


Criptografía post-cuántica basada en retículos

Lección 1: Minicurso Mar del Plata, Noviembre 2025

Syllabus

- Criptografia simetrica y asimetrica
- Principio de Kerckhoff
- Complejidad computacional y Security Level
- El objetivo CPA-IND



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1.3 Criptografia: confidencialidad y otros usos modernos

The art and science of keeping messages secure is **cryptography**, and it is practiced by **cryptographers**. **Cryptanalysts** are practitioners of **cryptanalysis**, the art and science of breaking ciphertext; that is, seeing through the disguise. The branch of mathematics encompassing both cryptography and cryptanalysis is **cryptology** and its practitioners are **cryptologists**. Modern cryptologists are generally trained in theoretical mathematics **they have to be**.

[Schneier15, Chapter 1, page 1]

Authentication, Integrity, and Nonrepudiation

In addition to providing confidentiality, cryptography is often asked to do other jobs:



- **Authentication.** It should be possible for the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin; an intruder should not be able to masquerade as someone else.
- **Integrity.** It should be possible for the receiver of a message to verify that it has not been modified in transit; an intruder should not be able to substitute a false message for a legitimate one.
- **Nonrepudiation.** A sender should not be able to falsely deny later that he sent a message.

[Schneier15, page 2]

1.4 Criptografia simetrica y asimetrica : primitivas

A cryptographic primitive is a fundamental building block used in cryptographic protocols and algorithms. These primitives provide basic functionalities and are combined to implement more complex cryptographic operations.

1.4.1 Criptografia simetrica



Primitivas importantes:

- **Block Ciphers:** Encrypt data in fixed-size blocks..
 - DES (Data Encryption Standard)
 - AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), KeyGen NIST SP 800-133
 - 3DES (Triple DES)
 - Blowfish
 - Twofish
 - Serpent
- **Stream Ciphers:** Encrypt data one bit or byte at a time.
 - RC4
 - Salsa20
 - ChaCha20
- **Message Authentication Codes (MACs):** Provide authentication and integrity.
 - HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code)
 - CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code)
 - GMAC (Galois Message Authentication Code)
- **Key Derivation Functions (KDFs):** Derive one or more secret keys from a secret value.
 - PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2)
 - bcrypt
 - scrypt
 - Argon2
- **Random Number Generators:** Generate random numbers for cryptographic use.
 - Cryptographically Secure PRNGs (CSPRNGs)
- **Hash Functions**
 - SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm)
 - SHA-3
 - MD5 (though considered weak)
 - RIPEMD-160

NOTE 1.4.1.3

Bitcoin usa SHA-256 para la Proof of Work y tambien en las 12 o 24 palabras de las billeteras (BIP-39).

1.4.2 Criptografia asimetrica o criptografia a clave publica

Figure 1.4.2.1: KeyGen: Asymmetric





Figure 1.4.2.2: Encipher & Decipher: Asymmetric



Most important asymmetric primitives :

- **Public Key Cryptography:** Algorithms that use a pair of keys.
 - RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman)
 - ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography)
 - DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm)
 - ElGamal Encryption
- **Digital Signatures:** Verify the authenticity and integrity of a message.
 - RSA Signatures
 - ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
 - EdDSA (Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
- **Key Exchange Protocols:** Allow secure key agreement between parties.
 - Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
 - ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman)
- **Identity-Based Cryptography:** Uses identity as a public key.
 - Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) systems

1.5 Security Level and Computationally infeasible

Security level λ

An encryption algorithm has a [security level](#) of λ bits if the best known attack has a computational cost of $O(2^\lambda)$ e.g. requires $O(2^\lambda)$ steps. This allows us to compare algorithms and is useful when we combine several primitives in a hybrid cryptosystem to understand any weaknesses. The security level is usually written in unary representation as 1^λ .

The standard security levels are 128, 192 and 256 bits , corresponding to NIST levels 1,3 and 5.

