The Macroeconomic Consequences of Family Policies

Anson Linshuo Zhou
University of Wisconsin-Madison

UMN-UW International-Macro Student Workshop

Motivation #1 - Social Mobility

- Policy makers are increasingly relying on family policies to reduce child poverty, raise children's human capital and boost social mobility (e.g. **$3k+ Child Tax Credit through 2025**, **$1.8 trillion American Families Plan**)

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- With **endogenous fertility**, my paper calls these conclusions into question
- **Quality/Quantity trade-off**: More generous child benefits raise fertility. Higher fertility makes investments in children's education more expensive for parents $\Longrightarrow$ Child human capital can fall, reducing social mobility

Motivation #2 - Population Aging

- Understanding the aggregate effects of family policies is important in its own right since these policies are widely adopted to combat population aging (**>2% of GDP** among OECD countries) ► example ► trend

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- Understanding the aggregate effects of family policies is important in its own right since these policies are widely adopted to combat population aging (**>2% of GDP** among OECD countries) ► example ► trend
- My paper evaluates the potential benefits of higher fertility on demographic structure and government budget in **general equilibrium**
  $\Longrightarrow$ Taxes can fall in the long-run, raising social welfare

This Paper

What are the macroeconomic consequences of large-scale family policies?

Particularly on: average income, intergenerational mobility and welfare. short-run vs long-run

- An OLG model with distortionary taxes and in general equilibrium

Endogeneous Fertility + **Endogenous Intergenerational Linkages**

with **childcare** arrangement choices

Children's human capital is shaped by both **public** and **private** investment; + inter-vivos **transfers**

\+ **Life-cycle Aiyagari**

earnings depends on **human capital**

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- **Government**: taxation, pension, baby bonus, childcare subsidy, public education
- **Policy mechanisms**: fertility responses, endogenous human capital, GE effects

Preview of Key Results

1. With degree of complementarity between quality/quantity that fits data, parents optimally **reduce private education investments** in response to a baby bonus. Baby bonus could **reduce intergenerational mobility** due to heterogeneous responses across households

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3. While average human capital falls by 1.4%, long-run welfare[1] **rises by 3.2%** as changes in demographic structure lead to reduced tax rates in equilibrium
4. Among different policy options, expanding **public education** is most effective in improving child human capital and intergenerational mobility

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Related Literature

Fiscal and Education Policies, Income transfers, and Mobility

- Benabou (2002), **de la Croix and Doepke (2003)**, Heckman and Mosso (2014), Bastian and Michelmore (2018), **Daruich (2019)**, Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2019), Mullins (2019), **Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2020)**...
- **Contribution: Endogenous fertility could reverse policy effects on child human capital and mobility. General equilibrium effects on welfare**

Family Policies and Fertility

- **Empirical:** Milligan (2005), Laroque and Salanié (2008), Drago et al. (2011), Luci-Greulich and Thévenon (2013), González (2013), Raute (2019)...
- **Structural:** Fan and Stark (2008), **Liao (2013)**, Moschini (2020)
- **Contribution: Evaluate large-scale policy counterfactuals with both endogenous fertility and endogenous child skill formation**

Outline

1. **Model**
2. **Calibration** (2010 USA)
   - **Key moments** on fertility profile (CPS), childcare arrangements (SIPP), parental investments and transfers (PSID) and lifecycle earnings profile (PSID)
   - Skill formation based on **RCT evidence** (Garcia, Heckman, Leaf and Prados 2020) and **intergenerational mobility** estimates (Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez 2014)
3. **Validation**
   - Model matches **fertility elasticities** estimated for Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend Program (Kelly, Timilsina and Yonzan 2020, Cowan and Douds 2020)
4. **Policy:**
   - Evaluate aggregate impacts of **large-scale** family and education policies
5. **Conclusion and Next Steps**

Model

Model: Timeline

Key Elements

- Life-cycle Aiyagari
- Endogenous Fertility
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

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

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

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

$$V_2(h,a) = \max_{c,a',n,t_h,m,e \geq 0} u(c/q_n) + \beta \mathbb{E} V_3(h', a', n, \mathbb{E}h_k)$$

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h : parents' skills	a : assets	n : fertility
t_h : home care	m : market care	e : private educ. input
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$\mathcal{S}$: childcare subsidy	$\mathcal{B}$: baby bonus	$\mathcal{E}$: public education

