


Asymmetric Fertility Elasticities

Sam Engle Chong Pang Anson Zhou


September 19, 2024

The emergence of below-replacement fertility



- Major implications for pension system, international relations, economic growth (Jones 2022), civilizational risk (Elon Musk)

Raising fertility seems to be extremely difficult

The image shows the header of the Vox website. It features a yellow square logo with the word "Vox" in black, lowercase, serif letters. To the right of the logo is a light gray navigation bar with the following menu items: "EXPLAINERS ▾", "CROSSWORD", "VIDEO", "PODCASTS", "MORE ▾", and a magnifying glass icon for search. Below the main header, there is a secondary navigation bar with three categories: "SOCIAL POLICY" (highlighted in yellow), "WORLD POLITICS", and "LIFE".

SOCIAL POLICY WORLD POLITICS LIFE

You can't even pay people to have more kids

These countries tried everything from cash to patriotic calls to duty to reverse drastically declining birth rates. It didn't work.

By Anna North | Nov 27, 2023, 8:00am EST

Reducing fertility seems to be easier

Many countries with low fertility problems now were reducing fertility not so long ago (e.g., China, Thailand, Singapore, Iran, . . .)

background



Did South Korea's Population Policy Work Too Well?

Romancing Singapore: When yesterday's success becomes today's challenge

Khamenei on Population Control: 'May God and History Forgive Us'

Research question

- Research questions:
 1. Is it systematically more difficult to raise fertility than to reduce it?
 2. If so, what are the micro foundation and the macro implications?
- This paper: new fact + new theory + new policy implications

This paper

1. Establish a new fact – asymmetric fertility elasticities

- Collect historical data on fertility policy stance and funding
- Compare fertility responses at the aggregate and the individual levels
- Discuss robustness to a variety of checks

2. What explains the asymmetry?

- Asymmetry challenges existing fertility theories
- **Loss aversion** to living standard + discuss other alternatives

3. Why does the asymmetry matter?

- A “slippery slope” perspective: sustained downward pressure on fertility with fixed underlying economic fundamentals
- Policymakers have a novel precautionary motive to set a higher fertility rate target than previously thought

Literature

- Empirical evaluations of fertility policies

McElroy and Yang (2000), Liu and Raftery (2020), Schultz (2007), Milligan (2005), Laroque and Salanié (2014), Raute (2019), González and Trommlerová (2023)

Contribution: first to systematically compare +ve and -ve policies

- Long-run fertility and population trajectories

Malthus (1872), Becker (1960), Easterlin (1968), Galor and Weil (2000), Feyrer et al. (2008), Lutz et al. (2007), Ibbetson (2019)

Contribution: a “slippery slope” perspective and new policy insights

- Structural models of fertility

Barro and Becker (1989), de la Croix and Doepke (2004), Córdoba and Ripoll (2019), Kim, Tertilt, and Yum (2024)

Contribution: first to incorporate loss aversion into fertility choice

Outline


- Empirical results using
 - Aggregate & individual-level data
 - Policy direction & intensities
- A model of fertility choice under loss aversion
- The “slippery slope” perspective and its implications
- Other potential explanations
- Conclusion

Establish a new fact
Empirical Findings

Data

- Fertility level and policy data from the United Nations
 - Policy stance dummy assigned by the UN Population Division since 1976 - lower, raise, maintain, no intervention map
- Aggregate variables from PWT, WDI, Barro and Lee (2013): GDP per capita, urbanization, infant mortality, female labor force participation, education
- Family planning funding from de Silva and Tenreyro (2017)
- Individual-level data on fertility, education, and income from the World Value Survey (WVS) Database

Fertility trends by policy stance in 1976



Fertility trends by policy stance in 1976

Panel regressions

- We estimate the following specification

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \text{TFR}_{it}/\text{TFR}_{it-1} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Policy_Lower}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Policy_Raise}_{it} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{Control}_{it} + \sigma_i + \eta_t + \epsilon\end{aligned}\quad (1)$$

- Control_{it} includes the level and growth rate of GDP per capita, education, urbanization, infant mortality, and female labor force participation
- Explanatory variables constructed by

$$\text{Policy_Lower}_{it} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{T=t-N}^{t-1} \mathbb{I}(\text{Policy}_{iT} = \text{Lower})$$

$$\text{Policy_Raise}_{it} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{T=t-N}^{t-1} \mathbb{I}(\text{Policy}_{iT} = \text{Raise})$$

