



Chapter 17

Transport-Level Security


Web Security Considerations




- The World Wide Web is fundamentally a **client/server** application running over the Internet and **TCP/IP** intranets
- The following characteristics of Web usage suggest the need for tailored security tools:
 - Web servers are relatively easy to configure and manage
 - Web content is increasingly easy to develop
 - The underlying software is **extraordinarily complex**
 - May hide **many potential** security **flaws**
 - A Web server can be exploited as a launching pad into the corporation's or agency's entire computer complex
 - Casual and untrained (in security matters) users are common clients for Web-based services
 - Such users are **not** necessarily **aware** of the **security risks** that exist and do **not** have the tools or knowledge to take **effective countermeasures**

Table 17.1 A Comparison of Threats on the Web


	Threats	Consequences	Countermeasures
Integrity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Modification of user data •Trojan horse browser •Modification of memory •Modification of message traffic in transit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Loss of information •Compromise of machine •Vulnerabilty to all other threats 	Cryptographic checksums
Confidentiality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Eavesdropping on the net •Theft of info from server •Theft of data from client •Info about network configuration •Info about which client talks to server 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Loss of information •Loss of privacy 	Encryption, Web proxies
Denial of Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Killing of user threads •Flooding machine with bogus requests •Filling up disk or memory •Isolating machine by DNS attacks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Disruptive •Annoying •Prevent user from getting work done 	Difficult to prevent
Authentication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Impersonation of legitimate users •Data forgery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Misrepresentation of user •Belief that false information is valid 	Cryptographic techniques



(a) Network Level




(b) Transport Level



(c) Application Level

Figure 17.1 Relative Location of Security Facilities in the TCP/IP Protocol Stack

Transport Layer Security (TLS)






Figure 17.2 SSL/TLS Protocol Stack

TLS Architecture

- Two important TLS concepts are:

TLS connection

- A transport that provides a suitable type of service
- For TLS such connections are peer-to-peer relationships
- Connections are transient
- Every connection is associated with one session

TLS session

- An association between a client and a server
- Created by the Handshake Protocol
- Define a set of cryptographic security parameters which can be shared among multiple connections
- Are used to avoid the expensive negotiation of new security parameters for each connection

A session state is defined by the following parameters:

Session identifier

An arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify an active or resumable session state

Peer certificate

An X509.v3 certificate of the peer; this element of the state may be null

Compression method

The algorithm used to compress data prior to encryption

Cipher spec

Specifies the bulk data encryption algorithm and a hash algorithm used for MAC calculation; also defines cryptographic attributes such as the hash_size

Master secret

48-byte secret shared between the client and the server

Is resumable

A flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new connections

A **connection** state is defined by the following **parameters**:

Server and
client **random**

- Byte sequences that are chosen by the server and client for each connection

Server write
MAC secret

- The secret key used in MAC operations on data sent by the server

Client write
MAC secret

- The secret key used in MAC operations on data sent by the client

Server **write**
key

- The secret encryption key for data encrypted by the server and decrypted by the client

Client **write**
key

- The symmetric encryption key for data encrypted by the client and decrypted by the server


Initialization
vectors

- When a block cipher in CBC mode is used, an initialization vector (**IV**) is maintained for each key
- This field is first **initialized by** the TLS **Handshake** Protocol
- The final ciphertext block from each record is preserved for use as the IV with the following record

Sequence
numbers

- Each party maintains separate sequence numbers for transmitted and received messages for each connection
- When a party sends or receives a change cipher spec message, the appropriate sequence number is set to zero
- Sequence numbers may not exceed $2^{64} - 1$

TLS Record Protocol



TLS Record Protocol Services

- **confidentiality**

- using symmetric encryption with a shared secret key defined by Handshake Protocol
- AES, IDEA, RC2-40, DES-40, DES, 3DES, Fortezza, RC4-40, RC4-128
- message is compressed before encryption

- **message integrity**

- using a MAC with shared secret key
- similar to HMAC but with different padding




Figure 17.3 TLS Record Protocol Operation







Figure 17.4 SSL Record Format




(a) Change Cipher Spec Protocol



(c) Handshake Protocol



(b) Alert Protocol




(d) Other Upper-Layer Protocol (e.g., HTTP)

