Risks & Vulnerabilities in Enterprise Audio Visual Solutions

'What do you mean I have to update?'

Whois: Tibbbbz

- Audio Visual Support Technician
- 4 years o AV/ IT experience
- IACD student at EMU
- Breaker of things / DIY
- sloth and cat enthusiast




Anthony Tippy



Why the talk?

AV Devices are...

- Designed, Installed, and forgotten.....until it breaks
- Often not considered in securing organizations
- Often Riddled with security vulnerabilities




Agenda

- 1. AV/ IOT Vulnerability Report
- 2. What are 'AV Conferencing Solutions'?
- 3. Shodan
- 4. Audio Conferencing
- 5. Video Conferencing
- 6. Control Systems
- 7. Misc. Hardware
- 8. Projectors
- 9. Other
- 10. Most Vulnerable Orgs
- 11. How to Secure?



IOT Malware Samples









2018 IOT Malware

- devices grew three-fold in 2018 (Kaspersky Labs)
- Brute force attacks made up 93% of attacks



Default Passwords


- 15% of devices have default passwords
- Top 5 username/passwords get access to 10% of devices
- "63% of data breaches use a weak, default, or stolen password." (Verizon 2016)



Close your ports!



There's a lot of open ports





What are A/V Conferencing Solutions?

- Professional Displays/ Digital
 Signage
 - Samsung
 - o LG
 - o NEC
- Control Systems
 - o Touch Panels
 - Master Controllers
- Phones
 - Desk Phones
 - Conference phones
 - Digital Signal Processors
- Video Conferencing Systems
 - Cisco
 - Polycom
- Misc Hardware Devices
 - Switchers/ scalers
 - Transmitters/ Receivers
 - Misc Processors




































Analyze the Internet in Seconds

Shodan has servers located around the world that crawl the Internet 24/7 to provide the latest Internet intelligence. Who buys Smart TVs? Which countries are building the most wind farms? What companies are affected by Heartbleed?




Down the rabbit hole!





Not all data is the same...



Audio Conferencing- VOIP

VoIP Services

- ATA Analogue Telephone Adapter
- IP Phones
- PC-to-PC

Popular VoIP Protocols

- Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
- H.248 control of switched networks
- T.38 Fax
- Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP)
- Skype Protocol





Popular VOIP Attacks

Eavesdropping

External actors could listen in on voip communications

DDOS

- Greatest threat to enterprise systems
- Widespread disruption of VOIP systems

Masquerading

Impersonate user, device, or service to gain access


Toll fraud

Actor accesses phone system to make fraudulent calls

Spoofing

 Caller ID spoofing to appear to be a legitimate number or source







DDOS Your Conference! (CVE 2018-0325)


- Cisco 7800, 8800, and 8821 series phones
- SIP vulnerability
- No patch as of Aug 2018
- 8800 Series phones could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected phone
- Stop all the productivity!





IP-Phone-Web GUI's

TOTAL RESULTS 648 TOP COUNTRIES Korea, Republic of 307 United States China Turkey Poland 29 **TOP SERVICES** Qconn 265 HTTP (8080) HTTPS 8081



Phones, Phones...





Login	Enterprise IP phone SIP-T60P		
Username Password			
Con	firm Cancel		





Support Website

LOGIN	
User Name: user	
Password:	E Log In
DEVICE STATUS	
Network State:	Network Ready
Network Channel:	5230
3G RSSI:	Y 41 (-49dBm)
Network Service:	4G
WAN IP Address:	*
Cell Info:	
LTE Signal Strength (RSRP):	
LTE Signal Quality (RSRQ):	
LTE Signal Interference (SINR):	

ALEOS Version 4.9.3 | Copyright @ 2009-2018 Sierra Wireless, Inc.