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

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- $G(h, \mathcal{E}, e, \epsilon)$ captures children's skill formation from age 0 to 20 with:
  - Private investment e from age 0 to 10
  - Public education $\mathcal{E}$ from age 0 to 18
- **Assumption**: childcare arrangement does not affect children's skill formation

Parent-to-Child Transfer



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$$y = wh \cdot 1$$

$$(1 + \tau_c)c + a' + n \cdot a_k = (1 + r)a + y - \mathcal{T}(y, a, n)$$

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

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- **Quality/quantity tradeoff**: higher child quantity n raises the shadow price of child "quality" e and a_k (Becker and Lewis 1972)
- To parents, baby bonus $\mathcal{B}$ and childcare subsidy $\mathcal{S}$ reduce the shadow price of child quantity while public education $\mathcal{E}$ raises child quality

► preferences ► later periods

Firms and the Government

- Representative firm with **Cobb-Douglas production function**:

$$Y = AK^{\alpha}H^{1-\alpha}$$

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- Government uses predetermined policy instruments $\{\mathcal{T}(\cdot), \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{E}\}$
- Denote demographic structure as $\{\Omega_j\}_{j=0}^{8}$ (with $\sum_{j=0}^{8}\Omega_j = 1$) and distribution of households across state space as μ. **Government fiscal budget**:

$$\underbrace{\left(\sum_{j=2}^{6}\Omega_j \int \mathcal{T}(y_j^*, a_j^*, n_j^*)\, d\mu\right)}_{\text{labor and capital income taxes}} + \underbrace{\left(\sum_{j=2}^{8}\Omega_j \tau_c c_j^*\, d\mu\right)}_{\text{consumption tax}} = \underbrace{\left(\sum_{j=7}^{8}\Omega_j wh\cdot\pi\, d\mu\right)}_{\text{pension payments}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{(\Omega_0+\Omega_1)\mathcal{E}}_{\text{public education}} + \underbrace{\int \Omega_2 n^*\cdot\mathcal{B}\, d\mu}_{\text{baby bonus}} + \underbrace{\int \Omega_2(1+\tau_c)m^* n^* p_m\cdot\mathcal{S}\, d\mu}_{\text{subsidized childcare}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{X}}_{\text{other spendings}}$$

► stationary equilibrium ► results

Role for Government Policies

Why may government policies improve welfare?

Long-run welfare: **average value** of newborn under the veil of ignorance:

$$\mathcal{W} = \int V_2 \, d\mu$$

Pragmatic approach that evaluates whether higher fertility, i.e. additional agents, improves the **average well-being** in the economy[2]

[2]See Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007) and de la Croix and Doepke (2021) for more discussions of welfare with endogenous fertility

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Externalities/incompleteness that government could address:

1. **Fiscal externalities of childbearing and childrearing**
   - Private returns $\neq$ social returns (i.e. $\{\Omega_j\}_{j=0}^{8}$ and μ)
2. **Parents cannot borow against children's future income**
   - Lack of compensation mechanism
3. **Life-cycle borrowing constraints**

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Exogenous vs Endogenous Fertility: Policy Implications

Consider an increase in $\mathcal{B}$ (baby bonus) or $\mathcal{S}$ (childcare subsidy)

On child quality h_k for a given parent with human capital h:

- With exogenous fertility, this is a **lump-sum transfer** - $h_k(h)$ rises unambiguously
- With endogenous fertility, $n^*(h)$ increases, **additional channels** on $h_k(h)$:
  1. **Complementarity/substitutability** via $v(n, \mathbb{E}h_k, a_k)$
  2. **Higher costs of childrearing** - $n\chi$ and q_n
  3. Interactions in budget constraint - **higher shadow price of e**

On aggregate fertility N and average human capital $\overline{h}$ in the economy:

- With exogenous fertility, N is fixed while $\overline{h}$ is boosted
- With endogenous fertility:
  1. Aggregate fertility rises $\Rightarrow$ lowers old-age dependency ratio $(\Omega_7 + \Omega_8)/(\sum_{j=2}^{6} \Omega_j)$
  2. Besides change in $h_k(h)$, effects on $\overline{h}$ rely on relative changes in $n^*(h)$ across h

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Exogenous vs Endogenous Fertility: Policy Implications

On child quality h_k for a given parent with human capital h:

