

Antonio Palmeros

Professor DelCogliano

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In the problem of evil, which looks to ask why there is evil and suffering in a world where God exists, Many times theists accept the world we live in as it exists and nothing more, they analyze the world and look to answer the problem of evil head on. However sometimes I think it is also important to take a step back and look at the world as just once possibility in the ocean of possible worlds that God could have created. I think that both Robert Adams and Philip Quinn take on this idea and have good reasonings for their point of view on the matter. This issue of God making the best possible world relates to the problem of evil because it looks to explain why God, who is an all powerful and all loving being would make a less than perfect world, or if he has the obligation to do so, or If God is even all Good or perfectly moral. It could also mean that God did create the best possible world and it's our world. Adams argues through some logical reasoning he concludes that God creating a certain world does not mean that he is a perfectly moral being, and that God does not have any sort of obligation, logical or moral to make the best of all possible worlds. Quinn disagrees with Adams. He explains that while Adams believes that God has no requirement to make a perfectly good world, It does not sufficiently go deeply into good philosophical reasoning and explanation for the argument to answer many questions. Therefore Quinn believes that if God is all

powerful and all Good, he would make a world that is unsurpassably morally good. These arguments sound similar, but when going deeper into context they are quite different. After looking through all of the reasonings from both views on the matter, I agree more with Quinn, namely his great utilization of fundamental weaknesses in Adams paper that greatly explain many of the questions that I had while looking at both points of view that ultimately make his conclusion make more sense than Adams's conclusion. I will summarize both papers and give my final conclusion on why I agree with Quinn's more.

Quinn starts off by giving some ground on what his argument is. He believes that God who is greatly worshiped and cherished must be perfectly moral and good. For we as humans do not worship any agent that is less than perfect. It is therefore essential that we see God as a perfect being. He looks to Adams's first premise which states that if a perfectly good moral agent created a world, it would be the very best of all worlds that they could create. Before he goes on to explain his view on the matter using his initial view of what God is, he looks at a fundamental conceptual issue in Adams's argument. He explains that a possible world is a state of affairs, things that cannot be simply created nor destroyed. With this definition, not even God cannot create a possible world. For this reason, he says one cannot say that God is creating possible worlds, but rather actualizing states of affairs. This means that God can create simple things like objects and trees and other simple things, he can even create greater things like angels and demons, but these are not the best possible world, they are inhabitants of the world. If God wanted to create a best possible world he could just create one

without any beings in it, but since there are no beings in it, could it really just be a best possible world? Quinn then goes on to give his definitions for each case in the framework for his final conclusion using this idea of world actualization and how he would go about measuring what makes a possible actualized world better than another one, and he says that it is by the moral goodness found in that world. He arrives at his premise which says that 1) “ If an Omnipotent and superlatively good moral agent were to actualize a possible world, he would actualize some actualizable world of unsurpassable moral goodness” (Quinn). He then Goes on to say that is similar to Adams’s conclusion, but it addresses the fundamental problem of possible worlds and it also answers Adams’s refutes and counter-examples as well.

Adams starts off by giving his proposition which is 2) “ If a perfectly good moral agent created any worlds at all, it would have to be the very best world that he could create” (Adams). He will argue with a Judeo-Christian ideas in mind. He starts off by explaining that there must be three characteristics that a perfectly good world would have when God made it, the first one is that none of the individual creatures in the world would even exist in a best of all possible perfect world. Second, none of the creatures in it has a life which is so miserable on the whole that it would be better for that creature if it had never existed. Third, every individual creature in the world is at least happy on the whole as it would have been in any other possible world in which it could have existed. Adams goes on to explain that if God were to create a world with these characteristics, then he would not wrong any of the creatures in this world, God would give them perfect kindness and would give these creatures perfect moral character. As

we know many of these creatures in the world do suffer, so it would make sense to say that if God were to create a world where these things fall short, then God as a good moral being would not be. Adams finally goes on to conclude that since the world we live in could not be the best possible of all worlds or even if there were many just like ours tied for first place, then there really cannot be a requirement or obligation for God to create one of these best of all worlds, whether that is logically or morally.

Looking at Quinn's paper and the evidence he uses for his argument, It makes more sense in explaining this best of all possible worlds than Adams does. For example, Quinn does a great job in explaining what some fundamental failings in Adams's are. He greatly explains that it is important to differentiate between what a one means by the best possible world and what creating one of these actually means. While Adam's has good reasoning given his proposition premises, he does not explain in great detail or backup these premises with any sort of philosophical or logical reason like Quinn does. Which makes me believe more of what Quinn is saying. Quinn explains that what we should actually be calling this is that God brings about certain states of affairs to a world and does not create the world as we so believe. It must be looked at as an actualization of a world, which means that God brings about things to such a world, or enables it to be a certain way. On page 431, Quinn makes a great point about what a best of all possible world actually is. He believes it should be measured by its moral goodness. He also goes on to explain what the idea of moral goodness is, he does not assume that a world where every creature is happy but has no pity for the suffering is a better morally good world where every creature is unhappy but shows pity

towards those that are suffering. He also remains neutral to whether justice gives more or less goodness in the world. After setting the stage for this he goes on to give twelve steps to his final proposition and conclusion of his findings.

In conclusion, given Adams's point of view and his findings, it is a very solid argument in essence, but after reading Quinn's point of view on the matter it swayed me to agree much more with his argument and much better polished logical and philosophical reasoning especially with his great dispute of Adams's fundamental flaws in the argument of a creation of a best possible world versus the actualization of said world.

### Bibliography

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