alone, Burkina Faso [recorded](#) 1 781 fatalities from violent extremist activity and the state's response to it, up from only 80 fatalities attributed to violent extremist activity in 2016. This increase has occurred despite investment by regional and international actors in a military-heavy counter-

terrorism approach in the Sahel. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees ([UNHCR](#)), severe insecurity had forced 1.85 million people to leave their home by May 2022, and is a major threat to economic recovery, exacerbating the [contraction](#) caused by Covid-19.

## EU involvement



The EU supports Burkina Faso through a mix of national and regional initiatives, some focusing on security, and others with a broad development objective, to achieve durable peace and security. As one of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, Burkina Faso benefited from [€623 million](#) in assistance under the European Development Fund (EDF) from 2014 to 2020, with good governance being one of the three main objectives pursued. It has also been one of the beneficiaries of projects funded by the [EU IcSP](#), to strengthen peacebuilding initiatives and the security forces. The European Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) in 2019, condemning human rights violations perpetrated by extremist groups in Burkina Faso. A [new strategy for the Sahel](#) was adopted in April 2021, strengthening the political dimension of the EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries, including Burkina Faso, and the emphasis on sustainable development beyond military engagement.

## Canada

Canada ranks 7th in the Normandy Index, indicating low levels of risk. It performs better than the world average on nearly every indicator, and scores notably well in democratic processes and cybersecurity.

## Background and key issues

Canada has a long-standing democratic tradition in the form of a parliamentary system, enhanced by strong levels of education and a high GDP per capita. In the 2020 [Human Development Index](#), it ranked 16th out of the 189 countries measured. In the Economist Intelligence Unit's [Democracy Index](#), Canada comes 12th overall, performing exceptionally well in electoral process and pluralism and political participation, but its ranking has suffered as a result of curbs on civil liberties imposed in response to the pandemic. Canada is the world's second most stable country according to the Normandy Index, as measured by the fragile states' indicator. Canada performs well on most indicators of traditional conflict, yet was ranked 48th in the 2022 [Global Terrorism Index](#). Canada recorded four terror-related deaths in 2021, up from three recorded in 2020, and the highest number since 2018.



## New security and hybrid threats

Canada has high levels of both economic development and human capital, and is the [9th largest economy](#) (current US\$) and second most stable economy globally, as measured by the economic crises indicator. Canada is one of only a few developed countries to be a net exporter of energy. Canadian society enjoys a high level of press freedom, ranking 19th in the 2022 [Press Freedom Index](#). [Cybercrime](#), in the form of online fraud and attempts to steal personal, financial, and corporate information, continues to be the most significant threat to Canada's cybersecurity. The 2022 [Human Rights Watch](#) report noted that considerable challenges remain to undoing decades of structural and systemic discrimination against indigenous people in Canada.

## EU involvement



Canada has been a formal [strategic partner](#) for the EU since 2016. Since then, the partners have strengthened their [foreign policy and sectoral cooperation](#), with a view to upholding their joint commitment to advance democratic principles and human rights and to work together to strengthen international peace and security and rules-based multilateralism. Canada is one of the steadiest contributors to the CSDP, having taken part in 10 missions and operations to date. The EU and Canada have also concluded a security of information agreement for the exchange of classified information. The agreement aims to facilitate further CSDP cooperation, and cooperation on counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and sanctions. Canada and the EU are also strong economic partners. In 2017, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement ([CETA](#)) between the EU and Canada provisionally entered into force, and aims at setting a high standard for sustainability chapters in trade agreements. The EU and Canada have joined forces as leaders in the international fight against climate change, including by co-convening a [Ministerial on Climate Action](#) (MoCA) with China in 2018. In 2021, the two sides also set up a [strategic partnership](#) on raw materials.

## Central African Republic

At 130st, the Central African Republic (CAR) ranks poorly in the Normandy Index. The country has struggled through ongoing episodes of civil war since 2003. Foreign fighters, including the Wagner Group paramilitary organisation, are active in the country. The security and political situation remains fragile.

### Background and key issues

Although President Faustin-Archange Touadéra was democratically elected in 2016, violence between armed groups remains common. The Anti-Balaka alliance dominate the southwest and the ex-Séléka militia the northwest of the country. The CAR ranked 6th globally on the [Fragile States Index 2021](#). The security vacuum that has emerged has contributed to the country's high violent conflict score. The CAR was the 17th country most impacted by terrorism on the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#). Elections in December 2020 exacerbated instability, as armed groups mobilised along political fault lines and [disrupted the electoral process](#). For [President Touadéra](#) to run for a third mandate, in elections planned for late 2023, [constitutional change](#) would be required (under an amendment tabled in Parliament in Bangui on 26 May 2022).



### New security and hybrid threats

The CAR is vulnerable to the emerging threats that affect weak states, including threats to cybersecurity and press freedom. Attacks on the media are frequent, leading to a [World Press Freedom Index](#) ranking of 101st. The CAR is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change in Africa, leading to massive population displacement and violent conflict between [farmers and herders](#) over water and pastures. In a [briefing](#) of 30 March 2022, Michelle Bachelet, the UN Special Commissioner for Human Rights, warned of the increasing number of serious

human rights violations and abuses in the CAR. The insecurity challenge has worsened, with the presence of mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group, and alignment with Russian foreign policy (e.g. CAR's abstention from voting in the UN General Assembly's 2 March 2022 resolution condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine).

### EU involvement



One EU military mission, [EU Training Mission in the Central African Republic](#) (EUTM CAR), is still present in the country, advising national forces. A civilian advisory mission, [EUAM RCA](#), launched in 2020 to support reform of the internal security forces, also remains present. However, the activities of the Wagner Group might threaten the future of these missions. On 5 May 2022, the European Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) on threats to security in the Sahel, condemning the increasing presence of the Wagner Group (in the Sahel), deeming it incompatible with security and defence cooperation with the EU, and calling upon all countries to examine the Wagner Group's track record in CAR. The CAR benefits from duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market ([Everything but Arms](#)). In the context of the [ACP-EU partnership](#), EU development aid to the CAR is financed by the [European Development Fund](#) (EDF) with up to [€442 million](#) allocated for 2014-2020. In addition, the EU [Békou Trust Fund](#) provided €243 million in 2019, mostly from the EU budget and the EDF. In December 2020, the EU mobilised a further €14 million to support the country's response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#). Under the Global Europe Instrument, the 2021-2024 multi-annual indicative programme (MIP) for CAR allocates: €172 million, split between: peace, security, justice and governance (€57 million), green transition (€57 million), human development (€51.5 million), and support measures (€6.5 million).

## Chad

Chad ranks 129th in the Normandy Index. The country suffers from the spill-over effects of Boko Haram activity, particularly around Lake Chad. This is further compounded by climate fragility and food insecurity.

## Background and key issues

Chad has a turbulent [history](#) of civil war, coups and democratic suppression. Libyan involvement in the country has further exacerbated instability. While Idriss Déby took power in a coup in 1990 and won the first multiparty presidential elections in 1996, rebellions nevertheless continued. Déby's regime turned to repressive tactics to stifle opposition, including alleged human rights abuses by security forces and electoral fraud. A new Constitution expanding presidential powers was adopted in 2018. [President Déby's death](#) soon after his re-election in April 2021 was followed by the [nomination](#) of his son, Mahamat Idriss Déby to replace him as transitional leader of a military council, occupying the combined functions of the president and head of the armed forces. Chad is classified as a 'not-free state', scoring 17/100 in the [2021 Freedom in the World index](#) and it ranks in 104th position out of 180 in the 2022 [Press Freedom Index](#).



## New security and hybrid threats

As well as internal strife, Chad has been involved in conflicts along its border regions. The Darfur conflict caused mass refugee movements into Chad and attacks by rebel groups. Chad took a lead in the regional response to violent extremism activity in the region, notably within the [Multinational Joint Task Force](#) (MNJTF) with Niger and Nigeria. Following one of the deadliest Boko Haram [assaults](#) ever experienced by Chad, in March 2020, the Chadian military has continued efforts to fight terrorism across the Sahel, but it remains characterised by [lack of internal cohesion](#), which may ultimately threaten these operations.

Chad ranks at the very bottom of the [2020 Global Hunger Index](#), with close to 40 % of Chadians undernourished. The country's economy [remains](#) fragile and vulnerable to several risks. Increased [pressures on natural resources](#) owing to climate change and population displacement from neighbouring countries have led many to turn to Boko Haram as a source of income.

## EU involvement



The EU adopted a [new strategy for the Sahel](#) in April 2021. Beyond military engagement, the new strategy strengthens the political dimension and the emphasis on sustainable development of EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries, including Chad. Chad benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything but Arms](#)'. The [European Development Fund](#) earmarked up to €542 million in assistance for Chad (2014-2020), to consolidate the rule of law and support food security, rural development and sustainable management of natural resources. In addition, the EU allocated nearly €10 million in assistance through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) from 2015 to 2020. The [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €113 million since 2016 for governance, migration management, resilience and economic projects. In 2020, the EU provided more than €30 million in [humanitarian aid](#) for Chad. Chad also benefits from [Team Europe](#) support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

## China

China ranks 68th in the Normandy Index and is considered more at risk than the Asia-Pacific average. Since the start of economic reforms in 1978, China has experienced significant economic growth, becoming the world's third largest economy in terms of nominal GDP after the USA and the EU.

## Background and key issues

China is [entangled](#) in border disputes with several countries, including India and Bhutan. Moreover, China's [claims](#) to sovereignty over Taiwan and several maritime areas in the East and South China Seas are increasingly heavily contested. In support of these claims, China fields the [world's largest army](#) and second largest [defence budget](#). China also possesses active nuclear weapons. China ranks 95th in the [2021 Fragile States Index](#), with particularly weak scores in the human rights and state legitimacy categories. This is largely a result of the Chinese government's [increasing repression](#) of democratic movements in the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and its oppression of religious and ethnic minorities, in particular the Tibetan Buddhist and the Uyghur Muslim minority in Xinjiang province, which some states have labelled as [genocide](#).



## New security and hybrid threats

China's rapid economic growth has had a negative impact on its natural resources and environment, severely undermining water quality and leading to erosion and widespread pollution. China's [deployment of coal](#) has dangerous implications for the environment and human health, coal combustion being the single-largest source of air pollution-related health impacts in the country. Ahead of COP26 in November 2021, China officially [submitted](#) its 'carbon neutrality before 2060' target. China relies on new technologies for its authoritarian model of social surveillance and conformity, which it portrays as an alternative to liberal

governance models. It consequently ranks 175th (out of 180) in the 2022 [World Press Freedom Index](#). A one-party state, it scores far below other Asia-Pacific countries when it comes to democratic processes.

## EU involvement



EU and China established a strategic partnership in 2003 through more than [60 dialogue formats](#), including on non-proliferation and disarmament. These have contributed to the implementation of the [EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation](#). Cooperation on [climate change](#), including [emissions trading](#), and on [sustainable development](#), [energy](#), [urbanisation](#), [water](#) and the [circular economy](#) is high on the agenda. The regular EU-China [human rights dialogue](#) also raises issues such as freedom of expression and of religious belief, although with limited progress on these issues. In 2019, the European institutions issued a joint communication on [EU-China – A strategic outlook](#), in which China is simultaneously described as a 'cooperation partner ..., an economic competitor ... and a systemic rival'. In December 2020, the EU and China concluded, 'in principle', a [Comprehensive Agreement on Investment](#) (CAI), which is 'frozen' and [awaits](#) European Parliament consent and approval by Council. In March 2021, the EU imposed [sanctions](#) on Chinese officials accused of perpetrating human rights abuses against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. In response, China imposed counter-sanctions targeting several Members of the European Parliament. On 9 June 2022 the European Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) on the human rights situation in Xinjiang.

## Colombia

Colombia ranks 111th in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the South American regional average, and performs below the regional average for terrorism, violent conflict, and resilience to disinformation.

## Background and key issues

Colombia has struggled with organised crime and the impact of terrorism. A peace agreement between the government and the biggest terrorist group, *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC), was signed in 2016. However, an [estimated](#) 2 500 FARC dissidents remain active. From January to November 2021, over 62 000 people became internally [displaced](#), with the major causes of displacement being armed confrontation and homicides, often related to FARC violence. Another major armed group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), is also behind significant violence and displacement, both in Colombia and neighbouring Venezuela, and ceasefire negotiations with the government [have failed](#) to date. Organised crime and terrorist groups will continue to pose a threat to peace in Colombia. This includes knock-on effects in other aspects of society, such as homicides. The [homicide rate](#) in Colombia is the 18th highest in the world.



## New security and hybrid threats

Colombia performs below the South American regional average for new security threats. However, it does show resilience in a number of areas, including energy security, being a net exporter of energy. In 2021, Colombia was South America's [largest coal producer](#) and second-largest petroleum producer after Brazil. Most of Colombia's coal is exported, making it the fourth largest exporter globally in 2020. It also performs higher than the South American regional average in cybersecurity. Colombia performs relatively poorly on press freedom and access to information. The country ranks 145th in the 2022 [World Press Freedom Index](#), owing to high numbers of death threats towards journalists and the resulting self-censorship.

## EU involvement


The EU has [supported](#) the Colombian peace process with an overall investment of more than [€645 million](#). This includes actions such as the Peace Laboratories and the Peace Territories project, the [Trust Fund](#) for Colombia (to which 21 EU Member States and Chile have pledged [€125 million](#)); European Investment Bank loans; and the IcSP, which mobilised an [extra €40 million](#) for critical elements of the peace process, such as transitional justice. EU cooperation covers areas such as victims' rights, reintegration of ex-FARC guerrillas into civilian life, de-mining, rural development, land restitution, environment, conflict resolution, peace post-conflict projects, and the establishment of a [special investigation unit](#) in the prosecutor-general's office to combat crime and protect activists. Eamon Gilmore, special EU envoy between 2015 and 2019, considered the EU's role in the peace process a success and a [model](#) for EU external policy. [Development cooperation](#) between EU and Colombia totalled €127 million for 2014-2020. The EU has a [Comprehensive Trade Agreement](#) with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, applied provisionally since 2013. Regional cooperation between the EU and the Andean Community aims to help cement regional ties in Colombia's neighbourhood. On 26 April 2021, the European Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) on the 5th anniversary of the peace agreement in Colombia, requesting increased EU political and financial support for the process. Parliament's observation mission assessed the 2022 general election as [transparent and credible](#).

## Costa Rica


Costa Rica ranks 10th in the Normandy Index, indicating relatively low levels of risk. In contrast to several other countries in the Central America and Caribbean region, Costa Rica has high levels of peace and political stability. Costa Rica enjoys a stable and uninterrupted democracy, with 14 presidential elections since 1948.

## Background and key issues

Costa Rica abolished its military in 1948, following the end of an intense civil war. This has had positive ramifications for its violent conflict and weapons of mass destruction scores. There is a limited threat of armed conflict within the country, and it enjoys good relations with neighbouring states. Additionally, it ranks among the countries suffering the lowest impact from terrorism. Costa Rica ranks 17th globally in terms of electoral integrity in the group of liberal democracies, and this is reflected in its high score on democratic processes. While it performs well on other indicators of traditional conflict, Costa Rica has relatively high levels of homicide. High homicide rates are attributed to [organised crime](#), which also affects many other countries within the Central American and Caribbean region.



### Threat comparison



## New security and hybrid threats

Costa Rica has a relatively high level of resilience to new security threats. It has a long-standing and stable democracy and benefits from high levels of press freedom and human rights. It ranks 8th in the [2022 World Press Freedom Index](#), owing to low levels of violence against journalists and state interference. As such, it performs above the regional average for the indicators measuring democratic processes and fragile states. Although Costa Rica performs better than the regional average for climate change, it ranks 60th among the countries most [vulnerable to climate change](#), with 181 being the most vulnerable. Costa Rica is making significant efforts to achieve carbon neutrality, and is the only country to have met all five of the UNDP's environmental stability measures.

## EU involvement



The EU has traditionally maintained strong political relations with Costa Rica. Both parties played an active part in the [San José dialogue](#) of 1984, in support of the peace process and democratisation efforts in Central America. Cooperation agreements were concluded in 1985 and 1993, and a political dialogue and cooperation agreement in 2003. The [3rd EU-Costa Rica High Level Dialogue](#) was held in November 2019. [Costa Rica](#) is also a signatory to the EU-Central America Association Agreement concluded in 2012. Under the 2014-2020 financial exercise, Costa Rica benefits from the EU thematic cooperation lines, the regional programmes for Latin America and the [sub-regional programme](#) for Central America, including cooperation on security and impunity. The EU also supports new regional approaches through triangular cooperation schemes; for instance, it is working with Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico on [strengthening restorative justice](#). The EU has also funded projects in citizen security, fighting discrimination against vulnerable groups, border security, and the Central American security strategy. Costa Rica has participated in [five IcSP projects](#) (totalling almost €12 million) and is aligned with the EU in international fora on many issues, including regional peace and security.

## Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire ranks 94th in the Normandy Index – a significant drop from last year – and roughly the same rank as the region to which it belongs, sub-Saharan Africa. The country suffers political polarisation and is exposed to climate change risks, while terrorism and violent conflict remain issues of serious concern.

## Background and key issues

Côte d'Ivoire was one of Africa's most stable and prosperous countries in the first decades after independence. After the death of its first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, in 1993, the country plunged into a spiral of instability and violent conflict between the Christian south and the Muslim north. The 2010 electoral victory of current president Alassane Ouattara, who needed the backing of UN and French troops to assume the function, put an end to the civil conflict, but left the country deeply polarised. Côte d'Ivoire has a mostly equatorial climate and is potentially exposed to flooding.



## New security and hybrid threats

The participation, for the first time since 2010, of opposition forces in the March 2021 parliamentary [elections](#), and former president Laurent Gbagbo's [return](#) to the country following his acquittal at the International Criminal Court have marked important [steps](#) towards national reconciliation. The political tensions created by the re-election, in November 2020, of President Alassane Ouattara for a controversial third term have largely [subsided](#). On the other hand, the risk of terrorist attacks from Jihadist organisations such as Malian-based groups Ansar al-Dine (AAD) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has grown, with a [risk](#) of local radicalisation also present. The country experienced its first major terrorist [attacks](#) in 2016, in the beach resort of Grand-Bassam.

From 2020 on, [jihadists](#) attacked security forces at the northern border with Burkina Faso several times. These new threats also create intercommunal [tensions](#). Due to its geographical position, the country is vulnerable to organised crime, particularly trafficking in human beings and drugs, as well as to [maritime piracy](#) in the Gulf of Guinea. Côte d'Ivoire has started exploiting offshore gas and oil reserves and, given its [potential](#), hopes to become a major producer.

