# The Autumn of Patriarchy

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
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#### Motivation

- Drastic changes in how families are organized in the past few decades
- Transition from patriarchal to egalitarian societies featuring:
  - 1. Declining fertility (Galor and Weil 2020, Greenwood et al. 2002)
  - 2. Declining marriage / dual parenthood (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007)
  - 3. Declining gender (income) gaps (Goldin 2014, Ngai and Petrongolo 2017)
- Existing researches
  - → Propose distinct theories for each phenomenon
  - ightarrow Study two phenomenons together, sometimes using the third as the exogenous driving force (Santos and Weiss 2016, Greenwood et al. 2016)
- This paper: develop a unified model to link all three trends

#### This paper

- A model w/ marriage, fertility, and human capital dynamics
- New mechanism based on empirical evidence: dual parenthood has differential impacts on the outcomes of boys relative to girls
- Prove and test a novel hypothesis: The Impossible Trinity of
  - 1. High fertility
  - 2. High marriage / dual parenthood
  - 3. Low gender income gap
- ullet Rising factor-neutral technology  $A_t$  can generate the transition from patriarchal to egalitarian societies, complementary to previous channels
  - ightarrow Skill-based technical change favoring quality over quantity
  - → Household appliance revolution favoring single parenthood
  - → Structural changes favoring women



#### Basic setup

- Two period overlapping generations economy
- Total factor productivity  $A_t$
- Individual with gender  $g \in \{ , , \varphi \}$  and preference

$$u^{g}(c^{g}, n) = \left( (1 - \beta) \cdot (c^{g})^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho}} + \beta \cdot n^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho - 1}} \tag{1}$$

where  $\rho > 1$  following Greenwood et al. (2005)

- Homogenous human capital within gender  $h_t^{\mathcal{O}}$  and  $h_t^{\mathcal{Q}}$
- Human capital gap is defined as

$$\Gamma_t^h = \frac{h_t^{O'}}{h_t^{\circ}} \tag{2}$$

#### Marriage and fertility – men

If single, men consume their labor income but have no children

$$V_t^{\mathcal{O},s} = u(A_t h_t^{\mathcal{O}}, 0) \tag{3}$$

• Once married, husbands work and transfer  $\alpha_t$  share of income to wives

$$V_t^{\mathcal{O},m} = u((1 - \alpha_t)A_t h_t^{\mathcal{O}}, n_t^m)$$
(4)

- $ightarrow \ lpha_t$  is an endogenous object
- $\rightarrow$  After marriage, husbands want  $n_t^m$  as high as possible

## Marriage and fertility – single women

• Single female solve single females solve

$$V_t^{\mathcal{Q},s} = \max_{c_t^{\mathcal{Q},s}, l_t^s n_t^s} \quad u(c_t^{\mathcal{Q},s}, n_t^s) \tag{5}$$

subject to budget and time constraints

$$c_t^{Q,s} = A_t h_t^{Q} l_t^s \qquad l_t^s = 1 - \chi n_t^s$$

### Marriage and fertility – married women

- Women receive idiosyncratic taste shock on marriage  $\tau \sim J(\tau)$
- Wives need to balance fertility and consumption

$$V_t^{Q,m}(\tau) = \max_{c_t^{Q,m}, l_t^m, n_t^m} \quad \tau \cdot u(c_t^{Q,m}, n_t^m)$$
 (6)

subject to budget and time constraints

$$c_t^{\mathbb{Q},m} = \underbrace{\alpha_t A_t h_t^{\mathcal{O}}}_{\text{transfer from husband}} + \underbrace{A_t h_t^{\mathbb{Q}} l_t^m}_{\text{own labor income}} \,, \qquad l_t^m = 1 - \chi n_t^m$$

Within marriage, fertility is subject to veto

### Aggregate quantities

- Let  $\mathcal{M}_t$  denote the share of women that choose to get married
  - $\rightarrow$  Aggregate fertility rate  $n_t$  is given by

$$n_t = \mathcal{M}_t \cdot n_t^m + (1 - \mathcal{M}_t) \cdot n_t^s \tag{7}$$

→ Average hours worked per female is

$$l_t^{\circ} = \mathcal{M}_t \cdot l_t^m + (1 - \mathcal{M}_t) \cdot l_t^s = 1 - \chi n_t \tag{8}$$

→ Gender income gap

$$\Gamma_t^y = \frac{y_t^{\mathcal{O}}}{y_t^{\mathcal{O}}} = \frac{\Gamma_t^h}{l_t^{\mathcal{O}}} \tag{9}$$

#### Human capital dynamics

Evolution of human capital

$$h_{t+1}^{\mathcal{Q}} = (h_t^{\mathcal{Q}})^{\theta} \qquad \theta \in (0,1)$$

$$\tag{10}$$

$$h_{t+1}^{\mathcal{O}} = Z \cdot (\mathcal{M}_t \cdot h_t^{\mathcal{O}})^{\theta} \tag{11}$$

where Z > 1 is a constant

- Assumption: human capital transmission operates within gender through family ties ⇒ boys are more sensitive to changes in M than girls
- Evidence: Autor et al. (2019), Wasserman (2020), Frimmel et al. (2024)