Video Conferencing- Cisco TelePresence




- Video Conference systems for all size organizations
- Managed with Cisco's Device
 Management platform (CUCM)







Average Devices 3.4K









Most Open Devices

		I N	nost Open Devices	5	
_	Country	City	Organization	Model	Devices
	China	Shanghai	China Telecom Shanghai	SX20	58
	Taiwan	Taipei	HiNet	SX20	37
	India	null	Bharti Airtel	SX20	35
4.	China	Beijing	China Unicom Beijing	SX20	25
	China	Beijing	China Telecom Beijing	SX20	23
	China	Nanjing	China Telecom jiangsu	SX20	22
	China	Guangzhou	China Telecom Guangdong	SX20	20
8.	France	null	Orange	SX20 1 - 25 / 2161	20 < >

CVE-2018-5391- FragmentStack (Linux DDOS)

- Linux 3.9 vulnerability
- Linux kernel is affected by the IP Fragment Reassembly Denial of Service

Affected Devices

- Cisco EX series
- Cisco Integrator C Series
- MX Series
- Profile Series
- SX80 codec
- WebEx Roomkit













illilli cisco



There are possible issues with your system. See Diagnostics for more info.

Cisco TelePresence SX20



Call Control



- 1





integration



System Information

General

Product:

Last boot:

Serial number:

Software version: Installed options:

System name:

IPv4·

IPv6:

MAC address:

Temperature:





H323

Status

Gatekeeper

Number ID

SIP Proxy 1

Status Proxy






Personalization

Select active wallpaper





Upload custom wallpaper

Only BMP, GIF, JPEG and PNG files smaller than 4MB are supported. Custom wallpapers do not apply to touch panels.

Choose File No file chosen


Upload

Select active ringtone



Ringtone volume

Volume: 75%



XML API

The XML files below are a part of the codec's API, and can be used by external services to inspect the state and configuration of the codec. The files are protected using Basic Authentication, thus you may be prompted for a user name and password.

File Name	Description
/configuration.xml	Configuration settings
/status.xml	Endpoint status parameters
/command.xml	Available API commands
/valuespace.xml	Value spaces of the XML files

Execute API commands and configurations

In the field below you can enter API commands (xCommand and xConfiguration) directly.


For example: xCommand Dial Number: "person@example.com" Protocol: Sip

Enter commands...



Tandberg Video Codec- 3000 MXP









File Management

TANDBERG parameter files.

Pictures

System Settings

File	Туре	Upload
Pictures		
Welcome Screen / Logo	System Default	Choose File No file chosen Upload
Encryption Required Screen	System Default	Choose File No file chosen Upload
System Parameters	Special File	Choose File No file chosen Upload
<u>Directory</u>	Special File	Choose File No file chosen Upload
Legal File Formats		

JPEG (.jpg) files that are not grayscale and non-progressive coded. Recommended maximum size is 704x576 for Welcome Screen and 352x288 for the other

Polycom Audio Video Call Systems



▲ Vulnerabilities Note: the device may not be impacted by all of these issues. The vulnerabilities are implied based on the software and version.				
CVE-2008-2939	Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in proxy_ftp.c in the mod_proxy_ftp module in Apache 2.0.63 and earlier, and mod_proxy_ftp.c in the mod_proxy_ftp module in Apache 2.2.9 and earlier 2.2 versions, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a wildcard in the last directory component in the pathname in an FTP URI.			
CVE-2010-0408	The ap_proxy_ajp_request function in mod_proxy_ajp.c in mod_proxy_ajp in the Apache HTTP Server 2.2.x before 2.2.15 does not properly handle certain situations in which a client sends no request body, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (backend server outage) via a crafted request, related to use of a 500 error code instead of the appropriate 400 error code.			
CVE-2017-7679	In Apache httpd 2.2.x before 2.2.33 and 2.4.x before 2.4.26, mod_mime can read one byte past the end of a buffer when sending a malicious Content-Type response header.			
CVE-2010-0425	modules/arch/win32/mod_isapi.c in mod_isapi in the Apache HTTP Server 2.0.37 through 2.0.63, 2.2.0 through 2.2.14, and 2.3.x before 2.3.7, when running on Windows, does not ensure that request processing is complete before calling isapi_unload for an ISAPI.dll module, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors related to a crafted request, a reset packet, and "orphaned callback pointers."			

Control Systems












- Used in..
 - Universities
 - Enterprises
 - Home Automation
 - Hotels
 - Airports

Popular Vendors

- AMX
- Cisco
- Crestron
- Extron

Crestron Touch Panels (TSW Series)









- Hotels/ Conference Centers
- Universities
- Airports
- Home Automation
 - Lights
 - Home Security
 - Music/Video
- Conference room control panel
 - Inputs
 - Audio Conference/ Video
- Conference Room Scheduler
 - Integrates with Exchange. Office 365,
 G Suite..etc
- Built in Camera/ Mic

CVE-2018-10630 - Passwords!