Figure 17.5 TLS Record Protocol Payload

TLS Change Cipher Spec Protocol

- one of 3 TLS specific protocols which use the TLS Record protocol
- a single message
- causes pending state to become current
- hence updating the cipher suite in use



(a) Change Cipher Spec Protocol

TLS Alert Protocol

➤conveys TLS-related alerts to peer entity

➤severity

- warning or fatal

➤specific alert

- fatal: unexpected message, bad record mac, decompression failure, handshake failure, illegal parameter
- warning: close notify, no certificate, bad certificate, unsupported certificate, certificate revoked, certificate expired, certificate unknown

➤compressed & encrypted like all TLS data

1 byte 1 byte

Level	Alert
-------	-------

(b) Alert Protocol

TLS Handshake Protocol

- allows server & client to:
 - authenticate each other
 - to negotiate encryption & MAC algorithms
 - to negotiate cryptographic keys to be used
- comprises a series of messages in phases
 1. Establish Security Capabilities
 2. Server Authentication and Key Exchange
 3. Client Authentication and Key Exchange
 4. Finish

1 byte	3 bytes	≥ 0 bytes
Type	Length	Content

Table 17.2 SSL Handshake Protocol Message Types

Message Type	Parameters
hello_request	null
client_hello	version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method
server_hello	version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method
certificate	chain of X.509v3 certificates
server_key_exchange	parameters, signature
certificate_request	type, authorities
server_done	null
certificate_verify	signature
client_key_exchange	parameters, signature
finished	hash value

(Table is on page 522 in the textbook)




Figure 17.6 Handshake Protocol Action

Cryptographic Computations

- Two further items are of interest:
 - The creation of a **shared master secret** by means of the key exchange
 - The shared master secret is a **one-time 48-byte** value generated for this session by means of **secure key exchange**
 - The creation is in two stages
 - First, a **pre_master_secret** is exchanged
 - Second, the **master_secret** is calculated **by both** parties
 - The generation of cryptographic parameters from the master secret

Generation of Cryptographic Parameters

- **CipherSpecs** require:

- A client write MAC secret
- A server write MAC secret
- A client write key
- A server write key
- A client write IV
- A server write IV

-----Which are **generated from** the **master secret** in that order

- These parameters are generated from the master secret by hashing the master secret into a sequence of secure bytes of sufficient length for all needed parameters




Figure 17.7 TLS Function **P_hash** (secret, seed)

Heartbeat Protocol

- Is a periodic signal generated by hardware or software to indicate normal operation or to synchronize other parts of a system
- Typically used to monitor the availability of a protocol entity
- In the specific case of TLS, a Heartbeat protocol was defined in 2012 in RFC 6250 (*Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension*)

Heartbeat Protocol

- Runs on top of the TLS Record Protocol
- Consists of two message types
 - heartbeat_request
 - heartbeat_response
- The use of the Heartbeat protocol is established during Phase 1 of the Handshake protocol
- The heartbeat serves two purposes
 - It assures the sender that the recipient is still alive
 - The heartbeat generates activity across the connection during idle periods, which avoids closure by a firewall that does not tolerate idle connections
- The requirement for the exchange of a payload was designed into the Heartbeat protocol to support its use in a connectionless version of TLS known as Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)

SSL/TLS Attacks

- The attacks can be grouped into four general categories:
 - Attacks on the handshake protocol
 - Attacks on the record and application data protocols
 - Attacks on the PKI
 - Other attacks
- The constant back-and-forth between threats and countermeasures determines the evolution of Internet-based protocols

TLSv1.3

- Primary aim is to improve the security of TLS
- Significant **changes** from version 1.2 are:
 - TLSv1.3 **removes support** for a number of options and functions
 - Deleted items include:
 - Compression
 - Ciphers that do not offer authenticated encryption
 - **Static** RSA and DH key exchange
 - 32-bit timestamp as part of the Random parameter in the client_hello message
 - Renegotiation
 - **Change Cipher Spec Protocol**
 - **RC4**
 - Use of **MD5** and **SHA-224** hashes with signatures
 - TLSv1.3 uses Diffie-Hellman or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman for key exchange and **does not permit RSA**
 - TLSv1.3 allows for a “**1 round trip time**” handshake by changing the order of message sent with establishing a secure connection

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)