- With exogenous fertility, this is a **lump-sum transfer** - $h_k(h)$ rises unambiguously
- With endogenous fertility, $n^*(h)$ increases, **additional channels** on $h_k(h)$:
  1. **Complementarity/substitutability** via $v(n, \mathbb{E}h_k, a_k)$
  2. **Higher costs of childrearing** - $n\chi$ and q_n
  3. Interactions in budget constraint - **higher shadow price of e**

On aggregate fertility N and average human capital $\overline{h}$ in the economy:

- With exogenous fertility, N is fixed while $\overline{h}$ is boosted
- With endogenous fertility:
  1. Aggregate fertility rises $\Rightarrow$ lowers **old-age dependency ratio** $(\Omega_7 + \Omega_8)/(\sum_{j=2}^{6} \Omega_j)$
  2. Besides change in $h_k(h)$, effects on $\overline{h}$ rely on **relative changes in $n^*(h)$ across h**

Policy effects of transfers to families with children cannot predict the aggregate effects of family policies when fertility is endogenous

Calibration

Parametrization: Preferences

- **Utility from consumption**:

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma_c}}{1-\gamma_c} \qquad \gamma_c \in (0,1)$$

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where parents value child quality via $u(\cdot)$ (Barro and Becker 1989) with exponential child discounting (Córdoba, Ripoll and Liu 2016)

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- $\nu_{12}, \nu_{13} > 0 \implies$ main results are driven by **quality/quantity trade-off** (Becker and Lewis 1972) rather than assumptions on preferences[3]

► fit ► V_2 ► V_3 ► intuition ► identification ► results

[3] Robust to (1) separable preferences (de la Croix and Doepke 2003, Moav 2005), (2) quality and quantity being substitutes (Jones and Schoonbroodt 2010), or (3) dynastic altruism (Daruich and Kozlowski 2020)

Child's Skill Production Function

- **Children's skill production function**:

$$h_k = \underbrace{Z}_{\text{scalar}} \cdot \underbrace{\epsilon}_{\text{shock}} \cdot \underbrace{h^{\rho}}_{\text{spillover}} \cdot \left(\underbrace{\mathcal{E}^{\omega}}_{\text{public education}} + \underbrace{e^{\omega}}_{\text{private input}} \right)^{\gamma/\omega}$$

$$\log(\epsilon) \sim \mathcal{N}\left(-\frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{2}, \sigma_\epsilon^2 \right)$$

- $\rho = 0.28$ - rank-rank mobility (Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez 2014)
- $\mathcal{E} = 0.165$ - \$12k per pupil per year (NCES)

► mobiltiy fit

Child's Skill Production Function Cont'd

Use **RCT evidence** to discipline the productivity of inputs $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$:

$$h_k = Z \cdot \epsilon \cdot h^{\rho} \left(\mathcal{E}^{\omega} + e^{\omega} \right)^{\boldsymbol{\gamma}/\omega}$$

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- **Garcia, Heckman, Leaf and Prados (2020)**
  - Two US early childhood development programs (ABC, CARE) in 1970s
  - Cost $\approx$ \$13.5k per year for five years - total \$67.5k per child
  - Followed up into adulthood and observe education/income
  - For every dollar invested, children's lifetime labor income increases by **\$1.3**

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  - For every dollar invested, children's lifetime labor income increases by **\$1.3**
- **Apply similar policy in the model: expand existing $\mathcal{E}$ by \$67.5k**
  - **Small scale**: prices and taxes remain unchanged
  - **Target**: children of parents at 10th percentile of earnings
- **Comparing labor income changes with program costs gives $\boldsymbol{\gamma} = 0.16$**

► childcare ► adult skill ► firm and gov.

Model Parameters

Table 1: Model Parameters

	Interpretation	Value	Source
	Preferences		
β	discount rate	0.98^{10}	standard
γ_c	elasticity of substitution	0.55	CPS
ψ	fertility preference	1.84	CPS
θ	quality preference	2.02	PSID
ν	transfer preference	0.42	PSID
	Childcare arrangement		
χ	childcare cost	0.18	Folbre (2008)
ι	economies of scale at home	0.7	Folbre (2008)
υ	substitutability of care	0.5	SIPP
p_m	price of full-time care	0.13	NACCRRA
	Taxes and pension		
τ_y^n, λ_y^n	tax levels and progressitivity	misc.	TAXSIM
τ_c	consumption tax	0.07	McDaniel (2007)
τ_a	capital income tax	0.27	McDaniel (2007)
π	pension replacement rate	0.40	OECD Database