- Crestron TSW-X60 Series
 - Models Affected
 - TSW- 1060
 - TSW- 560
 - TSW- 760
 - And MC3 Controller
- RCE/ Low skill level
- Shipped with No Authentication (CTP)
- ALL versions prior to 2.001.0037.001 affected
- Credit to: Jackson Thuraisamy & Ricky Lawshae for initial discovery

CVSS v2.0 Severity and Metrics:

Base Score: 10.0 HIGH

Vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C) (V2 legend)

Impact Subscore: 10.0

Exploitability Subscore: 10.0

CVSS v3.0 Severity and Metrics:

Base Score: 9.8 CRITICAL

Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (V3

legend)


Impact Score: 5.9

Exploitability Score: 3.9



TSW-X60 - Top Organizations


Total: 313












Vulnerable Touch Panels 25.5% TSW-560 TSW-1060 TSW-760

	Model	Version	Version
1.	TSW-560	1.000.0059	85
	TSW-1060	1.002.0029	30
	TSW-760	1.002.0016	23
4.	TSW-1060	1.002.0016	23
	TSW-1060	1.000.0059	23
	TSW-560	1.002.0016	17
	TSW-760	2.000.0051	16
		4 nnn nnen 1-2	5/26 〈 >

UPDATE YOUR DEVICES PLS








Lets see what we can find!




- FTP, SSH, HTTP, HTTPS, SIP wide open
- Crestron Default Port = 41794





Make your own rules!



Newer TSW-760- Fully Unauthenticated!



Jaw Drop



The **Photo.scr Miner** is a Trojan that utilizes a victim's computer processing power to mine the digital currency called Monero. When installed, this Trojan will install two monero different Monero miners called acnom.exe and acnon.exe that will attempt to mine Monero for the malware developer by using the resources of your computer's processor.



Network

Hostname:	TSW-560-00107F8D0E9F
IP Address:	
Subnet Mask:	255.255.254.0
Default Gateway:	
MAC Address:	00:10:7f:8d:0e:9f

Control System Connection

Address:	
IP ID:	3
Port:	41794
Status:	ONLINE

Crestron TSW telnet commands

Device Specific Commands (TSW)

ADDGroup Administrator Create a new local group

ADDUSER Administrator Create a new local user

ADDUSERTogroup Administrator Add an existing local or domain user to an existing local group

ADLOGIN Administrator Active Directory Login

ADLOGOUt Administrator Active Directory Logout

AUTHentication Administrator Authentication on/off

AUTODiscovery Operator Commands for Ethernet auto discovery

CARDS Operator Display Cards detected in system

CLEARerr Operator Clears the current error log

DELETEDOMAINGroup Administrator Delete an existing domain group

DELETEGroup Administrator Delete an existing local group

DELETEUser Administrator Delete an existing local user

ECHo Operator Enable/disable character echoing

ENABLEfeature Administrator Enables/disables specified feature

ERRlog Operator Prints the current error log

INFO Operator Print Software Capabilities

INITIALIZE Programmer Clear file system

KILLSOCKET Administrator Close an active TCP console socket

LISTGROUPS Administrator List existing local groups

LISTGROUPUsers Administrator List all existing (local and domain) users in an existing

LISTUSERS Administrator List of users authenicated on thus system

POEPLUS Programmer Enable/disable 24V when POEPLUS+ is available

RECOVEr Administrator Backup or Restore config/display folders

REMOVEUserfromgroup Administrator Remove an existing local or domain user from an existing loc

RESETPassword Administrator Reset an existing local user's password

RESTORe Administrator Restore factory defaults

SHOWHW Operator Display hardware configuration

TIMEZone Administrator Get/Set the timezone

TIMEdate Programmer Get the time and date

UPDATEPassword User Update current local user's password

UPTIME Operator Display the time the system is running

USERInformation Administrator Show access information for a specific user

VERsion Operator Print version to console

WHO Administrator Generate a report of the Ethernet consoles

Take Screenshot



[TSW-1060>Generating a screen shot to /mnt/sdcard/ROMDISK/logs/ScreenShot.bmp Screen width = 1280, height = 800 Raw image size is 4096000 bytes Begin pixel grab and shuffle...Done! BMP File Saved!

