

Robot Baseball: A Stochastic Markov Game Model

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Abstract

This document summarizes the mathematical formulation and computational approach used to solve the *Robot Baseball* problem developed by the Artificial Automaton Athletics Association (Quad-A). Each at-bat is modeled as a stochastic, zero-sum Markov game between a pitcher and a batter. The objective is to determine the probability of reaching a full count (3 balls, 2 strikes) under optimal mixed strategies for both players and to find the parameter p (home run probability) that maximizes this probability.

1 Game Description

At the beginning of each at-bat, the count is $(b, s) = (0, 0)$. At each pitch:

- The **pitcher** chooses to throw either a *ball* or a *strike*.
- The **batter** chooses to either *wait* or *swing*.

The outcomes are:

Pitcher	Batter	Result
Ball	Wait	$b \rightarrow b + 1$
Strike	Wait	$s \rightarrow s + 1$
Ball	Swing	$s \rightarrow s + 1$
Strike	Swing	Home run with prob. p ; otherwise $s \rightarrow s + 1$

The at-bat terminates if:

- $b = 4$: walk, batter scores 1 point.
- $s = 3$: strikeout, 0 points.
- Home run occurs: 4 points.

2 Mathematical Model

The game is modeled as a finite Markov decision process with states represented by the pair

$$(b, s), \quad \text{where } b \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}, \quad s \in \{0, 1, 2\}.$$

These represent the current number of balls and strikes, respectively.

The terminal (absorbing) conditions are:

$$V(4, s) = 1 \quad (\text{walk, 4 balls}),$$

$$V(b, 3) = 0 \quad (\text{strikeout, 3 strikes}).$$

Thus, there are $4 \times 3 = 12$ non-terminal states plus the terminal outcomes.

Bellman Equation

For non-terminal states:

Summing the expected values of all outcomes gives:

$$\begin{aligned} V(b, s) &= (1 - x)(1 - y) A \\ &\quad + [(1 - x)y + x(1 - y) + xy(1 - p)] B \\ &\quad + xyp \cdot 4. \end{aligned}$$

where

$$A := V(b + 1, s), \quad B := V(b, s + 1),$$

and $x, y \in [0, 1]$ are the mixed strategies:

Simplyfing, we obtain

$$V(b, s) = A + (B - A)(x + y - xy) + p(4 - B)xy,$$

- x : probability the pitcher throws a strike.
- y : probability the batter swings.

Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

In a mixed strategy equilibrium, each player randomizes their actions so that the opponent becomes **indifferent** between their own options.

Idea. The pitcher chooses the probability x of throwing a strike such that the batter's expected value of *waiting* equals that of *swinging*. Similarly, the batter chooses the probability y of swinging so that the pitcher's expected loss (or the batter's gain) is the same whether the pitcher throws a ball or a strike.

Mathematically. Let the expected value to the batter when the pitcher throws a ball ($x = 0$) be

$$V_B = (1 - y)A + yB = A + (B - A)y,$$

and when the pitcher throws a strike ($x = 1$):

$$V_S = (1 - y)B + y[p \cdot 4 + (1 - p)B] = B + yp(4 - B).$$

At equilibrium, the pitcher must make the batter indifferent between these two outcomes:

$$V_B = V_S.$$

This yields:

$$A + (B - A)y = B + yp(4 - B).$$

Solving for y gives the batter's optimal mixed strategy:

$$y^* = \frac{A - B}{p(4 - B) + (A - B)}.$$

By the symmetry of the previous equation, the pitcher's equilibrium mixing probability satisfies the same expression:

$$x^* = y^*.$$

Interpretation. This condition ensures that neither player can improve their expected payoff by deviating to a pure strategy. If the resulting x^* or y^* falls outside the interval $[0, 1]$, the equilibrium collapses to a **pure strategy** (i.e., one player always chooses the same action).

Boundary Conditions

$$V(4, s) = 1, \quad V(b, 3) = 0.$$

3 Probability of Reaching a Full Count

Let $r(b, s)$ denote the probability of reaching state $(3, 2)$ before termination.

Recursion

$$r(b, s) = (1 - x^*)(1 - y^*)r(b + 1, s) + [(1 - x^*)y^* + x^*(1 - y^*) + x^*y^*(1 - p)]r(b, s + 1).$$

Boundary conditions:

$$r(3, 2) = 1, \quad r(4, s) = 0, \quad r(b, 3) = 0.$$

Note that there is no additional term for the home run outcome, since a home run immediately ends the at-bat and thus cannot lead to the target state $(3, 2)$.

Thus $q(p) = r(0, 0)$ is the probability that an at-bat reaches a full count given parameter p .

4 Optimization Procedure

1. For a given $p \in [0, 1]$, solve $V(b, s)$, x^* , y^* by backward induction.
2. Compute $q(p) = r(0, 0)$.
3. Search numerically for

$$p^* = \arg \max_p q(p).$$

5 Results

The numerical search yields:

$$p^* \approx 0.227, \quad q_{\max} \approx 0.296.$$

Hence, under optimal play and the best choice of home run probability, approximately 29.6% of at-bats reach a full count.