Fact 1: Asymmetries in panel regression coefficients

Table 1: Population Policy and TFR

Policy Variables	ΔTotal Fertility Rate/Lagged Fertility Rate					
	Last Year		Average in the Last Five Years		Average in the Last Ten Years	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Lower fertility	-0.0118*** (0.0013)	-0.0071*** (0.0055)	-0.0129*** (0.0015)	-0.0076*** (0.0016)	-0.0102*** (0.0020)	-0.0042* (0.0022)
Raise fertility	0.0013 (0.0034)	0.0016 (0.0030)	0.0034 (0.0039)	0.0013 (0.0034)	0.0023 (0.0040)	0.0002 (0.0039)
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	10726	9146	10726	9146	9937	8462
R^2	0.133	0.174	0.133	0.173	0.123	0.170

compare

Policy Implementation and Reversal

- Motivated by González and Trommlerová (2023) on Spanish child benefits
- We estimate policy effects conditional the policy stance in the last period

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \text{TFR}_{it}/\text{TFR}_{it-1} = & \alpha + \sum_{P_1} \sum_{P_2} \beta_{P_1, P_2} \mathbb{1}(\text{Policy}_{it} = P_1) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Policy}_{i,t-1} = P_2) \\ & + \sigma_i + \eta_t + \epsilon\end{aligned}\tag{2}$$

$P_1, P_2 \in \{\text{raise, lower, maintain/no intervention}\}$

- Compare β_{P_1, P_2} with β_{P_2, P_1} for $P_1 \neq P_2$

Fact 2: Asymmetries in policy reversal coefficients

Table 2: Asymmetric Response of Policy Implementation and Reversion

		Last Period	No Intervention/ Maintain	Lower	Raise
		This Period			
No Intervention/ Maintain		NA	0.0028	0.0006	
	Maintain		(0.0039)	(0.0048)	
	Lower	-0.0094***	-0.0123***	-0.0105***	
		(0.0020)	(0.0014)	(0.0030)	
	Raise	0.0046	0.0090***	0.0035	
		(0.0057)	(0.0023)	(0.0035)	

Cohort exposure design

- Using individual-level data, we estimate the following specification

$$\text{Child}_{icbt} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Policy_Lower}_{cb} + \beta_2 \text{Policy_Raise}_{cb} + \eta \text{Age}_i \times \text{Gender}_i + \gamma_{ct} + \delta_b + \epsilon \quad (3)$$

- Construct individual's exposure to policies in a 10-year fertile window around mean age of childbirth MAC_{cb} :

$$\text{Policy_Lower}_{cb} = \frac{1}{11} \sum_{t \in [b + \text{MAC}_{cb} - 5, b + \text{MAC}_{cb} + 5]} \mathbb{I}(\text{Policy}_{ct} = \text{Lower})$$

$$\text{Policy_Raise}_{cb} = \frac{1}{11} \sum_{t \in [b + \text{MAC}_{cb} - 5, b + \text{MAC}_{cb} + 5]} \mathbb{I}(\text{Policy}_{ct} = \text{Raise})$$

Fact 3: Asymmetries in cohort exposure design

Table 3: Population Policy and the Number of Children

Interpolation of MAC	Number of Children								
	Country-Specific Year Polynomial				Nearest Neighbor			Socioeconomic Variables	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Target: Lower fertility	-0.776*** (0.220)	-0.762*** (0.210)	-0.624*** (0.185)	-0.844*** (0.201)	-0.655*** (0.188)	-0.875*** (0.208)	-0.831*** (0.243)	-0.821*** (0.232)	-0.631*** (0.215)
Target: Raise fertility	0.278 (0.181)	0.304* (0.162)	0.131 (0.186)	0.168 (0.167)	-0.007 (0.185)	0.141 (0.189)	0.259 (0.221)	0.262 (0.191)	0.046 (0.202)
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income Level-Age-Gender FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Education Level-Age-Gender FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Macroeconomic Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	205324	183738	163768	231257	205288	182719	210785	186911	170841
R ²	0.281	0.294	0.301	0.285	0.297	0.303	0.279	0.295	0.298

