## Conflict in Cyberspace

Graduate Seminar, Fall 2023

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Week 04: Technology Steps in

### Recap W03: Conflict Consequences

Confli	ct is immanent (s	o far):		
□ Reso	ources scarcity			
☐ Uncertainty is global				
☐ Role of beliefs				
- <b>^</b>	World Order	7		

**Conflict:** Anarchy

Monopolization of Violence \*\*\*

State

World Order

Olson

☐ Incentives to be Roving Bandit

☐ Capacity to control the territory: <u>Low</u>

☐ Individual harm from: Low

☐ 'bad investment climate

☐ 'general distrust'

L Strategy 'Steal Everything'

☐ Incentives to be Stationary Bandit

☐ Capacity to control the territory: High

☐ Individual harm from: High

☐ 'bad investment climate

☐ 'general distrust'

L Strategy 'Protection Racket'

☐ Other Factors

☐ Planning horizon (short- vs long-)

☐ Outside competitors (#)

4 Stationary Bandit does not care about others, only about her own utility

Volkov

☐ What drives 'Iron Law' of **Monopolization of Violence** 

☐ 'Prisoner's Dilemma'

☐ All potential 'bandits' are weak [RB]

L Strategy 'Steal Everything'

L War of 'All-Against-All'

☐ 1-Winner-1-Looser Mechanics

☐ Monopolization ↑ ···· # 'Bandits' ↓

☐ When Monopolization Stops?

☐ In theory: When it is complete

☐ In practice: not clear

☐ Why [almost] no violence after the state is created?

North

☐ Create economic monopolies

☐ Share rents with friends and strong

☐ Active Conflict → Latent Conflict

☐ But it does not go away!

☐ Important Factor

☐ What sectors produce the rents

☐ Resource-intensive

☐ Labor-intensive

Tilly

☐ After the State: Roving Bandit VS **Stationary Bandit** 

☐ Uncertainty

regarding neighbors:

☐ Military capacity

□ Wealth

#### Volkov 2002, "Iron Law" of Monopolization of Violence

#### 'Prisoner's Dilemma'

|--|

	Steal	Do not steal
Steal	[1;1]	[3;0]
Do not steal	[0;3]	[2;2]

☐ All players in similar conditions

☐ All players benefit most from: **[No Steal, No Steal]** 

☐ ['Steal'] – the best response of Player 1 to any actions


from Player 2

**↳** Incentives lead to worst-case scenario: [Steal, Steal]

**Incentives launch War of 'All-Against-All'** 


#### North (2009): No Violence After the State?

Risks of Violence




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


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


#### Pre-Digital Age Conflict: Summary



- ☐ Identify all the conflicts
- ☐ Which of them are two-sided conflicts?
  - both sides can impose violence / coercion
- ☐ Identify Stationary Bandit' strategies to mitigate them

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


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Any expectations regarding the Cyberconflict?


#### **Technology Steps In: Summary**

Figure II. RTLM radio coverage



# Monopolization of violence does not work in CyberSpace

Although this perspective was looked different 15 years ago: Viruses and Antivirus Companies as Protection-Racket Business



#### **Technology Steps in**

# □ Physical Space □ not only lead to a conflict but also triggers the development of the technologies □ Geography completely determines the communication due to costs it creates □ Role of beliefs □ Observed Patterns □ Writing -> Beacons, Semaphores -> Books -> Invention of print press -> Telegraph -> Phones -> Modems -> Internet -> Web -> Social Media □ Important Trends

- 1. Increase efficiency of information diffusion due to cheaper and faster technologies
- 2. One-to-one -> one-to-many -> many-to-many
- 3. Shift in a relative importance of substantive technologies and communication technologies -> communications and logistics use to be auxiliary things