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NOTES

ON

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

J. A. STEWART

VOL. I

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NOTES

ON THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

OF

ARISTOTLE

BY

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PREFACE

In the following *Notes* I quote the text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as it is given in Mr. Bywater's Edition (Clarendon Press, 1890); and it is to be understood that I approve Mr. Bywater's readings and punctuation throughout, except in the (comparatively few) places where I express doubt or dissent.

Mr. Bywater's *Contributions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Clarendon Press, 1892) unfortunately did not appear till the first four Books of my *Notes* were already in print; but in preparing the subsequent Books for the press I have taken account of the explanations and valuable suggestions contained in this brochure.

To Prof. Susemihl's critical edition of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, not to mention his edition of the *Eudemian Ethics* and his edition of the *Moralia Magna*, I am deeply indebted. On almost every page of these *Notes* I have to acknowledge something which I owe to Prof. Susemihl's industry and suggestive treatment of the text.

Before leaving the subject of the text, I ought perhaps to apologize for pretty often referring to the readings of certain inferior manuscripts — Cambr., CCC, NC, B^1, B^2, B^3 — which I happen to have examined. I quote these readings, not as being valuable in themselves, but—sometimes as enabling me to illustrate from my own observation the operation of causes which we have to take account of in

estimating the readings of the important manuscripts—sometimes simply as not having been hitherto published. So far as the problem of establishing the text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is directly concerned, Mr. Bywater is undoubtedly right in leaving as our recognised sources K^b and L^b, with r and Aspasius.

These volumes contain only 'Notes.' I have not written 'Introductory Essays,' partly because the brilliant and instructive 'Essays' contained in the First Volume of Grant's *Ethics* hold the field—partly, and chiefly, because I think that junior students—to whom I hope these *Notes* may be useful—can master the *Ethics* only by fighting their way through the problems and difficulties of the Treatise, as these start up—sometimes for the first time, sometimes again under altered forms—in the Greek text itself.

Having, for these reasons, dispensed with 'Introductory Essays,' I have been obliged to make a good many of the 'notes' somewhat long; and being anxious that every important passage, as it occurred, should there and then impress the student with its full weight—its weight being often the weight of Aristotle's whole Philosophy brought to bear through some technical term—I have not been very careful to avoid repetitions.

The quotations from other works of Aristotle, and from Plato, have been printed in full, in order that the junior student may be able to read conveniently, within the limits of these volumes, what he certainly must read, if he is to understand the *Ethics* in a concrete way as part of Aristotle's entire Philosophy.

In writing the 'arguments' I have allowed myself considerable liberty. In some cases it seemed that the student would be best introduced to the particular context by an epitome, in some cases by a paraphrase and explanation, in other cases again by a more or less free translation.

In composing the 'notes' I have of course had a great

mass of material to draw upon in the works of the many scholars, ancient and modern, who have commented on the *Ethics*. The Greek Scholiasts—Aspasius (*Heylbut*, 1889), the Paraphrast Heliodorus[1] (*Heinsius* and *Heylbut*), Eustratius, Michael Ephesius, and the other Scholiasts printed in the Aldine Collection[2] (1536)—I have used carefully throughout; and among the modern commentators I owe much, in different ways, to Zell (1820), Coraes[3] (1822), Michelet (1848), Fritzsche (for v, vi, vii—1851, and viii, ix—1847), Grant (last edition, 1885), Ramsauer (1878), and Jackson (for v—1879).

My largest debt is to Grant, whose *Ethics* I wish to mention here with the greatest respect, as an edition the value of which has steadily grown on me. For help, indeed, in certain classes of detail difficulties, I have had most often to turn to other authorities; but no other edition have I found so fertile in philosophical suggestions. These suggestions, I would remark, are to be found in unobtrusive notes, as well as in the Introductory Essays.

I must not omit to acknowledge my indebtedness to the modern translators—Stahr, Williams, and Peters—especially to the last. Here and there I have felt bound to say that I do not agree with a rendering given by Mr. Peters; but his Translation, taken as a whole, I have found an able and trustworthy assistant.

[1] We seem to have no good reason for believing that this was his name: see L. Cohen in the *Berl. philolog. Wochensch.* Nov. 9, 1889, p. 1419, and *cf.* Val. Rose in *Hermes*, vol. ii. p. 212.

For the Greek Scholiasts on the *E. N.* generally, see Val. Rose, *Hermes*, vol. v. pp. 61 sqq. *über die griechischen Commentare zur Ethik des Aristoteles;* and *cf.* Bywater in *Hermes*, vol. v. pp. 354 sqq.

[2] This collection is composed as follows according to Rose (*Hermes*, vol. v, article referred to in foot-note above)—Book I Eustratius, II-IV Anonymus, V Michael Ephesius, VI Eustratius, VII Anonymus rec., VIII Aspasius, IX-X Michael Ephesius.

[3] For the circumstances attending the publication of this interesting edition see ΑΔΑΜΑΝΤΙΟΣ ΚΟΡΑΗΣ *ὑπὸ* Δ. ΘΕΡΕΙΑΝΟΥ (Trieste, 1890), vol. iii. pp. 47 sqq.

My separate debts to predecessors I have tried to acknowledge in all cases as they were contracted; but it may well be that, in annotating a Treatise on which there are so many Commentators, I have sometimes put down, from ignorance or forgetfulness, as my own, what ought to have been credited to another.

There is one writer, not yet mentioned, to whom I wish to express special indebtedness. Dr. Rassow's *Forschungen über die Nicomachische Ethik* (1874) have been always before me in writing these *Notes*. I suppose all who know Dr. Rassow's little work will agree entirely with me when I say that very few works of the kind contain so much valuable matter in such small space. It would be a great gain if the *Forschungen*—a model of critical method—were made more accessible by means of an English translation.

It is not necessary to refer here, except generally, to the assistance—acknowledged in detail—which I have derived from the editors of other works of Aristotle, and from the editors of other authors, quoted in these *Notes*.

In conclusion—a few lines about 'interpolations,' 'dislocations,' and 'duplicate passages.' The subject is an interesting one, and I have touched it in some of my notes on Book v and Book vii, in connexion with the views of Dr. Jackson and Prof. Cook Wilson—also in other notes referring to the views of Dr. Rassow; but it properly lies beyond the scope of these volumes, which aim chiefly at helping readers of the *Ethics* to get hold of the philosophical doctrine of the Treatise. I feel sure that the scholars just mentioned agree with me in thinking that the philosophical doctrine, in its broad outlines and more important details, stands out with such evidence and actuality, that it is impossible to conceive our view of it as having to be appreciably altered in consequence of discoveries which may hereafter be made as to the condition of the text before the age of Andronicus. To take up the subject of 'interpolations,

dislocations, and duplicate passages'—even if I had been competent to do so—would therefore have been beside the aim of these *Notes* as concerned with the philosophical doctrine of the *Ethics*. Of course it would be a matter of extraordinary *philological* interest, if an Egyptian papyrus were found, old enough to decide for, or against, the ingenious speculations of the modern χωρίζοντες.

The Index added to these *Notes* does not profess to be complete. It is designed mainly to help the student by bringing together selected notes on some of the more important topics. To find his way in the Greek text, the student must turn to Mr. Bywater's Index.

J. A. STEWART.

July, 1892.

MANUSCRIPTS

K^b = cod. Laurent. 81. 11 (10th cent.).
L^b = cod. Par. 1854 (12th cent.).
M^b = cod. Marc. 213 (15th cent.).
N^b = cod. Marc. append. iv. 53 (14th cent.).
O^b = cod. Riccard. 46 (14th cent.).
H^a = cod. Marc. 214 (14th cent.).
P^b = cod. Vat. 1342 (14th or 13th cent.).
Γ = Vetusta translatio (13th cent.).
Cambr. = University Library 1879 I i. v. 44: the Eliensis of Wilkinson, Zell, and Michelet, the O^3 of Susemihl (13th cent.).
CCC = Library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 112: the O^1 of Susemihl (15th cent.).
NC = Library of New College, Oxford 227: the O^2 of Susemihl (15th cent.).
B^1 = Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 14080 (15th cent.).
B^2 = Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 6790 (15th cent.).
B^3 = Brit. Mus. Royal MS. 16 C. xxi (16th cent.).
Par. 1853 = Bibl. Nat. Paris: (part containing E. N. 15th cent.).

[For Bekker's MSS. of the *E. N.* see Susemihl, Die Bekkerschen Hss. der N. E. *Neue Jahrbücher für Philol.* 1878, p. 625 sqq.; and Bywater's *Contributions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nic. Eth.* For the English MSS. of the *E. N.* see *Anecdota Oxon.*, Classical series, vol. i. part 1. For Γ, the Vet. tr., see Newman's *Politics*, vol. ii. pp. xli sqq.]

CORRIGENDA

Vol. I, p. 5, foot-note, *read* καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.
„ „ 81, thirteenth line from top, *for* '*is* used' *read* '*is* is used.'
„ „ 169, heading of note on § 2, *read* ἀρετῶν.
„ „ 329, tenth line of note on § 2, *read* ἀρχιθέωρος.
„ „ 496, ninth line from top, *for* 'whole section' *read* 'clause.'
tenth line from top, *for* οὐ φύσει *read* μέντοι πᾶν.
„ II, p. 133, heading of note on 1146 a. 22 *read* παράδοξα ἐλέγχων.
„ „ 148, top line, *for* 'acts also against his consciously realised knowledge of the including universal' *read* 'at the same time consciously realises the including universal.'
„ „ 178, sixth line from top, *for* 'in' *read* 'is.'
„ „ 181, fourth line of note on a. 3, *read* ἀκρατής.
„ „ 264, sixth line from top, *for* 'imply' *read* 'implies.'
„ „ 295, seventh and eighth lines of note on a. 26, *for* ἔτι καὶ αὐτοῖς *read* καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Every art, every science, every action, every act of choice, aims at some good. Hence they have well defined The Good as 'the end which all things aim at.' But ends differ. Sometimes our end is the mere performance of a function; sometimes, something substantive beyond the performance of the function—in which case the something substantive is 'better than,' i.e. *is the* raison d'être *of the function by which it is produced.*

There are as many ends as there are arts, sciences, and forms of action. There are certain leading arts, sciences, and forms of action, under which certain other arts, sciences, and forms of action group themselves in various grades of subordination. The end of a leading art, science, or form of action is always more choiceworthy than the ends of the subordinate arts, sciences, or forms of action belonging to the group. Thus Generalship is an art, whose end, 'victory,' is more choiceworthy than 'riding,' the end of the subordinate art of horsemanship; as 'riding,' in its turn, is more choiceworthy than 'the bridle,' the end of the still more subordinate art of bridle-making. This example shows that an art whose end is, and an art whose end is not, a substantive product may belong to the same group of subordinate arts. A bridle is a substantive product, riding is the mere performance of a function; but the art of bridle-making and the art of horsemanship both fall under the same leading art.

§ 1. πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.] Eustratius, and other commentators after him, **1094 a. 1.** have noted that many of Aristotle's great philosophical treatises begin with a universal proposition. In the universal the cause is contained (*An. Post.* i. 24. 85 b. 26 τὸ δὲ καθόλου πρῶτον· αἴτιον ἄρα τὸ καθόλου): science explains things by their causes (*An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 9 ἐπιστάμεθα δὲ οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς. . . . ὅταν τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν); hence the propriety of beginning a scientific treatise with a universal proposition, rather than with a particular statement. The opening words of the *Politics* are ἐπειδὴ

1094 a. 1. πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν, καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς στοχάζονται: the *Metaphysics* begin—πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει: the *Post. Anal.* begin—πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως: similarly, the treatise *de Partibus Anim.* and the *Physics* begin with universal propositions. On the other hand the later *Eudemian Ethics* begin as Grant says (*Ethics:* essay i. vol. i. p. 23) 'without any scientific preface, but rather in the form of a literary essay, with the sentence: "In the temple of the God at Delos some one . . . has inscribed the following verses on the vestibule of the shrine of Latona."'

The exordium of the *E. N.* (taken in connexion with the similar exordia of the *Politics*, *Metaphysics*, *Posterior Analytics*, and other treatises mentioned) thus indicates, by its form, the logical method which Aristotle regarded as proper to 'a scientific treatise.' Demonstrative science in the strict sense (ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη—ἡ ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος *An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 20) is possible, indeed, only in the regions of metaphysics and mathematics, where the mind confronts truths which are abstract (ἄνευ ὕλης), eternal (ἀΐδια), and necessary (μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν). In these regions principles are apprehended by the eye in diagrams, or by the mind's eye in speculation, with perfect clearness and distinctness, and consequences are evidently seen to flow necessarily from principles[1]. In the concrete enquiries, on the other hand, of the natural and moral sciences, there is no such clearness of principles, or evident consequence of conclusions. *Health*, *Liberty*, *Temperance*, *Utility*, and all other 'mixed modes,' as Locke would call them, in themselves as principles, and in their relations to their consequences, stand on a very different footing from an intuition like that of *circle*, and a law of thought like that of *contradiction*. Yet, in his concrete enquiries, Aristotle is so far influenced by the analogy of ἐπιστήμη, in the strict sense, that he constantly refers his most particular observations to general principles of a highly abstract and formal character, and often symbolises the primary importance of these principles by the position which he assigns to them at the beginning of an enquiry, as if to show that the conclusions

[1] On space intuition as the ground of apodeictic science, see Lange, *Logische Studien*, p. 9 sqq.

reached in the enquiry flow from these principles, as the geometer's 1094 a. 1.
conclusions flow from the visualised definitions, or diagrams, which he posits as his starting-points. This penchant for the 'geometrical method' in concrete enquiry sometimes leads Aristotle far astray, where 'verification' does not force itself upon him, as it does in Ethics and Politics.

So much for the general logical significance of the exordium of the *Ethics*, as one of a class. Its special logical significance in relation to the Treatise which it introduces may now be indicated.

The cause assumed in this section is the Final Cause; and the leading doctrines of the Treatise may be shown to follow as conclusions from the universal proposition in which this cause is assumed.

The good which every being, consciously or unconsciously, strives to realise is not something external to itself (χωριστόν i. 6. 13), but *its own* good (cf. i. 5. 4 τἀγαθὸν δ' οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα), the perfection of its own nature, whatever that may be. The oak, which, springing from the acorn, grows according to the law of its nature, and becomes a perfect tree, realises the end of its existence, and attains 'its own good.' The final cause of an organism cannot be distinguished from the organism itself at its best. The final cause, or good, of the tree is the tree itself. Hence, for the term *good*, we may substitute the term *existence*. All beings, Aristotle might have said, struggle for existence according to their kinds. Φύσις, which in its strict sense is biological law—the law determining the growth of organised beings, is antagonistic to the ἄπειρον, or that which is indefinite and shapeless: see περὶ ζῴων γενέσεως i. 1. 715 b. 14 ἡ δὲ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἀτελές, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ ζητεῖ τέλος. The φύσις of the acorn produces the oak, and only the oak, an organism realising a definite shape, or πέρας, in which no one part, or function, is developed out of due proportion[1]. Such an

[1] Cf. *de Part. Anim.* i. 1. 641 b. 25 ὥστ' εἶναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν, φύσιν· οὐ γὰρ δή ὅ τι ἔτυχεν ἐξ ἑκάστου γίνεται σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐκ τοῦδε, οὐδὲ σπέρμα τὸ τυχὸν ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος σπέρματος· ἀρχὴ ἄρα καὶ παιητικὸν τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ σπέρμα· φύσει γὰρ ταῦτα· φύεται γοῦν ἐκ τούτου. Cf. *Met.* Δ. 16. 1021 b. 21 ἕκαστον τότε τέλειον, καὶ ἡ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ μόριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους. Cf. Themistius on the *Physics*, vol. i. pp. 170, 171 (ed. Spengel)—τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τουτέστιν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι. παράδειγμα δὲ εἶπον οὐχ ὡς οἱ τὰς ἰδέας λέγοντες αὐτό τι καθ' αὑτὸ ὑφεστὼς καὶ χωριστὸν εἶδος, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ὥρισται τὸ εἶδος ἑκάστου τῶν ὑπὸ φύσεως γινομένων, οἷον ἀνθράπου ἵππου

1094 a. 1. organism is essentially itself, containing in itself its own ἀρχή and τέλος, *i.e.* growing in its own way, and for its own sake [1]. In these respects natural organisms differ from the products of workmanship (τέχνη), which have an external ἀρχή—are shaped by another, and for some end towards which they are merely means. A house exists for the sake of those who inhabit it, but a plant or animal exists for its own sake. Τέχνη is accordingly related to the good in a very different manner from that in which φύσις is related to the good. Τέχνη is a means towards the attainment of the good, whereas φύσις is the realisation of the good. Now, since the subject of the *Ethics* is the Life of Man at its best (τὸ εὖ ζῆν), it is easy to understand that the relation of φύσις, rather than that of τέχνη, to the Good will be present to Aristotle's mind throughout the Treatise. Human life at its best is no mere device, or means, adopted by man for the sake of something beyond itself and better. The εὐδαίμων *lives*, and there is nothing better than his life. His nature is a λόγος, or organism, ὀρθός, balanced in all its parts, and containing, like the nature of a tree, its own ἀρχή and τέλος within itself—freely initiating functions, in the performance of which it treats itself 'always as an end and never merely as a means.' So far, there seems to be no essential difference between the Tree and the Man: the λόγος, or organism, of each affirms itself. Whether the fact that in the man the self-affirmation takes the form of *consciousness* of self makes an essential difference, is a question which need not be discussed here. As it is, the εὐδαίμων, in affirming himself, *knows himself*—takes a survey of human nature as an εἶδος, or organic whole, consisting of mutually related parts and tendencies.

But why related as they are, and not otherwise? Because 'it is best' that they should be so related—because 'Deus sive Natura' requires them to be so related. Hence the complete knowledge of human nature, as an εἶδος, requires a knowledge of God, and demands θεωρία strictly so called, or the contemplation of that which

βοὸς ἐλαίας συκῆς πλατάνου, καὶ ἡ ταῦτα δημιουργοῦσα ἀρχὴ μέχρι τοσούτου πρόεισι κινοῦσα τὴν ὕλην μέχρις οὗ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο καὶ τὴν μορφὴν τελείως ἐναρμόσαι τῇ ὕλῃ.

[1] For its own sake as representative of an immortal type. As individual, it sacrifices itself to the perpetuation of this type: see Aspasius on this §—ἕκαστον γὰρ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως σπουδῇ ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν τελειότητα· ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτην ἄγεται διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο νενευκέναι, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ τελειότατον (*i.e.* τὸ θεῖον).

is eternal. Accordingly, we find Aristotle defining εὐδαιμονία as 1094 a. 1.
θεωρία τις (x. 8. 8). And this is the formal definition, not only of the εὐδαιμονία of the Thinker (the subject of the context in which this definition occurs), but also of that of the moral agent—ἡ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς: for the latter exists for the sake of the former, and must be defined in accordance with it. The city exists for the sake of its thinkers. A materially prosperous city without thinkers would be ἀτελής, like the body without the life. Political institutions and moral rules are what they are, because the end of the city is to be the home of a few thinkers. The moral life, which bulks so largely in the city, is τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως in relation to the μορφή which the life of the thinkers—τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν—realises. Σοφίας ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει ἡ φρόνησις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ (*E.N.* vi. 13. 8). Hence it is in the θεωρητικὸς βίος that the ultimate standard of *all* conduct is found. The ultimate ὅρος or σκοπός, according to which the moral μεσότης is fixed, is given not by the practical, but by the speculative reason. Without the speculative ideal of τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν (*E.E.* 1249 b. 20), or τὸ ἀθανατίζειν (*E.N.* x. 7. 8), man's moral life would be meaningless. Why should he restrain his desires for the mere sake of restraining them? Εὐδαιμονία, then, even when realised in the performance of moral actions, is θεωρία, or contemplation of the eternal: for the εἶδος of human nature, which must be known, if moral conduct is to be achieved, cannot be known except in view of its end—τὸ ἀθανατίζειν, τὸ τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν [1].

The ultimate good, then, which man seeks after is the consciousness of his own εἶδος as θεῖον. It is only the 'Thinker,' as such, in the θεωρητικὸς βίος, who *has this consciousness clearly* (see *E.N.* x. 8. 8). The morally excellent man, however, *acts in a manner which would be inexplicable unless* the εἶδος of Human Nature were such as the 'Thinker' is conscious of it. The morally excellent man may be said to have a practical, as dis-

[1] It is interesting to note that Plotinus (quite as much a Neo-Aristotelian as a Neo-Platonist: see Hegel, *Vorles. über die Gesch. d. Philos.* vol. 3, p. 9) actually describes as θεωρία τοῦ εἴδους the effort of plants and animals to preserve and perpetuate their various types (*Enn.* iii. 8, vol. i. 333 sqq. ed. Kirchhoff), just as Aristotle often describes it as a striving after τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θεῖον. So also the *Scientia intuitiva* of Spinoza's wise man is a θεωρία of Human Nature *sub specie aeternitatis*, or as related to God. With *scientia intuitiva*, a man forms clear and distinct ideas of his passions, and so regulates them, just as the καλοκἀγαθός of Eudemus (*E. E.* H. 15) finds in his θεωρία of the Divine Nature, and of Human Nature as divine, the ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων.

1094 a. 1. tinguished from a speculative knowledge of it. He knows it as an ὀρθὸς λόγος, or organism maintaining itself with difficulty in an environment—liable to be disturbed by sensations and passions; and his 'unconscious metaphysic' consists in his strong *interest* in its maintenance, which causes him to reject the solicitations of the senses and passions, and 'choose the mean,' as the Practical Reason (acting in the service of the Speculative Reason) directs.

The morally inferior man, on the other hand, allows external influences to interfere with the steady operation of the internal organising principle of Reason. He allows himself to grow in this direction or that, out of due proportion (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), in the interest of ends foreign to his nature, as an harmonious organism. He devotes himself to pleasure (ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος), or wealth (χρηματιστὴς βίος), or social success (τιμή—see *E. N.* i. 5), objects which a turn of fortune may remove from his grasp, leaving him without any 'good of his own.' He fails in life, because he 'makes himself a means and not an end.'

Thus from the Principle laid down in the first section of the *Ethics* the whole teaching of the Treatise may be deduced: that the Practical Life consists in the maintenance of the Mean, or organic balance, in action and feeling, for the sake of the Speculative Life, which is supreme, and furnishes the Practical Life with a σκοπός.

τέχνη] The habit or faculty of making (ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική *E. N.* vi. 4. 3). It is external to the thing made, and, as such, is distinguished from φύσις, which is an immanent formative principle (*Met.* Λ. 3. 1070 a. 7 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ: and cf. *E. N.* vi. 4. 4). Although τέχνη aims at the good in a very intelligible sense, its relation to it, as has been pointed out above, is not that in which Aristotle is concerned to show that the rational agent stands to his good. The rational life is not a process, producing beyond itself something which may perhaps in turn be employed for some further purpose; it is good and beautiful in itself, like an organism, and not useful as a means.

μέθοδος]: see the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant, and *Index Arist.* s. v. Literally it means 'way to knowledge': here it stands for 'knowledge' or 'science' itself (ἐπιστήμη).

πρᾶξις] as used in the *Ethics* properly means 'moral action': cf. vi. 2. 2 ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. Πρᾶξις expresses reason

(λόγος), or what the man is as an indivisible εἶδος or person, just as 1094 a. 1.
the place of the hands on the dial at a given time expresses the whole mechanism of the clock. As such, πρᾶξις is distinguished from reactions in immediate response to isolated stimuli of sense.

προαίρεσις] defined in *E. N.* iii. 3. 9 as βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' a. 2.
ἡμῖν. It also is peculiar to man as possessing reason. It is the 'choice' of means to some end, the end being distinguished by reason from the pleasure of the moment—the object of ἐπιθυμία. It is good when it is the exponent of the whole man as perfectly apprehended by his reason; bad, when the end with which the agent 'identifies his good' falls short of being 'the whole man,' or is merely a phantastic image of him. Mere ἐπιθυμία, on the other hand, expresses only the reaction of the sensibility in relation to an isolated stimulus. It involves no conception of a *good*. Something is *pleasant* at the moment, and ἐπιθυμία rushes without reflection to the enjoyment of it. Προαίρεσις therefore, as implying the conception of an end different from present pleasure, is placed here with technical correctness in a list of faculties and functions which aim at 'a good.' Even 'bad choice' involves the notion, however imperfect, of 'a good': as Aspasius says *ad loc.* καὶ γὰρ αἱ μοχθηραὶ πράξεις καὶ μοχθηραὶ προαιρέσεις ἐφέσει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γίνονται, ἀλλὰ πεπλανημένων τῶν πραττόντων ἢ προαιρουμένων.

διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται] cf. *E. N.* x. 2. 4 οἱ δ' ἐκστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν. Cf. *Rhet.* i. 6. 1362 a. 23 ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾖ αἱρετὸν καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο αἱρούμεθα καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν· καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν. Cf. Themistius, Περὶ Ψυχῆς, fol. 92 (vol. ii. p. 208, ed. Spengel) ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις ᾗ αἴσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι οὐχ οἵα τε οὐδὲ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦ τέρποντος ἢ ἀνιῶντος, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦ νοῦ μόνου κρίνειν ἐστί. But if αἴσθησις and ἐπιθυμία, as such, are not directed to 'the good,' how can the lower animals, which have only αἴσθησις and ἐπιθυμία, be said 'to strive after the good'? Because their αἰσθήσεις and ἐπιθυμίαι have, like their protective colours and other bodily adaptations, assumed a definitely fixed character in relation to an orderly (i.e. rational) environment. Their organisms, which their αἰσθήσεις and ἐπιθυμίαι subserve, are embodiments of reason adequate to the conditions of the

994 a. 2. environment in which they survive: cf. *E. N.* vii. 13. 6 οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες· ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Man's ὀρέξεις conflict with his 'good,' because by his θεωρία he has risen into a sphere in which his merely animal adaptations are inadequate.

a. 3. § 2. διαφορά . . .] There are two kinds of ends. Some are immanent, being identical with the ἐνέργειαι, or functions, which constitute the essence, or perfect being, of the things of which they are said to be the ἐνέργειαι. A physical organism, and the noble life, are ends of this first kind. Some ends, however, are not immanent, but exist beyond the functions or operations which produce them. The products of τέχνη are ends of this second kind. They continue to exist after the processes which have produced them have ceased; whereas a physical organism ceases to exist, as such, when its vital functions cease. The end of τέχνη is an ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Hence the ἐνέργειαι, or operations as such, of τέχνη are said to be ἀτελεῖς, and are more properly called κινήσεις than ἐνέργειαι. Cf. *Met.* Θ. 6. 1048 b. 28, &c. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία, μάθησις, βάδισις, οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε· οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν, ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἀλλ' ἕτερον καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται· ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκε. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. Cf. *Met.* K. 9. 1066 a. 20 ἥ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελὴς δέ. But *Life*, whether viewed as an organised system of various functions, or as mirrored in one high function such as sight or thought, is ἐνέργεια in the strict sense, *i. e.* contains its own end in itself. Such ἐνέργεια, as Aristotle puts it, 'resides in' that organism of which it is said to be the ἐνέργεια, being indeed identical with the οὐσία or εἶδος of the organism; whereas the so-called ἐνέργεια of the builder or weaver, *quâ* builder or weaver, passes out into the house or web, which is 'better than' the builder or weaver, *quâ* builder or weaver. See Met. Θ. 8. 1050 a. 23, &c. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις, οἷον ὄψεως ἡ ὅρασις, καὶ οὐδὲν γίνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἔργον· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ γίνεταί τι, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν . . . ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἥ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ· ὅσων δὲ μή ἐστιν ἄλλο τι 1094 a. 3.
ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια· οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρᾶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωή γὰρ καὶ ποιά τις ἐστίν· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστιν. With the doctrine of this passage we may compare Aristotle's theory of the relation of the ψυχή to the σῶμα. The ψυχή is the *function* of the σῶμα, its *form*, or *essence*. A dead body is a body only in an equivocal sense, as a marble hand is a hand. It is life which constitutes the body; and the living body does not exist for the sake of any end external to itself. See *De Anima*, ii. 1. 412 a. 19 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντες—and *Met.* H. 3. 1043 a. 35 ψυχὴ γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια σώματός τινος[1]. As the whole body exists for the sake of, and is constituted by its life, so an organ like the eye, taken by itself, may be said to exist for the sake of, and be constituted by its special function—sight. The end, good, or being of the eye is sight. This end or good is not something which can exist apart from the eye; and an eye which does not see is not really an eye. Cf. *De Anima*, ii. 1. 412 b. 18 εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, ψυχὴ ἂν αὐτῷ ἦν ἡ ὄψις· αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ λόγον· ὁ δ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως, ἧς ἀπολιπούσης, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ γεγραμμένος. The noble life (εὐδαιμονία—τὸ εὖ ζῆν) is the function or ἐνέργεια of Human Nature as sight is of the eye.

§§ 3, 4] Τὸ εὖ ζῆν, the noble life, is the chief end of man, and all a. 6.
his actions and pursuits are for the sake of this. But every one of these actions and pursuits has its own immediate end, which, in its turn, is a means to the end of some more comprehensive pursuit.

[1] Cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* third ed. p. 487 (Aristot.).—'Besteht nun das wahre Wesen jedes Dings in seiner Form, und das Wesen alles Gewordenen in seinem Zwecke, so wird diess auch von den lebenden Wesen gelten müssen. Jedes lebende Wesen ist eine kleine Welt, ein Ganzes, dessen Theile dem Zwecke des Ganzen als Werkzeuge zu dienen haben. (Phys. viii. 2. 252 b. 24 εἰ δ' ἐν ζῴῳ τοῦτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, τί κωλύει τὸ αὐτὸ συμβῆναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν; εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ). Jedes Werkzeug ist aber von der Verrichtung abhängig für die es bestimmt ist; der Körper ist mithin um der Seele willen da, und die Beschaffenheit jedes Körpers ist durch die seiner Seele bestimmt: (de part. animal. i. 5. 645 b. 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῶν ἕνεκά του, τῶν δὲ τοῦ σώματος μορίων ἕκαστον ἕνεκά του, τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα πρᾶξίς τις, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ σύνολον σῶμα συνέστηκε πράξεώς τινος ἕνεκα πλήρους . . . . ὥστε καὶ τὸ σῶμά πως τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ἔργων πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον. Cf. Met. vi. 10. 1035 b. 14.)'

1094 a. 6. We thus find in life many ἀρχιτεκτονικαὶ δυνάμεις, so called however in a relative sense only, because *the* ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ δύναμις *par excellence* is the art of living nobly. All other ends—Health, Wealth, Victory—are subordinate to, and good only in relation to the noble life. Although some of the special operations of man, such as walking, riding, dancing, differ from the τέχναι proper in not resulting in ἔργα or things made, still they resemble them in looking beyond themselves, as *e.g.* to health, business, or amusement. On the metaphor implied, in the use of the term ἀρχιτεκτονική here, the Paraphrast has the following remarks: ἡ δὲ στρατηγικὴ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ πρὸς αὐτὰς [*i.e.* ἱππικήν κ.τ.λ.] καλεῖται· δύναται γὰρ ὅπερ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων ἐν τοῖς τέκτοσι· καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας ἐκεῖνα κελεύει ποιεῖν τοὺς τέκτονας ἃ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο φέρει τὸ εἶδος, οὕτω καὶ ἡ στρατηγική, καὶ εἴτις ἄλλη τοιαύτη, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους ταῖς ἄλλαις δίδωσι τοὺς κανόνας.

a. 10. § 4. δύναμιν] 'faculty,' in the sense in which we speak of the Faculty of Arts or Law at a University.

a. 11. χαλινοποιική] Accepted by Bekker and Bywater on the authority of pr. K^b alone, for the χαλινοποιητική of rc. K^b, and apparently all other MSS.

a. 13. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον] Bywater introduces κατά into the text from K^b, M^b, (and Cambr.). For δή read here by Bekker and Bywater, Susemihl gives δέ. The best MSS. seem to have δή, while δέ is given by CCC, B^1, B^2, and Ald. Where δέ and δή are concerned, however, MS. authority is not of much account. I prefer δέ.

a. 14. ἐν ἁπάσαις δέ] δέ is the reading of all MSS. apparently except M^b and Γ, which have δή. Δέ and δή are constantly interchanged in the MSS., and the best of them have not much authority in the matter. Zell, Grant, and Ramsauer read δέ, and explain it as an instance of 'δέ in apodosi.' The law of 'δέ in apodosi' in Aristotle is thus formulated by Eucken (*de Arist. dicendi ratione: pars prima: de particularum usu*, p. 31)—'δέ in apodosi usurpatur aut ita ut repetatur apud demonstrativum cum antecesserit apud relativum, aut post demonstrativum, cum non antecesserit, sed enuntiatio demonstrativa quodam modo opponatur relativae, aut post particulam εἰ, ubi apodosis opposita est protasi.' It seems natural then to bring the ἐν ἁπάσαις δέ of the present passage under the first

clause of the law for 'δέ in apodosi' as formulated by Eucken. 1094 a. 14.
Michelet, however, reading δέ, prefers to speak of an anacoluthon here. He follows Krische (*Jenaische allg. Literaturzeitung:* December, 1835: no. 230, p. 403) in thinking that the ὅσαι δ' εἰσίν with which the sentence begins is, after the parenthesis, changed *per anacoluthiam* into ἐν ἁπάσαις δέ, the δέ being simply repeated. The words of Krische (quoted by Eucken, p. 25) are: 'ὅσαι δ' εἰσί kündigt den Satz an, der durch die Vergleichung, welche aber von ihm nicht zu trennen ist, unterbrochen wird; mit ἐν ἁπάσαις δέ wird der unterbrochene Gedanke, der nun auch die Vergleichung in sich schliesst, wieder aufgenommen, so dass δέ nach ἐν ἁπ. das wiederholte erste δέ ist, und nimmermehr statt δή die Apodosis bildet:' on which Eucken remarks—'cujus sententiae assentirer, si Aristoteles scripsisset ἐν ταύταις δέ, sed cum ἐν ἁπάσαις legatur, quo verba omnia quae antecedunt comprehenduntur, nescio an cum codice M^b (cujus auctoritas in talibus rebus summa est) Korae, Bonitzio δή legendum sit.' I am inclined to follow Eucken in preferring δή to δέ here, on the principle which he lays down in substituting δή for δέ in *E. N.* iii. 11. 4. 1118 b. 24—'post τάντα non particula δέ, quae opponit, locum habet, sed δή, quae ea comprehendat quae antecedunt'—and quite independently of the authority of M^b. M^b notoriously abounds in unique readings, which have no genealogical significance, and can only be regarded as the conjectures of a scribe: see Susemihl's Pref. to his edition of *Eth. Nic.*, Teubner, 1880, p. viii.—'Cum inter peculiares M^b codicis lectiones haud paucae sint sine dubio e mera conjectura modo falsa modo recta haustae, summa in eo adhibendo cautione opus neque Bekkerus[1] ubique satis ea usus est.' Eucken therefore seems to me to take up a peculiarly untenable position, when he maintains (p. 40) not only that we must go to the MSS. to decide between δή and δέ, but that on this particular point M^b is to be preferred to all others: 'in Ethicis Nicomacheis ubicunque agitur utrum δή an δέ scribendum sit codex M^b ceteris omnibus praeferendus est.'

§ 5. διαφέρει δ' οὐδέν κ.τ.λ.] It does not affect the subordination of ends described in § 4, whether the subordinate ends are ἔργα, like a bridle, or ἐνέργειαι, like riding. Both fall under the end a. 16.

[1] According to Rassow (*Forsch. über die Nic. Eth.* p. 8) Bekker has altered the text on the authority of M^b unique in about twenty places.

1094 a. 16. of generalship—victory. Again, an ἐνέργεια like walking may be subordinated to an ἐνέργεια the end of which is an ἔργον, as when a builder walks to his work; just as, on the other hand, an end which is an ἔργον, like a bridle, may be subordinated to one which is an ἐνέργεια, like riding. The ἔργον is indeed 'better than' the ἐνέργεια which produced it, but not better than *any* ἐνέργεια. Thus a substantive ἔργον may be subordinate to a πρᾶξις which results in no ἔργον. So the Paraph. *ad loc.* εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ πράξεις εἶεν τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων, ἀλλὰ ἔργα, οὐδὲν κωλύει βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ αἱρετώτερον καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων τὸ τῆς ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς τέλος καὶ πρᾶξις ὅν ὥσπερ χαλινοποιητικῆς μὲν τέλος ἔργον χαλινὸς γάρ· στρατηγικῆς δὲ τέλος πρᾶξις· νίκη γάρ· καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν νίκην βελτίω εἶναι καὶ αἱρετωτέραν τοῦ χαλινοῦ· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς πράξεως, οὐ πάσης, ἀλλὰ μόνης ἐκείνης ἧς ἀποτέλεσμά ἐστι, διότι τέλος ἐκείνης ἐστί.

CHAPTER II.

Argument.

Now, if all forms of human endeavour have ultimately one and the same end, this end being sought after for its own sake, while all other ends are chosen as means towards its attainment—and this must be so, for, if all *our ends were but means to further ends, human endeavour would be an endless and vain process—this one ultimate end will be the Chief Good.*

The knowledge of the true nature of this ultimate end of all human endeavour must evidently have great influence on the conduct of life. If we possess the knowledge of it, we shall be more likely always to do the right thing in particular circumstances. We must therefore try to get at least a general idea of its nature, and to determine the science or art of which it is the object.

It must surely be the object of the science which rules all the other sciences, and supplies the plan which they all subserve. Such Statesmanship—the science or art of social life—manifestly is. All other sciences and arts exist and are cultivated subject to the provisions which this supreme science or art lays down for them. It uses the other sciences and arts for its own practical end: it determines authoritatively what we shall do, and what we shall not do. Its end therefore, including as it does the ends of all the other sciences and arts, will be man's Chief Good. When we say 'man's *Chief Good' it is eminently the* citizen's *Chief Good that we have in view; for although 'man' and 'citizen' are* essentially *one, and their good therefore essentially the same, the* accidents *of concrete life may partially isolate the individual from the society of his*

fellow-citizens, and the good which he attains to in his partial isolation will differ in degree, though not in kind, from that which men in full rapport *with the best social influences realize for themselves and their city. The former good is one which indeed we are often fain to acquiesce in, but the latter is far better—a more divinely beautiful thing to lay hold of and keep.*

§ 1.] As Grant says, this is 'the argument upon which the whole system of the *Ethics* is based.' We cannot always desire means; there must be an end desired for its own sake alone; for human nature, like the physical organism of an animal or plant, must have a limit or definite form. This limit or definite form will be the *summum bonum* (τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον) of man. As the functions of a physical organism do not build up an indefinitely increasing mass without constant shape, but result in a structure definite both in size and form, so man's desires do not follow one another endlessly, giving rise to conduct which has no plan, but conspire (with success proportioned to the rationality of the agent) towards the maintenance of a definite system of life. The irrational man, as such, loses sight of this end. He is dominated by the ἐπιθυμία which happens at the moment to engage him. This is succeeded by another ἐπιθυμία, perhaps in no way related to it. His life is thus not one, but many; it is a mere succession of episodes like a bad play. It has no object: ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις (*Pol.* ii. 4. 1267 b. 3). But the rational man has a definite object—the maintenance of the εἶδος of human nature. This εἶδος he apprehends as an organism which must 'correspond with a social environment,' because it cannot otherwise take its appointed place in the κόσμος, or realise itself as 'divine.' That harmonious play of all the functions of his nature, which enables man so to 'correspond with his social environment' that he may realise himself as 'divine,' is the End or Good of human nature. This 'correspondence' is the function of νοῦς, the synoptic faculty, which views everything in its relations to all other things, *i.e.* not as *phaenomenon*, but as *noumenon*, or *sub specie aeternitatis*. In the πρακτικὸς βίος, with which the main part of the *Ethics* is concerned, the synopsis is less perfect than in the θεωρητικὸς βίος; hence, as everything is defined in accordance with its perfection, we find man's chief end defined at the close of the *Ethics* as θεωρία. For the present, however, it will be enough to regard it as 'correspondence with the social environment.' 1094 a. 18.

In connecting the ἀγαθόν with the πέρας, Aristotle follows the

1094 a. 18. Pythagoreans and Plato. *E. N.* ii. 6. 14 τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου. Plato, *Philebus*, 27 B Σω. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν. τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἆρα μὴ πλημμελοίην ἄν τι; The good and beautiful are realised in the μίξις. Cf. *Phil.* 64 D Σω. καὶ μὴν ξυμπάσης γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν . . . . . ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς ξυμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ξύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην ἑαυτήν . . . . νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι. Aristotle's view of the relation of πέρας to the ἀγαθόν is very clearly stated in *Met.* α. 2. 994 b. 9 ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τέλος· τοιοῦτον δὲ ὁ μὴ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκείνου. ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἔσται τοιοῦτον τὸ ἔσχατον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρον. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἀλλ' οἱ τὸ ἄπειρον ποιοῦντες λανθάνουσιν ἐξαιροῦντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. καίτοι οὐθεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειεν οὐθὲν πράττειν, μὴ μέλλων ἐπὶ πέρας ἥξειν· οὐδ' ἂν εἴη νοῦς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις· ἕνεκα γάρ τινος ἀεὶ πράττει ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι πέρας· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἐστί. The ἀγαθόν, or πέρας, at which νοῦς aims, both in science and in the conduct of life, is order, system, κόσμος. Νοῦς combines separate facts into a theory, separate actions into a life, just as, according to Anaxagoras, it brings order into the material universe. No single desire or act can be properly said to be good. The good, like the beautiful, is realized only in the orderly arrangement of parts: see *Poet.* 7. 1450 b. 3 τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί. 'The relation of parts in a definite organism,' is what Aristotle means by the ἀγαθόν, the πεπερασμένον, the καλόν. This relation is the object and realization of νοῦς. It is the νοητόν which exists only for νοῦς. Hence it is said, as in *Met.* Λ. 9. 1074 b. 33, to be identical with νοῦς. The object of νοῦς is νοῦς itself. Νοῦς is therefore dominated by nothing external to itself, and better than itself, as αἴσθησις is dominated by τὸ αἰσθητόν. It is therefore absolutely good—κράτιστον:—αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις· φαίνεται δ' ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ. The true personality of the εὐδαίμων is his εὐδαιμονία or rationally ordered life (*E. N.* ix. 7. 4. 1168 a. 6 ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ), or perfect correspondence with his environment. It is the law of his own nature to correspond perfectly. We must not abstract him from his environment, as if he were one thing, and the environment another thing, and thus

represent him as dominated by something alien to, or external to 1094 a. 18.
himself. In the life of reason he is a 'law unto himself.' He understands and desires everything as it stands related to the great whole of which it is a part. His knowledge is 'adequate,' and his desires are according to his knowledge—*i.e.* his knowledge is equal to what can be known in his sphere, leaving no residuum of the unknown, and his desires give rise to no conduct which can ever become matter for regret. In the life of sense, on the other hand, a man perceives only the superficies of things, and fails to grasp them in their essence as parts of the whole. His desires too, following the superficial information supplied to them by sense, lead him to perform acts which he afterwards wishes undone. The world is wider and more complex than himself, and has many surprises and retributions in store for him. The life of sense is thus one of subjection, or passivity; while the life of reason is one of freedom, and supremacy (*cf.* the term *κράτιστον* applied to *νοῦς*). This life of reason, in which there is no ignorance or error is, it will be easily understood, an ideal, like Spinoza's *cognitio adaequata*, which no man ever actually reaches. Yet some men approximate to it more nearly than others; and in the beautiful structures of plants and animals we have a physical rendering of it which, save for the death of the individual, is perfect.

τῶν πρακτῶν] *i. e.* '*rerum agendarum*,' Michelet rightly, who finds fault with Muretus for supplying *τελῶν* with *πρακτῶν*, and distinguishing between *τέλη* which are *πρακτά* or attainable by man, and those which are *οὐ πρακτά*—ideal ends. But Aristotle cannot admit such a distinction; see x. 7. 8 *χρὴ δὲ οὐ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα, οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητὸν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν.* Τὸ *πρακτόν* is the result or object of *πρᾶξις* (as *τὸ ἐπιστητόν* is of *ἐπιστήμη*, *τὸ αἰσθητόν* of *αἴσθησις*) and as such may signify either 'something done' as a means to an end, or the end itself: see *E. E.* 1. 7. 1217 a. 35 *διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν. καὶ γὰρ ὧν ἕνεκα πράττομεν, καὶ τὰ τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν*, which Grant refers to as 'a sort of scholium' upon the term *πρακτόν*.

βουλόμεθα] employed here with technical correctness, *βούλησις* a. 19.
or wish being directed to ends. See *E. N.* iii. 2. 9 *ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος.* Similarly *αἱρούμεθα* implies *προαίρεσις* or choice of means.

πρόεισι] impersonal. For examples see *Ind. Arist.* a. 20.

1094 a. 21. ματαίαν] Cf. *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 b. 25 ὡς τοῦτο ὂν τὸ μάτην, τὸ πεφυ ἄλλου ἕνεκα ὅταν μὴ περαίνῃ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ἐπεφύκει—*i. e.* where a mea misses its end, *i. e.* is no means at all, we have τὸ μάτην. But part or function of a physical organism is thus useless. All pa conspire to the life or good of the organism. See *De Coelo* i. 271 a. 32 μάτην γὰρ ὑπόδημα τοῦτο λέγομεν οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπόδεσις· ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν ἀλόγως οὐδὲ μάτην ποιεῖ, where ἀλόγως mea without λόγος, or definite structure and ratio of parts. Cf. *Partibus Anim.* iii. 1. 661 b. 24 μηδὲν μάτην ποιεῖν τὴν φύσιν μ περίεργον, and other places noted in the *Ind. Arist.*

a. 22. § 2. ἆρ' οὖν] Zell and Michelet quote Muretus—'Mos hic Aristotelis, ut saepe, quae affirmare instituit, ea interrogando effe Cf. the common use of ἤ in Aristotle introducing as a quest the writer's own opinion, *e.g. E. N.* v. 9. 9 ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν;

a. 23. ῥοπήν . . . σκοπόν] There is a mixture of metaphors here, suggesting a balance, σκοπός being a target. On ῥοπήν Eustra says—ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν ζυγῶν οἷς ἐν τοῖς βάρεσι χρώμεθα. metaphor of the σκοπός occurs, as Zell and Grant notice, in P *Rep.* 519 B, C, where it is said of the ἀπαίδευτοι καὶ ἀληθείας ἄπ that σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἕνα, οὗ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἃ πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

a. 24. τοῦ δέοντος] Grant says:—'not "our duty" in the mo sense, this conception not having been as yet developed[1], more generally "what we ought to do" from any motive. word δέον was a received term with reference to moral subj Cf. Plato *Rep.* p. 336 D, where Thrasymachus, calling u Socrates to define Justice, says "Mind you don't tell me that the δέον or the ὠφέλιμον, or the λυσιτελοῦν or the κερδαλέον the ξυμφέρον." Cf. also *Charmides* p. 164 B; Xen. *Mem.* 22. But the exact import of the term was not fixed. Aristot the *Topics* ii. 3. 4 mentions among the πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα, οἷ τὸ δέον ἐστὶ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἢ τὸ καλόν.'

The fundamental meaning of δέον, or ὡς δεῖ, seems to be dicated by the conjunction which occurs in *E. N.* iii. 7. 2. 111 12 ὡς δεῖ δέ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεῖ (ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὰ φοβερά) τοῦ ε ἕνεκα. That is δέον, which is necessary as a means to the m

[1] I cannot assent to the view (apparently held by Grant) that the G had not developed the conception of 'Duty,' as we find it—to take a ty modern instance—in Kant.

tenance of the organism of man's moral nature—an organism 1094 a. 24.
which realises an ὀρθὸς λόγος, or just proportion of parts, and is therefore καλόν and ἀγαθόν in the eye of νοῦς which contemplates it. The same reference to a just proportion may be noticed in the use of τὸ δέον in *E. N.* iv. 2. 13 διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. Cf. *E. N.* iv. 2. 20 ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει. Similarly, the passage before us (*E. N.* i. 2. 2) means that, if a man knows the ἀγαθόν of man, *i. e.* the εἶδος or organisation of man's nature as a system of harmoniously balanced parts, and if he keeps the thought or perception of it always before him in all that he does, he will not fail to do, at the proper time, what is necessary (δέον) to its maintenance.

§ 3. τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν.] A frequently recurring metaphor, a. 25.
derived from the practice of the sculptor, who makes a τύπος or rough clay model before he begins the statue in stone. Before we begin our elaborate treatment of the chief good, we will try to form a rough general idea of what it is, and of the conditions under which it can be realised. See Zell and Michelet *ad loc.*, and Schwegler *Met.* vol. iv. p. 42, and *Index Arist.* s. v. τύπος, for such phrases as παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ, καθόλου λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ, τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγειν, τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς λέγεσθαι, τύπῳ διελθεῖν, τύπῳ διορισθέν. The ὑπογραφή in painting answers to the τύπος in sculpture. In *de An.* ii. 1. 413 a. 9, we find the metaphor from painting mixed with that from sculpture—τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ διωρίσθω καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς. In *E. N.* i. 7. 17 there is the same mixture of metaphors. We must suppose that the sources of the metaphors have at last ceased to suggest themselves distinctly. Both metaphors occur in Plato, *e.g. Rep.* 414 A τοιαύτη τις δοκεῖ μοι ἡ ἑλληνικὴ εὖναι καὶ κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ μὴ ἀ' ἀκριβείας εἰρῆσθαι, and *Rep.* 548 D ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι.

ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων] δύναμις is the generic term, and includes, a. 26.
as species, ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη: but here δυνάμεων seems to stand for τεχνῶν.

§ 4. κυριωτάτης] Grant remarks that here 'κυριωτάτης seems partly to mean "most authoritative" or "absolute," partly "that which is most absolutely a science."' Κύριος is (1) 'sovereign over'

1094 a. 26. (2) 'in the strict sense,' *i.e.* in the sense which has the autho of usage in its favour, and consequently 'prevails over' o senses of a term: cf. *E. N.* i. 7. 13 κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη ι λέγεσθαι = 'for this seems to be the more proper sense of the ter cf. also κυρία ἀρετή vi. 13. 1, where κυρία has probably both meanings mentioned above—'virtue, in the strict sense of term—sovereign virtue.' The present section may be rend thus: 'It would seem to be the object of *the* science *par excell* the science which is mistress and directs (ἀρχιτεκτονική) all the o sciences.'

a. 27. §§ 5—7. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται, κ.τ.λ.] It is man's na to be a citizen—φύσει ἄνθρωπος πολιτικὸν ζῷον. Severed, if that v possible, from the body politic, the individual would be like amputated hand, which is no longer a hand except in name, fo is the performance of its function in the economy of the liv body which constitutes it a hand. The ἄπολις would be eith beast or a god; not a man, for he would have no distincti human function: see *Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φ πόλις ἡ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγ εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, ε ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοι πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντι λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότ ἡ ἕκαστος δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλ μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενο αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. Cf. *Met.* Z. 1036 b. 30 οὐ γὰρ πάντως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἡ χείρ, ἀλλ' ἡ δυνα τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν, ὥστε ἔμψυχος οὖσα· μὴ ἔμψυχος δὲ οὐ μέρος.

Man realises his true personality as man, when he becomes c scious of the manifold relations in which he stands to his fellow that final social system which is distinguished as the πόλις from κώμη and οἰκία; and when, in consequence of having become c scious of these relations, he acts, not to please or profit himself, to show himself worthy of the civilization permanently emboc in his πόλις. Then his life is the chief good of man as m Hence πολιτική, the science of the plan (ἀρχιτεκτονική) accord to which the πόλις is constituted, will be the science of chief good of man as man, *i.e.* of man as a 'social being[1].'

[1] And as a 'thinker': for it is only in the πόλις that thinkers are fou

cordingly all man's special pursuits, such as warfare, household management, and public speaking, so far as they may promote or prevent the realisation of this 'plan,' are regulated by πολιτική. 1094 a. 27.

The subordination of στρατηγική to πολιτική does not need much explanation. The true function of the στρατηγός is to conduct successfully the wars which are necessary to the maintenance of the πόλις, as a home of the peaceful virtues and arts: πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν *E. N.* x. 7. 6. It is for πολιτική therefore to see that the military spirit is kept within just limits. The main point in Aristotle's criticism of the Spartan constitution is that, by the exclusive attention it paid to military excellence, it produced a state of society which could not last, no place being left for the peaceful virtues. See *Pol.* ii. 6. 1271 b. 2 πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν· τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν, μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς.

The subordination of οἰκονομική to πολιτική is a point of great importance in Aristotle's system. The πόλις is composed of οἰκίαι which, though chronologically prior, are logically posterior to the πόλις, *i.e.* they exist *for the sake of* the πόλις, as the members for the sake of the body. Hence πολιτική, which sees to the good of the πόλις, or whole, will regulate οἰκονομική, which sees to the good of the οἰκία, or part. The true function of the οἰκονόμος is so to rule his household consisting of wife, children, and slaves, and so to provide for their material wants, as to make his 'home life' such that he, and his sons when they grow up, can, without encumbrance or distraction, devote themselves to 'political life,'—that is, to the leisured life of culture which the society of the πόλις offers. In providing, in this 'political' spirit, for the material wants of his family, the οἰκονόμος is engaged in ἡ κτητικὴ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν, and the capital which he accumulates and administers is ὁ ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος, an amount definitely limited in relation to the end which it, as ὄργανον, subserves. But the οἰκονόμος may forget that 'political life' is the end, and 'home life' or 'private life' only the means. He may

The final cause of civilization, as developed through the stages of οἰκία and of κώμη, is the production of the small band of thinkers who, when the stage of the πόλις has been reached, illuminate each generation. Averroes rightly interpreted Aristotle's thought with the dictum 'necesse est ut aliquis philosophus semper sit in gente humana (Commentary on *de An.* iii).'

1094 a. 27. make 'home life' or a 'private career' his end. He may make it his end to have a luxurious establishment, or to accumulate wealth for its own sake by trade (χρηματιστική)—an unnatural thing to do, for wealth is naturally a means, and the man who makes its accumulation his end is engaged in an endless undertaking.

It is for πολιτική, therefore, as the science of the social organism, to see that the spirit of self-aggrandisement in οἰκονόμοι, or private persons, does not make the parts useless or even dangerous to the whole. See *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 b. 27 ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν· ὃ δεῖ ἤτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ παρίζειν αὐτὴν ὥστε ὑπάρχῃ, ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὅ γ' ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας.

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται.

κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπειρον οὐδενὸς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργάνων πλῆθός ἐστι οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν δῆλον· ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικόν, ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως.

The 'political' *raison d'être* of 'home life' is nowhere se more plainly than in Aristotle's theory of slavery (*Pol.* i. 2). T institution of slavery is supported on the ground that the sla is necessary to 'political life.' He exists not to contribute the personal comfort or luxury of the master, but to give h that σχολή without which 'political life' is impossible. A fr man, who is obliged to be, as it were, his own slave, or, like βάναυσος, to do slave's work, is naturally excluded from 'politi life.' This defence of slavery, as necessary to 'political li becomes intelligible when we recognise the 'gentlemanly' and e 'academic' character of Aristotle's 'political life.' In support the institution of slavery as he does, and in excluding the βάναυ and χρηματιστής from 'political life,' Aristotle merely gives expr sion to the truth, or truism, that refined culture and social brillia are found only within the circle of the leisured class. A 'go man,' according to the modern view, is a man who leads upright and useful life in his sphere, whatever that may be. A totle's 'good man' (σπουδαῖος) is, above all, a connoisseur of l a man of the world, educated, magnificent, fortunate. Slavery

some analogous institution is obviously necessary to the existence 1094 a. 27.
of a caste of men of this sort. See *Pol.* Γ. 3. 1277 b. 35 ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; . . . 1278 a. 8 ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην . . . a. 20 οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ἢ θητικόν: Z. 2. 1319 a. 26 ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς, ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τό τε τῶν βαναύσων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τὸ θητικόν. Aristotle's ἀρετή is essentially the quality of the gentleman.

The subordination of ῥητορική to πολιτική is an interesting point. In Plato's *Gorgias* 452 sqq. we find the sophist Gorgias attempting to identify them, maintaining that ῥητορική is the true art of government, and is concerned with the greatest good of man—with 'that which gives men freedom in their own persons, and to rulers the power of ruling over others in their several states,' viz. 'the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly or at any other political meeting' (Jowett). Socrates maintains against this view that 'rhetoric is the shadow of a part of politics:' *Gorg.* 463 D ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον. It is the art of flattery, and the simulation of justice. Similarly in the *Politicus* 304 πολιτική and ῥητορική are carefully distinguished, and the subordination of the latter to the former insisted upon. Public speaking was so essential to the exercise of political influence in a democratic state that the temptation to regard rhetoric as the highest art was very strong. Aristotle follows the example of Plato in strenuously opposing this view, and we cannot be wrong in supposing that it is his sympathy with Plato's opposition to the professional teachers of public speaking which makes him select ῥητορική here as one of his instances of an art subordinate to πολιτική. See *E. N.* x. 9. 20.

An orator is too apt to speak so as to obtain applause or benefit for himself, whereas his speaking ought to be a means to the good of the state. This it is for the state to see to. Aristotle obviously considered the art of public speaking as one requiring considerable regulation, for in *Rhet.* i. 1. 1354 a. 11–26 he says that in the best ordered states speakers are not allowed to make appeals to the emotions of the judges, but are confined to the facts of the case—a restriction, he dryly adds, which would reduce many speakers to silence. To appeal to the emotions of a judge is to bend the rule you are about to use. In the interest of the community at large it would seem that oratory ought to be regulated even in private cases

1094 a. 27. between citizens; but where the speech is addressed to a sovereign people to determine their policy, the responsibility of the speaker is much greater. It is very little however that statute can do, in the absence of good sense and good feeling, to curtail the licence of public speaking. The institution of the γραφὴ παρανόμων at Athens was an attempt in this direction, but does not seem to have been very successful. Its effect was evaded by the passing of ψηφίσματα (as distinguished from νόμοι), in force for one year, and annually renewable.

The relation of πολιτική to public speaking suggests, through the sophists the great teachers of rhetoric, the general subject of the relation of πολιτική to education. We are told in § 6 that πολιτική determines what sciences and arts shall be taught in the city, and to what extent, and to whom, and in the *Politics* (H. 13—Θ. 7) a sketch of the education which it is desirable that the state should provide is given. Again, in the last chapter of the *E. N.* (x. 9), the question whether education ought to be private or public is discussed (to a certain extent dialectically), and the conclusion reached that it ought to be public. The private point of view, even if it were backed by sufficient authority to enforce its particular system (which it is not), is too narrow.

It has been pointed out above that the difference of opinion between Plato and the sophists seems to have caused the selection here of ῥητορική as an instance of an art subordinate to πολιτική. The selection of στρατηγική seems also to be due to the influence of Plato, who, in *Politicus* 304, 305—a passage from which the present may very well have heen borrowed—describes πολιτική as the sovereign (βασιλική) science which regulates ῥητορική, στρατηγική, δικαστική, as well as μουσική and ὅλως αἱ περὶ χειροτεχνίας ἐπιστῆμαι. The selection of οἰκονομική is not accidental either, but is determined by Aristotle's peculiar view of the evil of χρηματιστική (see *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 b. 41), as well as by his theory of the origin of the πόλις (see *Pol.* i. 2. 1253 b. 2 ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν).

b. 4. § 7. χρωμένης] *i. e.* using as means to its own supreme end; cf. the use of χρήσιμον = 'the means,' as *e.g.* *E. N.* i. 5. 8 καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. *Pol.* ii. 6. 1271 b. 3 χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. *E. N.* viii. 6. 5 χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά.

χρωμένης . . . νομοθετούσης] Cf. the division of ἡ περὶ πόλιν φρόνησις

(*E. N.* vi. 8. 2) into (1) νομοθετική, (2) πολιτική, *i. e.* into that which 1094 b. 4.
lays down general rules of life, and that which deals, in the assembly and the law courts, as well as in the various executive departments, with the details of public business.

τοῖς λοιπαῖς [πρακτικαῖς] τῶν ἐπιστημῶν] Bywater brackets πρακτικαῖς.

§ 8.] The words ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ are a little startling, b. 7.
but must not be understood to mean that the individual is in any sense self-subsisting, and able to realise his good independently of the state. We have seen that Aristotle's doctrine is that the individual has no existence apart from the body politic. No man who is not a πολίτης can attain to the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. Indeed this doctrine is implied in the words ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ καὶ πόλει. Accordingly when Aristotle goes on to distinguish the good of the πόλις from that of the εἷς μόνος, as κάλλιον καὶ θειότερον, he must be understood merely to distinguish between πολῖται in different social circumstances—between the πολίτης who, like Solon or Pericles, is surrounded by all that is best in civil life, and the πολίτης who lives in exile, with a memory or a hope instead of a city, or is placed in social circumstances which are mean and unworthy of him, like 'the great soul in a small city' spoken of by Plato (*Rep.* 496). Plato indeed regards exile and a small city as distinctly favourable (in existing circumstances) to philosophy—man's highest occupation; but Aristotle takes the more concrete view, that with mean social surroundings, a man cannot perform his highest function well, although he may perform it in a way. It would be a misapprehension of Aristotle's teaching to suppose that the distinction drawn in this section is that between the good of the community at large—'the greatest good of the greatest number,' and the private good of a single member of the community. No such distinction could be made by Aristotle. The good of the εἷς μόνος, in which we must sometimes 'acquiesce,' is still his good as a 'social being'; it is not a κτῆμα of which he may be the solitary possessor, but an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς which can only be manifested in a social environment, unsatisfactory though that environment may be in a given case. A man's social environment may be fitted to call forth his noblest energies, or it may be such as to impede them without entirely destroying them: this is the distinction which Aristotle draws. His social energies impeded, a

1094 b. 7. man is apt to fall back upon the abstraction of the individu[illegible] *per se*—to live for himself, and forget that he is a member of th[illegible] body politic; when his noblest energies are constantly called fort[illegible] by brilliant social circumstances, he identifies himself with the bod[illegible] politic, which is no longer for him an abstraction, but his ow[illegible] concrete life. The true self is a noble life in a great city. Th[illegible] terms κάλλιον and θειότερον are applied with technical correctness to this life, which is, in the highest degree, one of definite order and form. The term καλόν, as we have seen, is applied where there is μέγεθος καὶ τάξις (*Poet.* 7. 1450 b. 3); and the term θεῖον marks the εἶδος which φύσις, whether in the natural or in the moral world, strives to perfect, by purifying from the influence of ὕλη. Θεός is pure form without matter (see *Met.* Λ. 7, and, for the expression ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως *De Interp.* 13. 23 a. 23.); φύσις is a principle which, by producing ever more and more definite forms (εἴδη), strives to approach the ideal of the divine immaterial form. Plants and animals, which perpetuate their species (εἴδη) in young individuals unaffected by the decay of age, are thus said to strive after τὸ θεῖον in so doing: *De Anima*, ii. 4. 415 a. 24 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν . . . τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύνανται. *Oeconom.* i. 3. 1343 b. 23 ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταύτῃ τῇ περιόδῳ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι· ἐπεὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος· οὕτω προφκονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου ἑκατέρου ἡ φύσις τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν. Similarly, in following pleasure, which is the symbol of functions tending towards the good of the organism, all animals follow a divine instinct: *E. N.* vii. 13. 6. 1153 b. 30 οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες· ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Τὸ θεῖον, then, being the principle of *form*, or *organisation*, in plants and animals, it is easy to understand how, apart from any special motive to use an ornate epithet, νοῦς should be described as θεῖος, as in *E. N.* x. 7. 8, and many other places. Νοῦς is the principle of form and order in man, *qua* man; the faculty whereby he abstracts his attention from the separate presentations, as such, of sense and feeling, and regards the relations in which the presentations stand to one another in an orderly system of science or life. To be able to *identify oneself* with such an orderly system may well be characterised as καλόν and θεῖον. The identification of νοῦς and τὸ νοητόν is a doctrine of the

greatest importance in Aristotle's philosophy, enabling him to reconcile the opposition (which Grant finds so conspicuous in his system: see Grant's *Ethics*, vol. i. pp. 412–413) between 'the end for the state' and 'the absolute worth of the individual consciousness.' Only that 'individual (*sc.* human) consciousness' has 'absolute worth' which has for its object, and identifies itself with, 'the end for the state.' The true self is the consciousness of social duty. 'Ημῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ (*sc.* θεῷ) αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν (*E. E.* H. 12. 1245 b. 18.). 1094 b. 7.

The Paraphrast shows little appreciation of the philosophical import of the passage: he says ἔστι μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διασῶσαι ἀγαπητὸν (ἄν τε ἐν ἑτέρῳ τις, ἄν τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δυνηθῇ φυλάξαι·) κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν, ὅσον ἡ τῶν πολλῶν εὐδαιμονία τῆς ἑνὸς ἀμείνων ἐστίν.

ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν] The Hellenic race with its various states as distinguished from non-Hellenic races is doubtless foremost in Aristotle's mind here. b. 10.

ἡ μέθοδος] 'This enquiry.' b. 11.

πολιτική τις οὖσα] Michelet says, 'τις nihil aliud indicat, nisi quod praeter moralem sint adhuc aliae scientiae quae politicae subjiciantur, ut οἰκονομική. Inferiores scientiae autem a nobiliore cui subjectae sunt denominantur.' Perhaps it is better to avoid committing Aristotle to the view that 'moral philosophy' falls under 'political philosophy' as species under genus. He can hardly be said to distinguish the two.

CHAPTER III.

Argument.

Our Subject then is the Chief Good, our Science a kind of Statesmanship.

Exactness of scientific treatment, it must be premised, depends on subject-matter. Some subjects do not admit of being treated very exactly, just as some materials do not lend themselves to very fine workmanship. Now, the science of society is not an exact science, because its subject-matter, Conduct, is a very complex one—indeed so full of inconsistencies and perplexities, that to some people it seems an arbitrary system, without foundation in the nature of things. On such a subject, then, we shall be satisfied with rough indications of the truth; with probable conclusions from probable premisses: with which the 'educated' reader will also be satisfied; for the educated man looks always in a science for that degree of exactness of which its subject-matter admits: he does not allow a mathematician to give him merely probable conclusions, or demand strict demonstration from an orator.

1094 b. 12. *A man may be 'educated' in some particular branch, or in the general sense of the term. In either case, he is a 'good judge,' as far as his education extends. Ethics is a practical as well as a theoretical study of the science of society. He is not a 'good judge' of doctrines belonging to a subject—the conduct of life—of which he has no real experience: moreover, he is so prone to be led astray by his feelings that doctrines have no influence over his conduct: and it is influence on conduct, not acquisition of doctrines, that is the raison d'être of our Science. What has been said regarding the youthful in years is true also of the youthful in character. There are men who at mature age still live under the rule of their passions. Their knowledge does such men no good. But if a man rules desires aright, and acts according to the dictates of his reason, knowledge of tracks of our Science will be of great use to him.*

This chapter is devoted to the logical method of Ethics,—a sub which is taken up again in ch. iv. §§ 5–7, and in ch. vii. §§ 17–2

b. 12. § 1. ὑποκειμένην ὕλην] The ὑποκειμένη ὕλη is the matter, distinguished from the form. See *Met.* Z. 3. 1029 a. 3 λέγω δὲ μὲν ὕλην, οἷον τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφὴν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἰδέας· τὸ δ τούτων τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸ σύνολον. This ὕλη (sometimes called ὑποκείμενον) is, in itself, formless, and therefore not an objec knowledge; see *De Coelo*, iii. 8. 306 b. 17 ἀειδὲς καὶ ἄμορφον τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι, and *Met.* Z. 10. 1036 a. 8 ἡ δ' ὕλη ἄγνωστος αὐτήν. It is, however, receptive, in various degrees, of form, together with a given form, constitutes a concrete thing (τὸ σύνολ see *Met.* Δ. 4. 1015 b. 13 ἡ πρώτη φύσις καὶ κυρίως λεγομένη ἐστ οὐσία (*i. e.* τὸ ἔνυλον εἶδος, Alex.) ἡ τῶν ἐχόντων ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὑ ᾗ αὐτά· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη τῷ ταύτης δεκτικὴ εἶναι λέγεται φύσις. *Quid* recep of the forms which φύσις or τέχνη may impose upon it, ὕλη i δύναμει ἕκαστον (*Met.* N. 4. 1092 a. 4), *i. e.* the potentiality of a defi form. Cf. *Met.* Z. 7. 1032 a. 20 ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ γινόμενα ἢ φύσει ἢ τ ἔχει ὕλην· δυνατὸν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ἑκάστῳ ὕλη. Cf. *Met.* H. 2. 1043 a. 24 τί ἐστι γαλήνη; ὁμαλ θαλάττης· τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλη ἡ θάλαττα· ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ με ἡ ὁμαλότης. Cf. *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 a. 8 λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἑ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον· οἷον ὑφάντῃ μὲν ἔρια ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν.

b. 13. τὸ ἀκριβές] ὕλη being the rough material which has to be brou into shape, the finish or perfection (τὸ ἀκριβές) of the shape largely depend upon the nature of the material operated on; *e.* figure carved in wood will differ in artistic character from one in marble. The facts dealt with by a science constitute its the science being the εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις (Eustratius) of the

As various materials, wood and stone, lend themselves differently 1094 b. 13.
to the efforts of the artist who gives them shape, so various subjects of enquiry admit of different degrees of definiteness in their scientific treatment: *οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητέον τὸ ἀκριβές, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις*: *e.g.* in medical and sociological enquiries the facts which science has to reduce to order, or *λόγος*, are so numerous, and their relations to one another so complicated, that probable conclusions, *i.e.* expectations which are more or less likely to be realised, are all that we can hope to reach. We can never be sure that we have taken into consideration everything affecting a social question or a medical diagnosis. In geometry, on the other hand, the influence of *ὕλη* is reduced to a minimum. All other qualities of bodies except their spatial, diagrammatically-representable qualities are ignored by geometry; and of the diagrams, as drawn, all actual irregularities are ignored. In nature there is no such thing as a circle with all its radii absolutely equal; but geometry assumes such a circle, and its deductions are true on the assumption. The first principles of geometry are so clear to the eye in the diagrams which represent them, and the reasoning, guided at every step by the eye, is so obviously affected by nothing save these principles, that we feel sure that our conclusions 'cannot be otherwise.' Geometry is thus the type of *ἀπόδειξις*, or necessary reasoning, because it has to do with *εἴδη* as such, *i.e.* with abstractions, *τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως—τὰ ἄνευ ὕλης*; cf. *An. Post.* i. 13. 79 a. 7 *τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα περὶ εἴδη ἐστί, κ.τ.λ.* Abstractions, or pure *εἴδη* as such, from their very nature are incapable of change, change being incident to concrete things which grow and perish. The plan of a house, as such, *i.e.* the conception of certain architectural relations, is unaffected by the *γένεσις* and *φθορά* which alter a structure of bricks and mortar. Where *λόγος* is *σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειλημμένος*, there *γένεσις* and *φθορά* obtain: *τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ οἰκίᾳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ* (*Met.* Z. 15. 1039 b. 21). Cf. *Met.* Z. 8. 1033 b. 16 *φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος ἢ ὡς οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ γενομένῳ ὕλη ἔνεστι, τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε.* The *εἶδος*, as such, is *indivisible* (*Met.* Z. 8. 1034 a. 8 *ἄτομον τὸ εἶδος*): *κίνησις* and *γένεσις* belong only to *τὰ μεριστὰ καὶ μὴ ὅλα* (*E.N.* X. 4. 4. 1174 b. 11), *i.e.* to material things, or *the formations of matter*; their 'matter' being the element of divisibility, confusion, and change in them. Cf. *de Gen. et Corr.* i. 4. 320 a. 2 *ἔστι δὲ ὕλη μάλιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς δεκτικόν.* Form,

1094 b. 13. or εἶδος, then, as such, being ἀκίνητον, ἀΐδιον, and μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, constitutes the object of ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη. Geometry is the type of ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη; for, although it is impossible for man to apprehend form without a certain admixture of matter (cf. *de Memor.* 1. 449 b. 31 νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος), still, in geometry, the matter, *i. e.* the irregularity due to the actual presentation of the form, is so slight, and so easily eliminated by an effort of imagination, that Aristotle is practically justified in speaking of the objects of the science as being ἄνευ ὕλης. See *Met.* α. 3. 995 a. 14 τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτητέον, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὕλην. διόπερ οὐ φυσικὸς ὁ τρόπος· ἅπασα γὰρ ἴσως ἡ φύσις ἔχει ὕλην: and *Met.* Z. 15. 1039 b. 27 τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὔτε ὁρισμὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν, ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην, ἧς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ' ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μή. διὸ φθαρτὰ πάντα τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἥ τε ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀναγκαίων, καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐπιστημονικός, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπιστήμην ὅτε μὲν ἐπιστήμην ὅτε δ' ἄγνοιαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δόξα τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οὕτως οὐδ' ἀπόδειξιν οὐδ' ὁρισμόν, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν οὔτε ὁρισμὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξις. Cf. *Met.* K. 3. 1061 a. 28 ὁ μαθηματικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται· περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ οἷον βάρος καὶ κουφότητα, κ.τ.λ. . . . μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές. Simple spatial forms, always the same, and spatial laws or conditions, never counteracted by unforeseen influences, explain for Aristotle, as they do for Dugald Stewart (*Elements of the Phil. of the Human Mind*, Part II. ch. i and ch. ii. § 3), and J. S. Mill (*Logic*, Book II. chs. v and vi) the necessity and universality of the truths of geometry.

On κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην Eustratius has the following note: ὕλη δὲ ἐφ' ἑκάστης μεθόδου καὶ τέχνης λέγεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτῆς περὶ ὃ καταγίνεται, ὑποκείμενον δὲ τῇ ἠθικῇ καὶ πολιτικῇ τὰ ἐν βίῳ ἐστὶ πράγματα καὶ αἱ περὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράξεις τε καὶ ἐνέργειαι, ἅτινα τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐνδεχομένων εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὗ καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀποπίπτοντα. [Cf. *Phys.* iv. 9. 217 a. 22 ὕλη μία τῶν ἐναντίων.] καὶ ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ οἱ λόγοι οἱ παραδιδόντες περὶ αὐτοῦ. διὸ οὐδὲ χρὴ ἀναγκαίας τινὰς ἀποδείξεις περὶ τῶν οὕτως ἐνδεχομένων ἀπαιτεῖν· ὥσπερ γὰρ μέτρον οἱ λόγοι τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶ περὶ ὧν λέγονται, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μέτρον ἐφαρμόζον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον. οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ ἔχον ὡσαύτως τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντι ἐφαρμόζεσθαι. The Paraphrast says: οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης ὁμοίως τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς, ἅτε ἀναγκαίαν

ἔχουσιν ὕλην καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, [cf. *Met.* Δ. 24. 1023 b. 2 ἐκ 1094 b. 13.
τῆς αἰσθητῆς ὕλης ἡ σύνθετος οὐσία· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ εἴδους
ὕλης: and *Met.* Z. 10. 1036 a. 9 ὕλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή.]
ἀμεγὴς ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ οὐδὲν ἡ ὕλη κωλύει τὸ ἀκριβές· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν οἷς
τὰ ὑποκείμενα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα οὐδὲ ἀεὶ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀρκετός ἐστι λόγος ὁ ἀπὸ
τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον συνάγων.

§ 2. τὰ δὲ καλά, κ.τ.λ.] The subject-matter of moral or political b. 14.
science is right conduct,—that which men, being such as they are, ought to do, in the various circumstances in which they are placed. But the notions comprised within this sphere—*Justice*, *Temperance*, *Courage*, &c.—are constituted by relations which vary (within limits) or are 'contingent,' not 'necessary' or immutable, as are those perceived in mathematics. It would, therefore, be absurd to demand 'demonstration' in such a subject. When Locke (*Essay*, iii. 11. 16) maintained that morality might be made 'capable of demonstration as well as mathematics,' if ethical terms, such as *Justice*, were carefully defined once for all, and the definitions used as first principles, he failed to see the full import of the circumstance that there are no diagrams in morals, and to appreciate the difference between a 'mixed mode,' however carefully defined in words, and a spatial form clearly represented to the eye in a diagram. But, even were it granted that, with definitions of its 'mixed modes' as principles of deduction, moral science, notwithstanding the absence of diagrams, might be made as 'accurate' as geometry, it would still be true that such an abstract system would be practically useless, being inapplicable to the varying contingencies of life; and indeed might become positively injurious, by stereotyping the conclusions of imperfect enlightenment, and handing them down in an authoritative form to times which might be profited by a change of conduct. Moral rules must suit themselves to the varying exigencies of life (so far as they do vary), and ethics cannot be made an 'exact science' without ceasing to be a practical system. According to Aristotle, however, ethics is essentially a practical system: *E. N.* i. 3. 6 τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις: and πρᾶξις is concerned with the contingent and variable; see *E. N.* vi. 5. 3. Demonstration can be looked for only where the subject-matter is abstract, *i. e.* where it is possible, and convenient, to ignore all actual irregularities and contingencies. But in ethics it would be as absurd to ignore the irregularities and contingencies in circumstances and

1094b.14. conduct, as in the art of navigation to ignore the variations of weather. A science which is concerned with things as they pre themselves concretely in nature can never attain to exacti ἅπασα γὰρ ἴσως ἡ φύσις ἔχει ὕλην *Met.* α. 3. 995 b. 17.

Yet, although *Right* and *Wrong* are not abstract and immu εἴδη like the principles of geometry, they are not the arbi creations of mere convention (νόμῳ), but have a definite natur their own (φύσει). There are certain actions which, except u the most extraordinary circumstances, must be performed there are certain which must be avoided by all men, if hu society is to maintain itself. We must not be misled by conc able exceptions, or by the numerous cases of actions which do involve the very existence of human society, and therefore w be indifferent but for fashion or some local and temporary uti into supposing that *all* actions are indifferent. Man's nature i a certain kind on the whole, and his circumstances are of a cer kind on the whole; and if he does not act in a certain way on whole he will perish. This is the φύσις in the distinction betw right and wrong. There is a 'natural' distinction between and wrong as there is between food and poison [1].

The question as to whether the δίκαιον exists φύσει or νόμ a prominent one in the history of Greek ethical speculation. fully discussed by the writer of the fifth book of the *Ethics* (ch. and the *Theaetetus* of Plato is chiefly devoted to it. Protag we are told in the *Theaetetus*, maintained that 'man is the mea of all things,'—that is, that things *are* what they *seem to him*. 'man' Protagoras did not understand 'the human faculties as s but 'every individual man for himself.' *Theaet.* 152 A φησί που [ὁ Πρωταγόρας] πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.· ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που; Θεαιτ. νωκα καὶ πολλάκις. Σω. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπ σύ τε κἀγώ; Θεαιτ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. Hence nothing has a na or essence of its own, but exists only in relation to the mind w happens to perceive it: *Theaet.* 157 A οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον. Hence (*Th*

[1] Cf. *Rhet.* i. 1. 1355 a. 20 χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διά τε τὸ φύσει κρείττω τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκ κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι . . . 37 ἀεὶ τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

167 C) *οἷά γ' ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ* 1094 b.14.
ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ: and (*Theaet.* 172 A) *οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι . . .* (B) *ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον.* This view, which was obviously fitted to recommend itself to professional teachers of rhetoric or the art of 'getting on,' seems to have been held by many of the sophists, as also by the Cyrenaics (*e.g.* Theodorus; see Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil. Theodorus*), and, after Aristotle's time, by the Epicureans. For a criticism of the view *νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή*, see Cudworth's *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, Books II and III.

§ 3. **καὶ τἀγαθά**]. 'Good things' also, as well as *τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ* b. 17.
δίκαια, are of a mutable nature, and cause many perplexities. The Paraph. has—*οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐξ ὧν δοκεῖ συνίστασθαι ἡ εὐδαιμονία (ἀνδρείαν λέγω ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι) καὶ αὐτὰ ἔχει πλάνην πολλήν, κ.τ.λ.* Although this section is thus primarily a statement about *τἀγαθά*, it may perhaps be regarded also as conveying, by its position, a refutation of the immediately preceding *νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι φύσει δὲ μή*. 'The argument from variability proves too much, viz. that good things *also*, such as wealth, have no quality of goodness in themselves independently of opinion and fashion. If right and wrong are indifferent, then riches and poverty are also.' Rassow conjectures *φιλίαν* for *ἀνδρείαν* (*Forsch.* p. 88). He says, 'Dass die Tapferkeit unter die *ἀγαθά* gerechnet wird, und nicht unter die *καλὰ καὶ δίκαια*, steht in auffälligstem Widerspruch mit den Grundanschauungen und dem Sprachgebrauche der Ethik. Der Scholiast [Eustratius] nimmt *ἀνδρεία* in der Bedeutung von *ἰσχύς*, aber diese Aushülfe ist unzulässig [the *Index Arist.* gives no instance of *ἀνδρεία*=*ἰσχύς*]. Ich vermuthe daher: *διὰ φιλίαν* Vgl. 9. p. 1099 a. 31 *φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως.*' The assumption which underlies Rassow's objection to *ἀνδρείαν* seems to be that *τἀγαθά* here, as distinguished from *τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια*, must be *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά*. I confess that I cannot see why Aristotle

1094 b. 17. should not be allowed, even immediately after the mention of τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, to take τἀγαθά in its generic sense, and, having given πλοῦτος as an instance of τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά, to add ἀνδρεία as an instance of τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ (see *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 26); cf. Eustratius, εἰ δὲ τὴν κυρίως ἀνδρείαν (as distinguished from ἰσχύς: Eustratius is here offering an alternative explanation for the ἀνδρεία=ἰσχύς explanation which he seems to favour), ἐρεῖς ὅτι ἐν πρὸς ἐν ἀντίθεμα, πρός τι τῶν θυραίων καὶ ἔξωθεν, ἐν τῶν ἐντὸς καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν.

b. 19. § 4. περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων] A common Aristotelian expression, περὶ τοιούτων referring to the matter of the enquiry, and ἐκ τοιούτων to the principles available for the establishment of scientific conclusions relating to this matter. See *Rhet.* ii. 1. 1377 b. 16, quoted by Zell—ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις ταῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ γὰρ τούτων (*i. e.* τὸ προτρέπειν κ.τ.λ.) καὶ ἐκ τούτων (*i. e.* αἱ δόξαι καὶ αἱ προτάσεις) τὰ ἐνθυμήματα. Cf. *Top.* i. 8. 103 b. 39 περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτά ἐστι: *de Part. Anim.* i. 5. 644 b. 23, sqq. συμβέβηκε δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐκείνας (*i. e.* τὰς ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους οὐσίας) τιμίας οὔσας καὶ θείας ἐλάττους ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν θεωρίας (καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι ποθοῦμεν, παντελῶς ἐστὶν ὀλίγα τὰ φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν κ. τ. λ. Cf. *Hist. Anim.* i. 6. 491 a. 13 περὶ ὧν τε γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἐκ τούτων γίνεται φανερόν. Add to these examples given by Zell, *E. N.* i. 3. 5 οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. *E. N.* vi. 11. 6 ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων.

In *Anal. Post.* i. 7. 75 a. 39, sqq. Aristotle says—τρία γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἓν μὲν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον συμπέρασμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον γένει τινὶ καθ' αὑτό· ἓν δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα· ἀξιώματα δέ ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν· τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὗ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοῖ ἡ ἀπόδειξις: and *An. Post.* i. 10. 76 b. 11 πᾶσα γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τρία ἐστίν, ὅσα τε εἶναι τίθεται· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γένος οὗ τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ παθημάτων ἐστὶ θεωρητική· καὶ τὰ κοινὰ ἃ λέγομεν ἀξιώματα, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων ἀποδεικνύουσι· καὶ τρίτον τὰ πάθη ὧν τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον λαμβάνει:—and in the same chapter, 76 b. 22 τρία ταῦτά ἐστι, περὶ ὅ τε δείκνυσι, καὶ ἃ δείκνυσι, καὶ ἐξ ὧν. On the passage 75 a. 39, sqq. Themistius (vol. i. p. 28, ed. Spengel) writes—τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, ἓν μὲν ὃ δείκνυται ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἓν δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα ἐξ ὧν δείκνυται,

αὗται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ προτάσεις ἐκ τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ ὑπαρχόντων, τρίτον δὲ τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἡ φύσις ἧς τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα δεικνύουσιν αἱ ἀποδείξεις, οἷον ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέγεθος: and on 76 b. 11 he writes (i. 36 Spengel) *τρία ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἑκάστη πραγματεύεται ἐπιστήμη, τό τε ὑποκείμενον γένος οἷον ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέγεθος, καὶ τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τούτῳ, οἷον τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν, ἢ τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν, ἢ τὸ συμπίπτειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰ ἀξιώματα, οἷον ἐὰν ἴσα ἀπὸ ἴσων.* It is to be noted that the analysis given in these passages (*An. Post.* 75 a. 39—76 b. 22) is introduced in order to expose the illogical procedure of applying the principles and method of one subject (γένος) to the explanation of another subject—75 a. 38 *οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάντα δεῖξαι, οἷον τὸ γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητικῇ· τρία γάρ ἐστι κ.τ.λ.* The conclusions (ἃ δείκνυσι) of a given science are proved within the sphere of its own subject matter (περὶ ὃ δείκνυσι, γένος), by means of certain formal principles (ἐξ ὧν), available within that sphere. The expression *περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων* evidently contains a reference to this analysis, *περὶ τοιούτων* relating to the γένος or ὑποκειμένη ὕλη of moral science, viz. *τὰ πρακτά*, and *ἐκ τοιούτων* to the principles available in such an enquiry. We must remember that these principles do not resemble either the axioms or the definitions of geometry, which are 'eternal and immutable,' but rather embody 'tendencies.'

1094 b. 19.

ἐνδείκνυσθαι] Eustratius has—*ἀπόδειξις μὲν καθαρῶς καὶ βεβαίως τὸ ζητούμενον παριστᾷ, ἔνδειξις δὲ διά τινων ἐκτυπώσεων καὶ μιμήσεων καὶ ἐμφάσεων.* According to the *Ind. Arist.* Aristotle does not use the verb elsewhere, and nowhere uses the noun (ἔνδειξις). In Athenian law *ἐνδεικνύναι* means 'to inform against, lay an ἔνδειξις against' anyone for illegal conduct. Cf. Plato, *Apol.* 32 B *καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων.* The 'probable' nature of the evidence upon which an ἔνδειξις relied may have suggested to Aristotle the employment of *ἐνδείκνυσθαι* in the present connexion. The author of the *ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον* 38. 1445 b. 8, speaking of the ἐξεταστικὸν εἶδος, uses the verb with what certainly seems to be a reference to its legal use—*ἐφεξῆς ἕκαστον προτιθέμενοι τῶν ῥηθέντων ἢ πραχθέντων ἢ διανοηθέντων ἐξετάσομεν, ἐνδεικνύντες αὐτὰ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ τοῖς νομίμοις καὶ τοῖς ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ συμφέρουσιν ἐναντιούμενα.* At any rate, in the present passage *ἐνδείκνυσθαι* may be rendered by 'indicate' (as distinguished from 'demonstrate'—*ἀποδεικνύναι*).

b. 20.

τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] That which generally takes place. It is distinguished from *τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης* on the one hand, and *τὸ*

b. 21.

1094 b. 21. *συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ τυχόν* on the other hand, see *Met.* K. 8. 10
b. 32, sqq. *Πᾶν δή φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης* [*e.g.* t
angles of a triangle are = 2 right angles], *τὸ δ' ὡς ἐπ τὸ πο*
[*e.g.* perseverance is rewarded by success], *τὸ δ' οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πο*
οὔτ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν [*e.g.* when a man digging l
vineyard, finds a treasure] . . . *ἔστι δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὃ γίγνεται μ*
οὐκ ἀεὶ οὐδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐδ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. Cf. also *Topics* ii. 6. 11
b. 1 *τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ*
ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν. Hence Deliberation is concerned with *τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ*
πολύ, for *τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης* and *τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης* are equally removed from t
sphere of man's influence: *E. N.* iii. 3. 10 *τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τ*
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον: and c
§§ 1–9 of the same chapter. In *E. N.* v. 10. 4 *τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον*
used in the same sense as *τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.* On the distinctio
between *ἐπὶ πολύ* (= far) and *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ* (both *ὡς* and the artic
with *πολύ* are essential to the expression) see Eucken, *Über d*
Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles (1868), p. 55, sqq. Thuc. (ii. 1
has *θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε προσιόντων μὲν ἑξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πο*
φόρου κατ' ἐνιαυτόν: and Isocrates *περὶ εἰρήνης* 166. b *καὶ ταῦτ' εἰ*
κατὰ πάντων οὕτως εἴθισται συμβαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τό γ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ
γίγνεται τὸν τρόπον. A fragment apud Meineke *Fragm. Com.* v
iii. 469 has *ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ πολλὰ τοῦτο ποιῶ.*

b. 22. **τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι**] From probable premisses only p
bable conclusions (*συμπεράσματα*) can be drawn; cf. *E. N.* vi. 5
εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔ
τούτων μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις (*πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν*) *κ.τ.λ.*

τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομέν
The Paraphrast gives the right sense,—*ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ περὶ τῆς πολιτ*
λέγων οὐ δύναται ἀκριβεστέραν ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν ἢ ὅσην ἡ ὕλη δίδωσιν, ο
καὶ ὁ κρίνων τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους καλῶς ἂν κρίνοι εἰ κατὰ τὸν αὐ
τρόπον μὴ ἀκριβεστέραν ἀλήθειαν ἀπαιτεῖ ἢ ὅσην ἡ ὕλη δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ
ἐνδεχομένην ἀποδέχεται. For *ἀποδέχεσθαι* in its present meaning
'accipere cum assensu, probare,' see *Index Arist.* Peters bri
out the point of the remark well—'The reader, on his part, sho
take each of my statements in the same spirit.'

b. 23. **πεπαιδευμένου**] The *πεπαιδευμένος* is the man whose cult
(*παιδεία*), whether special or general, enables him to criticise a
estimate fairly scientific methods and results. His familiarity w
the general principles of the 'logic of the sciences' leads him

expect differences of treatment, as the ὑποκειμένη ὕλη differs in various departments; and his acquaintance with the precise character of the ὕλη of a given department, aided by his knowledge of logic, enables him to judge whether a certain method of dealing with that ὕλη is appropriate or inappropriate. See *E. E.* 1. 6. 1217 a. 8 ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἐστι περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τούς τ' οἰκείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους: *Met.* Γ. 4. 1006 a. 6 ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ· ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. Cf. *Met.* Γ. 3. 1005 b. 3 ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη· ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἥκειν προεπισταμένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν. With this last passage cf. Aristoxenus, *Harmonica* p. 30 (ed. Marquard)—βέλτιον ἴσως ἐστὶ τὸ προδιελεῖν τὸν τρόπον τῆς πραγματείας τίς τυν' ἐστίν, ἵνα προγιγνώσκοντες ὥσπερ ὁδὸν ἢ βαδιστέον ῥᾴδιον πορευώμεθα εἰδότες τε κατὰ τί μέρος ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς καὶ μὴ λάθωμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παρυποληφθέντες τὸ πρᾶγμα· καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀεὶ διηγεῖτο τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀκουσάντων παρὰ Πλάτωνος τὴν περὶ τἀγαθοῦ ἀκρόασιν παθεῖν· προσάντει μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ὑπολαμβάνοντα λήψεσθαί τι τῶν νομιζομένων τούτων ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν οἷον πλοῦτον ὑγίειαν ἰσχὺν τὸ ὅλον εὐδαιμονίαν τινὰ θαυμαστήν· ὅτε δὲ φανείησαν οἱ λόγοι περὶ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας, καὶ τὸ πέρας ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἕν, παντελῶς οἶμαι παράδοξόν τι ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς· εἶθ' οἱ μὲν ὑποκατεφρόνουν τοῦ πράγματος, οἱ δὲ κατεμέμφοντο. τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον; οὐ προῄδεσαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἐριστικοὶ πρὸς τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποκεχηνότες προσῄεσαν· εἰ δέ γέ τις οἶμαι προεξετίθει τὸ ὅλον, ἐπεγίνωσκεν ἂν ὁ μέλλων ἀκούειν καὶ ἅπερ ἤρεσκεν αὐτῷ διέμενεν ἂν ἐν τῇ εἰλημμένῃ ὑπολήψει. Προέλεγε μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης δι' αὐτὰς ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας, ὡς ἔφην, τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἀκροᾶσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, περὶ τίνων τ' ἐστὶν ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τίς. Cf. *Met.* α. 3. 995 a. 6 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικῶς λέγῃ τις οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τῶν λεγόντων· οἱ δ' ἂν μὴ παραδειγματικῶς· οἱ δὲ μάρτυρα ἀξιοῦσιν ἐπάγεσθαι ποιητήν· καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβῶς, τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν [*i.e.* the minuteness of such enquiries, which seems to them tedious], ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον· ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναί τισι δοκεῖ· διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον. Cf. *de Part. Anim.* i. 1. 639 a. 1 περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν, τε καὶ μέθοδον ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγο-

1094 b.23.