## EU involvement


The EU has agreed [three main priorities](#) with Côte d'Ivoire to structure the flow of EU development aid to the country from the Global Europe instrument: develop human capital, foster sustainable, inclusive and digital growth, and strengthen the rule of law, democratic governance and preserve peace and security. The third priority is endowed with €45.60 million (20 %) during 2021-2024. It aims to uphold Côte d'Ivoire as a major stability pole in the West African region, while aiming to increase women's participation in peace and security matters. Further funding for peace is provided under the [Team Europe](#) 'Peace and Stability' initiative, amounting to a total €149.1 million: the EU contributes €29.4 million, France, Germany and Italy being the other main contributors. Since 2016, Côte d'Ivoire has been one of only two countries in West Africa to implement an [Economic Partnership Agreement](#) with the EU, which aims at liberalising commercial exchanges and encouraging economic diversification and development in Côte d'Ivoire.

## Democratic Republic of the Congo


The resource-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ranks towards the bottom of the Normandy Index at 132nd position. The country suffers from the political crisis triggered in 1997, when President Joseph Kabilo took over power from his father, assassinated in 2001. The crisis is still ongoing under President Félix Tshisekedi, who has said he will run for a second mandate. Presidential elections are scheduled for December 2023.

## Background and key issues

Despite the ongoing efforts of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo ([UN MONUSCO](#)) and President Tshisekedi's (contested) election in January 2019, the DRC ranks 5th in the [2021 Fragile State Index](#). The DRC ranked 17th in the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#), signalling a slight improvement in its terrorism score. Despite the state of siege in the eastern provinces of Ituri and North-Kivu decreed on 30 April 2021, the security situation has worsened. According to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the DRC remains one of the world's most complex and protracted humanitarian crises, with an estimated [27 million](#) people in need of humanitarian assistance and protection. In April 2022, DRC became the 7th member of the East African Community (EAC), an enlargement that sharpened [pre-existing rivalries](#) between Uganda and Rwanda.



## New security and hybrid threats



Joseph Kabilo's unconstitutional long term of office took its toll on democratic processes and on press freedom. The DRC ranks 125th out of 180 countries in the [2022 World Press Freedom](#) Index. The country is still considered at-risk, with particular vulnerability to corruption and depletion of its natural resources (including cobalt, which is strategic for the green transition), and largely controlled by [Chinese companies](#). In the Eastern Province of North Kivu, M23 rebels returned to fight the DRC army (the FARDC) in spring 2022, taking control of several cities and rural areas. The DRC accuses Rwanda of supporting M23, which Rwanda systematically denies. All de-escalation and cease-fire attempts have [failed](#).

On [13 June 2022](#), the M23 attacked the army in Bunagana, at the Ugandan border, and gained control over this strategic city. On [15 June 2022](#), in Kinshasa, the US Embassy denounced the actions of Rwandan troops in DRC, while the EU Ambassador warned against the activities of national and foreign armed groups.

## EU involvement



EU-DRC [relations](#) are strained on account of [sanctions](#) against several Congolese for human rights violations. At the same time, the DRC benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market ('[Everything but Arms](#)'). In 2022, the EU's humanitarian aid to DRC amounted to [€44 million](#). The DRC also received [Team Europe](#) support to respond to the [coronavirus pandemic](#). EU development aid to the DRC has been financed primarily through the [European Development Fund](#), with €620 million for 2014-2020. In addition, the EU allocated €54 million through the IcSP from 2015 to 2020. The EU financial allocation to DRC under the Global Europe Instrument for 2021-2024 amounts to [€424 million](#), split between human development (40 %), the alliance for sustainable development (40 %), governance, peace and security (15 %), and support measures (5 %). The EU plans to earmark €300 million in support to the FARDC under the 'United for Security' programme, in addition to further possible military support that might be funded from the European Peace Facility ([EPF](#)).

## Egypt

Egypt ranks 103rd in the Normandy Index. Following street protests in 2011, long-term President Muhammad Mubarak was forced to resign, with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi elected in 2014 and re-elected in 2018. Security issues, in particular the Islamic terrorist threat within the North Sinai governorate, remain high.

### Background and key issues

Egypt ranks 35th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), particularly due to its poor human rights record. The [military](#) remains the predominant political force in the country. Since 2014, the [terrorist group](#) Wilayat Sinai, or 'Sinai Province', the ISIL/Da'esh local branch in the Sinai Peninsula, has conducted a prolonged insurgency against Egyptian authorities. In 2022, the Cairo Criminal Court and the Emergency Supreme State Security [sentenced](#) former presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and the Muslim Brotherhood's ex-supreme guide Mahmoud Ezzat to 15 years in prison. Egypt holds 77 trillion cubic feet of proven [gas reserves](#), ranking 16th in the world. In line with the [REPowerEU plan](#), the EU and Egypt will accelerate and intensify their [energy partnership](#).



### New security and hybrid threats

Egypt's [ongoing internal security threats](#) have led to the detention and sentencing of journalists and political opponents of the government. The country is one of the biggest jailers of journalists, ranking 168th out of 180 countries in the 2022 [Press Freedom Index](#). Environmental challenges are concerning. The vast majority (98 %) of Egypt's population of approximately 95 million people are concentrated around the arable Nile valley and delta, which represents only 3 % of the country's total landmass. [Soil salinisation](#) also threatens 15 % of the country's farmland. Egypt also scores low on the economic crises indicator. President al-Sisi has been pushing for

economic and political reforms, at the core of which lies [Egypt's Vision 2030](#). Economic reforms and strong investment in urban and green development shielded Egypt relatively well in 2020-2021, with GDP growth of 3.6 % and 3.3 % respectively. However, inflationary pressures (13.1 % in April 2022) augur a challenging environment in the future. To mitigate these risks, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) [devalued](#) the pound by 17 % and raised its main interest rate by 100 basis points, to 11.25 %, on 21 March 2022.

### EU involvement



The 2001 Association Agreement, which entered into force in June 2004, forms the legal basis of EU-Egypt relations. Relations were further strengthened through the jointly agreed [EU-Egypt action plan](#) adopted in 2007, which helped to develop bilateral relations in the political, social and economic realms. In the context of the [revised European Neighbourhood policy](#), the EU and Egypt have adopted [partnership priorities](#) that guided the partnership in 2017-2020. The EU's [assistance](#) to Egypt will now focus on economic modernisation, energy sustainability and the environment; social development and social protection; as well as governance. In February 2021, the EU adopted a [new agenda for the Mediterranean](#), including an Investment Plan for the region worth €7 billion. On 19 June 2022, the 9th meeting of the [EU-Egypt Association Council](#) adopted new Partnership Priorities to guide the relationship until 2027, in line with the new agenda for the Mediterranean and its Economic and Investment Plan and Egypt's Sustainable Development Strategy Vision 2030.

## Eritrea

Eritrea ranks 118th on the Normandy Index. Despite the historic peace deal signed with Ethiopia in 2018, Eritrea suffers from a total lack of political freedom, and continues to have little tolerance for press freedom and democratic practices.

## Background and key issues

The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia reigned in 1998 over a border dispute. The 20 years to 2018 have been termed a state of [frozen war](#). Despite the peace deal signed with Ethiopia in 2018 and other indications that Eritrea was emerging from international diplomatic isolation, domestic repression has remained as intense as ever. Any hopes that Eritreans had of a relaxation of the security state and opening up of personal freedoms have faded, leading many citizens to [voice their criticism](#) in public places. The revolution in neighbouring Sudan in 2019, which toppled Omar al-Bashir, a dictator with 30 years in power, and subsequent democratic reforms (although not unproblematic), have led some to suggest that a similar [popular uprising](#) could take place in Eritrea and that President Isaias Afwerki is concerned about such a possibility.



## New security and hybrid threats

Eritrea remains a [militarised authoritarian](#) state that has not held a national election since independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), headed by President Isaias Afwerki, is the sole political party. [Arbitrary detention](#) is commonplace, and citizens are required to perform national service, often for their entire working lives. The government shut down all independent media in 2001. The [Freedom House](#) marked Eritrea with 3/100 points in its 2021 report, stressing the country's religious persecution of Evangelical and Orthodox Christians. In May 2021, the government interfered in the recognised Eritrean Orthodox Church (EOC) by installing a new patriarch. Eritrea ranks 179th out of 180 on the 2022 [World Press Freedom Index](#), just above North Korea. Eritrea's dire score on democratic processes reflects a total [lack of political freedom](#). Its low score in energy insecurity results from its dependency on oil imports. Less than half of the country's population have [access](#) to electricity.

**EU involvement**



In the framework of its [comprehensive strategy for the Horn of Africa](#), the EU promotes regional cooperation on migration and displacement, security, and the fight against violent extremism. The EU and Eritrea are part of the [EU-Horn of Africa migration route initiative](#), a policy dialogue on the fight against migrant smuggling. Following the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace deal in 2018, the EU and Eritrea redefined priority cooperation areas in support of peace, regional integration and sustainable development. Eritrea benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything But Arms](#)'. The new [Development Cooperation Strategy for 2019-2020](#) focused on infrastructure and energy (€125 million); job creation in the agricultural sector (€30 million); economic governance (€5 million); and the promotion of Eritrean culture and heritage (€15 million). The EU allocated €10.7 million in funding through the IcSP in 2015-2020, for crisis response and preparedness projects. The [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €151 million since 2016, for better governance and conflict prevention, and support for resilience and economic projects. Eritrea also benefits from [Team Europe](#) support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

## Ethiopia

Ethiopia ranks 122nd in the Normandy Index, and is considered more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average. Despite Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's efforts to both resolve ongoing disputes with Eritrea and introduce wide-ranging political and economic reforms, the breakout of armed conflict in the Tigray region in November 2020 has severely affected the risk levels in the country.

## Background and key issues

With over [80 different ethnic groups](#), speaking as many languages, Ethiopian politics are structured around the notion of ethnic federalism. A federal parliamentary republic, Ethiopia ranks 21st in the 2020 [Fragile States Index](#), with particular vulnerabilities arising from demographic pressures and group grievances. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has attempted to resolve ongoing disputes with Eritrea following the 1998-2000 war and [received](#) the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, for his efforts to achieve peace. However, conflict with Eritrea and among ethnic and religious groups has given rise to terrorist violence and Ethiopia ranks 149th out of 163 countries in the 2022 [Global Peace Index](#). Anti-terror measures are particularly harsh and cause for concern for many human rights organisations.



## New security and hybrid threats

Ethiopia ranks 114th in the 2022 [World Press Freedom Index](#). The declared states of national emergency in 2016 and 2018 were used to silence dissenting voices and [renewed](#) concerns about media freedom emerged in late 2019. The country already scores well on energy insecurity and [plans](#) to increase production, to make electricity available to everyone by 2030. Ongoing disputes with Egypt and Sudan over the filling of the [Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam](#) on the River Nile remain a point of tension. Following rising political tensions between the federal government and the northern Tigray region, violence broke out in November 2020 between the federal military and Tigray

regional forces. The conflict has reportedly resulted in 2.2 million displaced people and 50 000 killed. There are some hopes for resolution of the conflict and rebuilding of infrastructure. In April 2022, the World Bank [awarded](#) a US\$300 million grant to Ethiopia, funding a project to help conflict-affected communities and to rebuild infrastructure destroyed in the conflict. Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) president Debretson Gebremichael has also [affirmed](#) that the TPLF is 'prepared to negotiate for peace consistent with fundamental principles for human rights, democracy and accountability.'

## EU involvement



Ethiopia is a key partner for the [EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa](#). Ethiopia benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything but Arms](#)'. The EU aid to Ethiopia has included up to €815 million from the 2014-2020 [European Development Fund \(EDF\)](#). The EU has also financed projects worth €250 million through the [EU Trust Fund for Africa](#), as well as €10.7 million through the IcSP 2015-2020. However, due to the conflict in Tigray, the EU [suspended](#) its €88 million budget support to Ethiopia. On 19 December 2020, the EU increased humanitarian funding for Tigray by €23.7 million, bringing the total [humanitarian support](#) for Ethiopia in 2020 to €63.2 million. In June 2022, the European Commission [adopted](#) a proposal to mobilise €600 million from the reserves of the European Development Fund to address the food security crisis aggravated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

## Georgia

Georgia ranks 28th on the Normandy Index. It performs better than the regional average in indicators including crime, terrorism, energy insecurity and economic crisis.

## Background and key issues

Ever since Georgia became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, its central government has faced strong resistance in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In August 2008, Russia fought a [war](#) with Georgia, on the pretext of protecting separatists. Although fighting ended after a few days, the causes of the conflict have not been resolved. The country has experienced relatively low levels of terrorism in the past five years, ranking 93rd according to the [Global Terrorism Index](#). Georgia remains [embroiled](#) in a political crisis, which was sparked by the heavily contested parliamentary elections in November 2020, followed by the arrest and incarceration of the leader of the opposition and a subsequent boycott of the new parliament by opposition parties. After mediation efforts by the EU a deal was reached between the parties, however Georgia [quit](#) the EU-brokered deal in July 2021.



## New security and hybrid threats

Georgia ranks highest of the Eastern Partnership countries on the economic crisis indicator, and its economy, although hard-hit by the pandemic, is resilient. [Reforms](#) over the past 15 years have focused on globalising the business sector and boosting economic growth. Over the past decade, Georgia also diversified its trade. While neighbouring countries Russia, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and Turkey remain the main export destinations, it has expanded its ties with China and boosted links with the EU through an [Association Agreement](#) (AA), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), and committed to the NATO Response Force. Georgia has also increased its resilience

in other areas, such as cybersecurity. The February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has raised [fears](#) in Georgia that it could be next. Georgia has [applied](#) for EU membership and was granted pre-candidate country status in June 2022.

## EU involvement



Georgia lives with a Russian [military](#) presence in two regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). An EU monitoring mission ([EUMM](#)) has been deployed in Georgia since 2008. The country is committed to deepening relations with the EU, and officially [applied](#) for EU Membership in March 2022. The European Commission [opinion](#) on Georgia's application was published in June 2022, with Georgia receiving pre-candidate country status. With the EU-Georgia [AA/DFCTA](#), the EU is supporting the modernisation of the Georgian economy and institutions. Since the entry into force of the visa-free regime in 2017, Georgian citizens holding biometric passports have visa-free entry to the Schengen area. Since then, more than 900 000 Georgians have travelled to the EU. [European Neighbourhood Instrument](#) funding for Georgia in 2017-2020 totalled €453 million, including €183 million to help tackle the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic; in 2020, the EU also approved €150 million in macro-financial assistance (low-interest loans) for Georgia. The EU is Georgia's largest donor and provides over €120 million per year in grants to support the country with its reforms.

## India

India ranks 107th on the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the average for southern Asia, except for cybersecurity and democratic processes. Unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, both of which are also nuclear-armed powers, largely explain India's relatively low ranking.

## Background and key issues

Despite strong economic growth and modernisation since the 1990s, India has been challenged by ongoing inter-religious, inter-caste and inter-ethnic disputes. An [estimated](#) 83 million Indians live in extreme poverty. India ranked 12th in the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#). India's tensions with Pakistan, mainly over the Jammu-Kashmir region, have also given rise to a number of Islamist terrorist groups operating from Pakistani territory. India is opposed to signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty ([NPT](#)) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ([CTBT](#)) giving it a low score for the WMD indicator. On [12 June 2022](#), Uttar Pradesh State razed Muslim homes after riots over remarks by two figures of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's ruling party regarding the Prophet Mohammad. The remarks caused a [diplomatic row](#) with several Muslim countries and [threats of suicide bombings](#) by al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS). Finally, India, which imports most of its arms from Russia and remains the [largest importer](#) of Russian arms, has [not condemned](#) Russia's invasion of Ukraine.



## New security and hybrid threats

Government efforts to limit 'anti-national' discourse have led to India ranking 150th in the [2022 World Press Freedom Index](#). India has a much stronger cybersecurity infrastructure than average for southern Asia, as indicated by its strong performance in cybersecurity. The risks posed by flooding, rising temperatures and declining rainfall, make India's agricultural sector vulnerable to climate change: India was ranked the 7th most fragile country in the [Global Climate Risk Index 2021](#). With heavy investment in green technology, India ranked, the 10th best country in the [Climate Change Performance Index 2022](#). At COP26 in Glasgow in November 2021, India (like China and the island nations) succeeded, through a last-minute amendment, in changing the text of the [Glasgow Climate Pact](#) to call for 'phasing down' rather than 'phasing out' of [unabated coal power](#).

## EU involvement



With 60 years of diplomatic relations, India and the EU have been strategic partners since 2004. A middle-income country, India is not eligible for bilateral EU assistance, however it can benefit from the thematic and Asian regional programmes. The July 2020 [15th EU-India Summit](#) endorsed the EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025. The May 2021 [16th EU-India Summit](#) agreed to strengthen cooperation and to [resume negotiations](#), frozen since 2013, on a free trade agreement. The EU is, after Singapore and Mauritius, the [third largest investor](#) in India, accounting for 16 % of total investments received between 2015 and 2020. On 25 April 2022, in Delhi, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to launch the [EU-India Trade and Technology Council](#), aimed at tackling new trade, technology and security challenges.

## Indonesia

Indonesia ranks 30th in the Normandy Index. Significant economic growth in this populous country of 270 million inhabitants has raised its political prominence in the region. This rise has not been without issues: growing Islamic fundamentalism, sectarian unrest and terrorism each pose significant challenges.

## Background and key issues

Indonesia has faced a number of separatist and militant movements since its independence in 1949, and ranks 24th in the 2022 [Global Terrorism Index](#). A long-running insurgency continues in Papua. In Aceh, a 2005 agreement granting special autonomy brought peace. The former Portuguese colony of East Timor (occupied by Indonesia since 1975) gained independence in 2002. Indonesian counter-terrorist forces have been mostly effective in containing Islamist movements such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Sunni Islamist, religiously-motivated and violent extremist group, inspired by anti-Western jihadist ideology. The most recent emir of JI, Para Wijayanto, was [arrested](#) by Indonesian authorities in June 2019 and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in July 2020. Although law enforcement activities over the past decade have significantly impaired the group's leadership, JI remains a distinct organisation with a highly compartmentalised structure and 6 000 members, operating primarily in Indonesia, with a small number in Malaysia and the Philippines.



## New security and hybrid threats

Despite its success in instituting democratic practices, including the conduct of the 2019 general election, Indonesia ranks 117th in the [2022 World Press Freedom Index](#) and 100th on the [2022 Fragile States Index](#), with a particularly high score in the group grievances category. This is largely due to ongoing unrest in the province of Papua, where media access is restricted. The 2004 Aceh earthquake and tsunami, in which over 160 000 people were killed, demonstrated Indonesia's vulnerability to environmental and climate factors. Increasing drought frequency is [predicted](#) to threaten Indonesia's monsoon-based

agricultural practices and lead to food shortages, while rising ocean levels are forecast to threaten approximately 42 million low-lying households. Calls for an [environmentally conscious](#) form of Islam are growing in Indonesia, as climate change poses enormous ecological challenges for the country.