- The secure version of HTTP
- HTTPS encrypts all communications between the browser and the website
- Data sent using HTTPS provides three important areas of protection:
 - Encryption
 - Data integrity
 - Authentication

HTTPS (HTTP over SSL)

- Refers to the combination of HTTP and SSL to implement secure communication between a Web browser and a Web server
- The HTTPS capability is built into all modern Web browsers
- A user of a Web browser will see URL addresses that begin with **https://** rather than http://
- If HTTPS is specified, port 443 is used, which invokes SSL
- Documented in **RFC 2818**, *HTTP Over TLS*
 - There is no fundamental change in using HTTP over either SSL or TLS and both implementations are referred to as HTTPS
- When HTTPS is used, the following elements of the communication are encrypted:
 - URL of the requested document
 - Contents of the document
 - Contents of browser forms
 - Cookies sent from browser to server and from server to browser
 - Contents of HTTP header

Connection Initiation

For HTTPS, the **agent** acting as the **HTTP** client also acts as the **TLS** client

The client initiates a connection to the server on the appropriate port and then sends the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake

When the TLS handshake has finished, the client may then initiate the first HTTP request

All HTTP data is to be sent as TLS application data

There are three levels of awareness of a connection in HTTPS:

At the HTTP level, an HTTP client requests a connection to an HTTP server by sending a connection request to the next lowest layer

- Typically the next lowest layer is **TCP**, but it may also be **TLS/SSL**

At the level of TLS, a **session** is established between a TLS client and a TLS server

- This session can support one or more connections at any time

A TLS request to establish a **connection** begins with the establishment of a TCP connection between the TCP entity on the client side and the TCP entity on the server side

Connection Closure

- An HTTP client or server can indicate the closing of a connection by including the line `Connection: close` in an HTTP record
- The closure of an HTTPS connection requires that TLS close the connection with the peer TLS entity on the remote side, which will involve closing the underlying TCP connection
- TLS implementations must initiate an exchange of closure alerts before closing a connection
 - A TLS implementation may, after sending a closure alert, close the connection without waiting for the peer to send its closure alert, generating an “incomplete close”
- An unannounced TCP closure could be evidence of some sort of attack so the HTTPS client should issue some sort of security warning when this occurs


Secure Shell (SSH)

A protocol for secure network communications designed to be relatively simple and inexpensive to implement

SSH client and server applications are widely available for most operating systems

- Has become the method of choice for remote login and X tunneling
- Is rapidly becoming one of the most pervasive applications for encryption technology outside of embedded systems

SSH2 fixes a number of security flaws in the original scheme and is documented as a proposed standard in IETF RFCs 4250 through 4256



The initial version, SSH1 was focused on providing a secure remote logon facility to replace TELNET and other remote logon schemes that provided no security

SSH also provides a more general client/server capability and can be used for such network functions as file transfer and e-mail




Figure 17.8 SSH Protocol Stack

Transport Layer Protocol

- Server authentication occurs at the transport layer, based on the server possessing a public/private key pair
- A server may have multiple host keys using multiple different asymmetric encryption algorithms
- Multiple hosts may share the same host key
- The server host key is used during key exchange to authenticate the identity of the host
- **RFC 4251** dictates two alternative trust models:
 - The client has a **local database** that associates each host name with the corresponding public host key
 - The host **name-to-key** association is **certified by** a **trusted certification authority (CA)**; the client only knows the CA root key and can verify the validity of all host keys certified by accepted CAs




Figure 17.9 SSH Transport Layer Protocol Packet Exchanges




Figure 17.10 SSH Transport Layer Protocol Packet Formation

Table 17.3 SSH Transport Layer Cryptographic Algorithms

Cipher	
3des-cbc*	Three-key 3DES in CBC mode
blowfish-cbc	Blowfish in CBC mode
twofish256-cbc	Twofish in CBC mode with a 256-bit key
twofish192-cbc	Twofish with a 192-bit key
twofish128-cbc	Twofish with a 128-bit key
aes256-cbc	AES in CBC mode with a 256-bit key
aes192-cbc	AES with a 192-bit key
aes128-cbc**	AES with a 128-bit key
Serpent256-cbc	Serpent in CBC mode with a 256-bit key
Serpent192-cbc	Serpent with a 192-bit key
Serpent128-cbc	Serpent with a 128-bit key
arcfour	RC4 with a 128-bit key
cast128-cbc	CAST-128 in CBC mode