Intensive margin


- Using data on family planning funding (de Silva and Tenreyro 2017)

Table 4: Elasticity Estimation for Anti-Fertility Policy

Dependent Variable	Δ Total Fertility Rate/ Lagged Total Fertility Rate	
Construction of Policy Variables	Average in the Last Five Years	
	(1)	(2)
Family planning funding-GDP Ratio	-60.72*** (22.65)	-79.71*** (25.29)
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	Yes
Observations	2754	2648
R^2	0.220	0.278

Fact 4: Asymmetries in the intensive margin

- Combine with harmonized estimates of pro-fertility policies (Stone (2020))



- The median estimate of pro-fertility elasticities lies outside of the 95% confidence interval of anti-fertility elasticities

Robustness

- Empirical finding is robust to
 1. Use levels instead of percentage changes in fertility
 2. Policy effects at different horizons
 3. Country-specific trends
 4. Controlling for past fertility to mitigate reverse causality
 5. Split sample by initial fertility and GDP per capita
 6. Evaluate the cumulative contributions of policies to fertility changes for specific countries and compare with existing studies (in progress)

What explains asymmetric fertility elasticities?

A behavioral model of fertility

Asymmetry challenges existing models

- Existing models of fertility choice typically look like

$$\max_{c,n,(e,\dots)} U(c, n, e, \dots) \quad \text{subject to} \quad c + \chi n + \dots = I$$

⇒ smooth aggregate Marshallian demand $n(\chi, \dots)$


- The smoothness result holds uniformly in this class of models

- Static and dynamic problems
- Altruistic and warm glow preferences
- Continuous and discrete fertility choices
- Representative and heterogeneous agents
- With and without quantity-quality trade-off or status competition

- Inconsistent with asymmetric elasticities $\left. \frac{\partial n}{\partial \chi} \right|_+ > \left. \frac{\partial n}{\partial \chi} \right|_-$

Why loss aversion?

- Having a child often implies sacrificing some other aspects of life
 - Lifestyle (including leisure): “The sweet, sweet life of America’s DINKs”
 - Career outcomes: the child penalty for women (Klevens et al. 2021)



- Once these “perks” become “rights,” the endowment effect kicks in
- Lee Kuan Yew: “...There is no turning back the clock, unless we want to stop educating women.”

A Behavioral Theory of Fertility Choice


- Conditional on r , households solve

$$\max_{c,n} \quad \frac{1}{2}[u(c) + \beta u(n)] + \frac{1}{2}[G(u(c) - u(r)) + u(r)]$$

$$c + \chi n = I \quad u(n) = \frac{n^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1 - \gamma} \quad \gamma > 1$$

- Loss aversion when $\alpha > 0$

$$G(y) = \begin{cases} y & y \geq 0 \\ y - \alpha y^2 & y < 0 \end{cases}$$



- Consistency: $r = c$ in equilibrium with RA
- Results robust to c being a composite good

Result

- **Proposition 1:** When $\alpha > 0$, the optimal fertility response to an increase in χ is larger than the optimal response to a decrease in χ

$$\frac{\partial \log n^*}{\partial \log \chi} \Big|_{+, \alpha > 0} < \frac{\partial \log n^*}{\partial \log \chi} \Big|_{-, \alpha > 0} < 0 \quad (4)$$

- **Proposition 2:** When $\alpha > 0$, the optimal fertility response to an increase in r is larger than the optimal response to a decrease in r

$$\frac{\partial \log n^*}{\partial \log r} \Big|_{+, \alpha > 0} < \frac{\partial \log n^*}{\partial \log r} \Big|_{-, \alpha > 0} = 0 \quad (5)$$

- Intuition: Loss aversion creates a kink in the marginal benefit of c around the reference level r

FOC asymmetry in χ asymmetry in r

Why do asymmetry fertility elasticities matter?