## EU involvement



In 2014, Indonesia became the first south-east Asian country to sign a [partnership and cooperation agreement](#) with the EU, and a free trade agreement is currently being negotiated. The 11th negotiation round on the free trade agreement took place in November 2021 in a virtual format, after some delays due to the pandemic. As a middle-income country, Indonesia no longer receives EU bilateral [aid](#), except for programmes pre-dating 2014, but it continues to participate in programmes such as [Erasmus+](#) for higher education; EU funding also supports Indonesia's foreign trade through the ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU ([ARISE Plus](#)) facility. The EU and Indonesia conduct a wide range of policy dialogues on topics such as [human rights](#) and [security](#). As a regional leader, Indonesia is key to the EU's new strategic partnership with the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN).

## Iran

Iran ranks 116th in the Normandy Index. The country is slowly emerging from decade-long economic stagnation, exacerbated by US economic sanctions, re-imposed at the end of 2018, and the subsequent impact on oil exports, inflation and unemployment.

## Background and key issues

Tensions around Western interference in Iranian domestic affairs date back to the early 1900s, when the British government took control of Persian [oil production](#). The overthrow, with US Central Intelligence Agency backing, of democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, set off a wave of unrest that ultimately led to the revolution of 1979 and subsequent [US hostage crisis](#). Since then, Iran has found itself embroiled in several conflicts in neighbouring countries, beginning with the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, and continuing to this day in the conflicts in Syria and Yemen. The country came under increasing [international pressure](#) over its WMD capabilities and intentions, which were held in check by the Iran [nuclear deal](#) (the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action](#), or JCPOA), signed in 2015, until the USA withdrew from the agreement in 2018, and re-imposed wide-ranging [economic sanctions](#). In July 2022, Iran [claimed](#) that it had the technical capacity to build a nuclear weapon but had not taken a decision to do so.



## New security and hybrid threats

Since the re-imposition of US economic sanctions, Iran has suffered tremendous [economic](#) and social consequences. The economy is slowing recovering after three consecutive years of [recession](#), due to the combined effects of sanctions, the oil market collapse and the [coronavirus pandemic](#). The country is one of those most severely impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. Iran is still undergoing a grave [economic crisis](#) involving, inter alia, 40 % inflation. There has been widespread [social unrest](#) in response. Improved economic governance and the fight against widespread corruption are among the country's [key political challenges](#).

According to the [Corruption Perception Index](#), Iran ranks

150th out of 179 countries. [Future risks](#) for Iran include the resurgence of new Covid-19 variants, the worsening impact of climate change, and the war in Ukraine's impact on global food prices and Iran's imports. Iran has further ramped up its [nuclear programme](#) and entrenched itself in regional conflicts and fragile countries, especially Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

## EU involvement



The EU played an important role in facilitating the [nuclear agreement](#) between Iran and the EU3+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom, plus China, Russia and the USA). Following the [endorsement](#) of the JCPOA in July 2015, the EU established an [Iran Task Force](#), to coordinate the different strands of action in relations with Iran (including the implementation of the JCPOA and the development of bilateral relations). The EU continues to [facilitate](#) efforts to bring the USA and Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA. In 2021, the EU scaled up [assistance to Iran](#) to address the coronavirus pandemic, including the provision of urgent medical, [protective](#) and [testing equipment](#), and the delivery of vaccines. In 2021, the EU adopted a [multiannual indicative programme](#) to govern relations with Iran from 2021 to 2027.

## Iraq

Iraq ranks 128th in the Normandy Index. The country continues to be impacted by regional and domestic terrorism, and it also faces persistent political instability in the wake of country-wide protests against corruption that began in October 2019.

## Background and key issues

Iraq has a [history of military coups and revolutions](#) beginning in 1958. When Saddam Hussein seized power in 1979, Iraq began a new chapter of brutal authoritarianism, becoming embroiled in a series of conflicts to establish regional hegemony, starting with the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. In 1989, Iraq invaded neighbouring Kuwait, beginning the first Gulf War. In the aftermath, the international community, led by the USA, continued to impose devastating economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure on the country, to which Saddam Hussein responded with increasing domestic repression. In 2003, claiming Iraq had WMD capabilities, the coalition led by the USA once again invaded the country, provoking a power struggle among rival factions in the country that continues today. The [US troops](#) left in 2011, but returned in 2014, as part of the US-led coalition fighting ISIL/Da'esh. In the months leading up to their [withdrawal](#) in [December 2021](#), US troops and interests in Iraq were the target of dozens of [attacks](#), attributed to pro-Iranian Iraqi factions. Since 2003, [Iran](#) has established a strong and [destabilising influence](#) over its neighbour Iraq, and the [ISIL/Da'esh](#) terrorist group, which until 2017 controlled large parts of the country, remains active. Some 1.2 million civilians remain [internally displaced](#) and 4.1 million people need some form of [humanitarian assistance](#), with 1 million facing [acute humanitarian needs](#).



## New security and hybrid threats

From 2019 to 2021, Iraq witnessed [massive protests](#) against ineffective governance that were often [violently suppressed](#). In [response](#) to the protests, early parliamentary elections took place in October 2021. However, political factions unhappy with their outcome have succeeded in blocking the [government formation process](#), creating political paralysis. The caretaker government, which has limited ability to pass legislation or fund new projects, may have to remain in place until 2023, or even 2025, depending on whether early elections are called or not. Iraq also faces a continued threat of terrorism, as the second most terrorism-impacted country in the world, according to the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#), ranking behind Afghanistan. Iraq is also considered one of the Arab countries most [vulnerable to climate change](#), and will likely face decreased [water and food availability](#) and extreme temperatures in the future.

## EU involvement



Under the 2018 [EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement](#) (PCA), the EU [cooperates](#) with Iraq in many areas, including humanitarian assistance, stabilisation, reconstruction, human rights, migration, security, and the political, social and economic reform agendas. The EU adopted an [EU strategy for Iraq](#) in January 2018, to respond to the specific challenges Iraq faces following the territorial defeat of ISIL/Da'esh. Iraq has benefited from over €1 billion in EU assistance since 2003. In October 2017, the Council set up a CSDP EU advisory mission, [EUAM Iraq](#), to assist the Iraqi authorities with the implementation of its national security strategy.

## Israel

Israel ranks 57th in the Normandy Index, with an above-average score for the MENA region. While Israel is a relatively stable democratic country and scores high in resistance against crime, cybersecurity and economic crises, its continued occupation of Palestinian territory remains a significant weakness, as does the country's possession of WMD.

## Background and key issues

Since the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine in 1947, followed shortly after by the unilateral declaration of an independent state of Israel, Israel has been embroiled in [conflict](#) with the Palestinians and its other Arab neighbours. Following earlier peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), Israel [normalised](#) relations with four other Arab states in 2020. However, relations with its direct neighbours [Lebanon](#) and [Syria](#) remain fraught. Israel is categorised as a free country in the [2021 Freedom in the World Index](#), with an overall score of 76 out of 100. However, in 2022, Israeli continued its decade-long occupation of the West Bank, creating an '[increasingly coercive environment](#)' for Palestinians. Israel ranks 30th in the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#). [Terrorist groups](#) that target Israel include Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the [Sinai Province of ISIL/Da'esh](#).



## New security and hybrid threats

In [May 2021](#), fighting occurred over an 11-day period between Israel and Hamas, the Palestinian group that controls Gaza. A [new round](#) of fighting could break out at any time, as tensions between Israel and Hamas remain high. A series of [armed attacks](#) in Israel have been committed, both by Palestinians from the [West Bank](#) but also by Israeli-Arabs, in a new development posing new security challenges. Iran has [threatened](#) Israel with destruction on numerous occasions. Iran's nuclear and advanced missile programmes constitute a major strategic threat to Israel. [Hezbollah](#), Iran's proxy army in Lebanon and Syria, regularly target northern Israel. Israel is [not party](#) to any of the major treaties governing the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The country has signed, but not ratified, the [Chemical Weapons Convention](#). Israel has a policy of non-transparency regarding its nuclear capabilities, but it is widely estimated that it possesses a sizeable nuclear weapons arsenal, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Its position in a high conflict region makes WMD a significant threat.

Its position in a high conflict region makes WMD a significant threat.

## EU involvement

EU-Israel relations are governed by the 2000 [EU-Israel Association Agreement](#) and focus mainly on strengthening economic and social cooperation, as well as regular political dialogue. The [European Neighbourhood Policy](#), the main framework guiding political and economic relations with Israel, aims at promoting Israel's integration into European policies and programmes. [EU funds](#) are predominantly used to support the approximation of Israeli norms and standards in public administration with those of the EU. The EU also supports civil society initiatives that promote human rights. Israel is an important [partner](#) in [Horizon Europe](#), the [EU's key funding programme for research and innovation](#). The EU continues to [advocate](#) a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including an end to Israeli occupation of the Palestinian [territories](#).

## Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan ranks 37th in the Normandy Index. Although long seen as an island of stability in a very unstable and volatile region, the country was rocked by violent protests in the beginning of 2020.

## Background and key issues

Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic, gained independence in 1991, and was subsequently [ruled](#) by President Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev for almost three decades until stepping down in March 2019. He remains 'Supreme Leader' with significant influence and powers. Kazakhstan is dominated by its ruling party 'Nur Otan', now renamed '[Amanat](#)', leaving little room for any political opposition, which is routinely [repressed](#). The country accordingly scores very low on democratic process (121st globally). For some, however, the Kazakh leadership has been [hailed](#) as an 'island of stability and prosperity' in a highly unstable region. The Kazakh economy is highly [dependent](#) on oil exports, which is an economic risk and potential source of instability. Kazakhstan's largest challenge has traditionally been managing its relationship with an increasingly aggressive Russia, with [fears](#) in Kazakhstan that it could be the [next](#) Ukraine. [Around](#) 20 % of the Kazakh population is ethnic Russian, a fact that experts have cautioned could be used as a pretext for Russia to annex territory.



## New security and hybrid threats

Anti-government protests rapidly spread throughout Kazakhstan in January 2022, initially [due](#) to the removal of a price cap, doubling fuel prices. Current President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called the protesters '[terrorists](#)' supported by foreign powers, using excessive force to end the protest. President Tokayev [asked](#) for support from the Collective Security Treaty Organization ([CSTO](#)) on 5 January 2022, with the organisation rapidly deploying 2 500 troops, plus additional Russian troops. The CSTO

troops [withdrew](#) two weeks later. At least 200 people died during the protests, which according to Human Rights Watch, Kazakhstan has [failed](#) to investigate. According to Amnesty International, the human rights [situation](#) in Kazakhstan leaves much to be desired, with the situation [worsening](#) considerably during the 2022 protests. More positively, Kazakhstan [abolished](#) the death penalty in 2020. The country scores highly when it comes to resilience against terrorism, ranking 93rd in the [Global Terrorism Index](#).

## EU involvement



The EU has supported Kazakhstan's development since it gained independence in 1991. An enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement ([EPCA](#)) was signed with Kazakhstan in 2015 and entered into force in 2020. It was the first of its kind with a Central Asian partner. It enables cooperation in key policy areas such as justice and home affairs, economic and financial cooperation, among other areas. The EU adopted a [Central Asia strategy](#) in 2019, to strengthen cooperation with Central Asian countries. The EU Special [Representative](#) for Central Asia focuses on the EU's continued and comprehensive cooperation with the Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan. Areas of cooperation include security, rule of law, environment, water, climate change, education, and human rights, among others. The EU and its Member States have [provided](#) €123 million in funding to Central Asia and the EU launched a comprehensive €3 million Central Asia Covid-19 crisis response solidarity programme, focused on Kazakhstan, in 2020. The EU is Kazakhstan's largest trade [partner](#).

## Lebanon

Lebanon ranks 113th in the Normandy Index. The collapse of the country's currency and economic upheaval have fostered social discontent since October 2019. The massive explosion that destroyed large parts of Beirut in August 2020 epitomises the decline of the country's public and political institutions since its civil war ended in 1990.

## Background and key issues

Lebanon's history of conflict dates back at least to the civil war that erupted in 1975. A small state, Lebanon is at the centre of regional power struggles led today by Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the 2005 Syrian-assisted assassination of then Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, ongoing Iranian support for Hezbollah, and the spill-over of fighting and millions of refugees from the current Syrian crisis, among other events, have not only ensured [continued political and violent conflict](#) in the country, but have also led to deep economic crisis. Around 1.5 million Syrian refugees (one quarter of Lebanon's population) have sought refuge in the country since 2011.



## New security and hybrid threats

Lebanon is facing an economic crisis not seen since independence in 1943. Since October 2019, when nationwide protests broke out against the deepening economic crisis and perceived corruption, the situation has deteriorated steadily. The currency is at an all-time low, having lost around 90 % of its value. The country's economic model has been described as 'broken', and poverty has spread dramatically. A deadly explosion, attributed to negligence, ripped through the port of Beirut in August 2020, killing hundreds, injuring thousands and causing extensive damage to the capital. The Covid-19 pandemic added further hardship, and a

[food security](#) crisis is developing as a result of the Russian war on Ukraine. There are fears that the overlapping crises could lead to [societal collapse](#). Elections took place on 15 May 2022, but the outcome has [failed to resolve](#) the political deadlock that has paralysed the country for several years. Without a clear majority in parliament, the process of forming a government could [take months](#), further stalling urgent reforms.

## EU involvement


The EU recognises the importance and supports the efforts of Lebanon as the country with the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world. The EU has allocated more than €2.7 billion in [assistance](#) to Lebanon since 2011, including €2 billion in response to the Syrian crisis. Bilateral assistance has been allocated under the [European Neighbourhood policy](#), to cover local social and economic development, investment in infrastructure and support to civil society, among others. The EU has also provided direct [humanitarian assistance](#) to Syrian refugees, as well as resilience assistance to both Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees. The EU also helped [Lebanon](#) fight the Covid-19 [pandemic](#). Providing Lebanon with assistance continues to be a priority under the EU's new external funding instrument adopted in 2021, the [Global Europe Instrument](#). Multi-annual programming for Lebanon under the Global Europe Instrument is focused on funding to build a sustainable state, able to meet the citizens' needs, reinforcing the economy and ensuring security and stability. In 2021, Lebanon received bilateral assistance through the Global Europe Instrument worth €46 million.

## Libya

Libya ranks 126th in the Normandy Index, with a score below the average for the MENA region. Since the January 2020 Berlin Conference on Libya and the approval of the interim government in February 2021, there are hopes that a political process leading towards elections could bring the country closer to reconciliation and democratic transition.

## Background and key issues

Libya has been divided into [rival military and political camps](#) since 2014, based respectively in the capital, Tripoli, and in the east. Libya's third civil war in a decade began when Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an offensive on Tripoli in April 2019. Fayez al-Sarraj, leader of the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) turned to Turkey for military help in an effort to remain in power. In February 2021, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) agreed on democratic transition and the gradual reconstruction of the country. However, the failed [December 2021 elections](#) suspended political processes, once again forcing the country to the brink of chaos, political instability and social unrest. The rifts between the western factions based in Tripoli and the eastern factions based in Tobruk, resurfaced in February 2022, following the [appointment](#) of Fathi Bashagha as the new Prime Minister in a [flawed vote](#) by the House of Representatives in Tobruk. Popular anger [culminated](#) on 1 July 2022, when a mob set fire to the parliamentary building.




## New security and hybrid threats

Crime and violent conflict remained high in Libya, and also affect the economy. The UN estimates [economic losses](#) in Libya due to the civil war at €400 billion; [rebuilding costs](#) were assessed at €500 billion. Despite the cessation of violence, tens of thousands of foreign military personnel and mercenaries remain in Libya, supporting both sides. They were due to leave by the end of January 2021. In April 2021, the UNSC [adopted](#) resolution 2570 (2021), urging member states to withdraw 'all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay'. In July 2022, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) [announced](#) the suspension of services at several oil ports. The lengthy oil installation blockade has cut available fuel supply exponentially, which in turn has led to power outages and blackouts in several parts of the country, ultimately catalysing further protests.

**EU involvement**

The EU is committed to the [Berlin Process](#) under the auspices of the UN. Following the January 2020 [Berlin Conference on Libya](#), the EU launched a new military mission, [Operation Irini](#), with the goal of implementing the UNSC-imposed arms embargo. The European Union Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya ([EUBAM Libya](#)) supports the Libyan authorities in their efforts to disrupt organised criminal networks and terrorism. Libya has received support under the Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, as well as under the EU [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) (EUTF Africa). Particular attention was dedicated to full compliance with the UN arms embargo and support for the most vulnerable people – migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. A revised strategy for the Southern Neighbourhood was adopted on 9 February 2021, marking 25 years since the Barcelona Declaration and 10 years since the Arab Spring. Under the [IcSP](#), the EU has funded, and continues to fund, projects worth over €65 million, aiming at contributing to stability and peace. Following the onset of the coronavirus crisis, the European Commission [mobilised](#) over €66 million through its instruments to support immediate, health-related and socio-economic needs in the country.





## Mali

Mali ranks 124th in the Normandy Index. The country faces continued threats from violent Jihadist groups, as well as climate change-related challenges, including increased resource scarcity.

## Background and key issues

The Arab Spring triggered insurgency and rebellion in [Mali's north](#), launched by the Tuareg Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and followed by civil war. A 2013 intervention by the French armed forces created a dependency on international military resources that continues to this day, with over 17 600 UN peacekeeping personnel operating in the country, under the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali ([MINUSMA](#)). The Russian Wagner Group [deployed](#) to Mali in December 2021, to train local forces. In exchange, Russia has secured access to natural resources. In February 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron [announced](#) the withdrawal of French troops during the summer. On 14 July 2022, Mali's government [announced](#) that it was 'temporarily suspending' MINUSMA troop rotations.



## New security and hybrid threats

Mali scores significantly more negatively than the sub-Saharan average in the violent conflict and terrorism domains, due to attacks from [Jihadist groups](#). New political unrest erupted in the second half of 2020 when, following public protests over electoral irregularities, military officers overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta's government. The interim military-led government had initially scheduled democratic presidential elections for March 2022. However, in February 2022, the 121-seat army-dominated interim parliament [voted](#) to allow the military government to postpone elections and to rule for up to five years. On

15 May 2022, Mali left the [G5 Sahel](#) – a regional, intergovernmental organisation between Sahel countries – due to the refusal of the other Members (Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso) to allow Malian transitional authorities to lead the rotating presidency. A combination of [climate change](#) and resource-scarcity is leading to a severe humanitarian crisis. Conflicts are expected to [spread from northern Mali](#) into the central region around Bamako.