	Interpretation	Value	Source
	Child human capital production		
Z	normalizing scalar	2.45	
σ_ϵ	ability shock dispersion	0.45	PSID
ρ	intergenerational spillover	0.28	Chetty et al. (2014)
ω	substitution of education	0.9	ATUS
$\mathcal{E}$	public education	0.165	NCES
γ	input productivity	0.16	Garcia et al. (2020)
	Adult human capital evolution		
η	learning curvature	0.61	PSID
ζ	learning level	0.72	PSID
μ_z	skill depreciation	-0.23	PSID
σ_z	shock dispersion	0.42	PSID
	Firm production function		
A	total factor productivity	1	normalization
α	capital share	0.33	standard
δ_k	capital depreciation	0.04^{10}	standard

- 13 parameters are calibrated within the model using SMM
- Model matches salient features of fertility profile, childcare, parental investment, inter-vivos transfers, intergenerational mobility and lifecycle earnings profile

► identification

Validation

Fertility Response to Financial Incentives

Question: Does the model generate responses that match empirical estimates?

Answer: External validation using **Alaska Permanent Fund Dividends (APFD)**

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- Established in 1982 after discovery of the petroleum. Equal transfer to **all residents** regardless of income, employment or age
- Allows parent to claim dividend on behalf of a child with no requirements on how parents use a child's dividend.

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- **Ideal policy variation** to test fertility responses:
  1. **Similar institution and cultural background**
  2. **Large in scale (≈ $1.5k per year)** relative to other family policies
  3. **Clear implementation**: not tied to labor market status or policy bundles

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  3. **Clear implementation**: not tied to labor market status or policy bundles
- **Apply same policy in the model: UBI to all household members by $1.5k**
  (normalized by median income in Alaska relative to the rest of U.S. + partial equilibrium)
  - Completed fertility rises by **4.2%** in the model (Kelly, Timilsina and Yonzan 2020)
  - **Heterogeneous responses**: Larger responses from households with lower opportunity costs of time (model) - larger fertility increases among Alaska Natives and women without high school degree (Cowan and Douds 2020)

Evidence from Completed Fertility Rates



- 95% confidence intervals of sample mean
- Predicted 4.2% (0.08) increase in completed fertility rate is consistent with data

► by education

Counterfactuals

Large Scale and Permanent Policy

Evaluate universal policies of different scale (NPV for $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{E}$ and % for $\mathcal{S}$)

- **Budget balance**: consumption tax adjusts to balance budget each period
- **General equilibrium**: prices and distributions adjust

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Outcomes of Interest

- **Aggregate fertility**, **average human capital**, **per capita income** and **intergenerational mobility ($\frac{1}{IGE}$)**
- **Social welfare** in consumption equivalence (changes)

► welfare

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Outline

- **Long-run effects** - comparing new steady-state economy to baseline economy
- **Transition, alternative funding method** (in progress)

► welfare

Fertility Effects of Baby Bonus $\mathcal{B}$

Figure 1: Effects on fertility



Figure 2: Expenditure share



- Fertility increases as shadow price of child quantity falls
- Baby bonus needs to be greater than **$28k (NPV)** to raise aggregate fertility rate to **replacement level** (2.1, commonly stated long-run policy goal). The policy costs around **1.6%** of GDP in the new equilibrium

Heterogeneous Response and Effects on Human Capital

Figure 3: Heterogeneous fertility response



Figure 4: Average human capital



- Households with **lower human capital** respond more to baby bonus
- Recall intergenerational transmission of human capital h^o
- Average human capital **decreases by 1.4%** at replacement rate fertility

Responses in Private Education Investment and Mobility

Figure 5: Average private investment



Figure 6: Intergenerational mobility



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- Predictions consistent with empirical evidence from Australian baby bonus

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

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

- Parents **reduce** private investments as higher n increases the shadow price of e
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- Intergenerational mobility **decreases by 2%** at replacement fertility

► V_2 ► preferences

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

Figure 6: Intergenerational mobility



- Parents **reduce** private investments as higher n increases the shadow price of e
- Predictions consistent with empirical evidence from Australian baby bonus
- Intergenerational mobility **decreases by 2%** at replacement fertility
- Results are **stronger** when cash transfers are targeted at low-income households