1094 b.23. ρεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδείαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων· τοιοῦτον γὰρ δή τινα καὶ τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον οἰόμεθ' εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. πλὴν τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικόν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ περί τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἄν τις ἕτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακείμενος περὶ μόριον· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινὰς ὑπάρχειν ὅρους τοιούτους πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέρων ἀποδέξεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τἀληθὲς εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως. In the last passage ὁ ὅλως πεπαιδευμένος (cf. ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος of the *Ethics*) is one who is remarkable for his grasp of the general principles of logical method, and for his delicate appreciation of the applicability to various subjects of the notions defined in a work like the *Metaphysics*; while ὁ περί τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης (cf. ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον πεπαιδευμένος of the *Ethics*) is one who is distinguished for his appreciation of the method proper to a particular department, of the details of which he happens to have special knowledge, although his knowledge may be that of the *amateur*, as distinguished from the expert—a point made plain in *Pol.* iii. 11. 1282 a. 1 ὥσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις· ἰατρὸς δ' ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γάρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας· ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσιν. But, after all, the περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος and the καθ' ἕκαστον πεπ. are not so much separate persons as personifications of two elements in παιδεία. A man cannot show special παιδεία in a particular department with the details of which he has at least an amateur's acquaintance, without possessing a certain amount of the general παιδεία which consists in knowledge of the principles of logic as they apply in other departments; nor, on the other hand, can a man be said to realise the true meaning of these principles unless he has applied them for himself in a particular enquiry. Naturally, however, critics of science differ according as they present the one or the other of these two elements of the critical habit with the greater prominence. The difficulty raised by Eustratius regarding the *possibility* of ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος, 'the man who knows everything,' is thus irrelevant. Aristotle does not imagine the existence of a man who knows the details of all the sciences, as well as each specialist knows the details of his own department. The περὶ πᾶν

περ. is, as has been just said, the man who is familiar with the 1094 b.23.
logic of the sciences, and the notions more or less applicable in all departments; who brings, in short, to his criticism of the method of a given enquiry familiarity with the doctrines of the *Organon* and the *Metaphysics*; his habit realising the requirements of παιδεία specified by Alexander on *Met.* 995 a. 6 (p. 126 ed. Bonitz) δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς ἐγγυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τοῖς λογικοῖς ὅλως, καὶ εἰδέναι τοὺς τρόπους τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων συναγωγάς. In many respects the distinction between the περὶ πᾶν περ. and the καθ' ἕκαστον περ. is the same as that marked by the terms λογικῶς and φυσικῶς respectively, on which see *Phys.* iii. 5. 204 b. 4–10 λογικῶς [κοινῶς τε καὶ οὐ φυσικῶς, Themistius *ad loc.*] μὲν οὖν σκοπουμένοις . . . φυσικῶς δὲ μᾶλλον θεωροῦσιν κ.τ.λ., *i.e.* looking at the subject (1) in the light of the general formal conceptions which dominate all science, and (2) more concretely, in connexion with its own special proximate principles; cf. *Phys.* viii. 8. 264 a. 7 εἰς μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ὡς οἰκείοις λόγοις πιστεύσειεν οὗτοι καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσιν· λογικῶς δὲ ἐπισκοποῦσι κ.τ.λ. It will evidently be one of the most important functions of παιδεία to see that each of the two points of view—the formal (λογικῶς) and the concrete (φυσικῶς)—has its proper place assigned to it in a given enquiry, according as that place is determined by the nature of the ὑποκειμένη ὕλη. On the πεπαιδευμένος see the excellent notes of Michelet and Grant, to which I am largely indebted.

γένος] 'is with Aristotle the object of a single science: μία b. 25.
ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἑνὸς γένους (*An. Post.* i. 28 [87 a. 38]). Cf. the whole of *Met.* ii. 3,' Grant. See also *Met.* Δ. 6. 1016 a. 26 for the identification of the γένος with the ὕλη.

μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι] Taken from Plato, b. 26.
Theaet. 162 E, as Zell and Grant point out—ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδ' ἑνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίᾳ τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένους λόγους. Ἀποδέχεσθαι takes the gen. of the person, like ἀκούω, generally, however, with a participle such as λέγοντος, εἰπόντος. See *Liddell and Scott*, s. v.

ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν] The orator uses ἐνθυμήματα (*Rhet.* b. 27.
i. 1. 1355 a. 6) which are arguments ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων (*Rhet.* i. 2. 1357 a. 32).

1095 a. 1. § 5. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος] καθ' ἕκαστον must be supplied after ὁ, and κρίνει καλῶς understood from the preceding sentence. Coraes reads in his text ἀγαθὸς κριτής. Ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον πεπαιδευμένος· ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος, a reading supported by the version of Aretinus, *singula igitur is qui in singulis*. The μέν inserted after καθ' ἕκαστον by Bywater, is given by M^b, rc H^a and pr K^b.

ἁπλῶς] means 'simply,' 'without qualification' (distinguished from κατὰ πρόσθεσιν *E. N.* vii. 4. 3), 'universally.'

a. 2. διὸ . . . περὶ τούτων] Whatever his proficiency in logic, as such, may be, the youth is deficient in the other element of παιδεία, viz. special acquaintance with the material details of moral science, should he pose as a critic or connoisseur of it. The matter of moral science is life, with its circumstances and actions, of which he has as yet no sufficient experience. On account of his ignorance of life he will be likely to regard ethical problems as being more simple than they really are. His ignorance of the moral ὕλη will be practically tantamount to a denial of its existence. He will treat Ethics as if it were an abstract science like geometry. He will apply a few hastily assumed and arbitrarily defined principles to circumstances of all kinds. The author of the Sixth Book of the *Nic. Ethics* (ch. 8, §§ 5, 6) remarks that boys may succeed in mathematics, because the abstractions of that science (τὰ δι' ἀφαιρέσεως) do not need much experience for their acquirement; but that they do not show prudence, and are unfit students of natural science, because experience produces prudence, and the principles of natural science are not easily apprehended spatial relations, but generalisations, the results of long and careful inductive enquiries. *E. N.* vi. 8. 1142 a. 12 γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; As a critic of moral science, then, the youth will demand more elegance and exactness than the ὕλη (of which he is ignorant) admits. Geometry will supply him with his conception of what moral science ought to be. Not realising the endless

complexity of every moral and social question, he will admire a system in proportion to the 'lucidity' with which it pushes a few 'clear ideas' to their logical issues. Cf. in this connexion Mill's *Logic*, book vi. ch. 8, on the 'geometrical method' of reasoning in morals and politics. 1095 a. 2.

ἀκροατής] Michelet says 'Cum auditore, non cum lectore rem habet Aristoteles. Illa igitur vox luce clarius facit hoc opus Aristotelis, ut pleraque, ex praelectionibus in Lycaeo habitis ortum, ab ipso Aristotele vel etiam a proximis ejus discipulis hunc in ordinem redactum atque editum esse quem hodie servat.' It seems better to suppose that the *critical function* of the πεπαιδευμένος has suggested the word ἀκροατής, it being customary for Aristotle to think of κρίσις as the function of listeners (in the law courts or elsewhere) who follow a speech intelligently; see *E. N.* vi. 10. 2 ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον, and vi. 10. 3 ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς [ἔστιν ἡ σύνεσις]. Cf. *Philemon* apud Meineke *Fragm. Com.* iv. 46 χαλεπόν γ' ἀκροατὴς ἀσύνετος καθήμενος, | ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀνοίας οὐχ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται.

§ 6. ἔτι . . . πρᾶξις] Not only is the youth too inexperienced in the difficulties of life to appreciate a science attempting to deal with them, but even such knowledge of the principles and rules of conduct as may reach his understanding will be practically useless to him, because he allows his passions rather than his knowledge to determine his actions. This circumstance—that his knowledge will be practically useless to him, is conclusive against the attempt to impart it, the end of the science of life (πολιτική) being conduct and not mere knowledge. It is one of the most distinctive points in Aristotle's ethical teaching—that it is useless to address the understanding (λόγος) until the passions (πάθη) have been brought into order. So long as a youth is passionately fond of a certain course of conduct, it is vain to tell him that it is *wrong*. He will not understand what you mean; he will only feel that the course of conduct styled wrong is *pleasant*. *Right* and *wrong* have definite meaning only for one who is detached from the sway of his passing passions, and can regard them, and their objects, coolly in relation to life conceived as an organic whole. 'Affectus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio, simulatque ejus claram et distinctam formamus ideam.' (Spinoza, *Eth.* v. 3.) When the passions a. 4.

1095 a. 4. and desires have been *organised*, as it were, by the moral training which the state supplies, *i. e.* when λόγος, or proportion, has been thus effected among them, then the time has come to appeal to the consciousness of this λόγος which has now dawned in the man's mind, and to instruct him in the *rationale* of that conduct to which he has been imperceptibly habituated by influences operating from without upon his sensibility to pleasure and pain. Cf. *E. N.* ii. 3. 2 διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. When he has come to *like*, and *habitually do* what his moral instructors think *right*, then, but not till then, it will be useful to explain to him *how* and *why* it is right. The λόγος, or moral understanding appealed to by a theory of Ethics, does not come into existence till the desires have been reduced by moral training to λόγος, or order. The youth who acts κατὰ πάθος—on the stimulus of present feeling, cannot realise the truths of ethical science, which are recognised as such only by the calm survey of the man in whom the λόγος or moral order is assured. The youth, like the ἀκρατής, may possess a precarious λόγος—a fine system of generous aspirations and good intentions, in relation to which moral truths may have some sort of vague meaning for him in his calmer moments; but this λόγος, and the vague γνῶσις which it renders possible, cannot withstand the assault of πάθος: τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν (§ 7)—'their knowledge, such as it is, turns out profitless for them.' The ἀκρατής or 'incontinent man' knows (after a fashion) that it is wrong to yield to πάθος, but nevertheless yields. He possesses a λόγος which opposes itself unsuccessfully to ἐπιθυμία (see *E. N.* i. 13, §§ 15, 16, and vii. 3)—not the λόγος which amounts to φρόνησις (for that resists ἐπιθυμία successfully), but merely the faculty of posing dramatically, as a temperate man, in his intervals of reflection: see *E. N.* vii. 3. 8 τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὔπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑπολητπέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους.

To sum up—The νέος is an incapable student and critic of moral philosophy, because he is unacquainted with the facts, a knowledge of which it presupposes. His ignorance is due (1) to the short time he has lived, (2) to the strength of his passions,

which do not allow him to see even the facts, which he has had opportunities of observing, in their true light—*i. e.* as involving the distinction of *right* and *wrong*, rather than that of *pleasant* and *unpleasant*. He has not yet acquired the faculty by which the truths of moral philosophy can be apprehended, viz. the λόγος which neglects the pleasure or pain of the present, and regards the relation in which the pleasant or painful action stands to the whole life. Such knowledge of moral philosophy as the νέος acquires is but ear and lip knowledge, of no influence upon his conduct. The moral faculty (λόγος) must be evolved as the result of the right ordering of his ὀρέξεις by moral training, before it becomes profitable for him to study the theory of morals. If the end were merely to construct a speculative system, perhaps a youth might be able to appreciate such a system, as he appreciates the elements of geometry; but conduct is the end; and conduct requires knowledge of the perplexities of life, and a settled character directed towards a high ideal. 1095 a. 4.

§ 7. τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.] To the man of settled moral character a knowledge of the principles of moral philosophy will be very useful, just as a clear and methodical statement of the principles hitherto unconsciously followed is always useful to the artist or enquirer of practical experience. The Logic of a science is of very little use to one beginning the science; but may prove an invaluable guide to the experienced enquirer. A 'critique' may be meaningless to one who has not studied the picture or statue carefully for himself: but may become instructive after he has done so. Moral philosophy is useless to one who has no experience of life, and no faculty to discriminate between right and wrong, only a feeling for what is immediately pleasant or painful. Some of the Sophists, Aristotle says, (*E. N.* x. 9. 20), thought that it would be easy to legislate by making a collection of the most approved laws in existence, and selecting the best of them—as if the selection of the best required no judgment—as if the whole difficulty did not lie in judging correctly, as in music all depends upon the musical ear. Similarly (*E. N.* x. 9. 21), medical reports are useless to non-professional readers, but useful to men of professional experience. a. 10.

The description of the πεπαιδευμένος given by Isocrates (*Pana-*

1095 a. 10. *thenaicos* 239), although differing from that given by Aristotle not involving a technical specialisation of the term, is interest as bringing into clear light the combination of experience : ethical moderation which Aristotle regards as essential to πα in relation to the science of πολιτική. *Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμέ ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω; πρ μὲν τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκά προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν εὐτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένη ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος· ἔπειτα τοὺς πρεπόντως καὶ δι ὁμιλοῦντας τοῖς ἀεὶ πλησιάζουσι, καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτ εὐκόλως καὶ ῥᾳδίως φέροντας, σφᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς ὡς δυνατὸν ἐλαφροτάτους μετριωτάτους τοῖς συνοῦσι παρέχοντας· ἔτι τοὺς τῶν μὲν ἡδονῶν ἀεὶ τοῦντας, τῶν δὲ συμφορῶν μὴ λίαν ἡττωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀνδρωδῶς ἐν αὐ διακειμένους καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀξίως ἧς μετέχοντες τυγχάνομεν· τέταρ ὅπερ μέγιστον, τοὺς μὴ διαφθειρομένους ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγιῶν μηδ' ἐξα μένους αὐτῶν μηδ' ὑπερηφάνους γιγνομένους ἀλλ' ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξε τῶν εὖ φρονούντων, καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον χαίροντας τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρξ ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν φύσιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομέ* The *πεπαιδευμένος* is thus described by Isocrates as the man experience and moderation, who knows how to deal with circumstances of life as they occur. In the *Ethics* the *πεπαιδευ* is the *critic* of the science of life. But it is only the man of world described by Isocrates, who fulfils the conditions, moral intellectual, which Aristotle regards as essential to *παιδεία* (in technical sense of the term), when it is engaged in the cri estimation of *πολιτική*. It is only the man of experience moderation who can know what is meant by right and wrong. the man of experience and moderation knows how to live, l also the only competent critic of the science of life. His cri faculty, like his practical judgment, has become an instinct in See *E. N.* vi. 11. 6 *ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδεί διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς.*

The ethical and political doctrines of Aristotle are thus, we *φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσι*: hence the difficulty which we, at our dist from the ancient Greek life, experience in the study of them.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

What then is the Chief Good which is the object of our Science? Most people, cultivated and uncultivated, agree as to its name and call it Happiness: *but here the agreement ends; for some make Happiness consist in Pleasure, others in Wealth, others in Social Recognition; and often a man's view of it changes with his circumstances,* e. g. *when he falls sick, he thinks that it is Health, and when he is poor, that it is Wealth. Others again, conscious of their own ignorance, identify it with the Wisdom and Learning which they admire from afar: lastly, it has been held to be Something by Itself, apart from all particular good things, but the cause of their being good. It would take too long to examine all these views: it will be enough to notice those which have the greatest vogue, or most to say for themselves as theories of Life.*

But before we begin an examination of these views, and thereafter attempt to set forth a view of our own, it is important that we should be clear about the method proper to the Science of the Chief Good. Where ought the enquiry to begin? With general principles? or with particular facts? Evidently with something known: but when we say 'known', we may mean either *known in the strict acceptation of the term, known for what it is,* i.e. *known scientifically as a general principle is known;* or *known from our point of view,* i.e. *known as a particular fact presented to the senses. It is with the 'known' in the latter acceptation that our present enquiry must begin. This is why it is so important that the student of the science of conduct should bring to his study of the subject a good moral character. Without this, he cannot 'know' the elementary facts with which his study must begin,* i.e. *cannot understand a teacher who begins by pointing to certain concrete examples of Virtue or Vice, or by quoting certain popular sayings, or by taking for granted that this thing is wrong and that thing right. Indeed this elementary 'knowledge' is so important in itself that it does not matter much if the average man never proceed from it to the knowledge of principles, or of the reason why.*

§ 1. **πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις**] 'The original four terms τέχνη, μέθοδος, πρᾶξις, προαίρεσις are here reduced to two.' Grant. 1095 a.14.

Γνῶσις has for its object, or 'good,' the reduction of the data of experience to form, law, or theory; προαίρεσις aims at the preservation of the moral organism amid the dangers to which it is exposed in its environment.

1095 a. 18. § 2. εὐδαιμονίαν] It is Aristotle's object, in the *Ethics*, to give a new meaning to this accepted term. The popular view regarded 'Happiness' as consisting in the favour of Heaven and Fortune, and in the multitude of a man's possessions. Aristotle shows that it consists, not in what a man *has* or *receives*, but in what he *is* and *does*. It is an active function (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς), not a condition of passivity. It is 'noble living'—τὸ εὖ ζῆν in the active sense. Cf. the remarkable fragment of Aristotle preserved by Stobaeus, *Flor.* Γ. 54. vol. i. p. 78, ed. Meineke (assigned by Rose, *Frag. Arist.* 89 to the dialogue περὶ πλούτου),—νόμιζε τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἐν τῷ πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τῇ ψυχῇ εὖ διακεῖσθαι· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα αὐτὸ τὸ λαμπρᾷ ἐσθῆτι κεκοσμημένον φαίη τις εἶναι μακάριον ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἔχον καὶ σπουδαίως διακείμενον, κἂν μηδὲν τῶν προειρημένων αὐτῷ παρῇ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ψυχὴ ἐὰν ᾖ πεπαιδευμένη, τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα προσαγορευτέον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ λαμπρῶς κεκοσμημένος, αὐτὸς μηδενὸς ἄξιος ὤν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἵππον, κἂν ψέλια χρυσᾶ καὶ σκευὴν ἔχῃ πολυτελῆ φαῦλος ὤν, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄξιόν τινος νομίζομεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὃς ἂν διακείμενος ᾖ σπουδαίως, τοῦτον μᾶλλον ἐπαινοῦμεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις τῶν οἰκετῶν αὐτοῦ χείρων εἴη, καταγέλαστος ἂν γένοιτο, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷς πλείονος ἀξίαν τὴν κτῆσιν εἶναι συμβέβηκε τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως, ἀθλίους τούτους εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν· καὶ τοῦτο κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχει· τίκτει γάρ, ὥσπερ φησὶν ἡ παροιμία, κόρος μὲν ὕβριν, ἀπαιδευσία δὲ μετ' ἐξουσίας ἄνοιαν· τοῖς γὰρ διακειμένοις τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς, οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔτε ἰσχὺς οὔτε κάλλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὅσῳ περ ἂν αὗται μᾶλλον αἱ διαθέσεις καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὑπάρξωσι, τοσούτῳ καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω τὸν κεκτημένον βλάπτουσι, χωρὶς φρονήσεως παραγενόμεναι.

χαρίεντες] 'Cultivated'—synonymous with τοῖς σοφοῖς three lines below. Cf. *E. N.* i. 13. 7 τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες, an expression regarded by Zell as equivalent to τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρως τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες, *de Sensu*, 1. 436 a. 21. Cf. *de Divinat.* 1. 463 a. 4 λέγουσι γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες ὅτι δεῖ σφόδρα προσέχειν τοῖς ἐνυπνίοις· εὔλογον δὲ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ τοῖς μὴ τεχνίταις μέν, σκοπουμένοις δέ τι καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. For other references to the use of χαρίεις see *Index Arist.*

a. 19. τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν] 'εὖ πράττειν is an ambiguous phrase. In its usual acceptation it would rather mean "faring-well" than "acting-well."' Grant. It is Aristotle's object to give

an active instead of a passive sense to these commonly accepted expressions for the Chief End. 1095 a. 19.

τί ἐστιν] Τίς ἐστιν is the reading of O^b, CCC, NC, adopted by Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Ramsauer. The Paraph. and Aspasius seem to have read τί ἐστιν. Eustratius distinguishes between the two readings: ὧν τὸ μὲν (*i.e.* τίς) τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ (*i.e.* τί) τοῦ οὐσιώδους λόγου δηλωτικόν: *i.e.* τίς ἐστιν relates to a thing looked at in the concrete with all its material qualities, while τί ἐστιν (as=τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) is the technical expression for the essence (οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης) or form (εἶδος), declared in definition (ὁρισμός, ὅρος, or λόγος). Michelet argues that τίς is the better reading here, since Aristotle is about to state, not the definition of εὐδαιμονία, but popular opinions regarding it. See the notes of Zell and Michelet. The weight of MS. authority is in favour of τί, and τί seems to be required to bring out with sufficient sharpness the antithesis between the clauses beginning ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν and περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. a. 20.

§ 3. ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν] Eudemus (*E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 24) explains the identification of εὐδαιμονία with τιμή, δόξα, πλοῦτος, or παιδεία, by the fact that these are *conditions* of Happiness, and there is a natural tendency to identify the conditions of the existence of a thing with the thing itself: ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἴτια τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστι, καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων· ὧν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσιν. a. 23.

συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν] 'Conscious of their own ignorance.' They answer to those who make παιδεία, 'superior attainments,' the σκοπὸς τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, in the list given by Eudemus, i. 2. 1214 b. 8. a. 25.

ἔνιοι] The Platonists, whose view is examined in chapter 6. Aristotle formulates the doctrine of ideas in the expression ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλά (*i.e.* a single 'universal substance,' καθόλου οὐσία, in which the particulars, τὰ πολλά, τὰ αἰσθητά, 'participate'—μετέχει, but which is nevertheless separate from them—χωριστόν). His own view opposed to this doctrine he formulates in the expression ἓν κατὰ πολλῶν (*i.e.* that in which the particulars are seen to resemble one another, which is predicated of—κατηγορεῖται κατά—any one of them, as a quality—ποιόν τι—possessed by it. See *An. Post.* i. 11. 77 a. 5 εἴδη μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ἢ ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται· εἶναι μέντοι ἓν κατὰ πολλῶν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ καθόλου, ἂν μὴ τοῦτο ᾖ· ἐὰν δὲ τὸ καθόλου μὴ ᾖ, τὸ μέσον οὐκ ἔσται, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἀπόδειξις. *Met.* Z. 13. 1038 b. 35 φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν a. 26.

1095 a. 26. *τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν ι γορουμένων τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε.*

Spengel (*Aristotelische Studien I. Nic. Eth.* p. 203) cc *γάρ* for *δ'* after *ἔνιοι*: 'Es folgen nämlich die Philosophe etwas von den gewöhnlichen Ansichten weit abgehendes s dadurch dem Volke imponirten, das waren aber jedenfalls listen. Aristoteles ist damit in den Gegensatz von den den *σοφοί* übergegangen, und hat zugleich den Platonik Schlag gegeben; ihre Lehre werde von der Masse nur ar weil sie gar zu frappant und eigenthümlich scheine. Ich für nothwendig.' Spengel's *γάρ* would certainly conve pretty 'hit' at the Platonists; but I think that *δέ* is ı answer to *μέν*, line 22.

a. 29. § 4. **τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγ** which 'lie on the surface' and are therefore popularly ac views which, as 'involving a theory of some kind,' are more ı and are therefore confined to philosophers. Cf. *Rhet.* iii. b. 22 *ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα καὶ ἃ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσ* by Zell and Grant. Cf. Aristotle's *Fragm.* 470. 1555 b *διὸ καὶ τὰς κώπας αὐτῶν ἐλεφαντίνας ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τῷ μεγέθε ὅθεν ἡ Κορκυραία ἐπεπόλασε μάστιξ καὶ εἰς παροιμίαν ἦλ* Paraphrast's note is *ἱκανὸν δέ ἐστιν εἰ ἐξετάσομεν τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν πλειόνων νομιζομένας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.* The of selection laid down here is that of *Top.* i. 12. 105 a. 34 to by Zell after Muretus: *τὰς μὲν οὖν προτάσεις ἐκλεκτέο διωρίσθη περὶ προτάσεως, ἢ τὰς πάντων δόξας προχειριζόμενον πλείστων ἢ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν· καὶ τούτων ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείσ γνωριμωτάτων.*

a. 30. § 5.] 'From hence, to the end of the chapter, follows tl digression on the method of Ethics.' Grant.

Before beginning the examination, promised in § popular views (examined in chap. 5), and of the philosoph (examined in chap. 6), Aristotle enters upon a *παρέκβασις* ing the method of moral science and the previous traini the student of the science must have received. The seems to suggest itself suddenly in connexion with the m *τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας δόξας*, as distinguished from *τὰς ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.* The former *δόξαι* are of inductive origin, observation, however onesided, of the circumstances of life;

the latter recommend themselves on *à priori* and abstract grounds. 1095 a. 30. Hence the words *μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.*

In every enquiry a beginning must be made from what the enquirer 'knows.' Cf. *An. Post.* i. 1. 71 a. 1 *πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.* The enquirer's 'previous knowledge' may be either of abstract formulae generally applicable to the explanation of particular cases, or of particular concrete phenomena requiring explanation. Thus in Geometry he starts from the axioms and definitions,—certain abstract principles which are 'known,' and proceeds from them to the various more particular truths of the science. In the science of Medicine, on the other hand, the knowledge with which he begins is of symptoms—certain particular concrete phenomena of health and disease, from the observation and comparison of which he proceeds to the discovery of the hitherto unknown general laws of life, on which they depend. Where a few abstract forms of great simplicity, and therefore easily 'known,' can be applied to the resolution of particular problems, the enquiry is deductive. Geometry, which makes complex spatial relations plain to the eye by breaking them up into simple spatial relations already 'known,' (*Met.* Θ. 9. 1051 a. 21, &c. *εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ· διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν· εἰ δ' ἦν διῃρημένα φανερὰ ἂν ἦν· νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει· διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι, ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαῖς· εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον*) is the perfect type of deductive reasoning. But where the enquiry is concerned not with abstract spatial relations, or with the development of mere notions, but with the behaviour of real phenomena in nature, no such simple formulae capable of explaining the phenomena are 'known' to the enquirer from the first. The concrete phenomena themselves are 'known,' and the formulae have to be abstracted from them. The falling of bodies to the earth, the swinging of the pendulum, the tides, the orbit of the moon, and the orbits of the planets, had all been separately 'known' before Newton evolved the great generalisation which explains them. An enquiry concerned with the behaviour of real phenomena in nature is (in its earlier stages at least) inductive.

Having alluded to the distinction between Deduction and Induction, and indicated, by the expressions *γνώριμα ἁπλῶς* and *γνώριμα ἡμῖν* (of which more hereafter), the ground on which the

1095 a. 30. one or the other of these two methods is adopted in a given enquiry, Aristotle asserts that moral science must be prosecuted on the inductive method, because particular cases of conduct are at first 'better known' to the enquirer than the general principles of conduct which give them significance. These particular cases, however, which must be known to begin with by the student of morals, will be entirely beyond the experience of one who has not been habituated to perform right actions and avoid wrong actions, and therefore has no stable moral character. Moral science assumes that the student has learnt practically to discriminate in his conduct between right and wrong actions, or, to use the technical language of the present passage, that he 'knows' that such and such actions are right, and such and such others are wrong; it then proceeds to show him *how* and *why* they are right and wrong—*i.e.* to discover their law. But the man of unstable moral character does not 'know' that such and such actions are right or wrong, because these terms have no meaning except in relation to a definite system of life, and his life is conducted on no system, but is obnoxious to the temptation of the passing moment. The present παρέχεται, then, in which it is thus stated that the method of Ethics is observational and inductive, prepares us for the use which Aristotle afterwards (*E. N.* i. 8) makes of the popular views, which embody at least a certain amount of true observation, and explains the contempt with which he treats the *à priori* system of the Platonists.

a. 31. οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι] Deduction, συλλογισμός, *E. N.* vi. 3. 3 ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.

οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς] Induction, ἐπαγωγή, *Top.* i. 10. 105 a. 13 ἐπαγωγὴ δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθέκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος.

a. 32. ὁ Πλάτων] Bekker and Sus., following L^b, omit ὁ. Bywater, following K^b, M^b, Cambr., restores it to the text. Grant, omitting ὁ, remarks that 'the use of the word Πλάτων here, without the article, shows that a personal reference to the philosopher is intended': see also Grant's note on vi. 13. 3, where it is remarked that Aristotle uses the article when he speaks of characters in books (*e.g.* of the Socrates of Plato's Dialogues), but gives the names of real persons without the article, except in cases of renewed mention. But, as Plato is not a character in a book, like ὁ Σωκράτης, but always a real person, it is difficult to see what we gain by being told here 'that a personal reference to the philo-

sopher is intended.' Grant continues, 'The use of the imperfect 1095 a. 32.
ἠπόρει shows that the reference is *general*; when Aristotle quotes from a particular passage in the *Laws* (653 A) of Plato (*Eth.* ii. 3. 2) he says ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν.' It will be observed that in ii. 3. 2 the article appears in apparently all MSS., and yet the reference to Plato as the writer of a particular passage is as much 'a personal reference to the philosopher' as the 'general reference' to him in the present section. It seems to me to be unsafe to attach importance to the presence or absence of the article before Πλάτων here or elsewhere, more especially where, as here, the MSS. are divided. Σωκράτης, of course, is in an entirely different position. As regards the reference in ἠπόρει being 'general,' not (as Michelet and Heylbut, *Asp.* p. 9, suppose) to the passage on the dialectical method at the end of *Rep.* vi. 510 sqq., I think that this may very well be so. Muretus, failing to find any discussion of the ἀπορία in the writings of Plato, suggests that the reference is to his ἄγραφα δόγματα.

ἀρετέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων] Cf. *An. Post.* i. 1. 71 a. 1 b. 2.
πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως: *Top.* vi. 4. 141 a. 28 γνωρίζομεν δ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων . . . οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ μάθησις ἔχει.

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἁπλῶς] Ἁπλῶς attached to a term indicates that the term is to be taken in its *strict sense*: cf. the ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής of *E. N.* vii. 4. Γνώριμα ἁπλῶς, then, are objects which are *known* (*nota* not *scibilia*: see the notes of Zell and Michelet), in the strict sense of the term *known*. According to Aristotle the pure form (εἶδος, οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης) is known in the strict sense of 'known.' Where the form is with difficulty recognised, or not at all, on account of its implication with ὕλη in a σύνολον, or concrete material object, there is *knowledge* only in a secondary and qualified acceptation of the term. This inferior kind of knowledge, however, is given in experience before 'knowledge' strictly so called. Concrete objects of sense are πρότερα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, or γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν, while the εἴδη are πρότερα φύσει or γνωριμώτερα φύσει, *i. e.* although not first known by us in *the order of time*, the εἴδη are *logically* first, inasmuch as the knowledge of them is necessary to the right understanding of the material objects in which they are embodied; and they are 'naturally better known,'

1095 b. 2. because knowledge realises its true 'nature,' or reaches its goal, when it apprehends the εἶδος without admixture of matter. Cf. the use of φύσει in the statement, *Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 19 πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους—*i.e.* although the family existed before the πόλις was evolved by the συνοικισμός of κῶμαι, yet the πόλις is the goal towards which the φύσις of man tends from the very first; he is φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, and we cannot properly understand him in his earlier phases, unless we keep in view the final goal of his φύσις. Man moves towards the πόλις, in which individualism gives place to the consciousness of social relations, as the whole natural world moves towards the perfect form of the πρῶτον κινοῦν, attracted, as it were, by its beauty. See *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 a. 24 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν μέσον [see Bonitz *Met. ad loc.* on the text], ἔστι τούτου τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα. κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε· τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον . . . 1072 b. 3 κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον. Similarly, knowledge advances from the confused data of the senses to the clear perception of relation or form. Form is the goal of knowledge, and is therefore φύσει γνώριμον. It is the ἁπλῶς γνώριμον, that which is known in the true sense of 'known.' See *An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 33 πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον, καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον· λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἁπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πορρώτερον· ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα· ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἀντίκεται ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις. 'Quamvis,' says Michelet, p. 21, 'cognitio rerum sensibilium sit facilior nobis et primi ad eam feramur, vulgusque ipsum ea non careat (*Met.* i. 2): tamen minus scientiae et veritatis in rebus sensibilibus inest, et tum demum scire putamur, si universalia, difficillima cognitu et a sensibus remotissima, perceperimus; quo fit, ut principiorum, quippe quae non ἡμῖν γνωριμώτατα sint, etsi ἁπλῶς ἢ φύσει γνωριμώτατα, admodum pauci, ii nempe, qui divinam quaerunt beatitudinem, i.e. sapientes participes fiant. Principia vero ideo γνωριμώτερα sunt, quod ipsius animi naturam efficiunt, singularium autem rerum cognitio ex fortuitis uniuscujusque perceptionibus pendet . . . p. 22, Attamen si semper singularia nobis essent notiora, semper in scientiis ab singularibus ad principia ascendere deberemus; et Aristoteles prorsus, ut putant, esset empiricus qui analytica sola utatur methodo (*i.e.* induction). Sed

hoc loco Paraphrastes et Eustratius recte scientias distinguunt. 1095 b. 2. Sunt enim scientiae in quibus, naturali rerum ordine servato (*i.e.* the order of our knowledge is, as it were, that of φύσις), ἁπλῶς γνώριμα et nobis sunt γνωριμώτερα, ita ut ex causis (αἰτίων) utpote plus perspicuitatis habentibus ad effectus (αἰτιατά) digrediamur; ex gr. in mathematica et metaphysica, in quibus hanc ob causam a principiis et universalibus ad reliqua descendendum est. In quibusdam vero aliis scientiis effectus manifestiores nobis quam ipsae causae apparent, ubi, naturali rerum ordine mutato, nobis notiora non simpliciter sunt notiora. Quamobrem hisce in scientiis viam alteram ingredi oportet, non ex principiis, sed ad principia.' The difficulty of this ascent from the particular to the universal, from the effect to the cause, from the concrete to the abstract, from the matter to the form, is noticed in an interesting passage in *Met.* Z. 4. 1029 b. 4, sqq., where it is said that, as in moral education, the problem is to make that which is really or 'naturally' good also good for the individual, so in science, the problem is to make that which is really or 'naturally' known or true, also known or true for the individual student: ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἧττον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ὧν τοῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν, τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθά, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. The 'ordinary way of knowledge' from the concrete effects to the general law is described in *Top.* vi. 4. 141 b. 5, sqq., and illustrated by the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the στιγμή, or mathematical point. The solid is more evident to the senses than the plane, the plane than the line, and the line than the point. This is the order of our knowledge, but the order of natural production is in the opposite direction. The motion of the point generates the line, of the line the plane, of the plane the solid. The point is φύσει πρότερον to the line, plane, and solid; but the solid is πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον, *i.e.* more obvious to our senses. Τὸ φύσει πρότερον is the source from which the sensible particulars flow, as it were, and, though last to be known by us, is the first principle of natural generation. We can gather from Aristotle's theory of Definition διὰ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων, or *à priori*, which is stated in *Top.* vi. 4, as well as from his theory of ἀπόδειξις, that he found it more difficult than we do now to distinguish between a principle of actual generation, and a principle of clear explanation. He concludes the passage in the *Topics* (vi. 4) with the words

1095 b. 2. (141 b. 15) ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῶν προτέρων (*i.e.* φύσει πρ τὰ ὕστερα πειρᾶσθαι γνωρίζειν· ἐπιστημονικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστ οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδυνατοῦντας γνωρίζειν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀναγκα ἴσως διὰ τῶν ἐκείνοις γνωρίμων ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον . . . 142 a. 9 ἴσως δ καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς γνώριμον οὐ τὸ πᾶσι γνώριμόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῖς εὖ διακ μένοις τὴν διάνοιαν. Cf. *E. N.* vii. 3. 13, 14, where the καθόλου i distinguished as ἐπιστημονικόν from the ἔσχατος ὅρος of sensation.

Our knowledge of concrete objects, then, coming before ou knowledge of the forms or general laws which they realise, th method of all the concrete or natural sciences will be (at least i the earlier stages) observational and inductive: see *Phys.* i. 1 184 a. 16 πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα κ ἁπλῶς· διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μ τῇ φύσει, ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων, ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμ τερα. ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλ ὕστερον δὲ ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιρο ταῦτα. But in mathematics the case is different. Here there ar no concrete objects, in which the εἶδος is obscured by the ὕλη, an has to be abstracted from it by a toilsome process of comparis and generalisation. The objects are εἴδη pure and simple, o abstractions—τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, *ab initio*; and among these abstrac tions the simplest and most easily 'known' are those of the wide application. The axioms and definitions are more easily 'known than the particular properties of the various figures which a shown to involve these axioms and definitions; hence the metho of mathematics will be deductive. This does not, of course, affe the truth of the position (on which Aristotle is quite explicit: s *An. Post.* i. 18) that our knowledge of mathematical, as of all oth ἀρχαί, is derived from the materials presented in sense-experien The experience, however, required for the acquisition of math matical principles is much *slenderer* than that necessary for t attainment of the principles of a concrete science like medicine politics. In other words—where we deal with diagrammatica representable relations of space we can begin the deductive meth almost at once; where we deal with concrete phenomena, t deductive stage, if reached at all, must be preceded by a lo period of inductive enquiry. Νοῦς—the faculty of specially atten ing to that which is common in a multitude of sense-presentatio and of abstracting it as a point of view—perceives the form in t

matter supplied by induction, easily, or with difficulty, according to 1095 b. 2.
the nature of the matter. Spatial forms are easily abstracted, but 'kinds' or 'metaphysical notions' with difficulty; and when abstracted 'kinds' and 'notions' are not the lucid principles of deduction that spatial forms are, because their application is not diagrammatic, but to concrete phenomena. On τὰ φύσει γνωριμώτερα and τὰ ἡμῖν γν. see Michelet's note *ad loc.*, Trendelenburg's *Elementa Logices Aristoteleae*, § 19, and his *De Anima* ii. 2, § 1, note.

ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων] 'Perhaps then b. 3.
we at all events must commence with what *we* know? Aristotle was probably unconscious of the sort of pun in this sentence. He merely asserts that *we* (*i. e.* ethical philosophers) must start from a basis of personal experience.' (Grant.) The gist of the present παράβασις may be given as follows. Εὐδαιμονία is the ἀρχή, or first principle of human life. Are we in possession of the knowledge of this ἀρχή *ab initio*, as we are in possession of the principles of geometry, and will moral science consist merely in the deductive application of it to explain the details of conduct; or will the science not rather consist mainly in the attempt to abstract this ἀρχή from the ὕλη of our particular experience, *i. e.* to *find* it? Aristotle, as Eustratius and the Paraphrast (the latter with a certain qualification) interpret the present passage, decides here in favour of the second alternative. How far he is true to his decision we shall see. The Paraphrast's words are—ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ αἰτία ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων· δι' ἐκεῖνο γάρ τι πράττομεν) ζητητέον, τίς δεῖ ποιήσασθαι τὸν περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον· ἔχει γὰρ διαφοράν· καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν μικρὸν διαληψόμεθα· τῶν γὰρ αἰτίων τὸ μὲν τελικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν τὸ δὲ ὑλικὸν τὸ δὲ ποιητικόν· καὶ ποιητικὸν μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ τεχνίτου· ὑλικὸν δὲ τὰ ξύλα καὶ οἱ λίθοι ἐξ ὧν ἡ οἰκία. εἰδικὸν δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας· τελικὸν δὲ δι' ὃ ἡ οἰκία γέγονεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα αἴτια εἰσὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τοῦ εἶναι, αἴτια εἰσὶ καὶ τῆς γνώσεως αὐτῶν καὶ δι' αὐτῶν δύνανται ἐκεῖνα γινώσκεσθαι. ἐὰν γάρ τις εἰδῇ τὴν τέχνην τοῦ τεχνίτου καθ' ἣν τὴν οἰκίαν ἐδημιούργησεν, εἴσεται τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἀγαθὴν ἢ φαύλην, ὅσον τῇ τέχνῃ προσῆκε. καὶ ὁ τὴν ὕλην εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ τὸ εἶδος ὁμοίως. πάλιν δὲ γινώσκοντες τί τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς εἰσόμεθα ἢ ἀγαθὴν ἢ φαύλην. Συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τὰς αἰτίας γινώσκειν· ὁ γὰρ εἰδὼς τὴν οἰκίαν, [v. l. αἰτίαν] τὴν τέχνην εἴσεται τοῦ τεχνίτου, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως. ὥστε τοὺς λόγους διχῶς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι· ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποδεικνύναι, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰ ἀποτελέσματα·

1095 b. 3. χρήσομεθα δὲ ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν μεθόδων κατὰ καιρόν. [This is the qualific tion, alluded to above, with which the Paraphrast seems to acce the present passage as pledging Aristotle to an inductive method Ethics.] καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀποδείξομεν ὅταν αὗται δῆλαι ὦσιν· τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, ὅταν τὰ ἀποτελέσματα φανερώτερα ᾖ. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Πλάτ καλῶς ἐζήτει τοῦτο καὶ ἠπόρει, ὡς οὐκ ἀδιάφορον ὂν ἐπὶ παντός, πότερον ἀ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ προσήκουσα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὁδός, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· ὥσπερ ἐ στοιχείῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀβλοβετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. διττῆς οὖν οὔσ τῆς ὁδοῦ, πόθεν ἡμῖν ἀρκτέον; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτ δηλονότι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων, ὧν ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον τὸ πολιτικὸν τέλ ἐστί; δεῖ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἄρξασθαι, οὐ τῇ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν. φύσ μὲν γὰρ γνώριμα λέγονται αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ ἡ φύσ πρότερα παρίστησι, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρώτως ὁρᾷ· ἡμῖν δὲ τὰ ἀποτελέσμα γνώριμα· ἔθεν ἀρκτέον· οὕτω γὰρ σαφὴς ἔσται ὁ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμ γνωρίμων γινόμενος. Eustratius explains as follows—ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἀρχ μὲν τελικὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τέλος ἄγουσαι αἱ κατὰ τὰ ἀρετάς εἰσι πράξεις, αὗται δὲ ὕστεραι μὲν τῇ φύσει ὡς τῆς εὐδαιμον αἰτιαταί, ἡμῖν δὲ σαφέστεραι καὶ γνωριμώτεραι, ἐκ τούτων ἡμῖν ἀρκτέον ἀπτέον δι' αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ αἴτιον—*i. e.* εὐδαιμονία is the Final Cause Life. The various ἀρεταί are naturally subsequent to it, as bei its *effects*—*i. e.* as being what they are in virtue of it, just as t hand is a hand in virtue of the body; but they are more evid to us than it is—*i. e.* we learn (under the influence of moral trainin to discriminate practically, or in our habitual conduct, betwe good and bad actions, before we can form a notion of life a great whole, and understand why and how they are good a bad; accordingly, we must begin our study of moral science w this merely empirical 'knowledge of the ἀρεταί,' and rise from to the knowledge of their cause, εὐδαιμονία.

b. 4. §§ 6, 7. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς . . . τοῦ διότι.] The co nexion here may be exhibited as follows. Moral science must be with moral facts—with particular moral actions. The student moral science must be able to see for himself that a particular act good or bad. (Ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι . . . ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων). It will useless to *tell* him that such and such an act is good or bad; must have a tendency to think it good or bad. He cannot manif this tendency unless he has often performed, or abstained fr performing, the act in question—*i. e.* unless he has acquired *habit* in relation to it. When he has once acquired good hab

he may derive profit from the study of moral science; for then 1095 b. 4.
he knows what it is about—he then realises what is meant by calling such and such actions good or bad. Habit makes him think a certain act good: moral science explains to him why it is so. Thus ἀρχή here means 'what we start with'—the particular in this case: whereas ἀρχάς in the next sentence (§ 7) is to be understood in the technical sense of 'universal principles' (see Grant *ad loc.*). At the same time we cannot help seeing that in using ἀρχή popularly, Aristotle is not uninfluenced by the associations connected with its technical meaning. The perception that a particular act is good or bad, which is an ἀρχή, in the sense of being simply the beginning of the study of moral science, itself involves a universal principle. The universal principle is the tendency to regard the act as good or bad, derived from the habit of performing it or avoiding it. The habits are thus ethical ἀρχαί, or first principles, or, at least, *media axiomata* under the supreme ἀρχή—εὐδαιμονία. Without the habits, the moral perceptions have no existence. Accordingly we cannot be said to start from the moral perception in the popular sense of 'starting' (ἀρκτέον, ἀρχή), unless we have already a habit which is a 'starting-point' in the technical sense as being a general principle. This seems to be the implication of the passage before us; and our interpretation of it is borne out by passages elsewhere in which habit is actually described as a sort of universal, viz. *E. N.* vi. 11. 4 ἕξεις γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα (*i. e.* the habitual motive or aim), αὗται (*i. e.* particular acts)· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου—where καθόλου describes the habit which has been acquired by repetition of particular acts: and again *E. N.* i. 7. 20 τῶν ἀρχῶν δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως—'we perceive our starting-point, sometimes by induction, sometimes by simple sensation, sometimes by habituation. . .'—where ἐθισμός is presented as a sort of 'moral induction,' which puts us in possession of 'moral principles,' just as scientific induction gives us the principles of deduction.

There is no moral ὅτι, then, unless there are good habits. We begin our ethical studies with the ὅτι (ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι); but we should not perceive the ὅτι at all, unless we possessed the ἀρχή of habit. Our perception of the ὅτι is thus a sort of deduction from the principle of habit. So far as the conduct of ordinary men is concerned, the perception of the ὅτι supersedes the necessity of the knowledge

[illegible] 4. [illegible] the fact that they perceive a certain act to be good [illegible] being really good: this the νομοθέτης has seen to), implies that they are so habitually disposed towards it, that, from a practical point of view, speculative reasons, proving that it is good, may be dispensed with. Ordinary men, who act virtuously from habit, do not need to know, and perhaps could not understand, why they ought so to act. Their *Habit*, with the accompanying [illegible] that the things habitually done are good, is a sufficient substitute for the διότι. ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οἱ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. The νομοθέτης, however, who is the author of the habit, must possess the διότι—he must know why certain acts are good. In his case, at least, it cannot be said, that the ὅτι is enough without the διότι. He must be able to show how the law of the habit (which is merely 'empirical' to the ordinary citizen) can be derived from the Supreme Law (τὸ διότι) of Human Nature—εἰδαιμονία.

So much for the meaning which the immediate context undoubtedly gives to the present passage. But we must remember that ὅτι (as distinguished from διότι) has a special application which could not fail to make itself felt to Aristotle's mind here. To ὅτι is that which is accepted without ἀπόδειξις: it is ἀναπόδεικτον. Hence it is a term specially applicable to the ἀρχαί or universal principles of ἀπόδειξις, which of course would not be ἀρχαί if they admitted of deductive proof—*i.e.* if they could be explained by means of a διότι. Thus we find *E.N.* i. 7. 20 1098 a. 33 οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅτι δεικνύναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. Accordingly, the words before us—ἀρχὴ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι—abstracted for a moment from their context[1], mean that ἀπόδειξις must start from an ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος; and that, if this ἀρχή is so evident, it is unnecessary to attempt to make it more evident by trying to find some higher ἀρχή (διότι), which may explain it. The Paraphrast actually speaks of the ὅτι of the present passage as ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως. He says—εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀπεδείκνυον τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις ἀγαθὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὸν μὴ πεπαιδευμένον ἐν τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐπείθομεν ἄν, λόγων ἀνάγκῃ δήσαντες· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ ὑστέρων τὴν ἀρχὴν βουλόμεθα ἀποδεικνύναι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων δηλαδὴ καὶ δεῖ ὑποκεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καθάπερ ἀρχὴν ἀποδείξεως ὅτι ἀγα

[1] The passage would run very well with the clause ἀρχή . . . διότι omitted.

φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ δύναται πεισθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πείρᾳ καλὰς καὶ δικαίας τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις εἰδώς. 1095 b. 4

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως] '*i.e.* ὁ καλῶς ἡγμένος. b. 7. Such a one is in possession of moral facts, which either stand already in the light of principles, or can be at once recognised as such on the suggestion of the Philosophers.' Grant. The Paraphrast's comment is—εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι ἀγαθαὶ αἱ πράξεις ἀρκούντως δέξαιτό τις οἷδν δεησόμεθα τοῦ διότι· Τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν, τὸ τέλος δηλονότι, ἢ γινώσκει ἤδη, ἢ ἀκούσας ῥᾳδίως γνώσεται· ὃς δὲ οὐδ' ἕτερον ἔχει τούτων, καὶ μήτε αὐτὸς γινώσκει, μήτε παρ' ἑτέρων δύναται μανθάνειν, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου: Stahr's note (*Aristoteles' Nic. Eth. übersetzt und erläutert*) on this passage is good: 'Aristoteles will also dass die *Erkenntniss der Principien* der Sittlichkeit beim Menschen hervorgehe aus der *thatsächlichen Erfüllung* der Sittlichen *Pflichten*.'

μηδέτερον] neither ἔχει, nor λάβοι ἂν ἀρχάς. b. 8.

οὗτος μὲν κ.τ.λ.] Hesiod, ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι 291–295. The senti- b. 10.
ment expressed in these verses became proverbial, and reappears frequently in literature: see the notes of Magirus, Zell, Coraes, Michelet and Grant, who refer to Herod. vii. 16, Soph. *Antig.* 720, Livy xxii. 29, Cic. *Pro Cluentio* 31. The words of Sophocles are—

φήμ' ἔγωγε πρεσβεύειν πολύ,
φῦναι τὸν ἄνδρα πάντ' ἐπιστήμης πλέων·
εἰ δ' οὖν, φιλεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο μὴ ταύτῃ ῥέπειν,
καὶ τῶν λεγόντων εὖ καλὸν τὸ μανθάνειν.

and Livy's words are—'Saepe ego (*i.e.* Minutius addressing the soldiers) audivi, milites, eum primum esse virum qui ipse consulat, quid in rem sit, secundum eum qui bene monenti obediat: qui vero nec ipse consulere nec alteri parere sciat, eum extremi ingenii esse.'

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

It is quite natural that men's views about the Chief Good, or Ha should be determined by the manner of their lives. *There are three pr lives, and, corresponding to them, three leading views about Happiness.*

(1) *The life of sensual enjoyment. The votaries of this life make H Pleasure. This view has received more attention than it deserves, be life of which it is the theory—the life of a brute beast—is that led persons of high station.*

(2) *The life of the man of affairs. He makes Social Success the Ch But Social Success is too superficial a thing to be the Chief Good. I being rather in the applause of others than in the nature of the man whereas the Chief Good must surely be something in a man—somethin is his own, and not easily to be taken away from him. Moreover, t seek the applause of their fellow citizens, seek it that they may have faction of believing in their own Goodness. Thus they put Goodn applause. But even Goodness falls short of being the Chief End, f may 'have Goodness' and yet spend his whole life without doing anythi doing—nay, may be involved in the greatest misfortunes, notwithstan Goodness: and it would be paradoxical to call such a man 'Happy.'*

(3) *The life of the thinker. This we shall examine afterwards.*

As for the life of money-making, it is contrary to nature. Its end, obviously but a means, unnaturally converted into an end. Although is true of the other ends examined above, it is not so obviously true.

1095 b.14. § 1. ἡμεῖς . . . ὑπολαμβάνειν] Let us return from this digres examine men's ὑπολήψεις concerning the chief good, for (γ ὑπολήψεις are worth examination, being derived, as is only from their own experience of life (οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ ὑπολαμβάνειν). Incorrect as these ὑπολήψεις are, they are r out a certain foundation in experience, and will embody pa truth which we are in search of. They place happines satisfaction of one side of human nature; a review of tl bring to light how many sides human nature has, and wi us to fill in the details of our own theory of life, which, s outline, is that all the sides of human nature ought to satisfied under the synoptic eye of νοῦς. The subject of ἐ οἱ μὲν πολλοί in § 2, and οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες in § 4, the words δι Σαρδανιαπάλλῳ § 3, being parenthetical. Peters does not b the force of οὐκ ἀλόγως correctly; he translates—'As t notions of the good or happiness, it seems (to judge, as we ably may from their lives) that the masses, who are

refined, hold it to be pleasure.' Οὐκ ἀλόγως relates not to *our* 1095 b. 14.
inference, but to *the derivation of* ὑπολήψεις *from* βίοι *by those who live the* βίοι; the ὑπολήψεις so derived are pronounced 'natural' or 'not unreasonable.' Williams falls into the same error as Peters; he translates—'the many and baser sort give by their lives a fair presumption that their conception of the chief good and of happiness is that it consists in material pleasure.' Stahr is right—'Wir kehren jetzt zu dem Gegenstande zurück, wovon wir abgeschweift sind. Es scheint mir nämlich, dass die Menschen nicht ohne eine gewisse Berechtigung ihre Ansichten über das was gut und was Glückseligkeit sei, nach ihren verschiedenen Lebensarten bilden.' So Lambinus—'Sane vero summum bonum et beatitudinem non sine ratione ex variis vitae generibus existimare videntur.' The Paraphrast takes too narrow a view of the scope of the clause τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν . . . ὑπολαμβάνειν, when he understands it merely to give a reason why men's views of the chief good vary so much—viz. because their lines of life (βίοι) vary—ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος περὶ τοῦ ὅτι διαφόρους οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἔχουσι δόξας. ἕκαστος τοίνυν ἀκολούθως τῷ οἰκείῳ βίῳ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁρίζεται. This takes no account of οὐκ ἀλόγως, which prepares us for the importance which is attached below in chapter 8 to the ὑπολήψεις of the various classes of men.

§ 2. διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι] Ἀγαπῶσι means that they acquiesce b. 17.
in, or look no higher than; καί means that their life is in accordance with their theory, or ὑπόληψις.

τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι κ.τ.λ.] In the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος a man sacrifices the λόγος, or harmony of his nature as a whole, to the ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος—to his desire for pleasure; in the πολιτικὸς βίος (as the term πολιτικός is used here) he sacrifices it to the θυμοειδὲς μέρος—to ambition, or love of social success, and the applause of others; but in the θεωρητικὸς βίος human nature is not treated as a means, but reverenced as an end. To be reverenced as an end it must be seen *sub specie aeternitatis* as divine, and this involves θεωρία. Hence human nature cannot be maintained as a λόγος in the πρακτικὸς βίος, except by one who has the σκοπός (see vi. 1. §§ 1, 2, 3, notes) which θεωρία gives. To have this σκοπός, it is not indeed necessary to be oneself a 'philosopher' or 'thinker,' or actually to lead the separate θεωρητικὸς βίος strictly so called; but it is necessary to live in a city which has 'thinkers,' and is regulated for the sake

1098 b. 17. of them. In such a city θεωρία, which appears in the professed 'philosophers' or 'thinkers' as the clear consciousness of speculative truth, manifests itself in the men of affairs as a spirit whereby they are enabled to detach themselves somewhat from the influence of merely personal pleasures and ambitions—'material grounds of action,' and take a 'formal,' 'theoretic' view of life, comprehending it in its μέγεθος καὶ τάξις as a system of καλαὶ πράξεις. This is the spirit of the 'true politician,' as described by Eudemus—*E. E.* I. 5. 1216 a. 23 οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἕνεκα πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν ἅπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως. The 'true' πολιτικὸς βίος is thus, in a sense, a θεωρητικὸς βίος, even in the case of the man of affairs who is not a professed philosopher or thinker. More literally, of course, it is a θεωρητικὸς βίος in the case of the man of affairs who not only lives in a city which exists for the sake of 'philosophers' or 'thinkers,' but is himself also a 'thinker' in the strict sense, and enjoys moments of inward philosophical σχολή in the course of his 'political' career. It is not necessary to be a professed 'philosopher' or 'thinker,' and to abstain from active participation in affairs in order to lead the θεωρητικὸς βίος. Perhaps the θεωρητικὸς βίος is most successfully realised, not as a separate life, but as the form of the πολιτικὸς βίος.

The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (*Rep.* 581)—τὸ φιλοσοφοῦν γένος, τὸ φιλόνικον καὶ φιλότιμον, and τὸ φιλόκερδον, in the first which ἐπιστήμη has the mastery, in the second θυμός, in the third λόγος. These three types of individual character are exemplified on a large scale in πολιτεῖαι (*Rep.* 544, 549 c). In ἀριστοκρατία the three divisions, one mind extending throughout the whole body politic, all classes effectually conspire to maintain the good of the state, each performing its own function under λόγος or 'the common reason.' In τιμοκρατία order and discipline are confined to one class, the military class, representing θυμός, or the pushing self-assertive principle in human nature. In ὀλιγαρχία the principle represented by a wealthy class takes the place of θυμός. So far from adopting the maxim of 'each self-regarding member is a unit of anarchy.' Finally in δημοκρατία anarchy prevails, every individual doing what pleases him best: at the time of the [illegible] representing the supremacy of some one [illegible]

the individual character, puts an end to the licence of the many, 1095 b. 17.
that the licence of one—the worst anarchy—may reign. So, in the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος some tyrant ἐπιθυμία may determine conduct, or many ἐπιθυμίαι may have their turns; in the πολιτικὸς βίος ambition is the master-passion, and keeps order to a certain extent, but not in the interest of the whole man, only in its own interest; while in the θεωρητικὸς βίος all the functions of man's nature are exercised duly.

Michelet and Grant point out that this three-fold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heraclides Ponticus (apud Cic. *Tusc.* v. 3), in which life is compared to the concourse at Olympia—some come to contend for prizes, some to buy and sell, some—the noblest sort—to look on as spectators: '[Pythagoran] ut scribit auditor Platonis Ponticus Heracleides vir doctus in primis, Phliuntem ferunt venisse; cumque Leonte principe Phliasiorum, docte et copiose disseruisse quaedam; cujus ingenium et eloquentiam cum admiratus esset Leon, quaesivisse ex eo, qua maxume arte confideret: at illum, artem quidem se scire nullam, sed esse *Philosophum*; admiratum Leontem novitatem nominis quaesivisse quinam essent Philosophi, et quid inter eos et reliquos interesset: Pythagoran autem respondisse—Similem sibi videri vitam hominum et mercatum eum qui haberetur maxumo ludorum apparatu totius Graeciae celebritate: nam ut illic alii corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronae peterent, alii emendi aut vendendi quaestu et lucro ducerentur: esset autem quoddam genus eorum, idque vel maxume ingenuum, qui nec plausum nec lucrum quaererent; sed visendi causa venirent, studioseque perspicerent quid ageretur et quo modo: ita nos quasi in mercatus quandam celebritatem ex urbe aliqua sic in hanc vitam ex alia vita et natura profectos, alios gloriae servire, alios pecuniae; raros esse quosdam qui, ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis, rerum naturam studiose intuerentur: hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos: id est enim philosophos: et ut illic liberalissumum esset spectare nihil sibi adquirentem, sic in vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum cognitionemque praestare.' Iamblichus (*vita Pythag.* § 58) preserves the story in the following words—(see Cic. *Tusc.* v. 3, ed. Davisii, note) ἐοικέναι γὰρ ἔφη (Πυθαγόρας) τὴν εἰς τὸν βίον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάροδον τῷ ἐπὶ τὰς πανηγύρεις ἀπαντῶντι ὁμίλῳ· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖσε πανοδαποὶ φοιτῶντες ἄνθρωποι ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλου χρείαν ἀφικνεῖται, ὁ μὲν χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ κέρδους χάριν ἀπεμπολῆσαι τὸν φόρτον ἐπειγόμενος· ὁ

1094 a. 6. We thus find in life many
in a relative sense only,
excellence is the art of l
Wealth, Victory—are subo
the noble life. Although s
such as walking, riding, da
not resulting in ἔργα or th
looking beyond themselves
ment. On the metaphor i
τονική here, the Paraphrast l
γική ἀρχιτεκτονική πρὸς αὐτὰς
ὅπερ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων ἐν τοῖς τέκ
εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας ἐκεῖνα κελεύει
εἶδος, οὕτω καὶ ἡ στρατηγική, κ
ταῖς ἄλλαις δίδωσι τοὺς κανόνας.

a. 10. § 4. δύναμιν] 'faculty,' i
Faculty of Arts or Law at a

a. 11. χαλινοποιική] Accepted b
of pr. K^b alone, for the χαλ
other MSS.

a. 13. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον]
from K^b, M^b, (and Cambr
Bywater, Susemihl gives δέ
while δέ is given by CCC
are concerned, however, M
I prefer δέ.

a. 14. ἐν ἁπάσαις δέ] δέ is the
M^b and Γ, which have δή.
the MSS., and the best of the
Zell, Grant, and Ramsauer
'δέ in apodosi.' The law
formulated by Eucken (*de*
particularum usu, p. 31)—
repetatur apud demonstrati
aut post demonstrativum,
demonstrativa quodam mo
ticulam εἰ, ubi apodosis opp
to bring the ἐν ἁπάσαις δέ

1095 b. 17. δὲ δόξης ἕνεκα ἐπιδειξόμενος ἥκει τὴν ῥώμην τοῦ σώματος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τρίτον εἶδος καὶ τό γε ἐλευθεριώτατον, συναλιζόμενον τόπων θέας ἕνεκα καὶ δημιουργημάτων καλῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργων καὶ λόγων· οὕτω δὴ κἂν τῷ βίῳ πανδαποὺς ἀνθρώπους ταῖς σπουδαῖς εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροίζεσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ τρυφῆς αἱρεῖ πόθος. τοὺς δὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἵμερος, φιλονεικίαι τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχουσιν· εἰλικρινέστατον δὲ εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνθρώπου τρόπον τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν τῶν καλλίστων θεωρίαν ὃν καὶ προσονομάζειν φιλόσοφον.

The Neoplatonic rendering of the θεωρητικὸς βίος, which makes it an ecstatic life of entire freedom from bodily influences, is quite foreign to the concrete view of human nature taken by Aristotle. Aristotle's θεωρητικὸς βίος is the *raison d'être* of the πόλις, in the same sense that the ψυχή is the *raison d'être* of the σῶμα. We know of no ψυχή except as correlated with a σῶμα; so we know of no θεωρία except as manifested by a civilized man, or πολίτης. It is true that in the Tenth Book of the *Ethics* he uses language which may seem to lend itself to a Neoplatonic rendering; but his object there is to abstract, and present clearly, the formal principle or theoretic element in actual life, and we must be careful not to make 'a material use' of this merely 'formal principle,' and suppose that he asserts the possibility or desirability of an actual life of pure θεωρία for man, in which the ζῷον πολιτικόν should be transformed into the θεός. The σοφός, as distinguished in the Tenth Book from the πολίτης, is as much an abstraction as θεός considered apart from the κόσμος. Hence we must not accept as a correct account of Aristotle's view the mystical comment of Eustratius on the θεωρητικὸς βίος of this passage—διακόπτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ σαρκικὸν τοῦτο νέφος καὶ προκάλυμμα θεῷ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς δι' ἀπάθειαν συγγίνεται. Aristotle himself was no believer in such a Nirvana, whatever influence he may have had on the evolution of the mystic doctrines of which this note of Eustratius is a reminiscence.

b. 19. § 3. ἀνδραποδώδεις] Zell and Michelet compare *E. N.* iii. 10. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις. Magirus connects the contemptuous character of Aristotle's criticism of the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος in this section with the remark made in *Top.* i. 9. 105 a. 3 οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα, οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν· ἀλλ' ἣν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις τῶν λόγου δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως. The 'castigation,' as distinguished

from 'argument,' is contained here in the terms φορτικώτατοι and ἀνδραποδώδεις, and in the comparison with βοσκήματα. 1095 b. 19.

τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου] 'Obtain consideration.' Grant compares x. 6. 3. b. 21.

τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις] Zell compares viii. 6. 5 οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις.

Σαρδαναπάλλῳ] Cf. *E. E.* i. 5. 1215 b. 36 ὁ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς ὃν ὡς Ἄπιν τιμῶσιν ἐν πλείοσι τῶν τοιούτων (*i. e.* τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν) ἐξουσιάζει πολλῶν μοναρχῶν . . . 1216 a. 16 οἱ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον μακαρίζοντες ἢ Σμανδυρίδην τὸν Συβαρίτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οὗτοι δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται τάττειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. b. 22. See Cic. *Tusc.* v. 35 (among Rose's *Fragments* of Aristotle, No. 77) 'Quo modo igitur jucunda vita potest esse a qua absit prudentia, absit moderatio? Ex quo Sardanapalli opulentissimi Syriae regis error agnoscitur qui incidi jussit in busto,

Haec habeo quae edi, quaeque exsaturata libido
Hausit: at illa jacent multa et praeclara relicta.

Quid aliud, inquit Aristoteles, in *bovis* non in regis sepulchro inscriberes? Haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur.' Cf. also Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 32. 106 quoted by Rose *Fr.* No. 77. Had Eudemus, when he wrote ὁ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς κ.τ.λ., the work (Dialogue περὶ δικαιοσύνης according to Rose) to which this fragment belongs before him? The verses translated by Cicero are given by Athenaeus viii. 14. 335 τί γὰρ τῶν ἐπιτρῖψαι δυναμένων παρέλιπεν ὁ καλὸς οὗτος ἐποποιὸς (*i.e.* Archestratus, author of γαστρονομία) καὶ μόνος ζηλώσας τὸν Σαρδαναπάλου τοῦ Ἀνακυνδαράξεω βίον, ὃν ἀδιαφορητότερον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν προσηγορίαν τοῦ πατρὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφη. ἐφ' οὗ τοῦ τάφου ἐπιγεγράφθαι φησὶ Χρύσιππος τάδε·

εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι θνητὸς ἔφυς τὸν θυμὸν ἄεξε,
τερπόμενος θαλίῃσι· θανόντι τοι οὔτις ὄνησις.
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σποδός εἰμι, Νίνου μεγάλης βασιλεύσας.
κεῖν' ἔχω ὅσσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ σὺν ἔρωτι
τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια πάντα λέλειπται.
ἥδε σοφὴ βιότοιο παραίνεσις, οὐδέ ποτ' αὐτῆς
λήσομαι. ἐκτήσθω δ' ὁ θέλων τὸν ἀπείρονα χρυσόν.

Athenaeus (xii. 38. 528, 9, apparently quoting Ctesias) and Nicolaus Damascenus (ed. Tauchn. p. 251) describe fully the luxurious habits of Sardanapalus. The latter writer says οἴκησιν ἔχων ἐν Νίνῳ, ἔνδον τὸ σύμπαν ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις διατρίβων, ὅπλων μὲν οὐχ ἁπτόμενος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ θήραν ἐξιών, ὥσπερ οἱ πάλαι βασιλεῖς, ἐγχριόμενος

1095 b.22. δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον, καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑπογραφόμενος, πρός τε τὰ ἀμιλλώμενος περὶ κάλλους καὶ ἐμπλοκῆς, τό τε σύμπαν γ χρώμενος. Cf. Athenaeus xii. 39. 530 Ἀριστόβουλος (s Alexander, and wrote a history of his wars, which v chief authority) δ' "ἐν Ἀγχιάλῃ ἣν ἐδείματο (φησὶ) Σαρδανά ανδρος ἀναβαίνων εἰς Πέρσας κατεστρατοπεδεύσατο. καὶ ἦν τοῦ Σαρδαναπάλου μνημεῖον, ἐφ' οὗ ἑστάναι τύπον λίθινον τῆς δεξιᾶς χειρὸς τοὺς δακτύλους, ὡς ἂν ἐπικροτοῦντα. ἐπιγεγρ Ἀσσυρίοις γράμμασι· 'Σαρδανάπαλος, Ἀνακυνδαράξου παῖς, Ταρσὸν ἔδειμεν ἡμέρῃ μιῇ. ἔσθιε, πῖνε, παίζε· ὡς τἆλλα τούτ —τοῦ ἀποκροτήματος ἔοικε λέγειν." Sardanapalus (Asshı son of Esarhaddon, reigned from about 667 till about reign marks the culmination of Assyrian power and civi

b. 23. § 4. τιμήν] On τιμή as the end of 'political' life, see 7 μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος (*i. e.* to the ἄρχων), τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ *Pol.* ii. 4. 1266 b. 38, where the πολλοί are said to be s κτήσεις, but the χαρίεντες to strive after τιμαί, *honores*—ἔτι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶ ναντίον δὲ περὶ ἑκάτερον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κ οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν ἐὰν ὦσαι.

b. 24. ἐπιπολαιότερον] 'Too superficial for that which we a of.' Grant. Honour is not the nature and life of honoured, but a merely superficial and transitory reflec of the opinion of other people.

δοκεῖ . . . μαντευόμεθα] Honour depends on those not on him who receives it. It therefore cannot be the which is 'one's own' and depends on oneself; cf. *Met.* 34 sqq., from which we can understand how εὐδαιμονί ἐνέργεια which contains its own end in itself, must be οὐ something which resides wholly in the man who realis δὲ μή ἐστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχ οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ψυχῇ· διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τις ἐστίν. On the where a result different from the ἐνέργεια is produced b tion, *i. e.* where the ἐνέργεια is not its own end, but has end, the ἐνέργεια (consummation) is in the result—105 μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἥ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ὅ

ἐν τῷ αἰνουμένῳ. As ὕφανσις then is ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ, so τιμή is ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι: it does not reside ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ as θεωρία resides ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι. The good opinion of others is an ἔργον, as it were, which a man produces, like a web or a house; it is not *his own life.* 1095 b. 24.

The notion of *inherence*, which is doubtless the one primarily attaching to ἐν in the present case, does not of course exclude that of *being in the power of*, into which indeed it easily passes.

μαντευόμεθα] Zell quotes *Schol. Par.* μαντευόμεθα εἴρηται διὰ τὸ μέν τι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀποδειχθῆναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν εἰκασμῷ οὕτω λαμβάνεσθαι, στοχαστικὴ γὰρ τέχνη ἡ μαντική. Cf. *De Gen. Anim.* iv. 1. 765 a. 27 μαντευόμενοι τὸ συμβησόμενον ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων καὶ προλαμβάνοντες ὡς οὕτως ἔχον πρὶν γενόμενον οὕτως ἰδεῖν. May not the term have a special appropriateness in connexion with τἀγαθόν, or the true Form of human life—τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, which man 'divines,' just as all plants and animals after their kinds instinctively, by a kind of natural divination, find their good—succeed in maintaining and perpetuating their various types, and so realise τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θεῖον? See note on i. 2. 8 b. 7. All life—moral and physical—is a striving after Form, a divination of τὸ θεῖον. b. 26.

§ 5. ἔτι . . . κρείττων] The editors refer to viii. 8. 2, where τιμή is said to be sought κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

πιστεύουσιν] K^b, M^b, O^b, H^a have πιστεύσωσιν, which ought to be restored to the text for Bekker's πιστεύωσιν. See Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 53: 'der Aorist hat inchoative Bedeutung.' b. 27.

καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ] Epexegetical—'i. e. for their virtue.' b. 29.

§ 6. ἀτελεστέρα] ἀρετή is a mere ἕξις, or possession of the power of acting well, not an ἐνέργεια or act; see ii. 5. This ἕξις may subsist without going forth in action. It is therefore ἀτελεστέρα—'falls short of being the τέλος' (Grant)—which is τὸ εὖ ζῆν in actuality, not in mere potentiality. Εὐδαιμονία is the manifestation of ἀρετή, and is defined in i. 7. 15 as ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν. Thus ἀρετή is to εὐδαιμονία as δύναμις to ἐνέργεια. b. 32.

καθεύδειν] is opposed to ἐνεργεῖν x. 8. 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπολήψασιν αὐτοὺς [τοὺς θεούς] καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὅστερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα.

ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετήν] *i. e.* with the mere ἕξις of ἀρετή. 'Past merits,' b. 33.

1095 b. 33. says Grant, 'or the passive possession of qualities whose existence depends on the attestation of fame, cannot be thought to constitute the chief good. Very different from this is ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν an actual life of virtue in the present.'

1096 a. 1. κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν] cf. i. 9. 11. The good things of body and estate are the ὕλη in which the εὐδαίμων realises the form of his nature. Without this matter the form cannot be realised; but the form is not to be confounded with the matter. Εὐδαιμονία is a certain manner of life. This manner of life requires certain conditions, as the art of Phidias required marble or ivory. As Eudemus puts it (*E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 16), we must be careful to distinguish between τὸ ζῆν καλῶς and ὧν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς. Cf. Didymus, Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν δόγματα apud Mullach. *Fragm. Phil.* vol. ii. p. 90 τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ συμπληροῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ βίος ἐκ πράξεως συμπεπλήρωται· τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πρᾶξιν εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτό, οὔθ' ὅλως ἐνέργειαν . . . τὰ ὧν ἄνευ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν ἀδύνατον μέρη τῆς ἐνεργείας λέγω οὐκ ὀρθόν.

a. 2. εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων] For the meaning of θέσις as an ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως see *An. Post.* i. 2. 72 a. 14 sqq. where it is distinguished as ἀρχὴ ἣν μὴ ἔστι δεῖξαι, μηδ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν μαθησόμενόν τι from ἀξίωμα, which is an ἀρχὴ ἣν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν μαθησόμενον. Here (*E. N.* i. 5. 6) however we are concerned with the *dialectical* (as distinguished from the apodeictic) θέσις, which is described in *Top.* i. 9. 104 b. 19 (quoted by Eustratius and the commentators after him) θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης· ἢ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται καθ' Ἡράκλειτον· ἢ ὅτι ἓν τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ Μέλισσος φησί· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηναμένου φροντίζειν εὔηθές ἐστι. A θέσις, then, is a paradox maintained on the authority of some great philosopher. An exception is made in its favour in the application of that rule of Dialectic by which only ἔνδοξα are admitted as premisses, and παράδοξα *as such* excluded.

In Aristotle's time the Cynics maintained the paradox indicated in the present passage, and after his time the Stoics, contending ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν—that the mere consciousness of virtue, even though its manifestation 'in works' be prevented by external circumstances, constitutes Happiness. (See Zeller's *Stoics*,

ureans, and Sceptics, pp. 224, 225, Engl. transl.) Cicero (*Para-* 1096 a. 2.
n, 2) defends the *θέσις—ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*,
uing,' as Grant remarks, 'the greatness of Regulus in his
ortunes, as though that were identical with his happiness'; or
aps rather identifying his 'idea of happiness' with 'the con-
usness of happiness,' to borrow a delicate distinction drawn by
f. Jowett (*Plato*, Introduction to the Gorgias). 'Nec vero,' says
ero, 'M. Regulum aerumnosum nec infelicem nec miserum
quam putavi. Non enim magnitudo animi ejus cruciabatur a
enis, non gravitas, non fides, non constantia, non ulla virtus,
n denique animus ipse: qui tot virtutum praesidio tantoque
nitatu, quum corpus ejus caperetur, capi certe ipse non potuit
. bonus vir et fortis et sapiens miser esse non potest. Nec vero,
jus virtus moresque laudandi sunt, ejus non laudanda vita est,
que porro fugienda vita est quae laudanda est. Esset autem
ienda, si esset misera. Quamobrem quicquid est laudabile idem
beatum et florens et expetendum videri debet.' 'Plato,' says
of. Jowett (l. c.), 'does not mean to say that Archelaus is tor-
nted by the stings of conscience, or that the sensations of the
paled criminal are more agreeable than of the tyrant drowned in
urious enjoyment. . . . What then is his meaning? . . . He is
aking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of
piness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier
s in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without
n, or that physical suffering is always compensated by a mental
sfaction. Still we regard them as happy. . . . We are not con-
ed to justify this idealism by the standard of utility or by the
s of logic, but merely to point out the existence of such a
iment in the better part of human nature.'

Aristotle was not deficient in appreciation of the part which the
of happiness plays in life; but his idealism was not of the kind
xpress itself rhetorically, and seem to have always in view some
ic figure of the tragic stage. His idealism consisted in his
found recognition of the fact that man has aspirations which
never be satisfied; which, nevertheless, must be fostered,
ause they give *élan* to those functions which are capable of actual
ilment. The *αἱρετώτατος βίος* is indeed unattainable by man;
if he ceased to aspire to it, the good life, which is actually
hin his reach, would become, in its turn, an impossible ideal.
e *E. N.* x. 7. 8. 1177 b. 31 *οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώ-*

1096 a. 2. *πινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ.* The account given of the *ἀνδρεῖος* in *E. N.* iii. 9. §§ 3–5 shows us how well Aristotle understood the place of 'the idea of happiness' in life—not as a 'constitutive principle,' and equivalent to an actual 'consciousness of happiness,' but as a 'regulative principle.'

a. 3. **ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν**] It is often assumed that *τὰ ἐγκύκλια* are the same as *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*. One of the reasons for holding that the reference of the latter expression is to commonly accepted views, not necessarily embodied in any written work, is that the present tense is invariably (or almost invariably) used with it. But here, the perfect seems to indicate a special reference to a definite class of written works, or it may be to a definite course of lectures. See note on *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* i. 13. 5.

a. 4. § 7. **ὑπὲρ οὗ**] *περί* is Bekker's reading against the MSS., which all apparently give *ὑπέρ*. Susemihl and Bywater accordingly read *ὑπέρ*. *Ὑπέρ* with the genitive is so characteristic of the *M. M.* and the Aristotelian commentators, that its reception into the text here (justified by the MS. authority) raises the question, whether the clause in which it occurs should not be bracketed as an interpolation. See notes on iii. 3. 2, and iv. 2. 4.

a. 5. **ἑπομένοις**] x. 7.

§ 8. **ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς** (sc. **βίος**) **βίαιός τις ἐστίν**] The money-getting life is contrary to nature, for nature has always a definite *τέλος*, whereas money-getting goes on *εἰς ἄπειρον*, see *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 b. 41 *χρηματιστικήν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως . . .* 1257 b. 19 *ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν*. The term *βίαιος* is to be taken in its technical sense =*παρὰ φύσιν*: see *de Coelo* 300 a. 23 *τὸ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ταὐτόν*; *Met.* Δ. 5. 1015 b. 14 *εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἄπτα ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα, οὐθὲν ἐκείνοις ἐστὶ βίαιον οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν*: *Met.* I. 1. 1052 a. 23 *φύσει . . . καὶ μὴ βίᾳ*; *Phys.* iii. 5. 205 b. 5 *εἴη γὰρ ἄν τί που βίᾳ καὶ οὐχ οὗ πέφυκεν*: *Phys.* iv. 8. 215 a. 1 *πᾶσα κίνησις ἢ βίᾳ ἢ κατὰ φύσιν . . . ἡ μὲν γὰρ βίαιος παρὰ φύσιν ἐστίν*: *Phys.* viii. 4. 255 b. 31 *πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἢ φύσει κινεῖται ἢ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίᾳ*. Newman (note on *Pol.* i. 3. 1253 b. 18) remarks that the connexion which Aristotle traces between *τὸ βίαιον* and *τὸ παρὰ φύσιν* is inherited by him from Plato (*Tim.* 64 D), and from still earlier inquirers (cf. *Protag.* 337 D, for the words of the

Sophist Hippias). Eustratius interprets the passage incorrectly. 1096 a. 5.
He says that the χρηματιστὴς βίος employs violent means to make money. Dante (*Inf.* xi. 109–111, quoted by Michelet) had this interpretation in view when he placed usurers among the 'violent' in Hell: although it is to be observed that the 'violence' consists in 'setting Nature, in herself, and in her follower (Art), at nought.' Grant translates—'But the life of gain is in a way compulsory,' and remarks that βίαιος 'is to be taken in a passive, not in an active sense. It is the opposite of ἑκούσιος, meaning "forced," as in *Eth.* iii. 1. 3. It implies that no one would devote himself, at the outset, to money-making, except of necessity, "parce qu'il faut vivre" . . . It is true that in several places βίαιος is opposed to κατὰ φύσιν, and in such contexts means "unnatural"; ... But without such a context, it cannot simply stand for παρὰ φύσιν.' To this it may be answered that the term χρηματιστὴς of itself supplies the context required. That χρηματιστική is ἄπειρος and παρὰ φύσιν is a common-place in the Aristotelian system.

For βίαιος we have the conjectures βίος ἄβιος, or ἄβιος (Muretus), and οὐ βίος (Coraes); but no correction is necessary. Aspasius has τὸν δὲ χρηματιστὴν βίαιον λέγουσι, τουτέστι μικρόν, ὡς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν βίαιον λέγοντες τοῦτον—as if he read βαιός.

χρήσιμον] useful as means to end: see *Index Arist.* s. v. The a. 7.
term is technically employed (alone or with εἴς τι and πρός τι) to denote the *means*. The life of money-making is concerned only with means, and has no limiting conception of the end of human endeavour. This the life of θεωρία has, and with this end identifies itself. The θεωρητικὸς βίος is Life, and exists for its own sake (see x. 7. 5); whereas the χρηματιστὴς βίος is not Life, but undue care for one of the material conditions of Life.

καταβέβληνται] The editors quote *Pol.* Θ. 2. 1337 b. 22 αἱ a. 10.
καταβεβλημέναι μαθήσεις, 'the ordinary branches,' and *Pol.* Θ. 3. 1338 a. 36 τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων—where the notion of the *fundamental* character of these branches is conveyed. Here we may render—'and yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them,' thus bringing out the idea of *a foundation laid* for the claims of ἡδονή and τιμή and at the same time indicating that *labour has been wasted* on the attempt to lay such a foundation. I think that πρὸς αὐτά obliges us to take account of this latter point by suggesting κατηνάλωνται πρὸς αὐτά.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

Now let us examine the opinion of those who make the Chief Good a Essence, or Idea, existing apart from all particular good things. unpleasant duty to have to criticise this opinion, which is that of me our personal friends; but the philosopher is bound to prefer truth to

(1) *Objects conceived as members of a sequence* (e.g. *numbers*), *subsequent depends upon the prior, they do not bring under a con But* good *is a conception which appears in the Category of Substanc in the Categories of Quality and Relation, which are subsequent to th of Substance,* i.e. *presuppose it as their ground. How then, on principles, can they bring these various appearances of Good under o Idea?*

(2) *If all good things fall under one common Idea,* i.e. *have all o same Essence, or Form of Being, how comes it that, there being ten or Forms of Being, we find good things in all the ten, and not in on only? Thus, in the Category of Substance we find God and Reason Quality, the various Virtues; in that of Quantity, the Moderate; Relation, the Useful—and these are all 'good things,' although th their Being,' or 'their Essence' is not the same.*

(3) *Since things that have the same essential nature, or fall unde are all objects of one Science, good things ought all to be objects science. But this is not so. Even good things in the same Category of different sciences—under the Category of Time, the science of the opportunity in sickness is Medical Science; that of the favourable in warfare is Generalship.*

(4) *What do they gain by the prefix* real *by which they mark t* Real-man, *and* man, *have the same essential nature,* viz. *that of 'm is common to both. Similarly the* real-good, *and* a good thing, *are*

(5) *If they reply that* real *means* everlasting, *we ask, How can tion enhance Essence, and put the real-good in a higher position,* qua *a good thing? If the Idea of the Good* is good, *it is so independen and if a particular thing* is good, *it also* is good *independently of t a thing* is white, *whether it be white for a day, or a thousand years.*

A more plausible position than that before us is the position of goreans, who give us a column of good things, within *which, not which, they place the Principle of Unity. Even Speusippus, it wo follows the Pythagoreans rather than the Platonists here.*

But it may be objected to the foregoing criticism—'you have distinction between things good in themselves, and things good as me It is only things good in themselves which the theory professes to b one Idea.'

Let us then confine our attention to things good in themselves.

If it be asked What things may be so described?—there are two answers possible, viz. *They are things such as seeing, or thinking, or*

pleasures and honours—or *The Idea of the Good is the only thing good in itself. If the latter alternative be accepted, the class of things good in themselves will be left empty, for the Idea is not* in *the class. If the former alternative be accepted*—i. e. *if it be admitted that seeing, thinking, &c., are also good in themselves, as well as the Idea, then the same essential nature of Goodness must be apparent in them all, as the same quality of whiteness is apparent in snow and white paint. But as a matter of fact the 'goodness' of thinking differs essentially from that of seeing, and has its own definition. For the same reason the goodness of each of the pleasures and honours referred to has its own separate definition.*

When we call a thing 'good,' then, we do not mean that it participates in common with all other good things in one Idea of the Good. What then do we mean? We mean something: for the same epithet is surely not applied by mere accident to all these things, without there being some common characteristic in them all justifying its application. What is this common characteristic? Perhaps the fact that they 'belong to the same department,' or 'contribute to the same end'—i. e. *they are perhaps called 'good,' as a* knife *and a* bandage *are both called 'surgical,' because they belong to the same department—surgery, or as* cleanliness *and* exercise *are both called 'healthy,' because they contribute to the same end—health: or perhaps it is safer to say that things are called 'good' 'on the ground of identical relations'*—e. g. *the relation of the eye to the body is the same as that of reason to the soul; if we call the eye 'good' in its relation, we must call reason 'good' in its also. But the discussion of these matters belongs properly to another part of our system, and need not detain us further, especially as the Universal Good, apart by itself, even if it exist, is evidently a thing which man cannot make the end of his action, and lay hold of: and it is an end which he can lay hold of that we are now looking for.*

But it may perhaps be said that a knowledge of the Idea of the Good helps us to perform those good actions which we can perform, and to lay hold of those good things which are within our reach, by giving us an 'example or standard of goodness' to serve as a test of the goodness of our conduct. This is a plausible view; but it is not supported by what, as a matter of fact, is the procedure of the sciences and arts. They all try to realise a good, and to supplement what is lacking to them, but it is never 'the knowledge of the Idea of the Good' that they make their desideratum. If this knowledge were really useful, is it likely that all men of science and artists would thus neglect it? But the chief argument against this view that a knowledge of the Idea is useful, is that derived from the difficulty of explaining to oneself how *it can be useful*—how *it can be useful to a weaver or carpenter in his trade—how it can make a man a better general or a better doctor. So far, indeed, is a doctor from troubling himself with such wide 'knowledge,' that he does not take a wide view even of 'health,' the final end of his own profession. It is not Universal Health which he considers, but man's health, or rather his patient's health.*

Introductory Note.] The 'Ideas' of Plato answered, in part, to **1096 a. 11.** what we now call 'Laws of Nature.' As distinguished from particular phenomena which come and go, the 'Ideas are *fixed*;' hence are the objects of *scientific* knowledge, as distinguished from

1096 a. 11. mere sensation. Particular men are men, because they 'particip in,' or are 'copies of' the 'Idea of Man'; as we should say because they are common results of that fixed Law of Nat which brings forth such beings as men. Particular things beautiful, because they are 'copies of the Eternal Beauty'—as should say—because there is that in the fixed constitution of t universe which determines the production of things so characteris To give force to his assertion that the 'Ideas' are fixed, Pl was accustomed to speak of sensible things as fluctuating, a even unreal[1]. Such reality, at any rate, as they possess they deri from the 'Ideas' in which they 'participate.' We must not, ho ever, take Plato too literally. He speaks of the unreality of p ticulars, in much the same way as we speak of the impossibil of an uncaused phenomenon,—a phenomenon which is not p of the universe of Natural Laws. The language at his dispo for expressing the 'reality' of the Ideas was not adequate to t task. He was obliged to say that the Ideas have more οὐσία th the particulars, or that the particulars derive such οὐσία as th possess from the οὐσία of the Ideas; thus seeming to make the Ide separate *things*. But how can the particulars 'participate in' t οὐσία of a thing separate from them? This was the question whi Aristotle put to Plato, or the Platonists. The οὐσία of a thing mu belong to itself; a thing cannot have its οὐσία outside itself *in anoth thing*. This difficulty, raised by the inadequacy of the word οὐσία t the task assigned to it, was felt by Plato himself (see the *Parmenid* and was probably brought home to him, as to Aristotle, by the lite interpretation which pupils of the Academy gave to the doctri of the Ideas, not only speaking of them as separate *things* (th was almost unavoidable), but thinking of them as such.

The 'Ideas' then answer, in part[2], to our 'Laws of Nature,' t objects of scientific knowledge. But these 'Ideas' are memb of a system, in virtue of belonging to which they are what th are. This system is the Universe—the One, or the Good. If t 'Ideas,' are οὐσίαι, or 'fixed Laws of Nature,' the Universe which they are the fixed Laws, is ἐκείνου τῆς οὐσίας—is not it

[1] Modern Biology seems to enforce Plato's doctrine of the unreality of particular. We see the life of the individual shortened by natural selection the sake of the Race. See Weismann, *Essays upon Heredity* (Clarendon Pre Essays i and iii.

[2] In part they answer to the 'Categories of the Understanding' in mod philosophy. The ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ answers to the 'Ideas of the Reason.'

Law of Nature, but higher. How this doctrine of the Idea of 1096 a. 11.
the Good was misunderstood—by the Platonists, we may suppose, rather than by Aristotle—is best shown in the chapter now before us. There is nothing, I venture to think, in the Dialogues of Plato to justify the interpretation which Aristotle's criticism assumes: we shall accordingly follow the line of least difficulty, if we suppose that the Platonists are mainly responsible for the misunderstanding. In all likelihood too they are responsible for the popular ridicule which seems to have been bestowed on the doctrine—see *Diog. Laert.* iii. 26 and 27 quoted by Meineke, *Fragm. Com.* vol. iii. 302 τοιοῦτος δ' ὢν (Πλάτων), ὅμως ἐσκώφθη καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν κωμικῶν—Ἄμφις Ἀμφικράτει—

τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, οὗ σὺ τυγχάνειν
μέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἧττον οἶδα τοῦτ' ἐγώ,
ὦ δέσποτ', ἢ τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν· πρόσεχε δή.

It will now be convenient to place by the side of Aristotle's criticism, analysed above in the *Argument*, Plato's own account of the Idea of the Good as given in *Rep.* 506 sqq. The Guardians of the State must know the nature of the Good, for if they have not this knowledge, they cannot know the real nature of the Just or the Beautiful. What then is the Good? Socrates can answer only by a simile. The Sun, the Eye, and Visible objects, are in the sensible world, what the Good, Reason (νοῦς), and the Ideas (τὰ νοούμενα), are in the intelligible world. The ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is that which gives their truth (ἀλήθεια) to the objects of real knowledge, as the sun gives visible colour to the objects of sight. It is the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ which also gives the power of apprehending this truth (ἐπιστήμη), as the sun gives the eye the power of seeing. As light and sight are not identical with the sun, so ἀλήθεια and ἐπιστήμη are not identical with the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, but only *like* it; moreover as the sun causes the γένεσις of all things but is not itself γένεσις, so the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ imparts οὐσία to the objects of real knowledge, but is itself something higher than οὐσία—οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος (509 B).

'"Good," says Plato, "is the cause of existence and knowledge." This opens a sublime conception, on the one hand, of a world in which all things are very good; on the other hand, of a philosophy whose method of the deepest knowledge consists in no mere abstract investigations, nor any mere accumulation of

1096 a. 11. experience, but in apprehending with enthusiasm and joy all-pervading idea of good, as it manifests itself under the t forms of beauty, symmetry, and truth [*Philebus* 65 A].' Gr *Ethics*, Essay III. vol. i. p. 205.

It is difficult to understand a man of Aristotle's calibre attacki as he does, a theory like this; especially as his own philosoph human life, with its ideal of the θεωρητικὸς βίος, and its doctrine εὐδαιμονία as something not to be counted among particular g things (*E. N.* i. 7. 8.), is in entire sympathy with it. 'Im Gan Gnien, Schönen resolut zu leben,' is the ideal for Aristot εὐδαίμων, no less than for Plato's φιλόσοφος. We are tempted believe that it is not Plato's theory which Aristotle attacks he but the formalism of the Platonic school; at any rate, t criticisms contained in this chapter are entirely beside the ma as directed against the theory which is exhibited in *the Repub* Ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος is the man who, after a long educatio has risen to the speculative height from which he can see, li Spinoza's wise man, all things as belonging to a single system, relation to which they 'have existence,' 'are good,' and 'are know The ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is not a separate *thing*—χωριστόν τι; it is t system to which 'things' belong, and by belonging to which (or 'p ticipating in' which) are 'things'—it is the One, *Deus sive Natu* If the Platonic school had confined itself to presenting, as Pl does in *the Republic*, the conception of τὸ ἕν, or τὸ ἀγαθόν, as a g 'regulative principle,' probably no objections would have b raised by Aristotle. But the Theory of Ideas tended always become more and more a Theory of Ideal Numbers, lend itself to obscurantism; it also stood in the way of the accepta of that critique of the forms of speech (as epoch-making as Ka deduction of the forms of thought) which it was Aristotle's grea service to European culture to have begun and carried so It is therefore not entirely surprising to find the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγα notwithstanding Plato's presentation of it (an unexception presentation of it, one might have supposed, from Aristotle's p of view), coming in for a share of the opposition which the εἴδη ἀριθμοί, and χωριστὰ εἴδη of the school naturally roused in the au of the doctrine of Categories.

[1] There is a very interesting passage in Teichmüller's *Literarische Fe* pp. 232, 233 (to all the views contained in which I do not however wis pledge myself) which may be consulted in this connexion.

It is in the distinction drawn between πρώτη and δευτέρα οὐσία in *Cat.* 5 that the doctrine of the χωριστὸν εἶδος or 'universal thing,' as held by the Platonists, is most effectively met. That doctrine, like the paradox of Antisthenes (see Plato, *Soph.* 251 A, and Arist. *Met.* Δ. 29; cf. also Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* vol. ii. 270 and 281, 2) and Stilpo (see Plutarch, *adv. Colotem* 23), practically assumed that all words stand for *things*. Antisthenes consistently denied the possibility of predication, because each thing, marked by its own name, is itself. The thing marked by the word *Kallias* is itself, and the thing marked by the word *man* is itself. You cannot predicate *man* of *Kallias*, for that would be to change Kallias into man, and *make him another individual.* The Platonists, on the other hand, affirmed the possibility of predication; but it was only by the *tour de force* of their dogma of μέθεξις that they were able to do so. *Man* was indeed the name of a thing separate from the thing of which *Kallias* was the name; but somehow the thing called *Kallias* 'participated in' the 'Substance' of the other thing called *man.* 1096 a. 11.

In opposition to Antisthenes and the Platonic χωρίζοντες, it is pointed out in *Cat.* 5 that, although the term *man* looks like the name of a separate thing, it is really indicative of an aspect or attribute of a thing: see 3 b. 10 ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει . . . τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει, οὐ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλών [as distinguished from the ἓν παρὰ πολλά of the Platonists] ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον. The distinction drawn here is, in grammatical language, that between the proper name and the common term, practically amounting to that between the 'reality of existence' and 'the reality of validity' noted by Lotze, *Logic* p. 441 Eng. Tr.

'Among all the reasons,' says Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 302) 'with which Aristotle opposes the theory of Ideas, there are two which rise into prominence, and to them all the others may be mediately or immediately reduced, (1) That the universal notions . . . posited in the Ideas are not substances, but mark only certain properties and relations—at most, genera and species, not things themselves. (2) That the Ideas lack moving force, and that they not only do not explain, but render impossible, the change of

1096 a. 11. phenomena, creation and destruction, alteration and ı
and the natural properties of things thereon dependent.'