## EU involvement



The EU adopted a [new strategy for the Sahel](#) in April 2021. The new strategy strengthens the political dimension and the emphasis on sustainable development in EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries. Mali hosts two EU CSDP missions: [EUCAP Sahel Mali](#), a capacity building mission, and [EUTM Mali](#), a training mission for the G5 Sahel armed forces. In March 2020, the Council of the EU decided to extend the mandate of the EUTM Mali until May 2024. However, in May 2022, Mali's authorities [decided](#) to terminate the Defence Cooperation Treaty between France and Mali, as well as the Status of Forces Agreement governing the French and European partner forces involved in the Takuba Task Force (which [ceased](#) operations on 1 July 2022). Mali benefits from quota- and duty-free access to the EU market for '[Everything but Arms](#)'. The [European Development Fund](#) allocated €665 million to Mali (2014-2020), mainly to support peace consolidation. In addition, the EU allocated €57 million in assistance through the IcSP (2015-2020). Since 2016, the [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €220 million towards better governance and economic projects. Mali also benefits from [Team Europe](#) support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

## Mauritania

Mauritania ranks 87th in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk in crime, energy insecurity and state fragility, while the country is at low risk in terms of terrorism.

### Background and key issues

In recent decades, Mauritania's political life has been marked by several [military coups](#), the most recent led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in 2008, followed by his election in 2009. In June 2019, Mauritania [saw](#) the first peaceful transfer of power since it became independent in 1960, with the election of the ruling party candidate and former defence minister, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. Mauritania ranks 140th in the [2021 Corruption Perceptions Index](#). In February 2020, the national parliament formed a committee of enquiry to investigate [alleged corruption cases](#) during the former president's mandate. Despite increasing numbers of attacks in the Sahel, Mauritania has proved to be remarkably [resilient](#) against jihadism.



### New security and hybrid threats

Mauritania ranks 33rd in the [Fragile States Index](#). [Failure to eradicate slavery](#), despite its abolition in 1981, explains the country's particularly low score in state legitimacy. Mauritania faces the second highest risk of drought according to the [Global Risk Index](#), as it experiences recurring cycles of drought that exacerbate resource scarcity and food insecurity. Despite substantial renewable energy resources, three million people remain without power across the country and Mauritania scores low on energy security. The country passed its first data privacy laws in 2017, but is still at the early stages of addressing cybersecurity, ranking 145th in the [Global Cybersecurity Index](#). Mauritania fell from

72nd to 97th place in [the World Press Freedom Index](#) between 2018 and 2021. Repressive laws on defamation and disinformation notably led to the arrest of several journalists during the 2019 presidential campaign. In 2020, however, President Ghazouani appointed a national commission for press reform, in view of [consolidating press freedom](#). Finally, Mauritania represents a certain potential for the [export](#) of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) to European markets, with reserve volumes estimated at 15 trillion cubic feet present on the maritime border between Mauritania and Senegal, leading to the development of the US\$4.8 billion Grande Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) floating LNG project, the first phase of which is expected to produce up to 2.5 million tons of gas per year, the equivalent of 2.4 % of Russian deliveries to the EU in 2021.

### EU involvement



The EU adopted a [new strategy for the Sahel](#) in April 2021. Beyond military engagement, the new strategy strengthens the political dimension and the emphasis on sustainable development of EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries, including Mauritania. In 2019, the EU reinforced and moved its [Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell](#) for the Sahel to Mauritania, where the G5 Sahel permanent secretariat is based. Mauritania benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything but Arms](#)'. The [European Development Fund](#) provided up to €160 million during 2014-2020 for food security and sustainable agriculture; the rule of law; and improvement of the health system in Mauritania. Since 2017, the EU [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed [€79 million](#) for conflict prevention projects in the country. In 2019, the EU allocated €9 million in [humanitarian aid](#) to Mauritania. Mauritania also benefits from [Team Europe](#) support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

## Mexico

Mexico ranks 78th in the Normandy Index. Despite the progress made in combating organised crime, Mexico continues to suffer high levels of violent conflict and homicides, which affect civilians and politicians alike.

### Background and key issues

Mexico has suffered from large-scale organised criminal activity including drug-trafficking, kidnapping and extortion since at least the 1980s, when Mexico's crime groups started coordinating and assigning distinct regional areas of control and establishing trafficking [routes](#). The ensuing violence emanated not only from inter-cartel competition, but also the Mexican State's officially declared 'War on Drugs' in 2006. It is estimated that more than [100 000](#) people have 'disappeared', most of whom were victims of drug-related crime since [2006](#).



### New security and hybrid threats

The overall level of peacefulness in Mexico has slightly improved compared to the previous year, although the country's homicide rate remains at [historically high levels](#), with 26.6 deaths per 100 000 people, resulting in over 34 000 victims. This corresponded to 94 homicides per day in 2021. The rate of organised crime has deteriorated by 48.1 % since 2015, chiefly owing to the sharp 139 % increase in crimes related to retailing of drugs. Gun violence is also on the rise. In 2021, more than 71 % of male homicides and almost 57 % of female homicides were perpetrated with a firearm. Mexico's geography, situated between two oceans, makes it [vulnerable](#) to severe weather events and climate change. In rural areas,

extreme temperatures and erratic rainfall damage crops and livestock (which represent 80 % of weather-related financial losses since 1990). The country has had a climate change [law](#) since 2012 (last reformed in [2020](#)).

### EU involvement



The EU has a long-standing comprehensive partnership with Mexico, established through the European Union-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, which was signed in December 1997 and entered into force on 1 October 2000. This 'Global Agreement', also includes a free trade agreement, which is currently being [updated](#) (an agreement 'in principle' has been reached). It was the first EU agreement to create a free trade area and the first partnership agreement with a country in Latin America. The Global Agreement established a political dialogue and broad cooperation between the parties. In 2008, the EU agreed a [strategic partnership](#) with Mexico that introduced new high-level dialogue issues, such as on security, law enforcement and human rights. The EU is stepping up cooperation with Mexico on combatting organised crime. [Negotiations](#) concluding a working arrangement between Mexican authorities and Europol began in February 2020, and an agreement entered into force in [July 2020](#). Mexico has participated in a total of 25 [IcSP projects](#), with funding totalling more than €66 million.

## Moldova

Moldova ranks 21st in the Normandy Index, and is performing well in a wide range of indicators. However, war in Ukraine will have negative impact on the country's economic situation, as well as energy security.

## Background and key issues

The 2020-2021 economic downturn was accompanied by a protracted [political crisis](#) that intensified following the [presidential elections](#) in November 2020, when pro-European [Maia Sandu](#) – leader of the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) – won the second round with 57.72 % of the vote, becoming the country's first female president. Outgoing President Igor Dodon, openly [backed](#) by Russia, won 42.25 % of the votes. The crisis was resolved by the [parliamentary elections](#) of July 2021, when the PAS received 52.8 % of the vote and won 63 seats, obtaining a majority in the 101-seat parliament. Since August 2021, when the reform-oriented government took office, all Moldovan branches of government (including the president, the government and the parliament) have become aligned and now support a common ambitious reform agenda with the objective of European integration. Since 1991, Moldova is part of a [frozen conflict](#) over the Russian-backed breakaway region of Transnistria.



## New security and hybrid threats

The coronavirus pandemic, coupled with unfavourable climate conditions have affected Moldovan [economic growth](#), with GDP contracting by 7 % in 2020, creating the strongest recession since the global financial crisis in 2008. In 2021, the country's [fiscal deficit](#) reached 2.8 % of GDP, and public debt jumped from 8 % to 35.2 % of GDP. The country's GDP is expected to grow by 5.2 % in 2022 ([IMF](#)). The war in Ukraine is creating additional economic [uncertainty](#) as well as energy insecurity. The main [electricity production](#) coal-based plant is located in the Transnistria region. However, as of 16 March 2022, Ukraine and Moldova's electricity grids are [synchronised](#) with the continental European grid. [Dependence](#) on Russia in the

gas sector has long created insecurity, as Moldova's national gas company, Moldovagaz, imports the country's entire gas consumption from Gazprom.

## EU involvement



Moldova and EU signed an [Association Agreement](#) and a [DCFTA](#) in 2014. Following a request by Moldova, on 4 January 2022, the European Commission [adopted](#) a proposal for disbursing up to €150 million in new macro-financial assistance (MFA) to the country, of which up to €30 million takes the form of grants and up to €120 million of medium-term loans at favourable financing conditions. An additional €52 million [supported](#) Moldova energy security and resilience. On 3 March 2022, President Maia Sandu [signed](#) Moldova's formal application for EU membership, a decision hastened by Russia's invasion of neighbouring Ukraine. The Council of the EU [invited](#) the European Commission to submit its [opinion](#) on the application. On 23 June 2022, EU leaders [granted](#) the status of a candidate country for EU accession.

## Mongolia

Mongolia ranks 22nd in the Normandy Index, but is performing relatively poorly on cybersecurity, and on crime and democratic processes, also in the regional context.

### Background and key issues

A recognised democracy, Mongolia reaches rank 48 for democratic process in the Normandy Index, not least due to a deterioration in the most recent [World Press Freedom Index](#), to 90th place. Furthermore, according to a 2021 survey, [population's trust](#) in the independence of the judiciary system and in the [Independent Agency Against Corruption](#) is rather low. Given Mongolia's wealth in natural resources including coal, gold, copper, zinc, fluorspar, iron ore, tungsten, oil and gas, one of the driving forces of the country's economic development has been the mining and extraction sector. In 2020, the [mining and extraction sector](#) represented 22 % of Mongolia's GDP, 71 % of its direct foreign investment, and 94 % of exports. Additional revenue will stem from [gas transit](#); the Russia-China gas pipeline is expected to be completed in 2024.



### New security and hybrid threats

On 17 December 2021, the Parliament of Mongolia passed the Law on Personal Data Protection (PDPL), effective from 1 May 2022. It is [claimed](#) that new legislation will establish broader and more stringent regulatory regimes surrounding personal data in Mongolia, compared to the previous Law on Personal Secrecy (1995). The PDPL together with the [Cybersecurity law](#) (2021), Public Information Transparency Law (2021), and Electronic Signature Law (2021), will enter in force on 1 May 2022, and will create a comprehensive framework governing cybersecurity and data privacy protection in Mongolia. Mongolia performs poorly on criminality score, where the [Organised Crime Index](#) places it 143rd (out of 193 countries).

### EU involvement


[Diplomatic relations](#) between the EU and Mongolia were established in 1989 and are now based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which entered into force in 2017. The EU continued to [focus](#) on the support of vulnerable groups and the empowerment of civil society. The fight against child labour and other forms of exploitation of children continued to figure prominently among the EU's priorities. Other priorities included: gender equality; non-discrimination; the rule of law; and building resilient, inclusive and democratic societies; as well as the promotion of human rights and democracy. In 2020, the EU launched its first [budget support programme](#) with UNDP technical support, to boost employment and improve transparency in public finances. The EU also continued to support [small and medium-sized enterprises](#)' finances, human rights and democracy, through several ongoing projects, carried out with Member States or other partners. The focus included; support for the empowerment of herders; the fight against child labour and trafficking for labour or sexual exploitation; and support for civil society, including youth civic engagement and participation in the local economy.

## Morocco


Morocco ranks 55th in the Normandy Index, with a score above the average for the MENA region on several indicators. While Morocco is a relatively stable country and scores high in resistance against crime and terrorism, irregular migration remains a significant weakness, as do the country's energy insecurity and democratic processes.

## Background and key issues

The Moroccan government announced a US\$12.8 billion [Economic Relaunch Pact](#) on 6 August 2020. Austerity measures as part of the 2021 Finance Bill, combined with the effects of Covid-19, increased social discontent and protests and strikes organised by healthcare and transport unions occurred throughout 2020. The continued tense social situation following the pandemic further highlights longstanding issues, including access and capacity in the healthcare sector and regional disparities. On 1 July 2022, protests were organised in several cities following the deaths of at least 23 migrants at the frontier with the Spanish enclave of Melilla on 24 June 2022. Morocco's Human Rights Association [contested](#) the official death toll, reporting instead that 27 migrants had died, while the Spanish non-governmental organisation Walking Borders reports 37 fatalities.



## New security and hybrid threats



In 2020, Morocco [slipped](#) into its first recession since 1995, with GDP decreasing by 6.3 % in 2020 due to the impact of drought on agricultural revenue, and to the impacts of Covid-19. The economy [grew](#) by 7.3 % in 2021, driven by an exceptional cereal crop after two consecutive years of drought, solid exports and remittances (the latter estimated at €3.3 billion annually). Growth is projected to slow to 1.1 % in 2022, as agricultural output declines again by 17.3 % due to the drought. [Irregular migration](#), with over 12 000 illegal migrants intercepted in 2021, remains a sensitive issue, with four main migratory routes: via the Mediterranean to mainland Spain, through Spanish enclaves Melilla and Ceuta, and through the Canary Islands. Negotiations on an EU-Morocco readmission agreement, committing Morocco to taking back irregular migrants, began in the 2000s, but have not produced results to date.

Morocco is one of the main countries of origin and transit for migrants to the EU. The Council [granted](#) the European Commission a negotiating mandate to conclude a readmission agreement with Morocco in 2000, but work is still ongoing. On 8 July 2022, the European Commission vowed to step up its work with Morocco to fight human smugglers. The Commission presented a revised strategy for the Southern Neighbourhood on 9 February 2021, marking 25 years after the Barcelona Declaration and 10 years after the Arab Spring. Morocco is the [largest recipient](#) of EU funds in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). For 2014-2020, €1.6 billion in assistance was allocated to the country.

## EU involvement



EU-Morocco relations are based on the [Association Agreement](#) which entered into force in 2000, creating a free trade area between the EU and Morocco. The Association Council, which brings together the EU and Moroccan ministers, frames the EU-Morocco relationship, including the political dialogue and cooperation priorities. The last (14th) [Association Council](#) meeting took place on 27 June 2019, and adopted a [Joint Declaration](#), which gave new impetus to the strategic, multidimensional and privileged EU-Morocco relationship. Morocco is one of the main countries of origin and transit for migrants to the EU. The Council [granted](#) the European Commission a negotiating mandate to conclude a readmission agreement with Morocco in 2000, but work is still ongoing. On 8 July 2022, the European Commission vowed to step up its work with Morocco to fight human smugglers. The Commission presented a revised strategy for the Southern Neighbourhood on 9 February 2021, marking 25 years after the Barcelona Declaration and 10 years after the Arab Spring. Morocco is the [largest recipient](#) of EU funds in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). For 2014-2020, €1.6 billion in assistance was allocated to the country.

## Mozambique

Mozambique ranks 117th in the Normandy Index, a significant drop from last year. Its level of fragility has significantly worsened over the last decade, recently due to Jihadist threat in the Cabo Delgado province. Today, the country faces significant threats from violent extremism, lack of political participation and inclusion, and climate change.

## Background and key issues

The independence movement against the Portuguese began in the 1960s, with the establishment of the Liberation Front of Mozambique (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, or Frelimo) in 1962. Since its independence in 1975, Mozambique has experienced persistent internal conflict. Between 1977 and 1992, the country was ravaged by a guerrilla war against the one-party system established by Frelimo following independence. A 1992 [peace agreement](#) ended this conflict temporarily, launching a political and economic opening. The Frelimo party has governed the country, without a break, since independence. The opposition is politically and economically marginalised and has repeatedly criticised elections 'won' with large majorities by Frelimo. After violent outbreaks, two further peace agreements, the latest in [2019](#), were signed to provide the opposition, particularly former guerrilla movement National Mozambican Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, or Renamo), with a share of political and economic power. Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an annual per capita GDP of €500 ([World Bank](#)).



## New security and hybrid threats

Since 2017, an [Islamist insurgency](#) has destabilised the Northern province of Cabo Delgado, causing numerous civilian casualties, significant displacement and disruption to the economy. The national army proved relatively ineffective in fighting back, and in 2020-2021, Islamists temporarily took control of regional port towns, forcing foreign [companies](#) to put a huge offshore gas extraction project on hold. Since July 2021, Rwandan and southern African Development Community (SADC) member states' troops have deployed to Cabo Delgado and helped [stabilise](#) the situation. The government hopes gas revenues from offshore extraction in Cabo Delgado could improve the dire state of the public finances. The country

is exposed to extreme climate events, which in recent years have caused [devastation](#), exacerbating [food insecurity](#).

## EU involvement



Mozambique ratified the [EU-SADC economic partnership agreement](#) in 2017, enjoying additional safeguards to protect it from disruptive trade liberalisation. In November 2020, the EU [restored](#) its budget support to the country to help it deal with the impact of Covid-19, after a four year suspension of this aid in response to massive corruption in the country's government. In 2021, the EU and Mozambique agreed [common objectives](#) for their development cooperation under the Global Europe Instrument for the next seven years. The European Union has established a military training mission in Mozambique ([EUTM Mozambique](#)), which will provide training to the Mozambican armed forces in protecting the civilian population and restoring security in the Cabo Delgado province. Through the [European Peace Facility](#), the EU has committed [€89 million](#) to Mozambican armed forces in military equipment and supplies in conjunction with EU training missions.

## Myanmar

Myanmar ranks 124th in the Normandy Index, marked by a strong fall in ranking since the February 2021 military coup, which brought violence and chaos. The country has long been plagued by poverty, ethnic conflicts and severe human rights abuses.

## Background and key issues

Tensions between the Bamar majority and over 135 ethnic groups caused decades of instability in Myanmar. Conflicts between ethnic armed groups and government forces cost thousands of lives and [displaced](#) hundreds of thousands. Some 50 years of military rule have seen horrific human rights abuses and grinding poverty. Constitutional reforms that began in 2008, and the election of a civilian government in 2015, looked like positive developments. Democratic reforms also brought economic development, with a ten-fold increase in GDP per capita in 2000-2020, from around €146 to €1 450, ([World Bank](#)). Despite this positive development, ethnic conflict continued in several parts of the country with little progress towards a national ceasefire. In 2016-2017, the military killed thousands from the persecuted [Rohingya minority](#), who live in northern zones of Rakhine State, resulting in a mass exodus of refugees, and [genocide charges](#) brought against Myanmar to the International Court of Justice (see [The Gambia v Myanmar](#), filed in November 2019).



## New security and hybrid threats

A February 2021 military coup ended five years of uneasy co-existence between the civilian government and the still-powerful armed forces. Civilian leaders, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate [Aung San Suu Kyi](#), were imprisoned or placed under house arrest, and the country descended into chaos following violently repressed protests against military rule. Political instability already hampered economic growth even before the coronavirus pandemic, and Myanmar remains one of the poorest countries in Asia.

Strikes led by the anti-junta Civil Disobedience Movement have brought entire sectors of the economy to a halt, disrupting supplies of food and energy. With many healthcare workers on strike, efforts to contain the pandemic are also at risk. The outlook for the country remains extremely uncertain. In 2008, [Cyclone Nargis](#) hit the country, killing nearly 100 000 people and causing damage that affected millions, a reminder of the threat posed by climate change.

## EU involvement



The EU adopted economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Myanmar in the 1990s. Following democratic reforms, the economic sanctions were lifted in 2013, although the arms embargo remained in place. For 2014-2020, the EU allocated €688 million in development aid. It also gave Myanmar exports duty-free access to EU markets under the '[Everything but Arms](#)' preferential trade scheme, triggering a boom in the country's textile sector, which employs nearly one million workers. The EU already re-imposed some sanctions against military officers in 2018, following Rohingya massacres, and [broadened](#) sanctions in February 2022. Some development projects have also been suspended.