► V_2 ► preferences

Output Response and Change in Consumption Tax

Figure 7: Per capita output



Figure 8: Change in consumption tax



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

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

- **Per capita output** increases initially due to changes in **demographic structure**
- Consumption tax could be **reduced** while keeping government budget satisfied
- Larger baby bonus is **not always beneficial** as average human capital worsens

► budget ► demographic structure

Social Welfare under Baby Bonus $\mathcal{B}$

Figure 9: Change in welfare



Figure 10: Fertility Possibility Frontier



- Welfare effects are **not monotonic** in the size of baby bonus
- Welfare maximized around replacement fertility. Consumption equivalence increases by **3.2%**. Sources: (1) higher n, (2) lower τ_c, (3) change in μ
- **Progressive** policy with large welfare improvement for low-income households

Taking Stock

What is the policy objective?

Taking Stock



Taking Stock



► public education ► childcare subsidy ► next steps

Taking Stock



► public education ► childcare subsidy ► next steps

Conclusion

Macroeconomic consequences of large-scale family policies depend on:

- **Fertility responses**, **endogenous skill formation** and **GE effects**

Model

- Introduce **quality/quantity trade-off** into a GE-OLG model with incomplete market and distortionary taxes

Results:

1. Compared with models where fertility is fixed, introducing endogenous fertility reverses several key policy implications under conservative parametrization
2. Despite having negative effects on average human capital and social mobility, a **$28k** baby bonus raises fertility to replacement level and improves welfare by **3.2%** via effects on **demographic structure** and taxes in general equilibrium
3. Public education raises output, mobility and welfare, but has mild effects on fertility

Time Trend of Public Expenditures on Child Benefits



Source: OECD database

► back to intro

Expenditure Breakdown



Source: OECD database

► back to intro

Working Without Children and Retirement

- For households working without children:

$$V_j(h,a) = \max_{c,a' \geq 0} \quad u(c) + \beta \mathbb{E} V_{j+1}(h', a')$$

$$(1+\tau_c)c + a' = (1+r)a + y - \mathcal{T}(y, a, 0)$$

$$h' = L(h, 1, z)$$

- For retired households:

$$V_j(h,a) = \max_{c,a' \geq 0} u(c) + \beta V_{j+1}(h, a')$$

$$(1+\tau_c)c + a' = (1+r-r\tau_a)a + \pi \cdot wh$$

$$V_9(\cdot) \equiv 0$$

where π is pension replacement rate

► back to transfer

Stationary Equilibrium

- **Distributions:**
  - Demographic structure $\{\Omega_j\}_{j=0}^{8}$ and distribution of agents over states μ are invariant over time periods
  - Distribution of initial states is determined by older generations and shock processes
- **Households Optimize**: Households choose consumption, savings, fertility, childcare arrangements, child investments and inter-vivos transfers such that utility is maximized
- **Firms maximize profits**
- **Prices clear markets**
- **Government balances budget in period to period**

► back to firm and gov.

Identification

- Recall parametric assumptions:

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma_c}}{1-\gamma_c} \quad \gamma_c \in (0,1)$$

$$v(n, \mathbb{E}h_k, a_k) = \Psi(n) \cdot (\theta \cdot u(\mathbb{E}h_k) + \nu \cdot u(a_k))$$

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- Calibrate $\gamma_c = 0.54$ to match income-fertility profile (CPS)

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- $\{\theta, \nu\}$ governs utility from quality - average expenditures (Daruich 2019)
- Córdoba, Ripoll and Liu (2016): **γ_c (EGS) governs quality/quantity trade-off**. Higher $\gamma_c \Rightarrow$ higher MRS of quantity for quality $\Rightarrow$ MB_n rises faster with h than $MC_n \Rightarrow$ flatter or even positive **income-fertility profile**
- Calibrate $\gamma_c = 0.54$ to match income-fertility profile (CPS)
- Córdoba and Ripoll (2019) disentangles EIS from EGS. To fit data:
  - EGS is significantly larger than one (c.f. $\gamma_c < 1$)
  - EIS is at most one (c.f. risk-aversion to fit wealth accumulation)

► back to preferences ► back to table

Model Fit: Fertility-Income Profile



► back

Childcare Arrangement

- **Childcare arrangements**:

$$n \cdot \chi = \left(t_h^{\upsilon/\iota} + (n \cdot m)^{\upsilon} \right)^{1/\upsilon}$$

  Set $\chi = 0.18$. Returns to scale within family $\iota = 0.7$ (Folbre 2008)

