Robot Baseball: A Stochastic Markov Game Model

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Abstract

This document summarizes the mathematical formulation and computational approach used to solve the $Robot\ Baseball$ problem developed by the Artificial Automaton Athletics Association (Quad-A). Each at-bat is modeled as a stochastic, zero-sum Markov game between a pitcher and a batter. The objective is to determine the probability of reaching a full count (3 balls, 2 strikes) under optimal mixed strategies for both players and to find the parameter p (home run probability) that maximizes this probability.

1 Game Description

At the beginning of each at-bat, the count is (b, s) = (0, 0). At each pitch:

- The **pitcher** chooses to throw either a ball or a strike.
- The **batter** chooses to either wait or swing.

The outcomes are:

Pitcher	Batter	Result
Ball	Wait	$b \rightarrow b + 1$
Strike	Wait	$s \to s+1$
Ball	Swing	$s \rightarrow s + 1$
Strike	Swing	Home run with prob. p ; otherwise $s \to s+1$

The at-bat terminates if:

- b = 4: walk, batter scores 1 point.
- s = 3: strikeout, 0 points.
- Home run occurs: 4 points.

2 Mathematical Model

The game is modeled as a finite Markov decision process with states represented by the pair

$$(b, s)$$
, where $b \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$, $s \in \{0, 1, 2\}$.

These represent the current number of balls and strikes, respectively.

The terminal (absorbing) conditions are:

$$V(4, s) = 1$$
 (walk, 4 balls),
 $V(b, 3) = 0$ (strikeout, 3 strikes).

Thus, there are $4 \times 3 = 12$ non-terminal states plus the terminal outcomes.

Bellman Equation

For non-terminal states:

Summing the expected values of all outcomes gives:

$$V(b,s) = (1-x)(1-y) A + [(1-x)y + x(1-y) + xy(1-p)] B + xy p \cdot 4.$$

where

$$A := V(b+1, s), \qquad B := V(b, s+1),$$

and $x, y \in [0, 1]$ are the mixed strategies:

Simplyfing, we obtain

$$V(b,s) = A + (B - A)(x + y - xy) + p(4 - B)xy,$$

- x: probability the pitcher throws a strike.
- y: probability the batter swings.

Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

In a mixed strategy equilibrium, each player randomizes their actions so that the opponent becomes **indifferent** between their own options.

Idea. The pitcher chooses the probability x of throwing a strike such that the batter's expected value of waiting equals that of swinging. Similarly, the batter chooses the probability y of swinging so that the pitcher's expected loss (or the batter's gain) is the same whether the pitcher throws a ball or a strike.

Mathematically. Let the expected value to the batter when the pitcher throws a ball (x = 0) be

$$V_B = (1 - y)A + yB = A + (B - A)y,$$

and when the pitcher throws a strike (x = 1):

$$V_S = (1 - y)B + y [p \cdot 4 + (1 - p)B] = B + y p(4 - B).$$

At equilibrium, the pitcher must make the batter indifferent between these two outcomes:

$$V_B = V_S$$
.

This yields:

$$A + (B - A)y = B + y p(4 - B).$$

Solving for y gives the batter's optimal mixed strategy:

$$y^* = \frac{A - B}{p(4 - B) + (A - B)}.$$

By the symmetry of the previous equation, the pitcher's equilibrium mixing probability satisfies the same expression:

$$x^* = y^*.$$

Interpretation. This condition ensures that neither player can improve their expected payoff by deviating to a pure strategy. If the resulting x^* or y^* falls outside the interval [0,1], the equilibrium collapses to a **pure strategy** (i.e., one player always chooses the same action).

Boundary Conditions

$$V(4,s) = 1, V(b,3) = 0.$$

3 Probability of Reaching a Full Count

Let r(b, s) denote the probability of reaching state (3, 2) before termination.

Recursion

$$r(b,s) = (1-x^*)(1-y^*)r(b+1,s) + [(1-x^*)y^* + x^*(1-y^*) + x^*y^*(1-p)]r(b,s+1).$$

Boundary conditions:

$$r(3,2) = 1,$$
 $r(4,s) = 0,$ $r(b,3) = 0.$

Note that there is no additional term for the home run outcome, since a home run immediately ends the at-bat and thus cannot lead to the target state (3, 2).

Thus q(p) = r(0,0) is the probability that an at-bat reaches a full count given parameter p.

4 Optimization Procedure

- 1. For a given $p \in [0,1]$, solve V(b,s), x^* , y^* by backward induction.
- 2. Compute q(p) = r(0, 0).
- 3. Search numerically for

$$p^* = \arg\max_p q(p).$$

5 Numerical Implementation

A Python implementation uses dynamic programming and a grid search over p. The key functions are:

- solve_for_p(p)
- find_optimal_q()

6 Results

The numerical search yields:

$$p^* \approx 0.227, \qquad q_{\text{max}} \approx 0.296.$$

Hence, under optimal play and the best choice of home run probability, approximately 29.6% of at-bats reach a full count.