The position taken up by Aristotle against the Plat
ζοντες in objection (1) is that of the critic of the forms
or thought (the two are inextricably connected in Aristot
who distinguishes τὰ γένη τῶν ὄντων—the various senses
Kallias *is* something, *is* a man, *is* good, *is* a father. Un
distinctions were kept steadily in view (and the 'realis
Platonists was the great obstacle to their recognition) it
Aristotle rightly thought, to hope for advance in the scie
for objection (2), it comes from the man of science, w
satisfied unless he has *efficient* causes. But, as Lotze s
p. 447), 'The fact that they supply no beginning of moti
little against the doctrine of the Ideas . . . As concerns
criticism let us turn to the sciences of our own day. \
we say to our Laws of Nature? Do they contain in t
a beginning of motion? On the contrary, they all p
a series of data which they cannot themselves establish,
which *once given*, the necessary connexion one with anot
phenomena which ensue is deducible. No natural la
that the different bodies in our planetary system should
that their course should be directed towards one and n
quarter of the heavens, or that the acceleration which th
on each other by the force of attraction should have the
amount which it has and not a different one. But is
system of mechanical truths useless and mere empty bal
λογεῖν) because it leaves these first beginnings of mot
explained from some other source, and starting from
of motion as it actually finds it, is satisfied with expl
different phases in their necessary connexion with each
To see in the world of Ideas the patterns to which all
anything is, must conform, was a thought of which the i
is unfairly ignored by Aristotle.'

The doctrine of Ideas, as Plato himself sets it for
Dialogues, was, it must be admitted by the reader of
criticisms in the *Metaphysics*[1], misunderstood—but prob
by the Platonists than by Aristotle. Be that however a
Aristotle's criticisms have done much to give currenc

[1] It is in *Cat.* 5, as it seems to me, that we have the really valu
of the Aristotelian opposition to the doctrine of Ideas.

views regarding the doctrine, as held by Plato himself. For the 1096 a. 11.
doctrine, as held by Plato himself, we must go to Plato's own writings: and if we sometimes find statements there which seem to imply the χωριστὸν εἶδος, we must remember that Plato could hardly help using language which might be interpreted as implying it. He wished to describe the relation of Laws of Nature to particular things, and the Greek language almost obliged him to speak of these Laws as 'things.'

On the Platonic 'Ideas' generally see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* (Plato), Grant's *Ethics*, Essay iii. vol. i. p. 200 sqq., Jowett's *Introduction to the Parmenides*, Lotze's *Logic* Book iii. ch. 2—*the world of Ideas*; for Aristotle's general criticisms see *Met.* A. 6, Z. 13, 14, 15, M. 4, 5, 9, 10, and *Cat.* 5, Zeller's *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 293 sqq. (3rd German ed.), Zeller's *Plat. Studien*, pp. 232, 3, Grote's *Aristotle*, appendix i and appendix iii.

Keeping in view the account of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ given in *Rep.* 506 sqq. and remembering that Plato himself, as distinguished from weak disciples, did not regard—could not have regarded—'The Good' as a 'Thing' separate from 'particular good things,' we may go on to examine Aristotle's criticism in detail.

§ 1. τὸ δὲ καθόλου] *sc.* ἀγαθόν. Eudemus introduces his dis- a. 11.
cussion of the Idea of the Good (*E. E.* i. 8. 1217 b. 1) as follows—
σκεπτέον τοίνυν τί τὸ ἄριστον, καὶ λέγεται ποσαχῶς. ἐν τρισὶ δὴ μάλιστα φαίνεται δόξαις εἶναι τοῦτο. φασὶ γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δ' εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾧ ὑπάρχει τό τε πρώτῳ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αἰτίῳ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι.

§ 2. ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον]. Things related to one a. 18.
another as the terms of a series were not brought by the Platonists under one Idea. Where one thing grows out of another thing, the two things cannot be regarded as coordinate impressions of a single type. Aristotle recognises this in *Pol.* iii. 1. 1275 a. 34 (see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. p. 295 n. and Jowett, *Pol.* ad loc.) where he notes the impossibility of finding a common definition for the πολῖται of the various states, which he distinguishes as ἀρθαί and παρεκβεβηκυῖαι, the latter being subsequent to, or degenerations of, the former.

I understand Aristotle in the present § to refer, not to the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί of the Platonists, but to the μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί. The distinction between these two is given in *Met.* M. 6–8. The

096 a. 18. μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί are the 1, 2, 3 of ordinary numeration; the μονάδες of which these ἀριθμοί are composed are all συμβλητοί, being homogeneous. The μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμός 3 arises out of 2 by the addition of 1, and is thus subsequent to 2 (ὕστερον), or implies 2. The εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, on the other hand, are ἀσύμβλητοι: ἡ δυὰς αὐτή, and ἡ τριὰς αὐτή, (Duality and Trinity *as notions*), cannot be added together: the μονάδες of which ἡ δυὰς αὐτή is composed are not homogeneous with those of which ἡ τριὰς αὐτή is composed: the τριὰς αὐτή is not the δυὰς αὐτή + 1: it is independent of the δυὰς αὐτή. Thus the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, with which the Platonists identified the ἰδέαι, are distinguished from one another not as the term ἀριθμοί naturally implies—quantitatively, but qualitatively. They are ἀσύμβλητοι, which means that they are not quantitatively comparable. Accordingly, when they, equally with the μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί, are described as involving πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον (see *Met.* M. 6. 1080 b. 12, and Bonitz's note, p. 542 sqq., on τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ἰδέας—Trendelenburg's conjecture, μή before ἔχοντα, accepted by Zeller, *Platon. Stud.* p. 243, rejected *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1. p. 433, is wrong), the description is to be taken as one awkwardly transferred from the ἀριθμητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, which are not independent entities, to entities which, though called ἀριθμοί, are yet regarded as independent of one another. The phrase ἀσύμβλητοι ἀριθμοί really involves a contradiction. As Bonitz says, *Met.* p. 540: 'Plato enim licet ex Aristotelis testimonio dixisse videatur τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι ἀριθμούς, tamen hos numeros, qui idearum exprimere naturam, a mathematicis ea distinxit ratione, quae revera ipsam numerorum naturam penitus tolleret. Hos enim numeros dixit esse ἀσυμβλήτους, consociari non posse nec computari alterum cum altero. Sed quum numeris abstractis, utpote magnitudinibus ejusdem speciei, id necessario tribuendum sit, ut incrementa ac decrementa inter se et efficiant et patiantur, hoc qui negat, is numeros manifesto non quantitates definitas esse dicit, sed qualitates definitas, quas quum ipsas describere non possit, ad numerorum imaginem confugit.' The πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον of the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, in short, is *their being qualitatively distinct.* Alexander on *Met.* M. 6. 1080 b. 12 accommodates himself so entirely to this strained use of πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον as to say (Alex. *in Met.* p. 722 ed. Bonitz) τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας τὸν εἰδητικὸν ἀριθμόν, τὸν δὲ μὴ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔχοντα μηδὲ κατ' εἶδος διαφέροντα τὸν μαθηματικὸν εἶναι ἐτίθετο.

We may safely assume, I think, that for Plato himself the 1096 a. 18.
ητικοὶ ἀριθμοί were rather symbols of the fixity, separateness, and, it were, impenetrability of the qualitatively distinct ἰδέαι, than e ἰδέαι themselves: but it is evident from Aristotle's criticism in Met. M. 6–8 that Pythagorizing followers confounded the symbols nd the things symbolised.

I take it, then, that the reference in the present § is to the μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί and not to the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί: and I understand Aristotle to remind his Platonic opponents that, according to their own view, the μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί do not involve a common ἰδέα, because they are not mutually exclusive εἴδη independent of one another, (like the various species under the genus *animal*), but are so related to one another that the prior is included, as condition, in the subsequent. That the ἰδέαι themselves *are* ἀριθμοί is another entirely different opinion of the Platonists, not, as I think, alluded here. It would not be true to say οὐδὲ τῶν (εἰδητικῶν) ἀριθμῶν ἐν κατεσκεύαζον, for the Platonists certainly posited τὸ ἕν as the supreme ἰδέα or formal principle which produces the other ἰδέαι (called εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί,) in the matter of the δυάς, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν: = *Met.* A. 6. 988 a. 10.

The parallel passage in the *E. E.* runs as follows, i. 8. 1218 a. 1 ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, τοῦτο χωριστόν. Εἴη γὰρ ἄν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον· πρότερον γὰρ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον. ὥστε εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου ὕστερον, εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν, οἷον εἰ χωριστὸν ποιήσειέ τὸ κοινόν. Fritzsche (followed by Grant) makes the ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον of this passage the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, and compares *Met.* B. 3. 999 a. 6 ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερόν τι, οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναί τι παρὰ ταῦτα· οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δυάς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν· ὁμοίως οὐδὲ σχῆμα παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν σχημάτων. I agree with Bonitz (*Met.* p. 153 and 154) against Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1. p. 434), and Schwegler (on *Met.* Δ. 11. 1019 a. 3) that the μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί are intended in *Met.* B. 3. 999 a. 6. If so, the presumption is strong that they are intended in *E. E.* 1. 8. 1218 a. 1, and if in the latter passage, then in *E. N.* i. 6. 2. It ought to be mentioned that Zeller's opinion in the *Platonische Studien* (p 239 sqq.) was that the reference in *E. N.* i. 6. 2 is to the μαθηματικοί, not to the

1096 a. 18. εἰδητικοί ἀριθμοὶ: but that in his *Ph. d. Gr.* (ii. 1. p. 433 s edition) he reverses this opinion.

a. 19. τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται κ.τ.λ.] The category of substance—τὸ τί ἐ τὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἡ οὐσία, is naturally prior to the other categories the various relations and qualities recognised under the categories presuppose *Things* to be related and qualified. 'I white,' and 'being small,' are kinds of 'being' (γένη τῶν ὄ dependent on 'being a thing.' 'Being a thing' is the strict primary sense of 'being.' If, then, the subsequent or deper kinds of 'being,' on the one hand, and 'being' in the pri and fundamental sense, on the other hand, are equally desc as 'good,' it is plain that the term 'good' cannot represe generic notion. Substance and its accidents or offshoots are independent εἴδη, to be brought under 'good' as their γένος.

Two points are to be noted in this argument, (1) It seem assume that the Aristotelian doctrine of the Categories had c to be so far accepted by the Platonists that the inconsisten their theory of Ideas with it was worth pointing out to t (2) In laying stress upon the *dependence* of the other categori the first category it certainly makes a point against οἱ μὴ κατα ζοντες τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν, but at the expense of somewhat stagg the reader when he comes to § 3, where the *independence* or rateness of the categories is assumed, and it is contended since θεός as substance, and ἀρετή as quality, fall under dif κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος, or differ τῷ εἶναι (see *Met.* Δ. 7. 1017 ὁσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται [*sc.* κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας] τοσαυτα εἶναι σημαίνει: and cf. note on *E. N.* v. 1. 20), they cannot bo called 'good' *quâ* having one common nature. In § 2, lin τοῦ ὄντος is the 'being,' or τὸ εἶναι, of the first Category, an other Categories are presented as related to it as *accidents*, ε βηκότα; whereas in § 3, line 24, τῷ ὄντι is used generally f 'being,' or τὸ εἶναι, which is found in ten distinct kinds corres ing to the ten Categories.

[1] ἐστιν is omitted by K^b M^b O^b and CCC in l. 20, and apparently MSS. in l. 24. See Bonitz's note on *Met.* E. 2. 1026 a. 36. In enum the Categories it would appear that Aristotle sometimes writes τὸ τί f ἐστιν. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* p. 203) argues that the writer of *M. M.* mu found no ἐστιν here in line 20, for he has i. 1. 1183 a. 10 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ. In *E. E.* i. 8. 1217 b. 27, however, we have τί ἐστιν. I (*Forsch.* p. 53) would omit ἐστιν both in line 20 and in line 24.

§ 3. ἔτι δ' ἐπεί κ.τ.λ.] The argument in § 2 was that 'good,' when applied to a substance, and to a relation respectively, is not applied to two things belonging to mutually exclusive classes, capable of being brought under a higher class notion: the argument in § 3 is that substances and relations belong to mutually exclusive classes—these classes, however, are not εἴδη, but ultimate γένη incapable of being brought under one common γένος or ἰδέα. The categories are τὰ γένη τῶν ὄντων, and τὸ εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί· οὐ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὄν *An. Post.* ii. 7. 92 b. 13. Cf. *de An.* i. 5. 410 a. 16 οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πάντων [sc. τῶν γενῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν] εἶναι στοιχεῖα. 1096 a. 23.

τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι] 'The use of the term *good* is coextensive with that of the word *is*.' The categories, as αἱ κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος, are the various senses in which the word *is* used: see *Met.* Δ. 7. 1017 a. 22 καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας· ὁσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί ἐστι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ ποῦ, τὰ δὲ πότε, ἑκάστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸ σημαίνει. Οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνων ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἢ τέμνων τοῦ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει ἢ τέμνει.

ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί] see notes on ii. 5. a. 25.

δίαιτα] 'residence.' a. 27.

§ 4. τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη] cf. *Met.* I. 4. 1055 a. 31 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἓν γένος ἡ μία. 'This argument,' says Grant, 'is certainly unsatisfactory if applied to Plato's point of view. Plato would say dialectic is the science of the Idea of good, and in this all other sciences have their meeting-point. Even of the πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν it might be said that according to Aristotle's own account it falls (in all its manifestations, whether as means or ends) under the one supreme science—Politics.' a. 29.

§ 5] Susemihl brackets this § and § 6 as 'inserta ab editore antiquissimo.' I do not think that bracketing is safe or helpful in a chapter like the present. a. 34.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον] Grant compares *Met.* A. 9. 990 a. 34 οἱ δὲ τὰς ἰδέας αἰτίας τιθέμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ζητοῦντες τωνδὶ τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἴοιτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη. The ἰδέαι are merely the doubles of the particulars, and do not help us to explain them.

1096 a. 34. This criticism is valid against those Platonists who rega ἰδέαι, or laws which explain particular things, as themse *things*; but does not affect Plato who, in the *Parmen* A–E, anticipates it in its most telling form—in the forı τρίτος ἄνθρωπος refutation. (For this refutation see Bon pp. 111, 112 on A. 9. 990 b. 17.)

1096 b. 1. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος] The same definition, expressing the sam or nature.

b. 2. οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν] *sc.* αὐτοάνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος.

b. 3. οὐδ' ᾗ ἀγαθόν] *sc.* διοίσει ἀγαθόν τι καὶ αὐτοαγαθόν.

§ 6. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέ κ.τ.λ.] The connexion between this preceding section is well brought out in the parallel passa i. 8. 1218 a. 10 ἔστι τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν· τὸ οὖν αὐ κειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν· τοῦτο δέ τί ἂν εἴη πλὴν ὅτι χωριστόν. 'This prefix αὐτο-,' the Platonists are supposed t 'is not mere surplusage: αὐτο- = ἀΐδιον.' Aristotle replies duration does not enhance essence. The nature of white perfect in a snowflake, which falls into the river, as in a Parian marble.' I cannot agree with Grant (*Ethics*, p. 210), who sees in Aristotle's argument merely a ' between length of duration (πολυχρόνιον) and eternity According to Aristotle's doctrine the οὐσία, or τί ἦν εἶναι, i in particulars is ἀΐδιον, in the sense of being independe accidents of γένεσις and φθορά, which take place in time— It is the Platonists who confuse πολυχρόνιον and ἀΐδιον, b their ἰδέαι *things* separate from the particulars—χωριστὰ placing them in space and time—in space as τρίτοι ἄνθρω where, in time as πολυχρόνια. I therefore understand t fusion between ἀΐδιον and πολυχρόνιον' to be due to the I not to Aristotle. Aristotle says to them—'You make th notion, which is ἀΐδιον, or independent of the accident c thing among things in space and time. Your ἀΐδιον is, only πολυχρόνιον. You have not grasped the distinction b law which is eternally valid, and a thing which comes into and perishes.'

The statement εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐ take to mean that the accident of time does not affect

[1] Grant here follows Eustratius.

ι of λευκότης. Cf. Themistius περὶ ψυχῆς, fol. 69 a (vol. ii. pp. 1096 b. 3.
, 39, ed. Spengel), where λευκότης, as such, is said to be inde-
ndent of μέγεθος or space, and in this respect is compared with
ὅς—ᾧ γὰρ οὐδὲν συντελεῖ τὸ μέγεθος εἰς τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτο ἀμέγεθες καθ'
ό, εἰ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς διαιροῖτο· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πηχυαῖον λευκὸν μᾶλλον
οὐ πυδιαίου . . . διὸ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ταῖς ποιότησιν οὐ συντελεῖ, ἀλλὰ
ιδιαίρετος ἡ λευκότης ὡς λευκότης καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως εἰ τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους τό τε μεῖζον,
ρπίως καὶ τὸ σμικρότερον μόριον νοήσει, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ νοῦ τὸ
μέγεθος, εἴπερ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια. οὕτω γάρ τινα καὶ ἀχρόνως γίνεσθαι
λέγομεν, οἷς οὐδὲν ὁ χρόνος πρὸς τὴν τελείωσιν συνεισφέρει, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς
τέλεια καὶ ὁλόκληρα γίνεται ἐν ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ τοῦ χρόνου.

I conclude this note with an extract from Michelet *ad loc.*, to whom, it will be seen, I am much indebted—'Hoc loco pugnat Aristoteles adversus eos, qui ideas separant a singulis. Ii, qui ideas vel formas rerum ut ipsarum substantias ipsis rebus insitas esse putant, jam, etsi pereant singulae res, aeternitatem formarum adseverant, sive in hac exstent sive in illa re caduca: est enim aeternum immutabile aliquid, in quolibet temporis momento totum existens; singulae igitur res ipsae aeternae, quamvis caducae. Qui vero ideas separant a rebus singulis, illis aeternitas nihil aliud est atque infinitum temporis spatium, quod, cum percurri reque existere nunquam possit, idem est ac diuturnitas. Itaque non ex vera Philosophi sententia, sed ex falsa istorum opinione ἀΐδιον et πολυχρόνιον idem est.'

§ 7. This brief and obscure jotting, which is not reproduced b. 5.
either in the *E. E.* or in the *M. M.*, may be taken as a sort of *argumentum ad homines* addressed to the Platonists—'Your doctrine of the αὐτοαγαθόν is not held even by Speusippus, the head of your own school: he agrees with the more plausible view of the Pythagoreans.' The ἀρχαὶ αἱ κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγόμεναι of the Pythagoreans, or rather of a section of the Pythagoreans, are given in *Met.* A. 5. 986 a. 23 as—πέρας ἄπειρον, περιττὸν ἄρτιον, ἓν πλῆθος, δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν, ἄρρεν θῆλυ, ἠρεμοῦν κινούμενον, εὐθὺ καμπύλον, φῶς σκότος, ἀγαθὸν κακόν, τετράγωνον ἑτερόμηκες. Here τὸ ἕν appears in the column of good things—*i.e.* in the στοῖχος in which τὸ ἀγαθόν occurs. Taking this circumstance in connexion with the fact mentioned in *Met.* A. 6. 987 b. 27 that, while Plato regarded τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς as παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, the Pythagoreans regarded them as immanent in

1096 b. 5. particulars—*οἱ δ' ἀριθμοὺς εἶναί φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα*, we may perhaps venture to explain the section before us as praising the Pythagoreans at the expense of the Platonists, because they—the Pythagoreans—'make the One good, instead of making the Good one': *i.e.* they do not make the Good an abstract unity separate from things; they find it immanent in things in various forms which they enumerate; unity is only one of the forms of its immanence—being a united whole is one of the ways in which a thing is good. The Pythagoreans, in fact, are praised for drawing up a list of good things. Τὸ *ἕν, τὸ πέρας*, &c., may each be called good. There is no good separate from the things enumerated in the column: see Plut. *Is. et Osir.* (quoted by Zell) ch. 48 (ed. Parthey)—*οἱ μὲν Πυθαγορικοὶ διὰ πλειόνων ὀνομάτων κατηγοροῦσι τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἓν τὸ πεπερασμένον τὸ μένον τὸ εὐθὺ τὸ περισσὸν τὸ τετράγωνον τὸ ἴσον τὸ δεξιὸν τὸ λαμπρόν, τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ τὴν δυάδα τὸ ἄπειρον τὸ φερόμενον τὸ καμπύλον τὸ ἄρτιον τὸ ἑτερόμηκες τὸ ἄνισον τὸ ἀριστερὸν τὸ σκοτεινόν.*

As regards the precise nature of the agreement of Speusippus with the Pythagoreans we are left pretty much to conjecture. It is not unlikely, however, that Aristotle is contrasting with the one *ἀρχή* of the Platonists the *πολλαὶ ἀρχαί* of Speusippus: see *Met.* Z. 2. 1028 b. 21 *Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης οὐσίας ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας.* These *ἀρχαί* or *οὐσίαι* derived from *τὸ ἕν*, Speusippus held to be *better than τὸ ἕν*, because (as may be seen from a comparison of the seed with the adult form) *τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον* is not in the Beginning but in the End. Τὸ *ἕν*, then, although the first beginning of things (cf. *ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνός*), is not, for this reason, in an exceptional position as regards goodness. *Qua* good, it is only one among many good *ἀρχαί*, and indeed the least good among them, as being the most remote. It is to this doctrine, then, that Aristotle probably refers when he says here that Speusippus is one of *οἱ τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν*: see *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 30 *ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται.* The reason which Aristotle gives for this judgment is *τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον.* The *First* Cause is the *Best*—God, who is *ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον* (*Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 29). It is plain then that, in

he section before us (*E. N.* i. 6. 7), Aristotle must not be under- 1096 b. 5.
stood to approve the doctrine of Speusippus when he describes it as πιθανώτερον than that of the Platonists criticised. He merely uses the name of Speusippus as a controversial weapon against the Platonists. On the doctrine of Speusippus see Grant, *Eth. ad loc.* and Essay iii. pp. 217–218.

§§ 8–11] See *Argument.* b. 7.

§ 8. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος] I agree with Grant that 'we need not confine the reference of περὶ τούτων to the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, or refer it, with some commentators, to the books mentioned in the list of Diogenes (v. 25) περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων α'· περὶ Σπευσίππου καὶ Ξενοκράτους α'.' The reference is rather to 'the whole subject of the good in its relation to unity—to existence—to the world'; *i. e.* to 'the scope of Aristotle's entire *Metaphysics.*'

διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι] τοὺς b. 9.
λόγους is the theory of the Platonists. Coraes gives the sense of the clause well—ἀντειπεῖν τις ἂν ἔχοι μοι τοῦτο, ὅτι Πλάτων οὐ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ κυρίως καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ πεποίηται τὸν λόγον. The Platonic theory does not bring *all* good things (things relatively good included) under one Idea, but only things absolutely good. The omission of μή in CCC and O^b seems to be a mere blunder.

καθ' ἓν εἶδος] 'Assigned to one species.' εἶδος is here, as Grant b. 10.
remarks, tke Aristotelian *species*, not the Platonic *idea.*

§ 10. ἢ ὅσα . . . ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο] These are alternative questions. b. 16.
The latter is disposed of first by ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος, and the former is dealt with in § 11. If the ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ is the only thing absolutely good, the class (εἶδος) of things absolutely good, which the Platonists ask us to distinguish, will be void of contents, for the ἰδέα is not *in* the class; as Michelet says—'Distinxerat Noster in genere duas bonorum species (εἴδη): bona per se et propter aliud. Iam si omnia vere bona, tanquam non existentia per se, ab idea excluserimus, et alteram speciem tantum ideam esse voluerimus, haec bonorum species erit vana, omnique carebit argumento; nec essent duae species, generi coordinatae (id, quod tamen supposuimus), sed idea vana et multitudo existentium bonorum.'

1096 b. 21. § 11. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὑτά] If, on the other hand, the things enumerated also (*καί, i.e.* as well as the Idea) are absolutely good, and, as such, are λεγόμενα κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν, how are we to account for the fact that they do not all exhibit a common nature or essence of goodness capable of identical definition like the whiteness of white things?

b. 25. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν] 'The application, then, of the *term* "good" (cf. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; in the next sentence) to things does not imply that they all participate in a common "idea."'

b. 27. § 12. ὁμωνύμοις] ὁμώνυμα are things which have the same name without having the same nature (*e.g.* κλείς, a key, and the collar-bone), as distinguished from συνώνυμα, things which have the same name and the same nature (*e.g.* ox and horse, which both not only are *called* animals, but *are* animals): see *Cat.* i. 1 a. 1. When such very different things as *e.g.* a knife, a dinner, a field, and a horse are all called 'good,' they surely cannot get this common name by accident (οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις). There must be some reason why they are called 'good.' That reason, we have seen, does not lie in their participation in one Idea, or universal substance; nor does it lie in their having a common inherited nature, like the members of a biological class, which are συνώνυμα. What, then, is the reason of their being called 'good?'

ἀλλ' ἆρά γε . . . ἀναλογίαν;] τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς λεγόμενα and τὰ πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα (the two phrases are practically equivalent) are technically distinguished by Aristotle from τὰ ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα on the one hand, and τὰ συνωνύμως or καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα on the other hand. τὰ ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα have their common name ἀπὸ τύχης: τὰ συνωνύμως or καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα have it because they belong to the same εἶδος or γένος, whereas τὰ ἀφ' ἑνός, or πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα, are things which not necessarily belong to the same εἶδος or γένος, but agree in contributing to one end, in relation to which they are regarded as belonging to one department—as, *e.g.* a knife and a lecture may both be called 'surgical.' They are both called 'surgical,' not because an ox and a horse are both called 'animals,' nor yet as a key and the collar-bone are both called κλείς. See *Met.* K. 3. 1060 b. τό τε ἰατρικὸν καὶ ὑγιεινὸν . . . πολλαχῶς λέγομεν . . . ἰατρικὸς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ μαχαίριον λέγεται τῷ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι, τὸ

ίτη χρήσιμον. Cf. *Met.* Z. 4. 1030 b. 2 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἰατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ 1096 b. 27.
γον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὔτε ὁμωνύμως οὔτε καθ' ἓν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕν—on
hich Alex. (*in Met.* p. 441, l. 13, ed. Bonitz) has οὔτε καθ' ἓν καὶ
ωνύμως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕν, ἤγουν ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἑνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἕν. Cf. also
Met. Γ. 2. 1003 a. 33 τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ
ίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς
ήλιαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς
ηείας, τὸ δ' ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς. Καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
τῇ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφυὲς εἶναι πρὸς αὐτήν, τὸ δὲ
τῇ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς. Ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ληψόμεθα λεγόμενα
τούτοις. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μέν, ἀλλ' ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν·
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ' ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ' ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς
ίαν, ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας, ἢ τῶν
πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ
ὂν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φαμέν. Καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἁπάντων μία ἐπιστήμη
στίν, ὁμοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν καθ' ἓν λεγο-
μένων ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων
φύσιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον τινὰ λέγεται καθ' ἕν. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ
ντα μιᾶς θεωρῆσαι ᾗ ὄντα: on which Alex. (p. 199, l. 20) has—καθ'
ν μὲν λεγόμενα λέγει τὰ συνώνυμα καὶ ὑφ' ἕν τι κοινὸν τεταγμένα γένος. οὐ
μόνον δέ, φησί, τῶν οὕτως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα μία ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ῶν ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν . . . ἐν πᾶσί πως αὐτοῖς ὁρᾶται ἡ φύσις αὕτη ἀφ'
ς καὶ δι' ἣν οὕτως καλεῖται . . . καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ φυλακτικῷ τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ ἐν
ῷ ποιητικῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑγίειά ἐστιν ἡ θεωρουμένη. There is μία
ιστήμη of all ὄντα ᾗ ὄντα, just as there is μία ἐπιστήμη τῶν ὑγιεινῶν
πάντων: for not only τὰ καθ' ἓν λέγομενα (τὰ συνώνυμα), but τὰ πρὸς
ίαν λεγόμενα φύσιν fall under 'one science.' The term τὸ ὄν is used
n many senses, but in all πρὸς ἕν, just as ὑγιεινόν is always used
πρὸς ὑγίειαν, whether it be used to qualify something which produces,
reserves, declares, or is receptive of health; thus food, exercise,
nd a good complexion are all called ὑγιεινά. Similarly τὸ ὄν is
ways used in reference to (πρός) one object, viz. οὐσία, sometimes
arking οὐσία itself, sometimes its πάθη, sometimes ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν,
ometimes φθορὰ οὐσίας. Cf. also *M. M.* ii. 11. 1209 a. 23 οἷον
μὲν ἰατρικὸν τὸ μαχαίριον, ἰατρικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν
ιστήμην· ταῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μαχαίριον τῷ χρήσιμον
αι πρὸς ἰατρικὴν ἰατρικὸν λέγεται, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος τῷ ποιητικὸς εἶναι
ιείας, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῷ αἰτία εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή: *E. E.* H. 2. 1236 a. 16
ίγαρ ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἓν ἁπάσας μήθ' ὡς εἴδη
ὶ γένους μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως. Πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται

1096 b. 27. καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικόν. Καὶ ψυχὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν ὄργανον καὶ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. Πρῶτον δ' οὗ λόγος ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει. Οἷον ὄργανον ἰατρικόν, ᾧ ἂν ὁ ἰατρὸς χρήσαιτο· ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὀργάνου. Ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρῶτον: and for other references see note on v. 1. 7.

We can now see that the distinction made above in § 8 betwe τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διωκόμενα, as καθ' ἓν εἶδος λεγόμενα, and τὰ ποιητικὰ τοῦ καὶ φυλακτικὰ ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά, as διὰ ταῦτα λεγόμενα is real that between the συνώνυμα, or τὰ καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα, and the τὰ πρὸς καὶ ἀφ' ἑνός of § 12, and the other passages quoted. The Platonis assert that there are ἀγαθά so called συνωνύμως, *i. e.* ἀγαθά which a members of a true εἶδος (or γένος), their membership being explain as their μέθεξις in one ἰδέα; Aristotle's refutation consists in show ing that no ἀγαθά are συνώνυμα, but are τρόπον ἄλλον λεγόμενα.

b. 28. ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν;] This is Aristotle's final answe Different things are called ἀγαθά on the ground of identical relatio (ἀναλογία is defined in *E. N.* v. 3. 8. as ἰσότης λόγων). Th the relation in which sight stands to the body is the same that in which reason stands to the soul. If sight is 'good' in relation—*i. e.* contributes to its particular end, the welfare of t body, reason is 'good' in its like relation to the welfare of t soul: see Alexander *in Met.* p. 550, l. 17 (ed. Bonitz) τὰ ἀνάλο λεγόμενα . . . ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ, οἷον ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ νοῦς ἐν ψυ and p. 329, l. 13 τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἐν ὡρίσατο ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλ Different things are called 'good,' not because they all contribu well to *one* end, but because they all contribute well to *their resp tive ends.* Τὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν λεγόμενα may be represented by parall τὰ πρὸς ἕν by converging, lines.

b. 31. § 13. ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας] πρώτη φιλοσοφία, as distingui from the present enquiry which is πολιτική τις. Ὑπέρ for περί, ho ever, makes me suspect the whole clause from ἐξακριβοῦν to ἰδέας as an interpolation. On this late use of ὑπέρ see notes i. 5. 7, iii. 3. 2, and iv. 2. 4.

b. 32. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 53. defends καί, the reading of K^b, M^b, and Camb. against τό.

b. 35. §§ 14, 15, 16.] The χωριστὸν ἀγαθόν is not only an unrealis good, but it is also useless as an *ideal*—παράδειγμα. Grant h good note on these sections: 'It has been objected that Aris

es on too mean specimens of the arts, and that he might have 1096 b.35.
oken differently if he had adduced the fine arts. But the question whether, for practical life, the Idea, that is, a knowledge of the bsolute, could be made available? This forms a great point of ivergence between Plato and Aristotle. The latter seems to gard the Idea as an object of the speculative reason alone, omething metaphysical and standing apart; and between the peculative and practical powers of man he sets a gulf. Plato, on he other hand, speaking without this analytical clearness, seems to hink of the Idea as an object for the imagination, as well as the eason, as being an ideal as well as an idea. In this its many-ided character he would make it affect life as well as knowledge; or by contemplation of it the mind would become conformed o it.'

§ 16. **ὀφάντης ἢ τέκτων . . . εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν**] This is 1097 a. 8.
ot a fair criticism of Plato. He does not represent the knowledge of the *ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ* as attainable by artisans, but only by those xceptional natures who, having gone successfully through a long ourse of scientific training, are found capable of *διαλεκτική*, and, as hilosopher-kings, are to be entrusted with the management of the tate. See *Rep.* vii. In the *E. E.* i. 8. 1218 b. 7–24 the uselessess of the knowledge of the *ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ* is demonstrated from the ct that this *ἰδέα* is not an *αἴτιον ὡς κινῆσαν*; it does not produce motion, ther as the efficient cause at the disposal of an artificer produces or as the *τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν*, which calls forth the energies of the λιτικός, produces it. Aristotle and Eudemus, when they criticise ato, seem to forget their own great philosophical principle—that e *τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν* is not ultimate, but sought for the sake of the ωρητικὸς βίος, in the *σκοπός* of which—*θεὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ θεραπεύειν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν*—the *ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων* is to be timately found. Aristotle with his *ὁ τὸν σκοπὸν ἔχων ὀρθόν*, and ato with his *ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος*, are at one in making *tor intellectualis Dei* the ultimate spring and coordinating principle all man's varied activities, scientific, moral, and artistic.

τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν] (the reading of K^b restored to the text by a. 9.
water for the *αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν* of L^b and Γ preferred by Bekker) is uivalent to *τοῦτο τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν*. Instances of the separation of the efix *αὐτο-* from its word, are given in the *Index Arist.*, e. g. *Met.* 8. 1084 a. 21 *αὐτὸ ἕκαστος ἄνθρωπος*.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

But to return now from the Good of the Platonists, which, to say the least, i unattainable, to the attainable good, the object of the present enquiry—we s that this attainable good is something which differs in different actions an arts. But can we find no general term to characterise it in every case Surely in every case the good is that for the sake of which is done what is done— health in medical practice, victory in warfare, the house in building—in sho the End, whatever its special nature, in every case. So, if we have alway ultimately one end in all our actions, this one end will be the good attained b man in action; if more than one end, then these will be the forms which good is attained in action. Thus we are led again to our old conclusion which it is now time to explain more fully.

There are many so-called ends which are not really ends, but only mean to something else. Money, e.g. *and tools are ends which are not really end But the Chief Good must be really an end. Now that which is sought for its own sake is more really an end than that which is sought for the sake of some thing else; and that which is never sought for the sake of something else is mo really an end than that which is sought both for its own sake and for the sa of something else; while that which is always sought for its own sake an never for the sake of something else is most really an end,* i. e. *is an end withou qualification. Now Happiness is such an end without qualification. Honour pleasure, understanding, and the virtues, we seek both for their own sakes an for the sake of the Happiness which we suppose they will bring. But Happine no man seeks as a means to these, or to anything.*

That Happiness is the Chief Good may be inferred also from the fact th Happiness is self-sufficient. The Chief Good is self-sufficient: its possess lacks nothing; and with Happiness a man lacks nothing—when we say 'man' we mean not 'the solitary individual,' for he is an abstraction, but th real man—the citizen, whose concrete personality is constituted by the manifo relations in which he stands to kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens, with a definite circle. Such a man, then, with Happiness, lacks nothing: he h that which is the best of all good things—not best, however, in the sense being one of them, for if it were one of them, it could be made better by th addition of the least one of them.

But 'Happiness is the Chief Good' is, after all, a truism which throw little light on the real nature of Happiness or the Chief Good. Perhaps we m reach something more definite by determining 'the function of man.'

Every artist has his peculiar work or function. Surely man, as man, h his peculiar function also. What is it then? Let us review the vital functio in order. It cannot be taking in nourishment, and growing, for plants a animals, as well as man, live this kind of life, and we are looking for peculiar *function. Nor can it be perceiving with the senses, and feeling,*

this kind of life he shares with all animals. We are left then with the conclusion that man's peculiar function is the rational life—that is, rational conduct. *The good man will perform this function well,* i.e. *so as to realise the end of his being in the manifestation of his own peculiar excellence. The end or Chief Good of man may then be defined as 'vital function manifesting the excellence which is highest and most perfect in human nature.' But it is only 'in a perfect life' that this end can be realised; 'for one swallow does not make spring.'*

Let this serve as a 'rough sketch' of the Chief Good. If the outline is right, it will be easy to fill in the details afterwards. But our former warning must not be forgotten—the same exactness must not be looked for in all enquiries; for exactness varies with subject-matter, and with the nature of the particular enquiry or art. Nor must we always demand syllogistic antecedents. First principles have no such antecedents, but are data of sense perception, induction, or habit. We must try then to look for our principles in the place natural to each kind, and be careful to define them well when we have got them: for good definitions, to begin with, have great influence on what follows: 'the beginning is more than half the whole.'

§ 1. **ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν**] See i. 5. 8, where the expression τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν occurs, immediately before the digression of chapter vi. 1097 a. 15.

φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ] This result has been reached in ch. vi. § 12—καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. The γάρ introduces a clause which gives direction, as it were, to the question τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν; What is good, we have just seen, differs in different arts and pursuits, but is always the *end* of the art or pursuit in question; **τέλος** is the most general description which can be given of ἀγαθόν. Hence *the* ἀγαθόν, *i. e.* τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν must be **τελειότατον**—*the* end *par excellence.* Accordingly, if all πρακτά have ultimately one τέλος, or certain assignable τέλη, this, or these, will be τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. a. 16.

§ 2. **μεταβαίνων δή** κ.τ.λ.] Michelet has 'haec *aberratio* ipsa Philosophum jam ad ea quae sibi proposuerat reduxit'; Stahr translates 'So ist denn auf ihrem *Umwege* unsere Untersuchung doch zu demselben Resultate gelangt'; Williams, 'Our argument has now returned to the question from which it originally *digressed*'; and Peters, 'Our argument has thus come round *by a different path* to the same point as before.' I do not think that μεταβαίνων here implies *digression*, but rather *advance step by step*, through the particular cases of ἰατρική, στρατηγική, οἰκοδομική, &c., to the generalisation **ἐν ἁπάσῃ πράξει τὸ τέλος**: cf. *Met.* Z. 4. 1029 b. 1–12, where a. 24.

1097 a. 24. τὸ μεταβαίνειν expresses the inductive process by which τὰ φύσει γνώριμα are reached through τὰ αὐτῷ γνώριμα: πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον. ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἧττον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθά, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. τὰ δ' ἑκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ῥηρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα καὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐκ τῶν φαύλως μὲν γνωστῶν αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν, τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γνῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν. Eustratius evidently understands μεταβαίνειν here (*E. N.* i. 7. 2) to mean gradual advance—μεταβαίνων ὁ λόγος ἀεὶ ἑνὸς πρὸς ἕτερον, καὶ τοῦ μὲν τελειοτέρου ἀπτόμενος ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἀτελέστερον ὑπερβαίνων εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ζητούμενον τὸ κοινὸν ἁπάντων τέλος, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφίξεται.

εἰς ταὐτόν] *i. e.* to the same result as that reached in i. 2. 1.

a. 27. § 3. αὐλούς] Zell ejects αὐλούς as due to the following ὅλως. Ἀγρούς, φίλους, and δούλους have been conjectured by Coraes, Bonitz, and Bywater (*Journ. of Philol.* vol. xvii. p. 68) respectively. I confess that I do not see any objection to retaining αὐλούς.

a. 28. τέλεια] 'Ends in themselves.'

a. 30. § 4.] 'The conception of ends was not fully developed in Plato at the beginning of the second book of the *Republic*, those are said to be the highest goods which are desired both for themselves and for their results.' Grant. It is misleading, I think, thus to compare directly what Plato says about δικαιοσύνη, at the beginning of *Rep.* ii, with what Aristotle says here about τὸ ἄριστον. Plato merely says of δικαιοσύνη what Aristotle himself says of ἀρετή in § 5—that from one point of view it is an end, from another point of view a means; and Aristotle would certainly not dispute the statement that its being a means, as well as an end, makes it more valuable than it would be if it were merely an end. On the other hand Plato would agree with Aristotle in regarding the εὐδαιμονία, or noble life, of the indivisible organism of the πόλις, as an end which is never a means. It must be carefully noted that when Plato says, in the passage referred to by Grant, that δικαιοσύνη, as both end and means, is better than things which are merely ends, the ends which he has in his mind are τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς. He is not thinking of τὸ ἄριστον—the noble life, which the διαλεκτικός alone grasps in its unity. Perhaps we may say that

δικαιοσύνη has two senses with him—that, as one of the virtues, it is both end and means; but, in its highest sense, as equivalent to Aristotle's εὐδαιμονία, it is an end, never a means. 1097 a. 30.

§ 5. νοῦν] Not 'Reason' in the highest sense, but 'intelligence' or 'prudence' as in vi. 11. 6 καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην. Those who systematically make τιμή or ἡδονή their end, *i. e.* choose it δι' αὑτό, are those who identify it with εὐδαιμονία, as they are described in ch. v. The truly good man chooses τιμή, ἡδονή, νοῦς, and ἀρετή, for the sake of εὐδαιμονία: *i. e.* in all his special pursuits he is regulated by the ideal of the noble life. 1097 b. 2.

§ 6. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν] 'The same conclusion (viz. that εὐδαιμονία is the *summum bonum*) follows also from the consideration of its self-sufficiency.' b. 6.

τὸ δ' αὔταρκες κ.τ.λ.] 'The term "self-sufficient," however, we do not apply to the life of the *mere* Self—the solitary Self, but to that of the Self realised in association with others—with parents, children, and wife—with friends and fellow-citizens.' In this rendering I have tried to bring out the *logical* construction of the sentence, according to which αὐτῷ, the *logical* subject of αὐτάρκεια, is qualified (1) by μόνῳ, and (2) by γονεῦσι . . . πολίταις: *i.e.* the Self may be regarded either (1) in isolation, or (2) as constituted by social relations. In the first case it is a mere abstraction, and its self-sufficiency is only nominal; in the second case it is concrete and real, and self-sufficient in virtue of the presence of those relations which constitute its concrete reality. b. 8.

According to the *grammatical* construction, however, γονεῦσι and the following datives are *coordinate with* αὐτῷ. The dative αὐτῷ depends on the verbal notion in αὔταρκες, as Ramsauer points out: 'Egregia brevitate,' he says, 'per solam dativi casus vim tota enunciatio confecta est. Nobis magis perspicuum esset, si in eandem sententiam legeremus: αὔταρκες δὲ λέγομεν οὐχ ὃ αὐτῷ μόνῳ ἀρκεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσιν ἀρκεῖν δεῖ κ.τ.λ.' Cook Wilson (*Transactions of Oxf. Philological Society*, Feb. 3, 1888) calls attention to the words of the Paraphrast as giving 'the right explanation of the dative'—αὔταρκες δὲ ὃ ἀρκεῖ οὐ μόνον τινὶ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι κ.τ.λ. Of course properly αὔταρκες (neut.) cannot govern αὐτῷ (masc.), much less γονεῦσι: the only proper construction is αὐτάρκης αὐτῷ (cf. *M. M.* ii. 15. 1212 b. 26 αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ αὐτάρκης ἔσται): αὐτάρκης ἄλλοις (γονεῦσι . . . πολίταις) is a contradiction in

1097 b. 8. terms. The grammar therefore of the sentence is loose: we ought to have had something like this—τὸν δ' αὐτάρκη λέγομεν οὐχ αὐτῷ, ᾗ μονώτης, αὐτάρκη, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ, ᾗ οἰκονόμος καὶ πολίτης. The singular γυναικί (K^b and M^b however have γυναιξί), among the plurals, points to αὐτῷ as the logical subject of the clause ἀλλὰ . . . πολίτας.

b. 11. φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 54) defends the reading πολιτικόν given by K^b against the πολιτικός of L^b M^b, and compares ix. 9. 3 πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός.

Man realises his true nature or personality in the πόλις. The true 'self,' to which 'self-sufficiency' is ascribed, is that which consists in the clear consciousness of manifold social relations, and of the duties which they entail, as distinguished from the 'self' which is made up of the sensations and feelings, as such, of the individual: see *Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 1 φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί· καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος.

§ 7. τούτων δὲ λεπτέος ὅρος τις] Social life, the realisation of which by the individual constitutes his true personality, is, so to speak, a natural organism (τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί *Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 2), and must be *definite*—ὡρισμένον: cf. ix. 10. 3, 4, a passage which seems to redeem the promise ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον.

b. 12. γονεῖς] = προγόνους. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 111) suggests that after γονεῖς a genitive, τῶν γονέων, may have fallen out, but does not press the suggestion.

The true self, described as 'self-sufficient,' is constituted by the consciousness of relations to others—ancestors, contemporaries, and descendants, within a definite, and comparatively narrow, circle. The self, like the state, must be εὐσύνοπτος. The σπουδαῖος—the man who is earnest about the performance of duty, will not allow himself to be influenced in his daily life by the supposed wishes of very distant ancestors, or by the supposed wants of very remote posterity: nor will he try to adapt himself to a very wide and miscellaneous body of contemporaries.

b. 16. § 8.] All the editors have long notes on this section, which, after all, is not very difficult. 'Moreover we take (supply οἰόμεθα) Happiness to be the most choiceworthy of all good things—not "most choiceworthy" in the sense of being itself one of them, for (δέ as introducing this apagogic proof is practically equivalent to γάρ,

ich Susemihl, following Aretinus, indeed reads) plainly, if it 1097 b. 16.
re counted together with them as one of them, it would be made
re choiceworthy by the addition of the least of them—
e addition would cause an overbalance of good, and the
reater good is always the more choiceworthy.' Cf. the Paraphrast's very clear note—*ἔτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ λέγομεν συναριθμεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς· τῶν γὰρ αἱρετῶν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τὸ ἄκρον· καὶ εἰ σύσταχον αὐτὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήσομεν ἀγαθοῖς, φανερὸν ὅτι, εἰ προσθήσομέν τι τῶν ἄλλων αὐτῇ, αἱρετωτέραν ποιήσομεν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτὴ τὸ ἄκρον τῶν αἱρετῶν.* Eustratius, on the other hand, absurdly interprets the passage as meaning that *εὐδαιμονία*, though *πάντων αἱρετωτάτη* without addition of minor good things, is nevertheless made *αἱρετωτέρα ἑαυτῆς* by the addition of them—*οἷον τὸ εὔτριχον ἵππου, ἢ τὸ ἐπιδεξίως βαδίζειν, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, ὃ προστιθέμενον τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ μηδενὸς λειπομένῃ τῶν κυριωτέρων πρὸς σύστασιν αἱρετωτέραν αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀποτελεῖ.* I will not trouble the student with the other views of the interpretation of this passage. A statement and criticism of them will be found in Rassow's *Forsch.* pp. 112–115. Rassow interprets as I have done above, following the Paraphrast. So also do Coraes, Michelet, and Grant; Zeller, however (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. pp. 610, 611, third ed.), at the end of a somewhat puzzling note, suggests that the words *συναριθμουμένην δὲ . . . ἀεί*, or at least *ἐπεροχή . . . ἀεί* are an interpolation. But it is difficult to suppose that the writer of the *M. M.* i. 2. 1184 a. 15–25 had not the words suspected by Zeller before him when he wrote—*μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν πῶς τὸ ἄριστον δεῖ σκοπεῖν; Πότερον οὕτως ὡς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναριθμουμένου; Ἀλλ' ἄτοπον. Τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπειδή ἐστι τέλος τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλειον τέλος ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐθὲν ἂν ἄλλο δόξειεν εἶναι ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν συντίθεμεν; ἐὰν δὴ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ συναριθμῇς, αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔσται βέλτιον· αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἔσται. Οἷον τὰ ὑγιεινὰ θεὶς καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν, σκόπει τί τούτων πάντων βέλτιστον. Βέλτιστον δ' ἐστὶν ὑγίεια. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο πάντων βέλτιστον, καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον· ἄτοπον δὴ συμβαίνει. Οὐ δὴ ἴσως οὕτω γε σκεπτέον τὸ βέλτιστον.*

The doctrine of the present section may be explained as follows—*Εὐδαιμονία* is Life, and, as such, cannot be classed among the 'good things' of life. It is the Form and organisation of man's powers and opportunities. To suppose it possible to add one of these powers or opportunities to the already perfect Form, would be to suppose that the power or opportunity in question

1097 b. 16. has not been already organised in the Form[1], and that quently the Form is imperfect. The absurdity of such a suppo would equal that of representing a perfectly healthy man as more healthy by the addition of a heart. As the various org the body have no function, and therefore no real existence, from the living body, so particular good things (virtue, health, b wealth) have no existence, except as elements of the noble lif

In this section Aristotle virtually maintains all that Plato tended for in his doctrine of the Idea of the Good. As the of the Good is the unity of good things, and that by reas which they are good—in other words, as it is that definite sy or order, by belonging to, and subserving which, particular t are said to be *good*, rather than pleasant, or otherwise attra to mere sense; so εὐδαιμονία is that orderly and beautiful li relation to which, and only to which, man's powers and o tunities have any significance. The man who has no rat conception of the greatness and beauty of Life, as a system cherish, instead of that conception, an image borrowed from se he will identify Happiness, or Life, with pleasure, or ho Having made this identification, he will easily persuade hi that 'Happiness' may be enhanced by the addition of parti good things; for *his* 'Happiness' is itself only a particular thing. But Happiness, as the rational man conceives it, is a *thing*—not something that a man receives passively and poss (κτῆμα), but the *use* (χρῆσις) which he makes of the things h received and possesses. So, a tree is not the inorganic elem into which it may be analysed, but the use, as it were, to the organising principle puts these elements. Νοῦς in man, φύσις in the plant and animal worlds, recognises and im definite limits. Particular details are valued by it, not for t selves (if they were, no limit could be assigned to their desi multiplication), but for the sake of the beautiful Life which forms them. But the man who lives by 'sense and imagina is immersed in these details. Life, or 'Happiness,' is for a mere succession of particular experiences—an indefinite of good things which never satisfies him. To the external

[1] Cf. *Met.* Z. 17. 1041 b. 11 sqq., where it is shown in the case of σάρξ t οὐσία, or organic whole, is not co-ordinate with its στοιχεῖα or elemen cannot be added to them.

may seem to be εὐδαίμων, because the material conditions or 1097 b.16.
nents of εὐδαιμονία are separately present; but the transforming
rit is inwardly wanting—

'Er hat die Theile in seiner Hand,
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.'

le is receptive of isolated impressions; he lives κατὰ πάθος; he
oes not assert a personality in active function. Cf. *Poet.* 6.
1450 a. 18 ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστί, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τις ἐστίν, οὐ
ποιότης.

§ 9. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν b. 22.
ν φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δέ κ.τ.λ.] According to Ramsauer τὸ ἄριστον is
the subject and τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν the predicate, and τὸ ἄριστον must be
understood after τί ἐστιν. The accepted *name* εὐδαιμονία and the
desiderated *definition* are thus contrasted by μέν and δέ. But, if this
were the construction, should we not have ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν
τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δέ κ.τ.λ.?

§ 10. ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ] whether the ἔργον b. 26.
be a substantive result παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, or simply the ἐνέργεια itself
(see *E. N.* i. 1. 2 and *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 22–b. 3). In the former
case the ἔργον is better than the ἐνέργεια, in the latter case than the
ἕξις. Cf. *E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 a. 13 τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διχῶς· τῶν μὲν γάρ
ἐστιν ἕτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν, οἷον οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία ἀλλ' οὐκ
οἰκοδόμησις καὶ ἰατρικῆς ὑγίεια ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑγίανσις οὐδ' ἰάτρευσις, τῶν δ' ἡ
χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὄψεως ὅρασις καὶ μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. Ὥστ'
ἀνάγκη, ὧν ἔργον ἡ χρῆσις, τὴν χρῆσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἕξεως. Of this
latter kind is the ἔργον ἀνθρώπου of the present passage: cf. *Met.* Θ.
8. 1050 a. 34 ὅσων δὲ μή ἐστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν
τούτοις ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ
θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τις
ἐστίν. Cf. also *M. M.* i. 3. 1184 b. 9 Τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐχ ἁπλοῦν
ἀλλὰ διττόν· ἐνίων μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ τέλος αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρῆσις, οἷον
τῆς ὄψεως· καὶ ἔστι γε ἡ χρῆσις αἱρετωτέρα τῆς ἕξεως. Τέλος δὲ ἡ χρῆσις·
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν βούλοιτο ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν μὴ μέλλων ὁρᾶν ἀλλὰ μένειν. Ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἐπ' ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Ὧν ἄρα καὶ χρῆσις καὶ ἕξις ἐστίν, ἀεὶ
βέλτιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἡ χρῆσις τῆς ἕξεως· ἡ γὰρ χρῆσις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια
τέλος, ἡ δ' ἕξις τῆς χρήσεως ἕνεκεν.

§ 11. πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ.] The editors point out that this passage b. 28.
is taken from *Rep.* i. 352 E δοκεῖ τι σοὶ εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; ἔμοιγε. ἆρα

1097 b. 28. οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ᾖ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα; . . . ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; οὐ δῆτα. τί δή; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαῖμεν ἔργα εἶναι; . . . οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ᾧπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; . . . ἴθι δή, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι . . . ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; μάλιστά γε, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι; φαμέν.

b. 33. §§ **12, 13.**] The following extracts give in outline the psychology of these sections—viz. that living beings (τὰ ἔμψυχα), possessing the power of nutrition and growth, are either sentient (ζῷα) or non-sentient (φυτά). Sentient beings either combine their separate sensations into a rational experience (ἄνθρωπος), or they do not (τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα). *De An.* ii. 2. 413 a. 20 Λέγομεν οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. Πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἕν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις. Διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι' ἧς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους· οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν αὔξεται, κάτω δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ πάντῃ ὅσα καὶ τρέφεται, καὶ ζῇ διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφήν. Χωρίζεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτου ἀδύνατον ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς. Φανερὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν φυομένων· οὐδεμία γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει δύναμις ἄλλη ψυχῆς. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μηδ' ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δ' αἴσθησιν ζῷα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον. Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἁφή. Ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. Θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει· τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα. 3. 414 a. 29 Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. Δυνάμεις δ' εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. Ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντ' ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἁφήν· ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη: . . . Ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι

κοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ καὶ τιμιώτερον. . . . οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει 1097 b. 33.
νγισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ' ἐκείνων ἕκαστον,
ὑ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν.
Περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος.

§ 13. πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος] Grant translates, 'a moral 1098 a. 3.
life of the rational part,' and compares vi. 2. 2 τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. This translation is somewhat misleading. Man's highest function is not πρᾶξις in the sense of moral, as distinguished from speculative 'action'—θεωρία: nor do the words πρακτικὴ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος really limit us to the 'moral life.' See *Pol.* H. 3. 1325 b. 14 'Αλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐνέργειάν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. 'Αλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, κάλλιστ' οἴονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γεγομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξίς τις· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας. It is better then to translate the words πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, 'a life consisting in the action of the rational part.'

τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον] a. 4.
'With regard to the present passage,' Grant says, 'Bekker exhibits no variation in the MSS., and the Paraphrast evidently had it in his text. All that can be said therefore is that the present sentence interrupts the sense and grammar of the context, and that it is conspicuously awkward in a book which for the most part reads smoothly.' Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 72) brackets the sentence, pointing out that ἐπιπειθής does not occur elsewhere in the Aristotelian canon, and appears only in very late Greek. While the sentence itself, then, is doubtless an interpolation, its doctrine is strictly Aristotelian, being, in fact, that laid down afterwards in ch. 13, § 19 of this book. 'The rational part' is (1) Reason proper, τὸ λόγον ἔχον κυρίως—that which 'has reason' in the strict and proper sense of 'having,' i.e. 'has it *in itself*;' (2) the appetites *qua* obedient to reason, τὸ μετέχον λόγου—that which 'has reason,' not in the strict and proper sense of 'having,' but in the sense of 'participating in, or benefiting by, what another has.'

ἁπτῶς κ.τ.λ.] 'But, as this "rational life" may be understood in a. 5.

1098 a. 5. either of two senses—either as a state, or as a function, we take it in the latter, which seems to be the more proper sens am inclined to agree with Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 72) that καὶ ἡ ταύτης ought to be omitted. He supposes it to have been ins after the clause τούτου δὲ . . . διανοούμενον had been interpo After λεγομένης Rassow conjectures that such words as τῆς μὲ ἐνέργειαν τῆς δὲ καθ' ἕξιν have fallen out (*Forsch.* p. 73).

a. 7. §§ 14, 15.] The apodosis begins with τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν where γίνεται, as Grant remarks, 'is used as denoting a dedu from premisses' [cf. i. 8. 3 for a similar use of γίνεται], and m rendered 'it results that the good for man, &c.' Eustratius, how gives a different force to γίνεται: οὐκ εἶπε δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ἐστίν γίνεται, διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἵστασθαι ὀφείλειν τὸν τέλειον ἄνθρωπον ἐ ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ διὰ παντὸς ἐμμένειν αὐτοῦ ἀντεχόμενον . . . ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐ εἰπεῖν τὸ γίνεται· ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τινὰ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι ἔχει τὸ ὡς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἀγὼν καὶ ἡμέρα καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός· τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστον μὲν ὡς ὅλον οὐκ ἀπηρτισμένον ὑφίσταται, κατὰ μέρος δὲ γινόμενον ἀπο παρερχομένων τῶν μερῶν· οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ αὐτῆς τ γεγονὸς ἤδη παρῆλθε, τὸ δ' ἐπιγίγνεται μετ' ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτω οὐδέποτε ὁλόκληρος ἵσταται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀπαρτίζεται· διὸ καὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖον εἶναι εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι. Is Eustratius t ing of *E. N.* ix. 9. 5 ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργε ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι Grant's explanation of γίνεται is of course correct.

§ 14. ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια] The term ψυχή has not been actually above, but is naturally suggested by the divisions enumerat §§ 12 and 13, which are those of the ψυχή.

κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου] The Paraphrast explains rigl think, the distinction intended here: κατὰ λόγον, ὅταν διανοῆται, ἄνευ λόγου, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος κινῆται μετὰ λόγου[1]. expression κατὰ λόγον at the beginning of this section is follo will be observed, by the expression μετὰ λόγου at the end section; but the technical opposition between κατὰ λόγον (λόγος is a principle governing life mechanically from without μετὰ λόγου (where λόγος regulates life from within: see notes 13. 5) does not seem to me to be raised in the present pa

[1] So also Eustratius—τὸ μὲν κατὰ λόγον περὶ τῆς οἰκείου ἐχούσης λό διανοουμένης ψυχῆς θέμενος· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου περὶ τῆς λόγῳ ἐπιπειθοῦσ

although the two expressions occur in it. The expression μετὰ λόγου often stands merely for 'rational,' instead of λογικός, which Aristotle does not use in this sense—or hardly ever: cf. *Met.* Θ. 5. 1048 a. 3, where δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου are opposed to ἄλογοι δυνάμεις. Here, then (*E. N.* i. 7. 14), I think, the phrase πράξεις μετὰ λόγου = πράξεις λογικάς (as a later writer might employ the adjective); and expresses shortly what has been set forth more fully in the words ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, understood as by the Paraphrast[1]. Perhaps, however, it may be thought that ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου is = μετὰ λόγου in the technical sense of the latter expression (*i.e.* where λόγος is an immanent principle regulating life), and that ἤ thus introduces a correction of the inadequate formula κατὰ λόγον, which accordingly is not repeated, the more correct μετὰ λόγου being used. But it does not seem likely that Aristotle would introduce such an important distinction by means of the merely negative expression μὴ ἄνευ λόγου. On the other hand, such a negative expression is well fitted to designate the obedience of the passions to reason, as distinguished from the spontaneous activity of reason itself in the sphere of thought. 1098 a. 7.

τῷ γένει] qualifies τὸ δ' αὐτό. a. 8.

§ 15.] *The Definition of* εὐδαιμονία. Muretus quotes Cicero's neat rendering of Aristotle's definition of εὐδαιμονία, 'Aristoteles virtutis usum cum perfectae vitae prosperitate conjunxit.' *De Fin.* iv. 7. a. 16.

κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην] *i.e.* κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἀρετήν. a. 17. Reason is the Form of man which is impressed on the matter of the lower nature which he shares with the brutes. This Form (identical with the τέλος or ἔργον, cf. *E. N.* iii. 7. 6 ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει: *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 21 τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος) is the ἄριστον (§ 12) which is the object of the present enquiry. In seeking to discover the definition of a thing (and Aristotle is here really seeking to discover the *definition of man*), we always look for the characteristic Form irrespective of the matter in which it is realised. Hence here, when Aristotle identifies Happiness with the ἐνέργεια of Reason, he is considering it *formally*—as something which admits of *definition* (see note on vii. 13. 2 b. 10). But

[1] This was written before I became acquainted with Bywater's view that ἀνθρώπου 1098 a. 12 . . . οὕτω 16 is a repetition of what has gone before. This view explains the conclusion which I had reached that μετὰ λόγου and κατὰ λόγον are not distinguished here, as they are in vi. 13. 5.

1098 a. 17. it must not be forgotten (and Aristotle, unlike the exponents of his system, never forgets this) that I Form of Happiness, is only realised by man in a vegetative and sensitive. Accordingly, when Happi be an ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην ἀρετήν, i νοῦ, it is understood that *all* the functions, vegetative of man as a composite being are exercised in a ha teristic (ἴδιον) of man alone. This harmonious exe natural faculties is the 'exercise of Reason' in whi good consists. The exercise of Reason is *best* in the the co-ordination of all other functions, not in the s itself a function abstracted from the others, capabl distinguished from God) of operating without a mat in the ψυχή *qua* θρεπτική and αἰσθητική. See Laas (εὐδαιμ *in Ethicis Principium quid velit et valeat*, Berlin, and 11: 'In hac definitione non omnia plana sun quod hominis munus in sola ratione versatur, quia ej quasi non sentire et vivere, quamvis non proprium, munus sit. . . . Ut igitur cur rationi humana om noscas, memineris quaeso Aristotelem hominis propriu est igitur hoc potius anquirendum cur alicujus rei vis solo sit non in toto. . . Cum Platoni omnis essentia v versali, *illi* (*i. e.* Aristoteli) generalis definitionis pars materia in qua vera essentia specificae differentiae ex Ac si omne genus materia est, quo mersa differentia dicam, sola vim totius exprimit, etiam in rerum natura existit quatenus materiae forma est impressa: con necessariae ut forma possit comparere pro materia cum primum illud forma definitum prodiit, eae ad spiciendam nullius sint momenti. Itaque si ex Ar omnis plantarum vita animalium propriam exister praecedit tanquam conditio sine qua non, est ea i materia, vera autem essentia in proprio est quod in Quare verum munus hominis non in vivendo, nor seseque movendo—sed hae sunt conditiones in qu hominis vita efflorescat.'

a. 18. § 16. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 116, the question whether these words mean, as gener 'das volle menschliche Leben bis zum Tode'—*i* life spent prosperously up to the day of death.

admitting that there is much in favour of the view that such is their 1098 a. 18.
meaning: *first* the passage *E. N.* i. 9. §§ 10 and 11 οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει: *secondly*, the circumstance that the later Peripatetics undoubtedly took the words in this sense—*E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 b. 6 διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν, ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὔδαιμον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον: *M. M.* i. 4. 1185 a. 4 οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ γε ἀτελεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν τελείῳ· τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ. There is nothing, however, in the expression βίος τέλειος taken by itself, Rassow thinks, to warrant us in assuming that Aristotle—as distinguished from his followers—makes a long continuously prosperous life a necessary condition of Happiness. The phrase βιος τέλειος taken by itself means simply a life that reaches its end or aim. Of course to reach its end or aim a life must have a reasonable duration, and a reasonable amount of prosperity; but the question still remains, Did Aristotle, like his successors of the Peripatetic school, identify this reasonable duration and prosperity, necessary for the attainment of the end, with a long life continuously prosperous up to the day of death? To answer this question, Rassow appeals to *E. N.* i. 10. 14 οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥᾳδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος. Thus, while Solon will allow the title of 'happy' only to the man who possesses Happiness without interruption to the end of his natural life, Aristotle does not regard it as impossible to regain a Happiness which one has lost. If then it is conceivable that a man may possess, lose, and then regain Happiness, how can the βίος τέλειος, in the sense of 'das volle menschliche Leben bis zum Tode,' be the necessary condition of Happiness? We shall have to return to this subject in ch. 10.

§ 17. περιγεγράφθω . . . ἀναγράψαι] The editors compare *de* a. 20.
gen. anim. ii. 6. 743 b. 20 ἅπαντα δὲ ταῖς περιγραφαῖς διορίζεται

1098 a. 20. πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ λαμβάνει τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰς μαλακότητας καὶ τὰς σκληρότητας, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἂν ὑπὸ ζωγράφου τῆς φύσεως δημιουργούμενα· καὶ γὰρ οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῷον. The meaning of ὑποτυπῶσαι is to 'mould slightly or roughly,' then to 'outline' = περιγράψαι, which is opposed to ἀναγράψαι, to 'fill in in detail.'

In this (the third) digression on the logical method of Ethics (§§ 17–23), Grant remarks (*Ethics* vol. i. p. 394) that 'Aristotle points out his definition of the chief good as a "sketch to be filled up"; and also, it would appear, as an ἀρχή or leading principle, which in importance amounts to "more than half the whole" science. In filling up the sketch, he again cautions us that too much ἀκρίβεια is not to be expected. But it is plain that he has deserted his former view of the science as inductive [*i. e.* in i. 4. 5]; he now makes it depend on a general conception of the chief good which is to be applied and developed.' See generally Grant's Appendix A *on the Ethical method of Aristotle.* Grant seems to me to go too far when he says that, in the passage before us, Aristotle 'has deserted his former view of the science as inductive.' The opposition between induction and deduction is not an absolute one. In a concrete enquiry, of the complexity of that pursued in the *Ethics*, the phenomena could not be grouped and handled, as 'induction' requires, without the aid of 'deduction.' 'A general conception of the chief good,' framed in anticipation of the evidence to be afterwards fully adduced in support of it, is essential at the outset, as 'throwing the light of science' (to use Mill's expression) upon phenomena which would otherwise baffle knowledge by their complexity and apparent inconsistency. Aristotle's method in Ethics is thus 'inductive,' or 'deductive,' according to the point of view from which we choose to regard it. He starts with a 'general conception,' framed in advance of the facts, which he applies to their interpretation; so far his method is 'deductive.' But the results of the application of this 'general conception' are so carefully verified by appeals to experience at every step, and so often modified, to bring them into agreement with experience, that the so-called 'deductive' enquiry seems not to differ from the 'inductive' process of establishing generalisations by the observation of particular phenomena. In short Aristotle's method in Ethics answers pretty exactly to what Mill (*Logic* Book vi. ch. 9) calls the 'Physical or Concrete Deductive

,' the method of astronomy, natural philosophy, physiology, 1098 a.20.
ecially of social science, 'that most complex of all studies.'
ıthor of the *Ethics* is 'aware' (to borrow Mill's words)
he same superior complexity [of social phenomena] which
ı the instrument of deduction more necessary, renders it
ıore precarious'; and he meets this difficulty by the syste-
use of verification, characterised by Mill as 'the third
al constituent part of the Deductive method,' and described
process 'of collating the conclusions of the ratiocination
with the concrete phenomena themselves, or when such are
able, with their empirical laws.' Aristotle's appeals to 'the
te phenomena themselves'—to his own observations in
and Politics, occur on every page; while to 'their empirical
as popularly recognised in ἔνδοξα and λεγόμενα, he attaches
eatest weight. The spirit in which Aristotle employs the con-
leductive method in the *Ethics* could not be better charac-
l than in the following passage (Mill's *Logic* vi. 9): 'The
l of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the
ri reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and
of observation *à posteriori*. Either of these processes, apart from
ıer, diminishes in value as the subject increases in complica-
ıd this in so rapid a ratio as soon to become entirely worthless;
reliance to be placed in the concurrence of the two sorts of
ce, not only does not diminish in anything like the same
tion, but is not necessarily much diminished at all. Nothing
esults than a disturbance in the order of precedency of the
ocesses, sometimes amounting to its actual inversion; inso-
hat instead of deducing our conclusions by reasoning, and
ıg them by observation, we in some cases begin by obtain-
em conjecturally from specific experience, and afterwards
t them with the principles of human nature by *à priori*
ngs, which reasonings are thus a real verification.'
he *Ethics* 'the order of precedency' is frequently 'dis-
' and even 'inverted,' in correspondence with the
ies of a difficult enquiry. Hence the hesitation which
e's commentators have shown in deciding the question,
r the method of the *Ethics* is 'deductive,' or 'inductive.'
ıth however is, as we have seen, that the abstract distinction
ı Deduction and Induction is not *à propos* in relation to
ete enquiry like the present.

1098 a.20. With regard to Aristotle's attitude, in other concrete than those of the moral sciences, to the three operations Mill (*Logic* iii. 11) as essential to the Deductive metho processes (1) of direct induction, (2) of ratiocination, a verification, it may be said that while he is fully awa importance of the third, and carries out the second v vellous acuteness, he is not sufficiently careful about His natural science is largely vitiated by the influence o *temere a rebus abstractae.* But in ethical and politic the case is different. Here the ratiocinations, the results are carefully verified, proceed from principles which, nature of the subject to which they belong, are based o foundation of experience. Human life is always prese observation, and rouses our liveliest interest; and true generalisations about it before we are well aware are generalising at all; at any rate, our unconscious gene are so nearly true, that subsequent conscious verificati corrects them. But in the field of natural science, Aristot such foundation already laid for his ἀρχαί. He had to d an age in which observers were few and inexperienced, collaboration unknown, and instruments of observatio istent, almost entirely upon himself. Little wonder then principles in this field did not answer to the 'subtlety o and gave results often so vague, and wide of the mark, *seemed* to be verified by observations which were re irrelevant to the subject of enquiry.

a. 22. δόξειε . . . ἐλλεῖπον] Victorius, followed by most of th quotes *Soph. El.* 34. 183 b. 17 τῶν γὰρ εὑρισκομένων ἁπάντ παρ' ἑτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκ παραλαβόντων ὕστερον· τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὑρισκόμενα μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ἐ τούτων αὐξήσεως. Μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγετ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὑφθῆναι. Ταύτης δ' εὑρημένης ῥᾷον θέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπόν ἐστιν· ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥητορι συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας τέχνας.

διαρθρῶσαι] 'to articulate,' 'to work out in detail.'

a. 23. καὶ ὁ χρόνος κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Plut. *Conviv. vii Sap.* 9 τί σ χρόνος (ἔφη Θαλῆς)· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εὕρηκεν οὗτος ἤδη τὰ δὲ εὑρήσει

a. 26. § 18.] See Grant's useful note on the various meanings o

1098 a. 26. or counteract as far as practicable those of which the tendencies are injurious. A knowledge of the tendencies only, though without the power of accurately predicting their conjoint result, gives us to a certain extent this power.'

a. 28. **κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ**] Eustratius explains the distinction made here—*οὐ μόνον φησίν, κατὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐπιζητεῖν δεῖ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰς μεθόδους τὰς καταγινομένας περὶ αὐτά . . . εὑρίσκομεν γὰρ πολλάκις διαφόρους μεθόδους καταγινομένας ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατὰ τήνδε, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τήνδε τὴν πρόθεσιν . . . παράδειγμα τοῦ λόγου τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης περὶ ζήτησιν ἄμφω τῆς ὀρθῆς γωνίας καταγινόμενοι κ.τ.λ.*

a. 29. § **19. καὶ γάρ**] The connexion here is explained by Eustratius, as quoted in the last note. The comparison of the *γεωμέτρης* and *τέκτων* occurs also in Aristoxenus 33. 15 (p. 48, ed. Marquard)—*ὁ μὲν γεωμέτρης οὐδὲν χρῆται τῇ τῆς αἰσθήσεως δυνάμει, οὐ γὰρ εἴδεσι τῷ ὄψει οὔτε τὸ εὐθὺ οὔτε τὸ περιφερὲς οὔτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε φαύλως οὔτε εὖ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁ τέκτων καὶ ὁ τορνευτὴς . . . τῷ δὲ μουσικῷ σχεδόν ἐστιν ἀρχὴς ἔχουσα τάξιν ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀκρίβεια, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φαύλως αἰσθανόμενον εὖ λέγειν περὶ τούτων ὧν μηδέν τρόπον αἰσθάνεται.*

a. 30. **τὴν ὀρθήν**] *sc. γωνίαν.*

a. 31. **τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι**] 'Its essence, or essential attributes.' Technically *τί ἐστι* stands for the *γένος*, and *ποῖόν τι* for the *διαφορὰ εἰδοποιός* which, impressed upon the matter of the *γένος*, makes the *οὐσία* or *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* declared by the *ὁρισμός*. See *Top.* iv. 2. 122 b. 15 *οὐδενὸς . . . ἡ διαφορὰ γένος ἐστίν· ὅτι δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, δῆλον· οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ σημαίνει τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι, καθάπερ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν*: *Top.* iv. 6. 128 a. 26 *ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ τὴν ποιότητα τοῦ γένους, ἀεὶ σημαίνει . . . ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν πεζόν, ποιόν τι λέγει ζῷον*: *Met.* Δ. 14. 1020 a. 33 *τὸ ποιὸν λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας· οἷον ποιόν τι ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, ὅτι δίπουν, ἵππος δὲ τετράπουν· καὶ κύκλος ποιόν τι σχῆμα, ὅτι ἀγώνιον, ὡς τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότητος οὔσης.* 'Diese Unterscheidungsmerkmale der Arten (*i. e. ἡ διαφορά*) . . . sind nicht,' says Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 206, ed. 3) 'accidentelle, sondern Wesensbestimmungen (*Met.* vii. 4. 1029 b. 14, 1030 a. 14, *Top.* vi. 6. 144 a. 24 *οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπαρχόντων ἐστί, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ γένος· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὴν διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν*), sie gehören zum

griff des Subjekts, von dem sie ausgesagt werden, alles daher, 1098 a. 31.
as in ihnen enthalten ist, gilt von den Arten und den Einzelwesen, enen sie zukommen (*Kat.* c. 5. 3 a. 21 ff., b. 5). Es kann dessalb von ihnen gesagt werden, dass sie (zusammen mit der Gattung) die Substanz bilden (*Met.* vii. 12. 1038 b. 19), dass sie etwas substantielles aussagen (*Top.* vii. 2); sie selbst jedoch, für sich genommen, sind nicht Substanzen, sondern Qualitäten, drücken nicht ein τί, sondern ein ποιόν τι aus (*Top.* iv. 2. 122 b. 16, ch. 6, 128 a. 26, vi. 6. 144 a. 18–21, *Phys.* v. 2. 226 a. 27).'

The words before us are τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιόν τι, not τί ἐστι καὶ ποιόν τι. With καί, we could translate—'the genus and difference,' or 'the generic and specific attributes,' giving τί ἐστι its strict meaning, according to which it is distinguished from τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. In *de part. anim.* i. 1. 641 a. 16 the phrase καὶ τί καὶ ποιόν τι actually occurs, where τί and ποιόν τι are equivalent to γένος and διαφορά respectively, and the whole amounts to οὐσία, or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. But here ἤ obliges us to give τί ἐστιν by itself the meaning of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὐσία, or 'essence'; while the alternative (ἢ) ποιόν τι, which may be rendered by 'essential attributes,' expresses the same 'essence' looked at from a slightly different point of view, as constituted by the τελευταία διαφορά: see *Met.* Z. 12. 1038 a. 19 φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ [μετὰ τοῦ γένους δηλαδή, Alex. *ad loc.*] ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται: on which Alexander (p. 488, Bonitz's edition of Alex.) has ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ πρὸ αὐτῆς ὕλη . . . τὸ μὲν ζῷον περὶ ὕλη ἐστὶ . . . τὸ δὲ δίπουν εἶδος: and Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 207, ed. 3) explains that the τελευταία διαφορά is not simply the last specific character as such, but the specific notion determined by it. On the technical distinction between τί ἐστι and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 207–9, ed. 3; Schwegler, *Met.* Excursus i; Trendelenburg, *Rhein. Mus.* 1828, vol. ii. 457–483; Trendelenburg, *De Anima* note on i. 1. 2 (cf. his note *de An.* iii. 4. 7 on τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι); Trendelenburg, *Kategorienlehre* 34 ff.; Biese, *Ph. d. Arist.* i. 243, 366, 427, ii. 35; Waitz, *Organ.* 67. b. 12, 94 a. 11. 'Zu dem einfachen τί ἐστι,' says Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 209, ed. 3), 'verhält sich das τί ἦν εἶναι wie das Besondere und Bestimmte zum Allgemeinen und Unbestimmten . . . Das τί ἦν εἶναι ist mithin eine bestimmte Art des τί ἐστι (daher *De Anima*, iii. 6. 430 b. 28 τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, das Sein nach der Seite des Wesens), und es kann desshalb dieses, wie diess bei Arist. sehr häufig ist, in der engeren Bedeutung des τί ἦν εἶναι gebraucht werden, wogegen das letztere niemals

1098 a. 31. in der umfassenderen des τί ἐστι steht, so dass es auch den Stoff oder die blosse Eigenschaft oder das Allgemeine der Gattung, abgesehen von den artbildenden Unterschieden, bezeichnete.' Eustratius' note on the words before us is—ὁ δὲ γεωμέτρης τήν τε οὐσίαν καὶ ποιότητα τῆς ὀρθῆς ἐπιζητεῖ· τί τέ ἐστιν ἐξετάζων, καὶ τίνα ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν ὀξεῖαν καὶ ἀμβλεῖαν. This would be its τελευταία διαφορά.

a. 32. **ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα κ.τ.λ.**] cf. Agathon, apud Athen. 185

τὸ μὲν πάρεργον, ἔργον ὡς, ποιούμεθα,
τὸ δ' ἔργον, ὡς πάρεργον, ἐκπονούμεθα.

a. 33. § 20. **οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον . . . ὁμοίως**] Sections 17–19 have insisted on the importance of a περιγραφή, or ἀρχή, to the subsequent development of a science. Section 20 suggests that, while every science must accept its particular ἀρχή or ἀρχαί as ultimate (*i.e.* without foregoing *demonstration*), some sciences push their ἀρχή or ἀρχαί farther back than others. The theoretical sciences are concerned to have principles as ultimate and irreducible as possible[1], whereas the practical science of Ethics, the end of which is not knowledge but conduct, does well to acquiesce in a principle or principles leading to useful applications, without troubling itself to go back very far upon the theoretical reasons which might be adduced (were it worth while) in support of the principle or principles in which it acquiesces. What the Paraphrast says of ἀρχαί generally is especially true of the ἀρχή of morals—εἰ γὰρ ζητήσομεν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰτίαν οὐδέποτε ἀρξόμεθα ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄπειρον βαδιούμεθα.

1098 b. 1. **τὸ ὅτι**] as distinguished from the διότι: see *An. Post.* i. 13. 78 a. 22, sqq. Cf. *E. N.* i. 4. 7. 1095 b. 6. Τὸ ὅτι may signify, either a particular fact accepted immediately on the authority of sense, or a general principle accepted, without syllogistic proof, on the authority of induction. In either case there is an ἀρχή or Beginning—a stimulus which initiates, in the one case, a movement in correspondence, or a process of continued observation; in the other

[1] Cf. *Top.* i. 1. 100 a. 27 ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων συλλογισμὸς ᾖ, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἃ διά τινων πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε . . . ἔστι δὲ ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ μὴ δι' ἑτέρων, ἀλλ' δι' αὐτῶν ἔχοντα τὴν πίστιν· οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, ἀλλ' ἑκάστην τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι πιστήν. Cf. *De G. An.* ii. 6. 742 b. 32 τῆς γὰρ ἀρχῆς ἄλλη γνῶσις καὶ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις.

e, a ratiocinative train of thought. A sudden noise which 1098 b. 1.
kes me turn round to look, and a general point of view which
ables me to explain the particulars of a science, are both *ἀρχαί.*

οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή] Rassow b. 2
Forsch. p. 16), following Zeller and Münscher (*Quaest. crit.* p. 18),
egards the words *οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς* as an interpolation, at the
ame time holding that the whole passage § 18 *μεμνῆσθαι* a. 26 . . .
23 *ζητουμένων*, b. 8, consisting mainly as it does of repetitions
f i. 3. 1 and i. 4. 5–7, is not by Aristotle. Susemihl brackets
17 *δόξειε* a. 22 . . . § 23 *ζητουμένων* b. 8. Ramsauer proposes the
mission of *δ'* before *ὅτι*, and takes the clause *τὸ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ*
ρχή closely with *οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς*—'velut in iis quae principia
unt causas quaerere absurdum; esse enim illa, omnium primum
st.' I think that *οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς may* be an interpolation,
ut that we have no substantial grounds for condemning it as such.

§ 21. τῶν ἀρχῶν . . . ἄλλως] 'And these starting-points, or prin- b. 3.
iples, are arrived at, some in one way, some in another; some
y induction, others by perception, others again by some kind of
raining.' Peters.

ἐπαγωγῇ] Cf. *E. N.* vi. 3. 3. 1139 b. 28 *ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή*
τινι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ
ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. See *An.*
Post. ii. 19, where the part played by the repetition of particular
xperiences in producing principles is graphically described.
f. *An. Post.* i. 18. 81 a. 38 *φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἴσθησις*
ἐλλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν,
ἅτερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν
καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι
ἢ μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· . . . ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον· τῶν
ἄρ καθέκαστον ἡ αἴσθησις. This last passage, dealing as it does with
he origin of *τὰ καθόλου* or general principles, does not contradict
he statement before us, *αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει κ.τ.λ.*
ealing with the origin of *ἀρχαί* or principles which are not
egarded as necessarily *general* principles in all cases. Where
n *ἀρχή* is the result of *ἐπαγωγή*, it is of course a general principle;
ut sense-perception (*αἴσθησις*) can also give an *ἀρχή* which, though
erely a particular impression, is a *Beginning* (*ἀρχή*), or stimulus,
apable of inducing a train of *φαντάσματα*, or of rousing an *ἐπιθυμία*,
r of immediately calling forth a movement in response. The

1098 b. 3. ἀρχή produced by ἐπαγωγή is the cumulative result of a great many sense impressions, and action or thought suggested by such an ἀρχή is more likely to be in correspondence with the environment than that suggested by a single impression which may be of an exceptional character. But such a single impression obviously differs in degree rather than in kind from the deeper impression produced by induction. Sometimes we think and act on the strength of deep impressions produced by long and uniform experience, sometimes on the strength of the impressions which we receive at the moment. It is to be remembered, however, that the channels of these latter impressions—the organs of special sense—are themselves the results of long and uniform experience in the race, and that the impressions received through them are consequently not so particular as they seem to be when contrasted with 'generalisations from experience,' the formation of which we can trace in the life of the individual. Indeed Aristotle himself recognises the universal element in αἴσθησις in such passages as *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 16 καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὐ Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου: and *An. Post.* i. 31. 87 b. 28 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ τοιοῦδε, καὶ μὴ τοιόνδέ τινος, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαί γε ἀναγκαῖον τόδε τι, καὶ νῦν, καὶ νῦν.

The latter part of the passage quoted above (note on § 19 a. 29) from Aristoxenus illustrates how αἴσθησις may be an ἀρχή: τῇ δὲ μουσικῇ σχεδόν ἐστιν ἀρχῆς ἔχουσα τάξιν ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀκρίβεια, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φαύλως αἰσθανόμενον εὖ λέγειν περὶ τούτων ὧν μηδέπω τρόπον αἰσθάνεται.

The ἀρχαί obtained by ἐθισμός are (1) the moral habits or tendencies to act in certain ways. These habits are produced by the repetition of particular acts, just as scientific generalisations result from repeated perceptions. After many observations we acquire a certain point of view which dominates our scientific procedure in the department to which the observations belong. After performing many similar acts we acquire a bent which disposes us to go on performing the acts in question. Farther, as belief goes with action, a tendency to act in a particular way is attended by a belief that it is good (*i. e.* right or desirable) to act in that particular way. Hence ἐθισμός not only produces the ἀρχή of Habit, or tendency to act in a particular way, but also, as a kind of ἐπαγωγή, produces (2) a point of view from which conduct is re-

d—the ἀρχή of belief or opinion on moral matters. Cf. *E. N.* 1098 b. 3.
§ 5, 6.

ι ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως] This does not mean that there are *other* b. 4.
in which ἀρχαί are obtained besides the three mentioned.
ısl. 'some in one, some in another of these three ways.'
ıstratius has a note which brings out well the connexion
een the clause τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μέν κ.τ.λ. and what immediately
edes: ἐπεὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ δι' ἀπόδειξιν εἶπε γινώ-
θαι, μηδὲ τὸ διότι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος—καὶ
ταύτας γνωρίσομεν καὶ ἐπιστησόμεθα ἀγνώστους οὔσας καὶ μὴ ὑποβαλλο-
ι ἐπιστήμῃ; συμβήσεται γὰρ διὰ τῶν ἀδήλων δῆλα τὰ ἄδηλα γίνεσθαι—
ιδίωσι τοὺς τρόπους δι' ὧν ἡμῖν ἡ γνῶσις τῶν ἀρχῶν περιγίνεται ἄλλους
ι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὄντας. ἐπαγωγῇ μὲν θεωροῦνται ὡς αὗται· τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ
καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἴσα κ.τ.λ. . . . αἰσθήσει δὲ ὡς τὰς ἑκάστου τῶν πρώτων
γείων οἰκείας γνωρίζομεν ποιότητας· οἷον πυρὸς μὲν τὴν θερμότητα,
ι δὲ τὴν ὑγρότητα, ὕδατος τὴν ψυχρότητα, γῆς τὴν ξηρότητα. ἐθισμῷ δέ,
ι ἀρεταί· πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως καλὰ εἶναι γνωρίσομεν τὰ σωφρονικὰ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ
τιν ταῦτα;

22. μετιέναι κ.τ.λ.] 'We must endeavour to attain each in the
ral way'—Grant. *E.g.* we must remember that moral principles
rally result from ἐθισμός. We must not try to reach them by a
ly intellectual process, as if they were theoretical principles, or
he short-cut of the intuition or feeling of the moment. Cf.
tratius—ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ διαφόρους τρόπους ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν γνῶσις ἡμῖν
γίνεται, διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν ὅτι πειρατέον ἑκάστας κατὰ τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνον
ρχεσθαι καθ' ὃν πεφύκασιν εἰς γνῶσιν ἡμῖν ἔρχεσθαι.

ιορισθῶσι] Cf. *An. Post.* ii. 3. 90 b. 24 αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων b. 6.
μοί· ὧν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις, δέδεικται πρότερον. ἢ ἔσονται αἱ
ι ἀποδεικταί, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀρχαί, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται, ἢ τὰ
ι ὁρισμοὶ ἔσονται ἀναπόδεικτοι. Bywater has restored διορισθῶσι
ı K^b, for the ὁρισθῶσι of all other MSS.

23. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή] Cf. *Pol.* E. b. 7.
303 b. 29 ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἥμισυ εἶναι παντός, which seems to be
ordinary form of the proverb. Did Aristotle borrow the modi-
tion πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ from Plato, *Legg.* 753 E—ἀρχὴ γὰρ λέγεται μὲν
ν παντὸς ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις ἔργου, καὶ τό γε καλῶς ἄρξασθαι πάντες
ομάζομεν ἑκάστοτε· τὸ δ' ἔστι τε, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πλέον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ
οὐδεὶς αὐτὸ καλῶς γενόμενον ἐγκεκωμίακεν ἱκανῶς? If we are to
ieve Teichmüller, however (*Literarische Fehden*, p. 188), the

1098 b. 7. *Ethics* were written before the *Laws*. Cf. *Probl.* x. 13, 892 a. 29 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον· ἥμισυ γάρ. Cf. Hor. *Ep.* i. 2. 40 'Dimidium facti, qui coepit, habet,' and Orelli's note *ad loc.* Lucian, *Hermot.* 3, erroneously attributes the proverb to Hesiod; but Hesiod's dictum (ἔργα κ. ἡμ. 30 νήπιοι οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός) has an entirely different meaning.

b. 8. συμφανῆ] The notion of the Chief Good 'throws the light of science' upon the complicated phenomena of human life.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Let us now see if our Definition agrees with popular opinions about Happiness, for if it does not, it cannot be true in fact, however correct in logic.

Good things are popularly distinguished as (1) *external good things,* (2) *good things of the soul,* (3) *good things of the body; and good things of the soul are placed highest. Our Definition agrees, making the Chief Good consist in certain vital functions or actions of the soul, and in conduct. Indeed the expressions 'functions,' 'actions,' and 'conduct,' by themselves, are sufficient to show that our end is a good thing of the soul, not an external good thing. Again, the Happy man is popularly said to 'live well,' and 'to do and fare well': now, we practically define Happiness as 'a good life,' or as 'well-doing.' Further, everything that has ever been viewed as an essential requirement of Happiness, and has consequently been identified with it, is included in our Definition—Goodness, Prudence, Wisdom, Pleasure, External Prosperity. We must believe that these,* as elements, *are really contained in Happiness, unless we are prepared to deny all weight to consensus and authority.*

In the first place, then, we have the support of those who say that Happiness is Goodness, for we make it a function manifesting excellence, or goodness—our advance being that we thus make it consist, not in possession, *but in* use, *not in* having something, *but in* doing something: *for a man may have a good thing, and yet it may result in no good for him. As at Olympia the crown is for one of the competitors, not for the strongest man in Greece if he hold aloof, so in life, success is won not by* being good, *but by* well-doing.

Again, our Definition gives due place to Pleasure, for the 'life of well-doing' has its own pleasure—an inherent pleasure, not a merely ornamental pleasure, which may be put on, as it were, and taken off. Whatever a man does habitually he likes, i. e. *takes pleasure in; and the good man takes pleasure in the good actions which constitute his Happiness—indeed he would not be a good man if he did not take pleasure in them. Moreover, taking pleasure in the things which he ought to take pleasure in, he enjoys real pleasures,* i.e. *pleasures which*

ıe together harmoniously in his life; whereas the pleasures of ordinary re unreal, as judged by this test, i. e. *they conflict with one another.*
d not only are the actions in which Happiness consists pleasant in the eyes good man—they are also truly good and truly fair in his eyes: and he is :st judge.
ıppiness, then, is in itself 'fairest, sweetest, best'—all three: it is not teousness which is fairest, and possession sweetest, and health best, as the ian Inscription hath it: yet, 'the functions of the highest excellence,' in ch Happiness consists, cannot be performed in the absence of external good ıgs. It is impossible, or difficult, to play a brilliant part on the stage of life hout equipment. Friends, wealth, influence, are the instruments; high birth, · children, beauty, the ornaments of the Happy Life. This is why some v even identified Happiness with external prosperity, i. e. *with good fortune.*

§ 1. σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς] αὐτῆς grammatically refers to ἀρχή in 1098 b. 9. § 23, but the sense requires us to understand εὐδαιμονίας. I read for δή, with Susemihl and Bywater.

ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος] These words are to be en as a periphrasis for 'logically,' 'syllogistically,' or 'formally.' ıt we must examine our principle—the notion of the Chief Good, only from the formal point of view—from the point of view of onclusion and Premisses," but also in the light of the popular ıions about it.' This rendering takes λόγος=συλλογισμός by a mon usage, and contrasts τὰ ἐξ ὧν, the premisses, with the τέρασμα. Cf. *An. Post.* i. 7, i. 10, and especially *An. Prior.* i. 57 a. 36 (quoted by Ramsauer) φανερὸν οὖν ὅταν μὲν ᾖ τὸ τέρασμα ψευδές, ἀνάγκη ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος ψευδῆ εἶναι ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια. ıs passage seems decisive as to the meaning of the phrase ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, and deprives of plausibility an objection which might be ıd against our rendering, viz. that λόγος must here mean μός, and not συλλογισμός, because in the subsequent sections it ns ὁρισμός. Coraes is therefore wrong with ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος· τὰ ἐξ ὧν ὁ ὁρισμὸς σύγκειται τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. The definition of the ıf Good has been reached as a συμπέρασμα by a process of oning from premisses (ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος) involving such abstract ons as τέλος, ἀγαθόν, ἐνέργεια. The result of this abstract process ıe Definition of the Chief Good in i. 7. 15—must, Aristotle now , be *verified* by being collated with concrete experience as odied in the common opinions and sayings of men. While seems to be the plain meaning of the passage before us, the wardness of its phraseology must be admitted. Συμπέρασμα, technical term for the conclusion of the συλλογισμός, is im-

1098 b. 9. properly applied to an ἀρχὴ ἧς οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός, especially in context like the present (unless Rassow and Susemihl are right i bracketing ch. vii. §§ 17 or 18–23), where the non-syllogistic origi of ἀρχαί is carefully insisted upon. Eustratius, who sees th difficulty just noticed, has a good note, in which he gives what take to be the correct interpretation—ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ τῆ εὐδαιμονίας ὁρισμοῦ μεταβὰς εἰς τὸ κοινῶς εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, πάντων εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν αὐτὸς ἔθετο τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁρισάμενος. ἐπεὶ δὲ συλλογισ μενος διὰ πολλῶν συνῆξεν αὐτήν, τὸ ὅτι οὐ τὸ διότι ἀποδιδοὺς [Eustr. ha said above in his note on 7. § 20 τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅρου τῆς εὐδαιμον ἐκλεγόμενος οὐδαμῆ αἰτίαν εἴληφε δι' ἣν ὑπάρχει ἐκείνων ἕκαστον τῇ εὐδα μονίᾳ οὐδὲ διατί μέρος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἐστίν . . . ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη δείξ τοῦ ὅτι οὐ τοῦ διότι ἐστί], φησὶ νῦν ὅτι σκεπτέον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰ ἁρμόδι ὅρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ὁ ἀποδοθείς, οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὃ αὐτὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ ὅρος ἐστί, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος τουτέστιν ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων ἐξ ἃ ἡ περὶ αὐτοῦ δείξις συντέθειται, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

The doctrine, justly insisted upon by Aristotle in the prese passage—that the principle of moral science must be brought the test of substantial agreement with popular opinion—does n admit of analogical extension to the principles of the physic sciences. Popular opinion cannot afford to be far wrong in matte of conduct, but has little reason for being right as to the remo truths of the physical sciences. Aristotle, however, submits th principles of the physical sciences, equally with the principle moral science, to *dialectical* tests, *i.e.* examines them in connexio with τὰ ἔνδοξα: see *Top.* i. 2. 101 a. 36 ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν πε ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν [χρήσιμος ἡ πραγματεία, *i.e. the Topics*, whic supply premisses for the διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμός, and rules for i employment]· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήμ ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἁπάντων εἰσ διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ἐσ ἡ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστίν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα, πρὸς τ ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει. In his note on the above pa sage, Alexander (Berlin Schol. 254 b. 36) illustrates the relation Dialectic to first principles, by showing how ἔνδοξα may be used support and elucidation of the Definitions of Geometry. See Zell (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. pp. 243–4 ed. 3) 'Sie (*i.e.* die Dialektik) die insofern namenlich zur Feststellung der wissenschaftlichen Prin pien, denn da sich diese als ein erstes nicht durch Beweisführu aus etwas gewisserem ableiten lassen, bleibt nur übrig, sie vo

wahrscheinlichen aus zu suchen. Ihren Ausgang nimmt eine 1098 b. 9.
solche Untersuchung von den herrschenden Annahmen der Menschen; denn was alle, oder doch die erfahrenen und verständigen glauben, das verdient immer Beachtung, da es die Vermuthung für sich hat, auf einer wirklichen Erfahrung zu beruhen (cf. *E. N.* vi. 11. 6, x. 2. 4, vii. 13. 5; *Rhet.* i. 1. 1355 a. 15). Je unsicherer aber diese Grundlage ist, um so mehr drängt sich auch Aristoteles das Bedürfniss auf, aus welchem schon die Sokratische Dialektik entsprungen war, ihre Mangelhaftigkeit dadurch zu verbessern, dass die verschiedenen in der Meinung der Menschen sich kreuzenden Gesichtspunkte zusammengebracht und gegen einander ausgeglichen werden. Daher die Gewohnheit des Philosophen, seinen dogmatischen Untersuchungen *Aporien* voranzuschicken.'