## New Zealand

New Zealand ranks 6th in the Normandy Index, indicating low levels of risk. It performs better than the Asia-Pacific average on nearly every indicator, and scores notably well on the management of economic crises and democratic processes, a reflection of its relative success thus far in managing the pandemic.

## Background and key issues

New Zealand has a long-standing democratic tradition in the form of a parliamentary system, enhanced by strong levels of education and high per capita GDP, at €48 800 in 2021 ([World Bank](#)). In the 2019 [Human Development Index](#), it ranked 14th out of the 189 countries measured, on a par with Belgium. In the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2021 [Democracy Index](#), New Zealand ranks second overall, and first equal with Norway in electoral process and pluralism. In addition, it is the world's most stable country according to the Normandy Index, as measured by the fragile states' indicator. This is largely due to strong perceptions of state legitimacy, effective public services and low levels of external intervention. New Zealand performs well on most indicators of traditional conflict, but has moved up six rankings to 41st place in the 2022 [Global Terrorism Index](#). New Zealand suffered the most lethal terror attack in its modern history in 2019, when 51 people were killed and 49 injured in shootings at two mosques in the city of Christchurch.



## New security and hybrid threats

Thanks to its resilient democratic institutions, high standard of living and public services, and extreme remoteness from the world's most densely populated regions New Zealand has long been relatively insulated from traditional security and hybrid threats. However, an uptick in [terrorist incidents](#) and cyber-attacks in recent years, combined with a high level of trade dependency on China, and concerns that growing US-China strategic [rivalry](#) could spill over into the South Pacific, have made the strategic environment less benign. Outbreaks of new Covid-19

variants pose an additional threat to the country. , such In March 2022, the [Omicron variant](#) was infecting an average of 4.64 other people – the highest rate among 180 countries. The total number of infected people rose to 1.46 million causing 1 674 deaths ([Our World in Data](#), July 2022).

## EU involvement



The EU's bilateral political relationship with New Zealand is based on the 2016 [Partnership for Relations and Cooperation](#) (PARC). The agreement provides a framework for regular political dialogue, including consultations at ministerial, senior officials' and parliamentary levels. In 2018, the EU launched negotiations with New Zealand on a bilateral [free trade agreement](#) (FTA). On 30 June 2022, the EU and New Zealand [concluded](#) negotiations on an FTA that includes climate and labour commitments with sanctions available in case of their non-performance. The EU is New Zealand's third largest [trading partner](#) after China and Australia, and the second largest source of FDI for New Zealand. Within the EU, important bilateral trade partners for New Zealand include Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. New Zealand has [participated](#) in the EU's anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa, [EUNAVFOR Atalanta](#), as well as its [EUPOL](#) police mission in Afghanistan, and is an important development aid partner to the EU in the South Pacific.

## Niger

Niger ranks 121st in the Normandy Index. Regional instability has led to the proliferation of violent Jihadist groups, causing a surge in numbers of refugees and internally displaced people. For Niger, this compounds the already dire effects of climate change on access to resources, a further trigger for conflict.

## Background and key issues

Niger currently ranks 19th most fragile out of 178 countries in the [Fragile States Index](#), and 189th (bottom) in the [UN Human Development Index](#). The country's riches (seventh-largest producer of [uranium](#), with 5.4 % of global extraction in 2021) still overwhelmingly benefit foreign mining interests and a politically-connected elite, triggering conflict, notably with Tuareg groups. Niger has also suffered from increasing [regional instability](#), consequently its own conflict environment increased from 10 conflict events in 2011 with 25 fatalities, to 424 conflict events and 1 114 fatalities in 2020. In December 2020, the Boko Haram jihadist group killed over 27 civilians in the south east of the country, in one of the deadliest attacks in years. Niger's economy is not well diversified and depends primarily on [agriculture](#), which accounts for 40 % of its GDP.



## New security and hybrid threats

Niger's most immediate security threats come from the rapid spread of terrorism and violent extremist groups throughout the Sahel region. Deaths from [violent incidents](#) related to extremist groups in the Sahel reached 4 000 in 2019, a five-fold increase since 2016. Niger ranks 20th in the [Fragile States Index](#) and 8th in the [Global Terrorism Index](#). Niger has also been overwhelmed by an increase in [internally displaced people and refugees](#) fleeing neighbouring countries, particularly Mali. This displacement compounds the impact of climate

change, which is affecting Niger more than most Sub-Saharan African countries, heightening the competition for resources, in particular between traditional [farmers and herders](#).

## EU involvement


The EU adopted a [new strategy for the Sahel](#) in April 2021. Beyond military engagement, the new strategy strengthens the political dimension and the emphasis on sustainable development of the EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries, including Niger. The EU civilian mission [EUCAP Sahel Niger](#) is aimed at strengthening the capacities of forces from Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania to fight terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration. Niger benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything but Arms](#)'. The [European Development Fund](#) allocated €686 million in assistance to Niger in 2014-2020, to help deliver social services, food security and resilience, and road infrastructure for regions at risk of insecurity and conflict. In addition, the EU has allocated €45 million in funding to Niger through the 2015-2020 IcSP. Since 2016, the [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €279 million to improving governance, migration management and to supporting resilience and economic projects. In 2020, the EU allocated over €30 million to Niger in [humanitarian aid](#). Niger also benefits from [Team Europe](#) support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

## Nigeria


Nigeria ranks 112th in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average and is particularly vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. Ethnic tensions date back to colonial times. While the 1967-1970 civil war was primarily concerned with the equitable distribution of oil revenues between ethnic groups, recent conflict has assumed more sectarian overtones.

### Background and key issues

Despite an overall improvement on the previous year, Nigeria ranked sixth in the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#), the country experiencing a halving of terrorism deaths in 2021, due to military efforts against Boko Haram and the death of its leader Abubakar Shekau. The ISIL/Da'esh in West Africa Province (ISWA) overtook Boko Haram as the deadliest terror group in Nigeria in 2021. Terrorist attacks by Jihadist Fulani herdsmen against Christian farmers have also claimed numerous victims. The country's federal model provides a large degree of state autonomy between the predominantly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south, but endemic corruption has prevented the country from reaping the full benefits of its enormous oil wealth. The southern Niger Delta, where extraction is concentrated, suffers the environmental [effects](#), but profits little from the oil boon, which drives popular discontent. Nigeria ranks 14th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with high scores in the factionalised elites and group grievances indicators.



#### Threat comparison



### New security and hybrid threats

Despite being Africa's biggest economy by national GDP, Nigeria's economic situation is fragile, owing to its over-reliance on oil. After experiencing its deepest [recession](#) since the 1980s in 2020, due to Covid-19, Nigeria's economy has returned to [moderate growth](#). The country's very young population is a largely untapped economic potential. However, coupled with climate change and land degradation – a severe threat particularly in the north – demographic growth can also be a [driver](#) of severe social instability. Nigeria ranks 115th in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). While internationally supported elections allow for a high degree of political competition, they are often the victim of large-scale disinformation campaigns.

Political [competition](#) is already gathering speed ahead of the 2023 presidential elections.

### EU involvement



The EU has supported numerous initiatives to increase Nigeria's resilience to violent conflict and other threats. To help fight terrorism, the EU continues to [fund](#) an initiative grouping several Lake Chad countries – the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – against Boko Haram. In 2021, Nigeria and the EU agreed [new common objectives](#) for their development cooperation under the new Global Europe Instrument for the next seven years. These include objectives on governance, peace and human development, among others. The EU's support to the governance system aims to address the causes and consequences of conflicts and violence. The EU has negotiated a regional [economic partnership agreement](#) with Nigeria and other West-African countries, aimed at liberalising trade and fostering regional integration and sustainable development, but Nigeria is reluctant to implement it. The [EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) supports conflict prevention and relief measures, and greater economic and employment opportunities, to increase resilience in the most conflict afflicted areas. In 2022, the [Team Europe](#) initiative, 'Nigeria Green Economy' project [committed](#) €1.3 billion to the energy sector.

## North Korea

North Korea ranks 131st in the Normandy Index, clearly below the Asia-Pacific average. Talks on reunifying the Korean peninsula have consistently failed since 1948. The country performs very badly on democratic process, fragile state, disinformation and weapons of mass destruction.

## Background and key issues

A vestige of its 'military first' policy, North Korea has the [third-largest](#) military on active duty in the world, with a standing army of [1 469 000](#) soldiers. In 2013, this policy was replaced with the 'progress in tandem' policy, which emphasises economic progress and guaranteed security against South Korean or American incursion by nuclear development. The country has [nuclear weapons](#) and ballistic missile [programmes](#), and is believed to have chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Its [nuclear-capable](#) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are considered capable of [reaching](#) Japan, South Korea and the United States. North Korea continues to develop its [nuclear arsenal](#). The country has used cyber-attacks and cyber theft to amass [up to US\\$1.3 billion](#) in foreign and virtual currency, circumventing international sanctions. North Korea ranks 30th in the [2021 Fragile States Index](#), with a particularly weak score for state legitimacy. Its government ranks 174th out of 180 in the [2021 Global Corruption Perceptions Index](#), and thousands of political prisoners are known to be [interned](#) in prison camps.



14 July 2022, North Korea [recognised](#) (only the third country to do so, after Russia and Syria) the non-government controlled Donetsk and Luhansk areas in eastern Ukraine as independent states.

## EU involvement



The EU has a policy of 'critical engagement' towards North Korea, with a view to diminishing tensions in the Korean peninsula, upholding a nuclear non-proliferation regime and improving the human rights situation. It has applied [sanctions](#) against Pyongyang, implementing the UN Security Council Resolutions and adopting autonomous restrictive measures (the [latest](#) on 21 April 2022). Meanwhile, it has contributed over €135.7 million in [aid funding to North Korea](#) since 1995, mostly on food assistance, but also on disaster relief and poverty alleviation. EU-North Korea trade in goods fell dramatically after 2013. In 2019, the last year before the pandemic, it amounted to a mere [€7 million](#) (0.2 % of North Korea's external trade). The EU has maintained diplomatic relations with North Korea since 2001, but has no delegation in Pyongyang; its local representation is ensured in turn by one of the six Member States with embassies in the country (Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Poland, Romania and Sweden). On 30 May 2022, G7 countries and the EU HR/VP [condemned](#) 'in the strongest terms' a further intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test, conducted on 25 May 2022.

## North Macedonia

North Macedonia ranks 17th in the Normandy Index. Although it performs less well than the European average on crime, democratic processes and fragile states indicators, it outperforms the average for terrorism, energy insecurity and WMD.

### Background and key issues

North Macedonia gained independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. Today, the country scores within the top quartile of countries in the democratic processes indicator. The Macedonian Social Democratic Party (SDSM) [government](#), currently led by Prime Minister Dimitar Kovačevski, has improved relations with the EU and, in particular, with Greece. Through the [Prespa Agreement](#) (June 2018), the country changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia, in exchange for Greece ending its veto on its EU and NATO accession. In March 2020, following the signing of North Macedonia's accession protocol in February, the country officially joined NATO as the Alliance's 30th member.



### New security and hybrid threats

Since independence, North Macedonia has made progress in developing a westernised, open-market economy. This has included reforms such as registering property, gaining credit access and protecting minority investors. North Macedonia is the only middle-income country the [World Bank](#) ranks among the top 20 countries globally when it comes to ease of doing business. Its progress on economic reforms is demonstrated in its strong economic crisis score. However, North Macedonia ranks just below the world average, and second lowest in the European region on press freedom: 57th in the 2022 [Press Freedom Index](#). To foster the development of a safe, secure, reliable and resilient digital environment, the government

adopted a [National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan 2018-2022](#) in 2018. The criminality score remains relatively high, placing it 74th (out of 193) in the 2021 [Organised Crime Index](#).

### EU involvement



[North Macedonia](#) was the first Western Balkan country to sign a stabilisation and association agreement with the EU (in 2004); just one year later, it became a candidate country. On 26 March 2020, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia. To prepare the country for membership, the EU allocated [€664 million](#) of funding for 2014-2020, focusing on institutional building, cross-border cooperation, regional development, human resources and rural development. The EU is supporting the [strengthening of transport and energy connectivity](#) within the Western Balkans and with the EU, through a new connectivity package, road improvements and the implementation of the regional rail strategy, under the [Western Balkans Investment Framework](#). The EU also helped to establish the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), modelled on the Franco-German Youth Office, created in 1963 to boost cooperation between young French and German citizens. On 20 April 2021, the European Commission announced the conclusion of agreements for the delivery of Covid-19 vaccines to the Western Balkan countries. North Macedonia took part in the [EU-Western Balkans Summit](#) in Brussels on 23 June 2022. On 19 July 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Prime Minister Dimitar Kovačevski [announced](#) the opening of accession negotiations.

## Pakistan

Pakistan ranks 127th in the Normandy Index. Relations with terrorist groups, the military power's interference, strained relations with India, separatism, vulnerability to climate change and a critical financial situation, all contribute to the instability of a country affected by religious intolerance.

## Background and key issues

Pakistan, home to the world's second-largest Muslim population, was the first [Islamic republic](#). The country has undergone phases of military rule and political instability. Pakistan ranks 30th most fragile among 179 states in the 2022 [Fragile State Index](#). The chronic dualism between political and military powers, with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency playing a controversial role, has prevented civilian institutions from taking direct control of the state. This has impacted areas such as relations with Pakistan's neighbour India, which remain strained and volatile, despite a rapprochement in early 2021, due in particular to the unresolved Kashmir territorial conflict. Pakistan is [accused](#) of being an active sponsor of terrorism and a safe haven for terrorist groups. The [Global Terrorism Index](#) has placed the country among the 10 countries most impacted by terrorism without interruption since 2003; in 2022, it ranked 10th.



## New security and hybrid threats

Pakistan faces further separatist threats: the most critical situation is in the south-western province of Balochistan. Working for a media outlet in Balochistan is quite risky, as confirmed by the 2022 [World Press Freedom Index](#) ranking Pakistan 157th and underlining the ISI's pressure on journalists. The country is particularly [vulnerable](#) to the effects of climate change, as it is hit repeatedly by extreme weather events. This is among the reasons for a high level of food price inflation, contributing to political unrest. The [Financial Action Task Force](#) has placed Pakistan on its [grey list](#), hampering the country's access to international financing to address the post-coronavirus economic recovery.

## EU involvement



The EU and Pakistan strengthened political and security relations through the 2019 EU-Pakistan strategic engagement plan ([SEP](#)), which built on the 2004 [cooperation agreement](#). The fifth [EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue](#) held in November 2020 agreed a [joint declaration on Afghanistan](#). The 6th round of the [EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue](#) was held in December 2021. Both sides agreed to hold the first meeting of the new EU-Pakistan Security Dialogue in 2022, with sub-groups on non-proliferation and disarmament, and counter-terrorism. The [EU-Pakistan Joint Commission](#), which includes a sub-group on [democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights](#), held its 10th session in November 2019. The partners regularly hold a [political dialogue](#). Since 2014, Pakistan benefits from generalised system of preference plus ([GSP+](#)) status, increasing exports to the EU market by 65 %. Under GSP+, eligible countries can export goods to the EU market at zero duty for 66 % of tariff lines. This preferential status is conditional on GSP+ countries demonstrating tangible progress on the implementation of 27 international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection, climate change and good governance. However, in April 2021 the [European Parliament](#), concerned at the continued abuse of blasphemy laws in Pakistan, proposed to review the country's eligibility for GSP+ status. In June 2022, the European Union's monitoring mission arrived in Pakistan to gauge its eligibility to qualify for the next phase of the GSP+ in 2024-2034. Islamabad is also a beneficiary of the '[South Asia regional project](#)' to strengthen community resilience to Covid-19'.

## Philippines

The Philippines ranks 97th in the Normandy Index, lower than the Asia-Pacific average. It is one of the more democratic countries in the region, but faces a range of political, economic and environmental challenges. Crime rates are high, and thousands have died in a controversial war on drugs; there is also violence from rebel groups and terrorists.

## Background and key issues

The Philippines has a more pluralist political system than most of its neighbours in south-east Asia. However, it ranks among the top quarter of most fragile countries in the world. Ranking 50th in the [2022 Fragile States Index](#), the country has a particularly high score in the security apparatus category. One of the reasons for this fragility is the relatively high level of terrorism. The Philippines ranks 16th in the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#). The country has faced a number of insurgencies since independence, by Communist, Islamist, separatist and other movements. In 2016, ISIL/Da'esh-affiliated actors sought to establish an 'East-Asia province' in the country, occupying and holding the city of [Marawi](#) for five months. The violent crackdown on drug-related crimes, launched in 2016 under President Rodrigo Duterte, has been widely criticised. On 30 June 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. was sworn in as the 17th President of the Republic of the Philippines.



## New security and hybrid threats

The Philippines ranks 146th in the [2022 World Press Freedom Index](#) and 117th in the [2022 Corruption Perception Index](#). Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 caused the loss of 6 300 lives, the displacement of over four million people and US\$2 billion in damage, highlighting the threat posed to the country by climate change. As average sea temperatures rise, the Philippines' vulnerability to such extreme weather events is predicted to increase. Extensive mangrove deforestation has been [noted](#) as a factor that exacerbates this risk. The Philippines was [harder-hit](#) by [coronavirus](#) than most other Asian countries, with high numbers of deaths and infections. The pandemic also helped to spread disinformation and fake news; some 51 % of the population find it difficult to spot [fake news](#) in the media.

## EU involvement



Together with its Member States, the EU is the Philippines' largest aid donor. During 2014-2020, the EU allocated [€325 million](#) of development aid, focusing on two areas: the rule of law and inclusive growth (promoting renewable energy). Since 1996, the EU has also provided nearly [€125 million](#) in humanitarian aid, helping the country to respond to conflicts and natural disasters. The EU-Philippines Partnership and Cooperation Agreement came into force in 2018; talks on a free trade agreement were launched in 2015, but have been stalled since 2017. At present, the Philippines enjoys duty-free access to EU markets for most of its exports under the GSP+ scheme. The EU remains the Philippines' [fourth-largest trade partner](#). As the EU attaches high importance to its strategic partnership with ASEAN, President Ferdinand Marcos is expected to be invited to attend the 45th anniversary of EU-ASEAN relations at a commemorative [summit](#), to be held in Brussels on 14 December 2022.

## Russia

Russia ranks 106th<sup>3</sup> in the Normandy Index, performing better than the Eurasian average in terms of energy insecurity and cybersecurity indicators, but worse in the overall score. This is largely owing to weak performance on the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and violent conflict indicators.