### Endogenous technological growth

Endogenous technological growth

$$\frac{A_{t+1} - A_t}{A_t} = B \cdot A_t^{-\lambda} \cdot (1 + l_t^{\mathcal{Q}})^{\eta} \tag{12}$$

- Female labor force participation contributes to innovation
- This part is not essential for The Impossible Trinity, but helps to explain the speedy transition

# Model Characterization

## Marriage market equilibrium

- Men are homogeneous and are on the short side of the marriage market
- Transfer  $\alpha_t$  makes male indifferent between single and marriage

$$V_t^{\mathcal{O},m} = u((1 - \alpha_t)A_t h_t^{\mathcal{O}}, n_t^m) = u(A_t h_t^{\mathcal{O}}, 0) = V_t^{\mathcal{O},s} \Longrightarrow \alpha_t(n_t^m)$$
 (13)

- On the other hand,  $n_t^m$  is a function of  $\alpha_t$  from married women's utility maximization  $\Longrightarrow n_t^m(\alpha_t)$
- Lemma 1: For given  $A_t$ , there exists a unique solution  $(n_t^m, \alpha_t)$
- Lemma 2:  $n_t^m$  and  $\alpha_t$  both decline in  $A_t$  when  $\rho > 1$

### Marriage threshold

• There exists a threshold  $\tau_t^*$  above which women get married

$$1 = \frac{V_t^{Q,s}}{V_t^{Q,m}(\tau_t^*)} \tag{14}$$

$$\mathcal{M}_t = 1 - J(\tau_t^*) \tag{15}$$

• Lemma 3: The threshold  $\tau^*$  can be characterized as

$$\tau_t^* = \frac{1}{1 + \alpha_t \Gamma_t^h} \tag{16}$$

where  $\alpha_t \Gamma_t^h$  gives the "transfer potential"

The Impossible Trinity

# Steady-State Relationships

• Relationships between  $n_t$ ,  $\mathcal{M}_t$ , and  $\Gamma_t^y$  in the steady state

$$\mathcal{M} = 1 - J\left(\frac{1}{1 + \alpha \Gamma^h}\right) \tag{17}$$

$$l^{Q} = 1 - \chi n \tag{18}$$

$$\Gamma^y = \frac{\Gamma^h}{l^{\mathfrak{Q}}} \tag{19}$$

$$\Gamma^h = Z^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \cdot \mathcal{M}^{\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}} \tag{20}$$

•  $h^{\circ} = 1$  is a normalization

## Case 1: High fertility and dual parenthood

With high fertility, labor supply is low

$$l^{Q} = 1 - \chi n$$

With dual parenthood, human capital gap is high

$$\Gamma^h = Z^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \cdot \mathcal{M}^{\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}}$$

Gender income gap is necessarily high

$$\Gamma^y = \frac{\Gamma^h}{l^{\mathfrak{Q}}}$$

Classic patriarchal societies

# Case 2: High fertility and gender income equality

With high fertility, labor supply is low

$$l^{Q} = 1 - \chi n$$

• For gender income gap to be low,  $\Gamma^h$  needs to be low

$$\Gamma^y = \frac{\Gamma^h}{l^{\mathfrak{P}}}$$

• For  $\Gamma^h$  to be low,  $\mathcal M$  needs to be low

$$\Gamma^h = Z^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \cdot \mathcal{M}^{\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}}$$

Nordic countries

## Case 3: Dual parenthood and gender income equality

• With high  $\mathcal{M}$ , human capital gap  $\Gamma^h$  is high

$$\Gamma^h = Z^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \cdot \mathcal{M}^{\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}}$$

• To achieve low gender income gap,  $l^{Q}$  needs to be high

$$\Gamma^y = \frac{\Gamma^h}{l^{\mathfrak{Q}}}$$

• To achieve high  $l^{\circ}$ , fertility needs to be low

$$l^{Q} = 1 - \chi n$$


#### Discussions


- The impossible coexistence of
  - 1. High fertility
  - 2. High marriage / dual parenthood
  - 3. Low gender income gap
- But it is possible for countries to have only one, or even none of the three
- What does it look like in the data?


### Data source and grouping

- Fertility data from the U.N.
  - $\rightarrow$  Label as "High fertility" if TFR $_{it} > 2$
- Share of children born outside of marriage from the OECD database
  - ightarrow Label as "Dual parenthood" if share $_{it} < 30\%$
- Gender gap in median earnings from the OECD database
  - ightarrow Label as "Gender income equality" if  $\mathrm{gap}_{it} < 20\%$
- Unbalanced panel of 37 countries from 1970 to 2014, 541 observations

#### The Impossible Trinity







The Autumn of Patriarchy (in progress)

#### Mechanism




Figure 1: The demise of patriarchy

#### Conclusion

- A unified model of the transition from patriarchal to egalitarian societies
- Prove and test The Impossible Trinity: high fertility, dual parenthood, gender income equality
- Relentless technological growth triggers the transition

"...and the bells of glory that announced to the world the good news that the uncountable time of eternity had come to an end."

The Autumn of the Patriarch by Gabriel García Márquez