That Aristotle failed to draw consciously any very marked distinction between the principle, or principles, of moral science, and the principles of the physical sciences, as related to ἔνδοξα, shows how defective his conception of the method of the physical sciences really was. The dialectical sifting of ἔνδοξα, or men's opinions about facts, in order to find the residuum of truth contained in these opinions, can never take the place, in the physical sciences, of direct observation and arrangement of the facts themselves. The dialectical method of physical enquiry is on a par with the attempt to sift historical truth directly out of myths by a rationalising process (on which see Grote's *Greece*, Part i. ch. 16)[1]. The importance, however, of a dialectical treatment of the principle, or principles, of *moral* science cannot be too much insisted on. The value of these principles is that they lead 'not to knowledge but to conduct.' Unless conduct is to be revolutionised rather than regulated, these principles must, on the whole, agree with the moral sentiments and opinions which, by their prevalence, prove themselves to be such as the welfare of man requires.

The moralist's function, then, according to Aristotle's view (the justice of which is indisputable), is to introduce form, clearness, consistency, into the body of opinions, on practical matters, commonly held by men. These opinions are, on the whole,

[1] We must not, however, underrate the indirect service rendered by Aristotle to these very physical sciences. His 'dialectical' treatment of their principles put Europe in possession of the subtle calculus of philosophical language, without which later brains could not have thought out the discoveries suggested to them by wider and more careful observations.

1098 b. 9. sound (otherwise they would not prevail on ma
vital importance to the human race), but are wanting
and consistency viewed as a body. The moralist,
as a body, detects and removes the inconsistencies,
a system in which his contemporaries recognise the cl
of their own obscurely entertained sentiments. S
parallel case, the policy of Pericles was recognised by
δῆμος as the perfect form of its own political views an
which, without his genius, would never have found e
system. See *E. E.* i. 6. 1216 b. 26 πειρατέον δὲ τούτω
τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι
φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσ
οὖντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις· εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντ
βιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς
ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πῶς περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς
οὐ σαφῶς δὲ προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβ
γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένως (cf. *de*
413 a. 11): *E. N.* vii. 1. 5 δεῖ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλ
φαινόμενα, καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας, οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλισ
ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυρι
λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμέν
—*E. N.* x. 8. 12 σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ
βίον φέροντας, καὶ συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, δ
λόγους ὑποληπτέον (cf. *E. N.* x. 1. §§ 3, 4).

b. 11 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ . . . τἀληθές] The passage *E*
just quoted, helps us to understand this clause. Τὰ
'the natural attributes of the thing, the facts of its na
which, it is here tacitly assumed, are adequately repr
opinions or λεγόμενα appealed to. If the Definitio
μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ), these commonly recognised facts will
but if it be false (τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ), they will soon show
variance with it. Grant notices the confusion ca
word τἀληθές in the second part of the sentence an
ὑπάρχοντα in the first,' and consequently having to
a different sense from τῷ ἀληθεῖ immediately abo
however (*Forsch.* p. 73), conjectures, with great pl
τἀληθές is the blundering interpolation of a reader,
observe that τὰ ὑπάρχοντα is the subject of διαφωνε
of συνᾴδει. His words are 'Vergegenwärtigt man sic

es Abschnittes, so wird man nicht Anstand nehmen können, das 1098 b. 11.
Wort ἀληθές als falschen Zusatz eines Lesers, der ein Subject zu συμφωνεῖ vermisste, auszumerzen. Denn Aristoteles kann nur dieses sagen wollen: ist eine Begriffsbestimmung richtig, so stimmt sie mit den ὑπάρχοντα überein d. h. hier mit dem, was einem Dinge nach allgemeiner Ansicht zukommt; ist sie falsch, so ergiebt sich bald, dass sie damit in Widerstreit steht.'

§ 2. νενεμημένων δή . . .] 'To apply our principle (δή), goods b. 12.
have been divided into three kinds' (Grant)—*i.e.* to apply the principle of appealing to λεγόμενα.

As Ramsauer observes, this threefold division of goods is indicated by Plato in *Philebus* 48 E and *Euthyd.* 279 B. Cf. also *Legg.* 743 E. It is a very natural division, and doubtless was made long before Plato and Aristotle; but the Peripatetics seem to have given it philosophical importance, by taking it in connexion with their discussions of εὐδαιμονία. Cf. Plut. *de Vita et Poesi Homeri*, ch. 137 οἱ δ' ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου πρωτεύειν μὲν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθὰ νομίζουσιν οἷον φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην. δεύτερα δ' εἶναι τὰ τοῦ σώματος οἷον ὑγίειαν κ.τ.λ. . . . τρίτα δὲ τὰ ἐκτὸς οἷον εὐδοξίαν κ.τ.λ. . . ἐπαινετὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὸν τὸ ἐν ἀλγηδόσι καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ συμφοραῖς ἀβουλήτοις χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντεχούσης τοῖς κακοῖς, οὐ μέντοι αἱρετόν, οὐδὲ μακάριον· τὸ δ' ἐν ἀγαθοῖς κοινὸν ἔχειν τῷ ὄντι εὔδαιμον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν κτῆσιν μόνην τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καλόν. Didymus—Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν δόγματα (Mullach, *Fr. Phil.* ii. pp. 89, 90)—after making out a parallelism between the ἀγαθά of body, mind, and estate thus—

ὑγίεια	σωφροσύνη	πλοῦτος
ἰσχύς	ἀνδρεία	ἀρχή
κάλλος	δικαιοσύνη	φιλία
εὐαισθησία	φρόνησις	εὐτυχία—

goes on to say—τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ συμπληροῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ βίος ἐκ πράξεως συμπεπλήρωται· τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πρᾶξιν εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτό, οὔθ' ὅλως ἐνέργειαν.

The passages in which Aristotle refers to this threefold division are *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 25 οὕτω γὰρ αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά. ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δ' εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή:

1098 b.12. *Pol.* H. 1. 1323 a. 22 νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· ὡς δὴ γὰρ πρός γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἄν, ὡς οὖ, τριῶν ὄντων μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. Cf. *E. E.* ii. 1. 1218 b. 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τούτων αἱρετότερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διωρίσ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις: *M. M.* i. 3. 1184 b. 2 ἔστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι οἷον ὑγίεια, κάλλος, τὰ δὲ ἐκ πλοῦτος ἀρχὴ τιμὴ ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων. τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ β τιστα. The following passage, attributed by Mullach (*Fr.* i. p. 554 to the Pythagorean Archytas, is so evidently from a late Peripate summary done into the Doric dialect, that it is added here men as another proof of the importance given by Peripateticism to t threefold division of ἀγαθά, not as being a possible source fr which Aristotle may have borrowed that division: ὁ δ' ἄνθρω οὐχ ἁ ψυχὰ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ζῷον καὶ τὸ τοιούτων ἄνθρωπος· καὶ γὰρ αἱ τᾶς ψυχᾶς ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα πέφυκεν, ὃ καὶ τῶ ἀνθρώπω μέρος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἁ ψυχά. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁ μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώπω, ἁ δὲ τῶν μερέων. καὶ ἀνθρώπω μὲν ἀγαθὸν εὐδαιμοσύνα, τῶ μερέων τῶ ἀνθρώπω, ψυχᾶς μέν, φρόνασις, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνα, σωφρο σώματος δὲ κάλλος, ὑγίεια, εὐεκτία, εὐαισθασία. τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, πλοῦτος δόξα καὶ τιμὰ καὶ εὐγένεια ἐπιγένναμα ἦμεν τῶ ἀνθρώπω, καὶ ἀκάλουθα φύσει προϋφεστακόσιν ἀγαθοῖς. δορυφορεῖ δὲ τὰ μήονα τῶν ἀγαθῶ μέζονα, φιλία μὲν καὶ δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος σῶμα καὶ ψυχάν, ὑγίεια δὲ ἰσχὺς καὶ εὐαισθασία ψυχάν, φρόνασις δὲ καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ σωφροσύνα δικαιοσύνα τὸν νόον τᾶς ψυχᾶς, ὁ δὲ νόος τὸν θεόν. οἷτος γὰρ ὁ κράτ ἐντι καὶ ὁ ἁγεμονεύων· καὶ τούτω ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρῆμεν. στρατεύματος μὲν γὰρ ἁγεῖται στραταγός, πλωτάρων δὲ κυβερ τῶ δὲ κόσμω θεός, τᾶς δὲ ψυχᾶς νόος, τᾶς δὲ περὶ τὸν βίον εὐδαιμο φρόνασις. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτερόν ἐντι φρόνασις, αἰ μὴ ἐπιστάμα τᾶς περ βίον εὐδαιμοσύνας ἢ ἐπιστάμα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπω ἀγαθῶν.

b. 14. λέγομεν] 'are commonly said to be.' Peters.

b. 16. τίθεμεν] 'may be said to be.' Peters.

ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο] 'so our Definition (λόγος) is ri Τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικάς of the present pas is equivalent to the ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια of the Definition, as g in ch. 7. § 15. In making the highest good an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, Definition agrees with the commonly accepted view that the g of the ψυχή are the highest.

§ 3. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι . . . τέλος] 'But indeed we secure the 1098 b.18.
pport of this opinion by the mere statement that certain actions
d exercises are the end'—Peters: *i. e.* 'our Definition is also
en to be right, in that it makes certain actions and functions
e end.' 'Qui enim dicunt, actionibus humanis felicitatem
contineri, in animo sitam felicitatem volunt, cum solus animus
in homine agendi sit principium'—Michelet. As ψυχικάς was
the emphatic word in the previous §, ἐνέργειαι is emphatic here:
see Eustr., διαφέρει δὲ τοῦτο (*i. e.* the point made in § 3) τοῦ
πρὸ αὐτοῦ (*i. e.* that made in § 2), ὅτι ἐν ἐκείνῳ μὲν τὸ καλῶς εἰρῆσθαι
ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν συνέστησεν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι
πράξεις εἶναι καὶ ἐνέργειας τὸ τέλος. τὸ δὴ τινὲς προσέθηκεν ὅτι οὐχ
ἁπλῶς πράξεις καὶ ἐνέργεια τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ ποιαί· ἤτοι κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ
ἀγαθά.

γίνεται] 'is shown to be.' Cf. i. 7. 15 for this use of γίνεται. b. 20.

§ 4. τῷ λόγῳ] 'our Definition.'

τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα] 'the popular saying
that the εὐδαίμων lives and fares well.'

εἴρηται] *i. e.* in our Definition. b. 22.

§ 5.] 'Farther, the various things which are looked for in
Happiness seem all to belong to it as we have defined it.'

§ 6. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή] The Cynics, who held αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν b. 23.
εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν (Diog. L. vi. 11 apud Ritter and Preller, *Hist.*
Pl. § 226 *Cynici*)—a view afterwards adopted by the Stoics.

τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις] The commentators generally identify this with b. 24.
the view of Socrates, comparing *E. N.* vi. 13. 3; cf. *E. E.* i. 5.
1216 b. 3 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾤετ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν
τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπεζήτει τί ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον
τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς· ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ᾤετ' εἶναι πάσας
τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι
δίκαιον. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμὲν
οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. Of course this is an absurd travesty of the
doctrine of Socrates.

ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις] Anaxagoras probably for one: cf. *E. E.* i.
5. 1216 a. 11 τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρός τινα διαπορούντα τοιαῦτ' ἄττα, καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἕνεκ' ἄν τις ἕλοιτο γενέσθαι

1098 b. 24. *μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι "τοῦ" φάναι "θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν." Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἕνεκεν τὴν αὐ ᾤετο τιμίαν εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν.* Cf. *E. E.* i. 4. 1215 b. 6 *Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, "οὐθείς" εἶπεν "ὃν νομίζεις, ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἄν τίς σοι φανείη." Τοῦτον δ' ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν πον ἐκεῖνος ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας. Αὐτὸς δ' ἴσως τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἤ τινος θεωρίας κοινωνοῦ θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι.* Cf. *E. N.* x. 8. 11.

b. 25. **τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς**] cf. Pl *Philebus* 27 D *ἴθι δὴ νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε φρονήσεως*: cf. *Phileb.* 60 D, E.

μεθ' ἡδονῆς] seems to mean 'with pleasure added,' as distinguis from *οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς*, 'with pleasure essentially involved'; apparently, the Paraphrast—*τοῖς δὲ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν τούτων τικτομένης.* Cf. below, § 12 *οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑα* When Plato praises *τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως*, he, Aristotle, regards the relation of pleasure to virtuous action a essential one: this is plain from *Philebus* 63 E *ἄλλας δὲ ἡ ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἃς εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς τα τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπ καθάπερ θεοῦ ὁπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ ξυνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μ κ.τ.λ.* Aspasius explains differently: *μεθ' ἡδονῆς μὲν οἱ λέγοντες τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ποιοῦσι τὴν ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, οὐ μέρος ἀλ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡ εὐδαιμονία λέγουσι τὴν ἡδονήν.*

b. 26. **ἕτεροι**] The commentators identify this with the opinio Xenocrates, Plato's disciple: see Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. p. 41 quoted by Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Ph.* § 301 *Ξενοκράτης τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτῆσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρε αὐτῇ δυνάμεως. εἶτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχή δ' ὑφ' ὧν τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡς δὲ ἐξ ὧν ὡς μερῶν τὰς καλὰς πράξεις κα σπουδαίας ἕξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις, ὡς τούτων οὐκ τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός.* This does not seem to differ essentially Aristotle's own view of the nature and conditions of *εὐδαιμονία.*

συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν] M^b, O^b, Ald., C C C, and N C *συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν.* MS. authority does not count for much w *παρά* and *περί* are concerned. *Συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν* ('take in a

adjunct,' *Liddell and Scott*) expresses a view of the relation of 1098 b. 26.
ἡ ἐκτὸς εὐετηρία to εὐδαιμονία such as Aristotle himself holds; συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν ('include along with') expresses a view which Aristotle would object to as putting ἡ ἐκτὸς εὐετηρία—a mere condition, οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη, or ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, too much on a par with the formal elements, or μέρη strictly so called, of εὐδαιμονία. On τὰ μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας see below note on § 16.

εὐετηρίαν] literally, 'goodness of season (ἔτος),' and then, generally, 'prosperity.'

§ 7.] Cf. vii. 1. 5, and note there. b. 27.

§ 8.] 'Aristotle now proceeds to show his own coincidence b. 30.
with these preexistent theories. It is to be observed that he says nothing here in reference to those who made happiness to consist in "thought" [φρόνησις] or "a sort of philosophy" [σοφία τις]. This is one of the marks of systematic method in the *Ethics*. He will not anticipate the relation of φρόνησις and σοφία to εὐδαιμονία.' Grant.

Although it is true that Aristotle makes no explicit reference in this chapter to those who made happiness to consist in φρόνησις or σοφία τις, he seems to me not entirely to overlook their opinion; for in § 13 he passes from the consideration of the pleasure involved in αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις to the assertion that they are not only pleasant, but also καὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλαί, as judged by the σπουδαῖος, the standard of excellence. This appeal to the κρίσις τοῦ σπουδαίου involved in defining the Chief Good as ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀρετήν seems to me to give full weight in the Definition to the opinion of those who make Happiness consist in φρόνησις or σοφία τις, and I think that § 13 is intended to bring this out.

συνῳδός] Susemihl now wishes to read (*E. E.* Appendix, p. 163) σύνορος ('conterminous with') after K^b. He thinks that συνοδός, given by NC (not by Z=CCC) and Cambr., supplies the intermediate form between the correct σύνορος and the plausible συνῳδός: see his reply to Adolf Busse (*zur Textkritik der Nic. Eth.*: *Hermes*, vol. xviii. p. 137, sqq., 1883) in *N. Jahrb.* 1883.

ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια] 'For "exercise of faculties b. 31.
in accordance with excellence" belongs to excellence.' Peters. 'Zur Tugend gehört die ihr gemässe Wirksamkeit.' Stahr.

§ 9.] With this § cf. *M. M.* i. 4. 1184 b. 28 τὸ ἄρα εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ

1098 b. 31. ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῷ εὖ ζῆν ἐστίν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς
Τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἐστὶ τέλος καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. Ἐν χρήσ
ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. Ὧν γὰρ ἦν ἕξις καὶ χρῆσις, ἡ
ἐνέργεια τέλος· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις ἐστίν. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐ
χρῆσις αὐτῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὥστε τέλος ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χ
Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν. Ἐπειδ
ἄριστον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ αὕτη τέλος ἐνεργείᾳ, ζῆ
τὰς ἀρετὰς εὐδαίμονες ἂν εἴημεν καὶ ἔχοιμεν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν.
ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλειον ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλος, οὐδὲ τοῦτο δεῖ λαν
ἐν τελείῳ ἔσται. Οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἐν παιδί (οὐ γάρ ἐστι παῖς εὐδα
ἀνδρί· οὗτος γὰρ τέλειος. Οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ γε ἀτελεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν τελ
δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος, ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ. Καὶ γὰρ λέγεται ὀρθ
πολλοῖς ὅτι δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ βίου κρ
τὸ τέλειον εἶναι καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ τελείῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ. Ὅτι
ἐστιν, ἴδοι ἄν τις καὶ ἐντεῦθεν. Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις, οἷον εἴ τις
βίου, τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ πάνυ βουλόμεθα λέγειν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι· τ
αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐχ ὑπάρχ
τὴν ἐνέργειαν : cf. *E. N.* ix. 9. 5, and x. 6. 2.

b. 32. ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει . . . ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ] Eustr. has
καὶ κτῆσις, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀργάνων λέγεται καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ἀνάλο
καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐπὶ τῶν ἔν τινι θεωρουμένων ποιοτήτων καὶ τελειουσ
πλοῦτος μὲν καὶ σκεύη καὶ τὰ τῆς τέχνης ὑπουργὰ ὄργανα ἐν κτή
ἔχουσι λέγονται, καὶ δεῖ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ δέοντα ὡς μὴ μ
εἴη κτῆσις· τέχνη δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀρετὴ ἕξεις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐ
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὖσαι, τελειωτικαὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ εἰσί, καὶ δεῖ κατ'
ὡς μὴ μάτην τὰς ἕξεις ἔχοιμεν· ὡς γὰρ θησαυρῷ μὴ φαινο
κτῆσις, οὕτω καὶ ἕξει ἀγαθῇ μὴ ἐνεργούσῃ εἴη ἂν τὸ ὑπάρχειν δ

b. 33. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν . . . ὑπάρχουσαν] 'for the Habit (of
be present, and yet bring forth no good result.'

1099 a. 2. ἐξηργηκότι] ἐξαργεῖν means 'to lie quite idle,' like a
fallow.'

a. 3. πράξει] The subject is ἐνέργεια, but Eustrat. has π
ἀνάγκης ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργῶν καὶ εὖ πράξει· ἐκ γὰρ ἀγαθῆς
προβαίνουσιν ἐνέργειαι. So the Par. πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ὧν
ἐνέργειαν ἔχων, καὶ εἰ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει, εὖ πράξει.

ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *E. E.* ii. 1. 121
φανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες

τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν . . . ἐπήβολοι γίνονται] 'win the great 1099 a. 5.
prizes of life.' Cf. i. 10. 14 *μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν . . . γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.*

§ 10. **ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὑτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι** a. 7.
τῶν ψυχικῶν] The connexion is explained by the Paraphrast—*ἔστι δὲ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἡδύς, οὐκ ἔξωθεν ἔχων τὴν ἡδονήν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστίν* (cf. *E. N.* x. 3. 6 *εἰ δή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἥδοιτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή*), *οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαν μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναι.* Cf. *E. N.* x. 4. 10, 11, and x. 5. 6: also *E. E.* ii. 1. 1218 b. 32 *πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἱρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις· φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*: and *M. M.* i. 3. 1184 b. 5 *τὰ δ' ἐν ψυχῇ διώρισται ἀγαθὰ εἰς τρία, εἰς φρόνησιν εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡδονήν.*

ἑκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος] If a man is a. 8.
φιλοτοιοῦτος, he will, unless hindered, perform the *πράξεις* which his disposition prompts. These *πράξεις*, being *his own, i.e.* proceeding from *his own disposition*, will be pleasant (see *E. N.* viii. 3. 6 *ἑκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις*); their being pleasant and their being performed are two inseparably connected characteristics of such *πράξεις*.

§ 11. **τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι**] The *φαῦλος* is not an organic whole. His desires do not represent the good of a permanent personality, but are merely the cravings of this or that part as separately affected. The whole does not live in every part, but every part is devoted to its own separate gratification. What pleases one part displeases another part. But the rational man—the *φρόνιμος* or *σπουδαῖος*—perceives and loves the beautiful Form of Human Nature (*τὸ καλόν*), and is regulated by his consciousness and love of it in all his desires. Nothing is pleasant to him which harms, or even does not benefit, his nature as a whole—*τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. Τὰ φύσει ἡδέα*—'things naturally pleasant' are thus things which call forth the functions, and preserve the health, of a man's true *φύσις*—his rational personality; *τὰ μὴ φύσει ἡδέα* are things which stimulate desires 'not obedient to reason,' *i.e.* not organised as parts of a consistent and permanent system. Cf. the description in *E. N.* ix. 4 of the *σπουδαῖος* and of the *φαῦλος* respectively—§ 3 *ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ* (*ὁ σπουδαῖος*) *καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ*

1099 a. 11. βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἔκαστ εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. On the other hand (§ 9) στασιά (τῶν φαύλων) ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τ δ' ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. It may b noted that the term φύσει has the same reference, in the phrase τ φύσει ἡδέα, as the term *natural* has in Butler's expression, 'th natural supremacy of Conscience' (*Sermon* 2), viz. to Huma Nature *as a system*.

a. 14. ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὑτάς] 'accordingly they ar pleasant, both to those who perform them, and in themselves,' *i.* the desires of the φιλόκαλοι are in perfect correspondence with 'th Nature of Things,' or 'moral environment'—τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, th things in which a man *ought* to take pleasure, are αὐτοῖς ἡδέα, thing in which they do, as a matter of fact, take pleasure. Cf *E. N.* i 4. 5 καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστ ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτ αὐτῶν ὤν.

a. 15. § 12. οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται κ.τ.λ.] Ramsauer contrasts relation of εὐδαιμονία to τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά—§ 15 φαίνεται δ' ὅμως τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη. In short, ἡδονή, being τῶν ψυχικ cannot be a περίαπτον. On the whole § 12 see Zeller, *Ph. d. G* ii. 2. 620 (third edition): 'Die Lust soll nicht der Zweck u Beweggrund unseres Thuns sein, sondern nur eine nothwendi Folge der naturgemässen Thätigkeit; könnten beide getre werden, so würde ein tüchtiger Mensch die Thätigkeit ohne Lust Lust ohne Thätigkeit unbedingt vorziehen (*E. N.* x. 3. 12 οὐδείς τ' ἕλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλ λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπεφέ ἡδονήν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγ ἕπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἑλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή); in Wahrheit jedoch besteht die Tugend ei darin, dass man die Lust von der Tugend gar nicht zu trennen wei dass man sich in der tugendhaften Thätigkeit unmittelbar befried fühlt, und keines weiteren, äusserlichen Zusatzes von Vergnüg bedarf.' Zeller then quotes *E. N.* i. 8. 12. Cf. also ii. 3. 1.

a. 16. περιάπτου] 'τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν φυλακτήριον, καὶ συνηθέστερον, φυλακτόν (Γα

amulette)'—Coraes. Grant quotes Plut. *Pericles* 38 Θεόφραστος . . . 1099 a.16.
ἱστόρηκεν ὅτι νοσῶν ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοπουμένῳ τινὶ τῶν φίλων δείξειε περίαπτον ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ τραχήλῳ περιηρτημένον: and Plato, *Rep.* iv. 426 B οὐδ' αὖ ἐπῳδαὶ οὐδὲ περίαπτα.

οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων] 'This anticipates *Eth.* ii. 3. 1, where a. 17.
it is said that pleasure is the test of a ἕξις being formed.' Grant.

§ 13. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί] cf. Eustrat. οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖαι a. 22.
φησὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὡς οὐσιωδῶς αὐταῖς ἐνυπάρχουσαν παρεχόμεναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλαί.

καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον] *i.e.* ἄριστα καὶ κάλλιστα.

ἅπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν] See a. 23.
note on § 8 b. 30 above. Cf. Eustrat. καὶ τοῦτο (*i.e.* καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον) δῆλον ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος· σπουδαῖος γὰρ ὢν ὁ κρίνων περὶ αὐτῶν, ὁρθὸν ἔχει τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ κριτήριον, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἥδιστον αὐτῷ καὶ ἄριστον καὶ κάλλιστον αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεις κρίνονται, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, εἶεν ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοιαῦται· εἰ δὲ μή, φαῦλός τε ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ διάστροφος ὁ ὁρθός· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. On the σπουδαῖος as the standard cf. *E. N.* iii. 4-5; ix. 4. 2, 3.

κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν] viz. καὶ ἀγαθὰς καὶ καλὰς εἶναι τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον.

§ 14. καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα] 'and a. 25.
these are not separated as they are in the Delian Inscription.' The Eudemian Ethics open with the quotation of these lines[1]. Zell, Coraes, Fritzsche (*Eth. Eud.*), Michelet, and Grant collect various renderings of the sentiment, *e.g.* Plato, *Gorgias* 451 E οἴομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ᾀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ᾧ διαριθμοῦνται ᾄδοντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως κ.τ.λ.: Theognis (*Poet. Gn.* p. 11, Tauchnitz) κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον· λῷστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν | πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον τοῦ τις ἐρῷτο τυχεῖν: Simonides (or Epicharmus)

ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ
δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φυὰν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων:

[1] Brit. Mus. 16. C. xxi (B[5]) and the Aldine Edition give—ἥδιστον δὲ τυχεῖν οὗ τις ἱμαστος ἱμᾷ.

1099 a. 25. Soph. *Creusa* (apud Stob.)

> κάλλιστόν ἐστι τοὔνδικον πεφυκέναι
> λῷστον δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἄνοσον· ἥδιστον δ' ὅτῳ
> πάρεστι λῆψις ὧν ἐρᾷ καθ' ἡμέραν.

a. 29. **ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν**] The unity of εὐδαιμονία—the ἀρίστη ἐνέργεια in which the other ἐνέργειαι are not lost, but co-ordinated and used for the good of the whole—is well brought out by Eustr. in his note, here—ἔστι δὲ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἢ ὁμοῦ πᾶσαι αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνέργειαι, ἢ εἰ μίαν τις τούτων ἐρεῖ, ἡ ἀρίστη πασῶν . . . αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ φρόνησιν, ἡ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας συντηροῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα.

a. 31. § 15.] External goods are necessary as conditions of εὐδαιμονία, but are no parts of it, just as air and light are necessary to the life of a plant, but are no parts of that life. Even pleasure, although it must not be accounted a *part* of εὐδαιμονία, is more intimately connected with it than external goods. Cf. *Pol.* H. 7. 1328 a. 21 ἐπεὶ δ', ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταὐτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως, ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν . . . διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως . . . ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἕνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος κ.τ.λ.: *E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 11 μάλιστα δὲ δεῖ πρῶτον . . . διορίσασθαι . . . ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζῆν εὖ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν, ὧν ἄνευ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν· ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, καὶ ὧν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς: *E. N.* vii. 13. 2 οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. See Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 620, 621 (ed. 3) 'Mit mehr Schein liesse sich seinen Aeusserungen über die äusseren Güter der Vorwurf machen, dass er den Menschen hier zu sehr von blos natürlichen und zufälligen Vorzügen abhängig mache. Aber doch verlangt er auch jene nur darum und nur so weit als sie unentbehrliche Bedingungen eines vollendeten Lebens und Werkzeuge der sittlichen Thätigkeit sind, womit er unstreitig Recht hat. . . . pp. 622, 3 Die Glückseligkeit besteht wesentlich und ur-

ch in der vernunftgemässen Thätigkeit, in der Ausübung 1099 a. 31.
llendeten Tugend; alles übrige kommt nur als eine Be-
derselben in Betracht und ist nur insofern für ein Gut
n, wiefern es mit jener zusammenhängt, als ihre natürliche
ie die Lust, oder als ihr Hülfsmittel, wie die leiblichen und
Güter; muss aber vorkommenden Falls zwischen diesen
denen Gütern gewählt werden, so müssen alle andern den
und sittlichen, weil sie allein unbedingte Güter sind, nach-

γητον] 'Tanquam ars poetae vel actorum virtus jacet nisi a. 33.
splendore ac pompa scenaque adjuvetur, ita ἡ ψυχῆς
κατ' ἀρετήν fere nulla est nisi vita hominis instructa sit variis
Ramsauer. Without the χορηγία of favourable circum-
a man cannot play a brilliant part on the stage of life.

ἐνίων δέ . . .] Things, the absence of which mars εὐδαιμονία, 1099 b. 2.
nguished, as Ramsauer notes, from things which are neces-
it as ὄργανα. The δέ after ἐνίων thus answers to the μέν
λά. Grant quotes *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 18 εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία
ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν,
εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς,
αν κάλλος ἰσχὺν μέγεθος δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν, δόξαν, τιμήν, εὐτυχίαν,
οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ
ἀγαθά· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. He adds, 'The ex-
in the *Rhet.* "parts of happiness" is equivalent to "instru-
of happiness, the more accurate designation in the present
' This is scarcely correct;—the present passage, as we
t seen, distinguishes the instruments (ὄργανα) of happiness,
πλοῦτος, and its ornaments, such as κάλλος; whereas in the
th are called 'parts'—μέρη. In *E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 26
γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομί-
n the other hand, we find μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας contrasted with
ὐχ οἷόν τε, this latter expression being, in fact, equivalent to
of the *Rhet.* The *Rhet.*, concerned as it is to supply points
ers addressing popular audiences, naturally differs from the
hilosophical *Ethics* (*Nic.* and *Eud.*) in its presentation of
a. It includes conditions, instruments, and ornaments
the μέρη. For μέρη as 'formal elements of the notion' see
10 and 11.

1098 a 5 εὐγενείας] See Pseudo-Plut. *de Nobilitate* 7 Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ, τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῖς εὐγενείας δίδωσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς διατάττει τὴν εὐφυΐαν ἀντὶ ἡμιθείου. The fragments from this D[illegible] περὶ εὐγενείας preserved in Stob. *Flor.* 80. 24, 25, and 88. [illegible] Aristotle [illegible] seem to suggest for εὐγένεια a more i[illegible] relation to εὐδαιμονία than that occupied by the other ἀγαθ[illegible] named with it. For it is defined as ἕξις γένους—'hereditary [illegible] must in *Pol.* [illegible] 1259 b 39 [illegible]; and, as such, must contrib[illegible] the content of that τέλειος ἕξις which manifests itself in the [illegible] εὐδαιμονία. Εὐγένεια is thus on a higher level than the [illegible] ments or ornaments of εὐδαιμονία.

οὐ πάνυ εὐδαιμονικός] is not very likely to be happy.' Pe[illegible]

[illegible] ἡ φίλη.] omitted by H[illegible] N[illegible] P[illegible] Par. 1417, Par. 1853, Eust[illegible] [illegible]. Accordingly Susemihl brackets the words. [illegible] ἡ φίλη is certainly not quite in place here, whe[illegible] [illegible] is speaking of the ornaments rather than of the instru[illegible] εὐδαιμονία.

[illegible] ἐν τῷ ἕξει] These words are regarded as spu[illegible] [illegible] Ramsauer and Susemihl. But are they not n[illegible] [illegible] for the ἕξις which follows in Ch. 9. § 1? I [illegible] [illegible] The word ἕξις expresse[illegible] [illegible] which this new subject of discussion [illegible] introduced. Since happiness seem[illegible] [illegible] principles, an internal one, virtue, an[illegible] [illegible] circumstances, the question arises whether it is a[illegible] [illegible] through any prescribed means, or whe[illegible] [illegible] It seems likely, however, to be upo[illegible] [illegible] goes off. The question of the [illegible] comes before him in mentioning that [illegible] [illegible] The question forms an impo[illegible] [illegible] ethical systems of Aristotle and Plato. [illegible] is directly opposed to that which is tenta[illegible] [illegible] *Eth. Eud.* [illegible] — ἕξις δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν φόβον [illegible] ἕξις καὶ οὐκ ἐν παραγγέλματι.

[illegible] passages quoted from Aristotle in the editions of [illegible] authority. The passages were marked by J. C. Wo[illegible] [illegible] of the work. See Newman's *Politics*, vol. ii. p. 68.

membered, however, that, in the *Meno*, it is the *political* 1099 b. 8.
a Pericles or Themistocles which is ascribed to θεία
:reas in *E. N.* i. 9 Aristotle is speaking of the εὐπραξία of
izens—οἱ μὴ πεπηρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετήν.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

that Happiness is Good Fortune—a gift bestowed by an external
wen or Fortune, upon certain favoured persons, is the very anti-
r view that it is a function which the strenuous man, by his own
us to perform; and it may be useful here to compare the degrees in
uch opposite views of the origin of Happiness succeed in accounting
of life.
begin by admitting that if *Heaven has any gift for man, Happiness*
that gift: it is indeed a 'Divine thing': but this it surely may
of being the crown of man's endeavour.
Happiness were a gift of Fortune, it would be something exceptional,
distributed as it is. Its being widely distributed corroborates our
is attained through exertions of which most men are capable.
in, it is surely more in keeping with the 'beauty' of Happiness—
h the exquisite Harmony of the Happy Life, to ascribe it to the
a steady principle of causation, such as human agency, rather than
s principle like Fortune or Chance. The organisms of the physical
o beautiful, we think, and too definite, to be the results of Chance;
of the good man is far more beautiful and definite. Indeed this
definiteness of the Happy Life are implied in our Definition, which
much light on the question of the origin of Happiness now before
fine it as a vital function manifesting excellence—implying thus
a definite kind: and here we find ourselves in agreement with the
d down at the beginning of this Treatise—that the Chief Good is
Statesmanship; for the statesman's principal care is to produce a
nite character *in his citizens*, i. e. *to make them good, and capable of*
With good reason, then, we do not speak of an ox as 'happy'—for
erform the functions in which Happiness consists; or a child (unless
tion)—for he cannot yet perform them. The performance of them
have said, perfect excellence and a perfect life: and often enough life
: many are the changes of fortune; the man who flourishes most
upon great misfortunes in his old age, like Priam; and no one
Priam 'happy.'

1099 b. 9. § 1.] Cf. *E. E.* i. 1. 1214 a. 14 πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γέγονασι πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχάνοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιὰν διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὔσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ διά τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ' ἐθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ τούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον ἢ καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπνοίᾳ δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην (πολλοὶ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν).

b. 11. §§ 2, 3.] Aristotle, while declining to regard Happiness as a special gift bestowed on a favoured few by anthropomorphic gods, is willing to allow the term θεῖον to be applied to it as an ornate epithet—as indeed the term may be applied to any beautiful result of the formative agency of Nature: cf. *E. N.* vii. 13. 6 πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον: *de An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 26 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν ἔργων, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ ἠπόρηται τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτὸν ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν, ᾗ δύνανται· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, κἀκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν πράττει: *E. E.* II. 14. 1248 a. 26 κινεῖ γάρ πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον.

b. 14. ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον] Eustr. says τῶν περὶ προνοίας εἴη ἂν λόγων οἰκειότερον καὶ θεολογικῆς θεωρίας ἐχόμενον· ἠθικὴ δὲ ἡ προκειμένη πραγματεία, καὶ ὅσον κατ' αὐτὴν ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰρημένον. The question, however, is not one which Aristotle cares to discuss even where, as in the *Metaphysics*, it might seem more in place than here. The passage, *E. N.* x. 8. 13, in which he comes nearest to seriously entertaining the question of a personal relation between the gods and men, on close examination, is seen to commit him to nothing more than an ornate use of the epithet θεοφιλέστατος.

b. 18. § 4. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον . . . ἐπιμελείας] There is a certain looseness in the reasoning here; indeed Grant describes the last clause, as it stands, as a *petitio principii*. The argument seems to be this:—If we suppose that Happiness is acquired δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν, *i. e.* by our own personal exertions, we not only are still at liberty to describe it as ἄριστον, θεῖον, and μακάριον but we are able to explain the admitted fact that it is 'common to many' (πολύκοινον)—a fact which is irreconcileable with its being

θεόδοτος or the *special* gift of the gods. 'But it would seem also 1099 b. 18.
to be common to many—a characteristic which can be explained (γάρ) only if we suppose that it may be acquired through study and diligence, by all who are not incapacitated for virtue.' The importance of τὸ πολύκοινον, as enabling us to discriminate between the claims of an exceptional agency like θεός, εὐφυΐα, or τύχη on the one hand, and of man's own personal exertion (ἐπιμέλεια, &c.) on the other hand, to be the source of Happiness, is well brought out in *E. E.* i. 3. 1215 a. 12 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς (οὐ γάρ ἐστι δι' ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτῆσις οὐδὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας)· εἰ δ' ὁ τῷ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετασχεῖν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κεῖσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αὐτοὺς παρασκευάζουσι ποιούς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

§ 5.] On this section Ramsauer remarks, 'jam enim missa est b. 20.
omnis cogitatio de deorum beneficio. Nec deesset forsitan necessario τὸ πολύκοινον, si res ad deum referenda esse videretur; quod vero fortunae attribuitur spreta omni lege ne ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ quidem potest accidere.' The fact that Happiness is 'common to many' certainly excludes the hypothesis of mere chance being its cause; but I cannot agree with Ramsauer in thinking that the same fact does not, in Aristotle's mind, necessarily exclude the hypothesis of its being the gift of personal gods. We must remember that the popular conception of εὐδαιμονία which Aristotle has to correct is that embodied in the etymology of the word, and associated with such examples as Polycrates and Croesus, who, because *specially* favoured by Heaven, were also specially exposed to its φθόνος.

Michelet's note on § 4 makes εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον disprove the intervention of the gods. 'εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον' nempe si exercitatione virtus comparatur. Jam autem concludit: Cum a multis possit acquiri, revera exercitatione comparatur. Sin vero a Diis mitteretur, paucis Deorum amicis contingeret, ut admodum paucis Homeri heroibus, ex. gr. Menelao campi Elysii.' I think that τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πολύκοινον is intended to disprove the agency of *any exceptional* cause, whether God or Chance.

In illustration of the conception of φύσις contained in § 5 Zell and Michelet quote *Phys.* viii. 6. 259 a. 10 ἐν γὰρ τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ

.099 b.20. πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἐὰν ἐνδέχηται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον: *de Jun.* *Sen.* 4. 469 a. 28 τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ποιοῦσαν κάλλιστον.

The implication in the argument εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ ἐκ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν κ.τ.λ. is that εὐδαιμονία, being man's perfection or the realisation of his φύσις, will, like other realisations of φύσις, manifest τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον—that definite structure and function, which cannot be the result of an indefinite principle, or αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, such as τύχη. On τύχη see *Met.* K. 8. 106 b. 32 πᾶν δή φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης . . . τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δὲ οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὔτ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν . . ἔστι δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὁ γίγνεται μέν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ . . . τὸ δὲ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γεγνομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐστίν. τύχη δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός . . . ἡ τύχη δ' αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του γιγνομένων . . . τὰ δ' αἴτια ἀόριστα ἀφ' ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. Cf. also *Phys.* ii. 4, 5, 6—*e.g.* 5. 197 a. 18 καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναί τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἢ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἢ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρὰ ταῦτα· ὥστε ἐπειδὴ ἀόριστα τὰ οὕτως αἴτια, καὶ ἡ τύχη ἀόριστος.

In *Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 13 the definite products of φύσις, the principle of organic growth, are contrasted with the haphazard results of chance—ἔδει καὶ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι γίνεσθαι ὅπως ἔτυχεν ὅμως δὲ ἀναίρει ὁ οὕτω λέγων τὰ φύσει τε καὶ φύσιν· φύσει γὰρ ὅσα ἀπό τινος ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνεῖται εἴς τι τέλος· ἀφ' ἑκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάστοις οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν· ἀεὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἐὰν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ. *Phys.* ii. 8 is, indeed, the best commentary on the present §. It is argued in the present § that εὐδαιμονία, civilization, the perfect form of man's life, is too beautiful and definite an organism to be the result of chance; so in *Phys.* ii. 8 it is argued that the beautiful structures of plants and animals cannot be due to the working of the haphazard principle of τὸ αὐτόματον, with which 'the survival of the fittest' is mistakenly identified in the chapter—as in the following passage 198 b. 23 τί κωλύει οὕτω καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει, οἷον τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὀξεῖς, ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ὧν τινος ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ

ἀνθρέπωρα. ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος, ᾧ ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν, οὗτος, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος 1099 b.20.
τοιοῦτός ἐστιν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. Darwin quotes this passage at the beginning of the 'Historical Sketch' prefixed to his 'Origin of Species,' and adds—'We here see the principle of natural selection shadowed forth, but how little Aristotle fully comprehended the principle is shown by his remarks on the formation of the teeth.' Aristotle's doctrine of *φύσις*, however, is not inconsistent with Darwinism—indeed, if teleology is to find a place at all in Darwinism, it must, I feel sure, be in that form in which it is conspicuous in Aristotle's doctrine of *φύσις*. Aristotle's mistake in the passage quoted by Darwin is to see chance, and not natural law, in *τὰ συστάντα ἀκατηδείως*.

πέφυκεν,] Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater rightly place a b. 22.
comma instead of a full stop after *πέφυκεν*.

§ 6. τὰ κατὰ τέχνην] *τέχνη*, like *φύσις*, is *τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική*—strives to realise that which is definite: cf. *E. N.* ii. 6. 9. It is directly opposed to *τύχη*, which is its *στέρησις*: cf. *Met.* Λ. 3. 1070 a. 6 *ἢ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ· ἡ μὲν οὖν τύχη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ . . . αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων.*

κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην] *ἀρίστη δ' αἰτία τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐργαζομένων ἀρετὴ* b. 23.
ἐκ κρείττων καὶ τέχνης καὶ φύσεως. Eustr. Cf. *E. N.* ii. 6. 9. 1106 b. 14 *ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστίν.*

§ 7. συμφανὲς . . . ζητούμενον] 'Light is thrown on the b. 25.
question before us (*i. e.* how we attain Happiness) by our definition (of Happiness) also.'

ποιά τις] 'of a certain definite kind,'—*i. e.* realised under b. 26.
definite conditions internal and external. Cf. Aristoxenus 18. 20 (Marquard p. 24) *τὸ ἡρμοσμένον μέλος . . . προσδεῖται συνθέσεώς τινος ποιᾶς καὶ οὐ τῆς τυχούσης.* Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* ii. 4. 167 *οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ στέρησις ποιότης οὐδὲ ποιόν, ἀλλ' ἐρημία ποιότητος.* So here, *εὐδαιμονία*, being an *ἐνέργεια ποιά τις*, cannot be the result of *τύχη*, for *τύχη* is the *στέρησις* or *ἐρημία ποιότητος*.

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν . . . ὀργανικῶς] *i. e.* Happiness is essentially ψυχῆς b 27.
ἐνέργεια, but requires the other goods as the conditions of its realisation. (1) It requires *τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθά* as its *ὕλη*, matter,

1099 b.27. or necessary substratum—(*τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον.* Cf. 200 a. 7 *ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ἕνεκά του· οἷον διὰ τί ὁ πρίων τοιοσδί; ὅπως τοδί, καὶ ἕνεκα μέντοι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ἂν μὴ σιδηροῦς ᾖ· ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως οὖν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τέλος· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον· τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα* —health, vigour and longevity, goods of the body, are i the Form of Happiness, as the matter in which it is re cutting the form of a saw is realised in the matter of wood. This relation of Happiness or *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια* excellence is indeed merely an extension of Aristotl doctrine of the relation of the *ψυχή* to the body: see 412 a. 20, where *ψυχή* is defined as *εἶδος σώματος φυ ζωὴν ἔχοντος*—the *ψυχή* is the form of the *σῶμα*, which i or matter. (2) Happiness requires *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά* as (*τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς.* Cf. *E.* 1099 a. 33 *πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως*).

b. 31. § 8. **ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθούς**] *καὶ ἀγαθούς* is here epexeg certain definite character, *i. e.* good.' Cf. Eustratius: *ἔργον ἔχει ἐπιμελέστατον ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ποιούς τινας ἢ καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν.* By the agencies of *μάθησις, ἐθισμός, πολιτική* effects the Happiness of the citizens result.

b. 32. §§ 9, 10.] These sections are intended to strengthen that personal exertion is the cause of *εὐδαιμονία*, by poi absence of ability to make the exertion on the part of brutes, *ὧν οὐδὲν εὔδαιμον λέγομεν.*

1100 a. 4. §§ 10, 11. **δεῖ γάρ . . . πολλαὶ γάρ . . .**] T introduces a clause explaining why children cannot y *εὐδαίμονες*: the *πράξεις* in which *εὐδαιμονία* consists re *ἀρετή* and a *τέλειος βίος*. The second *γάρ* introduces irrelevantly) a clause which explains why even tho virtuous enough to be *πρακτικοί* may still fail to satisfy ment of the *τέλειος βίος*, regarded as a life free to th great misfortune. Thus the transition is made to of the next chapter. See Ramsauer on §§ 10 and 11.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Are we then 'to call no man happy while he lives,' following Solon's maxim 'wait for the end'? If this means that 'a man may be happy after *his death,' we who define Happiness as 'a vital function' can admit no such doctrine; but we need not suppose that Solon meant anything so absurd. He meant that when a man is dead he is beyond all chance of misfortune, and that we may then, if his life has been happy, safely say so. But* can *we really feel sure that even when he is dead a man is beyond the reach of good and evil fortune? A living man may be touched by good and evil fortune without being conscious of it; so perhaps the unconscious dead may be touched by the good and bad fortune of their children and remoter descendants. It would indeed be absurd to suppose that a dead man is so touched by posthumous fortune as to become now 'happy,' now 'wretched'; but it would be equally absurd to maintain that he cannot be touched by it at all. Perhaps however the further examination of Solon's maxim may throw some light on this question of posthumous fortune—Must we then 'wait for the end' before we venture to felicitate a man on his Happiness? Surely it is absurd to wait till Happiness is a thing of the past, before we venture to admit its existence—because, forsooth, it is a stable thing, whereas the fortune of man's life is unstable to the end. So, let our answer to Solon be—This continual observance of the changes of fortune is a great error. Happiness does not consist in good fortune, although it requires its material assistance: nor does Wretchedness consist in bad fortune: it is in actions, good and bad, that Happiness and Wretchedness consist. And here we may note that our Definition of Happiness is corroborated by Solon himself. It is the stability of Happiness which strikes him most. How the stability which he regards as essential to Happiness can be predicated of a life which is still obnoxious to fortune, is his difficulty. Now the functions in which our Definition makes Happiness consist have more stability than aught else in human life. They are the man's throughout life, even more than his knowledge and skill of hand. In the performance of the highest of them he lives continuously, identifying himself with them. Himself he still is both in prosperity and in adversity—a personality maintaining its identity through all changes. Slight changes do not influence him much; greater changes enhance his Happiness or mar it; but even where they do most to mar it by laying sorrows upon him and impeding him in the performance of his functions, his noble personality shines out: we see him bearing his misfortunes cheerfully, not because he does not feel them, but because he 'has a heart aboon them a'.' Such a man, whatever happened, could never become 'wretched,' for he could never perform the base actions in which Wretchedness consists; on the other hand it would be absurd to extol 'the felicity of his life,' if he ended his days like Priam.*

From what has been said it is evident that the happy life is essentially uniform. The happy man is not easily moved from his Happiness by ordinary misfortunes: and if once moved somewhat from it by great misfortunes, is not

restored to it in a short time, but, if at all, only after many years full of glori achievements.

And now we may present our Definition in this final form—'The hap man is he who, being perfectly good, manifests his goodness in action, who h been sufficiently furnished with external good things, whose life embrace definite, i.e. a perfect period—and (perhaps we should add), whose death according to his life.'

1100 a. 10. *Introductory Note.*] In this chapter Aristotle shows how his co ception of ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν may, as ἀρχή, be applied to sol (cf. i. 7. 23 δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων) what is undoubtedly th most pressing question which the moralist has to deal with. Th question is—How can there really be such a thing as Happine for living men, who are always exposed to terrible vicissitudes fortune? Aristotle's answer is—Happiness does not depend esse tially, as is popularly supposed, on the outer moment of Fortun but is within a man, and is as abiding as his personality, which it is the function. It is indeed affected by Fortune, but it not the sport of Fortune. If, then, the Definition is correct with ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, Happiness is possible. But further, very circumstance that pessimism, or disbelief in the possibility Happiness, prevails, is evidence in favour of the conception e bodied in the Definition. Men are agreed that Happiness, i exists at all, must be something stable and lasting; this is w considering too exclusively the mutability of Fortune, they desp of Happiness. Their agreement that Happiness (did it actu exist) would be something stable, is a δόξα in favour of the corre ness of ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, for such an ἐνέργεια is preeminen stable.

Having shown that Happiness is possible, because essenti ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, Aristotle is willing to concede to popu opinion a very important influence exercised by Fortune; and making this concession even entertains the question, whether influence of Fortune ceases for the individual at his death, or d not rather (as another popular belief will have it) affect even dead through their descendants. His discussion of this quest (resumed on ch. 11) is remarkable as leading to no definite st ment of his own view. The discussion is conducted in the sp of the dialectic which animates the Platonic 'Dialogues of Sear Indeed, the disproportionate space occupied by the subject or s

jects of chapters 10 and 11 suggests the thought that in these 1100 a. 10.
chapters we have part of an early Aristotelian *Dialogue* worked into the later and more dogmatic *Ethics*. Aristotle is reputed to be the author of a Dialogue Εὔδημος ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς treating of the immortality of the soul, fragments of which have come down to us (see Berlin Aristotle, p. 1479 sqq.). Cf. the conjecture of Blass (*Rhein. Mus.* vol. XXX. p. 481 sqq. 1875) that the Dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας was made use of in the composition of certain parts of the *Metaphysics* and *de Coelo*. Be this as it may, the point of interest for us here is that *in the Ethics* Aristotle thinks it worth while to discuss, at considerable length, without arriving at any positive expression of opinion, a question on which we know, from his other writings, that he had formed a positive opinion. The ψυχή he defines in the *de An.* ii. 1. 412 b. 10 as τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδὶ σώματι. Personal consciousness—all that is included in the designation παθητικὸς νοῦς, perishes with the body. The ποιητικὸς νοῦς is eternal, but it is cosmic not personal:—*de An.* iii. 5. 430 a. 17 καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀπαθὴς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ . . . χωριστὸς δέ ἐστι μόνον ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον· οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές . . . ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός· καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐδὲν νοεῖ—on which see Trendelenburg, *de An.* p. 491, who finds in οὐ μνημονεύομεν a denial of Plato's doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. Even in the chapter before us (*E. N.* i. 10) 'one phrase occurs,' as Grant points out (*Eth.* Essay v. p. 302), 'in which the real feeling of Aristotle, for the moment at least, seems to be let out. He asks (*Eth.* i. 10. 2), "Can Solon have meant that a man is happy when he has died?" and replies, "This would be an absurdity, especially since we consider happiness to be ἐνέργεια" . . . it is clear that we have here a brief indication that death destroys those potentialities that result in happiness. It would seem then that the only immortality which is left possible by his belief is a Buddhist nirvâna' (see generally Grant's *Eth.* Essay v. pp. 295–303, where he discusses Aristotle's opinions as to the nature of a soul). Why, then, does Aristotle discuss the question of personal immortality as he does here? The form in which the question is raised seems to help us to an answer. 'How is the happiness of the dead affected,' he asks, 'by the fortunes and conduct of their descendants'? We immediately think of the importance attached in ancient societies to the performance by descendants of the ceremonial rites due to ancestors, the proper performance of which may almost be said to

1100 a. 10. have been the *raison d'être* of the family as a corporation to b perpetuated. The large place which the cult of ancestors held i the imagination and traditional practice of the ordinary Greek seem to explain the prominence here given by Aristotle to the discussio of a subject in which he had no scientific interest, and his u willingness to commit himself to a conclusion which he knew woul be λίαν ἄφιλον . . . καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον (i. 11. 1). It is to be note however, that he rationalises the issue put—It is the effect on de ancestors, not of the ceremonial conduct, but of the fortunes of their descendants which he discusses. On ancient beliefs regardin the soul and death, and on the cult of the dead, see Fustel d Coulanges, *La Cité Antique* Livre i, chapters 1 and 2.

It is perhaps worth noticing in conclusion that in the Dialogu Εὔδημος ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς, an argument for the immortality of the So seems to have been drawn from the religious homage paid to th dead. Fr. 33, Berlin Arist. 1480 a. 11 ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπει αὐτοφυῶς πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ σπένδομεν χοὰς τοῖς κατοιχομένοις ὄμνυμεν κατ' αὐτῶν, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῷ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄντι σπένδει κατ' ὄμνυσι κατ' αὐτοῦ.

a. 11. § 1. κατὰ Σόλωνα] See Herod. i. 30–33 for the conversatio between Solon and Croesus—οὕτω ὦν, ὦ Κροῖσε, says Solon (ch. 3 § 6) πᾶν ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος συμφορή· ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ καὶ πλουτέειν μὲν μέ φαίνεαι καὶ βασιλεὺς εἶναι πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ εἴρεό με, οὔκω ἐγὼ λέγω (*i.e.* εὐδαίμονα), πρὶν ἂν τελευτήσαντα καλῶς τὸν αἰῶνα πύθωμαι. Again, § 12 πρὶν δ' ἂν τελευτήσῃ ἐπισχέειν, μηδὲ καλέειν κω ὄλβιον, ἀλ εὐτυχέα, and § 17 σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν ἀποβήσεται. πολλοῖσι γὰρ δὴ ὑποδέξας ὄλβον ὁ θεός, προρρίζους ἀνέτρε The result is given ch. 33 ταῦτα λέγων τῷ Κροίσῳ (ὁ Σόλων), οὔ οὔτε ἐχαρίζετο, οὔτε λόγου μιν ποιησάμενος οὐδενὸς ἀποπέμπεται· κα δόξας ἀμαθέα εἶναι, ὃς τὰ παρεόντα ἀγαθὰ μετεῖς, τὴν τελευτὴν παντὸς χ ματος ὁρᾶν ἐκέλευε. Plut. *Vita Solonis* ch. 27 Ἕλλησιν, εἰπεῖν βασιλεῦ Λυδῶν πρός τε τἆλλα μετρίως ἔχειν ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκε καὶ σοφίας τ ἀθαρσοῦς, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ δημοτικῆς, οὐ βασιλικῆς οὐδὲ λαμπρᾶς, ὑπὸ μετ τητος ἡμῖν μέτεστιν, ἣ τύχαις ὁρῶσα παντοδαπαῖς χρώμενον ἀεὶ τὸν βίον ἐᾷ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀγαθοῖς μέγα φρονεῖν οὐδὲ θαυμάζειν ἀνδρὸς εὐτυ μεταβολῆς χρόνον ἔχουσαν. ἔπεισι γὰρ ἑκάστῳ ποικίλον ἐξ ἀδήλου μέλλον· ᾧ δ' εἰς τέλος ὁ δαίμων ἔθετο τὴν εὐπραξίαν, τοῦτον εὐδαί νομίζομεν. ὁ δὲ ζῶντος ἔτι καὶ κινδυνεύοντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ μακαρισμός, ὥσ ἀγωνιζομένου κήρυγμα καὶ στέφανος, ἐστὶν ἀβέβαιος καὶ ἄκυρος. The co

mentators quote for the sentiment of this dictum attributed to Solon— 1100 a. 11.

Soph. *O. T.* 1528

ὥστε θνητὸν ὄντ' ἐκείνην τὴν τελευταίαν χρεὼν
ἡμέραν ἐπισκοποῦντα μηδέν' ὀλβίζειν, πρὶν ἂν
τέρμα τοῦ βίου περάσῃ μηδὲν ἀλγεινὸν παθών.

Trach. 1

λόγος μέν ἐστ' ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανείς,
ὡς οὐκ ἂν αἰῶν' ἐκμάθοις βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν
θάνῃ τις, οὔτ' εἰ χρηστὸς οὔτ' εἴ τῳ κακός.

Eurip. *Androm.* 100

χρὴ δ' οὔποτ' εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ὄλβιον βροτῶν,
πρὶν ἂν θανάντος τὴν τελευταίαν ἴδῃς
ὅπως περάσας ἡμέραν ἥξει κάτω.

Troad. 509

τῶν δ' εὐδαιμόνων
μηδένα νομίζετ' εὐτυχεῖν πρὶν ἂν θάνῃ.

To these passages may be added Διονυσίου τυράννου ἐκ Λήδας (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. iv. 18, ed. Meineke)—

θνητῶν δὲ μηδεὶς μηδὲν ὄλβιόν ποτε
κρίνῃ, πρὶν αὐτὸν εὖ τελευτήσαντ' ἴδῃ·
ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ γὰρ τὸν θανόντ' ἐπαινέσαι.

§ 2. ἄτοπον] See Grant's *Eth.* Essay v. p. 302, quoted in Introductory Note to this chapter. a. 13.

§ 3. μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται] 'Solon's meaning' was evidently ὅτι τηικαῦτα ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς κ.τ.λ., as may be seen from the accounts given by Herod. and Plut., not that 'a man is positively happy after death.' a. 15.

ἀσφαλῶς] Cf. Dionysius quoted at the end of note on § 1. a. 16.

ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα] Ramsauer points out that μέν here is not followed by δέ, the opposition generally expressed by means of two clauses being implied in the single clause ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα—'ut si explicares "haec quamquam vera sunt tamen aliam admittunt controversiam."' δέ at the beginning of § 4, ἀπορίαν δέ, has no relation to this μέν. a. 17.

δοκεῖ] not to be taken as necessarily an expression of Aristotle's own opinion. a. 18.

1100 a. 19. εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ] ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις ζῷα μὲ ἀγαθοῖς τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀγαθὸς ὤν, τῶν δὲ οἰκείων αὐτοῦ εὖ ἐχόντων, κ αὐτῶν εἰς γνῶσιν οὐκ ἔρχοιτο καὶ δι' ἀποδημίαν ἴσως ἢ διὰ χρόνον κ σφοδρὰν ἀσχολίαν πρὸς ἕτερα, οὕτω καὶ τῷ τεθνεῶτι συμβαίνει πολλάκ γίνεσθαι μηδεμίαν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἃ τοῖς οἰκείοις αὐτ συμβέβηκεν—Eust. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 120) would place a comma after ζῶντι, on the ground that the words μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ cannot go with the conditional clause: the construction is δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῇ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι κ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ.

A dead man, it may be argued, is like a living man absent on a long journey, to whom, without his knowing it, good and evil may happen, in the matter of his estate, or in the persons of his relatives left at home. A dead man may thus perhaps be said 'to participate unconsciously' in the happiness or misery of his descendants. Aristotle says nothing here to lead us to suppose that he appropriates this view; indeed, he could not appropriate it, for it still assumes personal immortality, although in a highly attenuated form. Aristotle's own doctrine is that 'immortality' belongs to the family or race, as distinguished from the individual: see *de A* ii. 4. 415 a. 26 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷ μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύνατ . . . ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ᾗ δύνατ μετέχειν ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δ' ἧττον· καὶ διαμένει ο αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτό, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δ' ἕν. *Oecon.* i. 3. 1343 23 ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταύτῃ τῇ περιόδῳ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι· ἐπεὶ κ ἀριθμὸν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος· οὕτω προφκονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θε ἑκατέρου ἡ φύσις τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν.

a. 20. τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι] *i. e.* to himself.

a. 21. § 4. ἀπορίαν δέ] This is Bekker's reading, followed by Bywat I am inclined to follow Susemihl in reading δή: nothing new going to be added: what has been said is going to be repeated different words.

a. 23. κατὰ λόγον] 'in accordance with his life': Eustr. has κατὰ λόγ ἤτοι κατὰ ἀκολουθίαν καὶ ἀναλογίαν τῆς αὐτοῦ μακαριότητος.

a. 26. τοῖς ἀποστήμασι] 'in their respective degrees of removal.' Gra

§ 5. μηδ' ἐπί τινα χρόνον] 'not even for a time'—*i. e.* for a short time after the death of the γονεῖς. 1100 a. 29.

On § 5 Grant remarks—'The second part of this sentence, pronounced so strongly as it is, seems to contradict what one would have supposed to be Aristotle's philosophical creed. But he is here speaking from the popular point of view, and states strongly the two sides of the difficulty that presents itself. For the nonce he accepts a common belief on the subject (cf. i. 11. 1, i. 11. 6), but modifies it so as to leave it unimportant.'

§ 6. τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν] viz. πότερον οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ; § 1. The solution of this ἀπορία will help us to the answer of τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, viz. πότερον συνικνεῖται τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν; the discussion of which is resumed in the next chapter. a. 31.

§ 7. ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι] Zell quotes *Phys.* iv. 14. 223 b. 24 φασὶ γὰρ εἴδλον εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα. Michelet quotes Herod. i. 207 εἴδλος τῶν ἀνθρωπηΐων ἐστὶ πρηγμάτων. 1100 b. 3.

§ 8.] Grant notes that the words χαμαιλέοντα καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένον form an iambic line, probably quoted from some play. b. 6.

§ 9. ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν;] This is Solon's error. He attaches too much weight to fortune. Happiness is essentially the virtuous life, which can maintain itself even in the midst of misfortunes. b. 7.

With ἐπακολουθεῖν ταῖς τύχαις cf. Menander (Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* ii. 8, Meineke, *Fr.* iv. 215)

δυσπαρακολούθητόν τι πρᾶγμ' ἐστὶν τύχη.

§ 10. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν] To be taken closely with what immediately precedes—'Happiness does not consist in good fortune. Good fortune is only an external condition, not part of the essence, of Happiness. Happiness consists essentially in the performance of function: and (§ 10) this theory (τῷ λόγῳ) of Happiness is confirmed by the very difficulties themselves which we have reviewed.' Τὸ διαπορεῖν is διέρχεσθαι τὰς ἀπορίας (see *Index Arist.* s. v. διαπορεῖν); consequently here τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν means 'the result of the review of ἀπορίαι which we have concluded.' The result of this review has been to bring out τὸ μόνιμόν τι εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν as the thought underlying the ἀπορίαι—'How can εὐδαι- b. 11.

1100 b. 11. *μονία*, which is *μόνιμόν τι*, be realised in the life of man, which is obnoxious to fickle fortune (§ 7)'? Our Definition, which makes Happiness consist, not in good fortune, but in those functions which are the most stable elements in human nature, is thus confirmed by 'the review of *ἀπορίαι*.' The Paraph. Heliodorus explains this excellently—*λέγομεν τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν, οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται, ἢ τοὐναντίον· ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται μὲν τούτων πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἡ δὲ οὐσία τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὐκ ἐν αὐταῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείᾳ συνίσταται, καθὼς εἴρηται. Μόνιμον γὰρ δεῖ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δυνατὸν αὐτὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τύχης συνίστασθαι· καὶ τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ προκειμένη ζήτησις· ἀπὸ τούτου γὰρ ἔλαβε τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ὑποκεῖσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μόνιμον εἶναι.*

b. 14. **μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι**] The contrast here is between deeply organised functions, *whether intellectual or moral*, involving the coordination of all parts of a man's nature—*i.e.* between the display of intelligence and moral goodness, on the one hand, and special knowledge, involving the perhaps exclusive cultivation of one small part of human nature, on the other hand. An intelligent man will show intelligence on all occasions, a just man will always act justly; but an examinee may quite forget a branch of knowledge, after the reason for which he 'got it up' has ceased to exist.

b. 15. **τούτων δ' αὐτῶν**] *i.e. τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν κατ' ἀρετήν.*

αἱ τιμιώταται] The exact force of this expression may be gathered from i. 12, which asks whether *εὐδαιμονία* is *ἐπαινετόν* or *τίμιον*. Things which are means are *ἐπαινετά*, but an end-in-itself, such as *εὐδαιμονία*, is *τίμιον*. Hence here *αἱ τιμιώταται* may be rendered—'the highest,' *i.e.* the most final. The *μακάριοι*—those who realise most perfectly that 'humanity is an end-in-itself,' not a means to something beyond itself, spend their lives in—identify themselves with the performance of functions which are 'highest' in this sense. We may take it, then, that *αἱ θεωρητικαὶ ἐνέργειαι* were in Aristotle's mind when he wrote *τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται.*

b. 16. **καταζῆν**] Coraes suggests *ζῆν*: cf. the Paraph. *διὰ τὸ ζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα.* The compounded form *καταζῆν* is rare, but it is, I think, appropriate here: perhaps, however, the *κατα-* represents a dittograph of the preceding *-τατα.*

ὡς] the reading of M^b, CCC, N C, Vet. Int. adopted by 1100 b. 17.
ihl and Bywater instead of αὐτά.

ην] Similarly in *E. N.* vi. 5. 8 τέχνη and φρόνησις are con-
—λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως (*e. g.* τέχνης) ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ'
ν. Τέχνη implies the cultivation of a small part of a man's
; whereas φρόνησις involves the organisation of the whole
and he cannot 'forget' or lose his φρόνησις without becoming
er being. Cf. Grant on the present § (i. 10. 10)—'The
... *is* our life and being, and it would be absurd to speak
getting this. It "is more abiding than the sciences," *i. e.* than
parate parts of knowledge, which do not constitute the mind

L τὸ ζητούμενον] τὸ ζητούμενον ἦν εἰ δύναται μένειν ὁ εὐδαίμων b. 18.
ς ἐν ταῖς τῶν τυχῶν μεταπτώσεσιν. Eustr. So the Paraph.—
τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, τὸ μόνιμον δηλονότι αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ
.

ιστα πάντων] 'mostly'—Grant; πάντων is neut. b. 19.

ξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν] Grant (note on § 10) points
at these words show that the opposition between *αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν*
ι and *αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι* in § 10 is not the opposition 'between the
l and intellectual *ἐνέργειαι*.'

' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου] Zell, Coraes, b. 21.
elet, and Grant refer to Plato, *Protagoras* 339 λέγει γάρ που
ὸης . . . ὅτι

ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ
τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τε-
τυγμένον.

Rhet. iii. 11. 1411 b. 25 λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα
ντα σημαίνει· οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον,
ρά· ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια, ἀλλ' οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν. Sopater, apud
Flor. vol. ii. 222 (ed. Meineke), quoted by Zell, indicates the
e metaphor conveyed by τετράγωνος—τίς οὖν οὕτω κατὰ τὸν
δν λίγον τετράγωνος, ὃς κατὰ πᾶσαν τύχην καὶ πραγμάτων
σιν ἀσφαλῶς ἑστήξεται. So Eustr. τετράγωνος, ἤτοι βεβηκὼς καὶ
ος· ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν τοιούτων σχημάτων, ἃ ὅπως ἂν ῥιφέντα πεσῆται
ίσταται. Cf. Suidas *sub voc.* Δαμάσκιος—σεμνὸς δὲ ἦν καὶ εὐσχή-

1100 b. 21. *μων τὰ πάντα καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένος, ὡς φάναι κατὰ τὸν Σιμωνίδην.*

b. 26. § 12. **καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.**] *αὐτά* and *ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν* are distinguished. 'In themselves they naturally help to lend a charm to life, and the use of them is noble and good.'

b. 30. **διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν**] Both Michelet and Grant remark on the Stoical tone of this passage. Grant compares *E. N.* iii. 9. 4, where the self-sacrifice of the brave man is described.

1101 a. 2. § 13. **ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κ.τ.λ.**] *τὰς τύχας ἢ ὡς ὄργανα χρὴ ἢ ὡς ὕλας ὑποκειμένας λογίζεσθαι.* Eustr.

a. 6. § 14. **ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε κ.τ.λ.**] The distinction between *εὐδαίμων* and *μακάριος* is not carefully observed by Aristotle. We may perhaps say that the latter term is strictly applied to the man whose happiness is not marred in any way by circumstances: cf. the derivation given in *E. N.* vii. 11. 3 *τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.*

a. 14. § 15.] In this § the words *ἢ προσθετέον* a. 16 . . . *πάντως* a. 19 are bracketed by Susemihl. Rassow had pointed out (*Forsch.* pp. 118, 119) that they (and also the words *εἰ δ' οὕτω* a. 19 . . . *ἀνθρώπους* a. 21 in § 16) are inconsistent with the result gained by Aristotle from the discussion of Solon's dictum, although quite in harmony with the later peripatetic view of the *βίος τέλειος*. Rassow's words are—'Was hindert uns also, fährt Aristoteles fort (§ 15), den glückselig zu nennen, der der vollkommenen Tugend gemäss thätig und mit äussern Glücksgütern hinlänglich ausgerüstet ist *μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον?* Schlösse hier die Untersuchung, so wäre nicht bloss die Ansicht des Solon zurückgewiesen, sondern man würde auch über die Frage, was man unter dem *βίος τέλειος* zu verstehen habe, keineswegs im Zweifel sein können. Denn wenn es denkbar ist, dass jemand die Eudämonie besitzt, verliert und wiedergewinnt, wie kann der Besitz derselben an das volle Menschenleben gebunden sein? (cf. note on i. 7. 16). Aber wider Erwarten erfolgt ein Zusatz, der zwar in der Form einer Frage auftritt, aber doch einer Frage, die eher zu Bejahung als Verneinung hinneigt. Es heisst: *ἢ προσθετέον . . . πάντως; εἰ δ' οὕτω . . . δ' ἀνθρώπους.* Wer so definirt

ann nichts einzuwenden haben gegen das Solonische Wort; denn 1101 a. 14.
ag er auch auf die äussern Glücksfalle ein minderes Gewicht
egen als Solon, so stimmt er ihm doch darin bei, dass es zur
Glückseligkeit nicht eines gewissen Abschnittes des Lebens,
ondern des ganzen Lebens bedürfe, und wer dies meint, wird
Solons Vorsicht im Urtheil nur billigen können. (Oben ch. 10 § 7,
war es als ein *ἄτοπον* bezeichnet, *εἰ ὅτ' ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύ-*
ουσι καθ' αὑτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον. Auch dies wird durch die Worte,
ἐπεὶ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν zurückgenommen). Die letztere
Definition, die, wenn man auf die Fassung Gewicht legen darf,
noch als fraglich hingestellt wird, scheint in der Schule des
Aristoteles die herrschende geworden zu sein. Denn während er
selbst noch Grunde gegen die Solonische Ansicht anführt, wird
diese in der Eudemischen Ethik kurzweg als richtig bezeichnet
und demgemäss der *βίος τέλειος* als das volle Menschenleben
gefasst.'

Susemihl apparently differs from Rassow in regarding the words
εἰ δ' οὕτω . . . μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους § 16 as genuine. But
surely, if the words *ἢ προσθετέον . . . πάντως*, with their references
to the future (*βιωσόμενον* and *τελευτήσαντα*) are inconsistent with
Aristotle's criticism of the Solonian dictum, the words *οἷς ὑπάρχει*
καὶ ὑπάρξει are equally so. Nor is the sentence *εἰ δ' οὕτω . . .*
μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους even consistent with itself. The writer of it
evidently lays emphasis on *τῶν ζώντων*, and intends to make a
statement which shall embody what he conceives to be Aristotle's
correction of Solon's *τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν*: but he does not see
that the words *καὶ ὑπάρξει* deprive the correction of meaning,
Aristotle's objection to Solon being that Solon will not acquiesce
in the present, but must needs wait for the future. Aristotle's
view of Life is like his view of Pleasure. Both Life and Pleasure
are perfect (*τέλεια*) *ἐν τῷ ἀτόμῳ νῦν.* We have not to wait for
a *future τέλος*: if we had, Life would be a *γένεσις*, not an
ἐνέργεια.

§ 16. **μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους**] Before *ἀνθρώπους* Γ, C C C, Eustr., a. 20.
Paraph., corr. P[1] (*i. e.* Par. 2023), and perhaps Asp. (see Bywater)
read *ὡς*, which Michelet ascribes to Christian influences—as if the
distinction intended were that between the imperfect happiness
competent to man's fallen nature and the perfect felicity of God:
whereas according to the true Aristotelian teaching, man, although

1101 a. 20. partially subject to the vicissitudes of fortune, has a regior thought—exempt from their influence. As exercising th enjoys a felicity which does not differ in kind from th while, as a composite being, he enjoys a human happir this as it may, I cannot see how the so-called Christian d may not be got out of the words before us as well withou ὡς. The meaning (with or without ὡς) seems however to l enough—we may call men μακάριοι, but we must remen they are *men*. The difference between the happiness of of God is not in the kind of function which consti happiness in each case, but in the continuity of that funct *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 13 ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς κα διαγωγὴ δέ ἐστιν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν· οὔτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκ ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον . . . ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδι τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

Eustratius, although he perhaps writes under the influ some extent, of the Christian distinction, does not reall present the Aristotelian teaching in his commentary on t before us—μακαρίους δέ φησιν ὡς ἀνθρώπους ἤτοι κατὰ τ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, οἷς ἡ ἐν βίῳ διαγωγὴ ἐν διηνεκεῖ ῥύσει καὶ ὑπάρχει, ἐπεὶ τῆς νοερᾶς καὶ θείας φύσεως ἄλλο εἶδος μακαρι στάσει τὸ εἶναι ἐχούσης καὶ μηδεμίαν ὑπομενούσης μεταβολήν. great doubts, however, of the genuineness of the words . . . δ' ἀνθρώπους.

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

To return now to the question whether the dead are touched by th of living descendants and friends—That they are not touched at a doctrine opposed to most men's way of thinking, and therefore not we should be justified in maintaining dogmatically: but to make examination of the particular cases, in order to estimate the probab dead being or not being touched in each, would take too long: a genera on the subject must suffice: and let it be this—Different things wh pening to ourselves or to our friends affect us differently. Some thing deeply, other things lightly. This during *our lives. But when w the way in which the dead are 'affected' with that in which the 'affected,' we must be prepared for a vast difference—much vaster th*

the theatre between the effect of a messenger's tale of horror and crime and the effect of the crime itself in all its horror enacted on the stage before our eyes. Taking account then of this vast difference in the way in which the dead as compared with the living are 'affected'—if they are 'affected' at all (a doubt which we must not lose sight of either)—we may say that if aught of good or evil reaches the dead from the living world and touches them, it is so trifling, or they are so insensible to its influence, that it does not affect their Happiness if they are happy, or Wretchedness if they are wretched.

§ 1] On the subject of this ch. see introductory note to ch. 10. 1101 a. 22. He now returns to the ἐπιζητούμενον of i. 10. 6.

λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον] Remembering that a. 23. the treatment of the subject in this and the preceding chapter is *dialectical*, we may recognise in these words two marks of the legitimate dialectical πρότασις or πρόβλημα, as it is described in the *Topics*. (1) No πρότασις may be employed which deeply offends the religious and moral sentiments of men, *Top.* i. 11. 105 a. 3 οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν· ἀλλ' ἣν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις τῶν λόγου δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορήσαντες πότερον δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν, καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν ἢ οὔ κολάσεως δέονται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ἡ χιὼν λευκὴ ἢ οὔ, αἰσθήσεως. So, to call in question the consciousness of the Dead is a heartless proceeding (λίαν ἄφιλον) and not suited to Dialectic. (2) Another mark of a legitimate dialectical πρότασις seems to be indicated by the words καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον, viz. that, except where it is supported by very exceptional evidence, it must not conflict with popular opinion. See *Top.* i. 10. 104 a. 8 ἔστι δὲ πρότασις μὲν διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἔνδοξος ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις, μὴ παράδοξος· θείη γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς σοφοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ ἐναντίον ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις ᾖ: and *Top.* i. 11. 104 b. 19 θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν· οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης . . . τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηναμένου φροντίζειν εὔηθές ἐστιν. In a dialectical discussion, then, like the present, we must not call in question the widely entertained belief, that the dead *are* conscious, the denial of which moreover wounds the tenderest feelings of mankind. But while, for these reasons, unwilling here entirely to deny this popular belief, Aristotle does not scruple to *minimize* it—his dialectical conclusion being § 5 ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διῖκνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἐγκύκλιον εἴτε τοὐναντίον, ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι,

1101 a. 23. *εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον.*

a. 28. §§ 3, 4, 5.] We have here a double protasis *εἰ δή* a. 28 .... *διαφέρει δέ* a. 31, the apodosis beginning—*συλλογιστέον δή* a. 34.

a. 32. § 4. *τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι*] 'It makes a much greater difference whether a calamity happen to the living or to the dead, than it does whether a terrible crime be presupposed in the plot of a tragedy or enacted on the stage.' Michelet appositely quotes Hor. *A. P.* 181

'Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus.'

There can be very little doubt that this is the meaning of the passage; but most of the commentators, beginning with Eustrat., miss the point, *e.g.* Coraes, with *οἷον ἐπὶ παραδείγματος, Οἰδίπους, τὴν μητέρα γαμῶν, τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκοπτόμενος, τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἐκπίπτων, ὅτ' ἔζη, διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πάσχειν ὑποκρινομένου Οἰδίποδος.*

a. 34. § 5. *συλλογιστέον*] 'we must take into account.'

μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.] 'or rather perhaps (we must take into account, *συλλογιστέον* understood) the fact that a question is raised about the dead etc.' Grant. Lambinus suggested *μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τόδε δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι*: but as Grant argues[1] 'The alteration would really alter and spoil the context. Aristotle does not say "Perhaps after all we had better start the question anew, whether the dead are conscious of events." This would contradict § 6. He only says, "While granting the hypothesis that they do feel, we must take into account the element of doubt which still continues to attach to the subject."' Rassow, however—(*Forsch.* p. 74), is of opinion that *μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τόδε δεῖ ἀπορεῖσθαι* is the correct reading. I cannot help thinking that the considerations urged by Grant against the conjecture of Lambinus tell equally against that of Rassow.

1101 b. 1. *ἐκ τούτων*] *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*—Aspasius: so Stahr, Peters, and Williams: but the Paraph. has—*φαίνεται τοίνυν ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ἔρχεται τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τούτων.*

[1] After noting the rendering of the Paraph. as supporting Lambinus—*σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς· βέλτιον δέ ἐστι σκέψασθαι εἰ κοινωνοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.*

εἰ δὲ μή] *sc.* ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ μικρόν. 1101 b. 3.

§ 6.] Victorius thinks that this § is an ancient scholium which has got into the text—'nihil enim novi tot verbis exponitur: nec solum sententia sed ne verba quidem variantur . . . sunt etiam libri nonnulli (which?) a quibus haec verba absunt.' Stahr follows Victorius in regarding the § as an interpolation. b. 5.

CHAPTER XII.

Argument.

Let our next question be this—Is Happiness a thing which we praise, *or is it not rather a thing which we* revere? *It must be either praised or revered; for it is actually good, not a mere possibility of good.*

A thing is praised because it is a good means to some end: e.g. a virtuous character is praised because it produces virtuous actions. Where there is no reference to an end beyond, praise is misapplied: e.g. it is misapplied, and ridiculously so, to the Gods who exist for themselves not for man. It is plain then that the Chief Good is above praise: 'that a good thing which is above praise must be the Chief Good' was indeed the argument which Eudoxus used to prove that 'Pleasure is the Chief Good'—and a very fine line of advocacy it was, in the opinion of many.

As for encomia—they are for performances such as feats of bodily strength or masterpieces of art: but the works of those who have made encomia their special subject may be consulted for details; our present subject is Happiness, and it is plain that Happiness is revered as an End. As a Beginning also or First Principle it is revered. All that is done by men is done for its sake: it is the Prime Mover or First Cause of all their actions. Such a Principle and Cause of Good we revere as divine.

Introductory Note.] Except that this chapter contains a further attempt to show the agreement of the Definition with popular opinion and forms of speech, its connexion with the immediate context is not evident. The following passage in *E.E.* ii. 1. 1219 a. 40—b. 16, which gives an imperfect conspectus of the contents of several chapters of the *E.N.*, seems however to bring out the solidarity of the enquiry before us with the preceding discussions, especially with the question εἰ δεῖ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν:—ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. τό τε γὰρ εὖ πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὧν ἕκαστον 1101 b. 10.

1101 b. 10. χρῆσίς ἐστι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις (καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ χρηστικὴ ἐστί . . .) καὶ τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μέχρ ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν, ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὔδαιμον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον)· ἔτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοι τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων· καὶ στεφανοῦσιν οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ· καὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὁποῖός τις ἐστίν· ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τἆλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἢ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὰ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργου· ὁ δ' ἔπαινος τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου· ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους. It will be observed that the word τίμιον is not used here, the writer, true to his view—τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος, ending the passage with ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.

b. 10. § 1.] εὐδαιμονία is evidently not a δύναμις or mere potentiality of good: it is definitely and actually good. But is it actually good as a means or as an end? This question, which has already been answered over and over again, may be answered once more by reference to the popular distinction between ἐπαινετά and τίμια, the former being good means, and the latter good ends. The result of this reference is οὐδεὶς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει (§ 4). Cf. *M. M.* i. 2. 1183 b. 20–37—a passage which fully explains what Aristotle understands here by ἐπαινετά (οἷον ἀρεταί) τίμια (οἷον ψυχή, νοῦς, ἡ ἀρχή) and δυνάμεις (οἷον ἀρχὴ πλοῦτος ἰσχὺς κάλλος). Ramsauer, who has an important note here, points out that the conjunction ἐπαινετά, τίμια, δυνάμεις occurs only in the *Eth. Nic.* and the *M. M.* In *Top.* iv. 5 τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικόν is distinguished as δι' ἄλλο αἱρετόν from τὸ τίμιον, which is δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετόν, no mention being made of τὸ ἐπαινετόν[1]: (126 b. 4 [ὁρᾶν δὲ] καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ τιμίων ἢ αἱρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἔθηκεν· πᾶσα γὰρ δύναμις καὶ πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικὸν δι' ἄλλο αἱρετόν), while in another passage, *Top.* iii. 1. 116 b. 37: τίμια and ἐπαινετά do not seem to be distinguished, *both* being ends or means—ἔτι τὸ κάλλιον καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τιμιώτερον καὶ ἐπαινετώτερον οἷον φιλία πλούτου καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἰσχύος. τὰ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ τῶν

[1] The term ἐπαινετόν does not indeed occur in this passage; but its contrary ψεκτόν occurs in the immediate context, 126 a. 30 ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἔθηκεν . . : then follows 126 b. 4 καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ τιμίων ἢ αἱρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν . . . ἔθηκεν.

ῥῶν καὶ ἐπαινετῶν, τὰ δ' οὐ καθ' αὑτὰ ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ 1101 b. 10.
ᾑρεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον δι' ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον, τὴν δὲ φιλίαν καθ' αὑτό, καὶ εἰ μηδὲν μέλλει ἡμῖν ἕτερον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἔσεσθαι. All we can say is that here in the *Ethics* Aristotle finds that it suits his purpose to make a distinction between ἐπαινετά and τίμια which he does not make in the *Topics*.

§ 2. φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τι b. 12.
πως ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι·] When the possession of a good *quality* places a thing in a definite *relation to* something else we praise it on account of its relation to that something else (γίνονται αἱ ἔπαινοι κατ' ἀναφορᾶς § 3). Cf. *Cat.* 7. 6 b. 2 ἔστι δὲ . . . τῶν πρός τι . . . ἕξις διάθεσις ἐπιστήμη αἴσθησις θέσις. πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται . . . ἡ γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη κ.τ.λ. Cf. the last words of the present book of the *E. N.*: τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν. A good quality to be ἐπαινετόν, however, must be one which places its possessor in a *definite* relation. There are certain good qualities—various ἐπιστῆμαι or τέχναι (the δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου of *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 a. 1) such as ῥητορική, διαλεκτική, ἰατρική, which may be used for good or evil indifferently, and therefore are not ἐπαινετά or, at least, not so without qualification. But moral ἕξεις (*e.g.* δικαιοσύνη) differ from such δυνάμεις in being the sources of good actions only in this respect resembling the ἄλογοι δυνάμεις or natural properties of *Met.* Θ. 2, which always produce the same effects—the particular property of fire, *e.g.* always producing heat: that of [illegible] also *E. N.* v. 1. 4. These moral ἕξεις are ἐπαινετὰ without qualification, as they tend definitely to good: whereas many intellectual ἕξεις (and it will be observed that no intellectual ἕξις is mentioned by Aristotle in the section before us—i. 12. 2 [illegible] class of δυνάμεις which are distinguished from τὰ ἐπαινετὰ [illegible]): Eustratius seems to see this—τὰ μὲν θεῖα τίμια λέγεται ὡς [illegible] ἀνθρώπινα . . . ἐπαινετὰ δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὡς τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι μὴ [illegible] ἐπαίνου δὲ μόνον τυγχάνοντα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα μὴ [illegible] ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα δέ, ὡς καὶ κατορθοῦν δύνασθαι καὶ [illegible] τοῦτο δυνάμεις λεγόμενα, ὅς τινας τῶν τεχνῶν ἐπαίνους εἶναι [illegible] ἡ ῥητορικὴ κ.τ.λ. These instances, it will be observed, differ from those given by the author of *M. M.* 1. 2. [illegible] ἡ πλούτος ἰσχὺς κάλλος 1183 b. 2[illegible].

Besides the moral ἕξεις, there is another class of [illegible]

1101 b. 12. sufficiently definite in the direction of good to be 'praised' without qualification—viz. those described in *Cat.* 8. 9 a. 15 as τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικήν—οὐ γὰρ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἕκαστον τούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν . . . τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως . . . οἷον πυκτικὴ ἢ δρομικοί (cf. the passage before us, § 2) λέγονται οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως. To prevent misunderstanding it is proper to add that, although in the view of the passage before us (*Eth.* i. 12. 2) the qualities or ποιότητες regarded as ἐπαινετά *par excellence* are the *moral* ἕξεις and τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενα, still it is not implied that all *intellectual* ἕξεις are mere potentialities for good or evil, like ῥητορική, and therefore not properly ἐπαινετά. Those ἐπιστῆμαι which are concerned with necessary truth cannot be turned to evil account, and, *qua* ἕξεις, are accordingly ἐπαινεταί: similarly the intellectual ἕξις of φρόνησις, although concerned with contingencies, is ἐπαινετή, being one of those οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα (*E. N.* vi. 6. 2). That Aristotle extended ἔπαινος to intellectual as well as to moral ἕξεις is indeed plain from the last section of this book, where ἀρετή is described as ἐπαινετὴ ἕξις, and the ἀρεταί are then distinguished as ἠθικαί and διανοητικαί. The tendency, however, which we have noticed in the passage before us (i. 12. 2) to regard the *moral* ἕξεις as preeminently ἐπαινεταί is developed by the writer of the *M. M.* into the doctrine that the intellectual ἕξεις are *not* ἐπαινεταί: see *M. M.* i. 5. 1185 b. 3 ἔστιν δ' ἡ ψυχή, ὡς φαμέν, εἰς δύο μέρη διῃρημένη, εἴς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. ἐν μὲν δὴ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις ἀγχίνοια σοφία εὐμάθεια μνήμη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀλόγῳ αὗται αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεγόμεναι, σωφροσύνη δικαιοσύνη ἀνδρεία ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοῦ ἤθους δοκοῦσιν ἐπαινεταὶ εἶναι. κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα· κατὰ δὲ τὰς τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται· οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι σοφός, οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται, οὔτε ὅτι φρόνιμος, οὐδ' ὅλως κατά τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. This is not in itself Aristotelian, but Aristotle suggested it.

With the words which head this note—φαίνεται δή κ.τ.λ. cf. *Met.* Δ. 14. 1020 b. 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν: cf. also *E. N.* ii. 5, which turns on goodness (ἀρετή) being regarded as *the* ποιότης *par excellence*: hence an examination of the admitted forms of ποιότης—ἕξις, δύναμις, πάθος (or παθητικὴ ποιότης), with the conclusion § 6. 1106 a. 11 λείπεται ἕξεις τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι.

b. 16. καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δέ] K^{b}: accepted by Rassow (*Forsch.* 54). The

1101 b. 33. ζομεν πράξαντας· τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ μὴ πεπραγότα, εἰ πιστεύομεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. See also the passage from *E. E.* ii. 1 quoted in the introductory note to this chapter.

b. 35. § 7. τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις] In a list of Aristotle's works given by Hesychius we find τέχνη ἐγκωμιαστική (see Berlin Arist. 1469): cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 4 on the ἐγκωμιαστικὸν εἶδος.

1102 a. 2. § 8. ἀρχή] ἀρχήν M^b, O^b C C C, Ald., but ἀρχή is right; Zell quotes ii. 9. 1 τοιαύτη ἐστὶν (ἡ ἀρετὴ) διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι, and vii. 14. 5 ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι.

The τέλος, or perfect adult form, is the ἀρχή which determines the growth, through all its stages, of a plant or animal (see *Met.* Λ. 8. 1073 a. 1 τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον); similarly, εὐδαιμονία—the τέλος, or perfect form of human nature, is, as such, the ἀρχή, or principle of attraction, which moves states and individuals to the performance of noble actions.

CHAPTER XIII.

ARGUMENT.

Since Happiness is 'a vital function manifesting perfect excellence,' let us now, in order to get a clearer view of Happiness, examine the nature of 'excellence.' In doing so we shall only be following out the line of enquiry contemplated at the beginning of this Treatise, when we described our Science as a kind of Statesmanship; for the 'excellence' or 'goodness' of their citizens is what all true Statesmen (e. g. the great lawgivers of Crete, Sparta, and other states) have been most anxious about.

Of course it is man's *excellence that we examine; and the excellence not of his body but of his soul; for we define Happiness as a vital function, i. e. a function of the soul. The Statesman then must know something about the soul as a whole, just as the physician must know the body as a whole: in each case no part can be known or treated aright except as part of the whole. But the Statesman's study of Psychology need not go into wearisome details, for its end is practical not scientific.*

It will be enough then if we here borrow the main outlines of Psychology from other works in which the subject is treated—and first, let us borrow the division of the soul into (1) *the irrational part and* (2) *the part which has reason—it does not concern us here whether these parts are really separate as hand and foot are in the body, or only separated in thought as convex and concave in the mathematical circumference. Then the irrational part is subdivided. First we have the vegetative part, the principle of nutrition and growth, which we see perhaps most plainly at work in the embryo; but it continues to*

operate in the adult also. This principle is common to all living creatures and not peculiar to man. Thus it operates most in sleep when the difference between men as men, i. e. between good men and bad men, is least apparent: 'during half their lives' according to the saying 'the happy are no better off than the miserable.' And this is easily explained, for sleep is the non-activity of the soul qua principle of conduct—although the principle of conduct may sometimes be so far active in sleep as to make the dreams *of the good man better than those of the bad man. But enough of this: let us pass on from the nutritive part whose excellence is not that of man as man, to the other subdivision of the irrational part—to 'the principle which though irrational yet participates somehow in reason.' In the continent man and in the incontinent man we see two principles, one that of reason which we praise, and another which opposes reason. This latter principle in the continent man at least obeys reason or participates in it. Thus the irrational part of the soul contains two principles —the vegetative principle which does not participate in reason at all, and the appetitive which does in the sense of listening to reason and obeying it. Admonition, reproof and exhortation all witness to its participation in reason; and if we wish on the strength of its 'participation' to say that it 'has reason,' there can be no objection to our saying so, and subdividing 'the part of the soul which has reason' into two parts—the part which has reason in the strict sense, i. e. in itself, like the father who directs; and the part which has it in a secondary sense, i. e. by derivation from another or participation, like the child who follows his father's directions.*

This subdivision underlies the classification of the 'excellences.' We distinguish them as those of the intellect (i. e. the part which has reason in itself) and those of the moral character (i. e. the part which follows reason). Wisdom, intelligence and prudence are excellences of the intellect; liberality and temperance of the moral character. When we are describing a man's moral character we do not speak of him as wise or intelligent but as good tempered or temperate; whereas the wise man comes in for the praise appropriate to his habit, which belongs to the other division, that of the intellect. In both divisions an 'excellence' may be described as a 'habit which we praise.'