## Background and key issues

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia rebuilt or altered many of its institutions. However, democratic processes are weak, and the regime has become increasingly authoritarian. Russia inherited the whole of the Soviet Union's huge stock of nuclear weapons, and now has nearly 5 977 warheads, almost half of the world's nuclear arsenal. Russia also has the highest homicide rate in the Eurasian region, at 10.82 per 100 000 people in 2021. This is significantly higher than the global average of 7.03 per 100 000. Russia has a very high energy security level, owing to its vast oil and gas reserves, which it has long used as an instrument of power to achieve its foreign policy goals, demonstrated most recently following the latest Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The EU is rapidly working towards reducing Russian energy imports, with Members of the European Parliament having already called for a full energy import ban, although some EU Member States' are in strong opposition. A ban on most oil imports is already in place.



## New security and hybrid threats

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked invasion in Ukraine, drawing widespread global condemnation. While indicators do not yet reflect Russia's 2022 aggression against Ukraine, Russia ranks 125th on violent conflict. Deteriorating Russian relations with the EU and NATO worsened after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Online disinformation campaigns and severe restrictions on independent media and journalists have had a severe impact on public opinion. Russia has excellent cyber-attack capabilities and also scores highly on the cybersecurity indicator, ranking ninth globally.

## EU involvement

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU applied sweeping sanctions on Russia, including individual restrictive measures, economic sanctions, restrictions on media, among others. The EU also took the unprecedented step of financing military assistance for Ukraine (including lethal) from a joint off-budget fund, the European Peace Facility, amounting to a total of €2 billion. Prior to February 2022, tensions also arose from Russia's interference in EU democratic processes, disinformation campaigns, and intelligence activities, as well as the attempted assassination and imprisonment of opposition leader Alexei Navalny. The EU previously applied sanctions against Russia for its violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity, as well as for cyber-attacks, the use of chemical weapons and human rights violations.



<sup>3</sup> Please note the ranking does not take into account the Russian invasion of Ukraine as data collected refer to the 2021 period.

## Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia ranks 73rd in the Normandy Index. It is enmeshed in several regional conflicts, most directly in neighbouring Yemen, and is facing increasing opposition, both domestically and internationally, due to its limited democratic space and poor human rights record.

## Background and key issues

Saudi Arabia has been engaged in a [decades-long proxy war with Iran](#) since the Iranian revolution of 1979. The Shia Iranian regime, headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, encouraged other Shia Muslims in neighbouring countries to overthrow their rulers; a call unsuccessfully taken up by the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia. This proxy war for regional hegemony has played out in several conflicts in the [Middle East](#), including in Lebanon, Iraq and perhaps most directly, in Yemen. The conflict in Yemen started in 2014, as a domestic Iranian-backed Houthi rebel uprising against a repressive Sunni-led government. The Yemeni government cause in fighting the rebels was quickly taken up by Saudi Arabia, which led a coalition of international forces to take back control. According to [UN estimates](#), by the end of 2021, the conflict in Yemen had caused over 377 000 deaths, with 60 % of them the result of hunger, lack of healthcare and unsafe water.



## New security and hybrid threats

The Houthis have used [ballistic missiles](#) and drones to attack Saudi Arabia, including the country's oil infrastructure. Besides the [ongoing conflict](#) in Yemen, Saudi Arabia faces longer-term challenges from its very limited democratic space. After Mohammed Bin Salman was appointed Crown Prince in 2017, he instituted several economic and social reforms, which many had hoped would also lead to greater democratic freedom. However, this has [failed to materialise](#). The Kingdom, which has a poor [human rights record](#), has repeatedly come under scrutiny for its treatment of dissidents, human rights activists, including women's rights activists, and independent clerics. The country permits no

independent media and ranked 166th in the [2022 World Press Freedom Index](#).

## EU involvement



In 1988, the EU entered into a [cooperation agreement](#) with the Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), which comprises Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A regular EU-GCC dialogue aims to strengthen the stability of countries in the strategically important Gulf region, broaden economic and technical cooperation and strengthen existing cooperation on energy, industry, trade and services, agriculture, fisheries, investment, science, technology and the environment. The EU and Saudi Arabia [signed](#) a [cooperation arrangement](#) in 2021. Moreover, in May 2022, the EU adopted plans to create a [strategic partnership](#) with the GCC countries, aimed at strengthening relations in six key policy areas, including the green transition and sustainable energy security, as well as regional stability and global security. The EU, and the [European Parliament](#) in particular, have been critical of Saudi Arabia's [human rights](#) record and have condemned and expressed grave concerns over [Saudi Arabia's role in Yemen](#).

## Serbia

Serbia ranks 30th in the Normandy Index, with a score in line with the Western Balkan regional average. In addition to high scores on terrorism and energy insecurity, the country is facing urgent challenges, such as the normalisation process with Kosovo,<sup>4</sup> resilience to disinformation and democratic processes.

## Background and key issues

The 1990s break-up of the former Yugoslavia remains a source of fragility in Serbia today, as it continues to affect relations with neighbours. Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations, as a basis for resolving bilateral problems, including the [Belgrade-Pristina dispute](#), are pre-conditions for Serbia's EU accession. Belgrade and Pristina have engaged in the EU-mediated dialogue since 2011. However, a comprehensive normalisation of relations remains out of reach, despite some encouraging developments, such as the [roadmap](#) for the supply of electricity to Serb-run municipalities in northern Kosovo, announced on 21 June 2022.



## New security and hybrid threats

[Strategic competition](#) and [disinformation campaigns](#) between global powers are on the rise in Serbia. Russia is a traditional geopolitical ally of the country and has provided diplomatic support to Belgrade, backing Serbia's position on non-recognition of Kosovo. In 2020, Russia provided vaccines, investment, economic and military aid. In return, Serbia [resisted](#) EU pressure to apply sanctions on Russia over its aggression in Ukraine. In addition, Serbia is a founding member of the [16+1 initiative](#), led by China. Due

to insufficient political dialogue between the ruling coalition and the opposition, the country [democracy rating](#) has also fallen. Serbia's (non-)alignment with EU foreign policy became evident in February 2022, when Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia joined the EU [sanctions](#) against Russia, while Montenegro [announced](#) it would adopt them in April. Serbia adopted [conclusions](#) in which it voiced support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but refrained from applying the EU sanctions. [Russia](#) remains Serbia's biggest arms supplier, although in increasing [competition with China](#). On 29 May 2022, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, announced an [agreement](#) on a new three-year gas supply contract with Russia.

## EU involvement

Serbia officially applied for EU membership on 22 December 2009. Serbia's [accession negotiations](#) began in 2014. Some 18 out of 35 chapters of the *acquis* have been opened, including all in [cluster 1](#) on the fundamentals, and two chapters have been provisionally closed. [Pre-accession support](#) for Serbia and other countries amounts to €12.9 billion for 2021-2027 (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III funds). Serbia and Kosovo have been engaged in the [EU-mediated dialogue](#) since 2011, following the adoption of the 2010 [UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298](#). On 20 April 2021, the European Commission and Austria [announced](#) the conclusion of agreements for the delivery of Covid-19 vaccines for the Western Balkan countries.



<sup>4</sup> This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

## Somalia

Somalia ranks 134th in the Normandy Index. It is significantly more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average and its performance is weaker for indicators including violent conflict, terrorism, resilience to disinformation, fragile state measures and climate change.

## Background and key issues

Somalia has struggled with the impact of civil war, which began in 1991, with the overthrow of dictator Siad Barre. The country is also responding to the jihadist and al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab insurgency that has plagued the country since 2008. In part as a result of this instability, the country is divided into autonomous and semi-autonomous regions. In the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#) Somalia ranks third worst, mainly due to Al-Shabaab activities. Somalia ranks second in the [Fragile States Index](#). This highlights the weakness of the central government, which has little practical control over much of its territory, in particular, but not only, in the self-declared state of Somaliland.



## New security and hybrid threats

In response to the weakness of the central government, Somalia has adopted a decentralised federal model. Somalia ranks 140th in the 2022 [World Press Freedom Index](#), being one of the most dangerous countries in Africa for journalists. Somalia is highly vulnerable to climate change and ranks as the country least adaptable to climate change, at the very bottom of the [Notre Dame Adaptation Index](#). Extreme [climate events](#) such as droughts and floods are exacerbating existing issues including intercommunal tensions and displacement. The [Climate Vulnerability Index](#) places Somalia as 173rd,

despite some efforts, such as the engagement to reduce green emissions by 30 % before 2030.

## EU involvement



Somalia is a major focus of the [EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa](#), which aligns various external policy programmes and instruments to tackle insecurity and its root causes in the area. Two EU military operations and one CSDP civil mission are based in Somalia: [EUNAVFOR operation Atalanta](#), [EUTM Somalia](#) and [EUCAP Somalia](#). While [EU direct naval action](#) has helped to secure the Coast of Somalia, international efforts to help improve Somali military and political governance, to which the EU has made a significant contribution, have yet to succeed. Somalia benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything but Arms](#)'. The EU aid to Somalia is financed primarily through the [European Development Fund](#), with up to €286 million for 2014-2020, of which more than one third was dedicated to peace- and state-building. Peace-building efforts are also financed by means of the [EU Trust Fund for Africa](#), for projects worth €312 million, with a view to mitigating the root causes of irregular migration. The EU has allocated €63 million in funding to Somalia through the IcSP for 2015-2020. Somalia also benefits from [Team Europe](#) support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

## South Africa

South Africa ranks 62nd in the Normandy Index, scoring higher than the sub-Saharan African average. While it is considered low-risk, and despite the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa still struggles with extremes of inequality and high crime rates.

## Background and key issues

South Africa consistently has one of the highest income inequality index scores in the world and approximately 25 % of the country's population live below the poverty line. Despite South Africa's strong democratic processes and status as the second largest African economy, it therefore ranks 79th in the [2022 Fragile States Index](#). South Africa's high violent crime rates also contribute to this fragility. The country's homicide rate, for example, is more than four times the sub-Saharan African average. South Africa ranked 73rd globally in the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#), facing no particular risk. In 1991, South Africa became the first country to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. Although South African [energy security](#) is generally much better than the sub-Saharan African average, the country is facing an energy crisis, including rolling blackouts, due to mismanagement at the state-owned enterprise Eskom and an ageing generating capacity.



95th on the [2022 Climate Vulnerability Index](#). In 2021, South Africa [committed](#) to carbon emission neutrality by 2050. Catastrophic [floods](#) and landslides hit KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape in April 2022, and rising temperatures are [expected](#) to hit the country hard in the long term.

## EU involvement



The EU [considers](#) South Africa one of its ten strategic partners in the world. Their strong relationship is based on the bilateral [Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement](#) (2000) and the [EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement](#) (provisionally in force since 2016). In 2021, the EU and South Africa agreed new [common objectives](#) for their development cooperation over the next seven years: sustainable, resilient, transformative and inclusive growth; reducing inequalities; and partnerships. The third objective includes the peace/security dimensions of promoting rule of law, partnerships and alliances to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls; peace negotiation, and international crime.

## South Korea

South Korea ranks 8th in the Normandy Index, making it the second best performing country in Asia after Singapore. The country performs very well in particular on climate change, crime, cybersecurity and democratic processes.

### Background and key issues

When the Korean War ended in 1953, the Republic of Korea counted among the [poorest](#) countries in the world. According to the [World Bank](#), its 2021 GDP per capita reached €34 757. The country ranks 23rd in the [Human Development Index](#) and [43rd](#) in the [World Press Freedom Index](#). South Korea also ranks [23rd in the EIU's Democracy Index](#). South Korea's First [Nationally Determined Contribution](#) announced at COP26 and submitted to the UNFCCC in December 2021 sets a [target to reduce emissions](#) by 40 % below 2018 levels by 2030. The revised Renewable Energy Law, passed in March 2021, strengthens South Korea's renewable portfolio standard, requiring major electricity utilities to increase their renewables share from 10 % by 2023, to 25 % by 2034. Faced with the ongoing military threat from North Korea (with a standing army of [1 469 000](#)), South Korea has a [standing army](#) of 613 000 and spends around [2.8 % of GDP](#) on defence.



### New security and hybrid threats

The ranking for cybersecurity in the [ITU index](#) is explained by South Korea's top score for legal measures, capacity development and cooperative measures and its very good score for technical and organisational measures. According to the [VDEM](#), South Korea is also one of the few countries not to have experienced violations of democratic standards at the beginning of the pandemic. On 29 September 2021, the Democratic Party, which currently holds a clear majority inside the Korean National Assembly, [decided not](#) to pursue

amendments to the press law which would undermine media freedom. South Korea is vulnerable in the [energy sector](#), as it imports almost 93.5 % of its energy and natural resource consumption. In 2018, Korea spent US\$1 459 billion on importing energy and resources equivalent to nearly 27.3 % of its total amount of imports.

### EU involvement



Trade and [diplomatic relations](#) between the EU and South Korea go back as far as 1963. Since 2010, South Korea is also one of the EU's main strategic partners in Asia. The [EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement](#) was not only the first of the EU's new generation trade agreements, but also the first [submitted to the European Parliament](#) for its consent, under the Treaty of Lisbon; it [entered into force](#) on 13 December 2015 (having applied provisionally from July 2011). South Korea is the EU's [ninth largest](#) export destination for goods, while the EU is South Korea's third largest export market. In 2019, the EU was the [largest foreign investor](#) in South Korea in cumulative terms; EU investment in South Korea stands at US\$122.8 billion. The EU and South Korea have a strong joint interest in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and work together in achieving lasting peace and stability. An agreement establishing a framework for South Korea's participation in EU crisis management operations was [signed](#) in 2014.

## Syria

Ranking 136th, Syria is the second least peaceful country in the world. With the exception of Afghanistan, Syria performs worse than the global average on every indicator, especially on democratic processes, terrorism, resilience to disinformation and violent conflict.

## Background and key issues

Syria's low position on the Normandy Index is largely due to the ongoing impact of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011. This war is [estimated](#) to have resulted in over half a million deaths and has caused massive population displacement and destruction of infrastructure. Nearly 5.7 million Syrians are [registered as refugees](#) in neighbouring countries, and an estimated 6.7 million are [internally displaced](#); an estimated [14.6 million](#) people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria. Several regional players, in particular Iran, [Turkey](#) and Russia, intervene in the ongoing civil war. The level of violence has now receded, and deaths from terrorism in Syria decreased by a third in 2021 (from 2020), to 488 deaths, with the fall in terror-related deaths largely due to the defeat of ISIL/Da'esh. However, Syria still ranks 5th in the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#) and continues to suffer the long-term effects of instability as a result of the conflict.



## New security and hybrid threats

The war and the extreme fragility of President Bashar al-Assad's regime has devastated Syria and diminished the country's social and economic capital, setting the country on 'a [trajectory](#) towards protracted instability'. The economy is in a dire state, with the local [currency](#) losing 99 % of its pre-war value against the US\$, and there is [rampant inflation](#), worsening already high food insecurity. Some 90 % of Syrians inside Syria live in [poverty](#) and 60 % (12.4 million people) suffer from food insecurity. Syria is the 65th [most vulnerable](#) country to climate change and the 7th least prepared; 2021 saw [unprecedented](#) water shortages. Turkey is [threatening](#) another invasion to establish a 'safe zone' along the northwest Syrian border.

## EU involvement



The EU suspended cooperation with the Syrian government under the European Neighbourhood policy in 2011, in response to the violent repression of anti-government protests. In parallel, the EU has adopted sanctions against the Assad regime. The EU and its Member States are the largest contributors to the international response to the Syrian conflict, having [mobilised](#) over €27.4 billion since 2011, for humanitarian aid inside Syria and in the region (Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey), most recently in the context of the sixth Brussels Conference on '[Supporting the future of Syria and the Region](#)'. Assistance has been adapted to respond to the [coronavirus outbreak](#), including the delivery of vaccines. The EU has [supported](#) the [UN-led intra-Syrian negotiations](#) towards a genuine political transition. The EU is of the view that the [presidential elections](#) that took place in Syria on 26 May 2021, winning Bashar al-Assad a [fourth term as Syria's President](#), met none of the criteria of a genuinely democratic vote and do not contribute to the settlement of the conflict.

## Thailand

Thailand ranks 84th in the Normandy Index. Rapid economic growth has lifted the country from the low-income to upper-middle bracket in just a few decades, but its development has been marred by political instability and recurrent military coups.

## Background and key issues

A long-running insurgency in Muslim-majority southern Thailand has claimed [over 7 000 lives](#) since 2004. However, violence has been on a downwards trend for several years, and 2020 was relatively quiet, although this was partly due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Peace talks between government and main rebel group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), have been ongoing since January 2020, but with no sign of a breakthrough. There is [little evidence](#) that ISIL/Da'esh has significant influence in southern Thailand. In the [Global Terrorism Index](#), Thailand ranks 22nd, with the worst score in the Asia-Pacific region. The deadliest terrorist incident in recent years was the 2015 [bombing](#) of the Erawan Shrine in Bangkok, which claimed 20 lives; two Chinese Uyghurs were charged with the attack.



## New security and hybrid threats

Recent years have seen frequent [clashes](#) between reformers and pro-monarchy conservatives. After five years of military rule, elections in 2019 installed a nominally civilian government, continuing the rule of the former junta. Since 2020, there have been large-scale but mostly peaceful protests demanding the resignation of the government and reform of the monarchy. Reflecting restrictions on freedom of expression, Thailand ranks 115th in the [2022 Press Freedom Index](#). A dynamic 'tiger economy' lifted millions out of poverty, but in recent years growth has stalled. The [2022 Fragile States Index](#) ranks Thailand in 86th place, with political instability and the role of the military

identified as particular areas of weakness. Thailand's energy policy currently [focuses](#) on reducing energy dependencies, seen as a big challenge.

## EU involvement



After the 2014 military coup, the EU broke off talks with Thailand on a partnership and cooperation agreement and a free trade agreement. The restoration of civilian rule in 2019 opened the door to [renewed engagement](#); talks have resumed on the partnership and cooperation agreement, and are expected to resume soon on the free trade agreement. The overall EU approach to bilateral relations with Thailand is set in the [Council Conclusions of 2019](#). Thailand participates in a number of EU international [programmes](#) such as Erasmus+ and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. EU bilateral aid includes projects supporting Thai exporters, refugees from Myanmar, and workers in the fisheries sector. The EU is Thailand's fourth [trading partner](#) (after China, Japan and the USA), accounting for 7.5 % of the country's total trade. Thailand is the EU's 26th largest trading partner worldwide. The EU is the second-largest investor in Thailand after Japan. Thailand is also an important member of [ASEAN](#), cooperating with EU in multilateral fora.

## Tunisia

Tunisia ranks 59th in the Normandy Index. It is considered less at risk than the MENA country average. Its performance is stronger than the MENA average for the indicator measuring energy insecurity, climate change and violent conflicts.