TSW-1060>



000

```
TSW-760>dir `id>test.txt`
Directory of \'id>test.txt'\
   [DIR] 02-03-17 16:55:17 SSHBanner
   [DIR] 04-26-18 17:10:39 SYS
   [DIR]
        04-23-18 05:08:36 User
   [DIR] 02-03-17 21:26:12 display
         2-03-17 21:26:24 display.hash
   [DIR] 07-27-17 12:56:21 firmware
   [DIR] 02-03-17 16:55:18 homepage
   [DIR] 08-02-17 06:30:13 logs
   [DIR] 02-03-17 16:55:17 media
   [DIR] 02-03-17 16:55:16 romdisk
     24
          8-02-17 07:24:23 test.txt
```

uid=0(root) gid=0(root)

TSW-760>type test.txt

TSW-760>bve

Disconnecting Bye....

asr@ubuntu:~/crestron\$ ^C ::: asr@ubuntu:~/crestron\$

Crestron MC3 Controller

Vulnerabilities

- Authentication disabled by default
- Can decipher super user passwords
- Firmware older than 1.502.0047.001

3.2.3 IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROL CWE-284

The devices are shipped with authentication disabled, and there is no indication to users that they need to take steps to enable it. When compromised, the access to the CTP console is left open.

CVE-2018-10630 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 9.8 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

3.2.4 INSUFFICIENTLY PROTECTED CREDENTIALS CWE-522


The passwords for special sudo accounts may be calculated using information accessible to those with regular user privileges. Attackers could decipher these passwords, which may allow them to execute hidden API calls and escape the CTP console sandbox environment with elevated privileges.

CVE-2018-13341 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 8.8 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).



Top Countries 1. United States 3.582 2. Canada 305 3. Brazil 190 4. Chile 5. Dominican Republic 6. China 58 7. United Kingdom 8. France 9. Mexico 10. Australia 44


Frequency vs. Firmware Version







Average Devices 24.4K










	Oto	O'es	O	Madal	0
	Country	City	Organization	Model	Count -
	United States	Scottsdale	Cox Communications	MC3	122
	United States	Albuquerque	University of New Mexico	TSW-560	117
	United States	Las Vegas	Cox Communications	C3	108
4.	United States	Scottsdale	Cox Communications	C3	84
	United States	Albuquerque	University of New Mexico	X-Frame-Otions: S	81
	Dominican Rep	Santo Domingo	Claro Dominican Republic	Server: Crestron S	71
	United States	Miami Beach	Atlantic Broadband	C3	68
	United States	Houston	Comcast Cable	C3	66
				1-25/11634	< >

AMX Systems











Past Vulnerabilities





CVE-2015-8362

- Back Door account access
- "The usernames "1MB@tMaN" and "BlackWidow" were hardcoded in the firmware and allow for remote login in debug mode, granting the attacker access to tools not provided to administrators such as packet sniffing."

CVE-2015-8362- BackDoors

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following AMX multimedia devices are affected by vulnerability CVE-2015-8362:

- NX-1200, NX-2200, NX-3200, NX-4200 NetLinx Controller, versions prior to Version 1.4.65,
- Massio ControlPads MCP-10x, versions prior to Version 1.4.65,
- Enova DVX-x2xx, versions prior to Version 1.4.65,
- . DVX-31xxHD-SP (-T), versions prior Version 4.8.331,
- DVX-21xxHD-SP (-T), versions prior Version 4.8.331,
- DVX-2100HD-SP-T Master, versions prior to Version 4.1.420 (Hotfix firmware version).
- . Enova DGX 100 NX Series Master, versions prior to Version 1.4.72 (Hotfix firmware version),
- Enova DGX 8/16/32/64 NX Series Master, versions prior to Version 1.4.72 (Hotfix firmware version),
- Enova DGX 8/16/32/64 NI Series Master, versions prior to Version 4.2.397 (Hotfix firmware version),
- NI-700, NI-900 Master Controllers (64M RAM), versions prior to Version 4.1.419.
- NI-700, NI-900 Master Controllers (32M RAM), versions prior to Version 3.60.456 (Hotfix firmware version),
- NI-2100, NI-3100, NI-4100, NI-2100 with ICSNet, NI-3100 with ICSNet, NI-3100/256, NI-3100/256 with ICSNet, NI-4100/256, versions prior to Version 4.1.419,
- . NI-3101-SIG Master Controller, versions prior to Version 4.1.419,
- . NI-2000, NI-3000, NI-4000, versions prior to Version 3.60.456 (Hotfix firmware version), and
- ME260/64 Duet, versions prior to Version 3.60.456 (Hotfix firmware version).