We will call a task *computationally infeasible* if its cost as measured by either the amount of memory used or the runtime is finite but impossible large.

[DH76, page 646]

To get a clue of the meaning of *computationally infeasible* imagine you are looking for a key k of m bits:

$$k \in \{0, 1\}^m$$

1.5.0.1 Brute Force: 30 bits

```
from timeit import default_timer as timer

#loop with 2**m rounds
m=30
start = timer()
j=0
while j < 2**m:
    # try with key k_j
    print(j)
    j+=1
end = timer()

#print the total time employed to check all keys
print(m, (end - start)/60 , "minutes") # Time in minutes.
```

Ejercicio 1.5.0.2

Cuanto tarda con m=64 bits ?

En criptografia la longitud de la clave, en bits, es un importante parametro de seguridad.

1.5.1 NIST-Standardized Post-Quantum Digital Signatures

As of 2024, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has standardized the following post-quantum digital signature schemes:

■ CRYSTALS-Dilithium

- **Type:** Lattice-based (Module-LWE)
- **Security Levels:** 1, 3, and 5 (NIST categories)
- **Status:** Primary standard for general-purpose signatures
- **Features:** Efficient, well-balanced performance

■ FALCON

- **Type:** Lattice-based (NTRU-like, short signatures)
- **Security Levels:** 1 and 5
- **Status:** Standardized (for use when smaller signatures are needed)
- **Features:** Very compact signatures but more complex implementation

■ SPHINCS+

- **Type:** Hash-based (stateless)
- **Security Levels:** 1, 3, and 5
- **Status:** Standardized as a backup (for long-term security)
- **Features:** Conservative security (based on hash functions), larger signatures

NOTE 1.5.1.1

- These algorithms were selected in **July 2022** as part of **NIST's PQC Standardization Round 3**.
- **CRYSTALS-Dilithium** is the recommended general-purpose signature scheme, while **FALCON** is suggested for cases requiring smaller signatures.
- **SPHINCS+** is included as a hedge against potential future attacks on lattice-based schemes.

1.6 CPA-IND and Probabilistic Encryption (Non deterministic)



Criptogramas diferentes para el mismo texto en claro M encriptados con la misma clave k .

The CPA indistinguishability experiment $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{cpa}}(n)$:

1. A key k is generated by running $\text{Gen}(1^n)$.
2. The adversary \mathcal{A} is given input 1^n and oracle access to $\text{Enc}_k(\cdot)$, and outputs a pair of messages m_0, m_1 of the same length.
3. A random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ is chosen, and then a ciphertext $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m_b)$ is computed and given to \mathcal{A} . We call c the challenge ciphertext.
4. The adversary \mathcal{A} continues to have oracle access to $\text{Enc}_k(\cdot)$, and outputs a bit b' .
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if $b' = b$, and 0 otherwise. (In case $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{cpa}}(n) = 1$, we say that \mathcal{A} succeeded.)

1.6.0.1 CPA-IND secure

The symmetric crypto system $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is **CPA-IND-secure** (or just CPA-secure) if no adversary \mathcal{A} can succeed with probability better than $1/2$.

1.6.1 Kerckhoffs's principle and models COA, KPA, CPA and CCA

Kerckhoffs's principle

The enemy knows the system (Shannon's Maxim). This means that security should just depend on the secrecy of the key.

[Kerckhoffs principle](#)

[Attack models](#)

Referencias

- [Schneier15] Bruce Schneier, *Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms and Source Code in C*, Wiley; 20th Anniversary edition, 2015.
- [DH76] Diffie, W.; Hellman, M. *New directions in cryptography*, (1976). IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. 22 (6): 644-654.
- [QUBIP23] QUBIP: *Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography*
QUBIP project is co-funded by the European Union under the Horizon Europe framework programme [grant agreement no. 101119746].
<https://qubip.eu/>
<https://github.com/QUBIP>
http://www.youtube.com/@qubip_eu