§ 1. περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη] K^b, Camb., and Asp., are the authorities for ἂν εἴη, accepted by Bywater. The words ἂν εἴη, are not found in other authorities. **1102 a. 6.**

A new division of the *Ethics* begins here. After indicating, in this chapter, the psychological ground of the distinction between the διανοητικαὶ and the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί, Aristotle goes on in Book ii, and Book iii chapters 1–5, to discuss the common characteristics of the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί. This discussion is summed up in iii. 5. 21 κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται: then follows a detailed account of the separate ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί up to the end of Book v: while Book vi is devoted to a discussion of the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί.

§ 2. ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός] Michelet compares *Pol.* iii. 5. **a. 8.**

1102 a. 8. 1280 b. 4 φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζομένῃ πόλει. Cf. also *E. E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 23 οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας. οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶ πράξεων προαιρετικός, αὐτῶν χάριν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν ἅπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως.

a. 10. § 3. Κρητῶν] *Pol.* ii. 7.

a. 11. Λακεδαιμονίων] *Pol.* ii. 6. Grant remarks that 'Aristotle seems to have inherited the preference felt by Plato and Socrates for the Spartan constitution; not so much as a historical fact, but rather as a philosophical idea. It presented the scheme of an entire education for the citizens, though Aristotle confesses that this became degraded into a school for gymnastic.' The fault which Aristotle finds with the Spartan legislation is that it is based on a one-sided psychology—that it recognises only the virtues of the θυμοειδὲς μέρος. Cf. *Pol.* ii. 6. 1271 a. 41 καὶ ὠδὶ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἄν τις . . . πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη δὲ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν· τοιγαροῦν ἐσῴζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν, μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. Cf. *Pol.* Θ. 3. 1338 b. 9 νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τό τε εἶδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν . . . οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην, βλέποντα ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν.

εἴ τινες ἕτεροι] Michelet suggests the Carthaginians, whose constitution is described, and on the whole favourably criticised in *Pol.* ii. 8. Eustr. has ὡς ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἑτέρων ἕτεροι.

a. 13. § 4. κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν] see *E. N.* i. 2. 5. Cf. i. 9. 8. The Par. has ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ζήτησις αὕτη ἀκόλουθος ἂν εἴη τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου σκοπῷ· ἦν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς πολιτικῆς.

a. 14. § 5. ἀνθρωπίνης] I transcribe Eustratius' note on this §, not as throwing much light on Aristotle's doctrine of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, but as an interesting example of how Aristotelian doctrine fared under the combined influences of Neoplatonism and Christian asceticism: πολλὰ γένη ἀρετῶν εἰσῆγον οἱ παλαιοί, πολιτικὴν καθαρτικὴ

ποιεῖν καὶ τὴν παραδειγματικὴν καὶ τὴν θεουργικήν· τούτων δ' ἑκάστην 1102 a. 14.
διαιροῦν εἰς τέτταρα τὰ πρῶτα φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην, ἄλλας καὶ ἄλλως ἕκαστον ἀποδιδόντες αὐτῶν, οἰκείως δηλονότι τῶν γενῶν ἑκάστου. ἀλλὰ νῦν ἡμῖν τὰ δύο ταῦτα συνέγνωσται γένη μάλιστα, ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ καθαρτική, ἡ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς συμπραττούσης τῷ σώματι, ἡ δὲ χωριζομένης αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐχούσης ἀσυμπαθῶς πρὸς αὐτό, ὡς εἶναι τὴν μὲν μετριοπάθειαν μόνον καλάζουσαν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν παθῶν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου συντηροῦσαν τὴν κατὰ ταῦτα ἐνέργειαν, τὴν δὲ ἡ εἰς ἀπάθειαν ἤνεσιν ἐν τῷ ἔτι καθαίρεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, ἣ καὶ ἤδη ἀπαγαγοῦσαν ὅτε ἤδη καὶ κεκάθαρται, καὶ ἀπροσπαθὴς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα γεγένηται. ἀνθρωπίνην τοίνυν ἀρετὴν φησὶ τὴν πολιτικήν, ὡς οὔσης τῆς καθαρτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐχ ἀνθρωπίνου ὅσον κατὰ τὸ συναμφότερον· ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον καὶ συναγελαστικὸν καὶ κοινωνικόν· ὅτε δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον σῶμα κοινωνίαν ἀρνήσεται, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπείαν τότε καθέστηκε σύνθεσιν, πᾶσαν ὑπὲρ ἀπηρνημένος ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ἀνεπιστρόφῳ τῶν χειρόνων ψυχῇ καὶ ἀβαρῆ πρὸς τὰ κρείττω ἀναφερόμενος καὶ πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἀναπλούμενος ἀλαμψιν.

§ 6. καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δέ] This clause introduced by καὶ . . . a. 17.
δέ (on which see Eucken, *de Arist. dicendi rat. Pars Prima: de particularum usu* p. 32) stands to that immediately preceding it in the same relation in which the words καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθόν κ.τ.λ. in § 5 stand to those immediately preceding them: accordingly, the Paraphrast's rendering is simply—ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀρετὴ οὐ τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς (καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν), κ.τ.λ.

§ 7. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν ⟨τὸ⟩ σῶμα] a. 19.
It seems best (with the Par., Victorius., Zell, Coraes, Grant, Stahr, Williams and Ramsauer) to govern καὶ πᾶν ⟨τὸ⟩ σῶμα by εἰδέναι, not by θεραπεύσοντα (with Eustr., Argyrop., Lamb., Michelet and Peters). 'The statesman must know something about the nature of the soul, just as the practical oculist must have a general knowledge of the body': δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πῶς ἔχει τὰ περὶ ψυχήν, ὥστερ καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀφθαλμὸν θεραπεύειν, τοῦ σώματος παντὸς τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη· Paraph. This interpretation is strongly supported by Plato, *Charm.* 156 B, quoted by Coraes and Grant—ἦ καί σύ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν εἰ μέλλει καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὖ ἔχειν· καὶ αὖ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἴεσθαι ἄν

1102 a. 19. ποτε θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος, πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι· ἐκ δὴ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα [cf. Ramsauer's conj. (adopted by Bywater) πᾶν τὸ σῶμα for πᾶν σῶμα in *E. N.* i. 13. 7] τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσι θεραπεύειν[1]. This wide view of the relation of the special organ to the whole body, or of local symptoms to the general condition of the body, recalls the teaching of Hippocrates, to physicians of whose school we may suppose Aristotle to refer in the expression τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες § 7. In the Treatise περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς 20, Hippocrates lays down, and in the *Prognostic* (see Littré, *Hipp.* ii. 96) and Treatise περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων (see Littré, *Hipp.* ii. 198) applies, the great principle—that we must study ὁ ἄνθρωπος, the concrete human organism, in all its rapports with external things, and ascertain the effects, healthy and morbid, which they produce upon it, instead of taking (as unscientific practitioners do) each symptom by itself, and pronouncing it to be a case of ψυχρόν, which must be met by the application of θερμόν, or of ὑγρόν, by the application of ξηρόν—a method which he derides in περὶ ἀρχ. ἰητ. 13, as ὁ τρόπος ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. See περὶ ἀρχ. ἰητ. 20 (Littré vol. i. p. 622) ἐπεί τοί γέ μοι δοκέει ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὶ ἰητρῷ περὶ φύσιος εἰδέναι, καὶ πάνυ σπουδάσαι ὡς εἴσεται, εἴπερ τι μέλλει τῶν δεόντων ποιήσειν, ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιόμενα καὶ πινόμενα, καὶ ὅ τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ ὅ τι ἀφ' ἑκάστου ἑκάστῳ ξυμβήσεται. Littré (vol. i. pp. 295, 296 *Introd.*) is of opinion that Plato has this passage (or one to similar effect at the beginning of the First Book περὶ διαίτης, see Littré vol. i. p. 300) in view in *Phaedrus* 270 C Σω. ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἴει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως; Φαι. εἰ μὲν Ἱπποκράτει τε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πείθεσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης. Although Aristotle only once mentions Hippocrates by name (and that without any reference to his doctrines—*Pol.* H. 4. 1326 a. 15), traces of the influence of his teaching are, according to Littré (vol. i. p. 72), numerous in the Aristotelian writings. To the passages mentioned by Littré may be added *de Sensu* 1. 436 a. 20 (quoted by Grant and Ramsauer to illustrate τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες), a passage which describes the method of physicians who observed a rule identical

[1] Cf. Aristocles peripateticus (Suidas. s. Ἀριστοκλῆς), apud Euseb. *Praepar. Evang.* xi. ch. 3 καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ ἰατροὶ μέρη τινὰ θεραπεύοντες, ἐπιμελοῦνται τῶν ὅλων σωμάτων πρῶτον, οὕτω κ.τ.λ.: see Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* iii. 206, 299.

(ἀναγκαῖον παντὶ ἰητρῷ περὶ φύσιος εἰδέναι) laid down by 1102 a. 19.
tes—σχεδὸν τῶν τε περὶ φύσεως οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ
ίρως τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες οἱ μὲν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰ περὶ ἰατρικῆς,
ν περὶ φύσεως ἄρχονται περὶ ἰατρικῆς. Medical specialists,
ɔd. ii. 84, for the length to which specialisation was
Egypt), must control their treatment of particular organs
npetent knowledge of the structure and functions of
organism; similarly, the statesman who has to educate
must do so with a knowledge of human nature as
c whole, otherwise he will fall into error like that of the
egislator who cultivated the warlike virtues of his people at
se of the peaceful. Cf. *Pol.* H. 13. 1334 a. 6 αἱ γὰρ πλεῖσται
ων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σώζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν
. . . . αἴτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν.
terpretation offered by Eustr., Argyrop., Lamb., Mich.
rs cannot, I think, be easily maintained against the
afforded by the parallels quoted above. Argyropylus
καὶ πᾶν σῶμα to θεραπεύσοντα, gives the following rendering—
modum et eum qui curaturus est oculos totumque corpus,
:ire oportet'; which is thus explained by Michelet—'ut
qui animo medetur animi naturam perspectam habere
a medicus qui oculum totumve corpus curat, id, quod
ırat, sive oculum sive corpus nosse debet. Virtus enim
ıd animum ut sanitas ad oculum corpusve.' The other
tion, according to Michelet, 'leaves us without a simile';
icere vult Aristoteles, animi virtutem spectanti majus
animo investigandum esse, quemadmodum qui oculis
totum corpus nosse deberet: istud enim de medico
ipsum verum est, de politico autem nihil simile proferre
This objection we may answer by remarking that what
nsists upon is that the statesman must have a knowledge
nature as a whole, if he is to deal successfully with
ion of *any of its particular* tendencies or capacities: *i. e.*
ever he is engaged with one part of human nature
ink of the other parts: *e. g.* when he is dealing with a
ὄρεξις, say the love of money, he must take it in con-
th other ὀρέξεις, such as that for pleasurable indulgence;
er, must consider the relation of the ὀρεκτικὸν μέρος
to the rational element: and the connexion of both
λόγος with the θρεπτικὸν μέρος.

1102 a. 24. § 8. τούτων χάριν] τῶν ἀρετῶν ἕνεκα. Eustr.

a. 26. § 9. ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις] I think that it is best to rende this expression quite generally—'in other accounts,' or 'else where,' leaving it to be gathered from the context whether th reference, in this or that particular case, is to written or to un written opinions, to the opinions of Aristotle himself, or to those o others. That the reference is always to a definite class of *popula treatises* (as distinguished from the *abstruse treatises*—ἀκροατικ λόγοι, see Strabo xiii. 609, Plut. *Alex.* 7, *adv. Colot.* 14, Aul. Gel xx. 5) written by Aristotle himself was held by many of the olde interpreters (*e. g.* by Victorius and Lambinus), but has been give up by most modern scholars. The literature of the subject is ver extensive. The student may consult (in addition to the note of Michelet, pp. 28–31 and p. 72, Zell, p. 56, and Ramsauer, p. 71) the following authorities—*Ind. Ar.* s. v. ἐξ. λογ.; Grant, *Ethics* (ap pendix B on ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι), Grote, *Aristotle* i. 63 sqq.—Bernays, *Di Dialoge des Aristoteles*, Susemihl, *Neue Jahrbücher* vol. 129 ('ἐξωτε ρικοὶ λόγοι bei Arist. u. Eud.'; his conclusion is that ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι= 'ausserphilosophischen Erörterungen mit verschiedener Färbung in verschiedenen Stellen'), Thurot, *Études sur Aristote*, 1860, p. 223 Brandis, *Die Schicksale der Aristotelischen Bücher*, *Rhein. Mus.* i. 254 Stahr, *Aristotelia* vol. ii. 3 (über den Unterschied exot. u. eso Schriften des Arist.), and Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* vol. ii. 2. p. 114 sqq Zeller's conclusion (p. 118 sqq.) is expressed thus—'Wenn auc im allgemeinen jede Erörterung eine exoterische genannt werde kann, welche nicht zu der eben vorliegenden Untersuchung gehö oder welche nicht tiefer in ihren Gegenstand eindringt, wenn fern die "exoterischen Reden" nicht immer und nicht nothwendi eine bestimmte Klasse von *Schriften* bezeichnen, so finden si doch Stellen, in denen wir allen Grund haben, sie auf solche beziehen.' The present reference (*E. N.* i. 13. 9) Zeller thin (p. 122), is most probably to the Dialogue *Eudemus*.

It is to be observed that the Paraphrast, in his note on t present passage, is careful to say that the reference is *not* to writ works—περὶ ψυχῆς τοίνυν οὐ μόνον ἐν συγγράμμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐ στόματος πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἀρκούντως εἴπομεν ἔνια· καὶ χρῆσ αὐτοῖς.

a. 27. οἷον] = scilicet, videlicet. See *Ind. Arist.* and Ramsauer's no

; (*die Dial. d. Arist.* p. 65) makes οἷον here = 'zum Beispiel,' 1102 a. 27.
', I think.

τῷ λόγῳ] As we might say—'logically two, but really a. 30.
a, *i.e.* as really existing) indivisible.' Cf. *Met.* M. 2. 1077 b.
he distinction marked by λόγῳ and πεφυκότα here is that
re marked by λογικῶς and φυσικῶς (see note on vii. 3. 9).
lain a thing λογικῶς is to explain it by means of a formula more
abstract and general: to explain it φυσικῶς is to explain it
oncretely, taking account of its natural properties. It is
that while only one exhaustive concrete view of an object
taken, more than one abstract view may. Thus a σύνολον
λόγῳ δύο. Ψυχή, which is the totality of the functions of the
xists (πέφυκε) only as a totality. Reason does not exist
sense, or sense without the vegetative functions; but we can
the ψυχή from various points of view—as rational, sensitive,
ve; just as in mathematics we can look at a real line, which
ertain breadth as well as length, from the point of view of
th only.

περιφερείᾳ] Here the circumference formed by a line 'with- a. 31.
adth' is *looked at* from two points of view—as concave and

-19.] The 'psychology' contained in these §§ is, with slight a. 32.
ces of terminology, that already given in i. 7. 12–13, where
es.

κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ] The meaning of κοινῷ here is explained
§ 12—ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται.
An. ii. 4. 415 a. 23 nutrition and reproduction are mentioned
wo functions of this 'part of the soul'—ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ
ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθ'
ει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν. ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι.

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα] The commentators 1102 b. 3.
περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως 1. 454 b. 32 τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ
ιαὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι· τρέφεται
αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον, ὡς οὐδὲν προσδεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς
ις. The natural connexion between sleep and nutrition is
t out in full detail in περὶ ὕπνου 3. 'Der Zweck des Schlafs,'
eller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. p. 550 (referring to *De Somno* 3), 'ist die

1102 b. 3. Erhaltung des Lebens, die Erholung welche ihrerseits wieder höheren Zwecke der wachen Thätigkeit dient. Seine natü Ursache liegt in dem Ernährungsprocess.'

b. 7. § 13.] In the treatise περὶ ἐνυπνίων Aristotle explains drea caused by κινήσεις, similar to those made by the αἰσθητά, occurri the organs of sensation in the absence of the αἰσθητά. He p to the phenomenon of 'after-images,' 2. 459 b, as illustratin principle of the persistence of sense κινήσεις, and accounts fo dreamer's belief in the truth of his dream, while it lasts, by th that the κίνησις which constitutes the dream is not exposed t lively criticism of other experiences, but has the ἀρχή (or con principle) of the dreamer all to itself, δι' ἀργίαν τῶν κατὰ αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν. The ἀρχή pronounces fo truth of any experience purporting to come from sense, un more authoritative experience be present to contradict the jud —περὶ ἐνυπνίων 3. 461 b. 3 ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεώς ἡ ἀρχή, ἐὰν μὴ ἑτέρα κυριωτέρα ἀντιφῇ. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, ὃ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τὸ ἐπικρῖνον κατέχηται ἢ μὴ κινῇ οἰκείαν κίνησιν.

b. 9. πλὴν εἰ μή] M^{b}, Asp.—adopted, in place of the πλὴν εἰ πῃ of sources, by Bywater, who makes the words ὅθεν φασίν . . . parenthetical.

b. 10. βελτίω] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* ix. 571 C: also *Probl.* A. 14. 957 a

b. 13. § 15. ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς] φύσις here is equivalent to ὁ or μόριον.

b. 14. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον] In the ἐγκρατής or tinent man,' and ἀκρατής or 'incontinent man,' there is a str between ἐπιθυμία and λόγος, with the result that, in the case of the τής, λόγος generally prevails, and, in the case of the ἀκρατής, ἐπι *i.e.* both know that it is wrong to follow pleasure, but feel in to follow it; the ἀκρατής, however, yields to his inclination, wh the ἐγκρατής does not. Distinguished from the ἀκρατής and ἐγκ in whom a struggle takes place between λόγος and ἐπιθυμία, a ἀκόλαστος or 'incorrigible,' and the σώφρων or 'temperate m neither of whom there is a struggle—because, in the ἀκόλαστο θυμία has gained complete supremacy, and λόγος, in the σώ The desires of the σώφρων cheerfully obey reason: the reas

conscience) of the ἀκόλαστος is either silenced or transformed into a ψευδὴς λόγος—a Flatterer of Desire. 1102 b. 14.

ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν] Cf. iii. 2. 4, 5 καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μέν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὔ. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὔ: cf. also note *ad loc.* with reference to *Rep.* 440, where Plato proves that the ἐπιθυμητικόν and λογιστικόν are distinct 'parts,' by pointing, just as Aristotle does here, to the 'opposition' between them. b. 21.

§ 16. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει] *i. e.* πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια . . . ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα . . . οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν—§ 10 above. b. 25.

§ 17. πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς] *sc.* ὀρεκτικόν. Aristotle seems here to offer a sort of apology for describing τὸ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς as μετέχον λόγου. See note on i. 3. 6 for an estimate of the λόγος τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. b. 26.

σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου] The σώφρων and ἀνδρεῖος are given as examples of *confirmed* virtue. ἐγκράτεια is not properly ἕξις. b. 27.

τάυτα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ] Cf. ix. 4. 3 ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ (ὁ σπουδαῖος) καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν. On the other hand, στασιάζει (τῶν μοχθηρῶν) ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀντιφαινόν τινων τὸ δ' ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διαστώντα—ix. 4. 9. b. 28.

§ 18. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν] *i. e.* as well as the ψυχή itself, which has already (§ 9) been divided into two parts—τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου] It is true that λόγος, as *conscientia*—*i. e.* as a regulating principle within the individual of which he himself is conscious, does not interfere with his vegetative (or merely physiological) functions, as it interferes with his appetites and desires. At the same time we must remember that these vegetative functions are there because they are materially necessary, in the economy of the ψυχή, for the realisation of its end—the consciousness of λόγος. In this sense then they 'participate in λόγος': they must be defined in reference to it (ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει iii. 7. 6): except as 'necessary in the economy of the ψυχή, for the conscious b. 29.

1102 b.29. realisation of λόγος,' they are meaningless—as the οἰκία is meaningless except as 'materially necessary for the πόλις.' We may say then, that, although the φυτικὸν μέρος 'has nothing in common wit λόγος'—if λόγος be taken to mean (as it certainly means in this con text) the individual's *conscious* regulation of irrational tendencie yet it 'has all in common with λόγος,' in so far as it is δεκτικόν, *i.e.* s constituted as to serve as material basis for the individual's con sciously realised λόγος. Again, although the conscious λόγος of th individual cannot step in suddenly to modify his own vegetative, merely physiological functions, as it can to modify his appetites an desires, the conscious λόγος of the 'legislator' does, in the lon run, modify the vegetative, or merely physiological functions of th individuals belonging to the race over whose development he pr sides. In the interest of the particular form of culture which it his 'end' to realise in his citizens, 'the legislator' will see that th suitable physique is at last produced in them. But, after all, w need not look so high as 'the legislator' to find conscious modific tion of vegetative functions. The results of 'sexual selection' a evidence for the reaction of 'consciousness,' even among the low animals, on the vegetative part. However, to limit the reference the human race—we can say τὸ μὲν φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγ only if we take λόγος in the restricted sense of the reason of th individual, and forget that νόμος which is λόγος ἀπό τινος φρονήσε καὶ νοῦ (*E. N.* x. 9. 12) takes measures which, in the history of th race, profoundly affect 'the vegetative part.'

b. 30. τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν] *i.e.* τὸ ὀρεκτικόν is the gene term: see *De An.* iii. 3, 414 b. 2 (quoted by Ramsauer) ὄρεξις γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις.

b. 31. οὕτω δὴ . . . μαθηματικῶν] The Paraph. has—λέγομεν γὰρ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων λόγον ἔχειν τὸ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ οἷς κα ουσιν ἐξακολουθεῖν· λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγον ἔχειν τὸ εἰδέ αὐτὰ καὶ γνῶσίν τινα καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἔχειν. The phrase ἔχειν λ has a double meaning: ἔχειν λόγον τῶν μαθηματικῶν is 'to have theory or demonstration of mathematical propositions' in o own mind—*i.e.* to understand it for oneself: to take it on autho would not be to 'have it,' in this sense of 'having:' ἔχειν λόγον πατρός is, idiomatically, to 'have regard to one's father'—to attention to his advice; but here the reader is asked to lose si for a moment, of the idiomatic sense of the phrase, and cont

'having the λόγος of one's father' with 'having the λόγος of mathematical propositions.' 'Having the λόγος of one's father' is having it as borrowed from him; 'having the λόγος of mathematical propositions' is having it in the strict sense of 'having'—having it in one's own right, for the λόγος of the *μαθηματικά* is the λόγος of the *μαθηματικός* himself—*ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον*: *De An.* iii. 4. 430 a. 2. 1102 b. 31.

It is difficult to express in English the double entendre of the Greek; but the meaning is that one is 'rational'—*ἔχει λόγον*—in two senses—as yielding to the good advice of another, and as grasping scientific truth by one's own effort.

§ 19. **εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι**] The **ἄλογον** has been shown to be **διττόν**—viz. **τὸ φυτικόν** and **τὸ ὀρεκτικόν**. **Τὸ ὀρεκτικόν** has, *qua* *κατήκοον* λόγου, been described as **μετέχον λόγου**. Aristotle now goes on—'If we are to say that the **ὀρεκτικόν** also (**καὶ τοῦτο**), as well as the **λόγον ἔχον** proper, **ἔχει λόγον** in virtue of its being **μετέχον λόγου**, then the **λόγον ἔχον** also will be **διττόν** as well as **τὸ ἄλογον**. We shall have the **λόγον ἔχον** subdivided into (1) **τὸ λόγον ἔχον κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ**—that which 'has reason,' in the strict sense of 'having,' *i.e.* 'has it in itself,' and (2) **τὸ λόγον ἔχον**, where **ἔχον**=**μετέχον**—that which 'has reason,' not in its own right, but by derivation or participation. An illustration may make this clearer: Animals are divided into (1) rational—man, and (2) irrational—the lower animals. Of the lower animals some (*a*) *e.g.* bats, do not allow themselves to be directed by man's reason: others (*b*) *e.g.* dogs, do: and if we may call (*b*) 'rational,' then (1) will have its two divisions, as well as (2), (*b*) being counted under both (1) and (2). 1103 a. 1.

ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν] See note on i. 12. 2. a. 8.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Excellence being of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral, the former owes its origin and development, for the most part, to teaching, and therefore needs time and experience, the latter comes from habit (ἔθος—*hence its name in Greek* ἠθική). *This being so, it is plain that the various forms of Moral Excellence,* i. e. *the various Moral Virtues, are not naturally implanted qualities in us; for habit cannot alter any natural quality:* e. g. *it is the* nature *of a stone to fall, and you cannot* habituate *it to rise by throwing it up into the air ever so often. The Virtues, then, are not naturally implanted qualities; but this does not mean that their presence in us is 'contrary to nature.' It is our nature to be capable of acquiring them; but it is by habit that we do actually acquire them.*

Further, where a natural endowment is concerned, the order in time is (1) *faculty, or organ,* e. g. *eyes, and* (2) *employment of faculty, or organ,* e. g. *seeing: we did not acquire our eyes by often seeing, but first had eyes, and then saw with them; whereas in the case of the Virtues the order is reversed: we acquire them by acting, even as we acquire the Arts—we become builders by building, just men by doing just acts. To understand how true this is, we have only to look at the procedure of law-givers. Wishing to make their citizens good, they provide laws under which their citizens are habituated to perform good actions. A good constitution differs from a bad one in the success with which it habituates the citizens to perform good actions.*

Again, the analogy of the Arts, referred to above, will help us to understand another point, viz.—that it is in the same, not in different circumstances, with the same, not with different opportunities, that one man, by repeatedly acting well, acquires a Virtue, and another man, by repeatedly acting badly, falls away into the opposite Vice. In the same circumstances one man becomes a good builder, or musician, and another man a bad builder or musician, according as the one repeatedly builds, or plays, well, and the other badly: so, it is in the same business that one trader becomes just, and another unjust, in the same service that one soldier acquires the Virtue of courage, and another falls away into the Vice of cowardice. To sum up—: it is from the repeated performance of similar acts that a Habit is formed. Hence the importance of seeing that the acts are of the right kind; for according as they are good or bad, so will the Habit be good or bad. It thus makes all the difference to a man's character, whether the acts, which he has been habituated from youth upwards to perform, are good or bad.

§ 1. τὸ πλεῖον] The Paraphrast has—καὶ ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ ἔχει μὲν 1103 a. 15.
καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν (δεκτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιστήμης) καὶ ἀπὸ ἔθους αὔξησιν λαμβάνει τινά· τὸ δὲ πλέον ἀπὸ τῆς διδασκαλίας καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν ἔχει. For an account of the relation of ἐμπειρία to the ἀρχαί of ἐπιστήμη see *An. Post.* ii. 19.

ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους] Grant quotes Plato, *Legg.* 792 E πᾶν ἦθος a. 17.
διὰ ἔθος. Cf. also *E. E.* ii. 2. 1220 a. 9, and *M. M.* i. 6. 1186 a. 1, and Plutarch *De Virt. Mor.* ch. 4 (quoted by Zell)—διὸ καὶ καλῶς ὀνόμασται τὸ ἦθος· ἔστι μὲν γάρ, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ποιότης τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ ἦθος· ὠνόμασται δέ, ὅτι τὴν ποιότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔθει λαμβάνει τὸ ἄλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πλαττόμενον, οὐ βουλομένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτε ἄμεινον) ἀλλὰ ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιθύοντος αὐτῷ, καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητας, ἐμποιοῦντος· ἐμποιεῖ δὲ τῇ φρονήσει τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναμιν εἰς ἕξιν ἀστείαν καθιστάς.

Ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, *as such*, comes ἐξ ἔθους: but ἔθος requires a certain εὐφυΐα to work upon (see Grant *ad loc.*). The children of a civilized community inherit tendencies to virtue which make habituation easy.

§ 2. οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται] *i.e.* only a. 19.
those ἀρεταί are called ἠθικαί which result from training under νόμος; for there are φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί (see *E. N.* vi. 13). The difference, however, between φυσικὴ ἀρετή and ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is that the former does not, like the latter, involve *the whole man.* A man may have 'natural,' or constitutional, courage without possessing other good qualities; whereas, if he possess ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, his nature has become a unity and a system in perfect adjustment to the complex external system represented by νόμος, or the law and fashion of the society in which he lives. When man is said to be φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, it is not meant that he is produced by Nature in ready-made correspondence with a complex social environment. His correspondence is only the final result of prolonged contact with society; but he has a *natural tendency* to correspond. In other words, the uncivilized man is not civilized already, but *has it in him* to become civilized—οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκότι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους (§ 3).

Φύσις, like many other leading terms, has both a generic and a specific sense in Aristotle—a circumstance which often involves the philosopher himself, as well as his interpreters, in considerable

1103 a. 19. confusion. In its generic sense it = 'laws of nature'; in its sense, 'laws of *organic* nature,' or 'biological laws,'—*i.e.* nature which result in the production and maintenance of living structures. It is in connexion with this narrower s the term that we must take all Aristotle's most characteristi ments about φύσις (as in *Phys.* ii)—οὐδὲν μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ φύσις—ἀρχὴ ἐν αὑτῷ—ἀεὶ τὸ βέλτιον, &c. In the section, however, φύσις is used in the wider sense, which i all 'laws of nature,' organic and inorganic. Of course, it only of the laws of inorganic matter that they are not char habituation (οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται); for sphere of biology τὰ φύσει ὄντα change in relation to, adapt selves to, or 'habituate' themselves to, changes in the e ment.

The distinction therefore drawn in *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1- μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί· αἱ δ' ἄλογοι μία does not properly discriminate between man's conscious life one side, and nature, whether organised or unorganised, other; but rather between organised nature (including conscious life) on the one side, and inorganic nature on th The expression μετὰ λόγου by itself is wide enough to incl organisms. Only organisms exhibit λόγος or *ratio*. In nature is essentially ἄλογος.

a. 28. § 4. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον] Grant observes (*Ethic* iv. vol. i. p. 240, note 34) that 'this doctrine is opposed t of the modern discoveries of psychology, as, for instance, Be "Theory of Vision."' Taking his stand on οὐθὲν τῶν φύ ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, Aristotle fails to see that the senses are really organised in the race, and that the difference between the and the moral virtues—both being viewed as adaptations to e ment—is that the former are adaptations of very long st deeply organised in the race, whereas the latter are, so t adaptations of yesterday's date, and not yet perfect in the ra not inherited except in the vague form of εὐφυΐα.

'We need only compare,' says Grant (note on § 2 of this c 'the theory of Virtue in this book with the discussions in t of Plato, to see how immensely Moral Philosophy had ga definiteness in the mean time.' Virtue and knowledge are, no longer confused together. Virtue is no longer said to

duced by 'teaching,' like knowledge, but to result from 'acting in correspondence with νόμος, or the social environment.' This was certainly a great advance in definiteness of theory. But yet, the 'social environment,' as Aristotle understands it, lacks continuity in time; every man has to begin his adaptation *almost* at the beginning. The peripatetic doctrine of catastrophes, or φθοραί (see *Pol.* ii. 5. 1269 a. 5, 6, and Newman's notes), whereby all except a few human beings were periodically destroyed, civilization having to begin afresh on each occasion (see Bernays, *Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit* p. 39), finds its parallel in Aristotle's theory of the growth of moral virtue, in which Heredity is not recognised *sufficiently*[1] by the side of Habituation, or individual adaptation. 1103 a. 28.

§ 5. νομοθέται] Aristotle, in common with his contemporaries, had not adequately grasped the truth that 'constitutions are not made but grow.' He shows a tendency to personify social influences, and make them emanate from a definite legislator in the past. The foundation of colonies, under ready-made laws, doubtless gave plausibility to this view, which in itself however is quite in keeping with the peripatetic doctrine of discontinuous civilization alluded to in the last note. b. 3.

§ 6. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.] *i.e.* 'The circumstances and acts are generically the same, only differing as to well and ill.' Grant. Repeated προαιρέσεις, good or bad (bad προαιρέσεις not being easily distinguishable from mere ὀρέξεις) transform an original δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων into a fixed ἕξις, good or bad, which resembles the ἄλογος δύναμις of *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1 in being μία ἑνός. See *Met.* Θ. 5. 1048 a. 8 ἐκεῖναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων [ποιητικαί], ὥστε ἅμα ποιήσει τἀναντία· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον· ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον· λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὄρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν: and *E. N.* v. 1. 4 δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή εἶναι, ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ. b. 6.

§ 7. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται] 'It will be observed that why an act tends to reproduce itself Aristotle does not inquire'—is Grant's remark here. But it need not sur- b. 21.

[1] Not that Aristotle did not make valuable first contributions to a just view of the importance of Heredity in morals and politics—in his doctrine of φυσικὴ ἀρετή and εὐφυΐα, and of εὐγένεια defined as ἀρετὴ γένους in a fragment of the Dialogue *De Nobilitate* (preserved by Pseudo-Plut. *de Nob.* 14 [but cf. Newman's *Politics* vol. ii. p. 68] and Stob. *Fl.* vol. iii. p. 166 ed. Meineke: see note on i. 8. 16. b. 3), and in *Pol.* iii. 7. 1283 a. 37.

1103 b. 21. prise us that Aristotle does not stop to put this question, for if it i a legitimate question at all, it is, at any rate, a very wide and vagu one. To ask why acts tend to reproduce themselves—wh they become easier instead of more difficult—why, in short, habit are formed, is tantamount to asking why there is such a thin as life, or the continuous correspondence of organism with environ ment. For further considerations relating to this subject see not on ii. 6. 17.

b. 22. § 8. ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι] '*tales reddere*'—Michelet. 'Wherefore we must see that the acts are of a certain kind.' For the Aristotelian use of ἀποδιδόναι see *Index Arist.* and Cope, *Rhet.* i. 1. 7. 1354 b. 3, note. Cope quotes the δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι of the present § and says—'τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδιδόναι is not simpl "to produce" but to produce energies that are due *to the system* energies *corresponding* to the faculties from which they spring Instead of 'corresponding to the faculties *from which they spring* he ought to have said—'corresponding to the faculties *which if desired to produce*'—*i.e.* fitted to produce certain faculties habits.

b. 23. ἀκολουθοῦσιν] For the technical meaning of this term see *E.* vii. 12. 1 b. 26, note.

CHAPTER II.

Argument.

The way then in which the acts are performed being so important, we mus now enquire what is the right way, for this Treatise is intended to be pra tically useful. The right way is the way which the Right Reason prescribes- let this be taken as the most general answer which can be given, and let us sta from it: we will examine afterwards the nature of the Right Reason and i relation to the Virtues.

But before proceeding, let us remind the reader again that we agreed that theory of conduct ought to be an outline, not an exact system; theories bein always conditioned by subject matter, and the subject matter of our prese inquiry—'all that relates to Conduct'—being one which presents no absolute fixed conditions, in this respect resembling the subject matter of medical scien —'all that relates to Health.' With such a subject matter, our Theory, as

whole, must be a tentative outline; still more tentative must be any narrower generalizations which we may make within its compass; for the particular cases which such generalizations attempt to explain are cases which fall under no art, and are provided for by no set of traditional rules, but must be dealt with, as the special occasions require, by the agents themselves, just as the exigencies of a particular case of illness must be dealt with by the doctor, or those of a particular storm, by the pilot, as he judges best at the time.

But we must not despair. We must do what we can to help our 'theory of conduct' in its evil plight. Let us then venture upon the generalization, that, as in eating and drinking, so in conduct, excess and defect are injurious, and the mean salutary— that e. g. *it is by fearing dangers too much and too little, that men become cowardly and rash; by avoiding these extremes, that they become courageous. It is in the same circumstances, then, and with the same opportunities, that one man, by repeatedly acting well, acquires a virtue, and another, by repeatedly acting badly, falls away into the opposite vice. To this we must now add, that the virtue or vice, once fully formed, will manifest itself in the continued performance of the acts, good or bad, in which it originated— herein following a law observable in the case of acquired bodily qualities also: men become strong by taking much food and exercise; and strong men show their strength in taking much food and exercise. So, men become temperate by denying themselves pleasures; and temperate men show their temperance in denying themselves pleasures.*

§ 1. ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι] The θεωρητικαὶ φιλοσοφίαι are three— μαθηματική, φυσική and θεολογική. See *Met.* E. 1. 1026 a. 18. 1103 b. 27.

ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 55), followed by Bywater and Sus., reads ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι for Bekker's ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι σκέψασθαι, on the ground that ἀναγκαῖον does not, except very rarely, occur with ἐστί in the Aristotelian writings. Rassow is supported by L^b, CCC, B^1, B^2. b. 29.

§ 2. κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον] 'In the present passage it seems best to avoid translating κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον "according to right reason," as is usually done, (1) because of the article which seems to show that λόγος is used in a general sense here, and not to denote a particular faculty of the mind; (2) in reference to the train of associations which must have been in Aristotle's mind of "standard," "proportion," "law," &c.'—Grant *ad loc.* Organic potentialities—αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις—may result in structures, or habits, variously fitted to correspond with the environment. Where the correspondence is an exact one, the organisation, or λόγος, is said to be ὀρθός. In ἠθικὴ ἀρετή human nature realises itself as a system or organism (ὀρθὸς λόγος), capable of withstanding the disintegrating influences of pleasure and pain. The process b. 32.

1103 b. 32. which results in ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is the εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθ μάτων (Eustr. *ad* vi. 13. 1). If a *faculty* of ὀρθὸς λόγος is to b distinguished from the proportion, or orderly arrangement, whic is its *object*, it can be distinguished only logically; for the two a really one. The ὀρθὸς λόγος is the personality, or orderly natur of the virtuous man, of which he is necessarily conscio 'According to the right ratio' renders κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον adequate in most places.

b. 33. ὕστερον] Book vi, or what may have corresponded to it the original Nicomachean Treatise.

b. 34. τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς] ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος is not coordinate with the ἀρετ any more than the whole body is coordinate with the hand head. The hand is a hand only because it belongs to a bo which has a head and all other necessary parts. The ἀρεταί a ἀρεταί only because they coexist in a definite system or λόγ Courage without all the other virtues is a mere abstraction, li a hand belonging to no body: οὐ χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρε *E. N.* vi. 13. 6.

1104 a. 4. § 3. οὐδὲν ἑστηκὸς ἔχει] Not being ἐξ ἀνάγκης, they vary; l they vary within the limits fixed by the conditions of hum existence. Τὰ δίκαια are not νόμῳ, but φύσει: *i. e.* they are suita to human nature, which is regulated by certain *uniform biolog laws*, not to be confounded, however, with the *necessities* of mat matics or metaphysics. After all, however, the expression οὐ ἑστηκὸς ἔχει is too strong, and is apt to mislead. Perhaps 'noth *absolutely* fixed' would express what we ought to understand.

a. 5. § 4. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου κ.τ.λ] The most gen statement that can be made in morals (the definition of εὐδαιμο is, even as a general statement, lacking in definiteness. It is o a περιγραφή (i. 7. 17) or rough sketch, of that which is essenti contingent: something very different from the absolutely defi ὁρισμοί of 'things which cannot be otherwise,' which stand as ἀρχαί of mathematics. But indefinite as the highest generalisat of morals is, it is more definite than the lower generalisatic which relate to special duties. When we descend from περιγραφή of Life as a whole, to the details of Life—to the du of Kallias in his particular circumstances, we are indeed 'immer

in matter'—we no longer look for ἀκρίβεια—not of course for mathematical ἀκρίβεια—for that did not belong to our περιγραφή—but not even for the ἀκρίβεια of the skilled workman. Rules of conduct for Kallias cannot be turned out like shoes. 1104 a. 5.

§ 5. βοηθεῖν] Still, something may be done in the way of supplying a rule applicable to all cases—'Do not run into extremes.' a. 11.

§ 6.] The parenthesis δεῖ γάρ . . . χρῆσθαι, follows ὁρῶμεν in Coraes' text, and the same order appears in two MSS. noticed by that editor, and in Argyropylus, and the Paraphrast. At any rate the parenthesis contains the reason for adducing the illustration ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος κ.τ.λ. Ethical phenomena are ἀφανῆ and must be illustrated by physical phenomena which are φανερά. Zell, however, *ad loc.*, refers to instances in which the clause containing the reason stands before that containing the statement for which the reason is given.

τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα κ.τ.λ.] Grant remarks that this is perhaps taken from Plato *Erastae* 134. Cf. *M. M.* i. 5. The doctrine that medical treatment ought to aim at the mean had been laid down by Hippocrates Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς, ch. 9 (Littré, i. 588). Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ ὑφηγέεται, ὅσα μὲν ἦν ἰσχυρότερα ἔβλαπτεν, ὅσα δ' ἦν ἀσθενέστερα ὠφέλεέ τε καὶ ἔτρεφε τὸν κάμνοντα καὶ τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα, εὐπετὲς ἂν ἦν τὸ πρῆγμα· πολλὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀσφαλέος ἂν ἔδει περιλαμβάνοντας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσθενέστατον. νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἁμάρτημα, οὐδὲ ἧσσον λυμαίνεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢν ἐλάσσονα καὶ ἐνδεέστερα τῶν ἱκανῶν προσφέρηται· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ λιμοῦ μέρος δύναται ἰσχυρῶς ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ γυιῶσαι (lame or weaken) καὶ ἀσθενέα ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἑτεροῖα μὲν τῶν ἀπὸ πληρώσιος, οὐχ ἧσσον δὲ ἅμα δεινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ κενώσιος· δι' ὧν πολλὸν ποικιλώτερά τε καὶ διὰ πλέονος ἀκριβίης ἐστί ('ainsi la médecine a bien plus d'une face, et exige une précision de plus d'un genre.' Littré). δεῖ γὰρ μέτρου τινὸς στοχάσασθαι· μέτρον δέ, οὐδὲ σταθμόν, οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἄλλον, πρὸς ὃ ἀναφέρων εἴσῃ τὸ ἀκριβές, οὐκ ἂν εἴροις ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ σώματος τῶν αἴσθησιν· διὸ ἔργον οὕτω καταμαθεῖν ἀκριβέως, ὥστε σμικρὰ ἁμαρτάνειν ἔνθα ἢ ἔνθα· κἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτον τὸν ἰητρὸν ἰσχυρῶς ἐπαινέοιμι τὸν σμικρὰ ἁμαρτάνοντα· τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς ὀλιγάκις ἔστι ἐπιδεὶς· ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοί γε τῶν ἰητρῶν ταὐτά μοι δοκέουσι τοῖσι κακοῖσι κυβερνήτῃσι πάσχειν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν ἐν γαλήνῃ κυβερνῶντες ἁμαρτάνωσιν, οὐ καταφανέες εἰσίν· ὅταν δὲ αὐτοὺς κατάσχῃ χειμών τε μέγας καὶ

1104 a. 15. ἄνεμος ἐξώστης, φανερῶς ἤδη πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις δι' ἀγνωσίην καὶ ἁμαρτίην δῆλοί εἰσιν ἀπολέσαντες τὴν ναῦν. There is much in the above passage (especially the remarks about τὸ ἀκριβές, and the illustration from κυβερνητική) to suggest that Aristotle retained a reminiscence of its drift when he wrote §§ 3, 4, 5, and 6.

a. 24. § 7. οἱ ἄγροικοι] In ii. 7. 13 the ἄγροικος is adduced to exemplify another ἔλλειψις—viz. that περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν παιδιᾷ.

a. 30. § 8. οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος] Here Aristotle may almost be said to explain the formation of moral habits by the principle of 'the survival of the fittest'—γίνεται γὰρ [*sc.* ἡ ἰσχύς] ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύνωιτ' αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. This is one of those very important passages in the *Ethics* which remind us that the author was a great biologist.

CHAPTER III.

Argument.

According as the performance of certain acts is attended by pleasure or pain, we may infer that the habit of performing them has or has not been acquired. Thus he who faces danger and feels pleasure, or at least no pain, so doing, is habitually courageous; while he who feels pain in so doing, cowardly. Indeed we may go so far as to describe the field of moral virtue as 'Pleasures and Pains'—for

(1) *It is Pleasure that tempts us to do wrong, and Pain that makes us holds aloof from noble deeds. True education is being trained from childhood to like and dislike aright, as Plato says.*

(2) *Pleasure or Pain attends every action and every feeling, and it is with actions and feelings that moral virtue has to do.*

(3) *Moral correction is effected by the remedial influence of Pain.*

(4) *Every thing is naturally related to, and concerned with, that which naturally affects it for good or evil. Now, we are affected for evil,* i.e. *made worse, by Pleasures and Pains unduly pursued and avoided. And this is so true, that some have been induced to go the length of defining Virtue, as* insensibility *to the influence of Pleasure or Pain. But this is too unqualified a statement; for it ignores the distinction between* due *and* undue *influence.*

(5) *Again, there are three objects of choice, the honourable, the useful, and the pleasant, and three of aversion, the dishonourable, the injurious, and the painful: now, the good man tends to act rightly in relation to all these objects, and the bad man tends to err, but chiefly in relation to Pleasure—for Pleasure enters most largely into the composition of human nature: it belongs not only*

urely sentient nature which he shares with the lower animals, but : pursuit and attainment even of the distinctively human objects of honourable, and the useful.
in, the liking for Pleasure has grown up with us all from our child- las sunk like a dye into the fibre of our lives, and is not to be easily

' not only do we estimate our feelings according to the Pleasure or ding them: even to our actions we all, more or less consistently, ame standard. To bring this personal standard into harmony with jectively right—to make the individual 'like and dislike aright,' is ortant object to which the Moralist must exclusively devote himself.
'ly, it is the glory of Art and Virtue to conquer difficulties. What ilt conquest than that of Pleasure could be set before Moral Virtue t of Virtuous Living?
' now established the following points—that Virtue is concerned with nd pains: that, according as the same opportunities are repeatedly : performance of good actions, or repeatedly used for the performance ns, a man acquires a virtue or falls away into the opposite vice: e formed virtue or vice manifests itself in the continued performance or bad actions in which it originated.

μεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ 1104 b. 3.
ς ἔργοις] If certain acts are attended by pleasure, we may take it that the habit of performing them has been con- as long as they remain painful, we can infer that the not been contracted.

ɔ be noted that the term ἐπιγινομένην occurring here is in *E. N.* x. 4. 8 to express the relation of pleasure to ελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ιενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. Transferring the simile :sent passage, we may say that pleasure is the sign of the ıbit, as the bloom of beauty is the sign of youthful prime.

ὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων b. 5.
Aristotle here lays it down that the good man does good ısily and with pleasure. But it may be urged—'The e difficulty, the greater the merit. There is no merit in ɔd actions mechanically.' Surely this is a narrow view to good action. A good action is not a *tour de force*. We allow the sense of pride and victory felt when a difficulty overcome, to influence our judgment. The important ıat a good action has been done, not that something has to stimulate *amour propre*. A difficult action is not so ɔe repeated as one which is done easily, and it is of im-

1104 b. 5. portance, in estimating the value of a good action, to know whether it is likely to be repeated, or is merely an isolated ἐπίδειξις.

b. 8. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή] The rest of this chapter contains *eight* Considerations in support of the statement that moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains.

b. 9. Consideration (1) is—διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα] A distinction seems to be drawn here between the ways in which we are influenced by pleasure and by pain respectively. Under the influence of pleasure we directly seek what is bad, not recognising it as bad (see the analysis of ἀκρασία in *E. N.* vii. 3), whereas pain makes us desist from doing what we clearly see to be right.

Particular pleasures and pains are the influences which tempt men to perform acts involving excess or defect—*i. e.* to sacrifice their permanent welfare to something unenduring. The μεσότης, or ὀρθὸς λόγος (right ratio), is that definite organisation of the moral nature, which has grown up in response to νόμος, and withstands the disintegrating influence of particular pleasures and pains. But the life κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον has its own pleasure. All acts which subserve the maintenance of the ὀρθὸς λόγος are pleasant to the good man, and habitually performed; while acts which tend to destroy that λόγος, however 'pleasant' they may once have been, have ceased to be pleasant to the good man, and are no longer performed. We are thus brought to the old distinction between 'good and bad pleasures,' *i. e.* between pleasures attending acts which conduce to the maintenance of the μεσότης, or ὀρθὸς λόγος (right ratio), and those attending acts which, on account of their kind or degree, hinder the establishment and maintenance of the λόγος. Ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is the final result of that education, or adaptation, which enables a man to distinguish between 'good and bad pleasures,' and choose the good.

b. 11. § 2.] Zell, Michelet, and Grant quote Plato, *Legg.* 653.

b. 13. § 3.] Consideration (2). The virtues have to do with πάθη and πράξεις, which are all attended by pleasure and pain: cf. *E. N.* x. 4. §§ 6–9, referred to by Michelet. αἱ, omitted by Bek., should be read before ἀρεταί (see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 55); K^b, CCC, and Cambr. have αἱ.

b. 16. § 4.] Consideration (3). Punishment, one of the great agencies

moral improvement, consists in the infliction of pain applied as 1104 b. 16.
contrary to vice which is pleasant. The Paraphrast has—*καθάπερ ἰόντες* (*i.e.* *ταῖς ἰατρείαις*) *ἐναντίαι αἱ νόσοι ἃς θεραπεύουσι, καὶ ἐὰν ἴδωμεν ἰατρὸν ψυχρὰν προσάγοντα θεράπειαν γινώσκομεν εὐθὺς τὴν νόσον ὡς θέρμης συστῆναι, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κολάσεων ὀδυνηρῶν οὐσῶν γινώσκομεν ὅτι θεραπευόμεναι κακίαι ἀπὸ ἡδονῆς γίνονται.* Zell, Michelet, and Grant refer to Hippocrates, *Aph.* xxii. § 2, for the doctrince *αἱ δ' νόσοι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων.* There is a passage however in his work περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς (13. Littré i. 598), in which Hippocrates ridicules the *application*, at least, which the doctrine receives from ordinary practitioners, who follow what he calls *ὁ τρόπος ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.* This τρόπος or Method juggles with certain *notiones temere a rebus abstractae*, simply directing the practitioner *βοηθεῖν τῷ μὲν θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν*, and so on with the other *ἐναντία.* But let us test this Method in a concrete case: A patient has a complicated illness occasioned by eating unwholesome food. Is his condition *θερμόν*, or *ψυχρόν*, *ξηρόν*, or *ὑγρόν*? Hippocrates asks derisively: And where shall we find the remedy likely to cure him under the contrary category? See also note on *E. N.* i. 13. 7.

§ 5.] Consideration (4). Pleasures and pains make us worse; b. 18.
since some have gone the length of defining virtue as insensibility to their influence. But this is going too far; for virtue is not λόγος like the abstract, but an *ἔνυλος* λόγος—the result of an *εἰδοποίησις καὶ ἕξις τῶν παθημάτων.* It is the order of the *πάθη*, not *ἀπάθεια.* Plato (*Philebus* 60 D, E) says that the Best Life must have both *ἡδονή* and *φρόνησις.* The peripatetic view is well expressed by Plutarch in the following passage (*De Virtute morali*, 12)—*διὸ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, τὴν ἄγαν ἀφαιρετέον ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀμύνας, τὴν ἄγαν μισοπονηρίαν. οὕτω γὰρ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάλγητος, ἀλλὰ σώφρων, καὶ δίκαιος, οὐκ ὠμὸς οὐδὲ πικρὸς ἔσται. τῶν δὲ παθῶν παντάπασιν ἀφαιρεθέντων, εἰ καὶ δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀργότερος ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀμβλύτερος, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης πνεύματος ἐπιλιπόντος. ταῦτα δ' ἀμέλει καὶ νομοθέται συνιδόντες, ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ἔριν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ σάλπιγξι καὶ αὐλοῖς ἐγείρουσι καὶ αὔξουσι τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ μάχιμον.* Cf. ch. 4 of the same treatise quoted above in note to ii. 1. 1, a. 17.

πρώην] Bywater, following K^b, for the *πρότερον* of all other authorities. I confess that I do not like *πρώην.* It does not appear in the *Ind. Arist.* In a course of oral lectures its occurrence

1104 b. 18. would not surprise us, as its ordinary meaning (especially in th phrase χθὲς καὶ πρῴην) seems to be 'the day before yesterday.'

b. 21. φαῦλοι] The reading of K^b L^b M^b, Camb., NC, is obviously righ (see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 55). Bekker reads φαῦλαι.

b. 23. ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου] 'by,' or 'in the definition,' or 'formula.'

b. 24. ἀπαθείας κ.τ.λ.] See the notes of Zell and Michelet. The Cynic seem to be specially referred to here: Socrates may also b intended, for he is elsewhere (*E. N.* vi. 13) accused of making th ἀρεταί, φρονήσεις, or λόγοι: and Speusippus held στοχάζεσθα τ ἀγαθοὺς ἀοχλησίας (see Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.*: *Speusippus*) Democritus also is stated to have held a similar view (see Ritt and Preller: *Democritus*).

b. 27. § 6. ὑπόκειται . . . πρακτική] The Paraph. has—ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ ἕξις ἡ οὕτως ἔχουσα περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καθὼς προσδιορισάμεθα—*i. e.* ὅτε δεῖ, ὡς δεῖ, κ.τ.λ., thus taking ἡ τοιαύτη closely wi περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. Grant has—'we may begin by assumin then . . . that this kind of excellence (*i. e.* moral) is concerned wi pleasures and pains.' So Williams and Peters. I think that th Par. is right.

b. 29. § 7.] Consideration (5). There being three generally recognis objects of αἱρεσις—viz. τὸ καλόν, τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ ἡδύ, the last involved in the first two. The καλόν is τὸ εὖ ζῆν—the Noble Li the conception of which serves as a regulative principle. T συμφέρον is (in the strict sense of the term) that which is recognis as a means to the attainment of some end, whether that end the realisation of the Noble Life, or some subordinate end. T ἡδύ is something desired irrespectively of its goodness or utili In seeking the καλόν and the συμφέρον a man is conscious a system of things; whereas in following the ἡδύ, as such, he l to do with merely isolated particulars. The pursuit of the κ and of the συμφέρον is, however, pleasant, because it is a purs to pursue successfully and to feel pleasure being practic identical.

γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν] I Bywater restores ὅτι from K^b, in place of the ἔτι of all c authorities. I think that ἔτι is right, and that καὶ ἐκ τούτων

= ἐκ τῶνδε. Φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν would = φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ ἠθικὴ 1104 b. 29.
τή ἐστι περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν: but throughout this chapter περί is
ed with the accusative of the terms denoting the circumstances or
vironment of ἠθ. ἀρετή. I think that here περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν can mean
ly 'about the same things,' i. e. about ἀρετή and κακία mentioned in
e two immediately preceding lines. I should like, however, to read
ὶ αὐτῶν for περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. The recurring -των or -ων terminations
the immediate context—αὐτῶν τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν—would easily
d themselves to clerical error.

τοὺς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν] 'The *subjects* of choice'—*i. e.* the three b. 35.
bdivisions mentioned *under the head of* αἵρεσις.

§ 8.] Consideration (6). The love of pleasure is innate, in- 1105 a. 1.
ined in our nature, and hard to rub out. 'χαλεπὸν ἀποπρίψασθαι
. ἐγκεχρωσμένον] the metaphor,' says Grant (following Gifanius
d Zell), 'though not its precise application, seems taken from
to, *Rep.* iv. p. 429 D, where the effects of right education are
npared to a dye with which the mind is imbued, so as to resist
detersive effects of pleasure and pain.'
Consideration (7). Pleasure and pain are the tests which we
ly to actions *also* (*sc.* as well as to feelings). Michelet ap-
itely quotes Diog. Laert. x. § 129, speaking of Epicurus—
ην (ἡδονὴν) γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης
ρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν, ὡς
ὶ τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.

10.] Consideration (8). It is very difficult to contend against a. 7.
asure and pain; the contest therefore is worthy of the great
of Life.

Ἡράκλειτος] See the notes of Zell, Coraes, Michelet and Grant: a. 8.
also Bywater's *Heracliti Eph. Reliquiae*, cv. p. 41. Heraclitus
ke only of the difficulty of contending with θυμός, as is recog-
ed in *Pol.* Θ. 9, 1315 a. 30, and in *Eth. Eud.* ii. 7. 1223 b. 23.
words, according to Bywater, were θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι
ἂν χρῄζῃ γίνεσθαι ψυχῆς ὠνέεται.

ἀρετῇ] ἠθικῇ read by M^b, rc. L^b, NC, Paris 1853, B^3 and some a. 11.
er inferior MSS.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

But here a difficulty may be raised—A man becomes just by performing just acts: but surely, if he performs just acts, he is already just: if a man writes correctly, he surely can write. *To this we may answer, that the inference is not certain in the case of the man who writes correctly, any more than in the case of the man who performs just acts. A man may write something correctly by chance, or at the suggestion of another person. We do not know that he can* write, *till we know that he has written something as only a person who can write could—*i. e. *from his own knowledge of the art of writing. So much for the analogy between an art and a virtue, appealed to by the promoters of the difficulty before us. The analogy, even so far as it holds, is evidently not in favour of their suggestion, but against it. It is, however, where the analogy breaks down entirely, that we see the best opening for a decisive refutation—and it breaks down here: a work of art has its artistic merit in itself: it is enough in the realm of art if a work, with certain good qualities in it, has been produced—we say 'What a beautiful work!' But in the realm of conduct we do not say 'Well done!' as soon as we see an action, with certain good qualities in it, performed. Before we pronounce, we look at the agent also, and ask—'How did he perform it?'* (1) *Did he know that he was performing it?* (2) *Did he choose deliberately to perform it, and that, because he thought it right, not because he thought it would lead to some ulterior pleasure or profit?* and (3) *Did he perform it as the result of a fixed and unchangeable habit in him? Unless these conditions in the agent be fulfilled, we do not speak of the moral value of actions: but works of art have their artistic merit independently of any such conditions in the artist, except of course that of his having knowledge. With the acquirement of the virtues knowledge, such as is required in the artist, has little or nothing to do; but the other conditions mentioned are all-important, realised as they are in consequence of the frequent performance of good actions.*

Actions, then, are said to be just or temperate, when they are such as the just or temperate man would perform; but it does not necessarily follow that if man performs these actions he is just or temperate. More is needed: to be just or temperate he must perform them as *just or temperate men perform them.*

We have good reason for saying, then, that it is by performing just or temperate acts that a man becomes just or temperate. Nay, how could it be otherwise? Who, if he omits to perform such acts, has the least chance of becoming good? And yet the majority of men omit to perform them, and take refuge in talk, and think that they have a philosophy of life which will make them good. They are like patients who listen attentively to their physician but do not follow his prescriptions. Foolish patients! foolish moralists!

§§ 1–3.] This ἀπορία we may resolve by pointing out (which 1105 a. 17.
Aristotle does not do explicitly) that τὰ δίκαια before the formation of the Habit are, so far as the agent is concerned, only ὁμωνύμως δίκαια. They are only apparently *his* just acts; really, *qua* just, they are expressions of the wise intention of the law-giver, or ruler, who enjoins and enforces them. The moral agent himself has to begin by acting under the compulsion of the law, until by repetition a habit is formed, and he performs the acts in question *proprio motu*, the habit bringing with it an insight, more or less clear, into the significance of the acts, and a belief that they are good. Then they are really the agent's own just acts—*i. e.* they are 'just' in the strict, and not in an equivocal sense. Thus the analogy between ἀρετή and τέχνη, appealed to by the promoters of the ἀπορία (which, it may be observed, is an *ignava ratio* in morals—or excuse for inactivity—see § 6 of this chapter—similar to that in science refuted in the *Meno* 80 E—οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδεν οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὅ γε οἶδε ζητοῖ· οἶδε γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως. οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ἅ,τι ζητήσει) does not help them. A just act may be just in an equivocal sense, as a word correctly written (γραμματικόν τι) may be 'correctly written' merely in an equivocal sense, and is no sure sign that a man *can* write. The analogy only makes it clearer that the difficulty about 'becoming just by doing just acts' is to be met by pointing out that the acts are not really 'just' at first, but 'must and can' be *made just* by the strenuous practice of the agent himself. It is this 'must and can' which οἱ ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες (§ 6)—the promoters of this ἀπορία—ignore.

But, after all, there is no real analogy (for the purpose of the present discussion) between the ἀρεταί and the τέχναι—ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν (§ 3, a. 26). The goodness of a work of art is something quite different from that of a moral action. The goodness of the work of art is a quality which we see at once in the work *itself*—Hermes is dug up at Olympia, and we find him beautiful as soon as we see him. But the goodness of a moral action is not a quality in the action itself, which we can appreciate apart from the goodness of the agent. The reason of this is that the real object of the moral judgment is not the isolated action, but *the system of conduct to which it belongs*; and this we can get at only through a knowledge of the *way in which* the agent performed the given action. If we find that an

1105 a. 17. action, belonging *prima facie* to a noble system of conduct, has, as a matter of fact, been performed by the agent deliberately in the interest of that system, and performed also easily and with pleasure, as being an action with which he identifies his own good, then we venture to speak of 'the goodness of the action.' We know that it is a good action which we can count on the agent to repeat. It is only actions which will be repeated that are morally significant. An action, however useful and even well-intentioned, which is not likely to be repeated, because the agent finds it difficult and unpleasant, is not an important factor in that correspondence with the environment which is the ultimate object of the moral judgment. Of course it is true that there are actions which from their very nature are exceptional, because intended to meet exceptional circumstances—actions involving heroic self-sacrifice, which take a position analogous to that of great works of art, and demand unhesitating and immediate applause, although performed by a man of whose disposition we otherwise know nothing; but in the vast majority of cases it is unsafe to estimate an action thus from the outside, judging of its moral value from its splendour or immediate utility; before we come to a decision, we ought to know the state of the agent—whether he is aware that he performs the act, whether he chooses it because it is right, and that, of fixed habit, having often performed it before and therefore being likely to perform it often again.

a. 28. § 3. ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι] I prefer αὐτά given by L^b and NC.

a. 31. πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς κ.τ.λ.] *i.e.* (1) it must not be done δι' ἄγνοιαν, otherwise it would be involuntary, *i.e.* not his act at all, but a mere accident without moral significance (see *E. N.* iii. 1. 3); (2) it must not be the result of unregulated θυμός or ἐπιθυμία, but βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις, *i.e.* προαίρεσις (see *E. N.* iii. 3. 19), and the βουλευσις must be directed to the good end, τὸ καλόν, τὸ εὖ ζῆν, for it is possible to employ apparently good actions as means to an unworthy end. This seems to be the sense of προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, viz. 'choosing means for the sake of the good end which one appears to choose them for': 'choosing them *as being what they are—good: i.e.* good means to a good end': *e.g.* a man may choose to perform a charitable act for the sake of the public good which such acts promote, not for the sake of personal popularity

In the latter case his 'charitable act' would be such only in 1105 a. 31.
appearance. Προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά cannot signify 'choosing them, *i.e.* the particular acts, for their own sakes, as ends-in-themselves,' for προαίρεσις is the choice of *means* (see *E. N.* iii. 2. 9). Good choice treats particular acts as means to the realisation of εὐδαιμονία, the chief end. (3) Not only must an act, to be morally good, be chosen in the way described above, but the choice of it must be habitual and practically inevitable. The προαίρεσις of means, to be good, must be guided by the βούλησις (*E. N.* iii. 2. 9) of an End, or Life, to which the whole nature of the moral agent has been perfectly adapted.

τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ.] 'This,' Grant remarks, 'is b. 2.
a reaction against the Socratico-Platonic doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge.' Aristotle uses εἰδέναι in two senses in the present context, in one of which he affirms, and in the other seems to deny, its necessity in morals. A man must *know that he is doing* an act, if the act is to have any moral significance at all. This is an indispensable condition (πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς), as we have seen above. But, this condition fulfilled, a man may act well without *a theory of action* (τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι), if his moral habits are good; whereas correct theory without good habits would avail nothing. The statement, however, τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, even as thus explained, is too strong from Aristotle's own point of view. Without a *theory*, conduct could not long maintain itself as a system. Aristotle concedes this in his doctrine of the πρακτικὸς νοῦς, and in his view that the moral agent ought to become νομοθετικός (*E. N.* x. 9. 14). After all, if allowance be made for difference of philosophical language, Plato and Aristotle hold essentially the same view about the place of knowledge in morality. It may be pointed out in passing that the distinction drawn in § 3 between a work of art which has its good in itself, and an action which must be interpreted in the light of the agent's character, is the distinction of *Met.* Θ. 8, between ἐνέργειαι which have an ἔργον παρ' αὐτάς, and those which have not—1050 a. 30 ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἥ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ κ.τ.λ. . . . ὅσων δὲ μή ἐστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια· οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι, καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι. The excellence of Homer is embodied in his ἔργον, and remains there for all time;

1105 b. 2. but a good action is only a glimpse which we get of a good On the one hand, it is the Iliad, and not its author th important; on the other hand, it is the orderly beautiful life which the action is a symptom, that is precious.

b. 3. τὰ δ' ἄλλα ... ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν ... περιγίν The ἄλλα are τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι δι' αὐτά and the ἕξις, both of w come from acting, not from philosophising.

b. 5. § 4.] Good actions are only then morally good, *i.e.* really they appear to be, when they are done by a good man: an good man is a man who performs good actions easily and in interest of a noble system of conduct.

b. 9. §§ 5, 6.] show that the remark πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς [*sc.* ἔχε μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει (§ 3) is directed, not so much ag Plato, as against Sophists like Isocrates, who professed (or accused, by those who did not themselves take fees, of profes to teach conduct by a course of lectures—cf. *E. N.* x. 9. 20.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

We have assumed the concrete existence of Virtue, and tried to show ho practically acquired: let us now try to find its formal definition; and f us ask—What is its Genus?

The qualities *which manifest themselves in the Soul are three—Fe Capacities, Habits; and Virtue will be one of the three.*

(1) *Feelings:* e. g. *desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, lo emulation, pity—these, and all other feelings, being accompanied by pleas pain.*

(2) *Capacities: being capable of experiencing these feelings*—e. g. *capable of feeling anger or pity.*

(3) *Habits: the relations, good or bad, in which we stand to our v feelings,* e. g. *if we are disposed too much or too little to anger, it is a bad if moderately, a good habit.*

The Virtues and Vices then are not feelings, because we are not said good or bad for our mere feelings, or praised or blamed for them, whereas praised for our Virtues, and blamed for our Vices. Again, we experi feeling, e. g. *anger or fear, without choosing to experience it, but the v involve Choice. Moreover we are said to be 'moved' by our feeling 'disposed,' not 'moved,' by our Virtues and Vices.*

Nor are the Virtues and Vices capacities, for we are not said to be good or bad, and we are not praised or blamed, because we are capable of experiencing certain feelings. Further, we are endowed by nature with these capacities; but it is not nature which makes us good or bad, as was pointed out before.

If then the Virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, it remains that they are habits.

§ 1. τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή] What is its γένος. It seems to be a reversal of the natural order to enquire first (as Aristotle has done in the previous chapters of this Book)—How Virtue is acquired; and then (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα) to ask—What Virtue is. This is surely the order which Socrates finds fault with Meno for wishing to adopt (*Meno* 86 C, D). Perhaps we may answer for Aristotle that it is only the man who has acquired ἀρετή for himself who can understand its τί ἐστι. The present enquiry therefore follows a natural course, when starting from ἀρετή, as something concretely known, it first tries to show how it is practically acquired, and then tries to find its formal definition. 1105 b. 19.

τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί κ.τ.λ.] As Michelet and other commentators point out, the phenomena in the Soul are here said to be three, because ἀρετή, or goodness, *the* quality (ποιότης) *par excellence* (cf. *E. N.* i. 9. 8 αὕτη δὲ [*i. e.* ἡ πολιτική] πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι: and *Met.* Δ. 14. 1020 b. 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν), suggests the accepted threefold division (so far as the ψυχή is concerned) of ποιότης into ἕξις, δύναμις, and πάθος. See *Cat.* 8. 8 b. 25 sqq., and Grant's note. Zell quotes Plutarch, *De Virt. Mor.* 4 τρία γὰρ δὴ ταῦτά φασι περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν, δύναμιν, πάθος, ἕξιν· ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ἀρχὴ καὶ ὕλη τοῦ πάθους, οἷον ὀργιλότης, αἰσχυντηλία, θαρραλεότης· τὸ δὲ πάθος κίνησίς τις ἤδη τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον ὀργή, αἰδώς, θάρσος, ἡ δ' ἕξις ἰσχὺς καὶ κατασκευὴ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον δυνάμεως ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγιγνομένη, κακία μὲν ἂν φαύλως, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἂν καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παιδαγωγηθῇ τὸ πάθος. b. 20.

§§ 2–6.] A πάθος is an isolated feeling or affection, and a δύναμις is the capacity for experiencing such a feeling. A capacity of this kind, with the resulting feeling, is *natural*, *i. e.* independent of education, and, in itself, is *neither praised* as good, *nor blamed* as bad. Moreover, a feeling is a *motion* (κατὰ τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα) which arises out of a capacity *independently of choice* (ἀπροαιρέτως). b. 21.

1105 b. 21. These characteristics of πάθος and δύναμις exclude the possibility ἀρετή being a πάθος or δύναμις: for ἀρετή is a *disposition* (κατὰ ἀρετὰς διακεῖσθαί πως λεγόμεθα) not a motion; it *implies choice;* a it *is praised* as good; besides, it is *acquired by education.* I these are the characteristics of ἕξις. Accordingly λείπεται ἕξεις αὐ εἶναι.

In other words, the 'Qualities' of the ψυχή are either affecti (πάθη) or capacities (δυνάμεις and ἕξεις). Virtue is not an isola affection. It is therefore a capacity. But it is not a natu capacity. Therefore, it is an acquired capacity, *i. e.* a ἕξις: a a ἕξις for which we are praised.

§ 2. πάθη] It is to be observed that the doctrine of this sect is considerably simpler than that of the corresponding passage *Cat.* 8. In this latter passage παθητικαὶ ποιότητες and πάθη are tinguished (9 a. 28). Παθητικαὶ ποιότητες are permanent qualit such as a pale complexion, or madness, whether congenital caused by disease; whereas πάθη are transient qualities (if the t *qualities* be admissible), such as paleness suddenly produced by f or excitement by pain—9 b. 19 ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων σημ μάτων (μελανία, ὠχρότης: and the same remarks are afterw applied to psychical conditions, such as μανικὴ ἔκστασις) ἀπό παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε, παθητικαὶ ποιό λέγονται· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα . . . ὅσα δ' ἀπὸ ῥ διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, ποιότητ οὔ. οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί τινες κατὰ ταύτας· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν δ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται· οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβηθῆναι ὠχ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι· ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιό δ' οὔ. Here the writer says that πάθη are not ποιότητες: but al (9 a. 28) he has said—τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητε πάθη. The difference between a παθητικὴ ποιότης and a δύ according to *Cat.* 8 is that, while the former is the perma manifestation or induration, as it were, of a πάθος, the latter natural capacity of doing or resisting something: see *Cat.* 9 a δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως ἢ μηδὲν πάσ The δύναμις of the *Categories* thus differs from that of the *Et* which is καθ' ἣν παθητικοὶ τούτων (*i. e.* τῶν παθῶν) λεγόμεθα. In the δύναμις of the *Ethics* stands very close to the παθητικὴ πο of the *Categories.* The manner in which the notion of παθ ποιότης, or permanent manifestation of a πάθος, naturally passes

that of δύναμις καθ' ἣν παθητικοὶ (τοῦ πάθους) λεγόμεθα is easily seen in 1105 b. 21.
the case of psychical παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, where the manifestations generally admit of degrees; thus the παθητικὴ ποιότης of μανικὴ ἕκστασις, or insanity, is not always violently manifested; and the violent outbursts, when they occur, appear as πάθη, or κινήσεις, arising out of the normal ἕκστασις, which thus comes to be regarded as a capacity, rather than as a manifestation. If we compare the parallel passage in the *Eudem. Ethics* (ii. 2) with *Cat.* 8 we can see how close παθητικὴ ποιότης and δύναμις stand to each other, where τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν at least are concerned. In the *Categories* the ὀργίλος is said to have a παθητικὴ ποιότης (*Cat.* 8. 10 a. 2 ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας [sc. τὰς παθητικὰς ποιότητας] λέγονται, ὀργίλοι κ.τ.λ.); in the *Eth. Eud.*, to have a δύναμις (*Eth. Eud.* ii. 2. 1220 b. 12 λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον κ.τ.λ. . . . καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιότης, ἀλλὰ πάσχει· κατὰ δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις, ποιότης· λέγω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς λέγονται κατὰ πάθη οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες· οἷον ὀργίλος κ.τ.λ.).

In the foregoing remarks I have purposely omitted, as irrelevant, reference to such παθητικαὶ ποιότητες as *sweetness*, so called because they *are qualities which produce* πάθη in us—*Cat.* 8. 9 b. 5 τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται.

λυπηθῆναι] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 88) seems to make out a good b. 25.
case for his conjecture φοβηθῆναι. After quoting the § from λέγω δὲ πάθη down to ἐλεῆσαι, he says: 'Affecte nenne ich Begierde, Zorn, Furcht u.s.w., überhaupt alles, womit das Gefühl von Lust und Unlust verbunden ist. Wer so definirt, kann unmöglich die λύπη selbst als Affect bezeichnen. Dennoch wird unmittelbar darauf λυπηθῆναι als Beispiel eines solchen angeführt. Ich vermuthe φοβηθῆναι, denn φοβεῖσθαι wird neben ὀργίζεσθαι wiederholt in diesem Abschnitte als Beispiel gebraucht. Z. 31 κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα, οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος. p. 1106 a. 2 ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως. Die grosse Ethik, die diesen Abschnitt fast wörtlich wiedergiebt, hat in ihrem Text bereits λυπηθῆναι i. 7. 1186 a. 15: dagegen hat Stobaeus *Ecl. Eth.* p. 85 Meineke φοβεῖσθαι: δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων εἶναι λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς ὀργιζόμεθα φοβούμεθα ζηλοῦμεν κ.τ.λ.'

ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς] Cf. *E. E.* ii. 2. 1220 b. 18 ἕξεις δέ εἰσιν, ὅσαι αἴτιαί εἰσι τοῦ ταῦτα (*i. e.* τὰ πάθη) ἢ κατὰ λόγον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναντίως. The ἕξις of virtue is the result of the

1105 b. 25. εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων (Eustratius) effected by moral training.

b. 29. § 3. οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι] Because, as is explained in *Cat.* 8, the πάθη are not properly ποιότητες: we are not ποιοί τινες in consequence of them. It is thus evident that it is only on account of their close connexion with παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, of which they seem to be at once the causes and the results, that πάθη are considered under the head of ποιότης at all. In themselves they are κινήσεις (see § 4 of this chapter), or ἐνέργειαι—not ποιότητες (see *E. N.* x. 3. 1). This is recognised in *E. E.* ii. 1. 1218 b. 35 τῶν δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν ἕξεις ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσί, τὰ δ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ κινήσεις.

1106 a. 3. § 4. προαιρέσεις] As Grant points out, there has been no proof of this yet. Aristotle, however, has probably in his mind the doctrine of *Met.* Θ. 2 and 5, according to which ὄρεξις or προαίρεσις determines (as τὸ κύριον) which of the two contraries open to a δύναμις μετὰ λόγου shall be manifested. He therefore assumes here as a settled point, that the ἀρεταί, having been acquired in circumstances in which the development of the contrary κακίαι was possible, are μετὰ προαιρέσεως. It is true that the δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου of *Met.* Θ. 2 and 5 are identified with the properly *intellectual* potentialities, or abilities, *i. e.* with the τέχναι and ἐπιστῆμαι: but the doctrine of *Eth. Nic.* iii. 5—that, if the performance of good acts is ἐφ' ἡμῖν, then the performance of bad acts is equally ἐφ' ἡμῖν—enables us, or rather obliges us, to extend the notion of ἡ μετὰ λόγου δύναμις ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων οὖσα so as to include *moral* potentiality also—*i. e.* the power of acting well or ill in given circumstances, which man, in virtue of his λόγος, possesses. Indeed, the notion may be even further generalised, so as to include all Life (physical as well as moral) *i. e.* all cases in which an *organism* may, or may not, succeed in doing what is for its advantage in given circumstances: and the generalisation of the notion would be in strict conformity with the meaning of λόγος=orderly arrangement of parts, or organisation. All organisms, in that they can so behave as to survive or perish, possess δυνάμεις τῶν ἐναντίων: whereas in the inorganic world there is no 'adaptation to an environment, or failure in adaptation' there are only ἄλογοι δυνάμεις, operating in one direction.

a. 6. διακεῖσθαί πως] Except, apparently, for the alliteration, this might have been ἔχειν πως. The ἀρεταί are διαθέσεις which have

become fixed, *i.e.* ἕξεις—see *Cat.* 8. 9 a. 8 διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως 1106 a. 6.
τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιωτέραν καὶ δυσκινητοτέραν. ἀεὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διάκειντάί γέ πως κατ' αὐτάς· οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν. Examples of a διάθεσις are ψυχρότης, νόσος.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

So much for the genus of Virtue—it is a Habit. But what is its differentia? What sort of Habit is it?

Let us begin with the statement, that a virtue or excellence gives perfection both to the condition and to the function of that of which it is the virtue or excellence. Thus the excellence of the eye makes the eye itself and its sight good. So man's excellence or virtue will be a habit which makes him good, and causes him to perform his peculiar function well. The differentia then which we are looking for is contained in the words—'which makes him good and causes him to perform his peculiar function well.' We have already said, in passing, that Goodness is preserved by the Mean, and that 'performing well' consists in avoiding extremes and choosing the Mean. Accordingly, if we now explain fully what 'choosing the Mean' is, we shall explain the true differentia of Virtue.

Wherever a measurable whole can be divided into two parts, we can subtract a part which is 'greater than,' or a part which is 'less than,' or a part which is 'equal to,' the part which we leave. Here 'equal to' is the arithmetical mean between any two unequal parts into which the whole may be divided; it is the absolute mean, or 'half of the thing,' which is the same for all men. From this absolute mean, however, we must distinguish the relative mean, or 'mean for me,' which is not the half of the thing and the same for all men, but that amount which is neither too much nor too little for me—that amount which exactly suits me in my particular circumstances: e.g. *let two pounds of meat a day be too little, and ten too much for me during my training: it does not follow that the arithmetical mean between two and ten—the* half *of their sum,* i.e. *six pounds, will suit me. Whatever quantity between the extremes two and ten suits me is* the mean for me, *and will be prescribed by my trainer. And the rule which the trainer here observes is that which all artists follow. They all look to this, not to the arithmetical mean:* i.e. *they all aim at what is simply enough in the circumstances, avoiding excess and defect. Thus we say of a master-piece of art—'you could not take from it, or add to it, without spoiling it.' And if Art achieves her triumphs by observing this golden rule, much more carefully will Virtue observe it, inasmuch as her*

triumphs are greater: for the Virtuous Character is like one of the organisms which Nature brings forth—it is more fitly contrived and more beautiful than any work of art. When we say that Virtue observes the mean, we refer only to Moral Virtue, for it is acquired in a region—that of feelings and actions—where excess and defect are possible. Thus, take the feeling of anger: if we are too angry, or not angry enough, we err and are blamed; but if we are angry at the proper time, and at the proper things, and with the proper persons, and with the proper effect, and in the proper way, we hit off 'the happy mean,' and do what we are praised for, and what is right. But where 'we are praised,' and 'do what is right,' Virtue *is concerned. It is Virtue therefore which makes us 'hit off the mean': indeed we may perhaps even say that 'Virtue is itself a kind of mean.' Again, there are many wrong ways (evil is something indefinite as the Pythagoreans opined, good something definite), but only one right way. Hence it is easy to miss the mark, difficult to hit it—another reason why we assign the mean—for it is difficult—to Virtue, and the extremes to Vice—for they are easy.*

Moral Virtue may then be defined, as 'A Habit involving Choice, lying in a Relative Mean fixed by Reason, that is, as the Prudent Man would fix it.'

But it is only as formally defined, that Virtue 'is a mean,' or 'lies in a mean,' between two vices, choosing the middle course between their extremes. This 'middle course,' we must remember, is likewise the Best Course: *and as choosing what is Best virtue is 'supreme excellence.'*

It is not to every action, however, and every feeling that the formula of the mean applies. Some feelings, e. g. *envy, some actions,* e. g. *theft, are seen, as soon as named, to imply evil. It is never possible to have such feelings, or perform such actions, 'in the right way.' To suppose it possible would indeed be as absurd as to suppose that acting unjustly or acting intemperately could have its excess, defect and mean, or that the exact mean point of justice or temperance could be resolved into excess and defect. In short there is no mean in excess and defect, and no excess and defect in the mean.*

1106 a. 15. **§ 1. ποία τις**] Having in the last chapter shown ὅ τι ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, viz. that it is a ἕξις, Aristotle now proceeds to declare its differentia—ποία τις.

§§ 2, 3.] Taken, as Grant points out, from Plato, *Rep.* 353 B.

a. 25. **§ 4. ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς**] Its differentia is that it is ἐν μεσότητι.

a. 26. **συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ**] Continuous and discrete quantity—*i.e.* magnitude (μέγεθος) and number (πλῆθος), according to Grant, who quotes *Cat.* 6. 4 b. 20 τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον τὸ δὲ συνεχές . . . ἐστὶ δὲ διωρισμένον, οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχὲς δὲ οἷον γραμμὴ ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος. It will be observed, however, that in this passage from the *Categories* the

m used is διωρισμένον not διαιρετόν. Is διαιρετόν in the *Ethics* 1106 a. 26.
uivalent to διωρισμένον in the *Categories*? Against an affirmative
swer we have *De Coelo* i. 1. 268 a. 6 συνεχὲς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ
ρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά: and *Met.* Δ. 13. 1020 a. 10 λέγεται δὲ πλῆθος
τὸ διαιρετὸν δυνάμει εἰς μὴ συνεχῆ, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ εἰς συνεχῆ, from
ich passages it would appear that both μέγεθος and πλῆθος, *i.e.*
th the συνεχές and the μὴ συνεχές are διαιρετά. If διαιρετόν then
o be distinguished from τὸ διωρισμένον, which undoubtedly stands
πλῆθος, we must translate συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ by 'continuous
d at the same time capable of division'—the rendering rejected
Grant, but supported by the Paraphrast, who has—ἐν παντὶ
νεχεῖ, οἷον γραμμῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ, σώματι, ἢ λόγῳ ἢ χρόνῳ, καὶ ὅλως ἐν παντὶ
ρίνῳ διαιρεθῆναι[1]. The writer of the parallel passage in *E. E.*
3 certainly understood the reference to be to the συνεχές alone,
d not to the συνεχές and διωρισμένον. His words are, 1220 b. 21
ἔστι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστὶν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον· καὶ
ὶ ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ ἐν ἰατρικῇ ἐν οἰκο-
μικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὁποιαοῦν πράξει καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστη-
μονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές· ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις
ησις. The Ald. Sch. follows the lead of Eudemus. He says—
δῆλον ὅτι πάσῃ πράξει παρακολουθεῖ χρόνος, οὐκ ἔλασσον δὲ περὶ
ξεις ἢ πάθη ἡ ἀρετή· καθ' ὃ οὖν ἐν χρόνῳ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐν συνεχεῖ καὶ
ρετῷ, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὴ τὴν διαίρεσιν λήψεται.

§§ 4–8.] It is unfortunate that Aristotle, in introducing the
bject of the ethical mean, gave such prominence to the συνεχὲς
ὶ διαιρετόν *i.e.*, to Quantity simply as Quantity. He thereby
vited scholastic explanations like that by which Eudemus attempts
show *how* moral action falls under the head of the συνεχές—
E. ii. 3. 1220 b. 26 ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές· ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις:
d laid his Theory open to the (really false) charge of recognising
ly a quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice. As a
atter of fact, however, he is careful to distinguish between the
σον τοῦ πράγματος and the μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. The μέσον τοῦ πράγ-
τος, as such, has no place in morals, being confined to depart-
ents in which the 'middle,' or 'half,' of something can be ex-
tly measured, or counted. The μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, with which

[1] It is fair to add, however, that the Paraphrast passes, a few lines below,
m the 'continuous' to the 'discrete'—but uses the term διωρισμένον, not
ρετόν. Aspasius is defective here.

06 a. 26. alone we have to do in morals, is that ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει, *i.e.*, that which enables a particular person to correspond successfully with his social environment. Here account must be taken of complicated organic conditions, of complicated external circumstances, and of intricate actions and reactions between these organic and external factors: and the division of a συνεχές throws little light upon the problem. This Aristotle sees clearly. It seems probable that, having arrived at a satisfactory result in the preceding chapter by looking at ἀρετή in connexion with the Category of ποιόν, he next turned to that of ποσόν for help, and so stumbled upon τὸ συνεχές, of which his commentators have unfortunately made so much.

When we have found τὸ μέσον τὸ τοῦ πράγματος, we have found a quantity simply. But in τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς we have a quantity, as it is related to a quality. From σχῆμα, the fourth kind of ποιότης (see *Cat.* 8. 10 a. 11), we may obtain an illustration of the way in which quantity is related to quality. Let us suppose that a disc is 'of no use' with a diameter of 10 inches, and that it must be enlarged till it becomes a disc 'of a useful size.' In adding matter (*e.g.* copper) to it, it is true that we must not add 'too much or too little'; but, more than this, 'the due amount' which we add must have *the quality of shape suitable to a disc*; the same 'amount' with another quality of shape would not help us. This *due amount thus circularly qualified* might be called τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς τὸν κύκλον. It is clear then that τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, although it has its quantitative aspect, is essentially that which is qualitatively suitable to the moral character in the circumstances in which it is placed [1].

The analogy between the moral character and the definite well-balanced forms of organic nature, and of art, was always present to Aristotle's mind; indeed we have to look no farther than the 9th section of this chapter to find it mentioned. Living organisms, and works of art, are σχήματα, definite after their kinds, which Nature and Man respectively form by qualifying matter. The

[1] Cf. Trendelenburg *Logische Untersuch.* i. 358 sqq.: he remarks that Aristotle's virtuous μεσότης is not a mere *quantum*, but keeps in view the qualitative peculiarity of virtue: and that when Plato extols measure in the moral, natural, and artistic worlds, he understands not measure *per se*, but measure in relation to a qualitative *end*. It is in the end which it subserves that measure has its ethical value.

of matter used in any case is determined by the form 1106 a. 26.
:d; the size of a particular organ, or part, is determined
form, which again is determined by the form (limiting
) of the whole organism, or work. Thus animals and
grow to sizes determined by their particular structures,
, and conditions of life[1], and each separate organ observes
portion of the whole to which it belongs. The painter or
· considers the symmetry of the whole composition in every
f his work. The conductor of a choir is forced to exclude
which surpasses all the others conspicuously in beauty—
8. 1284 b. 8 *οὔτε γὰρ γραφεὺς ἐάσειεν ἂν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα : συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῷον, οὐδ' εἰ διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος· οὔτε ναυπηγὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς· οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος ὢν καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χόρου φθεγγόμενον ἐάσει συγχορεύειν.*
cases Form dominates matter, quality quantity. Similarly,
ral character is a definite Form which maintains itself as
he *μέσον*, so-called, which it observes in various circum-
being that course of action which is best fitted in the
tances to secure its continued maintenance. The less we
f the 'middle,' or 'half' of *τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ διαιρετόν*, in such
exion, the better. When an insect escapes capture by
ling the colour of the leaves or bark on which it lives, its
ment of that particular shade of colour and no other, has
h right to be described as an observance of the *μέσον*, as the
ance which protects the citizen from extremes disastrous
elf and others.

τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν] otherwise *ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης*— a. 35.
by Nicomachus Gerasenus (*ἀριθ. εἰσαγωγή* i. 23, p. 124,
che): *ἔστιν οὖν ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης, ὅταν τριῶν ἢ πλειόνων ὅρων ἀλλήλοις κειμένων ἢ ἐπινοουμένων ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ ποσότητα διαφορὰ ται μεταξὺ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχουσα, μὴ μέντοι λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ὸς ἀλλήλους γίνηται, οἷον α, β, γ, δ, ε. ἐν γὰρ τῇ φυσικῇ ταύτῃ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ συνεχῶς καὶ ἀνυπερβάτως ἐξεταζομένῃ εὑρίσκεται πᾶς ν ὅρος δυεῖν ἀνὰ μέσον τεταγμένος τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ν μεσότητα· ἴσαι γὰρ αἱ διαφοραὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑκατέρωθεν ους, οὐ μὴν ἔτι καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς σώζεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.* Cf. also
ıs apud Mullach *Fragm. Phil.* ii. 119.

ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης answers to *the average* as found by

[1] Cf. Spencer's *Biology*, part ii. ch. 1 on Growth.

1106 a. 35. statistics. Statistics give us the average amount of beer, *e.g.*, consumed per head in a city: but it is only by accident that this amount happens to be that good for a particular person.

b. 7. § 8. μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς] Morality and art have nothing to do with the μέσον τοῦ πράγματος *as such*. When we say that they seek the μέσον, we mean by that term τὸ μέτριον (as used by Plato in the *Politicus*)—*the qualitatively suitable quantity*, which may of course, in some cases, *happen to be* τὸ μέσον τὸ τοῦ πράγματος. Thus corrective justice seeks to effect τὸ ἴσον (or μέσον) τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν (see v. 4. 3)—but only because that ἴσον or μέσον is qualitatively suitable: *the end of justice is best served*, if the parties are treated as equals who have been made unequal by the βλάβος, and the arithmetical mean is struck between them.

b. 8. § 9.] τέχνη, ἀρετή, and φύσις are principles which produce definite forms. The forms which τέχνη produces in matter do not, however, *penetrate* the matter, as do those produced by ἀρετή and φύσις. The sculptor shapes only the outside of the marble. But a living being is organised throughout its matter, as deep down as the microscope can reach[1]. Similarly, a virtuous character is no mere external accomplishment, but the personality of the man. For this reason ἀρετή is said to be πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀρείων. It is a beautiful organism in which nothing is μάτην, as distinguished from a product of workmanship, necessarily rough and imperfect.

What Aristotle somewhat unfortunately calls the μέσον in nature, art, and morals, Plato called more happily the μέτριον. In three passages in the *Politicus* he anticipates all that is valuable in Aristotle's doctrine, and even stumbles in one place upon the use of the term μέσον, only however to drop it. In the first passage (*Politicus* 283 E–284 A) he says that good and bad men are chiefly distinguished by their different relations to the φύσις τοῦ μετρίου, and that all the arts produce their good and beautiful results by observing τὸ μέτριον. In the second passage (*Politicus* 284 D) he distinguishes between the sciences which have to do with number and magnitude as such, and those which regard τὸ μέτριον, τὸ πρέπον, τὸν καιρόν, τὸ δέον, thus dividing ἡ μετρητικὴ into

[1] As Leibnitz says—'Machinae naturae *h.e.* corpora viventia sunt adhuc machinae in minimis partibus usque in infinitum. Atque in eo consistit discrimen inter naturam et artem, hoc est inter artem divinam et nostram.'

rts. Aristotle's distinction between the *μέσον τοῦ πράγματος* 1106 b. 8.
e *μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς* involves the same division. It is in this
e that Plato happens to use the term *μέσον*. In the third
e (*Politicus* 310) Plato makes a practical suggestion with
to the *realisation* of *τὸ μέτριον* in the character of the com-
', which shows us how deeply he has penetrated into the
ıg of this great principle of Life. The *μέτριον*, he suggests,
: realised by the *intermarriage* of opposite natures. Naturally,
ıφοτώνη, like seek like; *ἀνδρεῖοι* do not mix with *σώφρονες*.
esult is that after many generations the former become
, and the latter unable to hold their own. It is for wise
ion to weave together opposite tendencies, and produce a
hich may be compared to a web, *λεῖον καί, τὸ λεγόμενον*,
' (with a fine warp). Again, *μετριότης* or *ξυμμετρία* is the
le of good, beauty, and survival in an interesting passage
Philebus 64 D, E.

. *λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν*] *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* is *ἐν μεσότητι*, because it is b. 16.
concretely realised in the *ὕλη* of the pleasures and pains
attend actions and feelings. It is an *ἔνυλος λόγος* effected
ὕλη with difficulty. It is said to be *ἐν μεσότητι* in relation to
dencies to disorder which it withstands. But *διανοητικὴ ἀρετή*
Principle of Form or *λόγος* viewed *per se* as incompatible
ıe irregularity of excess or defect. Thus *φρόνησις* is the
le of Form in relation to the *ὕλη* of *τὰ πρακτά*. This
le *itself* is not said to be *ἐν μεσότητι*, but the *concrete* form, or
ırder, which it produces in our passions (*i. e.* the *ἔνυλος λόγος*
ı *ἀρετή*) is, because that concrete form may fail (by reason
ßολή and *ἔλλειψις*) to be produced. Where, however, failure
ssible—in the region of the *ἄυλοι λόγοι*, or *rationes*, of science
:culation, truths in the pursuit of which there is no *πλάνη*
ı temptation from the side of pleasure or pain[1]—it would
ıeaning to use the expression *ἐν μεσότητι*, which connotes
in circumstances in which failure is possible.
; the faculties by which we apprehend such truths—the purely
:ual *ἕξεις*—*σοφία* and *ἐπιστήμη*—are not described as *ἐν μεσό-*
τητι—for two reasons: first because they are phases of

[1] vi. 5. 6 *οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ*

1106 b. 16. the Principle of Form, which *in itself* is incompatible with ὑπ
βολή and ἔλλειψις: secondly because they are concerned w
objects which offer no obstacles to the reception of the form
reason. Hence the broad distinction which must be kept in vi
for the right understanding of the present section:—That in
practical exercise—in dealing with matter, or, as we should s
with 'an environment,' λόγος, or the Organising Principle (thou
in itself incompatible with ὑπερβολή and ἔλλειψις), is surrounded
difficulties and dangers, which it surmounts and avoids by 'doi
the best in the circumstances'—by 'adaptation'—τῷ τοῦ μέ
στοχάζεσθαι: whereas in its *scientific* exercise (as Aristotle und
stood its scientific exercise), the Principle of Reason has not
impress its form upon an alien and rebellious matter, but fa
itself face to face with itself in its object, and, being dominat
by nothing beyond itself, cannot fall into error: cf. *Met.* Λ. 1
1075 a. 3 οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὑλ
ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία.