The following AMX multimedia devices are affected by vulnerability CVE-2016-1984:

- NX-1200, NX-2200, NX-3200, NX-4200 NetLinx Controller, Version 1.4.65 and Version 1.4.66 (Hotfix firmware version),
- · Massio ControlPads MCP-10x, Version 1.4.65 and Version 1.4.66 (Hotfix firmware version),
- Enova DVX-x2xx, Version 1.4.65 and Version 1.4.72 (Hotfix firmware version),
- · Enova DGX 100 NX Series Master, Version 1.4.72 (Hotfix firmware version), and
- Enova DGX 8/16/32/64 NX Series Master, Version 1.4.72 (Hotfix firmware version).

- elevated privileges to configure user interfaces, change device settings, upload files, and download file
- Break all the things!



CVE-2015-8362- Hardcoded password

- Fully unauthenticated
- Web Interface pretty buggy
- Appears to be a "Smart Home"

System

Enable Security

Groups

Add Group

Modify Group

Directory Associations

Users

Add User

Modify User

<u>Directory Associations</u>

SSL


Server Certificate

Export Certificate Request

Import Certificate

```
-- File Names = 15
        1 C:\Program Files\Common Files\AMXShare\AXIs\NetLinx.axi
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\Drake Residence,Rev 1.axs
        2 C:\Users\
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev <mark>3\queue and threshold sizes.axi</mark>
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\SyslogMod.axi
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\FUNCTIONSwithEmailLog,Rev 0.axi
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\CFSOUNDII, Rev 1.axi
        7 C:\Users\
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\LIGHTS,Rev 1.axi
        8 C:\Users\
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\HVAC,Rev 1.axi
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\AUDIO,Rev 1.axi
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\Theater,Rev 1.axi
       12 C:\Users\
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\Intercom,Rev 1.axi
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\ALARM,Rev 2.axi
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\i!-ScheduleMod.axi
       14 C:\Users\
                              \Documents\IRC\Programming\AMX\Drake\Rev 3\MuteButton.axi
      2 Name is SYSLOG
```


AMX Web Control- Unauthenticated



RESETADMINPASSWORD	This command resets the administrator password back to "password". Note: This command is only available to Program Port terminal sessions. It is not available to Telnet sessions (see the Overview section on page 90).
SET FTP PORT	Enables/Disables the Master's IP port listened to for FTP connections.
	Note: The Master must be rebooted to enable new settings.
	Example:
	>SET FTP PORT FTP is enabled Do you want to enable (e) or disable (d) FTP (enter e or d): FTP enabled, reboot the Master for the change to take affect.
SET SECURITY PROFILE	Sets a pre-defined Security Profile (a grouped set of security settings). The Security Profile can be set to "none" (default setting), "Secure", or "DOD" (see below). Note: The Security Profile can only be configured via the terminal interface of the Master's Program port. Example:


Change all the things!







690.7

Average Devices







Most Open Devices

	Country	City	Organization	Model	Coun	t +
	United States	New York	Digital Ocean	null		
	Poland	Poznan	Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry P	null		
	United States	Chicago	Comcast Cable	NetLinx		
4.	United States	null	null	null		
	Brazil	Jaguariaiva	Mt-telecom Sul	null		
	United States	Columbus	Amazon.com	null		
	United States	Ashburn	Amazon.com	null		
8.	France	null	OVH SAS	null		
		Note: Many o	devices were unable to be identified	1 - 25 / 240		>

Misc Hardware Devices








Extron IN1608 Switcher


- No authentication Required
- Logs in as Admin
- Extron IN1608 SA- 8 Input switcher/ scaler





Oh boy...

