



Visual Studio **LIVE!**
EXPERT SOLUTIONS FOR .NET DEVELOPERS | San Diego

Level:
Intermediate

Modern SQL Server Security Features for Developers

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Code Again for the First Time!

Visual Studio 25 YEARS OF CODING INNOVATION

About Me



Leonard Lobel

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- Microsoft MVP
 - Data Platform
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Download Slides and Code

[http://bit.ly/
vslchicago2018_sqlsecurity](http://bit.ly/vslchicago2018_sqlsecurity)

(all lower case!)



Agenda

- **Three new SQL Server 2016 security features**
 - Dynamic Data Masking (DDM)
 - Row Level Security (RLS)
 - Always Encrypted (AE)



Dynamic Data Masking (DDM)



Introducing Dynamic Data Masking (DDM)

- Limit exposure to sensitive data by masking
 - Full – entire column is masked
 - Partial – show starting and/or ending characters of the column data, mask the rest with a custom string
 - Email – show the first character of the column data, mask the rest with XXX@XXXX.com
 - Random – entire column is replaced by random values
- Reveals masked data to queries
 - Data in the database is not changed
- Enforced at the database level
 - No impact at the application level



Masking Table Columns

```
CREATE TABLE Customer(  
  FirstName varchar(20)  
    MASKED WITH (FUNCTION='partial(1, "...", 0)'),  
  LastName varchar(20),  
  Phone varchar(12)  
    MASKED WITH (FUNCTION='default()'),  
  Email varchar(200)  
    MASKED WITH (FUNCTION='email()'),  
  Balance money  
    MASKED WITH (FUNCTION='random(1000, 5000)'))  
  
ALTER TABLE Customer  
  ALTER COLUMN LastName  
  ADD MASKED WITH (FUNCTION='default()')
```



Masking Different Data Types

| Masking Function | Behavior | Strings | Numbers | Dates | Other Types |
|------------------|----------|---------|---------|-------|-------------|
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| default() | Show xxxx mask (strings), or minimum value (other types) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

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| default() | Show xxxx mask (strings), or minimum value (other types) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| email() | Show first character and XXX@XXXX.com | Yes | No | No | No |
| random(<i>a</i>, <i>b</i>) | Show random value between <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> | No | Yes | No | No |

Discovering Masked Columns

- `sys.columns`
 - `is_masked`
 - `masking_function`
- `sys.masked_columns`
 - Inherits from `sys.columns`
 - Filters to show only masked columns
 - `WHERE is_masked = 1`



Mask Permissions

- DDM is based on user permissions
- Create a table with masked columns
 - No special permission required
- Add, replace, or remove a column mask
 - Requires **ALTER ANY MASK** permission
- View unmasked data in masked columns
 - Requires **UNMASK** permission
- Updating data in a masked column
 - No special permission



Dynamic Data Masking (DDM)

demo

DDM Limitations and Considerations

- DDM cannot be used with
 - FILESTREAM columns
 - COLUMN_SET, or a sparse column that's part of a COLUMN_SET
 - Computed columns
 - But will return masked data if it depends on a masked column
 - Key for FULLTEXT index
 - Encrypted columns (Always Encrypted)
- Masking is a one-way street
 - Once masked, the actual data can never be obtained
 - An ETL process from a source with masked columns results in an irreversible data loss when loaded into the target environment

Row Level Security (RLS)



Introducing Row-level Security (RLS)

- Restrict access to individual rows in a table
 - Create predicate functions (inline TVF)
 - Write custom logic to control user access to every row
- Security policy
 - Bind the functions to tables as a filter or block predicate
 - SQL Server filters and blocks user access to individual rows
 - Can enable/disable the policy as desired



Filter and Block Predicates

- Filter predicate
 - SELECT, UPDATE, DELETE
 - Can't select, update, or delete rows that violate the predicate
- Block predicate
 - AFTER INSERT, AFTER UPDATE
 - Can't insert or update rows to values that would violate the predicate
 - BEFORE UPDATE, BEFORE DELETE
 - Can't update or delete rows that violate the predicate
 - Implied when combined with filter predicate

RLS Security Policy

| Predicate | SELECT/UPDATE/DELETE rows that violate the predicate | INSERT rows with violating values | UPDATE rows to violating values |
|-----------|--|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
|-----------|--|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|

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RLS Security Policy

| Predicate | SELECT/UPDATE/DELETE rows that violate the predicate | INSERT rows with violating values | UPDATE rows to violating values |
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| Filter | No | Yes | Yes |
| AFTER INSERT block | Yes | No | Yes |
| AFTER UPDATE block | Yes | Yes | No |
| BEFORE UPDATE block | No | N/A | N/A |
| BEFORE DELETE block | No | N/A | N/A |

Creating Security Predicate Functions

- Write a security predicate function
 - Ordinary inline table-valued function (TVF)
 - Must be schema-bound
 - Accept any parameters of any type
 - Map these parameters to column values
- Implement your own custom logic in T-SQL
 - Examine the row via the columns passed in as parameters
 - Determine if access should be allowed or denied
 - Return a scalar 1 (allow) or nothing at all (deny)
 - Encapsulate logic inside WHERE clause of a single SELECT statement inside the TVF

Creating Security Predicate Functions

```
CREATE FUNCTION sec.fn_MySecurityPredicate(@Parm1 AS int, ...)
RETURNS TABLE
WITH SCHEMABINDING
AS
    -- SQL Server passes in column values of each row via parameters

RETURN
    SELECT 1 AS Result
    WHERE ...
    -- Custom logic here examines the parameters (column values)
    -- passed in, and determines the row's accessibility
```