The “slippery slope” perspective

Dynamic environment

- In period t , fertile households takes r_t as given and choose $\{c_t(r_t), n_t(r_t)\}$
- Adaptive reference updating process

$$r_t = \phi \cdot r_{t-1} + (1 - \phi) \cdot c_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \quad \epsilon_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2) \quad (6)$$

- ϕ is the persistence of past reference:
 - $\phi = 1$: random walk of r_t
 - $\phi = 0$: immediate updating $r_t = c_{t-1}$ (c.f., the Easterlin hypothesis)
- **The “slippery slope” perspective:** Starting from any consistent reference level r_0 , the expected fertility $\mathbb{E}(n_t)$ declines with time while the expected consumption $\mathbb{E}(c_t)$ and reference level $\mathbb{E}(r_t)$ rises with time.

Calibration



- Proof is simple for
 1. $\phi = 0$: due to the asymmetric responses to r

$$\begin{cases} c_t > c_{t-1} & \text{when } \epsilon_t > 0 \\ c_t = c_{t-1} & \text{when } \epsilon_t \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

2. $\phi = 1$: r_t is a random walk $\implies \mathbb{E}(x_t) = x_0$ for $x \in \{r, c, n\}$

- Numerical proof for $\phi \in (0, 1)$ based on calibration:
 - $\chi = 0.075$ from Greenwood and Seshadri (2002)
 - $\beta = 34$ to generate $n^* = 2.1$
 - $\gamma = 5.9$ and $\alpha = 98$ to generate pro-fertility elasticity and the degree of asymmetry in the data
 - $\phi = 0.95$ and $\sigma = 0.01$ to illustrate the idea

The “slippery slope”



- Fertility rate slides without changes in the underlying economic fundamentals \Rightarrow different mechanism from existing theories
 - Explanation for the puzzling fall in fertility since 2010 (Kearney et al. 2022)
 - To maintain fertility, government support needs to rise over time

Government problem

- Present a simple case to highlight the policy implications
- The policymaker faces social costs from population externalities

$$\mathcal{S}(n_t | \bar{n}) = \lambda \cdot (\log(n_t) - \log(\bar{n}))^2 \quad (7)$$


- Suppose the policymaker chooses n_0 (w/ consistent r_0) by permanently changing χ and solves

$$\max_{n_0} \quad \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \rho^t \mathcal{S}(n_t | \bar{n}) \quad (8)$$



where n_t are optimizing choices by households

- **Question:** What is the level of n_0 that minimizes the expected social cost?
- Set $\bar{n} = 2.1, \lambda = 0.2 \implies n_{\text{U.S. 2022}} = 1.62$ generates $\mathcal{S} = 0.62\%$ of GDP

Cost-minimizing initial fertility



Evolution of fertility and social cost




- When $\rho > 0$, there is an **intertemporal tradeoff** of social costs

Policy implications

- **Implication 1:** Unless the discount factor is zero, choosing the replacement rate as the initial level of fertility is never cost-minimizing
⇒ One can always find a path that dominates $n_0 = \bar{n}$ in expectation
- **Implication 2:** The cost-minimizing initial fertility level depends on the degree of asymmetry, the reference updating process, and the social discount factor
⇒ More intricate than the traditional approach of “getting it close to \bar{n} ”

Rethink the global campaign towards $\bar{n} = 2.1$



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019a). *World Population Prospects 2019*.

- This paper: There is precautionary motives to set $n_0 > \bar{n}$

Alternative Explanations

Alternatives

- Propagating mechanisms (e.g., peer pressure)?
 - They make elasticities larger, but not asymmetric
- Asymmetric technological feasibility?
 - The toolbox of policymakers is diverse but symmetric
 - Within the toolbox, the observed choices could be different depending on policy direction – but what explains patterns in policy choice?
- Explanations that are harder to rule out:
 - Multiple equilibria and transition path (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1994)
 - ...

more

Conclusion


1. Document a new fact: asymmetric fertility elasticities
2. Provide a micro-foundation using loss aversion
3. The “slippery slope” perspective offers new implications

“Demographics determine the destiny of a people.”

–Lee Kuan Yew

Appendix



The specter of Malthus in the 1960s



Data sources: Our World in Data based on HYDE, UN, and UN Population Division [2022 Revision].
This is a visualization from [OurWorldinData.org](https://ourworldindata.org), where you find data and research on how the world is changing.

Licensed under CC-BY by the authors Max Roser and Hannah Ritchie.