## Background and key issues

Since the removal of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali during the Jasmine Revolution of 2011, Tunisia has undergone a range of democratic reforms. The fallout from the 2011 revolution has, however, pushed the country up the [Fragile States Index](#), from 118th place in 2010, to 93rd in 2022. Tunisia has also been [affected](#) by instability and conflict in the region, in particular in neighbouring Libya. Economic growth has been subdued and unemployment persistently high, with much higher rates among women and young people. The dissolution of the government and the Assembly of People's Representatives by President Kaïs Saïed in July 2021 was supposedly designed to tackle corruption and general dissatisfaction with political elites. A constitutional referendum [took](#) place on 25 July 2022, a year to the day after Saïed seized broad powers in a move his opponents have called a coup. There is an expectation that this referendum, and the parliamentary elections to follow at the end of the year, will address the socio-economic and political concerns of a population deeply disenchanted with the political establishment.



## New security and hybrid threats

Tunisia ranked 94th out of 180 countries in the [Press Freedom Index](#), falling 21 places in one year, since President Saïed's coup. The country ranks well in energy security, as it [currently sources](#) approximately 85 % of its needs from domestic oil and gas. Energy is heavily subsidised, however the country's reserves are expected to decline, leading to a sharp rise in energy prices. In April 2022, Energy Ministry [announced](#) a 3 % monthly rise in fuel prices, corresponding to a 30 % annual increase by the end of 2022. The heterogeneous [regional development](#) and equality gap between the north and south of the country is a permanent

source of internal instability. A disillusioned youth, as well as an economically fragile population in the south, is inclined to anti-government rebellion and also terrorist action. In 2015, the country suffered two major terrorist attacks in tourist hotspots, leading to a drastic [decline](#) in the tourist economy. In 2020, three people died in a suicide bombing attack near the US embassy. Tunisia ranked 38th in the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#).

## EU involvement



The EU-Tunisia Association Agreement was signed in 1995. The 2011 revolution marked a turning point in [EU-Tunisia relations](#) and led to the establishment of a privileged partnership in 2012. Between 2011 and 2017, EU assistance to Tunisia amounted to €2.4 billion. The EU and Tunisia are also currently negotiating a free trade agreement. From 2017 to 2020, the EU's bilateral assistance averaged €300 million per year. Tunisia is also eligible for funding under the IcSP and Erasmus+. On 10 September 2020, HR/VP Josep Borrell met President Saïed in Carthage. Following the announcement of the referendum and new elections in 2022, the European External Action Service (EEAS) [stated](#) that the EU was monitoring the situation in the country and 'took note' of the decisions made by its president. On 12 February 2022, Borrell [outlined](#) the possibility of suspending macro-financial assistance to Tunisia.

## Turkey

Turkey ranks 114th in the Normandy Index, a ranking that reflects substantial security threats, failures on democratic processes and risks of terrorism and conflicts.

### Background and key issues

The failed [military coup](#) in 2016 was followed by constitutional reform and strengthening of the presidential regime, [repression](#) of political opposition and participation in foreign conflicts and maritime disputes in the [eastern Mediterranean](#) with EU Member states. Turkey ranks 62nd in the [Fragile States Index](#) and 23rd on the impact of terrorism in the [2022 Global Terrorism Index](#). This ranking reflects attacks by ISIL/Da'esh and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant Kurdish separatist group. Democratic failures and bilateral conflicts have effectively frozen accession negotiations with EU, as well as modernisation of the [EU-Turkey customs union](#).



### New security and hybrid threats

Turkey is faced with major insecurities, having been involved in foreign [military interventions](#) in Syria in September 2019, in Libya in January 2020, and in northern Iraq throughout 2020. The country's resilience to disinformation score is amongst the lowest globally, reflective of its ranking at 149th in the [Press Freedom Index](#). This is primarily due to severe censorship of criticism of the government and threats against journalists. Turkey has a 74 % [import dependency](#) to meet its energy demand. The signature of the November 2019 [Memorandum of Understanding](#) on delimitation of maritime zones between Turkey and

Libya has increased instability in the eastern Mediterranean. A Turkish lira in free-fall, as well as political interventions in monetary policy decisions, destabilised the macro-economic situation further, resulting in deteriorating investor confidence and galloping annual [inflation](#) at 79 %. In July 2022, [Fitch](#) cut Turkey's credit rating deeper into junk territory, downgrading it to B from B+.

### EU involvement


Turkey has been in a [customs union](#) with the EU since 1995 and an [accession country](#) since 2005. For 2014 to 2020, around €4.5 billion was allocated to Turkey, of which approximately €3.5 billion came from the [Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance \(IPA\)](#). Relations between Turkey and the EU have deteriorated in recent years. In 2017, the co-legislators agreed to cut pre-accession funds owing to failing democratic standards. In 2020, following Turkey's military action in [Syria](#) and [Libya](#) and illegal drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean, the EU decided to put Turkey's EU accession application on hold. The [EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis](#), created in 2014, allocated around €500 million to Turkey for refugees. Turkey has also received approximately €6 billion in EU aid under the [EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey](#), launched in 2016. In 2020, to alleviate the burden of the coronavirus pandemic, small-scale health infrastructure and equipment worth €90 million was procured for Turkey under the Facility. Two programmes under the Facility: the emergency social safety net and conditional cash transfers for education, were [extended](#) until 2022. In 2022, Turkey played an internationally appreciated role of mediator in the war in Ukraine.

## Ukraine


Ukraine ranks 102nd in the Normandy Index. Since February 2022, Russia's war of aggression is causing deep disruption in the human, economic and political domains. The EU remains committed to providing further military support to help Ukraine exercise its inherent right of self-defence.

## Background and key issues

In 2013, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's decision not to sign an association agreement with the EU sparked major [pro-European protests](#) in Ukraine. In February 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to impeach Yanukovich, who fled Kyiv. Russia responded by annexing the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, launching a hybrid war against Ukraine, including limited military aggression in eastern Ukraine and [repetitive](#) military build-ups at the country eastern borders. Up to January 2022, the conflict has cost over [14 000](#) lives on both sides. Torture and inhuman treatment by Ukraine's armed forces were [reported](#) by OSCE in April 2016. Russia launched a full-scale war on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, in total violation of international law. Since then over 5.8 million refugees have been registered in EU Member States ([UNHCR](#), July 2022).



## New security and hybrid threats



Even before the outbreak of war in 2022, Ukraine had the 16th lowest score in violent conflict globally. [Currently](#) Ukraine has lost control of around 20 % of its territory, mainly the regions bordering the Azov Sea, the major part of the Donbas and Luhansk, and large parts of the Black Sea coastline, but has [regained](#) control around Kyiv, including Chernobyl. [Partisan warfare](#) continues on territories under Russia's control. The war has [caused](#) the loss of thousands of lives lost and massive destruction of infrastructure, including civilian housing. According to a May 2022 [World Bank](#) assessment, the Ukrainian economy is expected to shrink by [45 %](#) in 2022 (with 22.5 % inflation expected), while at the same time

[military expenditure](#) remains high, tightening further the resources available for social needs, with over [7 million](#) people displaced internally. As war has disrupted both production and distribution of electricity, with Europe's biggest [nuclear](#) power plant at Zaporizhzhya [occupied](#) by Russia, [energy](#) insecurity remains a serious concern.

## EU involvement



To date, EU-Ukraine relations are based on an [Association Agreement](#), including a DCFTA, signed in 2014. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU introduced broad [sanctions](#) against Russia. The EU Member States are [supporting](#) Ukraine with military deliveries worth [€2 billion](#) to date, under the new [European Peace Facility](#). Since the Russian invasion, the EU has mobilised around [€4.1 billion](#) to support Ukraine's economic, social and financial resilience. The European Commission is considering exceptional macro-financial assistance (MFA) for Ukraine of €9 billion. The EU and European financial institutions' support for Ukraine for 2014-2021 was worth more than [€17 billion](#). To support Ukraine's [cybersecurity](#), the EU activated Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Cyber Rapid Response Teams in February 2022. Similarly, to lessen [energy](#) insecurity in Ukraine, its power grid was synchronised with the continental European power grid in March 2022. Finally, in June 2022, EU leaders [agreed](#) to recognise Ukraine's European perspective and decided to grant the country [EU accession candidate](#) status.

## United States of America

The USA ranks 82nd in the Normandy Index. It poses and faces new threats in the WMD domain, as it has withdrawn from treaties designed to keep nuclear arsenals in check and continues to experience a rise in right-wing and lone-wolf terrorism.

### Background and key issues

The United States ranked 129th out of 163 countries in the [Global Peace Index](#) in 2022, falling from 122nd place in 2021. Large military expenditure relative to GDP, continued engagement in external conflicts, high levels of weaponry imports and exports, considerable incarceration rates, and ongoing partisan disagreement about the functioning of the country's democratic institutions, all contribute to the continued low level of peacefulness relative to other high-income countries. The USA has the highest rate of gun-violence amongst this group of countries. In 2021, [20 934 firearm homicides](#) and 692 mass shootings were committed inside the USA, the [highest number](#) of gun-related fatalities in the past two decades.



### New security and hybrid threats

The USA is a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, however its 2019 withdrawal from the [Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty](#) (INF) with Russia and 2020 withdrawal from the [Open Skies Treaty](#) were alarming new developments. Both Russia and the USA will now be able to re-engage in the stationing of nuclear-capable missiles banned by the treaty, considered to be particularly [dangerous](#) for crisis stability. Although the [New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty](#) (START) between the two countries was set to expire in [February 2021](#), President Biden's new administration extended the New START Treaty for another five years, alleviating a significant nuclear threat. The USA has seen an overall [decrease](#) in fatalities from terrorism since 2002, but is suffering from an increase in far-right and lone-wolf terrorist activity. From January to August 2020, right-wing extremists committed [67 % of all terrorist attacks and plots](#), compared to [around 15 % in 2002](#).

### EU involvement


The USA is an EU strategic [partner](#) in the promotion of peace and security globally. In 2011, the USA signed a [Framework Partnership Agreement](#) on participation in CSDP operations; and has taken the [lead](#) on supplying weapons to Ukraine. US-EU cooperation also takes place through NATO, in the areas defined by the [NATO-EU](#) joint declaration. The USA and EU NATO-members have cooperated in Afghanistan, Libya and in Ukraine. On counter-terrorism, bilateral agreements include: an [Operational Agreement](#) between the USA and Europol, the EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) [Agreement](#), and the EU-US Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement. The EU-US [Umbrella Agreement](#) provides a framework of rules governing transatlantic data exchange. At parliamentary level, the EU and USA hold a regular dialogue, the [Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue](#). In December 2020, the EU put forward a new [transatlantic agenda for global change](#), which includes, among other things, new forms of cooperation in trade and technology, democracy, security and on the environment. The [EU-US Trade and Technology Council](#) and [EU-US dialogue on security and defence](#) were launched in 2021. A joint Task Force to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian fossil fuels and strengthen European energy security was [announced](#) on 25 March 2022.

## Venezuela

Venezuela ranks 123rd in the Normandy Index and is considered more at risk than the South American average. It performs worse on every indicator except energy insecurity at regional level, with international sanctions exacerbating the situation in this domain.

## Background and key issues

Since 2010, Venezuela has seen an economic and political [downturn](#) caused by a heavy reliance on oil exports and excess national spending. President Nicolás Maduro was re-elected in May 2018, in elections contested owing to irregularities in the way the results were announced. Claims to the presidential seat have been disputed, notably by the leader of the main opposition party, Juan Guaidó. Legislative elections – [not recognised](#) by the EU and other international actors – were held in December 2020, giving President Maduro control of Parliament. From 2013 to 2021, Venezuela fell by 54 places in the [Fragile States Index](#), largely as a result of falling state legitimacy and increased group grievances. Venezuela has one of the highest [homicide](#) rates globally.



## New security and hybrid threats

Emigration from Venezuela has reached massive levels, creating a [humanitarian crisis](#) in the region. Venezuelans have become the [second largest group](#) of displaced people in the world. To date there are over 190 000 registered refugees from Venezuela and over 6 million Venezuelans are displaced without formal refugee status. Venezuela has the largest known [oil reserves](#) in the world, and for decades was a major exporter. However, international sanctions and a deteriorating infrastructure make it difficult to access the oil, even within the country. At the same time, due to underinvestment and bad governance, [power outages](#) plague the population, with dire consequences adding

to the country's major humanitarian crisis. Adding to the many facets of the lack of democracy in the country, the Maduro regime has used [digital disinformation](#) as a political strategy and continues to crack down on [journalists](#) and freedom of expression.

## EU involvement


In the context of the current political and economic crisis, the EU supported the failed dialogue efforts between the government and the parliamentary majority, and reiterated the need for free and transparent [elections](#) in 2018, and again [in 2020](#). It also imposed [targeted sanctions](#) and an embargo on arms and related material that could be used for internal repression. By the end of 2019, [EU assistance](#) in the refugee and migrant crisis totalled over €170 million for measures both internally and outside Venezuela, including €15 million for stability and peace. Venezuela has benefited from 10 [IcSP projects](#) (totalling more than €21 million). In 2020, the EU [promoted](#) an International Donors' Conference to help Venezuelan refugees and migrants, pledging an additional [€147 million](#) for them in 2021. It established an [International Contact Group on Venezuela](#), which is working to [facilitate conditions](#) for a [peaceful and democratic solution](#) to the Venezuelan crisis and the rapid delivery of [humanitarian aid](#). On 21 January 2021, the European Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) on the latest developments in the National Assembly of Venezuela. The EU deployed an EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe the regional and local [elections](#) of November 2021.

## Yemen


Yemen ranks 135th in the Normandy Index, making it the third least peaceful country in the world. The conflict between the Saudi-backed government and Iran-backed Houthi forces that erupted in 2014 has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions and created severe food shortages. A truce negotiated in April 2022 has been extended, but violations are frequent.

## Background and key issues

Yemen has suffered [decades](#) of internal conflict, economic mismanagement and extreme weather conditions. A popular uprising in 2011 led authoritarian President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down. Taking advantage of the ensuing period of [political instability](#), the Houthi movement, tied to the Shia Muslim minority and supported by Iran, took control over northern parts of the country in 2014, thus sparking a [civil war](#) with the Yemeni Government backed by Saudi Arabia. An [estimated](#) 151 000 people have since been killed and 4.3 million [displaced](#) as a direct result of the [conflict](#). Furthermore, over 226 000 people are believed to have died due to the indirect consequences of the war, including food shortages and a lack of health services. Yemen ranks 21st in the [2021 Global Terrorism Index](#). Both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIL/Da'esh are active in Yemen.



## New security and hybrid threats



Yemen has ranked first in the [Fragile States Index](#) for the past three years. This is mainly due to the lack of central government control in large swathes of its northern and western territories, dominated by Houthi forces. The compounded threats of a fragile state and violent conflict have exacerbated issues including food and health shortages. By December 2022, a record 19 million people are expected to be unable to meet their [minimum food needs](#), and 7.3 million people will experience emergency levels of hunger. Yemen imports about a third of its [wheat](#) from Ukraine. As prices for wheat have risen as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, experts warn of a 'mass famine in

Yemen on a never-before-seen scale'. The country ranks 172nd in the [2022 Notre Dame Adaptability Index](#), a reflection of high vulnerability to climate change coupled with low levels of preparedness.

## EU involvement

Some 20 million Yemenis are currently in need of [humanitarian assistance](#). Since the beginning of the war in 2015, the EU has [contributed](#) over €1.2 billion to respond to the crisis in Yemen. This includes €827 million in humanitarian aid and €407 million in development assistance. In 2022, the EU allocated a further €135 million in humanitarian aid. The EU humanitarian aid includes food assistance, health care, education, water, and shelter. It also includes improved hygiene services in areas of high food insecurity and malnutrition, conflict-affected areas, and to displaced populations. The [EU humanitarian air bridge](#) has delivered medical equipment to help Yemen respond to the coronavirus pandemic, and the EU has also delivered Covid-19 vaccines to the country.

## 5. ANNEX – The Normandy Index: Methodology

This annex explains the components and the methodology of the index developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace.

### **Normandy Index of the European Parliament – Methodology**

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## 5.1. The Normandy Index Methodology

### 5.1.1. Background

Humanity is now facing challenges unparalleled in its history. The Covid-19 pandemic caused an immediate worldwide crisis and crystallised the interconnectivity of a globalised world. This is occurring against a backdrop of 'mega trends' caused by climate change, ever-decreasing biodiversity, depletion of the earth's fresh water, and overpopulation. All of these are taking place in a time of great socio-political uncertainty, with shifting power dynamics amongst global superpowers, the breakdown of traditional alliances and a widespread crisis of democracy.

Such challenges, whether short- or long-term, call for global solutions and require cooperation on a scale unprecedented in human history. In a hyper-connected world, the sources of many of these challenges are multidimensional, increasingly complex and span national borders.

These challenges, if not addressed, increase the strain on resources, infrastructure and society, all of which can affect levels of peace in nations and the world. The United Nations and World Bank *Pathways for Peace Report*, released in 2018, recognised the interconnectivity of these challenges and called for risks to be considered multi-dimensional in nature (World Bank & United Nations, 2018).

As a result of the [partnership](#) between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy in France, the 'Normandy Index' (NI) is produced on an annual basis since the initial edition launched in 2019. The purpose of the NI is to produce a measurement tool to allow policy-makers and civil society to grasp different aspects of the threats facing the globe. It aims at capturing threats to peace and offering insights into the multidimensional risks faced by countries. Annual updates allow the tool to track how dynamics shift from year to year and assess positive and negative changes in risks.

The Normandy Index has three main aims, to:

- assess the state of conflict and potential for conflict in each given country considering the current state and potential future state;
- provide a tool for measuring and monitoring trends across time;
- provide a mechanism to link the resulting categories of threat with a ranking of 'state and risk of conflict' that can be quantified and used for policy-making purposes.

#### **Text Box 1 – The Normandy Index in context**

The NI is intended to contribute to the field in identifying the different factors that the European Parliament believes pose threats to peace in the coming years. As such, the NI captures and conveys a unique angle to existing composite indices, such as the Institute for Economics and Peace's (IEP) Global Peace Index (GPI).

The GPI produced annually by IEP, ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peace as defined by the absence of violence and absence of fear of violence (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a). It is as such a measure of levels of **negative** peace today. The IEP also explores the **positive** aspects of peace in its Positive Peace Index (PPI), which measures the levels within the 163 countries of the attitudes, institutions and structures that are known to create and sustain peaceful societies (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019c).

Both the GPI and PPI measure levels of peace in the world **today**. The NI however captures **threats** to peace in the world today, making it a useful contribution to the suite of tools used for quantitative analysis of peace and security.

**The Normandy Index (NI) covers 137 countries and regions. The EU is considered one bloc and is given the average score of each country member.**

### 5.1.2. Methodology Overview

In the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the EU prioritised a number of domains as being threats to peace in the coming years (European Union, 2016).