RLS Security Policy

- Create a security policy
 - Add filter and block predicates to the policy
- Bind each predicate function to a table
 - Map table columns to the TVF parameters
 - SQL Server will call the TVF to determine the accessibility of each row

RLS Security Policy Examples

- With filter predicate

```
CREATE SECURITY POLICY sec.MySecurityPolicy
  ADD FILTER PREDICATE sec.fn_MySecurityPredicate(Col1, ...)
  ON dbo.MyTable
  WITH (STATE = ON)
```
- With AFTER INSERT and AFTER UPDATE block predicates

```
CREATE SECURITY POLICY sec.MySecurityPolicy
  ADD BLOCK PREDICATE sec.fn_MySecurityPredicate(Col1, ...)
  ON dbo.MyTable AFTER INSERT,
  ADD BLOCK PREDICATE sec.fn_MySecurityPredicate(Col1, ...)
  ON dbo.MyTable AFTER UPDATE,
  WITH (STATE = ON)
```



Getting started with
Row-Level Security (RLS)
demo



Identifying Users for RLS

- Credentials supplied for the database connection
 - SQL Server login (username and password)
 - Windows authentication
 - Obtain the username from DATABASE_PRINCIPAL_ID
- Different strategy required for n-tier applications
 - Typically, all users connect to the database using the same service account from the application tier
 - DATABASE_PRINCIPAL_ID is the same for every user
- Solution: Use new SESSION_CONTEXT feature
 - Store the application level user ID as a readonly value in session context



Using Row-Level Security in n-tier applications

demo



Always Encrypted

Traditional SQL Server Encryption Features

- Column (cell-level) encryption
 - Uses certificates or symmetric keys
- Database (page-level) and backup encryption
 - Transparent Data Encryption (TDE)
 - Uses TDE certificate with database encryption keys (DEKs)
- Keys and certificates are stored in the database
 - Risk of security breach at the database level
- Data is only encrypted “at rest”
 - Risk of security breach while “in flight”

Introducing Always Encrypted

- Always Encrypted in SQL Server 2016
 - Based on keys managed outside the database
 - Keys are never revealed to SQL Server
- Separating those who *own* the data from those who *manage* it
 - Uses client side drivers to encrypt/decrypt on the fly
- SQL server is incapable of decrypting on its own
 - Data is always encrypted in flight
- Enable Always Encrypted
 - Use T-SQL or the Always Encrypted Wizard in SSMS



Encryption Types


- Randomized
 - Unpredictable, more secure
 - No support for equality searches, joins, grouping, indexing
 - Use for data that is returned but not queried
- Deterministic
 - Predictable, less secure
 - Use for data that must be queried
 - Easier to guess by examining encryption patterns
 - Increased risk for small value sets (e.g., True/False)




Encryption Keys

- Column Encryption Keys (CEK)
 - Used to encrypt values in specific columns
 - Encrypted versions of each CEK is stored in the database
- Column Master Keys (CMK)
 - Used to encrypt all the CEKs
 - Must be stored externally in a secure key store
 - Key store providers: Azure Key Vault, Certificate store, HSM


Always Encrypted Workflow



Always Encrypted Workflow



~~Always~~ Encrypted Workflow



Always Encrypted Wizard (SSMS)

- Creates CMK in either:
 - Local Windows Certificate Store
 - Azure Key Vault
- Creates CEKs
 - Then encrypts them from the CMK
- Deploys to database:
 - Encrypted CEKs
 - Path to CMK
- Runs encryption migration
 - Queries the unencrypted table
 - Encrypts client-side (within SSMS)
 - Creates new encrypted temp table
 - Swaps in the new temp table to replace the old unencrypted table



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Always Encrypted Catalog Views

- **sys.column_master_keys**
 - Identifies each CMK
 - Contains external path to CMK location
- **sys.column_encryption_keys**
 - Identifies each CEK
- **sys.column_encryption_key_values**
 - Contains CMK-encrypted values of each CEK
- **sys.columns**
 - New metadata columns to identify encrypted columns



Always Encrypted demo

CMK Rotation

- CEKs encrypt all your sensitive data
 - Which is why they are encrypted by a CMK
- The CMK encrypts all your CEKs
 - When the CMK is compromised, all your sensitive data is compromised
- Solution: Rotate the CMK
 - Create a new CMK
 - Re-encrypt the CEKs with the new CMK
 - PowerShell script available at
 - <https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/sqlsecurity/2015/08/13/always-encrypted-key-rotation-column-master-key-rotation/>
 - SQL Server Management Studio has integrated GUI support

AE Limitations and Considerations

- Unsupported in SSDT
- Unsupported data types
 - xml, rowversion, image, ntext, text, sql_variant, hierarchyid, geography, geometry
- Also not supported for
 - FILESTREAM, ROWGUIDCOL, sparse, or partitioning columns
 - Fulltext indexes
 - Columns with default constraints
- Unsupported with randomized encryption
 - Columns referenced by unique constraints
 - Primary key columns

AE Limitations and Considerations (cont.)

- Client code
 - .NET 4.6 only
 - ODBC and JDBC updates to come
- Entity Framework 6 considerations
 - <http://blogs.msdn.com/b/sqlsecurity/archive/2015/08/27/using-always-encrypted-with-entity-framework-6.aspx>
- Performance
- Troubleshooting becomes more complex
- Additional management to install certificates on all clients
- And more...
 - <http://blogs.sqlsentry.com/aaronbertrand/t-sql-tuesday-69-always-encrypted-limitations/>

Questions?



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Thank You!

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