Logged in as: admin











Extron Controllers- Extron TLP 350MV





(c) Copyright 2008, Extron Electronics, MLC 226 IP, V1.10, 60-600-00 Wed, 19 Sep 2018 07:43:42


SMP 351


H.264 Streaming Media Processor

Key Features


- Process two high resolution AV sources from up to five available input signals
- · Record and stream simultaneously
- · High quality scaling with flexible two-window management
- Produce MP4 media or M4A audio files that are compatible with virtually any media player
- Stream concurrently at two resolutions and bit rates from the same source
- · LinkLicense® for dual channel recording and streaming














– File Upload	Utility —					
Dest	ct a file to uploa ination Name: ination Director		Browse recordings/lost+fo		Cancel	
Accessing Internal Filesystem Files may be downloaded or uploaded using a Secure-FTP (SFTP) client. Access this device at: sftp:// Log in using "admin" or "user" credentials.						
Name	Туре	Total	Used	Available	Recording Time	
Internal	Internal	73.36 GB	179.76 MB	69.46 GB	16:11:03	












Most Open Devices

	Country	City	Organization	Model	Count -
	United States	Santa Barbara	University of California, Santa	MLC 226 IP	70
2.	United States	Philadelphia	University of Pennsylvania	IPI204	6
	Taiwan	null	Taiwan Academic Network (T	MLC 226 IP	50
4.	United States	Philadelphia	University of Pennsylvania	MLC 226 IP	4
	Germany	Landau	University of Koblenz-Landau	MLC 226 IP	2
	United States	Cambridge	Massachusetts Institute of T	MLC 226 IP	2
	United States	Baltimore	University of Maryland Baltim	MLC 104 IP PL	2
				1-25/163	< >


Crestron Air Media







Crestron Air Media Data




Past Vulnerabilities

- CVE-2016-5640 (AM-100/101)
 - Directory Traversal /RCE
 - Firmware < 1.2.1
- CVE-2017-16709 (AM-100/101)
 - RCE Vulnerability
 - \circ Firmware < 1.6.0 / 2.7.0
- CVE-2017-16710 (AM-100/101)
 - XSS Vulnerability
 - o Firmware < 1.6.0 / 2.7.0
- 83% Vulnerable




Crestron Air Media




- Default Open Ports 80, 443, 161, 515, 5353
- Default passwords



Shenanigans!







To begin your presentation


enter the address at the top of this screen into your web browser.







Even further....



- Air Media authenticates users with 4 digit code
- 2. Disable code
- 3. Hack the planet





Projectors













Network Projector DATA


Top Countries	
1. United States	17
2. Spain	11
3. Canada	6
4. Mexico	2
5. Taiwan	1
6. Norway	1
7. Hungary	1
8. Austria	1





Sony Projectors





Data Projector	SONY			
Information	Control	Setup		
Owner information Network Password Mail Report Easy Menu Advertisement PJ Talk PJ Link SNMP	Administrator Name : root Password : Confirm Password : User Name : Password : Confirm Password : Appl	(a) (b) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c		
Service Reset				
VPL-FHZ55				

Epson Projector Web Control



- Power On/Off projector
- Change input
- Change projector settings
- Admin control



Wi-fi Settings!







Most Vulnerable Orgs

- Universities
- Small Businesses
- Understaffed/
 Inexperienced AV/
 IT Teams
- Legacy equipment









Total Count 40





UPnP – Automatic Port Forwarding



Universal Plug n Play (UPnP)
 settings will often automatically
 forward ports on your network
 to the open internet

How To Mitigate

- 1. Select "Disable UPnP" in router settings/ devices
- 2. Disable Port Forwarding on your router
- 3. Routinely audit UPnP connections

How do we secure our orgs? -Users

Basic Security Hygiene

1. STOP PUTTING DEVICES ONLINE

- a. Don't connect it at all!
- b. Does it REALLY need to be on your network/the net
- 2. Authentication
 - a. Default password/ easy password?
- 3. Security as a standard
 - a. Security integrated into the development process
 - b. Consistent and continual firmware upgrades/checks
- 4. Disable UPnP
- 5. Subnet your stuff
 - a. Data over there, A/V tech over here
- 6. Physically secure technology in locked rack
- 7. Enable Audit logs