- Elasticity of substitution: $\upsilon = 0.5$ - average share of income spent on childcare by education (SIPP) (Malik 2019)

- **Price of full-time childcare**: $p_m = \$6,860$ per year for child aged 0-10 (The National Association of Child Care Resource & Referral Agencies 2011)

Skill Evolution for Adults

- **Human capital of working adults** evolves:

$$h_{j+1} = \exp(z)\left(h_j + \zeta(h_j t)\right)^{\eta}$$

$$\log(z) \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_z, \sigma_z)$$

- $\eta = 0.61$, $\zeta = 0.72$ - lifecycle earnings (PSID) (Huggett, Ventura and Yaron 2011)
- $\mu_z = -0.23, \sigma_z = 0.42$ - 2% skill depreciation and lifecycle Gini coefficient of earnings (Huggett, Ventura and Yaron 2011)

► fertility ► calibration

Intergenerational Mobility: Model vs Data



- Rank-rank slope = 0.34 (Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez 2014)

► back

Other Parameters

- **Firms' production function**: capital share $\alpha = 0.33$ and 4% capital depreciation
- **Government taxes**
  - **Income taxes**:

$$\mathcal{T}(y, a, n) = y \cdot (1 - \tau_y^n y^{-\lambda_y^n}) + \tau_a r a$$

    where $\{\tau_y^n, \lambda_y^n\}_{n=0}^6$ estimated using TAXSIM
  - **Tax rates** from McDaniel (2014): $\tau_c = 0.07$ and $\tau_a = 0.27$
  - **Pension replacement rate**: $\pi = 40\%$

► back

Income Taxes: Model vs Data





- Child tax benefits (reduction in tax rates) are larger for low-income households

► back

Baby Bonus in Australia

- **A$3,000 baby bonus**[4] to every child born on or after July 1st 2004
- Peter Costello (Treasurer of Australia): “One (baby) for the Mum, one for the Dad, and one for the country"
- $\text{tfr}_{\text{AUS},2004} = 1.77 > 1.73 = \text{tfr}_{\text{USA},2018}$ before the Covid Baby Bust ► other
- Drago et al. (2011) finds:
  - Significant fertility responses and evidence for long-term/quantum effects
  - Marginal cost for an additional birth to be at least A$126,000[5]
  - Larger fertility responses from low-income households
- Gaitz and Schurer (2017) finds that the baby bonus was **ineffective** in boosting learning, socio-emotional or physical health outcomes of pre-school children

► back to intro ► back to results

[5] More details: (1) Announced on Mar.12th 2004, (2) universal coverage, lump-sum payment, (3) Equivalent to 4 times average weekly earnings, (4) Equivalent to $2,800 in 2010 USD.

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► back to intro ► back to results

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[5]Equivalent to $117,600 in 2010 USD. Quantitative model predicts $130,000 is needed for an additional birth (for the U.S.).

Total Fertility Rate Across Countries



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Evidence from Completed Fertility Rates



► back to validation

Change in Demographic Structure



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Highlights for Subsidized Childcare $\mathcal{S}$

Fertility



Average human capital



Per capita output



Change in consumption tax



Intergenerational Mobility



Welfare



- Need **78%** refund to reach 2.1 fertility, **50%** less cost-effective than baby bonus
- Impacts of subsidized childcare are qualitatively similar to baby bonus except that **it encourages work** (Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura 2020) and **mobility effect is small**
- **Less progressive** because subsidy amount depends on childcare expenditures

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Highlights for Public Education Expansion $\mathcal{E}$

Fertility



Average human capital



Per capita output



Change in consumption tax



Intergenerational Mobility



Welfare



- **Mildest fertility effects** (0.035 boost vs 0.3 boost using $40k baby bonus)
- **Most effective in improving mobility** (4% increase using $65k)
- **Progressive** policy with large welfare improvement for low-income households

► back

Change in Demographic Structure



Change in Demographic Structure



Next Steps

Transition path

- **Question**: How long do we need to wait for aggregate effects to take place? What are the distributional consequences for households in the original steady-state? Majority support for policy reform?
- **Conjecture**: Majority support may requires transfers **within cohorts**

Alternative ways of financing

- **Question**: How will things change if the policy could be funded via government deficits or labor/capital taxes?

Optimal policies

- **Question**: What is the optimal policy combination to maximize welfare?

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