MAC algorithm	
hmac-sha1*	HMAC-SHA1; digest length = key length = 20
hmac-sha1-96**	First 96 bits of HMAC-SHA1; digest length = 12; key length = 20
hmac-md5	HMAC-MD5; digest length = key length = 16
hmac-md5-96	First 96 bits of HMAC-MD5; digest length = 12; key length = 16

Compression algorithm	
none*	No compression
zlib	Defined in RFC 1950 and RFC 1951

* = Required

** = Recommended

(Table is on page 537 in the textbook)

Key Generation

- The keys used for encryption and MAC (and any needed IVs) are generated from the shared secret key K , the hash value from the key exchange H , and the session identifier, which is equal to H unless there has been a subsequent key exchange after the initial key exchange

User Authentication Protocol

- The User Authentication Protocol provides the means by which the client is authenticated to the server
- Three types of messages are always used in the User Authentication Protocol
- **User** name is the authorization identity the client is claiming, **service** name is the facility to which the client is requesting access, and **method** name is the authentication method being used in this request

Message Exchange

- The message exchange involves the following steps.
 - The client sends a SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST with a requested method of none
 - The server checks to determine if the user name is valid. If not, the server returns SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE with the partial success value of false. If the user name is valid, the server proceeds to step 3
 - The server returns SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE with a list of one or more authentication methods to be used
 - The client selects one of the acceptable authentication methods and sends a SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST with that method name and the required method-specific fields. At this point, there may be a sequence of exchanges to perform the method
 - If the authentication succeeds and more authentication methods are required, the server proceeds to step 3, using a partial success value of true. If the authentication fails, the server proceeds to step 3, using a partial success value of false
 - When all required authentication methods succeed, the server sends a SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS message, and the Authentication Protocol is over

Authentication Methods

- Publickey
 - The client sends a message to the server that contains the client's public key, with the message signed by the client's private key
 - When the server receives this message, it checks whether the supplied key is acceptable for authentication and, if so, it checks whether the signature is correct
- Password
 - The client sends a message containing a plaintext password, which is protected by encryption by the Transport Layer Protocol
- Hostbased
 - Authentication is performed on the client's host rather than the client itself
 - This method works by having the client send a signature created with the private key of the client host
 - Rather than directly verifying the user's identity, the SSH server verifies the identity of the client host

Connection Protocol

- The SSH Connection Protocol runs on top of the SSH Transport Layer Protocol and assumes that a secure authentication connection is in use
 - The secure authentication connection, referred to as a *tunnel*, is used by the Connection Protocol to multiplex a number of logical channels
- Channel mechanism
 - All types of communication using SSH are supported using separate channels
 - Either side may open a channel
 - For each channel, each side associates a unique channel number
 - Channels are flow controlled using a window mechanism
 - No data may be sent to a channel until a message is received to indicate that window space is available
 - The life of a channel progresses through three stages: opening a channel, data transfer, and closing a channel




Figure 17.11 Example SSH Connection Protocol Message Exchange

Channel Types

Four channel types are recognized in the SSH Connection Protocol specification

Session

- The remote execution of a program
- The program may be a shell, an application such as file transfer or e-mail, a system command, or some built-in subsystem
- Once a session channel is opened, subsequent requests are used to start the remote program

X11

- Refers to the X Window System, a computer software system and network protocol that provides a graphical user interface (GUI) for networked computers
- X allows applications to run on a network server but to be displayed on a desktop machine

Forwarded-tcpip

- Remote port forwarding

Direct-tcpip

- Local port forwarding

Port Forwarding

- One of the most useful features of SSH
- Provides the ability to **convert** any **insecure TCP** connection into a **secure SSH** connection (also referred to as **SSH tunneling**)
- Incoming TCP traffic is delivered to the appropriate application **on the basis of the port number** (a port is an identifier of a user of TCP)
- An application may employ **multiple** port numbers





Figure 17.12 SSH Transport Layer Packet Exchanges

Summary

- Summarize Web security threats and Web traffic security approaches
- Present an overview of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
- Understand the differences between Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security



- Compare the pseudorandom function used in Transport Layer Security with those discussed earlier in the book
- Present an overview of HTTPS (HTTP over SSL)
- Present an overview of Secure Shell (SSH)