Admitting fully the importance in Metaphysics and Ethics of th
doctrine of the infallibility and autonomy of Reason, I think th
it causes Aristotle to overlook the fact that there are proper
scientific operations which closely resemble moral actions in th
dangers and difficulties by which they are surrounded. Th
scientific operation of ἐπαγωγή, for example, consists in the sh
and difficult formation of a conception out of the manifold
confused sensations. At every step of this process the intellect
liable to be deceived by present appearances, while memory oft
plays it false: above all, the feelings affect its point of view
Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est. To form a true co
ception, or καθόλου, out of many αἰσθητά is as closely connect
with adaptation to the environment, as the formation of a go
habit of acting is, and attended by difficulties perhaps
great, though not of the same kind. The καθόλου therefo
which embraces just the most important points in the αἰσθ
omitting those which are not important, might with truth
described as apprehended or 'held' by a ἕξις lying ἐν μεσό
But Aristotle, although he gives a very good account of ἐπαγω
and the formation of universals, prefers, in contrasting moral vi
and science, to look at the latter as engaged with the abst
truths of mathematics and metaphysics, which the Greek m
pursued with so much success. If the difficulties of conc

scientific investigation had been more fully appreciated by him, he would not have drawn the line so sharply as he seems to do in this section, between ἠθικὴ ἀρετή and διανοητικὴ ἀρετή. It is to be noticed however that τέχνη, which he has correctly described as τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική, is the ἀρετή of the ποιητικὴ διάνοια: see *E. N.* vi. ch. 2 and ch. 4. Indeed it is implied in the definition of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή (§ 15) that φρόνησις also is στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου. The same is, as I have tried to show, true of other intellectual ἕξεις, in so far as they also are modes of our adaptation to a difficult environment. There is therefore little value in the limitation apparently implied in the words λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν, except in so far as attention is called to the much greater influence of pleasure and pain in the moral than in the scientific sphere of human activity. All thinking, even the most abstract, is 'a mode of adaptation'—*i. e.* is 'practical.' Aristotle admits this in the opening words of the *Metaphysics*—πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. A belief is honest which we are prepared to *act* upon; and a belief which leads to hurtful action is not *true*. The avenues of knowledge, the special senses, do not give the whole truth about the universe, but only so much as enables us to live. Their truth is relative to conduct. The practical curiosity of the eye of sense, which sustains the intelligence of the lower animals, becomes in man the theoretical curiosity of the 'mind's eye'—*Met.* A. 2. 982 b. 12 διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν.

1106 b. 16.

§ 11. μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον] The *via media* which ἀρετή takes is also the *best* way—*i. e.* the only right way in the circumstances. Cf. below, § 17. b. 22.

§ 12. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις] as well as περὶ τὰ πάθη, *e.g.* φαθηθῆναι, mentioned in § 10. b. 23.

ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται]] Rassow (*Forsch.* 33) suggests ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται καὶ ἁμαρτάνεται—on the ground that both predicates (ἁμαρτάνεται and ψέγεται) belong to each of the extremes. Bywater brackets ψέγεται. b. 25.

§ 13. στοχαστική γε] Ramsauer has—'Particulâ γε adjectâ excusatur quasi audacia loquendi qua nova vox μεσότης ἡ ἀρετή modo proposita est; neque enim prorsus certum virtutem ideo quod sit τοῦ μέσου vel στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου, necessario ipsam esse μεσότητα.' b. 28.

1106 b. 28. § 14. ἔτι τὸ μὲν κ.τ.λ.] There are many wrong ways of doing thing, but only one right way. Therefore (καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν) ὑπερβο and ἔλλειψις, involving as they do many ways of doing a thing, a characteristic of vice, and μεσότης is characteristic of virtue. Th Paraphrast has—φαίνεται ἄρα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν μὲν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τ ἔλλειψιν τῆς κακίας εἶναι (ἀόριστα γὰρ ἑκάτερον) τὴν δὲ μεσότητα τ ἀρετῆς, ὡρισμένην καὶ μίαν οὖσαν.

b. 30. Πυθαγόρειοι] See Grant, *Ethics*, Essay iv. (vol. i. p. 253), an Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* Doctrina Pythagoreorum, inprim Philolai.

b. 32. χαλεπόν] Cf. Theognis (*Poet. Gnom.* p. 14, ed. Tauchnitz):

Μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· πάντων μέσ' ἄριστα, καὶ οὕτως
Ἕξεις, Κύρν', ἀρετὴν ἥν τε λαβεῖν χαλεπόν.

b. 35. ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κ.τ.λ.] Spengel (*Aristotelische Studien Nic. Eth.* p. 205) would place this line after ἐπιτυχεῖν, b. 33.

b. 36. § 15.] This is the final definition of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή. The parts o which have not been already explained are—ὡρισμένῃ (dat.) λό and ὡς [Bywater reads ᾧ] ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν.

The μεσότης is 'rationally determined,' or 'determined accord to the proper ratio or proportion[1].' This ratio is, of course, t of the organisation which meets most successfully the condition human life. The man who realises this ratio most perfectly, is most clearly conscious of it, is termed the φρόνιμος. In the Si Book which treats largely of φρόνησις, we are told (ch. 13. 6) th is φρόνησις which raises φυσικὴ ἀρετή into κυρία ἀρετή. There e independently of education, in the children of a civilised commun certain natural tendencies to feel pleasure and pain in conne with the right objects. Without these natural tendencies to w upon, νόμος would have difficulty in making a beginning of m education. Thus θυμός is the natural source of ἀνδρεία, αἰδώ σωφροσύνη, and νέμεσις of δικαιοσύνη (see especially *E. E.* iii 1234 a. 24 sqq.). These natural tendencies νόμος limits in rela to one another, producing a συμμετρία of the whole man.

[1] No apology is needed for sometimes rendering λόγος, or ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγο *ratio* or *proportion*, rather than by *Reason*; for the object of Reason is or system, and the faculty of Reason and its object are identical, according far-reaching tenet of Aristotle, upon which he often insists. Ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγ *the moral constitution of man, of which he is conscious in his* λόγος, φρό *or* νοῦς πρακτικός.

nce between *θυμός* and *ἀνδρεία*, for instance, is that *θυμός* is 1106 b. 36.
l principle, depending upon accident for its manifestation,
ıble of originating a consistent course of behaviour in the
ıce of danger, and not necessarily bound up with any other
tendency, but often existing alone—as in the case of the
ans and other purely warlike nations: whereas *ἀνδρεία implies*
other virtues, being a *member* of the indivisible organism of
ıoral character; not a fitful principle of action, but mediating
ultimately determined by the man's whole moral nature, and
y the accident of the moment which might arouse his *θυμός*.
ın's *ἀνδρεία* is not a *feeling* which is born on the battle-field,
he spirit shown on the field by one who, not only has had
rience of danger, but has cultivated the peaceful virtues of
σύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοπρέπεια: and similarly, the
of *ἀνδρεία* is necessary to these peaceful virtues. *Νόμος* (which is
ἄνευ ὀρέξεως Pol. iii. 11. 1287 a. 32) perceiving the relation
ı ought to subsist between the tendencies of human nature, en-
ırs to effect it in the young, by encouraging some tendencies,
liscouraging others. At first the subjects of this educational pro-
ıre not aware of what is being really done; but in course of time
begin to see for themselves the relation which has been gradually
ed. *Φρόνησις*, or the consciousness of the proper relation (*ὁ ὀρθὸς*
), dawns in them, and aids *νόμος*, and gradually supersedes it in
ınction of preserving and perfecting the *συμμετρία*. Unless, on
ne hand, the wayward tendencies were first regulated in relation
e another by the constraining force of *νόμος*, we should never
ne *conscious for ourselves* of the proper relation in which they
to stand to one another, as members of a whole; but, on the
hand, unless this consciousness supervened in us, our virtue
l remain at the level of the mere good behaviour of children,
do what is right without knowing why, simply because they
ld to do it: *οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως* (vi.
). With *φρόνησις*, a man is *κύριος*—his own master; and con-
ı of the systematic unity of his nature in all its parts—*ἅμα γὰρ*
νήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί. With Aristotle's
y of the relation of *φρόνησις* to *κυρία ἀρετή* may be compared
esbury's view, that *Virtue*, as distinguished from mere *Good-*
is impossible without *Reflection* (*Inquiry concerning Virtue*,
. i. Part ii. Section iii), and Kant's doctrine, that kind actions
pted by a good-natured temperament have no moral value.

1106 b. 36. The virtuous habits produced by the external agency of νόμος, and maintained and perfected by the φρόνησις at last awakened in the subject himself, are severally termed μεσότητες. In this Book, and the two following Books, each of these μεσότητες is treated separately in connexion with its own special extremes, and little care is taken to remove the very natural impression that its relation is *only* to these specified extremes—that, for instance, the nature of ἐλευθεριότης is exhausted when we have defined it as the mean between ἀσωτία and ἀνελευθερία. Moral virtue thus seems to be presented as a σμῆνος ἀρετῶν. But closer attention shows that this is not the impression which Aristotle intends to convey—that the separate treatment of the virtues, in relation to special extremes, is intended only to bring out into clear light, one after another, a number of important *aspects of the same moral agent*, as he is placed in different circumstances: that we have to do, not with so many *individuals*—the ἀνδρεῖος, σώφρων, &c.—but with *points of view* obtained by analysis, the intention of the analysis being to enable us at last to clothe the concrete agent more fully with his attributes. Against the separate or analytical treatment of the various μεσότητες in succession, we must set the statement οὐ χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων ἀρεταί (vi. 13. 6). The various virtues, although for greater clearness they may be treated separately, are not separately existent, but each exists only as all the others exist, and form an ὀρθὸς λόγος, a system, which is different (within limits) for each man. Each man has, as it were, his own moral centre of gravity, and all the virtues related to one another in a particular way, are necessary to his stability; but his moral stability may be assailed in different ways in different circumstances. On the field of battle the emotions of fear and over-confidence are its special assailants, and its maintenance against them is courage. Other circumstances have other special temptations, and the maintenance of stability receives other names. But the centre of gravity remains the same in all, being that particular λόγος, or organisation, of his whole nature which is best for the particular man. The one vice of cowardice, or of rashness, would amount to the demoralisation of the whole nature. We cannot conceive of the magnificence of the rash man, or of the temperance of the coward.

These considerations show how mistaken the objection is to Aristotle's theory of the virtuous mean, that it makes merely a quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice. This objection

can be felt only by one who thinks of courage, for instance, merely 1108 b. 36.
in connexion with its specified extremes—cowardice and rashness. But courage is only a particular manifestation of ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή: and cowardice, or rashness, is only a particular symptom of *total* demoralisation. Cowardice, or rashness, therefore differs from courage as the confusion differs from the order of the whole nature. If this is not a *qualitative* difference, it will be difficult to point to any that is.

The various Virtues described in this Book and in the two following Books may be taken, then, to be illustrations, more or less striking, of the function of φρόνησις, or the consciousness of the 'right ratio,' in preserving that ratio against the various assaults to which it is exposed through the sensibility. As ἀνδρεία is the preservation of the right ratio in the presence of danger to life in battle, so σωφροσύνη is its preservation amid the temptations of bodily pleasure; μεγαλοπρέπεια its preservation in the midst of great wealth and state; ἐλευθεριότης, in the midst of the daily calls upon one's purse; πραότης, amid the irritations of social intercourse; εὐτραπελία, amid its gaieties. In these and all other circumstances of temptation there is no occult quality, no separate faculty, which deals with each kind of temptation—the man indivisible deals with each, preserving in the particular circumstances of each temptation a moral balance, which has been preserved so long, under such various assaults, that its preservation in any circumstances whatsoever is no longer doubtful.

But is not this all too vague? How shall a man know that he is really preserving his 'moral balance,' or character? The *E. N.* refer us to the φρόνιμος or σπουδαῖος, and the *E. E.* end by referring us to the σκοπὸς τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας, explained (*E. E.* H. 15. 1249 b. 20) as τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν—all that hinders this is evil; all that promotes it, good. This may be taken to mean that we must regulate our lives in accordance with νοῦς—τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, that we must not allow 'the sensibility' to dominate our conduct. But 'regulate our lives in accordance with Reason' is a formula which conveys no information as to the real requirements of Reason; for, although it is plain that we are to restrain the sensibility, how far we are to do so we are left without means of judging. How is a man to know when a particular πάθος, admitted, disturbs the poise of his whole moral nature, and when not? If he be καλὸς κἀγαθός, Eudemus seems to answer, he will know. Still, it would be

1106 b. 36. desirable that those who have not yet attained to the height of καλοκἀγαθία should know, at least approximately, the proportions of the moral κρᾶσις, which, when fully achieved, is doubtless very hard to disturb. But Eudemus gives us no further information on this point. Aristotle tells us to observe the proportions of the φρόνιμος or σπουδαῖος: but still we are not told what these proportions are. We are told that his nature is 'intelligible,' not a mere bundle of sensations: that it is ὡρισμένη λόγῳ—but we are not told more. Evidently, then, Aristotle will have us look *for ourselves* at the σπουδαῖος in the concrete, and watch how he actually tempers his nature. This is undoubtedly to refer us to a standard of great practical value, albeit to one which, being merely empirical, is apt to be misinterpreted. It must be admitted, however, that even those moral systems, which profess to give an ultimate standard, are obliged to acknowledge that the σπουδαῖος, or man who acts up to the requirements of the ultimate standard, is indispensable as a *representative standard*, which the bulk of mankind can easily see and will, from a natural tendency to imitate social types, probably conform to. So far, then, Aristotle's σπουδαῖος—the good man whom we admire and wish to imitate—is an excellent moral agency not only representing the standard of right actions, but supplying a strong motive to perform them. On the other hand, the Eudemian σκοπὸς τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας—τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν is a mere formula—'Live according to Reason'—not a concrete example of the rational life successfully achieved, which may serve at least as an empirical rule of conduct likely to be followed.

But how shall we know the σπουδαῖος, or φρόνιμος, when we see him? Aristotle's answer to this really vital question is nowhere given in so many words, but is not difficult to gather from the general drift of his *Ethics* and *Politics*. We recognise the φρόνιμος when we see him, because we have ourselves received an education similar in kind to that which he has received and perfected. This education is that of correspondence with the νόμος—the law, custom, fashions, and social conditions generally—of the State into which we have been born, and in which we live. The φρόνιμος corresponds with these conditions in an eminent manner. In all his actions he shows himself at home in his own city, and worthy of it. The maintenance, then, of a beautiful everyday life, according to Hellenic traditions—a life in whose varied activities one takes a personal, but not a self-aggrandising part—is Aristotle's

standard of Virtue. It has the advantage of being a standard 1106 b. 36.
which it is not very difficult to keep in view. It is easier to see whether a particular action is in harmony with the tone of the society in which one has been brought up, than to see whether it promotes the 'greatest good of the greatest number.' But it will be said—'The tone of the society in which one has been brought up may be bad: this is not an *ultimate* standard which Aristotle gives us.'

Perhaps not: but we must answer on behalf of Aristotle, that he knew nothing better than the limited society of the Hellenic city. The culture of the few, according to the Hellenic pattern, was his standard. He was a stranger to political and economic considerations, which, in modern times, have made 'society' co-extensive with 'the greatest number'; he was a stranger also to that philanthropy which gives up 'culture' with its πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρεταί, and leads what he must have considered a μονόκωλος βίος in order to help the miserable.

The ὀρθὸς λόγος, then, which the virtuous man preserves in all circumstances is 'correspondence with his social environment.' It is a 'correspondence' which 'extends in space and time'—*i.e.* it is an adaptation to the environment *as one whole.* The man whose habits have been determined by the conditions of peace, but not by those of war, or *vice versa*, is a man who does not correspond with his environment as one whole, and his correspondence even with one set of conditions is more apparent than real, because peace and war cannot be sharply separated; in war he must look forward to peace; and when he has obtained the blessings of peace, he must be ready to defend them. Thus the warlike and the peaceful virtues of the good man do not refer simply to war and peace respectively. The rule which his φρόνησις or social and moral tact lays down for him is—'So act in any particular case, that you heighten your power of acting well in any other case.' This rule implies a highly developed adaptation. Every stimulus is received as being what it is, because the whole environment is what it is. The moral nature of such a man is like a highly organised animal, which acts in response to a particular stimulus in a manner which promotes the good of the whole organism as exposed in the present and future to a whole system of stimuli.

Φρόνησις, or the 'Practical Reason,' does not appear fully in a

1106 b. 36. man till 'good habits' have been formed—till the manifold of his sensible nature has been reduced to the ὀρθὸς λόγος. Reason grows with its object. It is evolved as the moral agent takes increased pleasure in good actions—called 'good' at first only by anticipation, in relation to a future ὀρθὸς λόγος in him, or still latent Reason. Reason is thus the Habit of Habits. It may be that this supreme Habit of the moral life reveals its existence, in the experience of some men, suddenly, like the light-bringing idea which flashes all at once in the mind of a man of science, after years of patient study. This is the moral experience which Kant prefers to dwell on, maintaining that the recognition of Duty 'is not to be effected by gradual *reform*, as long as the Principle of a man's actions remains impure, but requires a *revolution* in the mind, and he can only become a new man by a kind of new birth, as it were, by a new creation and a change of heart.' And again—'Virtue is described by some as a long practice (in observing the law) by which a man has passed from the propensity to vice, by gradual reform of his conduct and strengthening of his maxims, into an opposite propensity. This does not require a *change of heart*, but only a change of *morals*.' We must not suppose, however, that passages like the foregoing are intended to condemn habituation, which no moralist could refuse to regard as the great practical agency in the formation of Virtue. The difference between Kant and Aristotle is not really one of principle, but of detail. Kant confines himself almost entirely to the description of the pure Form of Virtue, and leaves nearly untouched the practical question of its actual superinduction upon sensible beings; while Aristotle applies himself largely to this latter question. But Aristotle's Habituation (which Kant doubtless refers to in the passages quoted above) is misrepresented, when it is implied that it is a process which can go on while all the time the 'Principle of action remains impure.' 'The long practice in observing the Law' is possible, Aristotle would tell us, only because there is, in the subject of it, a principle of rational personality (τὸ προαιρούμενον) which, *aided* doubtless by 'the Law,' can and does set aside mere ἐπιθυμία. Virtue is a ἕξις προαιρετική. Προαίρεσις is an 'autonomous' principle. It is absurdly wrong to class Aristotle among those 'who recognise only 'heteronomy'—'Will ruled by appetites'—in morals. Προαίρεσις is βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις (iii. 3. 19)—a Principle which reaches forth to take, or refrains from taking, after deliberation,

as distinguished from ἐνθουσιασμός which rushes blindly at its object. The σπουδαία προαίρεσις which, as organising principle, builds up the virtuous character, reaches forth or refrains in the interest of the whole moral organism or Personality, and sets aside the solicitations of the separate parts as such. Aristotle's insistence on the unity of the virtues in φρόνησις disposes at once of the suggestion that he founds morality on 'heteronomy.' He would have no difficulty in agreeing with Kant in distinguishing between 'true and merely habitual morality.' Good natural tendencies (φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί) may be confirmed into habits, apparently good, but yet forming no parts of a moral organism. A collection of such independent habits would be 'habitual virtue,' as distinguished from a 'virtuous character.' The man who has merely 'habitual virtue' is virtuous because, being a man of naturally good disposition, he happens also to have lived all his life in contact with certain good influences: but his nature has no system. He is perhaps honest enough, but illiberal; temperate enough, but not courageous. This would be a case of 'heteronomy.' But where a habit—*e.g.* σωφροσύνη—exists in a man, just as the ὀρθὸς λόγος of *his whole moral nature* requires it to exist—so that all the other virtuous habits coexist with it in perfection—we have the 'autonomy of the Will.' The actions which proceed from such a habit are determined 'formally'—*i.e.* by the consciousness of the whole moral organism, or ὀρθὸς λόγος. They are 'formally,' not 'materially,' determined because they proceed from, or are the expression of, the man as an εἶδος or Form—a system of related parts grasped by Reason: and are not merely due to the susceptibility of a single part placing itself in material isolation. As man is concretely constituted, all his moral actions must be *occasioned* by stimuli conveyed through the parts—*i.e.* by particular feelings, pleasant, or painful. But in some cases, in the moral, as in the physical organism, the external stimulus acts merely as a local irritation, provoking, as it were, a reflex movement of merely local significance; while in other cases, it is answered by a deliberate movement, resulting from the reaction of the whole organism, and subserving its highest interest.

There seems, therefore, to be no real antagonism between Aristotle's doctrine of Habituation, and Kant's doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will [1].

[1] According to Kant, man has two characters—an 'intelligible' and a 'phe-

1106 b. 36. The close connexion which Aristotle's philosophical definition of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή establishes between the μεσότης and φρόνησις recalls the kinship popularly recognised between τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν and τὸ γνῶθι σεαυτόν—as, for example, in the following passage in Plutarch's *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, 28—δύ' ἐστὶ τῶν Δελφικῶν γραμμάτων τὸ μάλιστ' ἀναγκαιότατα πρὸς τὸν βίον, τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἤρτηται καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα. ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις σύμφωνα καὶ συνῳδά, καὶ διὰ θατέρου θάτερον ἔοικε δηλοῦσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν. ἓν τε γὰρ τῷ γινώσκειν ἑαυτὸν περιέχεται τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ γινώσκειν ἑαυτόν. Διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων φησὶν ὁ Ἴων οὕτως

τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν, τοῦτ' ἔπος μὲν οὐ μέγα,
ἔργον δ', ὅσον Ζεὺς μόνος ἐπίσταται θεῶν.

ὁ δὲ Πίνδαρος,

Σοφοὶ δέ, φησί, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν ἔπος αἴνησαν περισσῶς.

1107 a. 3. § 16. καὶ ἔτι τῷ] *i. e.* καὶ ἔτι μεσότης ἐστὶ τῷ. . . . Ramsauer says: 'Suppletur notio jam satis adumbrata (καὶ ἔτι). Dativo enim infinitivi circumscribitur qua ratione vel quibus in rebus sit virtus quod modo explicatum est: ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ . . . μεσότης τῷ. Quare in supplemento summum est ut referatur virtus et vitia illi opposita ad τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις.' Of course it is no new point which thus introduced by καὶ ἔτι. It has already been brought forward in § 10 αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη and πράξεις and in § 12.

a. 6. § 17. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν κ.τ.λ.] See Grant's excellent note *ad loc.* and his Essay iv. p. 260. 'This passage,' he says (in his note), 'implies that the term Μεσότης is an abstract and metaphysical expression for the law of virtue, estimated by the understanding (though doubtless the deepest view attainable); but that viewed in relation to the good, or (as we should say) from a moral point of view—virtue is no mean state lying between vices (as if virtue were a little less vice, and vice a little more virtue), but an extreme, that is, utterly removed from, and opposed to vice.' In other words—

nomenal.' In virtue of the former he is free: in respect of the latter, he is part of nature, and subject to its necessary laws. This distinction seems to me to be, at bottom, that between the individual organism, on the one hand, and its genealogical antecedents and its environment, on the other hand. When the organism 'corresponds with its environment,' the functions which it performs are *its own* functions—they are performed in accordance with its own constitution, and we may call them *free*: and yet they are *necessary*, because its constitution and the external stimuli which act on its constitution are products of the necessary laws of the Universe. Cf. note on *E. N.* iii. 1. 2.

μεσότης δύο κακιῶν is a scientific formula, which describes the virtuous character in relation to the difficulties which surround it in its 'struggle for existence.' It describes Virtue, as the Darwinian theory describes the forms of vegetable and animal life—with special reference to the πολλαὶ ἰδέαι θανάτου which they manage, in various ways, just to evade. But Virtue, like these other forms, is something more than the negative 'that which just manages to avoid fatal error.' It must contain some positive reason for its existence. It does not exist simply because it does not happen to perish. The scientific formula, however, takes no account of this positive reason, but confines itself to τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (see *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34 sqq.)—'*If* virtue is to be realised, such and such extremes must be avoided': so Darwinism—'*If* the butterfly is to live, it must have such and such spots.' But why Virtue (or the butterfly) should take the trouble to struggle for existence, is a question to which the formula contains no answer. Indeed no *scientific* answer can be given to such a question. We can only say with Aristotle that Virtue exists *because it is a beautiful and excellent thing* (see iii. 7. 6), just as plants and animals exist because it is 'better' that they should live than not live—see *De Gen. Anim.* ii. 1. 731 b. 24 ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια καὶ θεῖα τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον αἴτιον ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῦ βελτίονος ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀΐδιον ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν καὶ τοῦ χείρονος καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος, βέλτιον δὲ ψυχὴ σώματος τὸ δ' ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου διὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν τοῦ μὴ ζῆν, διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας γένεσις ζῴων ἐστίν. 1107 a. 6.

Regarded scientifically, then, as a form constituted in a certain way out of certain elements, Virtue is a Mean suggesting Extremes. The Extremes represent the prevalence of that matter which Virtue reduces to form; and a scientific account of Virtue must describe the manner in which it accomplishes this achievement. But the achievement itself is not the manner of its accomplishment. So, Phidias, in executing his work, must be alive to all the various treacheries of his material and subject; but when the work is finished, it stands a god.

Plutarch (*De Virt. Mor.* 5) glosses this passage in a manner which shows that he did not allow the doctrine of μεσότης to suggest 'a merely quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice'—ἀρετὴ ... οὐκ οὖσα φθορὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδὲ ἀναίρεσις, ἀλλὰ τάξις καὶ διακόσμησις, ἀκρότης μέν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ μεσό-

1107 a. 6. *της γίνεται, τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐξαιροῦσα καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.* Cf. also w
iv. 3. 8 *ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δ*

On *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* see *Met.* Z. 4 and 17: Trendelenbur
Mus. 1828, vol. ii. pp. 457–483: Trendelenburg, *De An.*
note, and iii. 4. 7, note: Trendelenburg, *Kategorienlehre*, pp.
Biese, *Phil. des Arist.* vol. i. 243, 366, 427, ii. 35: Wait
67 b. 12, 94 a. 11, &c.: Schwegler, *Met.* Excursus i.

The *τί ἦν εἶναι*, defined in *Met.* Z. 7. 1032 b. 14 *λέγω*
ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, is the law, or principle, in accorda
which a thing is constituted, and is what it is. It thus
nearly to Bacon's *Forma.* A doctor's prescription is a
which states the *τί ἦν εἶναι* of the dose which is made up in
ance with it: the architect's plan, realised in bricks and
the builder, is the *τί ἦν εἶναι* of the house: the structural ty
an animal conforms to is its *τί ἦν εἶναι.*

a. 8. § 18. **οὐ πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.**] *i.e.* there are *πράξεις* and *πάθη* whic
be so modified as to form parts of an orderly character
but must be eradicated by education. Thus *ἀναισχυντί*
a natural tendency towards vice in relation to bodily p
must be eradicated, as its contrary *αἰδώς*, which is a
tendency towards virtue in relation to these pleasures,
source of *σωφροσύνη* (see *E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 32), must be
in the young. Again, *φθόνος* contributes to *ἀδικία* (see *E.*
1234 a. 30)—*i.e.* it is a natural tendency to grudge our ne
his due share. This natural tendency cannot be organi
a virtuous character, or turned to good use, but must be er
if possible, by education. For the relation of *φθόνος* to
Chares (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 47. ed. Meineke),

ἀδικώτατον πρᾶγμ' ἐστὶ τῶν πάντων φθόνος,

and Hippothoon (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 48),

φθόνος κάκιστος κἀδικώτατος θεὸς
κακοῖς τε χαίρει κἀγαθοῖς ἀλγύνεται.

a. 12. *λέγεται*] Bekker and Susemihl read *ψέγεται* on the st
authority of M[b] alone.

§§ **18–20.**] These sections show clearly that Aristotle
make 'a merely quantitative difference between virtue and

[1] It would not be necessary to notice this view of Aristotle's doctri
not been advanced by Kant. There are other indications pointing t
clusion that Kant's study of Aristotle was not very careful.

νὶκ ἔστι σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις—*i.e.* ἀκολασία 1107 a. 12.
and ἀναισθησία do not differ from σωφροσύνη in a merely quantitative manner, nor θρασύτης and δειλία from ἀνδρεία: θρασύτης *e.g.* is not the ὑπερβολή of ἀνδρεία—the two are qualitatively different. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of the μεσότης of an ἄκρον—and the μέσον is in a sense an ἄκρον, an indivisible point which cannot be resolved into mean and extremes. We cannot speak of 'moderation in moderation.' Or otherwise—an ἄκρον is a quality not a quantity: cf. Plutarch's expression quoted in note on § 17 ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

Now let us draw up a Diagram to show in detail that our formula 'Excess—Mean—Defect' applies to particular cases. We shall thus give reality to a theory which, left in its general form, would be too vague.

[*For the 'Diagram' of* ἕξεις (§§ 2–13) *see text.*]

In the foregoing Diagram (§§ 2–13) *it is in the* Habits *of the Characters in the middle column,* i. e. *in the ways in which they are* disposed towards *actions or feelings, that the mean is realized. But* (§§ 14, 15) *it is sometimes realized also in feelings* themselves *and their immediate accompaniments. Thus, although Shame is not a virtuous* habit, *'the man who has a sense of Shame' is praised. He occupies the mean; while one extreme is occupied by 'the Bashful Man,' who is always covered with Shame, and the other by 'the man who is without any sense of Shame.' Again the feeling of Indignation is the mean between Envy and Malignant Joy. But we shall have an opportunity afterwards of discussing these matters.*

[Monro (*Journ. of Philol.* vi. pp. 185 sqq., 1876) brings forward what seem to be strong reasons for regarding this Chapter as an interpolation. Its terminology agrees rather with that of the *E. E.* and *M. M.* than with that of *E. N.* iv. The discrepancies will be pointed out in the notes on Book iv.]

§ 1. κοινότεροι] So Bywater. Bekker and Sus. read κενώτεροι. 1107 a. 30.
The reading of the majority of MSS. is κοινότεροι. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus *ad loc.* and *E. E.* appendix p. 164. Manuscript authority, however, is nearly useless in the cases of κοινός, κενός, and καινός, and Bekker, I think, was right in neglecting it here, and

1107 a. 30. going on internal evidence, which seems to be in favour of κενώτερα. See the passages adduced by Zell, Michelet, and Grant, and by Zeller *Ph. d. Gr.* (*Arist.*), p. 171. n. 2 (3rd German Edition), especially *de Gen. Anim.* 748, a. 7 οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος καθόλου λίαν καὶ κενός· οἱ γὰρ μὴ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν λόγοι κενοί. The reading κενώτερα, as the antithesis of ἀληθινώτεροι, is supported by a line of Menander preserved in the Florentine MS. (Laurent. 22. 8) of Johannes Damascenus (see Meineke's Stobaeus: *Flor.* iv. p. 242)—

ἀληθὲς εἶναι δεῖ τὸ σεμνόν, οὐ κενόν.

a. 33. διαγραφῆς] ὑπογραφή in *E. E.* ii. 3. 1220. b. 37.

§ 2.] See Michelet's important note, the gist of which is as follows—we have here *four* extremes round ἀνδρεία thus—

Defect of Fear—ἀφοβία. ἀνδρεία. Excess of Fear } —δειλία.

Excess of Confidence—θρασύτης. Defect of Confidence }

There is this difference between the two sides, as the Ald. Schol. notes, that excess of fear and defect of confidence are never disjoined, but always make together a single vice, of which they are, as it were, the moments; whereas the 'moments' on the other side—viz. defect of fear and excess of confidence, may exist apart, and give rise to two distinct vices, the defect of fear constituting what Michelet calls *Intrepidity*—a passive vice; the excess of confidence constituting θρασύτης, rashness—an active vice. Hence it results that *two vices* are opposed to ἀνδρεία on one side—'intrepidity' and rashness; and only one vice on the other side—cowardice. Further, as cowardice is a vice of defect, the writer of this chapter is led to speak of *both* the vices on the other side as vices of excess: hence the expression ὁ τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ὑπερβάλλων, instead of ὁ τῷ φόβῳ ἐλλείπων. The Ald. Schol. explains how Intrepidity is distinguished from θρασύτης—πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τῷ ἀφόβως καὶ τὸ ἀλόγως ἰτητικὸν πρὸς τὰ δεινά· καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ἐν τῷ θάρρει ἄφοβος, οὐκ ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄφοβος θρασύς. See also Grant's note *ad loc.* Grant acutely recognises this complicated treatment of ἀνδρεία as 'a sign that Aristotle is here only working his way to the theory of the mean.' He probably thought out his theory first in connexion with ἀνδρεία. It is to be noted, however, that in § 4 of this chapter a similarly complicated account of ἐλευθεριότης is given, and appears also in iv. 1, just as the refinement with regard to ἀνδρεία appears also in iii. 7. 7.

§§ 2–16.] The virtues, with their extremes, enumerated in this chapter, are all described in detail in Books iii and iv—where see notes. 1107 a. 33.

§ 4. δ' ἐν αὐταῖς] Bywater, for Bekker's δ' ἑαυταῖς L^b. κατ' αὐτάς is the reading of CCC, αὐτάς pr. Camb., δ' ἑαυτάς NC. Perhaps δ' ἑαυτοῖς: see note on viii. 4. 2. 1157 a. 19. b. 11.

§ 8. ⟨τῷ⟩ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν] Bywater adopts the τῷ from Ramsauer. I should like to read τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ οὖσαν. b. 25.

§ 9. κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον] Either τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου (§ 5), or (as the Paraphrast takes it) ζητοῦντες ἐν ἑκάστῳ τὴν μεσότητα καὶ τὰ ἄκρα: see the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant. 'According to the method which has hitherto guided us'—Grant. 1108 a. 3.

§ 11. πειρατέον . . . αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ.] 'Aristotle's method,' says Grant, 'consists partly in accepting experience as shown in common language, &c., partly in rectifying it, or re-stating it from his own point of view; partly in finding new expressions for it, so as to discover men's thoughts to themselves. He usually rather fixes the meaning of words, than creates new ones. For instance, he here assigns a peculiar and limited meaning to ἀλήθεια and φιλία. His influence upon the forms of language of civilised Europe can hardly be overrated. It is far greater than has ever been exercised by any one man beside.' a. 17.

§ 12. προσποίησις] See note on iv. 7. 15. b. 26. a. 21.

§ 14. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες] αἰδώς and νέμεσις, being πάθη, are not μεσότητες in the strict sense; but are here called μεσότητες, as it were by anticipation, because they represent tendencies which can be easily cultivated into ἀρεταί. They are the natural sources, or the physical basis, of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη respectively according to Eudemus (*Eth. Eud.* iii. 7), who describes them, together with φιλία, σεμνότης, ἀλήθεια, and εὐτραπελία, as παθητικαὶ μεσότητες—praiseworthy, but not ἀρεταί (nor are their contraries κακίαι), for they are without προαίρεσις. These praiseworthy πάθη, being φυσικά (*i. e.* natural in the sense of being independent of education), contribute to the φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί. Now, each perfectly developed virtue has its *natural* counterpart, out of which it has been evolved by φρόνησις—*Eth. Eud.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 29 ἑκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. Thus, αἰδὼς a. 30.

1108 a. 30. contributes to σωφροσύνη, and νέμεσις to δικαιοσύνη, and each may be called a μεσότης by anticipation. In Plutarch, *De vita et poesi Homeri* 132, the peripatetic doctrine of the relation of these πάθη to Virtue is touched upon as follows—τῶν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην ἐστὶν πάθη ἡγουμένων τὴν νέμεσιν καὶ τὸν ἔλεον (τὸ γὰρ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς δάκνουσα ἐπὶ τοῖς πλησίον, εἰ παρ' ἀξίαν εὐτυχοῦσι, νέμεσις καλεῖται· τὸ δὲ λυπεῖσθαι εἰ παρ' ἀξίαν δυστυχοῦσιν, ἔλεος λέγεται). Perhaps we may say that αἰδώς is a παθητικὴ μεσότης, or a φυσικὴ ἀρετή, when (*in the young*) it takes the fixed form of a παθητικὴ ποιότης, as distinguished from a mere πάθος (see *Cat.* 8. 9 b. 33 sqq.).

Νέμεσις is not again discussed. The Fourth Book ends with αἰδώς (the last section seems to be a later addition), and is probably defective[1].

Νέμεσις (νέμω) properly means the distribution of what is due. Personified, it becomes the Goddess of Justice (see the περὶ κόσμου 401 b. 12 Νέμεσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκάστῳ διανεμήσεως), especially of just retribution, who humbles the overweening. Without personification, it is the feeling of righteous indignation. We can thus easily understand why Eudemus regards νέμεσις, the feeling of indignation naturally aroused by the sight of undeserved success, as 'contributing to' justice, which is essentially διανεμητικὴ κατ' ἀξίαν. Although νέμεσις is not discussed in the Fourth Book of the *Nic. Ethics* as we have it, it is fully treated in *Rhet.* ii. 9, and its relation to δικαιοσύνη made very plain.

a. 33. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ] Rassow (*Forsch.* 74), following Coraes, and followed by Susemihl, inserts ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων· καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων before ὡς. For Bekker's ὁ μηδέ in the following line he reads μηδέν with K^b (*Forsch.* 55): and compares 1104 a. 20, where μηδέν occurs in a clause of similar structure. Bywater reads μηδέν for ὁ μηδέ.

a. 35. § 15. νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας] According to Grant φθόνος and ἐπιχαιρεκακία are 'only different forms of the same state of mind,' and cannot be opposed as two extremes. The true contrary of φθόνος is ἀναισθησία τις. This is recognised, he thinks, by Eudemus, who has 'φθόνος—ἀνώνυμον—νέμεσις' in his ὑπογραφή (*E. E.* ii. 3. 1221 a. 3), and by Aristotle himself in *Rhet.* ii. 9. 1386 b. 34 ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ

[1] The end of iv may have disappeared along with the Nicomachean v. and vii.

[illegible] 5.

The passage quoted [illegible]
rant's view that [illegible]
s contraries: but if we [illegible]
detailed description we [illegible]
nameless: the [illegible] is [illegible]
us: and then he [illegible]
[illegible], just as the [illegible]
then, in supposing [illegible]
Eudemus.' The [illegible]
1233 b. 18: [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

The writer of the [illegible]
in this making [illegible]
differs from [illegible]
and [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

1108 b. 4. course it is possible that a clause ending with λυπεῖται may have fallen out; but I cannot help thinking that it is awkward to characterise the νεμεσητικός in *two* closely adjacent clauses, instead of once for all; and I do not see why we should not be allowed to give its natural weight to the word ἐπιχαιρέκακος, and mentally supply ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσι after χαίρειν. A Greek, I feel sure, could not think of the ἐπιχαιρέκακος 'rejoicing at the *success* of any one, good or bad: hence Grant's objection falls to the ground—'Again, the ἐπιχαιρέκακος cannot be said τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπειν ὥστε κ.τ.λ, for he does not rejoice at the success of the good,' &c. I therefore think that Sauppe's clause is unnecessary. Of course the confusion, pointed out by Grant, of contrasting φθόνος and ἐπιχαιρεκακία as two extremes is not denied, but is perhaps not so great as Grant supposes. The φθονερός is pained by the good fortune of other people: the ἐπιχαιρέκακος rejoices at the ill fortune of other people: the νεμεσητικός is pained by undeserved good or ill fortune. The φθονερός and ἐπιχαιρέκακος may indeed be ὁ αὐτός (*Rhet.*), but there is a logical distinction.

b. 7. § 16. οὐχ ἁπλῶς] *i. e.* πλεοναχῶς v. 1. 7.

b. 8. ἑκατέρας] *i. e.* universal and particular justice v. 1. 8.

b. 9. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν] Grant (followed by Ramsauer) brackets this clause, 'because of the term λογικαί, which never occurs elsewhere in Aristotle or Eudemus, as applied to the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί—secondly, because of the sense, since Aristotle could not possibly say that he meant to show how the intellectual excellences were μεσότητες—thirdly, because of the extreme likelihood of an interpolation here.'

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

The two vices, that of Excess and that of Defect, and the virtuous Mean, are all three opposed in a certain way to one another—i. e. *the two extremes are opposed as contraries, both to the mean, and to each other. Now the mean, standing in contrary opposition to each of the extremes, may be quantitatively expressed as an 'equal' which is 'greater' than 'the less' of the defective extreme, and*

'less' than 'the greater' of the excessive extreme. But here the man who actually lives in *an extreme becomes the victim of a moral illusion. In 'greater than' or 'less than,' as applied to the mean in its relation to the extreme in which he lives, he sees 'too great,' or 'too little.' The coward calls the courageous man rash, and the rash man calls him a coward—each as it were pushes the man in the virtuous mean away from the middle place towards the other extreme. The contrariety is greater between the two extremes than between each and the mean, for each is more distant from the other than from the mean. But the mean is not always equally distant from each of the extremes, for one extreme sometimes* resembles *the mean after a fashion;* e.g. *Rashness bears a certain resemblance to Courage. Hence it is the defect, Cowardice, and not the excess, Rashness, which is regarded as the proper opposite of the mean, Courage, or as more distant from it: but in other cases it is the excess,* e.g. *Intemperance, which is so regarded, and not the defect,* e.g. *Insensibility.*

When one of the extremes is thus the *opposite* par excellence *of the mean, we have to explain the circumstance in either of two ways:* (1) *We may have to refer to the nature of the particular extremes themselves: thus ordinary observation makes it plain that Rashness, as a formed* Habit, *stands closer to Courage, and resembles it more nearly, than Cowardice does. This is the reason why we make Cowardice* the *opposite* par excellence *of Courage. It is a reason connected with a difference* in the formed habits themselves. *Or* (2) *we may have to refer to a difference, not in the formed habits themselves, but* in our own tendencies, *making it easier for us to acquire the one habit than the other. Thus our natural tendency to seek pleasure makes it easier for us to acquire the extreme habit of Intemperance than its opposite, the extreme habit of Total Abstinence. This is why Intemperance is* the *opposite* par excellence *of Temperance.*

§ 1. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ 1108 b. 13.
δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις] Cf. *Cat.* 11. 13 b. 36 sqq. ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθῷ μὲν κακόν· τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῷ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν· τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ, οὖσα ἀγαθόν. ἐπ' ὀλίγων δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ κακὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν. In *Cat.* 6. 6 a. 17 τὰ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει is quoted as a definition of ἐναντία: but that the writer regards it as too narrow is plain from a subsequent passage (*Cat.* 11. 14 a. 19) ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι. λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ γένος), δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος)· ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινῶν ὄντα. Cf. also *Met.* Δ. 10. 1018 a. 25 sqq.

§ 2.] ὁ μέσος, *i.e.* ὁ φρόνιμος or σπουδαῖος, alone is in a position to b. 15.

1108 b. 15. judge correctly. See iii. 4. 5 διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν. The ἄκρα do not possess, as it were, the αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης. Ramsauer appositely compares *de An.* ii. 11. 11. 424 a. 4 ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά· τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων—*i. e.* Sense is affected because it is a mean between contraries—because *e.g.* it is not so cold as τὸ ψυχρόν and colder than τὸ θερμόν. If it were as cold as τὸ ψυχρόν, it could not be affected by it: and, not affected by τὸ ψυχρόν, it could not be affected by the contrary θερμόν. Similarly, if it were as hot as τὸ θερμόν, it could not be affected by τὸ θερμόν—or by the contrary ψυχρόν. The difficult words γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων (which may be compared with ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. here) are thus explained by Philoponus (quoted by Trendelenburg)—πῶς τὸ μέσον γίνεται τῶν ὑπερβολῶν κριτικὸν ἔδειξε. τὸ γὰρ ἐν μεσότητι τινῶν ὂν πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἄκρων θάτερόν πως ἐστίν. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τὴν οἰκείαν αὐτοῦ θερμότητα ψυχρόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὴν ψυχρότητα ὑπερβάλλον θερμόν.

b. 27. § 4.] πλείστη ἐναντιότης] Bywater restores πλείστη in place of Bekker's πλείων. The MSS. are practically unanimous in favour of πλείστη. Was the original reading πλείων ἢ?

b. 31. § 5. ὁμοιότης] Both the θρασύς and the ἀνδρεῖος face the foe; but the δειλός runs away: both the ἄσωτος and the ἐλευθέριος spend money; but the ἀνελεύθερος does not. Further, θρασύτης and ἀσωτία represent the prevalence of tendencies which, if properly directed, would have become ἀνδρεία and ἐλευθεριότης respectively; whereas δειλία and ἀνελευθερία represent tendencies which could not be made to lend themselves to the formation of these virtues. Cf. iv. 1. 31, where it is said of the ἄσωτος that he is εὐίατος, and ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν.

b. 35. §§ 6–8.] For the two grounds on either of which one of the extremes rather than the other may be opposed to the mean as its contrary *par excellence*, see *Argument* of this chapter.

1109 a. 16. § 8. κοσμιότητα] ἀναισθησίαν—the *vice* opposed to ἀκολασία is what we should have expected (the Paraph. has ἀναισθησίαν), but Aristotle perhaps wished to avoid the unusual word. At any rate κοσμιότης here does not stand for ἀναισθησία, but rather for σωφρο-

he conjunction κόσμιος καὶ σώφρων is too close in Greek make it possible to take κοσμιότης as 'prudery.' 1109 a. 16.

ωτις] not 'our inclination' but 'our advance.' See the Zell, Michelet, and Grant. Grant's rendering is—'we things more contrary to the mean, in which we run to ngths.' a. 17.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

oral Virtue then is a mean state of a certain kind between two vices, ess and that of defect; and that it is a mean state because it can hit an in feeling and action—all this we have explained sufficiently. draw a practical conclusion from the Theory which we have set forth. cal conclusion is shortly this—It is a difficult thing to be good. Hitting n in conduct is like finding the centre of the circle—to do it, a man how. It is easy to open one's purse and give away money; but to right man, the right amount, at the right time, for the right object, in nanner—that is indeed difficult, and few can do it. All praise and refore to those who can. Since then it is so difficult to hit off the tly at first, we must begin by avoiding the extreme which is the more the mean, i. e. *the more dangerous extreme, 'steering far from foam ers' like Odysseus, adopting the proverbial 'second best course,' and e lesser evil. In order to do this, we must ascertain what things as individuals most—individuals are differently constituted—and, the strength of the temptation by the pleasure which the thing gives urselves away from that course to which we are constitutionally most for, by thus drawing ourselves far away from our evil bent, like straighten timber, we shall reach the mean. But on all occasions it is which we must guard against most carefully. We ought to feel 'leasure as the elders felt towards He'en, and echo their saying; for d the enchantress away,' we shall be the less tempted to sin. These neral rules for hitting the mean; but it is a difficult matter at best to ecially where a multitude of details are concerned: thus, it is a diffi- r to lay down any rule about anger, which shall determine the way in persons with whom, the class of things at which, and length of time hich, one ought to be angry: indeed, so far is there from being a rule, metimes praise the man who is deficient in the feeling of anger, and ood-tempered, and sometimes the man who waxes wroth, and say that nanly spirit. In short, the man who deflects only a little from the rse, whether towards the side of excess, or towards that of defect, is*

not blamed; only the man who deflects far, for he attracts notice: but how far he must deflect, to attract notice, and incur blame, it is not easy to determine theoretically: indeed the question is not really a general one at all, but relates to this, that, and the other particular case, and such particular cases elude theory; only sense can pass judgment upon them as they arise.

Thus much then is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy, but that it is sometimes by leaning to the side of excess, and sometimes by leaning to that of defect, that we shall more easily reach the mean, or that which is right.

1109 a. 29. § 2. διόπερ τὸ εὖ] This is the reading of K^b, Ald., B^1, B^3, B^4, and CCC (all except K^b insert ἐστί after διόπερ), and must be accepted as right, because *M. M.* i. 9. 1187 a. 4 has τὸ δὲ μέσον χαλεπόν, καθ' ὃ ἐπαινούμεθα· διὸ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ σπουδαῖον. All other authorities (including NC, Cambr., and Par. 1853) have ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ. Michelet, reading ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ, takes the words as parenthetical, and connects καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν, as predicates, with τὸ δ' ᾧ . . . καὶ ὡς.

a. 31. § 3. ἡ Καλυψώ] The editors point out that Aristotle is wrong here. It was Circe not Calypso who gave the advice to Odysseus (*Od.* xii. 109): but the line quoted is uttered by Odysseus himself afterwards (*Od.* xii. 219), when he gives directions to his pilot. CCC has ἡ Κίρκη Καλυψώ: B^1 and B^2 have ἡ Κίρκη.

a. 33. τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον κ.τ.λ.]—for the reason given in § 8 of last chapter.

a. 34. § 4. κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν] The meaning of this proverb seems to be placed beyond doubt by a fragment of Menander preserved by Stobaeus (*Flor.* vol. ii. p. 349, ed. Meineke) Μενάνδρου ἐκ Θρασυλέοντος,

ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δήπου λεγόμενος,
ἂν ἀποτύχῃ τις οἰρίου κώπαισι πλεῖν.

Thus the Scholiast on Plato, *Phaedo* 99 D, is wrong with παροιμία· δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶς τι πραττόντων, παρ' ὅσον οἱ διαμαρτόντες κατὰ τὸν πρότερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρασκευάζονται τὸν δεύτερον. The proverb occurs in *Pol.* Γ. 8. 1284 b. 19, in the *Phaedo* 99 D, and elsewhere.

§§ 4, 5, 6.] The doctrine of the μεσότης here suggests to Aristotle a valuable practical rule. 'Find out the things you have a weakness for, and avoid them as much as you can.'

b. 8. § 6. ἀδέκαστοι] 'unbribed.' δεκάζειν means 'to bribe' (cf.

ology apparently unknown). Λύκου δεκάς was the name for 1109 b. 8.
ibed jurymen at Athens. See *Liddell and Scott* s. v. δεκάζειν.
f. Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία ch. 27 ἤρξατο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ δεκάζειν, ῥήτου καταδείξαντος Ἀνύτου . . . κρινόμενος γὰρ . . . δεκάσας τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπέφυγεν.

Ἑλένην] *Il.* iii. 156 sqq. b. 9.

§ 7. οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (*Forsch.* 16) points b. 14.
out that the passage beginning here, and extending to the end of the Book, occurs again almost *verbatim* in iv. 5. 13, 14. He regards the Second Book as the original locus of the passage.

§ 8. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ b. 20.
διορίσαι] The twin clause in iv. 5. 13 shows that παρεκβαίνων must be understood here after πόσον.

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις] αἴσθησις is a κριτικὴ δύναμις (*An. Post.* ii. b. 23.
19. 99 b. 35), because a μεσότης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως (*de An.* ii. 11. 11. 424 a. 4). Here it stands for the faculty by which the good man, as μέσος, discriminates, with the accuracy required by the particular occasion, between the good and the evils contrary to it in the extremes. Cf. τὸ ὄμμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας of vi. 11. 6. See note on ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις iv. 5. 13, for the force of ἐν in the phrase.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

It is only for what is voluntary that men are praised or blamed; which is involuntary they are pardoned and sometimes even pitied. tinction between the Voluntary and the Involuntary is therefore a vita the theory of conduct; it is one also about which the practical legisla has to assign rewards and punishments, would do well to be clear.

Acts which are either (1) *forced upon us, or* (2) *caused by igno involuntary.*

Where the moving principle is external, i.e. *of such a kind that contributes nothing to the result by his action or feeling, the result upon him;* e.g. *the motion of a man who is carried off by brigands upon him.*

But is an act 'forced upon him' which a man performs when a alternative is offered to him, such as the alternative of his own d or *the death of those dear to him, and he brings himself to accept o two evils? Is it voluntarily or involuntarily that he accepts his honour? Is it voluntarily or involuntarily that he consents to the those dear to him? The parallel case of the man who throws overboard in a storm will help us to an answer. In ordinary circ a man does not throw his goods overboard voluntarily; but, to save life, and the lives of the crew, a man of sense will always do so. then call acts of this kind* mixed acts, i.e. *they are both volun involuntary; but more voluntary than involuntary; for an act i is to the agent, at the time when, and in the circumstances in performs it; and these mixed acts, at the time when they are perfo chosen as being the best in the circumstances, by an agent who has i the power of setting his limbs in motion to perform them, and who power, although he could have refrained from doing so. But although act is thus voluntary as actually performed in given circumstances, it itself the kind of act which a man would choose to perform apart from circumstances; and in this sense may perhaps be described as 'except circumstances involuntary,' or 'in itself involuntary'—this, howe stretch of language, for voluntary and involuntary properly descri*

the agent when performed. That mixed acts are voluntary as
rmed is shown by the fact that we even sometimes praise a man
; e.g. when a man submits to disgrace or pain in a noble cause we
hereas if he submit without good reason we blame him. Some-
r the disgrace which he submits to, and the acts which he brings
form, may be of such a kind that we cannot indeed praise him, but
in consideration of pressure too great for human nature to with-
ugh, again, there are things which nothing—not even the prospect
errible death—should compel a man to do: thus the Alcmæon of
ompelled to kill his mother' is a ridiculous figure. It is hard
decide which is the alternative one ought to *prefer; but harder far*
me's decision once made; for generally the choice is between pain
l, and bringing oneself to do or submit to something disgraceful.
blame or praise is given according as one does, or does not, bring
pt the disgraceful course.

shall we describe an act which is forced upon *a man?* In the
of the expression, that is forced upon a man which results
e lying outside himself, and is entirely independent of his own
whereas that which in given circumstances is chosen as the lesser
ried out by an agent who has the principle of its initiation in
t forced upon him (however 'involuntary in itself,' i.e. *generally*
t may be:, but is his voluntary act.

r painful alternatives: we cannot properly speak of a man being
where they are concerned.

contention that pleasant things. and things which are honourable
ce us to act, exerting external pressure upon us—it is obviously
t implies that all *our actions are forced upon us—all that we do*
sake either of pleasant things, or of things which are honourable
Moreover, when we are forced to do something, we do it with pain,
n we pursue something pleasant or good, we feel pleasure. It is
en to blame pleasant things, *and not our own susceptibility to*
ce—to take credit indeed to ourselves *for our good actions, but to*
me for our discreditable actions upon pleasant things.

is 'forced upon a man' which results, without his cooperation,
external to him.

hich is 'caused by ignorance' is always 'non-voluntary'; but it
led 'involuntary' unless the man is sorry for it when he finds out
hich it has done. If he is not sorry, it is best to describe his act
on-voluntary.'

is a difference between acts 'caused by ignorance,' and acts 'per-
norance.' The man who is drunk or in a rage acts indeed 'in
he does not know what he is doing; but we do not say that
the cause *of his misdemeanours or crimes: we ascribe them to*
or anger as the case may be. Indeed whenever a man commits an
ay be said to act 'in ignorance' of what he ought or ought not to
effect of repeating such offences is that he becomes an unjust or bad
uires a character. *Now we blame character, thus showing that we*
man a voluntary agent in its formation, i.e, *a voluntary agent in*

the performance of acts done 'in ignorance' of what he ought or ought not to do: or to put it otherwise—blindness of choice, or not knowing what one ought to do, does not make one's acts involuntary; on the contrary, it makes them bad, and, becoming chronic, amounts to a character for which one is blamed. It is only when a man's 'ignorance,' instead of being due to his own passions and character, is a mere accident of the circumstances of a particular case, that the acts arising from it are involuntary. Thus a man, without any fault of his own, may not know what *he does,* e.g. *that he is revealing a secret, or* whom *his act affects,* e.g. *he may mistake a friend for an enemy in the dark, or he may not know* how his act will take effect, e.g. *sparring he may hurt. Here it is not the man's disposition, temporary or chronic, but the mere accident of his not knowing a particular circumstance, which is the true cause of his act. His act then is involuntary—that is to say, if he is sorry for it afterwards.*

Acts forced upon a man and acts caused by ignorance being involuntary, voluntary acts will be those which have their origin in the man himself, he being fully aware of all the material circumstances surrounding their performance. This being so, it follows that acts caused by passion or desire are not to be described as involuntary. If such acts are involuntary, the lower animals, and even children, are incapable of voluntary action. And further—what about good *actions caused by passion and desire? Are they involuntary? Or is it only bad actions thus caused that are involuntary, the good ones being voluntary? It would be ridiculous surely to draw such a distinction between the effects of a single agency. And then the absurdity of having to say that we are involuntary agents when we are moved to action by feelings which ought to move us! for we* ought *to feel angry sometimes; we* ought *to feel a desire for health and knowledge. Moreover, what we do or suffer involuntarily is painful, whereas that which accords with our desire is pleasant. Again, what is gained by saying that a fault proceeding from desire, as distinguished from one proceeding from deliberate calculation, is involuntary? The important point is that they are both* wrong *and to* be avoided. *Indeed the irrational feelings are as much part of the man's nature as his calculating faculty: it is absurd therefore to talk of acts prompted by these feelings being involuntary.*

1109 b. 30. § 1.] The discussion of the ἑκούσιον and ἀκούσιον connects itself with the subject of ἀρετή, because ἀρετή is—(1) ἕξις ἐπαινετή (i. 13. 19, cf. ii. 9. 9), and—(2) ἕξις προαιρετική (ii. 6. 15). We *praise* what is voluntary; and *choice* (προαίρεσις, iii. 2) is the special form under which the voluntary principle appears in man, as a rational being, and therefore as capable of acquiring ἀρετή. Ἀρετή is a 'praiseworthy habit' produced by the repetition of acts of which a man himself is the cause, *i.e.* of voluntary acts. *How* a man is an ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων Aristotle does not say in the *Ethics*. He contents himself with pointing to the fact that he *is*. The author of the *Eud. Eth.* (ii. 6) and the author of the *M. M.* (i. 10. 11) discuss the subject of man's voluntary agency with an evident wish to fathom its metaphysical import, but, after all, leave us where Aristotle leaves us—

th the unexplained fact that man *is* a cause. They point out 1109 b. 30.
at all οὐσίαι or φύσεις are ἀρχαί, *i. e.* generative of other οὐσίαι or
ύσεις like themselves: *e. g.* ἄνθρωπος γεννᾷ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷον ζῷα καὶ
τὰν φυτά. But man is distinguished from other generative principles, animate or inanimate, by being the author of another class
f effects, viz. πράξεις:—see *E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 15 sqq. *The* ἀρχή,
roperly so called (κυρία), is that ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ κίνησις. Such is God.
Mathematical ἀρχαί are not properly ἀρχαί (ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς ἀρχαῖς
ὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον), because they are not causes of motion; ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεως τινός· ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις κίνησις. Where the effects are
contingent (ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή—such as may either happen
or not), the ἀρχαί must be contingent also. Human actions are
contingent; therefore man is a contingent cause—*E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b.
31 ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἕνια τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίως ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς
ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας . . . ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ
ὅρος, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή.

The view thus set forth by the author of the *E. E.* and the author
f the *M. M.* is based on the doctrine of *Met.* Θ. 2 and 5—that αἱ
τὰ λόγου δυνάμεις, being τῶν ἐναντίων, must be dominated by something external to themselves, which shall determine in which of the
wo contrary ways they shall actualise themselves; ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν
εἶναι τὸ κύριον· λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὄρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν (*Met.* Θ. 5. 1048 a.
). That which is κύριον *par excellence* in man, making him a
oral agent—αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων, is βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις, or προαίρεσις. It is by *choosing* certain acts, and performing them, that we
equire a certain *Habit.* Προαίρεσις converts the δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων
nto a definite ἕξις, which results in acts of one kind only: cf. *E.*
N. v. 1. 4. Ἀρετή is a ἕξις προαιρετική (ii. 6. 15), *i. e.* a habit which
as produced by, and is productive of, certain deliberately chosen
cts.

ἴσως] See Zell *ad loc.* and on i. 1. 1. Δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἴσως, σχεδόν, b. 33.
re often employed, 'quanquam in re certa . . . partim ex communi
Atticorum consuetudine, partim ex Aristotelis philosophandi ratione,
praesertim in his libris de vita et moribus hominum quae res accuratam subtilitatem non admittunt.'

§ 2. χρήσιμον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] 'It must not be supposed,' says Grant b. 24.
(*Plan of Book iii*), 'that the present disquisition on the Voluntary is
a disquisition on Free Will. The latter question Aristotle would
certainly have assigned to πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or Metaphysics, and

1109 b. 34. would have thought out of place in a system of Ethics. . . . The ensuing chapters assume that a man is an ἀρχή of his own actions, and, with this assumption, treat of the Voluntary under its various aspects in relation to virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment. From this practical point of view these chapters furnish to some extent a psychology though not a metaphysic of the Will.' Again (note on iii. 1. 1–2): 'It is plain that the discussions on the Will are never metaphysical. An appeal to language and common opinions sums up nearly the whole. The scope of the argument is limited to a political, as distinguished from a theological, point of view—ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι.' And: 'In asking what is the Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue a speculative method of enquiry. Such a method might have commenced with the deep-lying ideas of personality and consciousness, of the individuality of the subject, &c. But he is content with defining the Voluntary by a contrast to the common notions (δοκεῖ § 3) of what constitutes an Involuntary act. It might be said that this is giving a merely negative conception of freedom. But in fact the conception given is positive, only the analysis of it is not pushed very far. The voluntariness of an act Aristotle represents to be constituted in this—that the actor is in every case the ἀρχή or cause of his actions, except in cases of compulsion, where there is really a superior ἀρχή . . . or of ignorance, where he does not know what his action is, and can only be held to be the cause of what he meant to do. In what sense, and how, the individual is an ἀρχή is the point where Aristotle stops short in the enquiry.'

On this I would remark—that if Aristotle 'stops short in the enquiry,' perhaps his theory of 'in what sense, and how' is thereby conveyed. I think it is. This enquiry is about *Responsibility*; and 'Responsibility,' he gives us to understand by 'stopping short' where he does, is meaningless except as resting with the *immediate* cause of an act—*i. e.* with the concrete individual, whose function the act is. The individual is 'responsible' for acts which can be assigned to his *character* as immediate cause. 'Free,' applied to an act, means, 'caused immediately by a character'—the character, of course, performing its functions, like every other organism, in a definite environment, not *in vacuo*. In short, it is only *the individual, as affected by particular circumstances*, who can put forth acts, and be 'responsible' for them, *i. e.* come in for their conse-

This is Aristotle's *theory* of 'freedom'; and I believe 1109 b. 34.
thus taking its stand upon 'the concrete individual putting
:s in his environment,' it suggests the best possible solution
mous difficulty—How to reconcile 'freedom' and 'necessity,'
ıodern speculation has—to some extent, needlessly—raised
:. The solution which Aristotle's theory suggests may be
s—The ancestral, or other, antecedents of the concrete
al cannot be saddled with 'responsibility': *αἰτία ἐλομένου·*
τιος. The individual is 'responsible' for acts which can be
l to his *character*, as immediate cause. His character is
; we now believe, the necessary product of the universe, and
umstances which stimulate his character to put forth acts
wise necessary products of the universe: but this does not
him of 'responsibility' and make his acts not 'free,' for
pplied to an act, means 'caused immediately by a character
ing its functions in its environment.' Only 'the individual
er in its environment' can put forth acts, and be 'respon-
ır them—*i. e.* come in for their consequences. The universe,
rings forth individuals, is not itself an individual to be held
ible: 'Natur lebt in lauter Kindern; und die Mutter—wo
' The question of the efficiency, freedom, or responsibility
individual must not be mixed up with the question of the
f the individual.

l thus be seen that man as *ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* is merely a particu-
:ct of man as living being; for, to be a living being is to be
isible' (whether in a physical or in a political environment)
e' acts, *i. e.* for 'acts put forth by an organism.' But the
m must not be abstracted from the universe, and made a
;ent' in the sense of initiating acts with the production of
he laws of the universe have nothing, or not everything, to
hat would be to set up more universes than one. It is as
of a *libera necessitas*—to employ Spinoza's powerful phrase
we must conceive the 'free agent.'

n we say, then, that Man is an *ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* we are face to
h the (for morals) ultimate fact that he is a living being. All
eings, plants as well as animals, the irrational animals as
man, perform certain functions by which they maintain their
istence. To perform these functions is to be a living being.
moral *πράξεις*, by which he corresponds with his distinctively
, *i. e.* his 'political,' environment, proceed from habits of his

1100 b. 34. nature, just as his bodily functions proceed from organs of h nature. Moral πράξεις and bodily functions are necessary for th maintenance of his nature as a whole; and are, on exactly th same grounds, said to be *his* πράξεις and *his* bodily functio respectively. Biologically considered, bodily functions differ fro moral πράξεις in depending upon structural adaptations of olde standing. The performance of moral πράξεις being thus mor precarious than the performance of bodily functions, and, more over, affecting others, *praise* is accorded when the πράξεις are rightly performed. The praise is accorded *not because they are more truly the agent's own acts* than are the unerring perceptions of his eye or ear, or the regular movements of his heart, for which he is not 'praised' at all; but *because they are apt not to be performed rightly.* A man's virtue is praised and rewarded, but not his health, because, as a matter of fact, his virtue grows up in correspondence with an environment which makes itself felt by means of praise and blame, reward and punishment. Those vital functions which we distinguish as voluntary acts are those which proceed from sources within a man, which are capable of being modified, during the lifetime of the individual, in relation to his environment, especially to that very complex part of it of which praise and blame, reward and punishment, are the chief exponents. Such 'sources within a man' are the πάθη, belonging as they do to that part of human nature which is characterised as μετέχον λόγου, κατήκοον λόγου καὶ πειθαρχικόν—*i.e. still* capable of being *organised* in relation to νόμος, or the rational environment. From the πάθη proceed (1) actions neither more nor less the man's own actions than are the movements of his heart or lungs, but distinguished from these latter movements by the circumstance that they affect other people's interests directly or indirectly, and accordingly elicit praise or blame, or otherwise call forth social influences, in relation to which they suffer modification—are encouraged or repressed. From the πάθη proceed also (2) actions which do not affect other people's interests, and therefore do not elicit praise or blame, but are called voluntary because they do not proceed from their sources in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of their *not* proceeding from them under certain conditions. Whenever in short, an act proceeds not inevitably from an inherited organ but with some degree of hesitation from a state of feeling which in the history of the individual, can be (or could have been) affecte

ven to the extent of being sometimes rendered entirely inoperative) 1109 b. 34.
r other feelings, whether self-regarding or altruistic, we call the
t voluntary. As, however, man's true personality consists in his
onsciousness of social relations, and his readiness to be modified
n correspondence with social requirements, acts which meet these
equirements and acts which disregard them are 'voluntary' in
he truest sense. Acts which affect the agent alone, although
proceeding *contingently* from their sources, and therefore voluntary,
are so in the lower sense in which we speak of the actions of
children and brutes as voluntary. From the way in which Aristotle
connects 'the voluntary' with 'praise and blame' here, and in
other passages, we can see that he practically identifies *man's*
'efficiency' with his correspondence, or failure, by reason of the
prevalence of selfish feelings, to correspond with the social environment. As it is only the πολίτης who is truly αὐτάρκης (see *E. N.* i. 7. 6), so it is only the πολίτης who is *truly* an ἀρχὴ πράξεων. The term 'voluntary' however in its general sense is applicable to any act which results from a feeling or desire contingently, *i. e.* so results that it *may* be prevented by the operation of another feeling or desire. In carrying back the explanation of voluntary action to the possession by man of a δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων—*i. e.* of tendencies still capable of modification, and in connecting it so closely with the sanctions of a social system, the high complexity of which he fully recognised, Aristotle gives prominence to the same considerations as have led a modern evolutionist, like Spencer, to speak of 'Will as coming into existence through the increasing complexity, and imperfect coherence of automatic actions'—(*Psych.* i. 498–499; cf. whole chapter on *The Will*, Special Synth. ch. ix).

§ 3. τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν] 'Cum spontaneum id sit, cujus b. 35.
principium in eo sit qui agat, non ignorante singulas circumstantias, invite factum exstat simulatque una ex ambabus conditionibus, quas requirit spontaneum, abest.' Michelet *ad loc.* A voluntary act in one of which the ἀρχή is in the agent himself, he being at the same time aware of the several circumstances of his act. These are the two conditions of a voluntary act. An act is involuntary when either of these two conditions is absent: *i. e.* if the agent, while knowing all the circumstances of his act, is forced to act by an external constraining power, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες (§ 3); or if, while he is under no external constraint, he is ignorant

1109 b. 35. of the circumstances—*e. g.* one who administers poison, thinking it to be medicine, because it has been put, through no fault of his own, into a bottle labelled 'medicine,' is not held to be the 'cause' of the consequent poisoning, or to have poisoned 'voluntarily.' His act is one δι' ἄγνοιαν γενόμενον.

The remarks of Eudemus (*E. E.* ii. 8) on the βίαιον are very instructive. Τὸ βίαιον and ἀνάγκη, he says, are terms employed to mark a force which interferes with the law governing the behaviour of an object inanimate or animate; a stone is moved upwards βίᾳ, fire downwards βίᾳ. When these inanimate objects move in their own natural direction—κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν καθ' αὑτὰ ὁρμήν (1224 a. 18), they are not said to move βίᾳ, nor yet are they ἑκούσια. There is no name to characterise their movement. Similarly, in the case of animals, we see many motions or acts which are βίᾳ—viz. those done ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν ἔξωθέν τι κινῇ (1224 a. 22). In the case of inanimate objects it is easy to see the external ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως which interferes with the law of their nature. It is also easy in the case of irrational animals. They live τῇ ὀρέξει. Everything which thwarts their ὄρεξις is βίαιον. But in the case of man a difficulty arises. He has *two* equally internal principles—λόγος and ὄρεξις, which thwart each other. Does λόγος exert βία in the case of the ἐγκρατής, or ὄρεξις in the case of the ἀκρατής? No. Both λόγος and ὄρεξις are internal, and βία is exerted only by external agencies. An act done from prudence, and on rational grounds, is neither more nor less 'voluntary' than one done from the mere appetite of the moment,—ἡ δ' ὅλη ἑκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βίᾳ δ' οὐδέτερος (1224 b. 26). We must not abstract a man's motives (whether high or low, whether due to tendencies acquired during his own lifetime, or to those inherited from his ancestors) from *himself*, and say that they are external to him and force him (βίαια). If later controversialists had seen this as clearly as Aristotle and the peripatetics did, we should have been spared many profitless discussions about the 'Freedom of the Will' and 'Moral Responsibility.'

1110 a. 4. § 4. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος] A tyrant with power over the lives of a man's family commands him to do something base. He may do it from fear of greater evils—διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν, *i. e.* the death of his family or he may refuse to do it because honour forbids (διὰ καλόν τι

n either case he does something most painful to himself; and the 1110 a. 4.
question is: Does he act voluntarily or involuntarily?

§§ 5, 6.] The answer is given in these sections. Such actions a. 8.
are μικταί. Except under very exceptional circumstances no one performs them voluntarily—ἑκούσιοι δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσιοι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. But there are exceptional circumstances in which men perform them. In these exceptional circumstances, at the time at which they are performed, they are voluntary—they proceed from an internal ἀρχή, from a desire to perform them in the agent; but in any other circumstances, as a matter of fact, no one would perform them. In discussing therefore the voluntariness of a given action we must look at it strictly in connexion with the circumstances in which it takes place, for 'the end or motive of an act is that which is in view at the time' (Peters)—τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν—*e.g.* the τέλος or object which a man has in view when he throws his goods overboard is not the infliction of loss on himself, but the lightening of the ship. The question is whether such an act is *voluntary* or *involuntary*; not whether it is *wise* or *unwise* in the particular circumstances, or *likely to be matter of regret* when the danger has passed. I see no reason for holding with Grant that 'the phrase τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως is general, not referring only to the cases under dispute, but to action universally'—or that 'τέλος is used here in a peculiar sense to denote the moral character of an action.' It seems better to take τέλος in the passage before us in the sense in which it is afterwards employed in chap. 5. § 17 of this Book, as 'the object specially contemplated by a particular action'—*e.g.* the lightening of the ship. In discussing the question of the voluntariness of a disagreeable action, let us not lose sight of 'the object specially contemplated by the given action,' and wander into the irrelevancy of considering the feelings with which such actions are regarded in the abstract.

It may be remarked in passing with regard to the instance of a μικτὴ πρᾶξις given in § 5—that cases arising out of αἱ ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολαί were probably well known in the law courts: cf., for the *Lex Rhodia de jactura*, *Digest.* xiv. 2. 1—'lege Rhodia cavetur ut si levandae navis gratia jactus mercium factus est, omnium contributione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est';—*i.e.* the principle of the 'general average' is to be applied.

1110 a. 17. § 6. ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μ statement, taken as an aphorism by itself, would be too The functions of the heart proceed from an ἀρχή which i ἐν αὐτῷ, *i. e.* is involved in the φύσις of the individual (cf. ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ *Met.* Λ. 3. 1070 a. 7) and yet cannot be desc ἐπ' αὐτῷ.

a. 19. § 7. ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπα 'which shows that the acts are regarded as voluntary'– note *ad loc.*

a. 28. § 8. Ἀλκμαίωνα] The anonymous scholiast on this Book (. has the following note here—καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα τὸ ράου παῖδα, τοῦτον ᾧ ὁ πατὴρ ἀνελεῖν τὴν μητέρα (Eriphyle) ἐπέσ δὲ μή, ἔσται τὸν πατέρα λυπῶν· ὃς οὐ δι' ἀξίας αἰτίας ποιῶν τοῦτο ἀ ἄλλως· παρατίθεται τὸν παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ Ἀλκμαίωνα ὡς δι' εὐ ὑπομείναντα μητροκτονῆσαι· λέγει γὰρ παρ' αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀλκμαίων

μάλιστα μὲν μ' ἐπῆρεν ἐπισκήψας πατὴρ
ὅθ' ἅρμα⟨τ'⟩ εἰσέβαινεν εἰς Θήβας ἰών·

διὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐντολὰς τοῦ πατρὸς διηγεῖται, ὡς ἐντειλαμένου αὐτοῦ ἀ τὴν μητέρα, καὶ καταρασαμένου αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ ἀποκτενεῖ, ἀκαρπίαν τε γῆς νίαν, καὶ διαβολὰς τινὰς λέγει τῆς μητρός, ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν ἄξιον τηλικοῦ ἀναγκάσαι ποιῆσαί τινα.

a. 32. § 9. ἀναγκάζονται] We have here the influence of an ἀρχή—of motives, not of external force, and the term ἀναγκ perhaps improperly used. But it may be that Aristotl a distinction between ἀνάγκη and βία (cf. § 8 ἔνια δ' ἴσως ἀναγκασθῆναι—where βιασθῆναι would have been absurd); m painful cogency being ἀναγκαία, though, as internal princi βίαια. The writer of the *M. M.* discusses τὸ βίαιον and τὸ in separate chapters (i. 14 and 15); and, although he says καῖον οὐκ ἐν παντί, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός, his example shows tl thinking of *the effect produced on the mind of the agent* by an occurrence, not of physical compulsion—*M. M.* i. 15. 11 οἷον ἠναγκάσθην συντομώτερον βαδίσαι εἰς ἀγρόν· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπο εἶρον τὰ ἐν ἀγρῷ. In short, very painfully cogent motives called ἀναγκαία, as distinguished from pleasures, which c called ἀναγκαῖα however pressing—*M. M.* i. 15. 1188 b. ἀναγκαῖον οὐ πάντως οὐδ' ἐν παντὶ λεκτέον ἐστίν, οἷον ὅσα ἡδο πράττομεν. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἠναγκάσθην τὴν τοῦ φίλου γυ φθεῖραι ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδυνῆς, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη.

§ 10. **τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια;**] This question, following imme- 1110 b. 1.
diately upon the words **περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή**, and the terms in which it is answered, support the view that Aristotle, like the writer of the *M. M.*, distinguished technically between **ἀναγκαῖα** and **βίαια**. In the case of the **ἀναγκαῖον** it is true that **ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ἐστιν**, but not true that **ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλλεται**. The external occurrence operates through the medium of the painful feeling which it produces. On the other hand, **τὸ βίαιον** is distinguished from **τὸ ἀναγκαῖον** by the *differentia* **ὁπότ' ἂν ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται**. The external agency determines a man's act without the effective intervention of his feelings.

εἰ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἑκούσια] 'For acts b. 6.
fall within the sphere of particulars; and here the particular thing that is done is voluntary'—Peters: *i. e.* in discussing the *voluntariness* of an act done under painful circumstances, we must take the act by itself as 'a particular'—in connexion merely with the temporary state of mind out of which it immediately springs; we must not raise the general question of its wisdom or goodness.

ἀποδοῦναι] syn. **ὁρίζειν**: see *Ind. Arist. s. v.* **ἀποδιδόναι**—'it is not b. 8.
easy to say.'

§ 11. **εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ κ.τ.λ.**] The Aldine Scholiast b. 9.
seems to have read **λυπηρά** for **καλά**. He says—**τούτων γὰρ χάριν· τουτέστι τῶν ἡδέων καὶ λυπηρῶν, τὰ μὲν φεύγοντες τὰ δὲ διώκοντες· τὸ δὲ πάντες, δηλονότι χωρὶς τῶν ἀγαθῶν λέγει καὶ σπουδαίων.** But **καλά** (**bona, honesta, formosa**) are regularly coupled with **ἡδέα**, as *e.g.* in *E. N.* ii. 3. 7, **τὸ συμφέρον** (not mentioned here) being the means to either. See Grant's note here. Having shown that acts done from feelings produced by painful circumstances are *voluntary*, and are praised and blamed in various degrees, Aristotle goes on in the present section to show that acts proceeding from states of mind produced by pleasant objects, or by the contemplation of what is good and honourable, are also voluntary. The parenthetical words **ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα** are to be understood as describing the position of those (**εἰ δέ τις . . . φαίη**) whose view he is arguing against. Cf. *M. M.* i. 15. 1188 b. 17 **εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἠναγκάσθην τὴν τοῦ φίλου γυναῖκα διαφθεῖραι ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη.** Pleasant things, and things that are good and honourable, cannot be said to force us, or to be the causes of involuntary actions; for (1) if they

1110 b. 9. were so, then *all* actions would be compulsory and involuntar since it is for the sake of pleasant things, or of things that are goo and honourable, that we do all that we do: (2) those who act unde compulsion, and involuntarily, act with pain; those who act for th sake of the pleasant, or the good and honourable, act with pleasure (3) this doctrine that pleasant things force us 'leaves out of account, as Grant expresses it, 'the internal susceptibility of the agent (αὐτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα),' and, in fact, is merely an excuse for bad actions, which are generally done for the sake of pleasant things. We take credit to ourselves for good actions, and blame pleasant things for our bad actions.

The sum of Aristotle's teaching here is that we must not abstract a man's motives, whether good or bad, from himself, and say that they are external to him, and force him. The later doctrines of Necessitarianism and Free Will, both apparently now defunct, equally erred in making the abstraction deprecated by Aristotle.

b. 10. πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια] Bekker reads οὕτω for αὐτῷ: but the authority for αὐτῷ—K^b, L^b, M^b, NC, Cambr.—(accepted by Bywater) is stronger.

b. 18. § 13. οὐχ ἑκούσιον] 'Non-voluntary.'

b. 22. τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ] τοῦ is apparently masc —cf. iv. 6. 9 τοῦ δὲ συνηδίνοντος ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ. There is an apparent inconsistency between the doctrine of this §, according to which the μὴ μεταμελόμενος is not to be called ἄκων, and the doctrine of § 6 above,—καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ὅτε πράττε λεκτέον.

b. 24. § 14. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα 'Through ignorance' . . . 'in ignorance.' After ἀγνοοῦντ Bekker has ποιεῖν, given by Γ and NC. The distinction is tha between acting from unavoidable (τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν), and actin in avoidable ignorance (τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν). The unavoidabl ignorance which can be pleaded in excuse of an action, by an age who regrets what he has done (μεταμελόμενος § 13), and which con stitutes (equally with βία) the action in question ἀκούσιον, is that *mere* particulars (ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις); *e.g.* (to tak the example of ἀτύχημα given by the Paraphrast in his note o v. 8. 7)—a sportsman, shooting at a distance from the haunts

n, kills a man who lies concealed in a thicket. He kills the man 1110 b. 24.
rely from ignorance of the particular fact that someone is there
ncealed. He possesses no general principle from which he
uld possibly have inferred this fact. The fact stands entirely by
self, being of so exceptional a kind that he could not have foreseen
. His ignorance therefore is described (§ 15) as ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, and
ounts as an external cause co-ordinate with βία, the preposition διά
n the phrase δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν expressing, as Michelet remarks,
an agency distinct from himself, *i.e.* ignorance not due to his own
carelessness or other bad habits. But if, (to take the Paraphrast's
example of a ἁμάρτημα v. 8. 7), the sportsman shoots too near
a frequented highway and unwittingly kills a passer-by, we do not
acquiesce in his ignorance of the fact that someone was passing by;
we go back to the cause of this ignorance—his own carelessness.
We hold him responsible for his ignorance of a fact which he might
have, and ought to have, inferred as probable from the general
principle in his possession—that highways are frequented by
travellers. His ignorance is not due to the exceptional nature of
the fact, as in the first case, but to his own disposition. It is not
really ignorance of a particular fact which we have here to deal
with, but rather a state of ignorance—a general tendency not to
notice a certain class of facts. Hence this state of ignorance,
whether it consists in the non-application, or in the non-possession,
in the temporary obscuration, or in the entire absence, of principles
of good conduct, is described as ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει, or ἡ καθόλου
ἄγνοια (§ 15). It is not an accident external to the man. It is part
of himself and whatever it causes he causes. Being *a quality in the
agent*, it is, as Michelet remarks, well expressed by the participle
ἀγνοοῦντα agreeing with the subject of πράττειν. But not only is
it *his* ignorance, just as his health is *his* health. This would
not make him socially responsible for its results. He is responsible
because it supervenes although it *need not necessarily* supervene, or
is not removed, when it *might* be removed. Thus a man is
responsible for mistakes committed in temporary states of ignorance
induced by drunkenness or passion, because to pass into these
states is contingent not necessary: cf. *E. N.* iii. 5. 8 καὶ γὰρ ἐπ'
αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς
μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ
μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. For the same reason, he is
responsible for acts proceeding from an established vicious cha-

1110 b. 24. racter—from total blindness to the true end of human endeavour—what Plato calls 'the lie in the soul.' Similarly, ignorance of a law which has been published and is easy to understand is ignorance for which a man is responsible. Hence the principle of Jurisprudence *Ignorantia juris nocet; ignorantia facti non nocet.* Cf. *E.N.* iii. 5. 8 *καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.*

There is of course some confusion in calling *the acts themselves* which are done *δι' ἄγνοιαν* non-voluntary or involuntary. Strictly, the acts themselves are voluntary, but their *results* are such as the agent could not possibly have foreseen, and he is not held responsible for results which he did not contemplate and now regrets. It would be more correct to say that a man is not held responsible for such results, than that the acts are involuntary. The sportsman shoots voluntarily into the thicket, being ignorant of the fact that, contrary to all probability, a man lies concealed there. He kills the man; but is not held responsible for this unforeseen result of his voluntary act.

b. 27. **διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων**] *διὰ μέθην καὶ ὀργήν.*

b. 28. **ἀγνοεῖ . . . § 15 περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις**] If we follow Michelet in sharply distinguishing *ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια* and *ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια*, we may explain this passage thus—*τὸ συμφέρον*[1] is that which is useful as a means: *ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια* is ignorance in the choice of means to the attainment of an end, and hence is equivalent to ignorance of the *συμφέρον*—cf. iii. 2. 9 *ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος.* Now this ignorance in the choice of means is not an external accident, but a condition of the agent, which he has brought upon himself by yielding to his *πάθη.* Hence it is not the cause of involuntary but of voluntary actions—indeed it is the cause of those reprehensible actions the repetition of which eventually establishes an evil character—*μοχθηρία*: *οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας.*

Μοχθηρία is thus the same as *ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια*—ignorance of the true end itself—for it is the moral character which gives the end: iii. 5. 20 *τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα.* Thus, as Giphanius observes, *ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια* is characteristic of the

[1] Bywater reads *τὰ συμφέροντα* given by K^b, Asp., and NC.

κατής, who knows the end, but is tempted by his passions to stray 1110 b. 28.
om the path of duty leading to it: while ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια is
aracteristic of the ἀκόλαστος, who has become permanently blind
the end. A man is responsible for both kinds of ἄγνοια—for the
ἄγνοια of temporary passion, and for that of an established vicious
character.

But, although Aristotle undoubtedly distinguishes in this Book
προαίρεσις, as concerned with the means, from βούλησις the wish for
the end, and although it is reasonable to suppose that, in here using
the term προαίρεσις, he has in view the technical meaning which he
is about to give it; it does not therefore follow that in using the
expression ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια he has in view something as distinct from
ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια as προαίρεσις itself is distinct from βούλησις:
for in iii. 3. 16 he tells us that the objects of βούλευσις, and there-
fore of προαίρεσις, are not *mere* particulars, thus implying that they
are particulars in which *the general law or rule* of conduct is seen.
Hence ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, which is equivalent to ἀγνοεῖν τὰ
συμφέροντα, or ἀγνοεῖν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, is essentially 'an
ignorance of the end,' or 'a general ignorance,' ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια, and,
as such, is distinguished from the excusable ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα ἄγνοια—
the thought of this latter expression, as about to be used, having
determined Aristotle to translate ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια into the
equivalent ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια for the sake of the antithesis. Ἡ ἐν τῇ
προαιρέσει ἄγνοια is thus distinguished from ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα ἄγνοια as
being a *state*, inchoate, or established, *of the agent*, producing acts
which are so far from being involuntary that they are morally evil,
and confirm the evil tendency—μοχθηρία, from which they spring:
i. e. ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια may stand either for the state of the
ἀκρατής who is said to act from ἐπιθυμία and not with προαίρεσις
(iii. 2. 4)—his ἄγνοια being, in fact, the prevalence of ἐπιθυμία *where*
προαίρεσις *ought to prevail*; or for that of the ἀκόλαστος, or ὅλως
μοχθηρός, who is said to act προαιρούμενος (vii. 7. 2), *i.e.* calmly and
without passion choosing means to the bad end which his character
sets up—the ἄγνοια being, in this case, that confirmed moral blind-
ness to the good end which makes it possible for him 'to choose
means' to the bad end.

Ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, accordingly, meaning ignorance which
is a state or tendency inchoate or established of the agent, may, in
relation to the numerous ἁμαρτίαι which flow, or are likely to flow,
from it, be described as a *general ignorance*. Hence follow the

1110 b. 28. words οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου . . . ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα—'that is, it is not genera ignorance, but particular ignorance, which makes an act involuntary.' Here all turns on the point whether οὐδ' necessarily *distinguishes* ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια from the ἄγνοια previously mentioned, or admits of being rendered as above—'*that is*, it is *not* general ignorance,' &c. The Paraphrast, Grant, Ramsauer, and Peters do not distinguish ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια and ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια: and, with some hesitation, I agree with them, against Michelet, for the reasons I have given, and because I believe that οὐδ' can be legitimately rendered as above. The Paraphrast's comment is—ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰτία τῶν κακιῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας· οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθόλου περὶ τῆς μέθης ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πονηρὸν αἴτιον γίγνεται τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγνοῆσαι μεμεθύκοτα τήνδε τὴν μέθην, οἷον, φέρε εἰπεῖν, οὐκ εἰδότα μέχρι πόσου πιόντας ἔνι μεθύειν.

One further point however—Does the writer of *E. E.* ii. 9 throw any light on the present passage? Has he it in view at all and if so, is the distinction which he draws the same as that which Michelet finds here in § 15? His words are—1225 b. [illegible] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἓν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δικαίως ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον εἰ δι' ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρῆτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἄν, εἰ ὁ ῥᾴδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, μὴ ἔχει διὰ ἀμέλειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην. Is ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δέ the man whose ignorance is ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει—Michelet's 'ignorance in the choice of means,' and ὁ μὴ ἔχων the man whose ignorance is ἡ καθόλου—'universal,' i.e. 'of the end'? cf. the οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ γε ταύτην) of the *E. N.* with the ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἄν of the *E. E.*

1111 a. 1. § 15. ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ] 'Ignorance of the particular occasion and circumstances of the act'—Peters. Better—'the persons and things affected by the act': see below, notes on § 18.

a. 4. § 16. περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι] 'On what object or person.'

a. 9. § 17. λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς] *Liddell-and-Scott* has 'ἐξέπεσέ με—*it escaped* me unawares, Arist. *Eth. N.* 3. 1. 17,' but quotes no other instance of the usage. Ramsauer defends the usage—''Εκπίπτει με alienum a Graecae linguae indole non dixerit qui meminerit legi ἐκβαίνειν, ἐξελθεῖν χώραν.' The Paraphrast, how-

ever (perhaps reading λέγοντας), seems to make the subject of 1111 a. 9.
ἐκπεσεῖν the persons—λέγοντας γὰρ περὶ ἄλλων συγχυθῆναί φασι, καί τι καὶ περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων παραφθέγξασθαι, μὴ συνορῶντας ὁ λέγουσιν, ἢ καὶ ἀγνοοῦντας ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν—*i. e.* ἐκπεσεῖν (=συγχυθῆναι) means 'to be confused,' 'put out,' as we might say. The Ald. Schol., again, has—οἷον λέγοντός μου ἐξέπεσέν μοι τοιοῦτον ῥῆμα—as though he read λέγοντας, and understood the clause to mean, 'they say that, in the course of their talk, the word escaped them.' Aspasius has—τὸ δὲ τί ἐστιν τὸ πραττόμενον, ὅπερ ἐκπεπτωκέναι ⟨λέγουσιν, Heylbut⟩ αὐτοί, ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά.

Αἰσχύλος] Tried and acquitted by the Court of Areopagus: see a. 10.
Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. 387, Ael. *V. H.* v. 19, and the Ald. Schol.

ἡ Μερόπη] The Ald. Schol. has—καὶ ἔστι παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ ἐν τῷ a. 12.
Κρεσφόντῃ ἐπιβουλεύουσα Κρεσφόντῃ τῷ υἱῷ ὡς πολεμίῳ δι' ἄγνοιαν. Cf. *Poet.* 14. 1454 a. 5 ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν ἀποκτείνει δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισεν. Cf. *Plut.* περὶ σαρκοφαγίας 2. 5 (quoted by Coraes) σκόπει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ Μερόπην ἐπὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτὸν ὡς φονέα τοῦ υἱοῦ πέλεκυν ἀραμένην καὶ λέγουσαν

ὁσιωτέραν δὴ τήνδ' ἐγὼ δίδωμί σοι
πληγήν—

δοῦναι ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ κίνημα ποιεῖ.

ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ] λελογχωμένον δόρυ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον ἐπ' ἄκρου σιδήριον ὀξύ, τὴν καλουμένην λόγχην, χρήσιμον εἰς τὰς μάχας· ὅπερ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι γυμνασίας ἕνεκα καὶ οὐ μάχης ἤβλυνον, σφαιροῦντες ἢ στιποῦντες, οἷά εἰσι τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Γάλλοις καλούμενα *fleurets*. Coraes.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας] This is the certain emendation of Bernays a. 13.
(accepted by Susem. and Bywater) for the παίσας of the codd. Πατίσκειν is 'to give to drink.' The illustrations in the parallel passages—*E. E.* ii. 9, and *M. M.* i. 16—bear out the emendation.

δεῖξαι] restored by Susem. and Bywater in place of the δεῖξαι of a. 14.
most MSS.

ἀκροχειριζόμενοι] explained by the Ald. Schol.—ἔστι τὸ πυκτεύειν a. 15.
ἢ παγκρατιάζειν πρὸς ἕτερον ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς ἢ ὅλως ἄκραις ταῖς χερσὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων. 'It is what we call "sparring"',—Grant.

The various forms that ἡ ἄγνοια ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα may take are thus illustrated in the present section in the order in which they are

1111 a. 15. enumerated in section 16. Ignorance (1) of the thing done (τί)—. Aeschylus and the Mysteries, the catapult accident: (2) of the object of the act (περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι)—Merope's mistake: (3) of the instrument (τίνι)—the pointed spear, the stone mistaken for pumice-stone: (4) of the result of the act (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα)—killing by a potion intended to cure: (5) of the manner (πῶς)—when in sparring a man hits harder than he supposes or wishes.

a. 16. § 18. ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις] bracketed by Ramsauer, l. 16. In line 18 the same expression occurs in a specific sense,=the persons affected by the act.

a. 18. κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα] 'The most important circumstances are the objects of the action and its result'—as the Paraphrast explains, τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ τὸ ἔργον. The οὗ ἕνεκα here is not, as usual, the *intention* of the doer, for he cannot be ignorant of what he intends to do; but the *outcome* or *result* of what he actually does, which is the opposite of his intention. See Grant *ad loc.*

a. 24. §§ 20, 21] In the words ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν it is implied that the position ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν is inconsistent with the definition of τὸ ἑκούσιον just laid down. This position must be examined, for if it is correct, the definition will require modification, θυμός and ἐπιθυμία being ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῷ.

a. 27. § 23.] Here, as elsewhere in this Book, Aristotle maintains the necessity of keeping the question of the *voluntariness* of actions distinct from that of their *goodness or badness.* Popular thought tended to merge these two questions. All actions, Aristotle argues, proceeding from modifiable feelings and states of the agent, are voluntary; it matters not, so far as the voluntariness of the actions is concerned, whether the feelings and states are morally good or bad, *i.e.* are the causes of morally good, or of morally bad actions. Further, in this section, Aristotle makes it clear that he regards θυμός and ἐπιθυμία as the sources of τὰ καλά. In his system, the passions are not abolished, but regulated. Ἀρετή is the result of the εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων (Eustrat.). The passions supply the motive power in action; διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐδὲν κινεῖ (vi. 2. 5).

αἰτίου ὄντος] 'As one man is the author of both'—Peters. 1111 a. 29.
' γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον, θυμὸς ἢ ἐπιθυμία—Par.

ν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι] θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are two species of the a. 30.
ις, the third species being βούλησις (see *E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 a.
s yet mentioned. Θυμός and ἐπιθυμία elicited by proper
ν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι) are surely not causes of involuntary actions.
hat they are would be to maintain the position, which
parently wishes to maintain, that τὰ καλά are involuntary.

The Paraph. has—εἰ ἀκούσια ἦν τὰ κατὰ θυμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα, a. 33.
' τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἁμαρτανομένων, κατὰ τὴν ἑκουσίου καὶ
αφοράν· διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις φευκτά,
ίου ἐστί, καὶ ψόγων ἄξια οὐδὲν ἧττον· ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ἦν, εἰ διέφερεν
' ἀκουσίου. The force of the section may be brought out
rther, *do* the faults of anger differ from those of calcula-
eing involuntary? Surely not. Faults of both kinds
avoided, and the irrational passions seem to be no less
man nature than the reason.'

ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ⟨αἱ⟩ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ b. 1.
K^b and Γ give ὥστε καὶ αἱ, and the αἱ before ἀπό is
re adopted by Byw. from Susemihl. Τοῦ ἀνθρώπου thus
the predicate in correspondence with ἀνθρωπικά in the
. The other authorities (followed by Bekker) instead
ὰ αἱ give αἱ δέ. This latter was evidently the reading
Paraph. had: his words are—ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἄλογα πάθη καὶ
εἰσιν ὥσπερ ὁ λογισμός· ἀπὸ τούτων δὲ τῶν παθῶν, θυμοῦ δηλο-
θυμίας, πᾶσαι αἱ ἀνθρώπιναι γίνονται πράξεις.
iter of the *E. E.* discusses the relation of τὸ ἑκούσιον and
ν to ἐπιθυμία and θυμός in ii. 7. His first position is
3 τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ
τε βίαιον καὶ ἀκούσιον· τὸ ἄρα κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον. His
sition takes the form of an ἀπορία, through which he
passes to the solution of the problem of the nature of
. 1223 b. 3 ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειεν ἂν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν
ναι, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τοὐναντίον. ἅπαν γὰρ ὁ ἑκών τις πράττει,
πράττει, καὶ ὁ βούλεται, ἑκών. βούλεται δ' οὐθεὶς ὁ οἴεται
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἃ βούλεται ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ παρ'
λτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν. ὥστε
τεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον.

1111 b. 1. Wish (βούλησις) is voluntary; but the ἀκρατής, who acts ἐπιθυμίαν, acts contrary to his wish; therefore to act κατ' ἐπιθ is to act involuntarily. But, as the writer points out in the chapter (*E. E.* ii. 8), this ἀπορία owes its existence to an warranted abstraction. We are not entitled to look at ἐπιθυμί itself as constituting the man, and to say that in the ἐγκρατής forced by λογισμός, or at λογισμός by itself, and say that in ἀκρατής it is forced by ἐπιθυμία—1224 b. 26 ἡ δ' ὅλη ἑκοῦσα ἡ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βίᾳ δ' οὐδέτερος. Ἐπιθ in short, is as much the man as λογισμός, and action consequ upon either is voluntary. The same remarks apply to θυμός.

In the *Rhetoric* i. 10. 1368 b. 32 seven causes of action enumerated—τύχη, φύσις, and βία of involuntary, and ἔθος, λογισ θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία of voluntary actions:—πάντες δὴ πάντα πράτ τὰ μὲν οὐ δι' αὑτοὺς τὰ δὲ δι' αὑτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δι' αὑτοὺς τὰ διὰ τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βίᾳ τὰ φύσει, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δι' αὑτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ φύσει τὰ δὲ βίᾳ. ὅσα δὲ δι' αὑτούς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι' ἔ τὰ δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλογον ἔπι ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ' ἢ ὅταν οἰηθῇ ἀγαθόν, ἄλογοι δ' ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττ ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι' αἰτίας ἑπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι' ἔθος λογισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Let us now discuss Choice *: for its connexion with moral virtue is intim and it is a better criterion of character than overt action is.*

Choice falls as a species under 'the voluntary,' i. e. *'the voluntary' wider extent, for* (1) *while children and brutes are as capable of volun action as adult men are, they are incapable of choice: and* (2) *the sudden of adult men are voluntary acts, but not acts of choice.*

Some have identified choice with desire or passion: but (1) *the lower ani have desire and passion, without having the power of choice: and* (2) *the a the incontinent man result from desire, not from choice, those of the cont man from choice, not from desire:* (3) *there is a contrariety between desir choice; for desire is related to things simply* qua *pleasant and painful choice is not related to its objects* qua *pleasant and painful, but* qua *and bad.*

The difference between choice and passion is even more marked than that between it and desire—acts which we perform in a passion we are very far from iting to choose.

Others again have identified choice with wish. The two are closely connected, t there is a difference: for we never choose an impossibility, although we may ish it, e.g. *we may wish never to die. Again, we often wish for results hich we have no power to bring about,* e.g. *that a certain competitor may get e prize; whereas we only choose what we can ourselves bring about. Further, ish is properly of the end,* e.g. *we wish health; choice of the means,* e.g. *we hoose to do this, that, and the other thing conducive to health, in all cases the bjects of choice being things which lie within our power.*

Nor is choice opinion, for we may have opinions about all things in heaven nd earth, not merely about things which lie within our power; and opinions re distinguished as true or false, whereas choice is good or bad. But if we ay not for these reasons identify choice with opinion generally, perhaps we ay identify it with opinion about right and wrong in conduct. No: for hoosing rightly or wrongly makes us good or bad men; but having opinions bout right and wrong does not. And it is correct to say 'we choose to do something,' but not to say 'we have an opinion to do something.' It is 'about something' *that we have an opinion. Again choice is praised for having a good bject; opinion, for being true; and what we choose is that which we consider ood; but we form an opinion about a thing independently of any such consideration. Nor do we always find good choice and true opinion going together. There are some people with excellent opinions who have bad characters, and hoose as they ought not. It is another question, which does not concern us, whether an opinion precedes, or attends, an act of choice: at any rate we have hown that the two are not to be identified.*

What then remains after all these exclusions? In choosing, as we have een, we always act voluntarily; but in acting voluntarily we do not always ait to choose—we sometimes act on the spur of the moment, from mere desire. It remains therefore that, in acting from choice, we act voluntarily, not on the pur of the moment, but deliberately; consequently the object of choice is a voluntary act, about which a man has deliberated. After going through a process of reasoning he prefers that which he 'chooses.'

§§ 1–14. περὶ προαιρέσεως] This chapter treats of προαίρεσις or 1111 b. 5.
deliberate choice (late Latin *electio*: see Victorius *ad loc.*). Προαίρεσις is a *species* of τὸ ἑκούσιον—§ 2 ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον—*i. e.* τὸ ἑκούσιον is of wider extent, for (1) children and brutes have τὸ ἑκούσιον, but not προαίρεσις: (2) sudden acts are ἑκούσια but not κατὰ προαίρεσιν. Again προαίρεσις is not ἐπιθυμία or θυμός, for (1) irrational animals have ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, but not προαίρεσις: (2) ἐπιθυμία and προαίρεσις must be distinct principles, for the supremacy of the one or the other constitutes the different character of the ἀκρατής or of the ἐγκρατής respectively: (3) the opposition between προαίρεσις

ι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποία τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν 1111 b. 5.
γων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποιός τις. αἱρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια,
ιωτετώτερον δ' ἡ προαίρεσις. Cf. *E. N.* x. 8. 5. The doctrine of the present section is already involved in Aristotle's definition of ἀρετή as ἕξις προαιρετική κ.τ.λ.

§ 2. τὰ ἐξαίφνης] Ramsauer compares what is said in iii. 8. 15— b. 9.
διὰ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀπάρακτον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς. τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.

According to both passages, apparently, τὰ ἐξαίφνης are not κατὰ προαίρεσιν: but according to the later passage the ἕξις of ἀνδρεία is specially shown in them. How is this to be reconciled with the definition of ἀρετή as ἕξις προαιρετική? By pointing out that the virtuous ἕξις is the organic result, as it were, of many acts of rational choice, which, at first hesitating and difficult, have at last become 'secondarily automatic.' In the first passage Aristotle contrasts sudden acts in general with those chosen after deliberation; in the second passage he has specially in view the sudden emergencies which call for prompt action on the part of the courageous man; and he says, in effect, that the truly courageous man, *having organised his deliberation*, will be ready for these emergencies; that, in relation to them, he will show how well organised his προαιρετικὴ ἕξις of courage is; whereas τὰ προφανῆ may be faced, after deliberation, by one whose deliberation is not yet organised—has not yet become 'secondarily automatic.'

§ 4.] Peters' translation here is—'The continent man, on the b. 13.
other hand, deliberately chooses what he does, *but does not desire it.*' Better—'the continent man acts from deliberate choice, not from mere desire,' for we must remember that προαίρεσις is βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις (*E. N.* iii. 3. 19), and involves appetite and desire.

§ 5. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ b. 15.
οὔ] This does not mean that one desire is never *opposed* to another (cf. Ald. Schol. *ad loc.* δοκεῖ καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντία, οἷον εἴ τις διέχει ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ, ὧν τὸ μὲν δεῖται δαπάνης, ὁ χρηματισμὸς δὲ φαδῶ περιγίνεται χρημάτων), but that the opposition is not of the nature of *contrary* opposition; whereas deliberate choice and desire are opposed as contraries (ἐναντία), if opposed at all. Two desires

1111 b. 15. relating to *two different* objects may indeed clash and wrangle; but deliberate choice and desire, relating to *the same* object, are opposed in a much more definite manner. Desire seeks to possess it, because it is pleasant; deliberate choice, keeping in view the permanent welfare of the whole man, declines it. The opposition between desire and deliberate choice is, in fact, that between desire and reason—between the tendency to disorder and the principle of order—a definite and standing opposition, very different from the accidental, and often temporary, opposition which obtains between two desires. An illustration may help to make this great difference clear. Two disorderly and self-seeking factions in a state may oppose each other bitterly, or may join hands against the orderly government which strives to repress them both. Their opposition to each other is accidental, not necessary. But the opposition of orderly government to faction is a necessary one, as long as the state, in the proper acceptation of the term, lasts. In the *Republic*, Plato has sketched the décadence of a state, in which order, or λόγος, has ceased to assert itself, and various ἐπιθυμίαι assume in turn the functions of government. A strong passion, such as that for honour, or wealth, may, for a time, preserve order in its own interest, and maintain the semblance of a state, but is soon overpowered by a coalition of other passions, which, having obtained mastery over it, begin to wrangle among themselves, till a passion stronger than the rest—personified as the demagogue-tyrant—vaults into supremacy. (*Rep.* 545 sqq.) No one ἐπιθυμία is necessarily and always opposed to another. Each has its own object, which may, or may not, at a given time, be compatible with that of another. But so far as all ἐπιθυμίαι, as such, seek objects which stand out of relation to an orderly system, they are essentially opposed to reason, the principle of order, and therefore to its exponent, deliberate choice. Reason is the permanent personality of the man, which distinguishes itself from every passing desire. It coexists with the desire, and distinguishes itself from it. But one desire does not really *coexist* with another: *i.e.* two desires do not quarrel about the possession of the *same* thing. Each merely seeks its own object, and is unconscious of, and careless of, the object of the other. The technical meaning of the word ἐναντιοῦται thus gives the key to the interpretation of the passage before us, as the Ald. Schol. seems to have seen. His words are—ἀδύνατον τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα ἐπιθυμεῖν τοῦ τε τραφῆναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ

βῆναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἐναντία τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὅτι περὶ τὸ αὐτό. 1111 b. 15.

Met. Δ. 10. 1018 a. 25 ἐναντία λέγεται τά τε μὴ δυνατὰ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ κεῖνται τῶν διαφερόντων κατὰ γένος, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν τῷ τῷ γένει, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ δεκτικῷ, καὶ τὰ εἶστον διαφέροντα τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ὧν ἡ διαφορὰ μεγίστη ἁπλῶς ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατ' εἶδος. Contrariety (ἐναντιότης) is between ings in relation to the same quality, or circumstance, not in elation to different qualities, or circumstances; *e.g.* ἐπιθυμία urges man to drink, and προαίρεσις restrains him from drinking: ἐπιθυμία and προαίρεσις are here opposed (as contraries, ἐναντία) on the common ground of drinking. But there is no such common ground on which two ἐπιθυμίαι can be opposed. One ἐπιθυμία does not urge the man to drink, and another restrain him. He does not 'desire' at the same moment to drink and not to drink. The 'opposition' between ἐπιθυμίαι is of a less definite kind than this: *e.g.* the desire of drink may be 'opposed' to that of money; but this is not 'contrary' opposition (οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται), because ἐναντία are properly the most distant extremes within the same class, and the desire of drink and the desire of money fall under different classes. But to desire to drink, and to choose not to drink are 'contraries,' both falling under the class of attitudes towards drinking.

The special explanation of the term ἐναντίον given in *E. N.* ii. 8. 8 also throws light on the passage before us. The extreme which represents a naturally strong desire is there said to be 'more contrary' to the mean, or good choice, than the extreme which represents a naturally weaker desire; *i. e.* it is more difficult, and more painful, to avoid the extreme which represents a naturally strong desire; for, as desire is of pleasure, the opposition to desire must involve pain. Hence προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται. But if one ἐπιθυμία conquers another, it is because we like it better—no pain is involved—ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὔ.

The contrariety of λογισμός and ἐπιθυμία is discussed in *Rep.* 440, q. v.

καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία . . . οὔθ' ἡδέος] The Paraph. has—ἔτι ἡ μὲν b. 16.
ἐπιθυμία λυπηρά ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀεὶ ἀντικείμενον ἔχει (πρὸς αὐτὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ φέρεται), ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις οὔτε λυπηρά ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικείμενον ἔχει. He seems to have had before him the reading ἐπίλυπος (Cod. Victor.), ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηρὰ (N b) οὔθ' ἡδέος. Adopting the reading of Bekker's and Bywater's texts, we may explain the state-

1111 b. 16. ment thus—ἐπιθυμία is concerned directly and exclusivel pleasure, which it seeks, and pain, which it avoids—the twc very intimately connected, since the pain which it avoids is the emptiness which it seeks to fill with pleasure (cf. *E. N.* 2). The Paraphrast's reading ἐπίλυπος was evidently inten bring out this meaning. which, however, is sufficiently plain better supported reading ἐπιλύπου.

But λυπηρά for λυπηροῦ involves a blunder in Arist doctrine. Προαίρεσις, when, in the ἐγκρατής, it declines an im nate pleasure, or, in the ἀνδρεῖος, chooses wounds and deat noble cause, of course involves pain: see *E. N.* iii. 9, §§ 1 καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία κ.τ.λ. So, we cannot read ἡ προαίρεσις λυπηρὰ οὔθ' ἡδέος. But it is true to say that 'deliberate choice concerned with the painful or the pleasant.' Its object is the συμφέρον, or ἀγαθόν generally. It does not seek merely present pleasure, and avoid present pain, as ἐπιθυμία doe it looks at πράξεις and πάθη in their relations to an er has to do with the selection of means, irrespectively of tl mediate pleasure obtained, or pain avoided, in the course selection. The end, of course, whether high or low, is re by the agent as good and pleasant. The text followed l Paraphrast, though obviously corrupt in the form in which l it, may, however, represent the source from which the writer parallel passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* (ii. 10. 1225 b. 3 rived his—ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης· προαιρε πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης—a statement which is true.

b. 18. § 6.] Cf. the comparison of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία in vii. 6. 1

b. 19. § 7. βούλησις] not will, but *wish*.

b. 23. ἀθανασίας] merely 'exemption from death.' The quest the 'immortality of the soul' is not raised here: see Z Grant.

b. 26. § 9. τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον] 'Again *we are more properly s* wish the end," "to choose the means." '—Peters. This brir correctly the force of μᾶλλον. The words in iii. ch. 3, § 20 § 1 seem to imply that the proper use of both terms is p definite—that as προαίρεσις is only of means so βούλησις is the end,—ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιά ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τελη. ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται.

tus is equally explicit with regard to *προαίρεσις*—*E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 1111 b. 26.
a 7 *οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.* But with
egard to *βούλησις* he says *βούλεται δέ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος* (1226 a.
13), and *βούλεσθαι μὲν καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δ' οὐκ
ἔστιν* (1226 a. 16)—which may be thought to suggest the propriety
of limiting the reference of *μᾶλλον* in the passage before us (*E. N.*
iii. 2. 9) to *βούλησις*, notwithstanding the absolute statement in *E. N.*
iii. 4. 1 *ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται.* The Paraphrast
however has—*ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν ἀεί, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν
πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων.*

βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν] *sc. ὅτι βουλόμεθα εὐδαιμονεῖν.* Ramsauer. b. 28.

§ 10. **περὶ τὰ ἀΐδια**] We are to understand that *δόξα* may *pro-* b. 32.
nounce upon ἀΐδια, as upon anything in heaven or earth (*cf.* vii. 3. 4
δῆλοι δ' Ἡράκλειτος); but only *ἐπιστήμη* has them as its *true objects*:
see vi. 3. 2.

§ 11. **ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί**] An opinion on moral matters—as is made 1112 a. 1.
clear by the parallel passage *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 a. 4 *οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν
ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὄντων πρακτῶν δόξα ᾗ τυγχάνομεν υἱόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ
πράττειν.* The Ald. Schol. has—*οὐδὲ τινί· οἷον τῇ περὶ τούτων περὶ ἃ ἡ
προαίρεσις· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν προαίρεσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν ποιοὶ ἐσμέν· ἢ γὰρ
ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί· κατὰ δὲ τὴν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων δόξαν οὐκέτι ἀγαθοὶ ἢ
κακοί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ δοξάζων ὅτι ἡ ἀνδρία ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἤδη καὶ ἀν-
δρεῖος ἢ ἀγαθός· ὁ προαιρούμενος δέ· τοῦ γὰρ ἀκρατοῦς δόξα μὲν ὀρθή, προαίρε-
σις δ' οὔ.* We can gather from this section what Aristotle would
have thought of the tendency to estimate a man's character by his
speculative belief.

§ 12. **φυγεῖν [ἢ] τι**] Bywater brackets *ἢ*. It is omitted by K^b. a. 3.

οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν] 'We never opine.' *πάνυ* intensifies the nega- a. 5.
tive, as in the next section—*ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν* (*sc. ἀγαθὰ ὄντα*).

§ 13. **ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς**] *ἤ* is here equivalent to *ἤτοι*, and introduces a. 6.
words explanatory of *οὗ δεῖ*. A comma between *μᾶλλον* and *ἤ*, as in
Coraes' text, would prevent a natural misunderstanding of the con-
struction.

ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν] *sc. ἀγαθὰ ὄντα.* It is necessary to supply these a. 8.
words in order to give the argument force. Ramsauer, who fails
to supply them, is aware that the argument, as he conceives it, is a
weak one; for he says—'parum in sexto hoc argumento ponderis:
ὅσοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι (vii.
3. 3). Poterit igitur nihilominus *ἡ προαίρεσις* esse *δόξα τις*.' Aristotle

1112 a. 8. means to say here that we choose what we have reason to consider good, but form opinions about things quite irrespectively of this consideration. Here an important difference is noted between choice and opinion: the former relates to the good, the latter does not. The Paraphrast's note I accordingly regard as wrong—*ἃ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ σφόδρα γινώσκομεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ γινώσκομεν ἀληθῆ εἶναι.*

a. 10. § 14. **ἔνιοι**] *οἱ ἀκρατεῖς*, see vii. 3 on the relation of *ἀκρασία* to *δόξα*.

a. 11. § 15. **εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως κ.τ.λ.**] That opinion precedes (and accompanies) choice is undoubtedly Aristotle's opinion, see iii. 3. 17 *τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθὲν προαιρετόν ἐστι.* Cf. *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 9 *ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις*: cf. also *E. N.* vii. 3. 9 where the premisses of the Practical Syllogism are described as *δόξαι*: and *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 27 *ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική.*

For the use of the term *παρακολουθεῖ* Ramsauer quotes *E. E.* ii. 10. 1225 b. 21 *μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων, καὶ ζητοῦντι δόξειε ἄν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἡ προαίρεσις, ἤτοι δόξα ἢ ὄρεξις· ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα.* **Προαίρεσις** is not identical with either *ὄρεξις* or *δόξα*, but 'involves' both.

a. 16. § 17. **μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας**] Both terms mark an intellectual process, as distinguished from an intellectual act—they mark an association of ideas, a train of thought, a review of the circumstances of the case in their relation to the possibility and advisableness of taking action. 'Choice implies reasoning, and a process of thought.' That 'association of ideas,' 'train of thought,' 'intellectual process' is one of the prominent meanings of **λόγος** is shown by the fact that it is frequently used for *συλλογισμός*: while, in its *dominant* sense, *διάνοια* is the faculty of *joining* and *separating νοήματα*—see passages quoted in notes on vi. 2. 2, 3; cf. also vi. 9. 3 where *διάνοια* is said not to be an assertion, or finished intellectual result—*διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται (ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν εὐβουλίαν) αὕτη γὰρ (i.e. διάνοια) οὔπω φάσις.*

a. 17. **πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν**] '*προαίρεσις*, lit. "choosing before." Our "preference" exactly corresponds here, but unfortunately cannot always be employed.' Peters.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

n is Deliberation? And what are the things about which we for plainly we do not deliberate about everything. In the first place, ngs which a fool or madman might think fit to 'deliberate about'— eternal and immutable verities of the Universe and of Mathematics ut those changes, whether produced by necessity, or nature, or however hich take place uniformly, like the changes of the seasons—nor vents which occur without uniformity, like rains and droughts— ance events, such as the discovery of a buried treasure—nor yet hich concerns the conduct of human life, for example no Lacedae- ks of deliberating how the blessings of good government may be con- the Scythians.

s then that we deliberate about things which lie within our own have nothing to do with things which are accomplished by other Man's efficiency, i. e. *nothing to do with things produced by Nature, d Chance, the other causes commonly enumerated.*

n deliberates about those things which he has it in his power i—but not where he has the guidance of an exact Science or Art. deliberate, for example, how to shape letters, and spell words—for no doubt about that—but where the things, which it is in his power h, or affect, are not uniformly the same, but vary according to s, as, for example, the things which a doctor or merchant has to ary according to circumstances Thus, there is more room for in navigation than in gymnastic, navigation being a less exact gymnastic. For the same reason there is wider scope for deliber- atters of opinion than in matters of scientific knowledge. We t short, where results can be predicted with more or less probability, certainty; and where great issues are involved, we try to get other with us in our deliberations, because we fear that by ourselves we able to come to a right decision.

bout the end that we deliberate, but about the means. We set an urselves, and then enquire how, and by what means, we can reach are more ways than one of reaching it, we enquire which is the best way; if there is only one way, we review its steps in the backward 'l we come to the first step, which is the last to be thought of, but the tually taken.

man who deliberates may be compared with the man who solves a

geometrical problem by analysing an assumption into simpler and simpler elements, till he comes to something sufficiently evident to serve as the starting-point of the synthetic process by which he is conducted to the solution. If, in the course of his deliberative analysis of the successive steps, a man comes upon a step which he sees cannot be taken—e.g. *a step impossible without money which cannot be procured—he gives up the idea of trying to reach the end; but if all the steps seem possible, he takes the matter in hand. By 'possible' we mean able to be effected by himself, for that which is effected for him through the instrumentality of his friends may be said to be effected by himself, inasmuch as he is the cause of the actions of his friends. His friends are his instruments, and an important part of deliberation is always about instruments—what instruments are at my disposal, and how shall I use them?*

Man is a Principle or Cause of Actions. Deliberation is about Actions, i.e. *about means (for actions are means), not about the end. But, although then concerned with particulars, deliberation is not concerned with them as such is, which takes each by itself, and merely says—'this is white,' 'that is sweet.' Deliberation reviews certain particulars as members of a definite system—as conspiring to the end, and is thus a process with clear limits, although concerned with particulars.*

What deliberation considers, and choice selects, is the same step viewed at different times. Before anything is settled the step is simply 'under deliberation'; but when, as the result of deliberation, it is once for all preferred to other steps, it is 'chosen.' A man comes to the end of his review of practical steps when he reaches the point at which his own efficiency begins, i.e. *when he brings the matter to where he, with his leading principle, or power of choice, can do something. Thus in the Homeric constitution the deliberation of the chiefs ended with the practical decision announced by them to the people.*

Choice then may be defined as the deliberate reaching forth towards things which lie within our power.

1112 a. 18. § 1.] βούλευσις, or βουλή, Deliberation, is not about (1) things a madman or fool would deliberate about, nor (2) about eternal and immutable laws, such as those of the Universe and of Mathematics, nor (3) about uniform changes whether due to Necessity or Nature or any other principle of causation, *e.g.* the rising of the sun, nor (4) about variable events, *e.g.* drought and rain, nor (5) about chance events, *e.g.* the finding of a treasure, nor (6) about all human affairs, *e.g.* not about the government of Scythia (which a Greek could not influence). After all these exclusions, there remain as the objects of deliberation, τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτά, and these are not ends but means. Assuming an end as good, we look about for means, till we arrive at one which it is immediately in our power to produce or supply—τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον of § 11. Having used this means, we are then in a position to use a further means, and so on.

1. ὑπὲρ οὗ] for περὶ οὗ —an infrequent use of ὑπέρ in Aristotle, 1112 a. 20
more frequent in the *Ethics*, *Topics*, and *Rhetoric* than elsewhere, according to Eucken (*Sprachgebrauch des Arist.* p. 47). In the *Nic. Eth.* it occurs five times—i. 5. 7, i. 6. 13, here iii. 3. 2, iii. 1. 7, and x. 1. 2 (see notes on these passages). Nor is this use of ὑπέρ frequent in the majority of those books in the Aristotelian Corpus which are plainly not by Aristotle himself. In the *M.M.* however it is very frequent, occurring between 80 and 90 times, and is even more frequent in the *Rhet. ad Alex.*

§ 3. περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων . . . οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου] Cf. *de Coelo* a. 21.
ii. 14. 296 a. 33 ἡ δέ γε τοῦ κόσμου τάξις ἀίδιος ἐστίν. This order of the Universe which is said to be ἀίδιος depends upon, or is the expression of, an eternal immaterial principle, described in various parts of the *de Coelo* and *Metaphysics* as—οὐσία ἀίδιος ἀκίνητος—ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως—τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐ κινούμενον—θεός: *e.g. Met.* Λ. 6. 1071 b. 4 ἀνάγκη εἶναί τινα ἀίδιον οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον—and Λ. 7. 1072 a. 21 ἔστι τι αἰεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δ' ἡ κύκλῳ· καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ' ἔργῳ δῆλον. ὥστ' ἀίδιος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός. ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν καὶ μέσον, ἔστι τοίνυν τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀίδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα. κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν [κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα]. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὂν καλόν. . . . ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς. ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. καὶ ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτως γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνο ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα. ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ' ἑαυτὴν τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. ἑαυτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγόνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων. ὥστ' ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον τούτου ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς αἰεί, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. καὶ ζωὴ δέ γ' ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀίδιος. φαμὲν

1112 a. 21. δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

As Alexander in his commentary on this chapter (*Met.* Λ. 7) puts it (p. 667. ed. Bonitz) ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου σφαῖρα, and the σφαῖραι of the other planets, are moved by ἡ ἀπλανὴς σφαῖρα, or πρῶτος οὐρανός, which is τὸ κινούμενον-καὶ-κινοῦν, and intermediate (μέσον) between τὸ πλανώμενον (*i. e.* ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου σφαῖρα and the other planetary σφαῖραι), which it moves, and τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐ κινούμενον, by which it is itself moved. Not only is the Prime Mover described as ἀΐδιος, but the πρῶτος οὐρανός is similarly described (*Met.* Λ. 7), as are also the sun, and other bodies of the planetary spheres—*Met.* Θ. 8. 1050b. 20 sqq. and *Met.* Λ. 8. 1073 a. 26–39. From the last passage referred to we learn that the eternal motions proper to the sun and other planets are caused by an equal number of ἀΐδιοι καὶ ἀΐδιοι οὐσίαι, which we must regard, not as independent principles, but as *special manifestations* of the πρῶτον κινοῦν, which primarily manifests itself in the circular motion of the πρῶτος οὐρανός. (See Alex. *Met.* p. 682; each planetary sphere, he says, has its ψυχή in subordination to the πρῶτος νοῦς, as the spheres themselves are subordinate to the ἀπλανὴς σφαῖρα.) The circumstance that the path of each planet is the resultant of its own proper motion and the motion of the containing sphere next above it explains the phenomena of natural growth and decay. The sun and other planets, by variously approaching and receding from different parts of the earth at different seasons, cause the alternations of γένεσις and φθορά which take place in our sublunary region (cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* p. 469, sqq., 3rd ed.)—See *de Generat. et Corrupt.* ii. 10. 336 a. 26 sqq.—φανερὸν ὅτι μιᾶς μὲν οὔσης τῆς φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι ἄμφω διὰ τὸ ἐναντία εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πέφυκε ποιεῖν. ὥστε ἤτοι γένεσις ἀεὶ ἔσται ἢ φθορά. δεῖ δὲ πλείους εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις καὶ ἐναντίας, ἢ τῇ φορᾷ ἢ τῇ ἀνωμαλίᾳ· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία αἴτια. διὸ καὶ οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φορὰ αἰτία ἐστὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλον· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεχές ἐστι καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι δύο κινήσεις· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἴ γε ἀεὶ ἔσται συνεχὴς γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀεὶ μέν τι κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιλείπωσιν αὗται αἱ μεταβολαί, δύο δ', ὅπως μὴ θάτερον συμβαίνῃ μόνον. τῆς μὲν οὖν συνεχείας ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φορὰ αἰτία, τοῦ δὲ προσιέναι καὶ ἀπιέναι ἡ ἔγκλισις· συμβαίνει γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν πόρρω γίνεσθαι ὁτὲ δ' ἐγγύς. ἀνίσου δὲ τοῦ διαστήματος ὄντος ἀνώμαλος ἔσται ἡ κίνησις· ὥστ' εἰ τῷ προσιέναι καὶ ἐγγὺς εἶναι γεννᾷ, τῷ ἀπιέναι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ πόρρω γίνεσθαι φθείρει, καὶ εἰ τῷ πολ-

: προσιέναι γεννῇ, καὶ τῷ πολλάκις ἀπελθεῖν φθείρει· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων 1112 a. 21.
ντία αἴτια. See Schwegler, *Met.* vol. iv. pp. 255, 256. Cf. also
Coelo ii. 6. 288 a. 26 sqq.—ἡ γὰρ ἀνωμαλία γίγνεται διὰ τὴν ἄνεσιν
ἐπίτασιν. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπό τινος κινεῖται, ἀνάγκη τὴν
μαλίαν γίγνεσθαι τῆς κινήσεως ἢ διὰ τὸ κινοῦν ἢ διὰ τὸ κινούμενον ἢ δι'
ω· εἴτε γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει κινοῖ, εἴτε τὸ κινούμενον ἀλλοι-
ι καὶ μὴ διαμένοι τὸ αὐτό, εἴτε ἄμφω μεταβάλλοι, οὐθὲν κωλύει ἀνωμάλως
σθαι τὸ κινούμενον. οὐθὲν δὲ τούτων δυνατὸν περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι·
μὲν γὰρ κινούμενον δέδεικται ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ
ρτον καὶ ὅλως ἀμετάβλητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν πολὺ μᾶλλον εὔλογον εἶναι
τον· τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν τοῦ ἁπλοῦ καὶ τὸ
ρτον καὶ ἀγένητον τοῦ ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἀγενήτου κινητικόν· ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ
ρενον οὐ μεταβάλλει σῶμα ὄν, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ κινοῦν μεταβάλλοι ἀσώματον
ὄντε καὶ τὴν φορὰν ἀδύνατον ἀνώμαλον εἶναι.

Now to return to the passage before us, *E. N.* iii. 3. 3—we do deliberate about the eternal constitution of the κόσμος, because cannot alter it—it is the expression an οὐσία ἀίδιος ἀκίνητος, 'an mal not ourselves.' Nor about the eternal relations of mathe- ics, *e.g.* the incommensurability of the diagonal and side of quare. From the words with which § 4 begins—ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ ὧν κινήσει, it is plain that Aristotle thinks of the ἀίδια here, in as ἀκίνητα (Ramsauer suggests that he has forgotten to add the ds καὶ ἀκινήτων l. 21). Now, it is strictly true that the objects of *mathematics* are ἀκίνητα (see *Met.* E. 1. 1026 a. 13 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ικὴ περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια [*i. e.* mathematics, as distinguished from optics and astronomy: *ad loc.*] περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ' ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ τη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα): but, as we have seen, in the μος, an οὐσία ἀίδιος ἀκίνητος manifests itself in ἀίδιοι κινήσεις. must suppose then that, in using the words περὶ τῶν ἀιδίων οἷον τοῦ κόσμου, he is thinking only of the πρῶτον κινοῦν or οὐσία ητος, which is the cause of eternal motion, but is not itself ion; this cause alone is the true object of θεολογική or ἡ πρώτη σοφία, the motions in their various spheres produced by it ng under the provinces of ἀστρολογία and φυσική. This is iously the conception of the province of θεολογική which he ertains in *Met.* E. 1 partly quoted above; for the passage con- ies—1026 a. 15 ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. ἀνάγκη ὄντα μὲν τὰ αἴτια ἀίδια εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα· ταῦτα γὰρ αἴτια τοῖς φαινομένοις τῶν θείων—*i.e.* πρώτη φιλοσοφία is concerned with τὰ αἴτια,

1112 a. 21 the causes of the visible motions of the heavenly spheres. The πρῶτα καθ' αὑτὰ fall under ἀστρολογία and that part of φυσική which may be entitled περὶ κινήσεως *par excellence*: see *Phys.* ii. 7. 198 a. 27 [ἔστι τοῖ φυσικοῖ εἰδέναι] ὅλως ὅσα κινούμενα κινεῖ· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὐκ ἔστι φυσικῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντα κίνησιν οὐδ' ἀρχὴν κινήσεως κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀκίνητα ὄντα.

a. 22 § 4 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει . . . ἀνατολῶν] These, as distinguished from the ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα (objects of θεολογική and μαθηματική), are the objects *partly* of ἀστρολογία—a branch of applied mathematics dealing with the ἀΐδιοι κινήσεις of the various heavenly spheres, which present such phenomena as those of τροπαὶ καὶ ἀνατολαί, here described as ἐξ ἀνάγκης (*i.e.* ἐξ ἀνάγκης . . . ἢν λέγομεν τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως *Met.* E. 2. 1026 b. 29: cf. Δ. 5. 1015 a. 34); *partly* of φυσική—a science which deals with uniformities of sublunary motion manifesting themselves in the phenomena of (*a*) inorganic and (*b*) organic nature—for this is what the distinction made in *de gen. anim.* i. 4. 717 a. 15—πᾶν ἢ φύσις ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖ ἢ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον practically amounts to. The motions of inorganic nature (manifesting themselves in such phenomena as those of gravitation, heat, light, electricity, chemical combination) are said to proceed ἐξ ἀνάγκης, because, although they differ from the *eternal* motions of the heavenly spheres in being capable of suspension (as when a stone is not allowed to move downwards), still, when they do take place, they *always* take place in one way (see *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 4 αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου [δυνάμεις] πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί· αἱ δ' ἄλογοι μία ἑνός· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσων καὶ ὑγιείας).

The other class of natural motions comprises those that proceed ἕνεκά του. These are organic processes, or biological laws, resulting in the production and maintenance of the various definite forms of vegetable and animal life, in which all separate parts and functions conspire in the interest of the whole. It is these organic processes, and the resulting organisms, rather than the phenomena of inorganic nature, which Aristotle has in view in describing φύσις as he does in the following passages which are typical of many others—*Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 15 φύσει γάρ, ὅσα ἀπό τινος ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνεῖται εἴς τι τέλος· ἀφ' ἑκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάστοις οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν, ἀεὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ . . . ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκά του γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευ-

ν. καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ 1112 a. 28.
μική, ὁμοίως ἂν φύσει ἐποίει· ὥστ' εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του,
φύσει. μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρεύῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· τούτῳ γὰρ
ἡ φύσις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἰτία ἡ φύσις, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἕνεκά του,
ν. *Phys.* ii. 1. 193 a. 28 ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις
α, ἡ πρώτη ἑκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν
ως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν
'... καὶ μᾶλλον αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης . . . ἡ μορφὴ φύσις. *Phys.* ii.
4 a. 28 ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα—and the frequently re-
ng οὐδὲν μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ. This is Aristotle's *dominant*
ption of φύσις. It is evidently taken from the phenomena of
nic nature, being in fact that noted in *Met.* Δ. 4. 1014 b. 16
λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἡ τῶν φυομένων γένεσις, οἷον εἴ τις ἐπεκτείνας
τὸ ν. At the same time, as has been pointed out above, he
guishes τὰ φυσικά as inorganic (τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης) and organic
οὗ τὸ ἕνεκά του)—viz. in *de Gen. An.* 717 a. 15 quoted above,
in *An. Post.* ii. 11. 94 b. 36 ἡ μὲν ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ φύσις, ἡ δ'
ήκης· ἡ δ' ἀνάγκη διττή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὁρμήν, ἡ δὲ
παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, ὥσπερ λίθος ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται,
ν δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνάγκην. It will be remembered that this same
ward motion of the stone, which is here described as ἐξ
ης, is said to be φύσει in *E. N.* ii. 1. 2. Cf. Grote's *Aristotle*,
5: 'Nature produces effects of finality, or with a view to
given end, and also effects of necessity, the necessity being
r inherent in the substance itself, or imposed by extraneous
. Thus a stone *falls* to the ground by necessity of the first
but *ascends* by necessity of the second kind.'

ie whole field of φυσική is mapped out in the following passage,
. ii. 1. 192 b. 8 τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας
, φύσει δέ φαμεν εἶναι τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ
τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆν καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα [ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι
τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν]. πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥηθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα
τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα· τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχει
ως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ
' ἀλλοίωσιν.

φύσις ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιοῦσα—law of inorganic nature, and ἡ
ἡ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦσα—biological law, may then be distinguished
: two coordinate species of the genus φύσις. But biological laws
e their ends—certain vegetable and animal organisms, by con-
ng to certain definite conditions imposed, as we say, by the

1112 a. 23. environment. *If* organisms are to come into being an all, it is *necessary* for them to conform to certain condition we must distinguish from ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιοῦσα (whi ordinate with ἡ ἕνεκά του), τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον, or τὸ ὡς μενον ἀναγκαῖον, which is the condition to which ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα must conform, if it is to realise its end: see *Met.* Δ. τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἁπλοῦν, *i. e.* in the strict sense, as τὸ μὴ ἐν ἄλλως ἔχειν, is distinguished from τὸ οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ζῆν τίου . . . καὶ οὗ ἄνευ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσ *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34 τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἢ καὶ ἁπλῶς; νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βα πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς, διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κουφό ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα πλὴν ὡς ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τοῦ κρύπτειν καὶ σώζειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοις τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐχόντων τὴν φ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ὡς ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἕνεκά του, οἷον διὰ τί τοιοῦτος; ὅπως τοδὶ καὶ ἕνεκα τουδί. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἂν μὴ σιδηροῦς ᾖ· ἀνάγκη ἄρα σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔστ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τέλος· ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ . . . φανερὸν δ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις α καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ τίνος ἕνεκα· γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους· καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ οὗ ἕ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνη οἰκία τοιόνδε, τάδε δεῖ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ ἐπεὶ τοδί, τάδε δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὑπάρχειν. οὕτως καὶ εἰ ἐ τοδί, ταδί· εἰ δὲ ταδί, ταδί. Thus τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον, is that suitable environmen stituted for the most part by the operation of the necessary inorganic nature—ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιοῦσα as explained which is the necessary condition of the successful operatio laws of organic nature. Looking at an organism *per se*, that its vital functions are conditioned by mechanical and c laws; looking at it in relation to its external environment, that its life is maintained in correspondence with laws re the inorganic phenomena of gravitation, heat, light, electric

Ἡ φύσις ἡ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦσα, then, is 'biological law'; ἡ φ ἀνάγκης ποιοῦσα is 'law of inorganic nature'; while τὸ ἀναγκα

σεως expresses the relation in which 'biological law' stands 1112 a. 23.
ı environment constituted for the most part by phenomena of
rganic nature.' Organisms, and works of human intelligence,
produced only under definite conditions or limitations imposed
his environment.

Thus the ἐξ ἀνάγκης—'according to the laws of inorganic nature,'
l the φύσει of the present section (*E. N.* iii. 3. 4) cannot be
arded as mutually exclusive expressions. A stone is said to fall
th ἐξ ἀνάγκης, and φύσει. On the other hand, if we give φύσει its
πάντα sense of 'according to biological laws,' we can distinguish
from ἐξ ἀνάγκης—'according to the laws of inorganic nature.'
e must remember, however, that 'biological laws' operate only
the ἀνάγκη of the environment permits.

§ 5. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως] From the examples given here a. 26.
τῶν αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων—we may perhaps identify these with τὰ
ὸ συμπτώματος of *Phys.* ii. 8. 198 b. 35 πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ ἀεὶ οὕτω
ντα ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. οὐ
ρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ'
ὑπὸ κύνα· οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλ' ἂν χειμῶνος.

οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης] τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης are distinguished as a. 27.
currences directly affecting man, not to be foreseen by him,
cause exceptional, from τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου—occurrences, or
enomena, not conceived as affecting man, which contradict the
linary laws of nature: see *Met.* Λ. 3. 1070 a. 6 ἢ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἢ
ται γίγνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ
ς ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι
ρήσεις τούτων: *i. e.* τύχη is the στέρησις of τέχνη (or, more generally,
νοῦ καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου § 7). Its sphere is τὸ ἄδηλον in human
irs: τὸ αὐτόματον, in its specific sense, is the στέρησις of φύσις—
ı the spontaneous, or that which contradicts uniform law in the
main of nature—especially of organic nature: see *Met.* K. 8.
65 a. 26 τὸ δὲ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας
ν. τύχη δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥσπερ
καὶ ὧν ἐστι τὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω καὶ αἴτιον.
ύχη δ' αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του
ρμένοις. διὸ περὶ ταὐτὸ τύχη καὶ διάνοια· προαίρεσις γὰρ οὐ χωρὶς
νοίας. τὰ δ' αἴτια ἀόριστα ἀφ' ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης· διὸ ἄδηλος
ποτέρῳ λογισμῷ καὶ αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἁπλῶς δ' οὐδενός. In
ys. ii. 6. 197 a. 36, however, τὸ αὐτόματον is presented as the

1112 a. 27. genus of τύχη—διαφέρει δ' ὅτι τὸ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλεῖόν ἐστι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειε καὶ ὅλως πρᾶξις. διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην· σημεῖον ὅτι δοκεῖ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἡ εὐτυχία ἢ ἐγγύς, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τις· εὐπραξία γάρ. ὅσοθ' ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πρᾶξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παῖς οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν· οὐδ' εὐτυχία οὐδ' ἀτυχία ὑπάρχει τούτοις, εἰ μὴ κατ' ὁμοιότητα.

Human intelligence, and natural organisms, attain to the various ends on condition of utilising and adapting themselves to the necessary laws of 'matter' or 'the environment.' As a rule (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) they succeed in doing so—ὕλη or τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τῆς ὑποθέσεως appears as τὸ συναίτιον. But not always. Sometimes the formative principle is unequal to the task of comprehending the complexity of the material environment, and results follow which as it were, take the designer or the organism by surprise. These are τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης in the region of human deliberation, τέρατα in the animal and vegetable worlds. Τύχη and τὸ αὐτόματον thus represent *the mistakes and failures of intelligence and of the organising principle in nature*, in their relations to the material environment. This seems to be the fair inference from Aristotle's statement that they are στερήσεις of διάνοια and φύσις, as well as from his adoption of the description of τύχη as ἄδηλος αἰτία ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ. Material conditions, once ascertained, are found to remain always the same (αἱ δ' ἄλογοι δυνάμεις μία ἑνός), but organising principles may fail to ascertain them, or use them, and so may miscarry: cf. *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 b. 29 οὕτω δὴ τὸ αὐτόματον κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα ὅταν αὐτὸ μάτην γένηται. Τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, and τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου represent then the mistakes and failures of organising principles. These mistakes and failures are *their own* mistakes and failures (as a man's bad acts are his own acts), not freaks of a positive 'principle of mistake or irregularity' in the ὕλη, or external world, which is otherwise regulated by necessary laws—*Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 1 εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ἕνια κατὰ τέχνην οἷς τὸ ὀρθῶς ἕνεκά του, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις ἕνεκα μέν τινος ἐπιχειρεῖται ἀλλ' ἀποτυγχάνεται, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἁμαρτήματα ἐκείνου τοῦ ἕνεκά του. I cannot think that Grote (*Arist.* i. 165) is right when he speaks of '*the independent agency*' of Chance and Spontaneity. These are not *positive agents*, but στερήσεις.

§ 6. **Σκύθαι**] In *E.E.* ii. 10. 1226 a. 29, and *M. M.* i. 17. 1189 a. 20, **Ἰνδοί** (brought within the Greek horizon by Alexander's conquest) are substituted for **Σκύθαι**. 1112 a. 28.

§ 7. **ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου**] See *Rhet.* i. 4. 1359 a. 30 **πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λεκτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἅπαντα ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή. ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἀδύνατον ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἁπάντων· ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἔνια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ὅσα ὧν εὕρωμεν εἰ ἡμῖν δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι.** Below, in the same Chapter (*Rhet.* i. 4), Aristotle enumerates five objects of deliberation —(1) revenue, (2) peace and war, (3) defence, (4) imports and exports, (5) legislation. These are all **δι' ἀνθρώπου**. a. 32.

τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν] Added lest the reader should misinterpret the words **πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου**. The object of deliberation *generally* is **πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου**: but the *individual* can deliberate only about that part of **τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου** which is **δι' αὐτοῦ**. a. 33.

§ 8. **ἀκριβεῖς**] As Grant remarks, not 'exact' in the sense in which we speak of the 'exact Sciences,' but rather 'fixed'—as may be gathered from the example, the art of writing. b. 1.

καὶ αὐτάρκεις] explains **ἀκριβεῖς**. The **ἀκρίβεια** of a science which has its own principles within itself (which is **αὐτάρκης**) is greater than that of one which has to borrow them from another science: see *An. Post.* i. 27. 87 a. 31.

§ 9. **μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας**] **τέχνη**, as Grant notes, is here distinguished from **ἐπιστήμη**, although in § 8 **ἐπιστήμη** has just been used as equivalent to **τέχνη**. b. 6.

§ 10. **ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ**] See note on i. 3. 4. b. 21. b. 8.

καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον] Ramsauer suggests **καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἀδιόριστον**: Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 75), following the **ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς ἤδη ἀόριστόν ἐστι τὸ ὡς δεῖ** of *M. M.* i. 17. 1189 b. 24, suggests **καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ ὡς δεῖ ἀδιόριστον**. It is pretty plain that the writer of the *M. M.* had before him both the *E. N.* and the *E. E.* (ii. 10. 1226 a. 33 sqq.) when he wrote 1189 b. 18–26; he reproduces the **διχῇ γινομένης τῆς** b. 9.

1112 b. 9. ἁμαρτίας which is peculiar to the *E. E.*, and the ἀδιόριστον which is peculiar to the *E. N.* But he uses the word ἀόριστον, which is less appropriate in the context than ἀδιόριστον, for ἀόριστον is that which has *no* limits (and therefore would elude intelligence, and could not be the subject of any forecast whatsoever) whereas ἀδιόριστον is that which has *no very definite* limits: see Waitz on *Anal. Pr.* i. 4. 26 b. 14. It may be conjectured that the writer of the *M. M.* found in his copy of the *E. N.* καὶ ἐν οἷς ἃ δεῖ (*sc.* πράττειν) ἀόριστον, a reading which might easily spring from an original καὶ ἐν οἷς ἃ δεῖ (*sc.* πράττειν) ἀδιόριστον[1].

b. 11. § 11. βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν] It sometimes happens, however, that deliberation about the means to a contemplated end results in our seeing that the end is not worth the means, and that *another* end is preferable. We sometimes cannot be sure that an end is desirable, *i. e.* is really an end for us, till we have ascertained what means it necessitates. But the ends instanced by Aristotle in this section are those more obvious ends which may be accepted as ends *before* deliberation.

b. 18. κἀκεῖνο] 'refers to ἑνός and διὰ τούτου'—Grant.

b. 19. τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον] *i. e.* the step which must be first taken (πρώτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει), which, however, is the last to be thought of in the review of the steps (ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει). A wishes to obtain an appointment: he can obtain it through the influence of B: he must get an introduction to B: C can give him an introduction: he must write to C: what is C's address? He must look it out in the directory: there is a directory in the club: he must go there: he must call a cab. Here 'calling a cab' is the πρῶτον αἴτιον.

b. 20. ἀναλύειν . . . ὥσπερ διάγραμμα] Cf. *Top.* i. 16. 175 a. 27 συμβαίνει δέ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν.

We must suppose that the reference is to what is known as the Analytical Method of proof in Geometry—a Method which Plato is said by Proclus (ed. Friedl. p. 211) and Diogenes Laertius (iii. 24) to have invented, although there are traces of its employment before his time (see Gow, *History of Gk. Mathematics* p. 176).

[1] As regards the admissibility of ἃ δεῖ = τί δεῖ, I am indebted to Prof. Cook Wilson for references to *Ind. Arist.* 532 b. 14, and Kühner's Gk. Gr. § 562. 4, 2nd ed.

It consists in assuming as true the proposition to be proved, and 1112 b. 20.
deducing from it, as principle, the necessary consequences to which it leads (see D. Stewart, *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Part ii. chap. 4, § 3. 1. Preliminary observations on the Analysis and Synthesis of the Greek Geometricians)—'If in this deduction,' says D. Stewart, 'I arrive at a consequence which I already know to be true, I conclude with confidence that the principle from which it was deduced is likewise true. But if on the other hand I arrive at a consequence which I know to be false, I conclude that the principle or assumption on which my reasoning has proceeded is false also. Such a demonstration of the truth or falsity of a Proposition is called an Analytical Demonstration. According to these definitions of Analysis and Synthesis those demonstrations in Euclid [1] which prove a proposition to be true by showing that the contrary supposition leads to some absurd inference, are properly speaking Analytical Processes of Reasoning. In *every* case the conclusiveness of an Analytical Proof rests on this general maxim—that *truth* is always consistent with itself; that a supposition which leads by a concatenation of mathematical deductions to a consequence which is true must itself be true; and that which necessarily involves a consequence which is absurd or impossible must itself be false. It is evident that when we are demonstrating a Proposition with a view to convince another of its truth the synthetic form of reasoning is the more natural and pleasing of the two, as it leads the understanding directly from known truths to such as are unknown. When a Proposition, however, is doubtful and we wish to satisfy our own minds with respect to it, or when we wish to discover a new method of demonstrating a theorem previously ascertained to be true, it would be found far more convenient to conduct the investigation analytically.'

Themistius in his commentary on *An. Post.* i. 12 (vol. i. pp. 41–43, ed. Spengel) has remarks on ἀνάλυσις which are worth careful attention in the present connexion. They bring to light an important difference between βούλευσις and γεωμετρικὴ ἀνάλυσις, here roughly compared by Aristotle. He begins by defining ἀνάλυσις—p. 42 (fol. 6 b) ἀναλύειν δὲ λέγω νῦν τὸ τεθέντος τινὸς ἀληθοῦς συμπεράσματος τὰς προτάσεις ἐξευρίσκειν δι' ὧν συνήχθη. But

[1] 'The *reductio ad absurdum* is a kind of theoretic analysis. This is the only analysis that Euclid admits.' Gow, *Hist. of Gk. Mathematics* p. 177, note 2.

1112 b. 20. true προτάσεις may be inferred, as consequences, from a false assumption. Is not this a circumstance which must seriously affect the value of the Geometer's ἀνάλυσις? Themistius meets this difficulty by simply pointing out (after Aristotle: see *An. Post.* i. 12, 78 a. 10) that, as a matter of fact, the Geometer *does not infer his true consequences from false assumptions*; and that he can be sure that he does not, because the objects of intuition with which he deals in his ἀνάλυσις are so simple and so limited in number—p. 41 (fol. 6 b) ἐν δὲ τοῖς μαθήμασιν . . . οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ παραλογισμός . . . ὥρισται γὰρ ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἑκάστου σχεδὸν δεῖξίς ἐστι· τὸν γὰρ κύκλον ἀκούσας εὐθὺς ὁρᾷ γεγραμμένον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ φέρεται ἐπ' ἄλλο τι σημαινόμενον. In non-mathematical reasoning, on the other hand, *i.e.* in διάλογοι, the προτάσεις are indefinite in number and lend themselves to various ambiguities—p. 42 εἰ δ' οὐκ ἦν δυνατὸν ἐκ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι, ῥᾴων ἂν ἦν τὸ ἀναλύειν . . . χαλεπὸν τὸ ἀναλύειν· ἐν ἀπείροις γὰρ ἡ ζήτησις τῶν προτάσεων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτῃ διαφέρει τὰ μαθήματα τῶν διαλόγων, ὅτι ῥᾴων ἐν ἐκείνοις ἡ ἀνάλυσις, αἴτιον δέ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ψεῦδος λαμβάνουσιν εἰς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. The non-mathematical reasoner can never be sure that his προτάσεις are not false. But the mathematician sees that his are true; and, as true premisses can give only a true conclusion, he thus demonstrates the supposition with which he began his analysis by the reverse process of synthesis. According to this view, the plainness to the eye of the προτάσεις obtained by the ἀνάλυσις of διαγράμματα has evidently much to do with the conviction that the conclusions synthetically built upon them 'cannot be otherwise.' An assumption is resolved into its elements. These elements are necessarily few, and their nature, and their connexion with the whole, plain to the eye. They are evidently true premisses, hence the conclusion (*i.e.* the original assumption) must be true. But in concrete enquiries, as in that about the cause of τὸ φιλλορροεῖν (see *An. Post.* ii. 16), there is no such visible evidence; we can never be sure that we have analysed rightly; hence the conviction of their *necessity* is wanting to our synthetic reasonings on such matters. The writer of the *M. M.* has also a passage in which he dwells on the difference between γεωμετρικὴ ζήτησις and βούλευσις—*M. M.* i. 17. 1189 b. 6–19.

The ἀνάλυσις of the present section is not to be confounded with the διαίρεσις of *Met.* Θ. 9. 1051 a. 21, where Aristotle says that theorems and problems are solved by 'division,' *i.e.* by

rawing lines. Thus the Theorem '*τρίγωνον* = two right angles' 1112 b. 20.
s proved by so 'dividing' *τρίγωνον*—by so drawing the lines which may be drawn in relation to *τρίγωνον* (or, otherwise, the lines which are 'potentially in *τρίγωνον*') that at last angles = *τρίγωνον* are obtained which are *plainly seen* to be also = two right angles. The three angles of *τρίγωνον* are at last made into angles which can easily be pieced together so as to make two right angles—1051 a. 21 *εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα* (here = demonstrations: see Bonitz *ad loc.*) *ἐνεργείᾳ διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ' ἦν διῃρημένα, φανερὰ ἂν ἦν· νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαῖς. εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον. διὰ τί ἡ ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρθὴ καθόλου; διότι ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἥ τε βάσις δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἀνιστᾶσα ὀρθή, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκεῖνο εἰδότι. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὑρίσκεται.* The two proofs given here are of course 'synthetic,' and in *An. Post.* ii. 11 Aristotle selects the latter of them for reduction to syllogistic form. The angle in the semicircle is 'divided' and so proved to be = one right angle; it is not *assumed* to be = one right angle, which would be the case if the proof were 'analytical.' For a criticism of Euclid's Synthetic Method see Schopenhauer *die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* i. 82–87. Schopenhauer's contention is that Euclid's Synthetic Method involves the substitution of *logical* for *intuitive* evidence. It is *intuitive* evidence, I take it, which Euclid *always* offers (the evidence of superposition in the last resort): but often not in the most direct way. The issue is not, as Schopenhauer will have it, between intuitive evidence on the one side, and the Synthetic Method on the other; but between the Analytic Method and the Synthetic Method. Schopenhauer may or may not be right in holding (against Euclid) that the Analytic Method is better than the Synthetic for the purpose of teaching Geometry. This is a practical question in *Paedeutik* upon which I am not competent to give an opinion; but I think that he is certainly wrong in supposing that Euclid's evidence is 'logical, *not intuitive.*' Euclid marshals intuitive evidence according to the Synthetic Method. The passage quoted from *Met.* Θ. 9 shows that the Synthetic Method of *διαίρεσις* is fully consistent with the appeal to intuition at every step. As an instance of the confusion into which Schopenhauer falls, the fact may be mentioned that, while blaming Euclid for his neglect of the Analytic Method and of the appeal to intuition,

1112 b. 20. (the two seem to be identified by Schopenhauer), he singles out the apagogic proofs for special condemnation, as relying on *Logical* as distinguished from Intuitional evidence. But competent authorities tell us that these apagogic proofs are the only examples of the Analytic Method in Euclid!

b. 23. § 12. καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον . . . γενέσει] The Paraphrast has—τρόπον τινὰ ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος καὶ ὁ μαθηματικὸς ἀναλύει· καὶ ὁ ἔσχατον εὑρίσκεται ἀναλύοντι, τοῦτο ἔργον πρῶτον γίνεται τῷ βουλευομένῳ· καθάπερ ὁ μαθηματικός, πρὸς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀφίξεται ἀναλύων, τοῦτο ὑποτιθείς, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου διὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὁδεύων, ἀποδείκνυσι τὸ προκείμενον. Καὶ ἄμφω δέ, εἰ ἀναλύοντες ἀδυνάτοις ἐντύχοιεν, ἀφίστανται τοῦ ζητήματος.

b. 24. § 13. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται] The parallel in μαθηματικὴ ζήτησις to such a case in βούλευσις would be the ἀδύνατον to which the ἀνάλυσις conducts in apagogic demonstration: cf. καὶ ἄμφω δέ in the passage quoted from the Paraphrast in last note.

b. 30. § 14. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς . . . διὰ τίνος] This clause comes in awkwardly. What are the λοιπά? How does the δι' οὗ—whether masc. (Michelet) or neut. (Grant)—differ from the ὄργανα just mentioned, and the πῶς from ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν? The πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων of § 11 seems to make it necessary to take ἢ διὰ τίνος here as epexegetic of πῶς, and therefore to regard τίνος as neut. If τίνος is neuter, it will be reasonable to suppose that οὗ is masculine.

b. 31. § 15. καθάπερ εἴρηται] Ramsauer notes that the exact phrase ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων has not been used before, although νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου has been given (§ 7) as one of the αἴτια. Καθάπερ εἴρηται, he thinks, would be strictly in place only if some such words had been used as we find in *E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 18 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεών τινών ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζῴων. Perhaps, however, ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, § 13, may be considered sufficient to justify καθάπερ εἴρηται.

Ramsauer has another difficulty. He thinks that the words ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων are unnecessary to the argument which follows. The 'conclusion' βουλευτὸν τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος is derived from the premisses ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν, and αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα: but these premisses, he thinks, do not need ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων to rest upon. Strictly not: but surely these latter words have this bearing on what follows, that the

introduce (or reintroduce) the *τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν* and the 1112 b. 31.
which are, in Ramsauer's view, necessary to the 'con-
If, however, we follow Bywater in adopting the *οὐ γὰρ*
υλευτόν of K^b in place of the old *οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη β.*, Ram-
ifficulty will not arise.

ράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα] *Πράξεις* here are *τὰ αὐτῷ πρακτά, τὰ καθ'* b. 33.
i. 1. 10 *αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα*), or *λοιπά*, which are
some end (iii. 5. 18 *τὸ τέλος . . . φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ*
ς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες πράττουσι). Ramsauer finds the statement
ις ἄλλων ἕνεκα too general, and inconsistent with the doctrine
hat some *ἐνέργειαι* or *πράξεις* are their own *τέλη*. But it
remembered that properly it is only *εὐπραξία*, or a syste-
of *καλαὶ πράξεις*, which is its own *τέλος*. Each individual
the system is correctly described as *ἄλλου ἕνεκα*, cf. iii. 7. 6
ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

ὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη] This, the reading of K^b alone, seems to be
βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη has already been
ı in § 11: whereas the old reading *οὐκ ἂν οὖν* would make
nclusion' now independently reached. It must be re-
d, however, that in these writings a conclusion is some-
ɔved, in the most formal manner, more than once in
passages. Grant quotes *Rhet.* i. 6. 1362 a. 17, for the
—*βουλευτὸν τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.*

ἢ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα] These words are added to prevent b. 34.
: misunderstanding. *Τὰ αὐτῷ πρακτά*, with which *βουλή* is
d, are indeed *καθ' ἕκαστα*: but *βουλή* is concerned with *τὰ*
α in a different way from *αἴσθησις*. *Αἴσθησις* is concerned
ἕκαστα as such, i. e. separately—with 'this is red,' 'this is
his is heavy'; but *καθ' ἕκαστα as such* are not the objects
: only *καθ' ἕκαστα* in so far as they may turn out to be
some end: *e. g. αἴσθησις* says this piece of cloth is scarlet:
ides that it is a bad colour for a uniform.
ɔws (*δή*) from *τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη* being the objects of *βουλή*,
αθ' ἕκαστα per se, as well as *τὸ τέλος* (this is the force of
beyond its scope.

εἰ βουλεύσεται (sc. *τις*), **εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει**] Grant says that 1113 a. 2.
ıpersonal: but the analogy of *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 2 *εἰς*
ɔ*ῦσι* suggests that *τις* should be supplied.
not think that this clause ought to be taken very closely

1113 a. 2. with the immediately preceding words: it rather refers to τὰ τὰ τέλη, and says that in tracing back the series of means (τὰ καὶ διὰ τίνων) we must stop somewhere, and begin to act. Οὐ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ are, as Ramsauer observes, question fact. With such questions deliberation has indeed nothing to but it is not suggested, I think, by the words εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει deliberation would never reach its goal *if* it tried to deal them. It simply cannot deal with them; but, within its sphere of τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος it may prolong the review unduly. must be noted, however, that the writer of the parallel passage in *E. E.* (ii. 10. 1226 b. 1) understands by the regression εἰς ἄπ an examination of the data of αἴσθησις themselves. So also Paraphrast—οὔτε τοίνυν τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ βουλευτόν, οὔτε τῶν πρὸς τὸ τ ὅσα καθ' ἕκαστα· οἷον, εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο, εἰ πέπεπται, εἰ πεποίηται ὧν ταῦτα γὰρ αἰσθήσει γινώσκομεν, οὐ βουλῇ καὶ κρίσει· εἰ δὲ περὶ τούτω βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει.

a. 3. § 17. πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν] 'Except that thing chosen is, as such, set apart,' *i. e.* it is the same step, whi first 'under deliberation,' and then 'chosen,' set apart, or upon. We cannot review steps εἰς ἄπειρον: we must event choose one of them.

a. 5. ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν] Cf. *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 l βουλευόμεθα πάντες τοῦτο ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς γενέσεω ἀρχήν.

a. 6. τὸ ἡγούμενον—τὸ προαιρούμενον] Schol. ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς. C 2. 5.

a. 8. § 18. οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ προείλοντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ] Paraphrast's note is—Ὅμηρος . . . εἰσάγει τοὺς βασιλεῖς μετ βουλὴν τὸ προκριθὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντας τῷ δήμῳ, ὥσπερ τῇ προαιρέσει, πραχθῆναι. Here ὀρέξει might be substituted for προαιρέσει t advantage of the Paraphrast's interpretation, according to v then the βασιλεῖς would represent βούλευσις, the δῆμος would r sent ὄρεξις, and the result would be the adoption of a lin public action—a προαίρεσις. But if we turn to Aristotle's te see that this can hardly be the true interpretation. If the supplies the active element of ὄρεξις, while the βασιλεῖς suppl βούλευσις, how are we to explain ἃ προείλοντο οἱ βασιλεῖς? It not seem likely that we can have a careless proleptic use o

word, in a passage which contains the definition of προαίρεσις. 1113 a. 8.
We must believe, I think, that οἱ βασιλεῖς, representing, as they do, τὸ ἡγούμενον, also represent τὸ προαιρούμενον, and are therefore the sources of βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις. What place then has the δῆμος in the comparison? Merely, I think, that of ὀργανικὰ μέρη, which can be set in motion by the προαίρεσις.

§ 19. βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν] Here τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν is a a. 10.
partitive genitive—'the object of choice is that among things in our power which we seek to take after deliberation': whereas in the next line it is a genitive depending on ὄρεξις. It is a very careless style of writing which permits ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν to stand so close to ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

ἐκ τοῦ . . . βούλευσιν] M^b has βούλησιν: but βούλευσιν is certainly a. 11.
right: cf. vi. 2. 2. The λόγος of vi. 2. 2 is the βούλευσις of the present passage.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

Choice then is of means, wish of the end. But is the end wished the really good, as some suppose, or, as others suppose, only that which the wisher thinks good? Each view has its difficulties. If we say that the really good is the object of wish, we must draw the conclusion that the man who makes a wrong selection, and 'wishes something bad,' does not 'wish' at all; while if we say that whatever a man thinks good is the object of wish, we must be prepared to maintain that there is no such thing as a natural or absolute object of wish, but that all is relative to the feeling of the individual.

Perhaps we may avoid this dilemma by saying that the really good is the object of wish in the strict and true sense of the expression 'object of wish,' but that what each of us thinks good is the object of wish for each of us, i. e. *object of wish in a relative sense; so that, if a man is really good, that which is really good will be 'his object of wish,' and, if he is bad, that which is bad—just as the healthy man finds an ordinary 'healthy diet' good for his health, while an invalid finds the diet of the sick room good for his.*

In all matters the good man judges rightly, and what things really are he thinks them to be. Every man looks at things in his own way, according to his disposition; but the good man is the normal man, with whose measure the divergencies of other men must be compared. His distinguishing characteristic is that he sees things as they truly are: other men are deceived by pleasure. They think that it is good, although it is not. They seek after it as good, and shun pain as evil.

1113 a. 15. § 1. ἡ δὲ βούλησις . . . τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν] Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 467 D *ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει.*

δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι] τἀγαθοῦ is the reading of Γ, Asp., CCC, NC, Cambr., Ald., and is accepted by Bywater and Susem. The other authorities have ἀγαθοῦ. Grant has a good note here in which he quotes Plato, *Gorgias* 466 sqq., where the doctrine τἀγαθοῦ ἡ βούλησις is maintained: see also passages collected by Bonitz (note, p. 497, on *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 a) in which Aristotle describes the general tendency of Nature as towards the good—*de Gen. et Corr.* ii. 10. 336 b. 27 *ἐν ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὀρέγεσθαί φαμεν τὴν φύσιν*—*de Part. Anim.* iv. 10. 687 a. 15 *εἰ οὖν οὕτω βέλτιον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖ τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ διὰ τὰς χεῖράς ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος φρονιμώτατος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζῴων ἔχει χεῖρας.* Cf. also *de Inces. Anim.* 2. 704 b. 15, and passages quoted in note on *E. N.* i. 9. 5.

In all creatures there is a *θεῖόν τι* which directs their efforts towards that which is naturally good. This instinctive tendency to conform to the objective law of the environment is often thwarted by influences of subjective origin; but the continuance of life proves it to be the strongest principle—*τὸ κράτιστον.* 'It rules the world,' because, after all, it 'has might as it has right.'

a. 16. τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ] Grant refers to *Met.* K. 6. 1062 b. 13 *καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος* (Protagoras) *ἔφη πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι μέτρον ἄνθρωπον, οὐθὲν ἕτερον λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτ' εἶναι παγίως . . . μέτρον δ' εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ.* Cf. *Met.* Γ. 5. 1009 a. 6, where Aristotle says that the doctrine of Protagoras amounts to a denial of the Principle of Contradiction—*ἔτι δ' ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος, καὶ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἄμφω ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ εἶναι. πολλοὶ γὰρ τἀναντία ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταὐτὰ δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεῦσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι πάντ' ἀληθῆ· τὰ ἀντικείμενα γὰρ δοξάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ διεψευσμένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες· εἰ οὖν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα οὕτως, ἀληθεύσουσι πάντες.* The denial of this Principle (πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή *Met.* Γ. 3. 1005 b. 18) amounts to the denial of Life. Life is not a succession of unrelated *φαντάσματα*, but a principle acting in conformity with definite objective laws—the physical life acting in conformity with definite physical laws, the moral life with

the law of Duty. Right and wrong are 'in things,' not in our feelings. See Cudworth's *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, book ii. chap. i for an excellent discussion of the individualistic morality of Protagoras. 1113 a. 16.

§ 2. **συμβαίνει . . . μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἱρούμενος**] This verbal difficulty (for Aristotle is really at one ith Plato against Protagoras and all who set up the subjective andard of feeling) the writer of the *M. M.* (ii. 11. 1208 b. 39) ades by means of a verbal distinction—*βουλητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀθόν, βουλητέον δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν.* a. 17.

§ 3. **μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν**] *i. e.* they deny the existence of an ective moral standard. a. 20.

τὸ δοκοῦν . . . φαίνεται] Zell quotes passages which show that se terms are properly distinguished: but here there does not m to be any distinction suggested—*E. E.* II. 2. 1235 b. 25 *ὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ ᾔδυ ὀρεκτόν· φαινόμενον γάρ τι ἀγαθόν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ νεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταὐτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα—de An.* iii. 3. 428 a. 18 sqq. a. 21.

4. **ὁ σπουδαῖος κ.τ.λ.**] There is an objective good, a *φύσει λητόν*, or *ἀγαθόν*, which *ἀρετή*, man's true *φύσις*, or perfection closes: cf. vi. 12. 6 *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν.* What aid here of the *σπουδαῖος*, or perfect *man*, must be said of every fect organism. Its actions are adapted to its environment. e were to ask 'what is best for a butterfly?' the answer would —'to do as the nature and instincts of a butterfly dictate.' The mple introduced by *ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων* a. 26 shows how far as from Aristotle's thought to draw a sharp line between *ἀρετή* l other phases of life. His biological studies made it impossible him to do so. a. 29.

§ 5. **μέτρον**] For the *μέτρον ἄνθρωπος* of Protagoras Aristotle stitutes *μέτρον ὁ σπουδαῖος*: cf. *E. N.* ix. 4. 2, and x. 5. 10. a. 33.

τὴν ἡδονήν] *i. e.* the pleasure of *ἀπόλαυσις* is their chief good. ey do not know that the performance of duty—*τὰ καλὰ πράττειν* is the chief good, and is attended by 'its own' pleasure: cf. *N.* i. 8. §§ 11 and 12. a. 34.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

The particular acts deliberately chosen as means to a wished for end being voluntarily performed, and virtue manifesting itself in the performance of such acts. it follows that being virtuous is 'in our power'—and being vicious also: for, if to do this or that is right, and is in our power, then not to do it, being wrong, will also be in our power; and if not to do it is right, and in our power, then to do it, being wrong, will also be in our power. Indeed, if we deny that being good or bad is in our power, we must deny that man is the parent of his actions. But this we cannot deny, for actions cannot be referred to any other origin than to the man who performs them. Originating in him they are in his power, or voluntary. If they originated elsewhere, what would be the use of trying to influence him by rewards and punishments? If they were not voluntary, we should no more try to persuade *him to do them, than we try to persuade a man to feel warm, or experience any other sensation over which he has no power. On the other hand, where the efficiency of the man is obviously excluded, that is, in the case of acts forced upon him, and of acts caused by ignorance, we do not think of punishing him—unless, indeed, the ignorance he caused by himself. Thus the drunken man is ignorant of what he does; but he is himself the cause of the ignorance; and in some cities is doubly punished—both for the ignorance, and for what he does in it: so also men are punished for what they do in ignorance of a plain law, because the ignorance is due to their own carelessness. If it be urged in extenuation—that 'it is their nature to be careless'—we answer that it is a second nature, which they have acquired by repeating acts which it was in their power not to perform: that they knew quite well what the repetition of these acts was leading to; and that consequently their final state—their carelessness or injustice generally—has been voluntarily chosen by them: not voluntarily chosen, however, in the sense that they can, if they wish, lay it aside and become just, any more than a man can, if he wish, lay aside the bad health which has resulted from a voluntarily chosen course of dissipation. It originally rested with themselves not to become unjust; but they have made themselves so with their eyes open. In this sense they are 'voluntarily unjust' although it is now beyond the power of 'wishing' to change their injustice into justice. And, lest it should be thought strange that a moral state which we cannot alter if we wish, should yet be described as 'voluntary,' and be blamed, it may be pointed out that there is nothing exceptional in this: what we say of a moral state is true of many bodily states also: no one would blame a man for natural unsightliness; but for unsightliness produced by dissipation or carelessness a man is blamed: blamed, because his unsightliness was 'voluntarily' produced, although now beyond the power of 'wishing' to change. In short, where blame lies, the vice is 'in our power.' We cannot shelter ourselves from this blame behind the pretext that the vice is* now *fixed and* no longer *'in our power'; it* originally *was 'in our power' not to contract it.*

But some one may say—' Perhaps it is not true that it originally was in our wer not to contract it. Perhaps the vicious disposition which you hold a man ponsible for because he himself, as you say, has fixed it with his eyes open, was ed for him from the beginning. A man always seeks what he thinks good. ut is he master of his thoughts? Does not his view of the Chief End of Life pend upon his disposition? You say that he himself contributes to the mak- g of his disposition, in which case, of course, he would be in a sense the cause the view which he takes of the Chief End, and he responsible for the conduct 'ermined by that view—but what if he himself has nothing to do with the king of his disposition—if it is fixed by nature from the beginning? Then rly no blame attaches to the man who does evil. He does evil because nature not endowed him with an eye for the true end of life.'

To this we answer—You prove more than you wish. You prove virtue to be involuntary as vice. If vice is natural blindness, virtue is natural endow- ut. The virtuous man, equally with the vicious man, is dominated in his ions by a conception of the end which has been fixed for him from the begin- g. But if, in order to make the good man a voluntary agent, you admit 'er that he has something to do with the formation of his conception of the l end, or that, though dominated by an end fixed for him by nature, he rtheless selects means voluntarily—surely you are bound to make the same nissions in the case of the bad man? If the good man is a voluntary agent the bad man. Both are efficient in the performance of acts, if not in the nation of the conception of the end. Nay rather, we cannot regard acts and 'as separate. By acts good or bad we contribute to the making of character l or bad; and according as is the character so is the end.

f then the virtues are 'voluntary,' the vices are also 'voluntary.' It is not e supposed, however, that these habits are voluntary as actions are voluntary. oluntary action is one over which an agent, with full knowledge of all the umstances, has control from beginning to end. But a voluntary habit is over the beginning only of which the agent had control—which has imper- ibly, like bodily weakness, taken hold of him and become at last independent is control. It is called voluntary because the acts which produced it were *in power to perform or not.*

§ 1. **περὶ ταῦτα**] Apparently τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος: see iii. 3. 15, αἱ **1113 b. 4.**
ξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα.

§ 2. **ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή κ.τ.λ.**] The Paraphrast exhibits the **b. 6.**
nexion between this clause (introduced by δή) and the previous use thus—ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις δι' ἐθίζομεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν ἀρετὴν προαιρεταὶ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσίν. The iter of the *M. M.* (i. 9. 1187 a. 7) makes 'Socrates' deny the ctrine of this section—Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπου- ος εἶναι ἢ φαύλους. εἰ γάρ τις, φησίν, ἐρωτήσειεν ὁντιναοῦν πότερον βούλοιτο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἄδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν ἕλοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐπ' κίας καὶ δειλίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως. δῆλον δ' ὡς εἰ φαῦλοί

1113 b. 6. *τινες εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἑκόντες εἴησαν φαῦλοι· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής. διὰ τί γὰρ ὁ νομοθ φαῦλα πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα κελεύει; καὶ ἐπὶ μὲ ζημίαν τάττει, ἂν πράττῃ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς, ἂν μὴ πράττῃ; ἂν εἴη ταῦτα νομοθετῶν, ἃ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι πράττειν. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν τὸ σπουδαίοις εἶναι καὶ τὸ φαύλοις.* The writer of th course, misunderstands the true position of 'Socra 'Socrates' says that vice is involuntary (*e.g. Protag* also *Gorg.* 509 E), he means only that it is *παρὰ φύσι* doctrine *Meno* 100 B *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνο παραγίγνεται*, where the reference is to the political Themistocles or Pericles—it is evidently not touch arguments as those here brought forward by the writer 'Socrates' was not the man to underrate the influ *νομοθέτης*.

b. 7. **ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ.**] Grant refers to *Met.* Θ. 2 λόγου *δυνάμεις* are said to be *τῶν ἐναντίων*. Cf. *Met.* *ὄρεξις* or *προαίρεσις* is said to be *τὸ κύριον*, and to determ the two possible *ἐναντία* shall be selected.

b. 13. **§ 3. τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι**] 'And *καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά*) is, according to our view, and bad.' *ἦν* refers back (as *e.g.* in iii. 8. 14), not Grant thinks, 'to the preceding section,' but more the doctrine already established that the *deliberate choi* or *τὰ αἰσχρά* indicates a good or bad *character*: cf. i any rate Trendelenburg, in his paper on *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* *Museum*, 1828, vol. ii. pp. 457 sqq.), referred to by Gran telling us that *ἀγαθοῖς* here is simply by attraction to *ἡμ* the formula *τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι* = 'the essential idea of good a good man,' is not in the writer's mind. He seems to of the way in which a man's deliberate actions indicate to the ordinary observer; not of the scientific form *εἶναι*) of Virtue or Vice. For the use of the dat. w express the essential notion see *De Anima* ii. 1. 412 *γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ*—*An. Post.* ii. 4. 91 *τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι.*—*Phys.* 23 *τὸ γὰρ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρον τὸ αὐτό, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ ἅ καθ' ὑποκειμένου*—*Met.* Z. 6. 1031 b. 11 *ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἓν εἶν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, ὅσα μὴ κατ' ἄλλο*

καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ πρῶτα—*i.e.* the words *ἄπειρον, ἀγαθόν, καλόν* mark 1113 b. 13.
notions, not concrete things. That *τὸ ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι* in the present passage (*E. N.* iii. 5. 3) cannot mean 'the essential notion' of the virtuous man becomes very plain if we turn to ii. 6. 17, where the essential notion of *ἀρετή* is distinguished from its excellence—*κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.*—*Τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ* answers to the *τὰ καλὰ πράττειν* of the present passage.

§ 4. **οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος**] *μακάριος* seems to be b. 14.
the reading of all MSS., and is accordingly restored by Bywater. Bekker and Susemihl adopt *μάκαρ*, the suggestion of Victorius. Bergk (*Poet. Lyr.* p. 1076, referred to by Ramsauer) thinks that this line may be by Solon. The Schol. (quoted by Zell and Michelet) says—*παροιμία τοῦτο ἢ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ Συρακόσιος κέχρηται ὡ οἷς φησίν· ἀλλὰ μὰν ἐγὼ ἀναγκαῖος ταῦτα πάντα ποιέω, οἴομαι δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρός, οὐδ' ἅταν ἔχων. ἐν Ἡρακλεῖ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ παραφόρῳ.* The line is quoted in the spurious dialogue *περὶ δικαίου* (Plato *Dial.* p. 374 a.) referred to by Zell, Coraes, and Grant. There can be no doubt that the writer of the line used *πονηρός* in the sense of 'wretched,' to contrast with *μάκαρ* meaning 'happy.' But Aristotle here, and the writer of the dialogue *περὶ δικαίου*, quote the line in order to give the word its other sense of 'wicked,' although that other sense is obviously not intended by the poet. The liberty which they thus take with the poet's meaning is not so great however as it seems. A Greek would not distinguish the two senses of *πονηρός* so sharply as we do when we are compelled to translate the word by 'wicked' in one context, and by 'wretched' in another.

§ 5. **τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις**] Above, iii. 3. 15—*ἔοικε δὴ . . . ἄν-* b. 17.
θρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων. As for the parallel *ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων*, it has not, Ramsauer notes, been mentioned before in the *E. N.*; but in *E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 15 we have—*εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἑκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους . . . πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζῴων.*

§ 6. **εἰ δὲ ταῦτα**] *i.e. τὰ εἰρημένα.* b. 19.

παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν] Bekker reads *ἐφ'* in b. 20.
place of the first *ἐν*. The text as given above is that restored by

1113 b. 20. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 56) who quotes in support of ἐν in l
the account of τὸ ἀκούσιον as οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν 1110 a. 1, an
where τὸ ἀκούσιον is said to occur ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τ
in contrast to τὸ ἑκούσιον which is that οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τ
1110 b. 4. He also quotes 1110 a. 16 ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινοῦ
μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ
αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή: also 1111 a. 23, 1112 b. 28, :
1135 b. 19, 1140 a. 13. Ἐπ' or ἐφ' and ἐν are often c
scribes, and MS. authority does not help us much in
a decision; but here there seem to be good internal
preferring ἐν in both places. As for the inference that
ἀρχαί are ἐν ἡμῖν the acts are ἐφ' ἡμῖν, it is not, as t
conclusive. The movements of the heart and lungs pr
ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, but are not therefore ἐφ' ἡμῖν. There are
kinds of ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν. What is the special nature of th
ἡμῖν which produce movements that are ἐφ' ἡμῖν?

b. 24. § 7. ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι] This is a full s
what is implied in the δι' ἄγνοιαν of iii. 1. 14. Grant
excellent remarks on the value of the argument of t
'This fact [of rewards and punishments] is not suffic
prove a metaphysical system which would represent
judge, criminal, and the whole world, as forced to do w
by an irresistible succession of cause and effect. But e
politically it is sufficient to justify a practical assumption
And in any system it must at all events be taken accoun

b. 31. § 8. διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια] The reference is, as the e
out, to the law of Pittacus, see *Pol.* ii. 12. 1274 b. 19, a
25. 1402 b. 9.

1114 a. 4. § 10. τοιούτους] K^b N^b and NC have τοιοῦτον.
conjectures τοιοῦτοι, and in the next line ἄδικοι and ἀκόλα

a. 11. § 13.] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 28) would transpose the
ἔτι δ' . . . ἀκόλαστον, and εἰ δὲ μὴ . . . ἂν εἴη. That wh
first brings the foregoing remarks to an end; while tha
puts second introduces a new point—the Platonic τὸ
μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι (see *Gorg.* 509 E ὡμολογήσαμεν
λόμενον ἀδικεῖν ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν,
345 D, E). I think that the run of the passage is mucl
by the transposition.

§ 14. οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε κ.τ.λ.] 'No man wishes to be unjust' would be true if wish (βούλησις) were only of τὸ ἀγαθόν, as distinguished from τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. But the ἀδικῶν voluntarily with his eyes open performs the acts ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, and he is responsible for the habit of ἀδικία which is formed. He must be treated practically as if he wished to form it. It is irrelevant, then, to urge 'no man wishes to be unjust' as an excuse of injustice. 'Not wishing,' in the sense of 'not making injustice his ideal,' has evidently nothing to do with the matter. He did not 'wish' in this sense to be unjust, and yet he became unjust by his own voluntary acts; and, being unjust, he may wish to be just, but that will not make him just. 1114 a. 13.

καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν] καίτοι is Rassow's certain conjecture (as it seems to me) for καί, see *Forsch.* p. 28. a. 15.

προεμένῳ] *sc.* τὴν ὑγίειαν. Par. a. 17.

βαλεῖν] K^b, L^b, M^b, O^b, Γ, Ald., Cambr., have βαλεῖν: but λαβεῖν is the reading of CCC, NC, B^1, B^2. Syllables written backwards are not very uncommon in MSS. Bywater brackets καὶ ῥῖψαι, reading βαλεῖν. If βαλεῖν accidentally became λαβεῖν, the words καὶ ῥῖψαι would be naturally added; or perhaps ῥῖψαι was originally a marginal gloss on βαλεῖν, and crept into the text, and suggested the change (not however universally made) of βαλεῖν into λαβεῖν. Susemihl reads λαβεῖν καὶ ῥῖψαι. a. 18.

§ 15.] We are held responsible for states of body sometimes; *à fortiori* for states of mind, even though it may be beyond the power of 'wishing' to change them. a. 21.

§ 17.] This involved section, into which the movement of a whole Dialogue seems to be compressed, consists of two sentences, in the first of which—εἰ δέ τις 1114 a. 31 .... εὐφυΐα 1114 b. 12—the protasis states the position of Aristotle's opponent, and the apodosis, beginning οὐθείς 1114 b. 3, develops the consequences of that position in such a way as to lead up to the second sentence—1114 b. 12 εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐπαινετόν;—in which Aristotle refutes his opponent by showing him that he 'proves too much.' The clause 1114 b. 1 εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . b. 3 αὐτὸς αἴτιος is best regarded as a parenthesis stating Aristotle's own view, thrown in at the beginning of the 'Dialogue,' by the side a. 31.

1114 a. 31. of the opponent's view, to make the issue between the two disputants clearer.

a. 32. **τῆς δὲ φαντασίας**] *φαντασία* is described in *de An.* iii. 3. 428 b. 10 as a *κίνησις* started by *αἴσθησις*, and resembling it; *φαντάσματα* are images derived from sense—*ideas*, *Vorstellungen*, 'reliques of motions made in the sense'—to quote an expression of Hobbes (*Lev.* iii), whose account of *Imagination* (*Lev.* ii and iii) resembles Aristotle's account of *φαντασία* very closely. See *de An.* iii. 3, where, after having shown that *φαντασία* is not *αἴσθησις*, *ἐπιστήμη*, *νοῦς*, or *δόξα*, Aristotle says (428 b. 9) *οὔτ' ἄρα ἕν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὔτ' ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία. ἀλλ' ἐπειδή ἐστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.* Cf. also 429 a. 1 *ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἴληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φάους οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι.* *Φαντασία* is thus a motion caused by sensation, distinct from sensation, but resembling it. As such, it mediates between sensation and thought—*de Mem.* 1. 449 b. 31 *νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος*—and gives appetite objects, see *de An.* iii. 10. 433 a. 27 *ἡ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον ταύτῃ ἑαυτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική· ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει.* *Αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία* converts the sensation of object into an idea of it which attracts or repels: *λογιστικὴ* (call *βουλευτική* in *de An.* iii. 11. 434 a. 7) *φαντασία* enables the calcu tive faculty to marshal reasons which will appeal to *ὄρεξ* Hobbes' 'Trayn of Imaginations' (*Lev.* iii)—the crime, the offic the prison, the judge, and the gallows—is an excellent example what *λογιστικὴ φαντασία* does. The close connexion which th subsists between *φαντασία* and *ὄρεξις* enables us to appreciate force of the former term in the present section. It is used h simply for 'the idea that this or that is good.' Hence it is alm equivalent to 'a desire or wish for this or that.'

ν οὖν . . . αὐτὸς αἴτιος] Aristotle's own view here parenthe- 1114 b. 1.
stated in conditional form involves a difficulty. A man is
ς πως αἴτιος because he has voluntarily performed the acts
have resulted in the ἕξις: but each of these acts implies
ι—ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας: what if φαντασία ἧς οὐ
μεν dominates the whole process by which a ἕξις is formed?
e cannot be said to face this difficulty. It is enough for
ent purpose to refute his opponent by making him prove
an he wishes, *viz.* that we cannot take credit to ourselves
virtues. Broader ground, however, might have been taken.
t have been argued that the φύσις, or natural bent which
ıes the τέλος, is after all *the man's own* φύσις—*his own*
r—in short *himself*—the concrete man, made up of ele-
ıherited from ancestors, and of elements taken on in the
of the individual; and that consequently to say that the
xed φύσει is to say that the man himself fixes it, not that
d for him, in spite of himself, by an external power. The
ıl antecedents of the individual are not external to him.
: summed up *in* him. Aristotle's opponent in the present
like many disputants in our own day, commits the mis-
xternalising biological antecedents. He does not see that
ited character is still *the man's own* character.

μή, οὐθείς] εἰ δὲ μηδείς is the reading of M^b, L^b, N^b, Γ, b. 3.
B², NC, CCC, adopted by Rassow (*Forsch.* 121) and
l. K^b, O^b, Camb., read εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθείς, adopted by Bekker,
:r, and Bywater. If εἰ δὲ μηδείς be adopted, the whole
s one sentence, in which the protasis makes three starts:
τις λέγοι, (2) εἰ δὲ μηδείς, and (3) εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ—the
beginning at τί μᾶλλον b. 12.

ι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει] Ramsauer notes that b. 4.
resembles Aristotle's ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν
ρεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ
E. N. iii. 1. 14. Aristotle differs from his present op-
ı regarding the μοχθηρός as αἴτιος τῆς ἀγνοίας, in recognising
σις which causes the ἄγνοια the man's own character.

ῶ τέλους ἕφεσις] = τὸ δὲ τέλος οὗ ἐφίεται. b. 5.

] That εὐφυΐα is highly prized by Aristotle is shown by b. 8.

1114 b. 8. the place which φυσικὴ ἀρετή (*E. N.* vi. 13. 1) and εὐγένεια (see on i. 8. 16) occupy in his system.

b. 9. τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . τοιοῦτον ἕξει] There is a Platonic ring these words, and the doctrine reminds one of that maintai the end of the *Meno*—that ἀρετή is a divine gift, which its po cannot communicate to others. We can imagine a Plat opponent encouraged by Aristotle to enlarge on ἡ τελεία καὶ εὐφυΐα, and so lay himself open to the awkward question—τί ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιων ;

Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 121) finds the construction of the s τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα irregular : the words τὸ γὰρ . . . ἕξει have no suitable predicate, the predicate τελεία καὶ εὐφυΐα being a superlative which answers rather to the claus εὖ . . . πεφυκέναι. He accordingly translates, as if εὐφυΐα ἂν read after ἕξει, thus—'das Grösste und Schönste, was m einem andern nicht empfangen und lernen kann, sond man so besitzen wird, wie es von Natur geworden ist, εὐφυΐα), und ist es gut und schön von Natur geworden, s die vollkommene und wahre εὐφυΐα.' I cannot help thinki this is a little too subtle. The superlatives μέγιστον καὶ κάλλ the first clause of the sentence surely deserve the superlat dicate as much as τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι. But is right in making τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἕξει a subject wit (whether τελεία or not) as predicate? Is it not better to μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον the object of ἕξει and to regard th τὸ γὰρ . . . ἕξει as explanatory of εὐφυής l. 8, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ developing εὐ- and καὶ ὁ . . . ἕφυ developing -φυής? We then translate—'for he will have that which is greatest an and that which one cannot receive or learn from another, entirely from nature.' Then follows the clause καὶ τὸ εὖ . . not as 'Ein steigernder Zusatz zum Subject (Rassow, 121),' but added to distinguish this moral εὐφυΐα, as ἀληθινή, from the lower kind of εὐφυΐα which a man o natural ability' possesses. The τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφυΐα passage may be compared, as Ramsauer notes, with the θεί (*E. E.* H. 14. 1248 b. 3), or εὐφυΐα ὀρέξεως καὶ ἐπιθυμίας (14. 1247 b. 39) of the *E. E.* and *M. M.* The writers treatises found the doctrine of φυσικὴ ἀρετή in Aristotle ; certainly developed it in a way which suggests Platonic i

The Platonic tone and phraseology of the following passage (*M.M.* ii. 8. 1207 a. 35) is remarkable:—*ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐτυχία ἄλογος φύσις· ὁ γὰρ εὐτυχής ἐστιν ὁ ἄνευ λόγου ἔχων ὁρμὴν πρὸς τἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνων, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ φύσεως· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔνεστιν τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον ᾧ ὁρμῶμεν ἀλόγως πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχωμεν. καὶ εἴ τις ἐρωτήσειε τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, διὰ τί τοῦτο ἀρέσκει σοι οὕτω πράττειν; οὐκ οἶδα, φησίν, ἀλλ' ἀρέσκει μοι, ὅμοιον πάσχων τοῖς ἐνθουσιάζουσιν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ἄνευ λόγου ὁρμὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τι.* Cf. Plato, *Meno*, 99 D *καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσι.* 1114 b. 9.

§ 18. **τὰ δὲ λοιπά**] *τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.* b. 15.

§ 19.] At the end of § 17 the opponent had to admit that if the *τέλος* being *φυσικόν* makes vice involuntary, it also makes virtue involuntary. But he wishes to believe that virtue is voluntary (*ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν* 1114 b. 19); accordingly he must admit *either* that the end is not fixed *φύσει* (*εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν*—it is partly due to himself) *or* that the end is indeed *φυσικόν*, but the means are voluntarily chosen by the good man (*εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον . . .*). But either admission, made in the interest of the voluntariness of virtue, entails the voluntariness of vice. b. 16.

§ 20. **ὥσπερ λέγεται**] *i.e.* it is maintained by our opponent that *virtue* is voluntary. b. 22.

§§ 21, 22.] The order accepted by Bekker from the MSS. viz. (1) *κοινῇ . . . προστάξῃ*, (2) *οὐχ ὁμοίως . . . ἑκούσιοι* ought to be reversed: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 28. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* pp. 205–6) inclines to the view that the section *οὐχ ὁμοίως . . . ἑκούσιοι* is a *marginale*, and not, as Scaliger supposed, a part of the original text detached from its immediate antecedent § 20 by the intrusion of the words *κοινῇ . . . προστάξῃ*. He thinks that the words *οὐχ ὁμοίως . . . ἑκούσιοι* are out of place after § 20, which merely proves that *ἀρετή* and *κακία* are equally voluntary. But are they out of place as referring back to the remark made at the end of § 14? b. 26.

§ 21. **πρακτικαὶ ⟨καὶ⟩ καθ' αὑτάς**] *i.e.* not *τούτων πρακτικαὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός*: *e.g.* the *ἕξις* of temperance produces temperate acts, because it is its own nature to do so, not because they happen to b. 28.

1114 b. 28. conduce to health or respectability. Susemihl and Bywater insert καί before καθ', with Γ, Asp., O^b, CCC, NC, Cambr. Of course MSS. do not help us to a decision. I do not like the καί.