The population bomb




The global family planning movement


- Led by global organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, USAID, and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
- \$4.2 billion spent across low- & lower-middle-income countries in 2021
- Many country-specific policies (e.g., the one-child-policy in China)
- Gradually attaches more benefits to low fertility: economic development, health, gender equity, environment...
- Evidence that fertility policies played an important role in the rapid fertility decline (de Silva and Tenreyro 2020)

back

Fertility policy in 1986 and 2021




Source: United Nations Population Division




Source: United Nations Population Division

[back](#) [distribution](#)

Fertility policy distribution




The sum of coefficients is significantly negative



- Wald test-based comparison regions for simultaneous inference for two parameters (Eckert and Vach 2020)

back

Responses to pro-fertility policies



- “An increase in the present value of child benefits equal to 10% of a household’s income can be expected to produce between 0.5% and 4.1% higher birth rates.” (Stone 2020)

back

Technological Reversibility

1. Propaganda: "It's better to make a family disappear than to make a second new birth appear" (China) & "have one for mum, one for dad and one for the country" (Australia) & "Do it for Denmark"
2. Family policies: childlessness tax (Soviet) & maternity capital (Russia)
3. Access to tech.: planned parenthood (global) & Decree 770 (Romania)
4. Reproductive coercion: forced sterilization (Bangladesh) & monthly gynecological exam w/ plant-level birth target (Romania)

Fertility policies have different combinations of cost-effectiveness and repugnancy. But each of them is **technologically feasible** in either direction

back

Control for past fertility

Table 5: Population Policy and TFR: Control Average TFR in the Last Five Years

Dependent Variable Construction of Policy Variables	Δ Total Fertility Rate/Lagged Fertility Rate			
	Last Year		Average in the Last Five Years	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower fertility	-0.0121*** (0.0014)	-0.0065*** (0.0015)	-0.0134*** (0.0016)	-0.0070*** (0.0017)
Raise fertility	0.0031 (0.0037)	0.0013 (0.0033)	0.0033 (0.0043)	0.0009 (0.0038)
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Average TFR in the Last Five Years	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9881	8446	9881	8446
R^2	0.134	0.182	0.133	0.182

back

Country-specific trends

Table 6: Population Policy and TFR: Control Country-Specific Linear Trend

Construction of Policy Variables	Dependent Variable ΔTotal Fertility Rate/Lagged Fertility Rate			
	Last Year		Average in the Last Five Years	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower fertility	-0.0040** (0.0018)	-0.0050** (0.0019)	-0.0038 (0.0026)	-0.0054** (0.0026)
Raise fertility	-0.0006 (0.0039)	-0.0001 (0.0037)	-0.0004 (0.0047)	0.0009 (0.0045)
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Specific Linear Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	10726	9146	10726	9146
R^2	0.204	0.220	0.203	0.220


Split samples

Panel A: Subsample with High TFR in 1960				
Dependent Variable	Δ Total Fertility Rate/Lagged Fertility Rate			
Construction of Policy Variables	Last Year		Average in the Last Five Years	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower fertility	-0.0076*** (0.0014)	-0.0056*** (0.0014)	-0.0080*** (0.0018)	-0.0057*** (0.0018)
Raise fertility	0.0003 (0.0034)	0.0005 (0.0055)	0.0009 (0.0062)	0.0007 (0.0056)
Observations	5936	5247	5936	5247
R^2	0.339	0.390	0.337	0.388



Panel B: Subsample with Low TFR in 1960				
Dependent Variable	Δ Total Fertility Rate/Lagged Fertility Rate			
Construction of Policy Variables	Last Year		Average in the Last Five Years	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower fertility	-0.0150** (0.0028)	-0.0117** (0.0049)	-0.0151*** (0.0023)	-0.0117** (0.0047)
Raise fertility	0.0016 (0.0038)	0.0030 (0.0037)	0.0024 (0.0044)	0.0038 (0.0043)
Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	4789	3899	4789	3899
R^2	0.128	0.147	0.128	0.147

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Different horizons



Cumulative effects




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
First-order condition

- The first-order condition of optimal consumption satisfies

$$u'(c) \cdot (1 + G'(u(c) - u(r))) = \frac{\beta}{\chi} \cdot u' \left(\frac{1-c}{\chi} \right)$$




Asymmetry in χ



- Comparative static when χ falls (left) or rises (right)

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Asymmetry in r



- Comparative static when r falls (left) or rises (right)

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