

Decentralized decision power and information sharing in horizontal logistics collaboration

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Agenda

1. Introduction
2. The network design - multicommodity flow problem
3. Allocation rule
4. Three systems with central authority
5. Fully Decentralized Iterative Cooperative System
6. Computationally results
7. Conclusions

Introduction

Horizontal logistics collaboration

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The network design - multicommodity flow problem


The network design - multicommodity flow problem

Commodities:

	Origin	Terminal	Size	Revenue
k^1	1	2	1	10
k^2	1	4	1	10
k^3	3	1	1	10
k^4	2	4	1	10

Edges:

	Capacity	Activation cost
\forall edge	2	5



Original network.


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Solution without cooperation.


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Cooperative solution.

Allocation rule

1. The revenues generated by any served commodity are allocated to its owner.
2. The activation cost of any active edge is paid by its owner.
3. The price of using an unit of capacity on an edge $e \in E$ owned by agent $w(e)$ for any other member of the coalition, $i \in N \setminus \{w(e)\}$, is equal to $\frac{c_e}{q_e}$.

Three systems with central authority

Three systems with central authority

- A central authority with certain decision power.
- Agents have to share certain amount of information to cooperate.
- 3 systems: $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Fully centralized cooperation system (FCCS),} \\ \text{Partial cooperation system (PCS),} \\ \text{Residual cooperation system (RCS).} \end{array} \right.$

Three systems with central authority

Fully centralized cooperative system (FCCS)


Fully centralized cooperative system (FCCS)

- A central planning system \implies Central authority with full information and all the decision power.
- Commodities and edges of all the agents are aggregated into a single bigger problem.
- Final profit allocation must be individually rational.

Three systems with central authority

Partial cooperative system (PCS)


Partial cooperative system (PCS)



Three systems with central authority

Residual cooperation system (RCS)

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Fully Decentralized Iterative Cooperative System


Some characteristics:

- Developed **only for two agents**.
- There is NOT a central authority with decision power, but only an information platform.
- Agents exchange information and make decisions in an iterative process.
- In each iteration, agents solve an optimization problem and update the information platform.

An agent can share in the information platform:

1. Which edges he is planning to active leaving residual capacity on them.
2. Which edges previously shared by the other agent he would like to use, indicating:
 - The capacity he would like to use in each edge.
 - Which “combinations” of that edges he requires for each commodity, as well as the size of that commodity.


Fully Decentralized Iterative Cooperative System



Computationally results

- 10 instances with 2 agents and 10 with 5 agents.
- All the parameters selected from uniform distributions.
- Instances with edges with LOW or HIGH capacity.

Results: Instances with 2 agents



Results: Analysis of agents order relevance in FDICS

	Total payoffs		% Dif.
	Order:1-2	Order:2-1	
2_low_0	25.0	25.0	0.00
2_low_1	21.0	21.0	0.00
2_low_2	17.0	17.0	0.00
2_low_3	15.0	15.0	0.00
2_low_4	27.0	26.0	3.70
2_high_0	73.0	72.0	1.37
2_high_1	70.0	69.0	1.49
2_high_2	65.0	63.0	3.08
2_high_3	68.0	67.0	1.47
2_high_4	74.0	73.0	1.35

Conclusions

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- In terms of solution quality: $FCCS > PCS > FDICS > RCS$.

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- In terms of solution quality: FCCS > PCS > FDICS > RCS.
- Extension of FDICS to more agents might be interesting.

Thank you for the attention.

Extra slides.


Example

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
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Design of the network.


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Route the commodities.

Allocation of the decision power.

		Coop. systems with central authority		
		FCCS	PCS	RCS
Agents	Activate edges	No	Yes	Yes
	Route flow	No	No	Yes
Central Authority	Activate edges	Yes	No	No
	Route flow	Yes	Yes	Yes [*]

^{*} Only the residual commodities through the residual capacities of the active edges.

Differences

Information to be shared by the agent with the central authority

		Coop. systems with central authority		
		FCCS	PCS	RCS
Commodities	$o(k), t(k)$	$\forall k \in \Theta$	$\forall k \in \Theta$	$\forall k \in \Theta_R$
	$w(k)$	"	"	"
	d_k	"	"	"
	r_k	"	"	"
Edges	$o(e), t(e)$	$\forall e \in E$	$\forall e \in E_A$	$\forall e \in E_R$
	$w(e)$	"	"	"
	c_e	"	"	—
	q_e	"	"	—
	$\frac{c_e}{q_e}$	"	"	$\forall e \in E_R$
	q_e^R	—	—	"

Results