Each domain is in and of itself a complex system with multiple, interconnecting dimensions that are hard to quantify. Recognising this, the NI seeks to simplify many of these domain concepts by selecting one key representative indicator, rather than delving into the more complex and subjective exercise of selecting, weighting and aggregating multiple indicators for each domain. The indicators selected for each domain were based on current academic and policy literature, data availability, and in consultation with the European Parliament. (Table 1 presents the indicators selected to capture these domains).

**TABLE 1 – Normandy Index – indicators**

IEP research is directly relevant to the Normandy Index (NI).

Domain	Indicators	Definition	Source	Number of countries covered	Latest year of data
Climate Change	INFORM Global Risk index	INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters.	United Nations	191	2022
Cybersecurity	Cybersecurity Index	The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a survey measure capturing the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity in order to raise awareness. It is the only open source Cybersecurity Index available.	International Telecommunication Union	194	2020
Democratic Processes	Participatory democracy index	A measure of the extent that the ideal of participatory democracy achieved within a country.	VDEM	179	2021
Economic Crises	Financial vulnerability - Non-performing loans as % of total loans	Nonperforming loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of nonperforming loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.	World Bank	143	2021
	Central government debt, total (% of GDP)	Central government debt, total (% of GDP)	International Monetary Fund	135	2022
Energy Insecurity	Energy imports	Energy imports, net (% of energy use). Banded to be 0 if country is a net exporter of energy.	World Bank, Enerdata	143	2019
	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	World Bank	142	2019
Fragile States	Fragile States Index	The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact	Fund For Peace	179	2021

		their levels of fragility. The index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data – quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation – are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI.			
Crime	Homicide rate per 100 000 people	Homicide rate per 100 000 people – used as a proxy for crime	UNODC	192	2018
	Perceptions of criminality banded	Responses to the Gallup question 'Do you feel safe walking alone'	Gallup/IEP	163	2022
Resilience to disinformation	Resilience to disinformation	A measure of how often domestic and foreign governments and political parties use social media and advertising to spread disinformation within a country.	VDEM	179	2021
Terrorism	Global Terrorism Index	A composite score providing an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by terrorism.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2022
Violent Conflict	Conflict sub-indicators of the Global Peace Index	Worst score of the following indicators from the Global Peace Index: (1) Intensity of Internal Conflict, (2) Deaths from Internal Conflict (3) Number of Internal conflicts, (4) Intensity of External Conflict, (5) Deaths from External Conflict  This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries that are signatories to non-proliferation treaties score better in this indicator	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2022
WMD	Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Indicator from the Global Peace Index.	The Nuclear Threat Index assesses countries' progress on nuclear security, highlights security gaps, and recommends actions for governments to better protect nuclear materials and facilities and build an effective global nuclear security architecture.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2022
	Nuclear Threat Index		EIU	176	2018

The 2016 EU Global Strategy also discusses the importance of **hybrid threats** in coming years. Hybrid threats combine conventional and unconventional, military and non-military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific political objectives. They can range from cyberattacks on critical information systems, through to the disruption of critical services such as energy supplies or financial services, to the undermining of public trust in government institutions or the deepening of social divisions. Given the combined nature of hybrid threats, it is not possible to capture the risk posed to a country in any one measure. By capturing the potential components of hybrid threats in the NI domains, no separate 'hybrid threat' domain is calculated.

### 5.1.3. Detailed Domain and Indicator Descriptor

## Domain 1 – Climate Change

### Indicator: INFORM Global Risk index – Natural Disaster Risk Sub-indicator

**Full Description:** The INFORM Global Risk Index gives an annual per country score between zero and ten, where ten is 'very high risk'.

**Rationale:** INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters, based on three dimensions of hazard and exposure, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity. It recognises climate change and the risks associated with it as having both natural and man-made components, and that the risk resulting from climate change is also dependent on how countries are able to cope with the effects of climate change.

**Source:** INFORM (European Commission, 2019)

**URL:** <http://www.inform-index.org/>

## Domain 2 - Cybersecurity

### Indicator: Global Cybersecurity Index

**Full Description:** The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a measure of the commitment of International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Member States to cybersecurity, assessed along five dimensions: legal measures; technical measures; organisational measures; capacity building; and, cooperation.

**Rationale:** The threat from cybersecurity can only be countered by a systemic and cross-sectoral regulatory approach grounded in technological capabilities. If a country is not currently taking active steps to protect financial and physical infrastructure, personal or government data, it leaves itself open to attack. Examining the action and measures a country takes to try and minimise threats from cyber-attacks, via this GCI, is a viable, open source-quantified measure of future threat.

**Source:** ITU (International Telecommunication Union, 2017)

**URL:** <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/global-cybersecurity-index.aspx>

## Domain 3 – Democratic Processes

### Indicator: Participatory Democracy Index

**Full Description:** The Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) database is a set of country level indicators of political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; the state; and the body politic.

The Participatory Democracy Index used in the NI is a measure of the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy achieved within a country.

**Rationale:** Democratic processes are widely recognised as contributing to peace. Well-functioning democracies themselves have institutions to deal with societal grievances in a non-violent way. It is also believed democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflict with other democracies.

Democratic countries on average have the highest levels of peace globally in the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a). Furthermore, with the exception of relatively infrequent 'black swan' political or conflict events, a country's current democratic status tends to be a good predictor of future democratic status.

**Source:** Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) (University of Gothenburg, 2020)

**URL:** <https://www.v-dem.net/>

## Domain 4 – Economic Crises

### **Indicator: Financial Vulnerability – Non-performing loans as % of total loans**

**Full Description:** Nonperforming loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of nonperforming loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.

**Rationale:** Non-performing loans are a good predictor of financial crises, with broader social consequences. Most immediately, high levels of debt may affect the state's ability to provide basic public services, which in turn is a key source of legitimacy for a government. Excess borrowing, particularly external debt, means increased exposure to global market risks, and creditor decisions, both of which can make a state vulnerable to external economic shock (Weltwirtschaftsforum & Zurich Insurance Group, 2019). Unsustainable borrowing and debt may exacerbate underlying societal cleavages, particularly if real or perceived inequalities grow.

**Source:** World Bank (World Bank, 2020, Trading Economics, 2021)

**URL:** <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS>

### **Indicator: General government net debt (% GDP)**

**Full Description:** General government net debt to GDP ratio is calculated by using the value of general government net debt as the numerator and the total GDP as the denominator.

**Rationale:** Sovereign debt crises have been found to be correlated with civil unrest (Reinhart, 2010), and some argue that sovereign debt crisis followed by extreme austerity measures were a contributing factor to the outbreak of World War II in Germany, and genocide in Rwanda (Goldmann, 2012).

**Source:** International Monetary Fund

**URL:** <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April>

## Domain 5 – Energy Insecurity

### **Indicator: Energy Imports**

**Full Description:** Energy imports, net (% of energy use).

**Rationale:** Energy independence, that is self-reliance on domestic sources of energy including oil, natural gas, other minerals as well as clean energy sources, has been a defining component of

energy security since at least the oil price crisis of October 1973 (Cohen et al., 2011). Although it is but one aspect of energy security, along with measures such as source diversity and distance to consumption, it is a measure for which open source, comparable data exists at a global scale, and is hence minimally sufficient to capture the conceptual threat of energy insecurity.

The IEP has supplemented the World Bank data with more recent data obtained from the 2020 Global Energy Statistical Yearbook. This covers 60 countries up to 2019.

**Source:** World Bank (World Bank, 2020, Enerdata, 2021)

**URL:** <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/eg.imp.cons.zs>

<https://yearbook.enerdata.net/>

**Indicator:** Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)

**Full Description:** Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)

**Rationale:** Countries that consume more energy and have high dependence on imports will be more fragile than countries with a different profile.

**Source:** World Bank (World Bank, 2022)

**URL:** <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC>

## Domain 6 – Fragile States

**Indicator: Fragile States Index**

**Full Description:** A score between 0 and 120, where 120 is the highest level of fragility. Each country is scored annually based on 12 conflict risk indicators grouped into four dimensions: cohesion, economic, political and social.

**Rationale:** The Fragile States Index is based on a conflict assessment framework – known as 'CAST' – that was developed by FFP nearly a quarter of a century ago for assessing the vulnerability of states to collapse. The CAST framework was designed to measure this vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations, and continues to be used widely by policy-makers, field practitioners, and local community networks. The methodology uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators, relies on public source data, and produces quantifiable results.

**Source:** Fund for Peace (The Fund for Peace, 2020)

**URL:** <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>

## Domain 7 – Criminality/Homicide

**Indicator: Homicide rate**

**Full Description:** Country Homicide rate per 100 000 population

**Rationale:** High homicide rates are associated with high risks to security of persons within a country and reflects a diminished capacity of government to perform its duties to protect people within its borders.

The EU Global Strategy highlights trans-border crime as a significant potential threat to peace in the world. Transnational organised crime, by its very nature, affects all countries. The nature of trans-border crimes vary greatly, from Class A drug smuggling to human trafficking. Crime recording varies from country to country, and no single database captures interdictions of trans-border crimes. While UNODC publish a 'transnational organized crime threat assessment', these are meant to be applied at the local level and do not provide a platform to be able to create a globally comparative ranking of countries.<sup>5</sup> Further complicating the issue is that the factors which enable trans-border crime also enable all other types of economic activity: communications, trade, interconnectedness, globalisation and new technologies.

In the absence of a relative country measure for transnational/transborder crime, the NI uses a countries homicide rate per 100 000 people as a proxy for levels of crime. While this is a crude measure, the link between homicide and organised crime is widely explored,<sup>6</sup> it has been used in the literature as an indicator of organised crime in a country.<sup>7</sup>

**Source:** UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020)

**URL:** <https://dataunodc.un.org/>

### Indicator: Perceptions of Criminality

**Full Description:** Responses to the Gallup World Poll question: 'Do you feel safe walking alone?'

**Rationale:** Perceptions of criminality in a society affect citizens' sense of security and identity with broader implications to businesses, security spending and security policies. Perceptions of high levels of criminality can have a destabilising effect on the social contract between a government and its population. The Institute for Economics and Peace has found that the cost of violence containment, which is influenced by perceived threats, costs around US\$1 800 per person per year (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a).

**Source:** IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a)

**URL:** <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/>

A final country score is calculated by a weighted sum of 0.75 Homicide Rate + 0.25 Perceptions of Criminality.

## Domain 8 – Resilience to Disinformation

### Indicator: Resilience to Disinformation

**Full Description:** The Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) database has four indicators of the presence of disinformation:

- Government dissemination of false information domestic: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010

<sup>6</sup> (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011)

<sup>7</sup> (Alberto Alesina, 2019)

- Party dissemination of false information domestic: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?
- Foreign government dissemination of false information: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?
- Foreign government ads: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media in order to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

Each country is ranked on a Likert scale of (0) Extremely often, to (4) Never, or almost never. The Resilience to Disinformation indicator used in the NI is the country average of each of these four indicators.

**Rationale:** There is a growing concern over the ability of both state and non-state actors to not only restrict the free flow of information, but also to actively interfere in the functioning of civil society through the use of disinformation campaigns. Research into resilience to disinformation is a relatively new field of quantification with a number of emerging sources in recent years (Eurasian States in Transition Research Center, 2018; Global Disinformation Index, 2020). The NI will continually monitor the literature to build on these measures in forthcoming releases.

**Source:** Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) (University of Gothenburg, 2020)

**URL:** <https://www.v-dem.net/>

## Domain 9 – Terrorism

**Indicator:** Global Terrorism Index Score

**Full Description:** A composite score that provides an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by terrorism

**Rationale:** This is a core indicator of the multidimensional impact of terrorism on a country. This is the most reliable and consistent data source, available across more than 163 countries and updated on an annual basis, starting in 2001.

**Source:** IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019b)

**URL:** <http://www.visionofhumanity.org>

## Domain 10 – Violent Conflicts

**Indicator:** Violent Conflict

**Full Description:** A composite indicator of the number, intensity and fatalities of both internal and external violent conflicts.

**Rationale:** The Institute for Economics and Peace annual Global Peace Index measures the following four indicators relating to violent conflict:

## Number and Duration of Internal Conflicts

This indicator measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a specific country's legal boundaries. Information for this indicator is sourced from three datasets from: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset.

### Number of Deaths from Organised Internal Conflict

This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict. UCDP defines conflict as: 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year'. Statistics are compiled from the most recent edition of the IISS ACD, which has the following definition of armed conflict-related fatalities: 'Fatality statistics relate to military and civilian lives lost as a direct result of an armed conflict'.

### Number, Duration and Role in External Conflicts

This indicator measures the number and duration of extraterritorial conflicts in which a country is involved. Information for this indicator is sourced from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding all individual conflict scores where that country is involved as an actor in a conflict outside its legal boundaries. Conflicts are not counted against a country if they have already been counted against that country in the number and duration of internal conflicts indicator.

### Number of Deaths from Organised External Conflict

This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year'. When no data were provided, several alternative sources have been used: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database; the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, and the EIU.

Each of these are scored out of 1-5. The NI uses a country's worst score across all of these indicators for the Violent Conflict domain.

**Source:** IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019b)

**URL:** <http://www.visionofhumanity.org>

## Domain 11 – Weapons of Mass Destruction

**Indicator:** Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Indicator

**Full Description:** The Global Peace Index Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Score (**HWC**): a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries are given a score of 1 for low military capabilities. Nuclear countries are scored 5.

**Rationale:** This indicator is a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons.

**Source:** IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019b)

**URL:** <http://www.visionofhumanity.org>

**Indicator:** Nuclear Threat Index

**Full Description:** The Nuclear Threat Index assesses countries' progress on nuclear security, highlights security gaps, and recommends actions for governments to better protect nuclear materials and facilities and build an effective global nuclear security architecture.

Normandy Index Score is calculated by the minimum country score in the following three indicators:

1. Nuclear Threat 1: Scores for 22 countries with 1kg or more of weapons-useable nuclear materials
2. Nuclear Threat 2: Scores for 153 countries and Taiwan with <1kg of weapons-useable nuclear materials
3. Nuclear Sabotage: 46 countries and Taiwan with nuclear facilities including power plants and research reactors with a capacity >2MW

In addition, to capture potential fallout or tensions posed by a country by the Nuclear Threat of neighbouring or regional countries, the NI calculates a country score incorporates the average regional score.

A final country score is calculated by a weighted sum of 0.75 Country Score + 0.25 Regional Score.

**Source:** Economist Intelligence Unit

**URL:** <https://www.ntiindex.org/>

#### 5.1.4. Data Availability and Imputation

The methodology developed has been designed to align with other prominent global indicators, and substantial effort has been made to populate the index with the best existing country information. However, the major challenge to developing a harmonised composite index is in attempting to overcome the paucity of consistent and comprehensive data across very diverse countries around the world. They vary significantly not just in terms of demographic and geographic characteristics, but also in terms of socio-economic characteristics, which can often impact data collection and quality. The issue of data gaps is a common challenge to creating an index. The OECD recommend a number of statistical techniques for dealing with data imputation to fill in data gaps (OECD et al., 2008). Table 2 lists the approaches used in the NI. Using the combination of these techniques, the NI represents the use of the best possible data without an overly complex methodology.

**TABLE 2: Data Imputation methods**

Method	Description	Application in NI
Cold Deck Imputation	Replacing the missing value with a value from another source.	The NI uses this either when it uses the most recent data point in a series as the current data point, or uses additional country statistics to fill in gaps.
Hot Deck Imputation	Replacing the missing value with a regional average.	The NI uses hot deck imputation for data that is not available for all countries.

### 5.1.5. Weighting the Indicators

As the EU Global Strategy 2018 does not rank domains in order of priority, the NI uses **an equal weight of 1** across all domains, simplifying the calculation of the final NI score.

The only NI domain with more than one indicator is that of **Crime** which includes **Intentional homicides (per 100 000 people)** and **Perceptions of Criminality Banded**, which are weighted at 0.75 and 0.25 respectively.

### 5.1.6. Domain Calculations

This section illustrates how each indicator, and hence each domain is treated. The Domain process is in two stages: 1) data collection, and 2) imputation and banding.

Banding data in the case of the NI is a way of dealing with comparing otherwise incongruous information. It takes each indicator and scales them to a score between 0 and 1, relative to the whole data set. To do this, appropriate minimum and maximum values for the data set are decided such that anything below the minimum is assigned 0, and anything above the maximum is assigned 1, and everything else is scaled evenly between the two. Therefore, in year  $y$ , after data imputation, the banded score is calculated for indicator  $i$  by Equation 1.

#### **Equation 1: Banding Equation**

$$\text{Banded}_i = \frac{\text{Country Indicator Value in Year } y_i - \text{mininum cutoff}_i}{\text{maximum cutoff}_i - \text{mininum cutoff}_i}$$

Banding this way indicates the implicit assumption that higher levels of the indicator are better. However, higher levels of some indicators, such as the Global Terrorism Index score, represent a less desirable case for countries. In such cases, the banded score is reverse and is calculated by Equation 2.

#### **Equation 2: Reverse banding equation**

$$\text{Reverse Banded}_i = 1 - \frac{\text{Country Indicator Value in Year } y_i - \text{mininum cutoff}_i}{\text{maximum cutoff}_i - \text{mininum cutoff}_i}$$

The banded indicator score for each country is then the domain score, as each domain is measured by only one indicator. Each domain score lies between zero and one.

An integral part of this process is to set appropriate minimum and maximum cut-off values for the banded scores. There are empirical and normative methods available for doing this. While some data may be distributed normally and therefore lend itself well to standard and well-defined mathematical techniques such as defining outliers as those greater than three standard deviations from the mean, other data sets do not follow well-behaved trends. The final choice of which technique is used must depend on a number of considerations: the nature of the data, the underlying distribution, the purpose of the index, what information is being conveyed, etc. Upon investigation of the global datasets used in the YDI, very few of the distributions can be classified as normal. The presence of outliers affects not only the average, but the variance, skewing both the minimum and maximum.

To account for this, IEP in some instances set artificial minimums and maximums to ensure results are not too heavily influenced by outliers. In the cases where outliers are present, the lower bound set for the banding process are set as the lowest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range below the first quartile (where the interquartile range is defined as the distance between the first and third quartiles). Similarly the upper bound set for the banding process are set as the largest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile.

### 5.1.7. Aggregating Domain Scores to Final NI Score

Since each domain is weighted equally in terms of threat significance, the final aggregated NI score can be calculated as the average of the eleven domain scores. Thus the final NI score is a value between zero and ten for each country in each year.

$$NI\ Score = 11 \times \frac{\sum_{i=D1}^{D11} Country\ Indicator\ Banded\ Score_i}{11}$$

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With war having returned to the European continent, measuring the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world – as the 'Normandy Index' does – is more important than ever. The annual Index was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2022 exercise, which draws on data compiled in 2021, and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 60 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

The paper forms part of the EPRS contribution to the 2022 Normandy World Peace Forum. It is accompanied by two papers, one on the EU's contribution to peace and security in 2022, and the other on EU peace-building efforts in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

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