AV/IT Security by Design

- Vet products as part of design process
- Consider AV equipment within your threat model and risk assessment
- If it connects to the network, its probably a risk you should consider

Threat / Vulnerability Model Brought Into Risk Register

Risk No.	Risk Category	Equipment	Risk Description	Impact Description	Impact Score (1/2/3)	Probability Description	Probability Score (1/2/3)	Risk Score (1-9)
1.1	Open Ports	Projector	Telnet Enabled	Clear text communi- cation can be read if intercepted.	2	Unlikely people are spying on projec- tors.	1	2
1.2	Open Ports	Projector	HTML Server enabled	Unused open control port	2	Easiest way to access system	2	4
1.3	Known Vul- nerability	Projector	Open SSL version 1.0.1e	Vulnerable to heartbleed	3	Compromised sys- tem can be used as an attack vector	2	6
1.4	Projector	Projector	FTP enabled	Firmware can be up- loaded at any time	1	Not likely attack if password is enabled	1	1
2.1	Authentica- tion	VTC	Default Password not Changed	Anyone can access the system	3	IP address is exposed and default password is on Google	3	9
2.2	Open Ports	VTC	Telnet Enabled	Clear text communi- cation can be read if intercepted.	3	VTC is an attractive target	2	6
3.1	Room Setup	Room	Sight Lines	Content can be viewed from the lobby through the big glass windows. Room hosts confidential meetings.	3	Likely, anyone can see in and visitors wait there	3	9

Phones/ Communication

- Diligent monitoring through RMS
 - Firmware upgrades
- Minimize open ports/ services
- VLAN to separate voice traffic from data
- End to end encryption
- PATCH PATCH PATCH!



Video Conferencing

- Enable encryption on calls
- Disable broadcast streaming
- Disable far end camera control
- Disable auto-answer feature
- Monitor technology with management software
 - o AMX RMS, Cisco UCMS
 - Has audit logs for events/incidents



What can you do?- Manufacturers

Security by default/Design

- No more *default* passwords for devices
 - California is enacting this to law by 2020
- Disable unnecessary ports by default
- Web interfaces need passwords
- Automatic firmware updates (need network)
- Triggered alerts
 - Upon outage, or error
- Audit logs
- Properly Designed UPnP usage



Top Strategies to Secure Your Organization

- 1. Your firewall should NOT be open (Check UPnP)
- Device management software for ALL networked A/V devices
- 3. Robust passwords for maintenance/ Service
- 4. Include A/V devices within your IPS/IDS system
- 5. Vet A/V products for security issues/ vulnerabilities before design / installation
- 6. Encryption on communications
- 7. Lock/ restrict access to physical equipment



Thank You's

- MiSec Community
- Shodan
- GrrCon Community
- Inspiration from Dan Tentler's talks on Shodan
 - "115 batshit stupid things you can put on the internet in as fast as I can go"
 - "Drinking from the caffeine firehose we know as shodan"
- Ricky 'HeadlessZeke' Lawshae "Who Controls the Controllers Hacking Crestron"



BONUS: Crestron Smart Home!?- PYNG-HUB

Can Control:

- -Lights
- -doors
- -thermostat
- -TV's/ Media sources
- -Touch Panels





PYNG-HUB Query

















HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 18:00:03 GMT

Server: Microsoft-WinCE/7.00

Last-Modified: Tue, 15 May 2018 20:47:40 GMT

Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 105768



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2018 17:36:52 GMT

Server: DNVRS-Webs ETag: "0-1630-1e0" Content-Length: 480 Content-Type: text/html Connection: keep-alive

Keep-Alive: timeout=60, max=99 X-FRAME-OPTIONS: SAMEORIGIN

Last-Modified: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 10:24:04 GMT





PYNG-HU Version: 1.502.3107.28407

Crestron

Hostname: PYNG-WURTAK Model: PYNG-HUB

Firmware: 1.502.3107.28407 Build Date: Jul 05 2017







Lightin

Climate


Usage This Week 11/19/2018 - 11/25/2018 9% 148 hours

Usage Last Week 11/12/2018 - 11/18/201 16% 272 hours



An overview of lighting usage







FIN