1115 a. 3. § 22. χρήσασθαι] 'to act': cf. the use of χρῆσις = ἐνέργεια *E.E.* ii. 1. 1219 a. 14.

a. 5. § 23. πόσαι] See Grant's excellent notes here and on ii. 7. 1. Aristotle can hardly have regarded his list of virtues as theoretically exhaustive. He only means that it is not limited to the four 'cardinal virtues' σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, but involves a more minute analysis of the conditions of human life than that enumeration presupposes. We may suspect that, having written τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς, he naturally went on to write καὶ πόσαι.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

Here ends our general description of moral virtue. Let us now proceed to describe in detail the various forms of moral virtue—the virtues *in the plural: their number our list, when finished, will show.*

Courage. *It is a mediocrity in relation to the feelings of fear and confidence. Now, we fear* evils—*to use the most general expression. Hence fear is defined as the expectation of evil. But although we fear* all *evils—disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, it is not with all of them that courage has to do: for there are some evils which a man* ought *to fear. Thus if a man does not fear disgrace he is shameless, not courageous, although the latter epithet is sometimes wrongly applied to him, because he resembles the courageous man in 'not fearing.' On the other hand, poverty and disease perhaps ought not to be feared: they do not come by one's own fault; but yet, being without fear of them does not constitute a man courageous, except in a metaphorical sense. A man may be a coward in war, and yet look the loss of his fortune boldly in the face. Or again, he may fear the outrage of wife and children or the jealousy of Heaven, and yet be no coward; may look forward to a flogging with a stout heart, and yet not be courageous. What then is the object of fear with which courage is concerned? Surely that which is the object of the greatest fear—for the courageous man is the man to face it—death, which puts an end to life. But death, as such, however coming—thus, not death by shipwreck or disease—is death coming gloriously in battle. He is courageous, in the strict sense, who without dread of a glorious death, and of the risks which bring it to [illegible]*

quarters with him in sudden onslaught—and such above all are the risks of war: not that the courageous man is not also without dread of death by shipwreck or disease; but the prospect of such a death does not call forth his peculiar excellence, for he revolts against it, as miserable and inglorious, often, in his inexperience, regarding it as inevitable, when it is not; nor can he take up arms and defend himself against it. It is only where a man can take up arms and defend himself, or where death is glorious, that he can 'show courage.'

§ 1. περὶ ἀνδρείας] See Grant's excellent notes on §§ 1–8 of this chapter, in which he refers to the *Protagoras* (349–51, 359–61), and to the *Laches* to show that 'Aristotle's admirable account of courage is to some extent indebted to the observations of Plato, while in some points it is a protest against the Platonic theory.' Aristotle's relation to the Platonic theory may be briefly stated thus—Aristotle is at one with Plato in recognising the moral elevation of the virtue, but he limits its sphere to war, whereas Plato extends it so as to include all dangers—even those of temptation. 1115 a. 6.

§§ 1, 2. περὶ φόβους ... προσδοκίαν κακοῦ] Grant quotes *Protag.* 358 D προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε, and *Laches*, 198 B ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα, οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ. But, it is argued by Socrates,—ἀνδρεία cannot be an ἐπιστήμη, for science has nothing to do with time. Agriculture, or strategy, μία οὖσα ἐφορᾷ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα (198 E) . . . καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως. If courage is a science, it cannot be confined to the future (δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων) but must be concerned with good and evil universally—ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων (199 C). Then, asks Socrates, can he be wanting in the highest virtue, who knows all that is good and all that is evil; and can he fail in temperance or justice or holiness, who alone can guard against evil and compass good, whether in the service of the gods or in the society of men? οὐκ ἄρα, concludes Socrates (199 E), μόριον ἀρετῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ νῦν λέγομενον ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή. What we call 'moral *courage*' is, in fact, made the foundation of all virtue. Such is the suggestion put forward in the *Laches*. It is particularly to be noted that it is only a suggestion. In § 3 Aristotle protests against this wide and vague use of the term

1115 a. 6. ἀνδρεῖος suggested in the *Laches*. The term is properly u
thinks, only in connexion with the dangers of war (§ 1
καθ' ὁμοιότητα (§ 4) in connexion with all other evils.

a. 7. ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται] This is the reading K^b, O^b, (
accepted by Susemihl and Bywater, instead of the καὶ
εἴρηται of other MSS. (some of which, e.g. CCC, B^1, B^2, h
add φανερὸν γὰρ γεγένηται) accepted by Bekker. I prefer E
reading: cf. below iii. 10. 1 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ
σωφροσύνη εἴρηται ἡμῖν. Whatever may be thought of the g
ness of the διαγραφή in ii. 7, there can be no doubt that ther
διαγραφή of some kind there to which Aristotle is entitled
back here.

a. 10. § 3. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν] E
(*E. E.* iii. i. 1229 a. 33) limits the application of the term
He distinguishes φόβος, properly so called (fear of death
dread of disgrace, &c. ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ
τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς· τοῖς γὰ
τινὰ προσδεχομένοις λύπην ἑτέρα μὲν ἂν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοιτο κ
ἕτερον, φόβος δ' οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῷτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπ
φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οἵαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενο
ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται,
φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. Thus φόβος is not the proper name
anticipation of the pain of envy or shame; it is applied only
anticipation of such pains as are destructive of life—ὅσων
ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. This refinement in the use of the term φό
doubtless suggested primarily to Eudemus by Aristotle's lir
of the sphere of ἀνδρεία to war; but a passage in *Rhet.* ii. 5.
21 may also have had its influence—ἔστω δὴ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ
ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα
φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ
δύναται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλ
γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦν
ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. εἰ δὴ ὁ φόβος τοῖτ' ἐστίν, ἂν
τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φ
βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην συντεινούσας.

a. 12. ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν] Eudemus woul
avoided the word φοβεῖσθαι here: nor is it quite consistent
usage of *Rhet.* ii. 5: εὐλαβεῖται τὸ αἰσχρόν expresses bet
φοβεῖται the relation of the ἐπιεικής to moral evil.

λέγεται] The subject is ὁ ἀναίσχυντος. 1115 a. 14.

§ 4. οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν] In limiting the a. 17.
sphere of ἀνδρεία to war, without narrowing the application of the
term φοβεῖσθαι (as it is narrowed by Eudemus), Aristotle shows that
he fully recognises the virtue which we call 'moral *courage*'—the
πάμπαν ἀρετή of *Laches* 199 E, which Plato (adopting the Socratic
doctrine of ἐγκράτεια) very rightly regards as the foundation of
πολεμικὴ ἀρετή and all the other virtues.

§ 5. φθόνον] Does he mean the envy of a rival (or of Heaven), a. 23.
or the pain of being oneself envious? The writer of the *E. E.* iii. 1.
1229 a. 37 adopts the latter alternative—φόβος δ' οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ
τις προαρῴτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἣν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται.

§ 6. φοβερώτατον . . . κακὸν εἶναι] Here δοκεῖ does not *necessarily* a. 26.
express Aristotle's own view, any more than it does in i. 10. 3 δοκεῖ
ᾧ εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. *E. N.* i. 10. §§ 3–5, and
E. N. i. 11, should be read in connexion with the present remark.

§ 7. ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις] Grant quotes *Laches*, 191 D, E, for a. 29.
the extended use of the term ἀνδρεία, to which objection is made
here and in the following sections—βουλόμενος γάρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ
μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ καὶ ἐν ξύμ-
παντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν
οἷς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους
καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ
μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ
λύπας δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες—εἰσὶ γάρ πού τινες,
Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖοι.

§ 8. καλλίστῳ] Cf. Thuc. ii. 42. 5 καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης a. 31.
καὶ ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν.

§ 10. ὑπόγυια] αἰφνιδίως ἐπερχόμενα Paraph.—the sense given to a. 34.
the word here by *Liddell and Scott*; cf. iii. 8. 15 διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειο-
τέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν
οἷς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ
προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης
κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. The word ὑπόγυιος means literally 'nigh at hand,'
and Hippocrates 1225 C. E. F. is quoted by *Liddell and Scott* for
an absolute use of ὑπόγυιον='near the end, at the approach of

1115 a. 34. death.' ὑπόγυια here may have been selected by Aristotle with a reminiscence of this absolute use; cf. *E. E.* iii. i. 1229 b. 10 καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτους λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ᾖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν· φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.

b. 2. § 11. οἱ μέν] οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι.

b. 4. § 12. ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν] Men 'show courage' where they can take up arms and defend themselves, or (ἢ) where death is glorious. The former condition may be realised without the latter; in which case the ἀνδρεία would be of one of the spurious kinds described in chapter 8: the latter condition, however, cannot be realised without the former. Death, in a good cause, which a man endured fearlessly, but could not actively resist, would not be καλὸς θάνατος.

CHAPTER VII.

Argument.

Men differ in the things which they fear; but there are things so fearful that no man in his senses will regard them without terror, or think of facing them. These may be dismissed, for we have to do only with things which, although they are fearful, it is possible for men to face. These latter are, in themselves, and for different men, fearful in different degrees. Similarly, things inspire confidence in different degrees. It is with objects of fear, then, which are not too fearful for man to face, and with the grounds of confidence which may be set off against them, that the courageous man is concerned. His fear and his confidence he will govern aright, facing the danger of battle, as he ought, and as reason dictates, for the sake of glorious achievement; for glorious achievement is the end of virtue. A courageous act, like every other virtuous act, realises its own end when it shows forth the end for the sake of which its parent habit exists. The habit of courage is a glory to human nature: it exists for the sake of being a glory to human nature—to be this that it is is its end. To show forth then the peculiar glory of courage is the end for the sake of which the courageous man faces danger and does deeds of courage.

On the side of excess we have:—

(1) *The man whose fearlessness is excessive. He has no name, but may be described as a sort of madman, or insensate person, for whom (as they say for the Celts) earthquakes or waves have no terrors.*

2) The man whose confidence is excessive—the rash man, who is also a ggerer and a pretender to courage, but fails in the hour of real danger.
3) The man whose fear is excessive—the coward. He appears also on the of defect, for his confidence is defective; excessive fear, however, is what is noticeable in him, and hopelessness; whereas the courageous man is full of hope. Rash men again are eager for the fray before the danger is at hand, in the hour of danger they hang back; whereas courageous men are keen n the time for action comes, but keep quiet before it.
ourage then is a mediocrity in relation to the feelings of confidence and fear, hese are roused in war; and the courageous man deliberately takes his stand rt he does because it is glorious to do so, or would be disgraceful not to n.
ut to commit suicide in order to avoid poverty, or the pangs of love, or any r pain or sorrow, is not courageous, but cowardly: for to shrink from hard- is effeminacy; and the suicide braves death, not because death is glorious, because life is evil.

1. **τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν . . . ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον**] There are two classes 1115 b. 7.
φοβερά, (1) φοβερά which men can face; each one of these is rently φοβερόν to different men: (2) φοβερά so appalling that no in his senses will face them—lightnings, earthquakes, inun- ons (Paraph.).

2. **ὡς ἄνθρωπος**] *i.e.* so far as τὰ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον are concerned. b. 11.

φήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα] *i.e.* as well as τὰ ὑπὲρ ωπον.

δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ] προστάττει is to be understood b. 12.
λόγος, and ὁ ἀνδρεῖος is the subject of ὑπομενεῖ. He will indeed them, but yet, in obedience to the dictates of reason, will face . Ramsauer refers to a passage in *Top.* iv. 5. 125 b. 20, in h Aristotle makes the ἀνδρεῖος ἀπαθής, instead of, as here, τῆς φόβου. (See § 5, below κατ' ἀξίαν . . . πάσχει καὶ πράττει ρεῖος). The passage in the *Topics* is as follows—διαμαρτάνουσι οἱ τὴν ἕξιν εἰς τὴν ἀκολουθοῦσαν δύναμιν τάττοντες, οἷον τὴν πραότητα ειαν ὀργῆς καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φόβων καὶ κερδῶν· ος μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρᾶος ὁ ἀπαθὴς λέγεται, ἐγκρατὴς δ' ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ νος. Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἀκολουθεῖ δύναμις ἑκατέρῳ τοιαύτη, ὥστ' εἰ πάθοι, σθαι ἀλλὰ κρατεῖν· οὐ μὴν τοῦτο γ' ἐστὶ τῷ μὲν ἀνδρείῳ τῷ δὲ πράῳ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλως μὴ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν. We may explain difference between the *Topics* and *Ethics* by pointing out that e *Topics* Aristotle is speaking of the abstract notion of ἀν- —τοῦτό γέ ἐστι τῷ μὲν ἀνδρείῳ εἶναι, as discussed by dialectical

1115 b. 12. disputants; whereas in the *Ethics* he is describing the ἀνδρεία in the concrete.

τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς] Ramsauer observes that it is here for the first time that the chief end is described as τὸ καλόν: henceforward it is often so described, as in *E. N.* 1116 a. 11, 12, 1117 a. 8, 1178 b. 13, 1120 a. 23, 24, 1122 b. 6: in *E. E.* 1229 a. 8, 1230 a. 27: and in *M. M.* 1190 a. 28 and 33.

b. 15. § 4. ⟨ὁ⟩ οὐ δεῖ] Susem. and Bywater restore ὅ from Γ.

b. 17. § 5. ὁ μὲν . . . ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος . . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν] 'The man who governs his fear and also his confidence aright, and faces the dangers that he ought to face.'

οὗ ἕνεκα] *sc.* δεῖ, *i. e.* καλοῦ ἕνεκα—in a glorious cause.

b. 19. κατ' ἀξίαν] There ought to be the same ratio between the magnitudes of two φόβοι as there is between the magnitudes of their respective φοβερά.

ὁ λόγος] The faculty which perceives, or the consciousness of, that right ratio (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος . . . τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν) which education has established among the ἄλογα πάθη of human nature.

b. 20. πάσχει] Cf. note on § 2, b. 12, above.

§ 6. τέλος δὲ . . . τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν] See paraphrase at the beginning of this chapter. Rassow's ἕξιν· καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ· ἡ δ' ἀνδρεία καλόν· for the received ἕξιν· καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν is probably right (*Forsch.* p. 90). We see from this passage what a 'positive' conception of Nature underlies Aristotle's 'Teleology.' Human Nature is a beautiful organism, and to be beautiful is its *raison d'être*. So a plant or animal is its own *raison d'être*; it performs the functions of its nature for the sake of maintaining that nature in perfection—a doctrine which was afterwards eagerly taken up by Plotinus: see *Enn.* v. 8. (vol. 2. p. 12, ed. Kirchhoff) Διὸ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ποθεινόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ταὐτὸν τῷ καλῷ, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐράσιμον, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι. πότερον δὲ ποτέρου αἴτιον τί χρὴ ζητεῖν, οὔσης τῆς φύσεως μιᾶς;

b. 22. ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει] These words are placed by Imelmann (*Obs. Crit. in Arist. Eth. Nic.* p. 6) after τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν with the approval of Rassow. I think they are better in

heir old place, immediately after τοιοῦτον (*i. e.* καλόν) δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος, 1115 b. 22.
which they explain. The meaning is—'If ἀνδρεία *is* καλόν, we may infer that its *end* is τὸ καλόν, for a thing is (*i. e. is essentially* as defined—ὁρίζεται) what it is in relation to its τέλος.'

§§ 7-12.] *Cf.* ii. 7. 2, where the same complicated system of b. 24.
extremes is exhibited, *viz.*:—

1. excess of fear
2. defect of confidence } constituting the δειλός.
3. excess of confidence constituting the θρασύς.
4. defect of fear (or excess of fearlessness) constituting an ἀνώνυμος.

The writer of *E. E.* iii. 1. 1228 a. 33 sqq., instead of distinguishing he ὑπερβάλλων τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ as ἀνώνυμος from the θρασύς, simply says θρασὺς . . . οἷος φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἧττον ἢ δεῖ θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

§ 7. Κελτούς] *Cf. E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 b. 28. Zell and Coraes b. 28.
ote Strabo vii. p. 293, who relates, on the authority of Ephoros—a αἵρεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πλημμυρίδας τοὺς Κίμβρους, καὶ ὅτι ἀφοβίαν οἱ τοὶ ἀσκοῦντες κατακλύζεσθαι τὰς οἰκίας ὑπομένουσιν. Zell thinks it unlikely that Aristotle here borrows directly from Ephoros. msauer refers to an extract in Stobaeus, *Flor.* ζ. 40 (vol. i. p. 167 Meineke) from the συναγωγὴ ἐθῶν of Nicolaus, Κελτοὶ οἱ τῷ ανῷ γειτνιῶντες αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦνται τοῖχον καταπίπτοντα ἢ οἰκίαν φεύγειν, μμυρίδος δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἔξω θαλάττης ἐπερχομένης μεθ' ὅπλων ἀπαντῶντες μένουσιν ἕως κατακλύζονται, ἵνα μὴ δοκῶσι φεύγοντες τὸν θάνατον εῖσθαι. As Ramsauer notes, both Plato and Aristotle represent character of the Northern peoples as marked by the preponrance of θυμός *Rep.* 435 E, *Pol.* 1327 b. 23. Eudemus says *E.* iii. 1. 1229 b. 29) καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ τίν.

§ 10. ἐν ταῖς λύπαις] *i. e.* ἐν φόβοις. Excessive fear (generally 1116 a. 1.
roducing physical symptoms, see iv. 9. 2) is more manifest than efective confidence.

§ 13. ἐν οἷς εἴρηται] *i. e.* ἐν πολέμῳ. a. 11.

τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle, Grant a. 12.
emarks, 'does not sympathise with or discuss the sentimental deaths f the Cynic philosophers. Suicide was afterwards dignified by the

1116 a. 12. Stoics with the name of ἐξαγωγή—"ushering oneself out o world."' See Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics* p. 31((English translation) for suicide among the Stoics.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Such is Courage strictly so called; but five other kinds less strictly: may be distinguished: and first, as resembling true courage most closel

(1) *The courage of the ordinary citizen. He faces danger becaus punishes and disgraces him if he does not, and honours him if he does. 'courageous men' are most common in those cities in which cowardice i dishonour and courage in honour. This is the sort of courage which Ho trays in Hector with his—'What will Polydamas think of me!' and in I with his—'What will Hector say!' It is like the true courage in so f motive is virtuous,* i. e. *shame and a wish to avoid disgrace and a d honour and glory. Under this head we may also bring the courage who are compelled by their commanding officers to face danger—a much form, being actuated not by shame, but by bodily fear, by desire to avoid grace but physical pain. This kind of courage to which a man is com very far removed from that of the truly courageous man, who faces dea the inspiration of a glorious cause.*

(2) *The courage of experience: that of trained professional sold know the risks of war (often more imaginary than real), and how to m with the greatest safety to themselves and loss to their adversaries. into battle knowing that they are likely to come out of it unhurt. If confronted by superior numbers, and see that there is real danger, the first to flee; whereas non-professional citizen troops prefer death to the of flight. Socrates, when he said that 'courage is knowledge,' seemed to true courage with this courage of experience; but the two are widely d*

(3) *The courage of passion and spirit. This is the courage of wi when they rush upon those who have wounded them, and of Homer when their 'blood boils,' and they 'breathe forth wrath through their The truly courageous man is indeed helped on by his passion and spiri consciousness of the glorious significance of his achievement is his rea and guides him throughout, whereas passion and spirit are blind gu cannot supply a moral motive: their influence is that of mere feeling-ful feeling, when one is angry, of pleasurable feeling, when one were vengeance. If pleasure and pain were moral motives, then the boldened by the pain of hunger to graze on, in spite of blows, and risking all to enjoy his mistress, would be examples of true courag courage is not a thing of feeling, but of reason; nevertheless the c*

passion and spirit lies near to true courage, in that it is more deeply constitutional than the other forms, and expresses the nature of the man more fully, and accordingly may become true courage, if guided by reason and supplied with an ideal.

(4) *The courage of hope. Those who have often conquered are confident in danger, their confidence being due to the idea that they are superior to their adversaries, and will receive no harm from them. Men who are drunk also become emboldened by hope; but if things do not turn out as they expect, then they flee. The unexpected is the best test of a man's courage. Expected dangers a man who is not very courageous may prepare for, and face, because he has come to the conclusion that there is less risk in facing them than in avoiding them; but if a man is found facing an unexpected danger, we may infer that the habit is strong in him.*

(5) *The courage of ignorance. It is not unlike that of hope, but inferior to it, inasmuch as the man who hopes is actuated by an idea of success in circumstances of which he is aware, whereas the man whose courage is that of ignorance is not actuated by an idea of success in circumstances of which he is aware, but by ignorance of the circumstances, like the Argives who went boldly out to battle, not because they hoped to beat Spartans, but because they thought that Spartans were Sicyonians.*

§ 1. κατὰ πέντε τρόπους] The ground on which these five forms 1116 a. 16.
of courage are distinguished, as spurious, from true courage is concisely stated in *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 12 ἔστι δ' εἴδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. The spring of action is different. In the case of true courage it is the obligation which the perception of τὸ καλόν lays upon the agent: the source of each truly courageous act is the whole man, *i. e.* the agent as a rational whole; whereas the seeming courageous acts done κατὰ τοὺς πέντε τρόπους spring not from the whole man, but from isolated feelings. It is the same difference as Kant marks by the distinction between a formal principle and material grounds of action.

These spurious forms are given in three different orders by Aristotle, Eudemus, and the writer of the *M. M.* Eudemus (*E. E.* 1229 a. 12 sqq.) has ἡ πολιτική—ἡ στρατιωτική (δι' ἐμπειρίαν)—ἡ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν—ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα—ἡ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον οἷον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν. The writer of the *M. M.* (i. 20. 1190 b. 21 sqq.) has ἡ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν—ἡ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν—ἡ διὰ τὰ πάθη, οἷον οἱ ἐρῶντες ἢ οἱ θυμοειδιάζοντες—ἡ δι' αἰσχύνην τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας—ἡ δι' ἐλπίδα.

πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν] 'ideoque (γάρ) a. 17.
obtineat primum locum.' Rams. 'This phrase (πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία),' says Grant, 'is to be found in Plato's *Republic* p. 430 C, where it

1116 a. 17. probably originates, but it is there used in a different se
the present. Plato meant by the term "civil courage"
tinguish the true courage of a civilized man from all men
instincts. Δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τ
παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, τήν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάν
ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγ
Ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦ
πολιτικήν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξει. Aristotle meant by "civil c
that daring which is prompted, not by an independent c
the beautiful, but by a regard to reputation, and to the
disgrace and even punishment awarded by society to
cowardly actions respectively.' It is scarcely necessar
that the difference here between Plato and Aristotle is o
the use of a phrase. Aristotle is at one with Plato in
true ἀνδρεία as a habit acquired by the πολίτης under the
of νόμος. We can only say that he thinks fit to use the
πολιτική in an inferior sense here, just as he does in *E.*
where he makes the πολιτικὸς βίος one of the inferior lives,
man is φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον. The contrast between πολῖται (
citizens), and hired στρατιῶται (§ 6 below), going out t
was doubtless in his mind when he wrote § 1, and prol
duced him to give πολιτική the sense which it bears here:
iii. 1. 1229 a. 13, where πολιτική and στρατιωτική occ
together—Μία μὲν πολιτική, αὕτη δ' ἐστίν, ἡ δι' αἰδῶ οὖσα.
στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι. That the
of νόμος, so carefully allowed for in Plato's definition c
(*Rep.* 430) as δύναμις καὶ σωτηρία διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε κα
δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μή, is fully taken account of in Aristotle's
ἡ ἀνδρεία ἡ διὰ τὸ καλόν is proved, if it is necessary to quot
passages in support of what is involved in Aristotle's wh
ception of the relation between the individual and the s
Rhet. i. 9. 1366 b. 11 ἀνδρία δὲ δι' ἣν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλ
ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει καὶ ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ.

a. 23. § 2. Πουλυδάμας] *Iliad* xxii. 100.

a. 25. Ἕκτωρ] *Iliad* viii. 148.

a. 28. § 3.] Ramsauer, rightly I think, makes δι' αἰδῶ γάρ pare
This kind of courage resembles true courage more closely
other forms do, because it is actuated by αἰδώς, which, th

ἐμπ, is akin to it, and contributes to it (see ii. 7. 14 ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς 1116 a. 28.
ἐμπ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων: cf. iv. 9), and by a desire for τιμή, which though not τὸ καλόν, or the chief end (see i. 5. §§ 4, 5), is yet its 'guinea stamp,' and an object the moderate pursuit of which constitutes an ἀρετή (see iv. 4) which contributes to the attainment of the chief end.

§ 4. ἀναγκαζομένους] There are thus two kinds of πολιτικὴ a. 30.
ἀνδρία: (1) ἡ δι' αἰδῶ, (2) ἡ δι' ἀνάγκην καὶ φόβον. Grant refers to *Phaedo* 68 D, 'where Plato speaks of most men being courageous from a sort of cowardice'—τῷ δεδιέναι καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· καίτοι ἄτοπόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι.

ὁ Ἕκτωρ] *Π.* ii. 391. It is Agamemnon not Hector who a. 33.
speaks. The lines are quoted again in *Pol.* iii. 9. 1285 a. 10 and attributed correctly to Agamemnon. See Zell's note.

§ 5. προστάττοντες] The reading apparently of all MSS., except a. 36.
a 'Codex Pontificius,' which has the reading προτάττοντες accepted by Lamb., Vict., Coraes, and Susemihl. Προτάττοντες would mean 'posting in front'; προστάττοντες, simply 'posting,' generally with dat. or adverb of place.

τύπτοντες] The commentators refer to Herod. vii. 223, where the Persian commanders at Thermopylae are said to have used whips. See Rawlinson's note (7) on the chapter, and note (8) on Herod. vii. 22 for the practice among the Persians and other Oriental nations.

§ 6. ἡ ἐμπειρία] See *Laches* 195, and *Protag.* 360, where b. 3.
ἀνδρία is defined as ἐπιστήμη or σοφία τῶν δεινῶν τε καὶ μή, and *Protag.* 350, where those who know the art of warfare are said to be bolder than those who do not (if the latter are bold they are not ἀνδρεῖοι but μαινόμενοι)—in short οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. But as we have seen (note on iii. 6, §§ 1, 2), objections are raised in the *Laches* 199, to the definition ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μή, and 'the knowledge of good and evil,' with which ἀνδρεία is identified at the end of the dialogue, is something differing *toto coelo* from the ἐμπειρία of the professional (*i. e.* mercenary) soldier with which Aristotle very unfairly wishes to confound the Socratic ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν. Aristotle's unfair statement of the Socratic position, 'is

1116 b. 3. corrected,' Grant tells us, 'by Eudemus in his Ethics'—(*E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 15) ἡ στρατιωτικὴ . . . δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὅσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. I fear that this 'correction' does not really amount to a fair treatment of the Socratic doctrine. Eudemus still wishes his readers to think that Socrates identified courage with στρατιωτικὴ ἐμπειρία, and therefore ought to have made it knowledge, not of τὰ δεινά, but of τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν, for he says, *E. E.* iii. 1. 1230 a. 4 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσοι δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅνπερ τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτόν ἔχει ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. οὔτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερὰ θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱστοὺς ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴσασι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν· οὔτε δι' ὃ θαρραλεώτερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ Θέογνιν ἀνδρεία εἶεν·

"πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος."

φανερῶς ⟨δ'⟩ ἔνιοι δειλοὶ ὄντες ὅμως ὑπομένουσι δι' ἐμπειρίαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ οἴονται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἴσασι γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας. σημεῖον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἴωνται βοήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλησίον ᾖ τὸ δεινόν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. The knowledge of the professional soldier is indeed the knowledge of the means of avoiding danger; but the knowledge required by Socrates is the knowledge of danger itself—the power of estimating it rationally and facing it at the call of duty. The courageous man is the man who knows when to risk all. The professional soldier, simply *quâ* professional soldier, never makes up his mind to risk all. If his experience does not tell him that he is likely to escape, his courage fails. To make the Platonic Socrates seem to identify courage with professional ἐμπειρία is ridiculously unfair. And it is only a very superficial appreciation of the meaning of such a statement as that in Xen. *Mem.* iv. 6. 11 οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί—which could lead anyone to suppose that the real Socrates identified them. For a estimate of the meaning of the Socratic 'virtue is a science' see Grant, *Eth.* vol. i. pp. 165 sqq. Essay II.

b. 7. κενά] The editors have notes here to show that τὰ κενὰ τε πολέμου—'the empty alarms of war,' *inania belli* (Tac. *Hist.* ii. 69 and τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου, 'the surprises of war,' are both expression

in use. See also Göller's note on Thucydides, iii. 30, where τὸ 1116 b. 7.
πολὺ τοῦ πολέμου is proved to be the correct reading. The MSS. here (*E. N.* iii. 8. 6) vary hopelessly between κενά and καινά, and need not be considered. I think that κενά is to be preferred; it seems to be a more natural object for συνεωράκασιν than καινά.

§ 7. εἶτα] Their ἐμπειρία gives them confidence (1) as making b. 9.
them aware of τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and (2) εἶτα, as making them skilful in the use of weapons, &c. See Grant's note on § 6.

§ 9. τὰ δὲ πολιτικά] the citizen troops. b. 18.

τῇ Ἑρμαίῳ] The Ald. Schol. has the following—Ἑρμαῖον ἐν b. 19.
Κορωνείᾳ τῆς Βοιωτίας τόπος οὕτω καλούμενος ἐστὶ πεδινὸς ἐν αὐτῇ, τῶν ὅλων ἀνωμάλων ὄντων· ἐν ᾧ παρατεταγμένοι ποτὲ Κορωνεῖς σὺν τοῖς βοηθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς στρατιώταις ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχοίου, μετὰ τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν ἵνα τὴν πόλιν κατέλαβον· καὶ τὴν Ἀκρόπολιν εἶχεν ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ Ὀνόμαρχος ὁ Φωκεὺς προδοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ· αὐτοὶ μὲν μείναντες ἀπέθανον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ὀνόμαρχον ἀποκλείσαντες τὰς πύλας, ἵνα αὐτοῖς μηδὲ βουλομένοις ἐξείη φεύγειν καὶ καταλιπεῖν τὴν πατρίδα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στρατιῶται ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχοίου ἔφυγον εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς μάχης, βουλόμενοι ἕνα τεθνάναι τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν Χίρωνα. Ἱστοροῦσι περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ταύτης Κεφισσόδωρος (Κηφισόδιος?) ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἱερᾶς πολέμου, καὶ Ἀναξιμένης ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ τῶν περὶ Φίλιππον καὶ Ἔφορος ἐν τῇ τριακοστῇ.[1] Cf. Zell's note on this scholium.

See Grote, *Hist. of Greece* pt. II, chap. 87, for the career of Onomarchus the Phocian. The date of the capture of Coroneia by him was B. C. 353 or 352.

§ 10. καὶ τὸν θυμόν] θυμός in Plato is the *Wille zum Leben*— b. 23.
that principle that manifests itself, not only in anger, but in tenacity of purpose, rivalry, pluck, push, and other forms of 'spirit.' Without its aid, λόγος would succumb. The λόγος of the state—its constitution, and institutions, must be maintained by 'public spirit' and 'patriotism,' against the selfishness of citizens, and the attacks of foreigners; the λόγος of the individual must be 'preserved and succoured' against the attacks of pleasure and pain, by 'strength of will'—succoured by θυμός against the insidious attacks of ἐπιθυμία (see *Rep.* 441 A ἐν ψυχῇ . . . ἐστὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐπί-

[1] I find this scholium (with a few verbal differences, and the words ἱστοροῦσι . . . τριακοστῇ omitted) on the margin of CCC. *ad loc.*

1116 b. 23. κουρον δν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, and 440 A πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνταί τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίαι, λοιδωροῦντά τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντοιν ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου), and preserved by it against the disturbing influence of fear (see *Rep.* 430 B δύναμις καὶ σωτηρία δόξης ὀρθῆς κ.τ.λ.). In Aristotle θυμός has the same fundamental meaning—spirit of independence, enterprise, patriotism, loyalty in national and individual character. Here indeed, as in the parallel passage *E. E.* iii. 1 (1229 a. 24 δι' ὀργὴν καὶ θυμὸν ὡσαύτως, and 1229 b. 29 καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας), and in *E. N.* vii. 6, §§ 1–5, it is regarded chiefly in the light of its special manifestation—anger: but in *Pol.* H. 6. 1327 b. 23 sqq. its fundamental meaning—spirit of enterprise, independence, patriotism, loyalty in national and individual character, is brought out very strongly—τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μέν ἐστι πλήρη, διανοίας δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἄθυμα δέ, διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἔνθυμον καὶ διανοητικὸν ἐστίν· διόπερ ἐλεύθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη [καὶ] πρὸς ἄλληλα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ [τε] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ διανοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῇ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. ὅπερ γάρ φασί τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν. αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ἣ φιλοῦμεν. σημεῖον δέ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος προσηκόντως τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν·

"σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεαι."

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμός.

b. 26. ἰτητικώτατον] Ramsauer quotes Plato, *Protag.* 349 E καὶ ἴτας γε (ὁ ἀνδρεῖος), ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι.

μηρος] Zell and the other editors note that the first quotation 1116 b. 27.
om *Il.* xiv. 151, or xvi. 529; the second from *Il.* v. 470; and
hird from *Od.* xxiv. 318. The fourth does not occur in Homer
ll. Theocritus 20. 15 (later than Aristotle) has *ἐμοὶ δ' ἄφαρ*
ν αἷμα, and in *Probl.* ii. 26. 869 a. 5 we find *ὁ θυμὸς ζέσις*
θερμοῦ ἐστὶν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν. Coraes compares Soph. *O. C.*
ὁπηνίκ' ἕζει θυμός, κ.τ.λ.

ll. ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς] cf. below § 12 *φυσικωτάτη δ'* b. 31.
ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα
τὸ διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττειν) ἀνδρεία εἶναι. There is a natural
ice between *θυμός* and *λόγος*: see Plato, *Rep.* 441. *Θυμός* is an
principle which sides with *λόγος*, the principle of order,
ist the mere *passions* of the sensibility—the pleasures and
Cf. *E. N.* vii. 6, §§ 1–5, where it is argued that *ἀκρασία*
is not so bad as *ἀκρασία ἐπιθυμιῶν*, because *θυμός* is, at least,
to *λόγος*, whereas *ἐπιθυμία* is *ἐπίβουλος*. There is thus a
al reason for confining the remark *συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς* to *θυμός*:
Eudemus, looking at the matter from a slightly different
of view, is also right in recognising the material value to
courage of *all* the feelings—shame, anger, hope, &c. which
e the various forms of spurious courage—*E. E.* iii. 1. 1229
πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα:
amsauer's note. Fritzsche (*E. E.* p. 65, note 28) quotes Cic.
iv. 19. 43 'quid? quod iidem Peripatetici perturbationes istas,
nos exstirpandas putamus non modo *naturales* esse dicunt,
iam utiliter a natura datas. Primum multis verbis iracundiam
nt: cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt.'

ἔλει] Struck out by Vict. and Scaliger: see Spengel, *Arist.* b. 33.
p. 206: may be a dittograph of *ἐν ὕλῃ ᾗ*.

] Zell and Coraes adopt the suggestion of Camerarius that b. 36.
ference here is to *Iliad* xi. 557

ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὄνος παρ' ἄρουραν ἰὼν ἐβιήσατο παῖδας
νωθής, ᾧ δὴ πολλὰ περὶ ῥόπαλ' ἀμφὶς ἐάγη,
κείρει τ' εἰσελθὼν βαθὺ λήϊον· οἱ δέ τε παῖδες
τύπτουσιν ῥοπάλοισι· βίη δέ τε νηπίη αὐτῶν·
σπουδῇ τ' ἐξήλασσαν, ἐπεί τ' ἐκορέσσατο φορβῆς.

ι. φυσικωτάτη] Cf. *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 27 *μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ* 1117 a. 4.

1117 a. 4. τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται: *E. N.* vii. 6. 2 ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κ.τ.λ. Θυμός in short represents the natural man—those inherited qualities of constitution which supply the rough material to be shaped by education into the form of virtue. Cf. *Rep.* 410 D καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γε ἄγριον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἂν τῆς φύσεως παρέχοιτο, καὶ ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρεῖον ἂν εἴη.

προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν] θυμός is one of the forms of ὄρεξις. This ὄρεξις must become βουλευτική.

a. 5. **καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα**] *i. e.* τὸ καλόν, cf. *E. E.* iii. i. 1230 a. 27 ἐπεὶ πᾶσά γε ἀρετὴ προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὖσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. Θυμός then is a principle which naturally lends itself, if cultivated rightly, to the performance of *duty*. It is an active principle which makes a man scorn the passive life of submission to pleasures and pains.

a. 6. **ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἥδονται**] But, if uncultivated, θυμός manifests itself chiefly as anger—a pain hungering for the pleasure of personal revenge. It thus ceases to be the ally of λόγος, and becomes an ἐπιθυμία opposed to it. Cf. *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 b. 31 καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὔτ' εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὔτ' εἰ δι' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀνδρεῖος λέγοιτο τούτων. Cf. *Rhet.* ii. 2. 1378 b. 1 (referred to by Fritzsche in his note on the above passage) καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὐτῷ. διὸ καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ

> ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
> ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται.

a. 7. **διὰ ταῦτα**] *i. e.* λύπην (ἀλγοῦσι) and ἡδονήν (ἥδονται). Pain and pleasure are subjective springs of action (πάθη). Moral action must be actuated by reverence for the objective law of duty (τὸ καλόν) apprehended by reason.

a. 8. **οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος**] *sc.* κελεύει, cf. *E. E.* iii. 1.

ι ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν 1117 a. 8.
κελεύει.

w (*Forsch.* pp. 29, 30) omits (with K^b, O^b, and CCC) the
οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα . . . κίνδυνον at the beginning of § 12
)bably a dittograph of the similar clause in § 11. 1116 b.
places the sentence φυσικωτάτη . . . ἀνδρεία εἶναι after τι at
of § 12, 1117 a. 9; and reads δέ (with M^b, O^b) instead of
καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι 1117 a. 6. He adds that the words καὶ οἱ
. δρῶσιν § 11 ought perhaps to be struck out. They are
lace in a context relating to τὰ θηρία, and anticipate the
made by the words καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δέ.

ιηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν] Perhaps we should read μηθὲν ἂν ἀντιπαθεῖν. a. 14.
S. have μηθὲν ἀντιπαθεῖν.

ιεθυσκόμενοι] Zell quotes *Prob.* A. 1. 955 a. 1 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
ίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσιν προθυμῶς, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ
λπιδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γῆρας
τιν, ἡ δὲ νεότης ἐλπίδος πλήρης.

ιὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] The courage of the sanguine man is the a. 17.
temporary feeling; he is elated by a perhaps groundless
victory. But the truly courageous man is actuated by
inciple. His nature is such that the law of duty is always
s eyes. Hence (διό) you may take him on a sudden
liscomposing him. His courage will be ready on the
ιotice, because it is *himself*, not a passing mood.

εως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς] This is a. 19.
reading for the ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. of
ccepted by Bekker. K^b, O^b, CCC, and Cambr. have
ὅτι ἧττον. I am not sure that the imp. ἦν is in place here.
uggest ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον εἶναι, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς.

ἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων] Because their hope blinds a. 23.
ιine to the real nature of the danger which they en-

] Those who do not know (οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες) are, however, a. 24.
ɔ the sanguine in not having that opinion of their own
y which the latter have. Ἀξίωμα is here the superior
ch the sanguine attach to themselves, as persons likely to
:f. *E. N.* iv. 3. 12, where τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα is the

1117 a. 24. superior value which the *μεγαλόψυχος* assigns to himself—
αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν—iv. 3. 3.

a. 26. *ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον*] The editors refer to Xen. *Hell.* iv
for this incident, which occurred in the battle (B. C. 392)
Long Walls of Corinth, between the Argeians, Corinthia
Athenian mercenaries who held Corinth, and the Corinthia
aided by Lacedaemonians and Sikyonians. 'The Argeia
Grote (*Hist. of Greece* pt. II, chap. 75), 'bold from superi
bers attacked and broke the Sikyonians, tearing up the p
and pursuing them down to the sea with much slaughte
which Pasimachus the Lacedaemonian commander of
coming to their aid, caused his small body of horsemen to d
and tie their horses to trees, and then armed them with
taken from the Sikyonians inscribed on the outside with t
sigma (Σ). With these he approached on foot to att
Argeians, who, mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed
charge with alacrity.'

Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. 1. 1230 a. 16 sqq.) thus sums
discussion of the spurious forms of courage—*πάντων τῶν ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖεν ⟨ἂν⟩ καθάπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἕκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα·*

"Ἕκτορα δ' αἰδὼς εἷλε·"

⟨καὶ⟩

"Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει."

*καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη. ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὕτη οὔτ
οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἃ διὰ τὸν θυμ
τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους
ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχει
τικάς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰήσεται οὕτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ' ἐπε
ἀρετὴ προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι εἰ
πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον
ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὖσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει καὶ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν,
δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ'
ἐπεί, ἄν γε μὴ καλὸν ᾖ ἀλλὰ μανικόν, οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.*

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

We have said that Courage is concerned with feelings of confidence, and with feelings of fear: but it is with the latter more than with the former that it is concerned, for fear is painful, and it is harder and more praiseworthy to bear pain than to abstain from pleasure. But though the exercise of courage is surrounded by circumstances of pain, yet the end is sweet, as the garland is sweet for the athlete, though the contest be painful. The courageous man endures death and wounds for the sake of glorious achievement in war. It would be absurd however to say that he rejoices in death and wounds: he endures them as pains, and the more complete his excellence, and the happier his life, the greater pains are they to him: life is so well worth living, and he has to look forward to the loss of so much. But he is all the more courageous that he gives up so much for glory in war: his courage realises in the most perfect way the type of those strenuous virtues which taste pleasure only in laying hold of the end. But, although he is thus the bravest of men, perhaps a less brave man, with nothing to lose, might make a more useful soldier, being ready to risk his life for a small remuneration.

§ 1. **μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά**] So, as Ramsauer notes, σωφροσύνη 1117 a. 30.
is ἧττον περὶ τὰς λύπας (iii. 10. 1), and ἐλευθεριότης is μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ δόσει (iv. 1. 1).

§ 2. **δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**] Cf. ii. 3. 10 περὶ a. 34.
δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ.

§ 3. **οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ,** a. 35.
ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι] The ἡδονή which the courageous man experiences in realising his end is not a pleasurable feeling, but an ideal satisfaction. Pleasurable feeling cannot coexist with painful feeling; but ideal satisfaction may. As Professor Jowett says in his *Introduction to the Gorgias*—Plato does not 'mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What then is his meaning? And what is the value of his method? His

1117 a. 35. meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have alway among mankind. We must remind the reader that Soc self implies that he will be understood or appreciated by He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, b idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good ca a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death c are without pain, or that their physical suffering is alw pensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them and we would a thousand times rather have their dea shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have glory in another world, when their enemies and persecut proportionably tormented. Men are found in a few ins do what is right, without reference to public opinion o sequences. And we regard them as happy on this gro much as Socrates' friends are described as regarding h opening of the Phaedo; or as was said of another, "th upon his face as upon the face of an angel." We are cerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility, rules of logic, but merely to point out the existence sentiment in the better part of human nature.'

b. 4. **εἴπερ σάρκινοι**] Grant translates (rightly I think) 'the are painful and grievous to flesh and blood,' following I who has *cum ex carne consient.* Michelet rejects this ren *praesertim si mulla praediti sint carne*, referring to *de An* 423 b. 22 where flesh is said to be the medium of touch- *ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν συμβαίνοι ὅπ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐπιτιθεμένων γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθάνεται· ὥστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σ*

b. 5. **διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ . . . φαίνεται ἔχειν**] The ideal satisfact Idea of Happiness,' is apt to be lost in the crowd c feelings.

b. 7. §§ **4, 5.**] In these sections self-sacrifice is praised in which we shall do well to keep in mind when we Aristotle's account of *μεγαλοψυχία. Quâ μεγαλόψυχος* th seems to be devoted to his own *εὐδαιμονία*: but *quâ ἀνδ* ready joyfully to surrender it. See Grant's interesting

ich Aristotle's ἀνδρεῖος, ᾧ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον is compared with 1117 b
ordsworth's 'Happy Warrior'—'more brave for this, that he hath
ch to love.'

§ 5. οὐ δὴ . . . ἐφάπτεται] *sc.* τις. 'The deep moral pleasure,' b. 15.
s Grant (*Ethics*, Essay IV, vol. i. p. 226), 'which attaches to
ble acts, Aristotle describes as triumphing even over the physical
in and outward horror which may attend the exercise of courage.
d he acknowledges that in many cases this may be the *only*
asure attending upon virtuous actions.'
Of course τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν stand in a somewhat exceptional
ition, as compared with τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. They are
nful in a sense in which other virtuous actions are not. Other
nous actions indeed imply a restraint put upon inclination; but
en once the moral character has been formed, they are no
ger painful: and some of them are even in themselves (*i.e.* as
inguished from their ends) pleasant, *e.g.* τὰ κατὰ τὴν μεγαλοπρέ-
are themselves pleasant to the connoisseur (ἐπιστήμων) who
forms them. Τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν however are not thus *in*
selves pleasant. They are so painful that it is only the man
has the strongest interest in the chief end, who will bring
self to perform them. Aristotle thus gives due prominence
his account of ἀνδρεία to the struggle which some have repre-
ted as essential to morality. But we must not allow ourselves
e misled by his remarks here. He is not one of those who
e a struggle *essential* to morality. On the contrary, morality
him is perfect adaptation to environment: accordingly, we
him in his accounts of the other virtues dwelling on the ease
pleasure with which the good man acts. But the other virtues
concerned with life, and may well result in pleasant actions;
reas ἀνδρεία shows itself in the presence of death. It necessarily
olves acts which are painful, as breaking with life. Its grandeur
nhanced, in proportion as the life or adaptation which it calls
an away from, is the more perfect. It is perhaps a defect in
stotle's system that it does not recognise any other virtues,
ept ἀνδρεία, which call a man away from the brilliant everyday
of which the μεγαλόψυχος is the ideal ornament: *e.g.* Aristotle's
d man is never required to give up his brilliant career, in order
help the outcasts of society. As it is, it is only here in this
sage, in reference to the ἀνδρεία of the man ᾧ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον,

1117 b. 15. that we find Aristotle deeply touched by the sublimity and pathos of that struggle between inclination and duty, which impressed Kant so powerfully, and is celebrated by him in so many passages full of lyrical fervour.

b. 17. § 6. στρατιώτας] *i.e.* mercenaries: μή goes with the subject τοὺς τοιούτους, and κρατίστους στρατιώτας is predicate.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Next in order comes Temperance, the excellence of the other subdivision of the irrational part of the soul. It is, as we have said, a mediocrity in relation to pleasures, and (though to a less extent) to pains; and profligacy is related to the same pleasures and pains.

To what special pleasures then is Temperance related? Pleasures may be distinguished as bodily and mental. Mental pleasures are those which affect the mind without affecting the body, such as the pleasure of being esteemed, of acquiring knowledge, of listening to wonderful tales, of hearing oneself talk, and of gossip. It is not in relation to any of these pleasures that we speak of men being temperate or profligate. The man, e. g. *who likes to hear himself talk is a bore, but not a profligate. Accordingly, it is with bodily pleasures that Temperance will be concerned; but not with all of them—not with the pleasures of the eye, as such:* e. g. *a man is not temperate or profligate by reason of the pleasure he takes in painting, although there is undoubtedly a right way of liking pictures, as there are wrong ways—nor with the pleasures of the ear: we do not speak of those who are too much addicted to music and the theatre as profligate, or of those who like them in moderation as temperate—nor with the pleasures of smell, except by association: thus there is no profligacy or intemperance in being very fond of the scent of flowers, but there is in being very fond of the odours of the perfume bottle and the dinner table. Profligate, gluttonous persons like these odours because they remind them of the things they lust after. Even people who are not gluttonous like the smell of food when they are hungry; but gluttonous persons like it without being hungry. This associated pleasure is the only pleasure which the lower animals derive from the senses of sight, hearing, and smell. The dog likes the smell, because it suggests the taste, of the hare which he tracks; the lion rejoices when he hears the lowing of the ox and knows that it is near and may soon be eaten; the roe deer, or wild goat, pleases his eye with the prospect of food. Temperance and profligacy then are concerned with those pleasures which the lower animals share with man—servile and brutish pleasures, it would thus appear. These are the pleasures of touch and taste—although taste, properly so called,* i. e. *the*

discrimination of flavours, as exemplified by the wine-taster, or the chef, *is not what the gluttonous person takes much, or any, pleasure in. His pleasure is in the purely tactual enjoyment which is common to swallowing meat and drink. Thus a certain* gourmand *wished that his throat were as long as a crane's, showing thereby that his pleasure was tactual. Profligacy then being related to touch, which is the most general or elementary of all the senses, and belongs to man, not as man, but as animal, is justly held to be a disgraceful and brutish vice. Certain finer tactual pleasures must however be distinguished from those to which profligacy, or intemperance, is related. Profligacy, or intemperance, has to do only with the tactual pleasures of certain definite organs: not e.g. with the pleasure of a skin glowing under the hand of the rubber in the gymnasium.*

§ 1. περὶ σωφροσύνης] See *E. E.* iii. 2 and *M. M.* i. 21. 'Σω- 1117 b. 23.
φροσύνη,' says Grant, 'which in spite of the false etymology given by Plato's *Cratylus* 411 E [σωτηρία φρονήσεως] and *Eth.* vi. 5. 5 [σώζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν] meant originally "sound mindedness" (a German, Besonnenheit), soon came to mean temperance with regard to pleasures. In this sense it is often popularly defined by Plato, cf. *Rep.* 430 E κόσμος πού τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια. *Sympos.* p. 196 C εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσι σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, &c.' See also *Charm.* The same tendency which appeared in Aristotle's treatment of ἀνδρεία appears in his treatment of σωφροσύνη—the tendency to narrow the reference of a term which Plato, in accordance with popular usage, employed with a wider meaning. Σωφροσύνη in the *Republic* is good sense and good feeling, resulting in moderation in all things; and is especially viewed as a *communis sensus*, or ὁμόνοια uniting the various classes of the state in peace and contentment under an established system of government (*Rep.* 432). But Aristotle limits the meaning of the term to moderation in respect of certain bodily pleasures. Σωφροσύνη, from being, in the *Republic*, a virtue with as distinct a social reference as δικαιοσύνη itself, thus becomes, in the *Ethics*, the most strictly personal of all the virtues.

δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί] Ramsauer suspects these words. As they stand, they seem to indicate a plan upon which Aristotle arranges the ἀρεταί in order. He begins with the two ἀρεταί *specially* associated with the two subdivisions of the ἄλογος φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου—viz.:—θυμός and ἐπιθυμία. It is true that the other ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί, as well as ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, consist in the regulation of ἄλογα πάθη having their

117 b. 23. origin in θυμός or ἐπιθυμία: but ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη are specially associated with these parts, being the regulation of their most characteristic manifestations—those manifestations, namely, which are common to man and brutes, and may, as owing nothing to social influences, be deemed ἄλογα in a more thorough sense than such passions as a desire for other people's money, or a desire for honour, which are called into existence by social influences. On the other hand, if the divisions of the ὀρεκτικὸν μέρος were in Aristotle's mind, 'Why,' as Grant asks, 'does he not begin with σωφροσύνη, since θυμός is higher than ἐπιθυμία (Eth. vii. 6)?' I am inclined, after all, to think with Grant that 'Aristotle probably began his list of the virtues with courage and temperance, because they were two of the Greek cardinal virtues'; and to follow Susemihl in attaching great weight to Ramsauer's suggestion that the words δοκοῦσι γὰρ . . . αἱ ἀρεταί are interpolated.

b. 25. εἴρηται] ii. 7. 3.

b. 26. ἧττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας] The article before λύπας (*cf.* ii. 7. 3 περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἧττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας) limits the reference to the pains caused by the absence of the pleasures: *cf.* below iii. 11. 5.

b. 28. διῃρήσθωσαν] *cf.* x. 5, where ἡδοναί are distinguished according to the ἐνέργειαι which they attend.

b. 29. ἑκάτερος] *i. e.* ὁ φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλομαθής.

b. 30. τούτων χαίρει] Scaliger's conjecture τούτῳ is probably correct.

1118 a. 1. § 3.] See Theoph. *Char.* xxii. (iii) περὶ ἀδολεσχίας, and xxiii. (vii) περὶ λαλίας, and xxiv. (viii) περὶ λογοποιΐας.

a. 9. § 5. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] *i. e.* 'by association.'

a. 13. §§ 6, 7, 8.] *Cf. de Sensu* 5, where two kinds of ὀσμαί are distinguished, (1) those which are correlated with the various χυμοί, and have therefore τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, or by association. (These are the ὀσμαί with which the ἀκόλαστος is said in *E. N.* iii. 10. 6 to be concerned κατὰ συμβεβηκός.) They are associated with τροφή and τὸ θρεπτικὸν μέρος, and so become indirectly objects of ἐπιθυμία. When the desire for food has been satisfied, these ὀσμαί no longer give pleasure. (2) Those ὀσμαί which are pleasant καθ' αὑτάς, *e.g.* the scent of flowers. They do not invite us to eat, nor do they stimulate any desire. The pleasure

derived from such *ὀσμαί* is peculiar to man, whereas that of *ὀσμαί* 1118 a. 13.
associated with tastes is common to him with the brutes; see *de Sensu* § 443 b. 16 *εἴδη δὲ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ δύο ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ τινές φασιν, οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδη τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν. διοριστέον δὲ πῶς ἔστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς χυμοὺς τεταγμένον αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ γευστικοῦ πάθη εἶναι, ἐπιθυμούντων μὲν ἡδεῖαι αἱ ὀσμαὶ τούτων εἰσί, πεπληρωμένοις δὲ καὶ μηδὲν δεομένοις οὐχ ἡδεῖαι, οὐδὲ τούτοις, ὥστε αὗται μέν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, διὸ καὶ πάντων εἰσὶ κοιναὶ τῶν ζῴων· αἱ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰς ἡδεῖαι τῶν ὀσμῶν εἰσίν, οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἧττον πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν παρακαλοῦσιν, οὐδὲ συμβάλλεται πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον.* Cf. *E. E.* iii. 2, where the above distinction between *αἱ ὀσμαὶ αἱ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδεῖαι* and *αἱ καθ' αὑτάς* is brought out distinctly (it is only hinted at in the *E. N.*—*τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ στεμμάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους* § 5), 1231 a. 6 *ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀσφρῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὑτάς. λέγω δὲ μὴ καθ' αὑτάς, αἷς ἢ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὄψων καὶ ποτῶν (δι' ἑτέραν γὰρ ἡδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ σιτεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθ' αὑτὰς δὲ οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν εἰσίν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Πρωτόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν τὰς δὲ ἡδύ.*

We may say that *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία* are concerned with those ἡδοναί which Plato distinguishes as *πληρώσεις τῆς ἐνδείας*, or *ἀπαλλαγαὶ λύπης*, from the *καθαραὶ ἡδοναί*: see note on x. 3. 7, for quotations from *Rep.* 584 B, and *Philebus* 51 B, where Plato distinguishes these two kinds of *ἡδοναί*. The *οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι* of *E. N.* i. 10. 3 may be an echo of the *τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα* of *Philebus* 51 B. The *τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας* (*Philebus* 51 B shows that the distinction marked by Aristotle's *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* and *καθ' αὑτάς* was present to Plato's mind. The following passage in *M. M.* ii. 7. 1205 b. 20–28 may be compared as giving very clearly this distinction between *ἡδοναί*, which is the psychological ground upon which Aristotle proceeds in determining the proper sphere of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία*—*ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ καθισταμένης τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, οἷον καθισταμένης μὲν αἱ ἐξ ἐνδείας ἀναπληρώσεις, καθεστηκυίας δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὖσαι, βελτίους ἂν εἶησαν αἱ καθεστηκυίας τῆς φύσεως ἐνέργειαι· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρους λεγόμεναι τοὺς τρόπους ἐνέργειαι εἰσίν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδοναὶ καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τοῦ διανοεῖσθαι βέλτισται ἂν εἶησαν, ἐπεὶ αἵ γε σωματικαὶ ἐξ ἀναπληρώσεως.*

1118 a. 16. § 7. **οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' . . . συμβεβηκός**] Zell refers to *Problemata* KH. 7, 950 a. 9 *οὐσῶν δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέντε, τά τε ἄλλα ζῷα ἀπὸ δύο μόνων τῶν προειρημένων ἥδεται, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἄλλας ἢ ὅλως οὐχ ἥδεται ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο πάσχει. ὁρῶν μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὁρῶν, ἢ καὶ ὀσφραινόμενος, χαίρει ὅτι ἀπολαύει· καὶ ὅταν πληρωθῇ, οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡδέα αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ταρίχου ὀδμή, ὅταν ἄδην ἔχωμεν τοῦ φαγεῖν. ὅταν δὲ ἐνδεεῖς ὦμεν, ἡδέα. ἡ δὲ τοῦ ῥόδου ἀεὶ ἡδεῖα. Cf. E. E.* iii. 2. 1230 b. 36 *ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τἆλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἁπτά. περὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδέα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθήτως διακείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἢ κάλλος. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μή τί που συμβέβηκε τεραστίως· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τάς γε αἰσθήσεις ὀξυτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς.*

I agree with Grant in thinking that this view according to which 'brutes have no pleasure of hearing or smell or sight except accidental ones, namely when sounds or scents indicate to them their prey or their food' is questionable. Some animals seem to derive pleasure from music[1]. A dog will sit for an hour at a time at a window looking with evident pleasure and interest at people and vehicles passing in the street. As for his pleasures of smell, which engross so much of his attention, they are obviously so different from any with which our less developed sense makes us acquainted, that it would be rash to say that they are all *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. Indeed the presumption is in favour of many of them being *καθ' αὐτάς*. That a dog experiences *ψυχικαὶ ἡδοναί*, such as those of friendship, performance of duty, and vanity, is pretty obvious.

a. 18. **αἱ κύνες**] Giphanius notes that *κύων* and *canis* are feminine when hunting is concerned. Aristotle tells us that the female Laconian hounds were better than the males; see *Hist. Anim.* ix. i. 608 a. 27 *αἱ Λάκαιναι κύνες αἱ θήλειαι εὐφυέστεραι τῶν ἀρρένων εἰσίν.*

a. 22. **ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἢ [εὐρὼν] ἔλαφον**] *οὐδ' ἰδὼν* = *οὐδὲ τῇ ὄψει* (*cf. οὐδὲ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς*, and *οὐδὲ τῇ φωνῇ* above); and *ἢ εὐρών* is added

[1] Coraes calls attention to *Pol.* Θ. 6, where Aristotle himself admits that brutes have some appreciation of music: 1341 a. 13.

ecause he (or an interpolator, according to Sus. and Byw.) is 1118 a. 22. hinking of Iliad iii. 23

> ὥστε λέων ἐχάρη μεγάλῳ ἐπὶ σώματι κύρσας,
> εὑρὼν ἢ ἔλαφον κεραὸν ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα.

§ 8. **ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται**] Zell quotes a. 25. ·τοῦ. ΚΗ. 2. 949 b. 6 διὰ τί κατὰ δύο μόνας αἰσθήσεις ἀκρατεῖς λέγομεν, ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν; ἢ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένας ἡδονὰς ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις; ἅτε οὖν κοιναὶ οὖσαι ἀτιμόταταί εἰσι, διὸ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ μόναι ἀναίδιστοί εἰσιν. ὥστε τὸν ὑπὸ τούτων ἡττώμενον ψέγομεν καὶ ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἀκόλαστον εἶναι φαμέν, διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν χειρίστων ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι.

ἁφή] Touch is the fundamental sense in all animals; see *de* a. 26. *Anima* ii. 2. 413 b. 4 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἁφή. ὥσπερ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἁφὴ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει· τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα. Touch is necessary to the preservation of the animal. Sounds and colours and smells do not feed the animal. What which feeds it must touch it immediately. The touch of food is taste. Taste accordingly is correlated with τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόριον, see *de Anima* iii. 12. 434 b. 11 ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον σῶμα ἔμψυχόν τι, σῶμα δὲ ἅπαν ἁπτόν, ἁπτὸν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἁφῇ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα ἁπτικὸν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον. αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι' ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή· ἁπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ τι αἰσθησιν, οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀνάγκη ἔσται σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον. διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἁφή τις· ἁφῆς γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἁπτόν. ψόφος δὲ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ὀσμὴ οὐ τρέφει, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ οὔτ' αὔξησιν οὔτε φθίσιν. ὥστε καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ἀνάγκη ἁφὴν εἶναί τινα, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὖ ἕνεκα καὶ γένει ζῴων ἤδη οὐ τῷ χάριν, ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἷον τῷ πορευτικῷ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ μέλλει κινεῖσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἁπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄπωθεν. *Cf. Sensu* i. 436 b. 10 Τοῖς δὲ ζῴοις, ᾗ μὲν ζῷον ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν τὴν ἁφήν· τούτῳ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον εἶναι καὶ μὴ ζῷον διορίζομεν. Ἰδίᾳ δ' ἤδη καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ μὲν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἡ μὲν ἁφὴ διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, ἡ δὲ γεῦσις διὰ τὴν τροφήν· τὸ γὰρ ὑγρὸν διακρίνει καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν αὕτη περὶ τὴν τροφήν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φεύγειν τὸ διώκειν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ χυμός ἐστι τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ μορίου πάθος. Αἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἔξωθεν αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἷον ὄσφρησις καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ

1118 a. 26. ὄψις, πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωσί τε προαισθανόμενα τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φεύγωσι, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι τοῦ εὖ ἕνεκα· πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγέλλουσι διαφοράς, ἐξ ὧν ἥ τε τῶν νοητῶν ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις καὶ ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν.

§ 9 τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι] With the pleasures derived from the various flavours which γεῦσις perceives as distinct (and it is with these that γεῦσις in the strict sense is concerned—τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν) the ἀκόλαστος has not directly to do. Γεῦσις, the perception of flavours, stands to the mere sensation of throat-touch, with which the ἀκόλαστος has directly to do, in much the same relation in which the smell of food stands to its taste; and, although certain χυμοί may, like certain ὀσμαί, be desired κατὰ συμβεβηκός by the ἀκόλαστος, yet roughly the remark of Eudemus is true that ἀκολασία is not concerned with the pleasures of the tip of the tongue, but with those of the throat: *E. E.* iii. 2. 1231 a. 12 ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδ' ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔοικεν ἁφῇ μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὔχονται τὴν γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἁπτόμενα, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν.

With τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν may be compared *de An.* ii. 10. 422 b. 10 τὰ δ' εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων, ἁπλᾶ μὲν τἀναντία, τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἐχόμενα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἁλμυρόν· μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμὺ καὶ τὸ αὐστηρὸν καὶ στρυφνὸν καὶ ὀξύ· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν. ὥστε τὸ γευστικόν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, γευστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ αὐτοῦ.

a. 32. § 10. ὀψοφάγος] His name, Philoxenus, is given in the passage *E. E.* iii. 2. 1231 a. 16 quoted above, and in the present passage is supplied by N^b, O^b, Ald., K^b, CCC, NC, Cambr., and other MSS.: also in *Prob.* KH. 7. 950 a. 2 we read τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τροφὴν αἱ ἡδοναὶ ἐνίων μὲν ἐν τῇ γλώττῃ τὸ ἡδύ, ἀπ' ἐνίων δὲ ἐν τῷ λάρυγγι, διὸ καὶ Φιλόξενος γεράνου φάρυγγα εὔχετο ἔχειν. There are several references to him (or them, for there were more than one of the name) in later writers—Plutarch, Aelian, Athenaeus: thus, Plut. *de Amori* 1 has χυμῶν ἡδονῇ δεδουλῶσθαι Φιλόξενον τὸν ὀψοφάγον: Plut. *de occulte vivendo* 1 τοὺς μὲν γὰρ περὶ Φιλόξενον τὸν Ἐρύξιδος . . . ἐστη-

περὶ τὰ ὄψα: Athenaeus *Deipn.* viii. 26 κἂν ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει φησί 1118 a. 32.
ν]

Φιλόξενός ποθ', ὡς λέγουσ', ὁ Κυθήριος
ηὔξατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πήχεων,
ὅπως, κατα πίνω, φησίν, ὅτι πλεῖστον χρόνον,
καὶ πάνθ' ἅμα μοι τὰ βρώμαθ' ἡδυνὴν ποιῇ.

ο Aelian *Var. Hist.* x. 9 Φιλόξενος λίχνος ἦν, καὶ γαστρὸς ἥττων.
phanes mentions an Eryxis son of Philoxenus in *Batrach.*
Corr. K^b and Γ have Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιος, pr. K^b and CCC
ξιος.

ηξ is properly the wind-pipe, but is here used loosely for
οφάγος or gullet. Ramsauer refers to *de Part. An.* iv. 11.
29 to show 'quo sensu Aristoteli probabile fuerit votum
eni': ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα τῶν χυμῶν ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, τῶν ἐδεστῶν
ιόδῳ ἡ ἡδονή . . . καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν πλείστων ὄψων καὶ ἐδεστῶν ἐν τῇ
ει τῇ τάσει (*v. l.* θίξει) τοῦ οἰσοφάγου γίνεται ἡ χάρις.

πάτη] *i.e.* it belongs to all animals: see *de Anima* ii. 2. b. 1.
4 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἁφή. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρε-
ύνεται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν
ἰσθήσεων. θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ
φυόμενα μετέχει· τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν
The Paraphrast's explanation is wrong—κοινοτάτη ἐστὶν ἡ
τάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπεὶ καὶ ἁφῇ τινὶ πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθά-
for Aristotle in the *de Sensu* 4. 442 a. 29 finds fault with
ritus for reducing all the senses to touch: Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ
τοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, ὅσοι λέγουσι περὶ αἰσθήσεως, ἀτοπώτατόν τι
πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσιν. καίτοι εἰ οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει,
ς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἑκάστη ἁφή τις ἐστίν· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι
, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν. Cf. Hamilton's *Lectures on Meta-*
vol. ii. pp. 152 sqq. for a defence of the view of Democritus
by Aristotle.

ἐλευθεριώτατα] Opposed to ἀνδραποδώδεις in § 8. b. 4.

ισίοις] In the Gymnasia there were baths, apparently b. 6.
to our Turkish baths, which were used by the gymnasts
ercise. For the advantages derived from τρίψεις and the
ιεντ θερμασία see *Prob.* ΛΖ. 2. 965 b–966 a, b.

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

Desires are (1) *common to all men and natural, and* (2) *peculiar to individuals and acquired. Thus the desire for food and drink and the sexual desire are* (1) *natural, while individuals show* (2) *preferences for this or that kind of food, etc. But even in these individual preferences there is an element of natural desire, in that there are some things which all men agree in preferring to certain other things. So far as a desire is simply natural,* i. e. *so far as individual preference has not refined upon it, it does not hold out much temptation to error, and when error takes place, it is always in the way of excess. Thus those people are few who, simply because they are hungry or thirsty, will overfill their bellies with whatever comes to hand. It is only the lowest sort of people who tend to become guzzling-bellies as they are called.*

But when individual preference comes in as to the particular kind *of food, etc. with which the natural desire is to be satisfied, there are many who err, and many are the ways of error. For when we say that a man 'has a great liking for something,' we mean either that he likes something which he ought not to like at all, or likes it more than the average man does, or in the wrong way. Now in all these respects the profligate, or intemperate man, goes to excess. He delights in things which he ought not to delight in at all – abominations; and where it is permitted to take delight, he does so more than he ought, and more than the average man does.*

So much for the relation of temperance and intemperance to pleasures: as for the pains to which they are related, they are those caused by the absence of the excessive pleasures. Such pains the temperate man does not feel, while the profligate, or intemperate, man is tortured by them. These absurd pains (pains produced by pleasures!) are to be distinguished from the more real pains which the courageous man endures and the coward shrinks from.

Those who are deficient in their love of pleasure are very rare—so rare that they are not even distinguished by a name; indeed such insensibility as theirs is scarcely human.

As for the temperate man, he observes the mean in these things. He takes no pleasure in what the intemperate man takes most pleasure, but rather hates it; and the pleasures which he does allow himself are never excessive or ill-timed—whether they be those proper to a healthy constitution, or other pleasures in so far as they do not interfere with health and vigour, and are not inconsistent with the ideal of a noble life, or beyond his means.

1118 b. 8. §§ 1, 2, 3, 4.] The κοιναί, or φυσικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι are those which all men experience. But few men habitually gratify them in an improper way, simply *quâ* κοιναί or φυσικαί, *i. e.* promiscuous-

hout caring for the manner in which they are gratified, so long 1118 b. 8.
they are gratified somehow. The few who do so are the λίαν
ραποδώδεις, who *e.g.* overfill their bellies with any sort of food.
ε ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι ἐπιθυμίαι are partly (1) the particular directions
ich the κοιναὶ ἐπιθυμίαι legitimately take in different men, *e.g.*
ference for this kind of food or drink rather than that, where
things specially desired are good, if taken in moderation;
rtly (2) perversions of the κοιναὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, by which they are
ected to objects which are μισητά. It is where the κοιναὶ ἐπιθυμίαι
e particular directions, that we find ἀκολασία for the most part.
is particular (and in itself legitimate) way of gratifying a natural
man desire attracts one man, that particular way another man,
d they go to excess in these particular ways. Here we have to
with what is distinguished in *E.N.* vii. 5. 8 as ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη
ασία from ἡ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ἡ θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, under which
er head it may be noted the desire of τὰ μισητά mentioned in
properly falls.

1.] Scaliger, with the approval of Susemihl and Rassow,
rsch. p. 58) inserts καὶ φυσικαί after κοιναί, b. 8.

ροφῆς . . . καὶ εὐνῆς] These are the two objects of τὸ θρεπτικόν b. 9.
nguished in *de Anima* ii. 4. 415 a. 23—nutrition and repro-
ion—ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ πρώτη καὶ
τάτη δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν· ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα
ῖσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρήσασθαι.

ηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς] We have here the ordinary distinction b. 10.
een solid and liquid nourishment. For Aristotle's *scientific*
unt of the physiology of nutrition and taste see *de Sensu* 4.
b. 15 sqq. where he tells us that τὸ ξηρόν and τὸ ὑγρόν must
ı be present in every experience of taste and process of nutrition
ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἐναποπλύνοντες ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς
ὕτων ἔχειν ποιοῦσι τὸ ὕδωρ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φύσις τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ γεῶδες,
διὰ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ γεώδους διηθοῦσα καὶ κινοῦσα τῷ θερμῷ ποιόν τι τὸ
ὶν παρασκευάζει. Καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο χυμὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρη-
ν ξηροῦ πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τῆς γεύσεως τῆς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλοιωτικὸν
ἐνέργειαν· ἄγει γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἰς τοῦτο δυνάμει προῦπάρχον· οὐ γὰρ
ὰ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. Ὅτι δ' οὐ
τὸ ξηροῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ τροφίμου οἱ χυμοὶ ἢ πάθος εἰσὶν ἢ στέρησις, δεῖ
λῶν ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ξηρὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγροῦ οὔτε τὸ ὑγρὸν ἄνευ τοῦ
ροῦ· τροφὴ γὰρ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεμιγμένον.

1118 b. 11. **Ὅμηρος**] The editors quote *Iliad* xxiv. 129.

ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων] As Achilles, whom Thetis is addressing in the lines referred to above.

b. 12. **τοιᾶσδε**] *τροφῆς καὶ εὐνῆς.* Ramsauer conjectures *παντός* for *πᾶς* in this clause, construing *τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκέτι παντός ἐστιν οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν* (masc.). But it is better to accept the anacoluthon, and to suppose that Aristotle wrote *τὸ δέ* with the infinitive in his mind, and then carelessly wrote *πᾶς* instead of *παντός* because he had written *πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ* above. Reading *πᾶς* we must of course make *τῶν αὐτῶν* neuter, and explain—*οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ αὐτός.* Bywater's suggestion, *τῆς δὲ τοιᾶσδε,* is very tempting however.

b. 13. § 2. **ἡμέτερον**] 'Et fere *ἐφ' ἡμῖν,*' Ramsauer. '*Ἐπίθετος, ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐπινοηθεῖσα,* Par. 'Merely capricious,' Grant.

b. 14. **ἕτερα γὰρ . . . τυχόντων**] Here two reasons are given for the assertion that there is something 'natural' even in the most factitious tastes: (1) they are 'natural,' in the sense of being the expressions of the nature of the particular individuals, it being 'natural' that the tastes of individuals should vary within certain limits; and (2) they are 'natural,' because they are confined within these limits—because, though varying, they agree in not giving the preference in any case to certain things distinguished as *τὰ τυχόντα.*

πᾶσιν] *τισίν* O^b, a mere blunder.

b. 20. § 3. **αὐτήν**] *sc. τὴν γαστέρα.*

b. 22. § 4. **τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων . . . πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν**] Rassow (*Forsch.* 58, 59) reads *τό* for *τῷ* before *χαίρειν* (with M^b and O^b) and before *μᾶλλον* (N^b and O^b) in line 23, and treats the words *τῶν γάρ* (l. 22) . . . *δεῖ* (l. 24) as an independent sentence, which he closes with a full stop. If *τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων* is to be treated as a genitive absolute, *τῷ* being retained before *χαίρειν* and *μᾶλλον,* and a comma placed after *δεῖ,* l. 24, then we must follow Eucken (*De Arist. dic. rat.* p. 31) in reading *δή* (M^b) after *κατὰ πάντα.*

Grant thinks that *ὡς* in the phrase *ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί* is an interpolation, because he supposes that, if it is retained, we must place a comma after *μᾶλλον,* and treat *ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί* as a separate clause, rendering '*or* because they like them as people

lo;' whereas (he argues) *μᾶλλον ἤ* ought to be taken 1118 b. 22.
as to give the rendering 'or because they like them
people in general' (*πλέον ἢ κατὰ τοὺς πολλούς*, Par.).
loubtedly the right rendering (it is remarkable however
does not notice its inconsistency with the natural
the reading *καὶ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν* which he accepts
ut it is not necessary to omit the *ὡς* in order to obtain
ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί is as good Greek as *μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί*,
e same meaning. Thus in vii. 8. 2 (referred to by
we have *ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστιν τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις*
ου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, although in iv. 4. 4
Grant) we have *ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί.*
being the meaning of *ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί*, it is
necessary to accept in l. 27 the reading of K^b, CCC,
καὶ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, rendering 'and more than people in

he pains with which the *σώφρων* and *ἀκόλαστος* are b. 27.
are not independent pains like those which the *ἀνδρεῖος*
pains caused by pleasures (*καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ*
caused by the absence of pleasures.

πῳ] This is what Grant calls 'the disgraceful paradox' 1119 a. 4.
. The Paraphrast has *ὥστε καὶ ἄτοπόν τι δοκεῖ τὸ δι'*
σθαι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου.

πάνυ γίνονται] The ascetic spirit (unless we regard a. 6.
s a manifestation of it) was conspicuously absent from
national character.

νθρωπική ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ
Such insensibility would be inconsistent with being
man is after all an animal: *cf. E. N.* iii. 1. 27 *δοκεῖ δ'*
θρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη.

ε δ' κ.τ.λ.] In *E. N.* ii. 7. 3 we have *ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ* a. 10.
πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦ-
δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. 2. 1230 b. 13) has
ήτως ἔχοντας δι' ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν
ισθήτους, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἔστι
νώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον
ἄλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδέων ἧτταν
μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷους οἱ κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι παρά-

1119 a. 10. γουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἱ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσιν. *Cf. E. N.* ii. 2. 7 ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός τις: and *E. N.* ii. 7. 13 περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία: *cf.* also *E. N.* vii. 9. 3 εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ᾖ ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ. From these passages we may gather that, if any name belongs to the ἐλλείπων περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, it is ἀναίσθητος, and that the ἄγροικος or rustic (as distinguished from the ἀστεῖος or town-man) is merely adduced in *E. E.* iii. 2 and *E. N.* ii. 2. 7 as an example of ἀναισθησία, as he is introduced elsewhere as an example of other peculiarities—in *E. N.* ii. 7. 13, of dullness, and in vii. 9. 3, of opinionativeness. Theophrastus, *Char.* x. (iv), gives an amusing sketch of the ἄγροικος. Ἀγροικία is ἀμαθία ἀσχήμων. The ἄγροικος is the man who maintains that myrrh smells no sweeter than thyme: his shoes are too large for him: he talks loudly: he mistrusts his own friends, and makes confidants of his servants. He will stand on the road and look at a cow or a goat, but will look at nothing worth looking at. He runs himself to answer a knock at his door. The ἀναισθησία of Theophrastus does not seem to have much in common with Aristotle's ἀναισθησία—insensibility to the pleasures περὶ ἃς ἀκόλαστος. Ἀναισθησία is defined in *Char.* xxv. (xiv) as βραδύτης ψυχῆς ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν. The ἀναίσθητος is the only man who goes to sleep in the whole theatre. He loses things and cannot find them. He fatigues his children by obliging them to wrestle.

With regard to the ἄγροικοι of the κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι referred to by Eudemus—plays entitled ΑΓΡΟΙΚΟΣ, ΑΓΡΙΟΙ, ΑΓΡΙΩΤΗΣ, are known to have been written by Antiphanes, Menander, Pherecrates, and Sophron: see Fabric. *Bib.* ii. pp. 414, 460, 474, 494 referred to by Zell. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Theophrastus sometimes borrowed from the comedians in writing his *Characters*.

a. 13. § 8. οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 91) reads οὐδ'... οὐδέ for the οὔθ'... οὔτε of the codd. here. The clause occupies the same position in the first (οὔτε γὰρ ἥδε ...) of the two main divisions of the sentence, as the clause

i κ.τ.λ. does in the second (οὔτ' ἀπόντων . . .); and if οὐδέ is 1119 a. 13.
ı the second division it must be in the first also. Susem.
water follow Rassow.

ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 91) favours a. 15.
making it depend upon ἐπιθυμεῖ. Although all MSS.
ıtly exhibit οὐθενός, three—K^b, O^b, and CCC—read im-
ly after it, not ὅσα but ἃ, and so are as good evidence for
ginal οὐθέν· ὅσα, as for an original οὐθενός· ἃ. It seems
that the letters οσ are original, and that Susemihl's οὐδέν· ἃ
g. I think, however, that οὐδέν is right. I take the phrase
ις τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν as a blank adverbial formula, or *et*
ıdded to οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ and οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, and, with them,
tic of μετρίως by which οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ is
l. This blank formula is to be filled in ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ
ν διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα (*E. N.* ii. 3. 5)—*e.g.* οὐδ' ὡς μὴ δεῖ
e included in it.
reading οὐθενός· ὅσα would easily arise by dittographia of
would be retained by scribes, for Rassow's reason—that
lepends on ἐπιθυμεῖ

ἔχων] *i. e.* ὁ ὀρεγόμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν τούτοις ἐμποδίων ὄντων, a. 19.
ὁ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

*acy, or intemperance, is more voluntary than cowardice, for it pur-
ure, which men naturally seek after, whereas cowardice consists in not
in, which men naturally avoid. Moreover, pain disturbs and destroys
e of its subject, but pleasure has no such effect. Being more voluntary,
is therefore more disgraceful. It is easier to habituate oneself to resist
asures, than to habituate oneself to endure the pains of fear; for
nany more opportunities in life of habituating oneself to resist bodily
and the process of habituation is without danger. But the habit of
is more voluntary than the particular acts of cowardice; for the
vot in itself painful, whereas the acts are caused by a pain which
he man's nature and makes him throw away his arms and otherwise
imself. Hence the opinion that these acts are even forced upon him.
her hand, acts of profligacy are more voluntary than the habit is; for
ctuated by desire and appetite, whereas no one desires the habit.*

The term ἀκόλαστος—which means literally, 'unchastised'—is also applied to children when they are naughty; for there is a certain similarity between the 'profligate' and the naughty child. It does not matter here which is the original application of the term; at any rate, its transference is warranted by the real analogy between desire and a child—both try to do what is unseemly, and both grow apace, and need chastisement. If desire be not chastened and brought under subjection to reason, it will go great lengths, being an insatiable principle, which is strengthened by indulgence, till it at last casts reason out. As the child must live in obedience to his master, so must the principle of desire be subjected to reason. Hence in the temperate man desire will be in harmony with reason; both will aim at that which is noble and good; desire will seek the right objects, in the right way, and at the right time, in conformity with the dictates of reason.

1119 a. 21. §§ 1, 2.] In these sections Aristotle is speaking about τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις. *Acts* of intemperance are more voluntary than acts of cowardice, because the former are prompted by the desire of pleasure, and express the natural bent of the agent, while the latter are done under the constraint of pain, and seem to represent, not the agent, but his necessity.

a. 24. § 2. φύσιν] The normal state, as Grant points out.

μᾶλλον δὴ ἑκούσιον] *sc.* ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. The MSS. seem all to have δ', but δή is certainly right: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 92.

a. 26. πρὸς αὐτά] πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα, Coraes.

a. 27. §§ 3, 4.] In these sections he passes on to speak about the ἕξεις themselves.

The *habit* of cowardice is more voluntary (οὐχ ὁμοίως=μᾶλλον) than acts of cowardice; the habit of profligacy less voluntary than acts of profligacy. The reasons given for these differences are that the habit of cowardice is not painful, as compared with acts of cowardice, which seem to be forced upon a man at the time by the pains of fear; while the habit of profligacy is not desired or sought after, although profligate acts are. There is a good deal of confusion here. The habit δειλία is acquired by the repetition of particular acts caused by λύπη. It is misleading therefore to describe it as αὐτὴ ἄλυπος, in order to prove it to be 'more voluntary' than the particular acts. When Aristotle calls a *habit* 'voluntary' he means, as we have seen (iii. 5. 14), that we are *responsible for it.* If then the *acts* which produce the habit of δειλία are in a sense involuntary (as caused by λύπη ἡ ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν

1119 a. 27. drinking brandy, keenly felt at the beginning of the drunkard's progress, disappears almost entirely at last and leaves him the victim of a physical craving—of pain, not of pleasure.

It is to be noted that ἑκούσιον, after ὁμοίως in § 3, is the reading of Γ, N^b, Ald, mg. O^b, pr. P^2, NC, B^1, (B^1 has ἑκούσιον ὁ καὶ κρείττων in the text; O^b has on the margin καὶ ἑκούσιον ὁ καὶ κρείττων); while φευκτόν is the reading of Bekker's four MSS., K^b, L^b, M^b, O^b and also of CCC and B^2.

a. 33. § 5.] Eudemus (*E.E.* iii. 2. 1230 a. 38—1230. b. 8) has the following account of the derivation and uses of the word ἀκόλαστος —λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς. ὅ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πως μηδ' ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός, ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος· ἄτμητον γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες. κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως.

b. 2. δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου] I agree with Grant that 'there can be no doubt that the punishment and unrestrainedness of children is the more concrete and primary idea.' Aristotle seems to make it plain in § 8 which he regards as πρότερον and which ὕστερον—ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα . . . οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

b. 9. § 7. ἀνοήτῳ] One without τὸ ἄρχον—νοῦς.

τὸ συγγενές] That which is born with one—connate. He means that the gratification of desire strengthens the natural principle of desire in us. Function reacts on organ. Coraes has—προβιβάζει τὴν συγγενῆ καὶ ἔμφυτον τῇ παιδικῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἂν μὴ κολάζηται.

b. 13. § 8. ὥσπερ δέ] K^b, O^b, and Camb. have ὥσπερ δέ, CCC has ὥσπερ δή. Bekker's ὥσπερ γάρ is given by L^b, M^b, Γ.

b. 16. § 9. ἀμφοῖν] *i.e.* The ἐπιθυμητικόν and λόγος. Cf. vi. 2 2 δεῖ τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν . . . καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι, τὴν δὲ διώκειν.

BOOK IV.

ory Note.] THE *E. E.* and *M. M.* agree in the rder—*ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, πραότης, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλο-λοπρέπεια*: then follow, though not in exactly the in each treatise, the *παθητικαὶ μεσότητες—νέμεσις, αἰδώς, της, ἀλήθεια,* and *εὐτραπελία.* The *Nicomachean* order *σωφροσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, φιλο-ης, φιλία, ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία,*—and lastly, *αἰδώς,* distin-n all the foregoing as a *πάθος.*

iii. 10. 1 Aristotle seems to give a reason (but see) why he begins with *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη—viz. δο-ν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται αἱ ἀρεταί.* It is true that all the s consist in the regulation of *τὸ ἄλογον* or the element in man; but *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* represent this element urely animal forms, without the regulation of which, to the more distinctively human and social virtues could ired. The reasons which make it proper to begin the *ρεία* and *σωφροσύνη* are in favour of giving the third *ιότης,* which consists in the regulation of *ὀργή,* a feeling shares with the brutes. As *ὀργή,* however, is most often causes which depend for their existence on society, f *πραότης,* if placed third, makes an easy transition to and the other virtues which consist no longer in the f purely animal instincts, but of feelings which are of human origin—*i.e.* do not come into existence except -the desire of wealth, the love of display, the desire of wish to please, and so forth.

may be said to discuss the virtues which consist in the

regulation of feelings and desires, which, however evolved f animal instincts, owe their present form and force to soc 'Ανδρεία and σωφροσύνη (and perhaps to some extent πρα although, as *virtues*, they are no less social than ἐλευθερότης the rest, are concerned with feelings which have their roots in man's animal as distinguished from his social nature[1].

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Liberality (ἐλευθεριότης) *is the observance of the Mean in spending* (*quiring 'wealth'* (χρήματα)—*its more characteristic side however lei which relates to spending*, i.e. *to the* use *of 'wealth'—of moderate w must be understood, not of great wealth. Being the habit of using such properly, its extremes,* ἀσωτία *and* ἀνελευθερία, *are the habits of abusi wealth. The term* ἀσωτία, *however, is often employed with an imp* (συμπλέκοντες, § 3) *of* ἀκρασία *and* ἀκολασία, *and thus appears in a v light. In the strict sense* (οἰκείως, § 4), *however, the* ἄσωτος *is one wh his substance* (§ 5), *and so ruins himself—as the etymology of th shows* (ἀ *and* σώζειν).

The ἐλευθέριος, *then, is concerned with the* χρῆσις χρημάτων, *and i characterised as one who spends well than as one who acquires well acquire is* κτῆσις, *not* χρῆσις—i.e. '*to acquire well*' *is, at best, th refusal to receive except from proper sources, it is not active function.* θεριότης *will thus realise the characteristic of all* ἀρετή—*to issue in well-doing, rather than to merit the merely negative praise of refrainin evil* (§ 7). *The* ἐλευθέριος *will give* τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς (§ 12), i.

[1] See, however, Zeller's *Ph. d. Gr.* 3rd German Ed. p. 634 (Ari note 1, for a criticism of Häcker (*das Eintheilungs- und Anordnungs der moralischen Tugendreihe in der Nikomachischen Ethik*, Berlin, 186 adopts a view similar to that advanced above. Zeller's chief point is the view were correct, πραότης must come after ἀνδρεία. To this it answered—that it could hardly come in *between* the two Cardinal ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after σωφρ the *E. E.* and *M. M.*—a point which Zeller does not mention. Arist deed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discus ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη and that of δικαιοσύνη and φρόνησις: but this is I I would urge, the virtues of the Fourth Book (like δικαιοσύνη which diately follows them) are distinguished from ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη b concerned with the regulation of feelings which owe their appearance to The fact that πραότης has the third place in the *E. E.* and *M. M.* seems t show that the writers of these treatises think that ἀνδρεία and σω stand on a different footing from the virtues of the Fourth Book, occupying an intermediate position.

n regard to the fitness of things, of which his φρόνησις makes him a correct dge. Consequently his liberality must not be estimated from the amount that gives, but from the relation which the gift bears to his means (§ 19). *Hence ants with practically unlimited means are not ἄσωτοι. They cannot 'ruin emselves' by their extravagance* (§ 23). *The ἐλευθέριος does not value alth for its own sake, but only ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. Those who have made rtunes have done so by setting a high value on wealth and devoting themselves its acquisition. They are less likely to be liberal with their money than se who have inherited fortunes* (§ 20).

Of the extremes, ἀσωτία is much better than ἀνελευθερία. It runs short of ans (§ 30) *and, being a generous impulse, may be chastened by age and perience into ἐλευθεριότης* (§§ 30, 31). *It also benefits many, by making oney circulate.' 'Ανελευθερία, however, is incurable, being the vice of old e and helplessness, and of narrow and timid natures, of which nothing can made* (§§ 37–40).

We may note in this account of ἐλευθεριότης and its extremes— the stress laid on the point that ἐλευθεριότης results in a χρῆσις μέτρων. It thus takes its place with the other virtues in a life doing. The χρηματιστὴς βίος, which may be contrasted with the of the ἐλευθέριος, is concerned merely with indefinite κτῆσις, l is a life of reception, that is, not properly a Life at all. The importance attached to force of character. It is better do what is noble, than to refrain from what is base; and the l spendthrift is a more hopeful character than the timid niggard. The remark that the spendthrift 'benefits many,' may be ced as untrue. Money does more work and 'benefits' more ole as 'capital' than it does if scattered about broadcast: cf. nt's good notes on §§ 31–32 and § 44.

s I observed in note on ii. 7. 2, Aristotle's treatment of ἐλευ- της is as complicated as his treatment of ἀνδρεία: see ii. 7. 4 iv. i. 29. The ἄσωτος is in excess as regards spending and lefect as regards acquiring; the ἀνελεύθερος is in excess as rds acquiring, and in defect as regards spending. Nor are the moments of ἀνελευθερία always united in one character. Some ed in acquisition; others are in defect as regards spending: v. 1. 38, 39.

L.] The method of exhaustion, by which its object is assigned 1119 b. 22.
ευθεριότης may be compared with that by which the object of cular Justice is found—v. 2. 5.

2.] Cf. v. 5. 15. b. 2.

1119 b. 30. § 3. **συμπλέκοντες**] 'with an implication'—imply
perance. Grant compares 'the Prodigal Son.' Tl
Theopompus, Aristotle's contemporary, in a passage p
Athenaeus (iv. 62), gives a vivid picture of the *ἀσωτία* c
his friends, which may serve as an illustration of *ἀσω*
implication'—*Φίλιππος, ἐπεὶ ἐγκρατὴς πολλῶν ἐγίνετο χ
ἀνάλωσεν αὐτὰ ταχέως, ἀλλ' ἐξέβαλε καὶ ἔρριψε, πάντων
κιστος ὢν οἰκονόμος, οὐ μόνον αὐτός, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτόν.
οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἠπίστατο ζῆν ὀρθῶς, οὐδὲ σωφρόνως οἰκεῖν οὐ
αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἦν, ἄπληστος καὶ πολυτελὴς ὤν, προχείρως δ
καὶ κτώμενος καὶ διδούς· στρατιώτης γὰρ ὤν, λογίζεσθαι τὰ
τἀναλισκόμενα δι' ἀσχολίαν οὐκ ἠδύνατο. ἔπειτα δ' οἱ ἑτα
πολλῶν τόπων ἦσαν συνερρυηκότες· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆ
ἐκ Θετταλίας, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἀριστίνδην
ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἦν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροις λάσταυρο
ἢ θρασὺς τὸν τρόπον, οὗτοι σχεδὸν ἅπαντες εἰς Μακεδονίαν
ἑταῖροι Φιλίππου προσηγορεύοντο. εἰ δὲ μὴ καὶ τοιοῦτός
ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς διαίτης τῆς Μακεδονικῆς ταχέως ἐ
ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οἱ πόλεμοι καὶ αἱ στρατεῖαι, καὶ α
θρασεῖς αὐτοὺς εἶναι προετρέποντο, καὶ ζῆν μὴ κοσμίως ἀλλ
τοῖς λῃσταῖς παραπλησίως.*

b. 33. § 4. **οἰκείως**] 'they are not properly called *ἄσωτοι*.'

1120 a. 4. §§ 6–8.] See *Argument* at the beginning of this chap

a. 14. § 8. **ἔπεται**] For the technical use of this term =
or *κατηγορεῖσθαι τινός*, see *An. Pr.* i. 27 and 28 *passim*.

a. 17. § 9. **ἧττον προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι**] 'For i
inclined to give away (*ἧττον προΐενται*) what is their own,
ἢ = *ἤ*) to abstain from taking what belongs to others.'
and other editors point out *μᾶλλον* is redundant.

a. 20. § 10. **οὐχ ἧττον**] = *μᾶλλον* Ald. Schol.

a. 33. § 16.] Grant has an interesting note on this section
calls attention to 'the spirit of manliness and nobili
καὶ φιλόκαλος cf. Eth. iv. 4. 3.) which runs through
characters of Aristotle.' 'The principle of individual
'a sense of life and free action (*ἐνέργεια*), are with
basis of morality, and the first requisite to nobleness
self-respect . . . Christianity says "It is more blessed

:ive" . . . In the Christian sentiment there is so great a 1120 a. 33.
ny between the object and subject, that the subjective side
's to be lost; but in reality it is only lost to be found again,
minished to be enhanced. Aristotle's statement would be,
better to give than to receive, because it is more noble."
ıas a slight tendency to give too much weight to the sub-
side.' I think not—*εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ καὶ πόλει,*
μ καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῴζειν.

. **ἀναγκαῖον**] *i. e. ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*—materially necessary, b. 1.
beautiful form (*τὸ καλόν*) is to be realised (see *Met.* Δ. 5.
ι. 20).

3. **βλέπειν**] Bekker reads *ἐπιβλέπειν* with L^b^. Rassow b. 6.
ι. 59) prefers *βλέπειν*, the reading of K^b^ and M^b^. CCC,
in this part of the Ethics is practically a transcript of
rt of K^b^ (see *Anecd. Oxon.* Classical Series, vol. i. part i.
omits not only the prefix *ἐπι-* but also the *μή* immediately
ng.

. **αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν**] '*δίδωσιν* fort. seclu- b. 9.
a' Bywater. Retaining *δίδωσιν*, I would suggest *οὗτος* in
f *αὕτη*.

.] Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Grant compare Plato, *Rep.* b. 11.
C, where Socrates (in his conversation with Cephalus) says
τησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά (*sc. τὰ χρήματα*)·
γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ . . . καὶ οἱ πατέρες κ.τ.λ. Cf. also *E. N.* ix.

οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα] Cf. note on iii. 11. 8, a. 15 *οὐδ' ὅλως* b. 21.
ύτων οὐδέν.

ἕπεται . . . b. 34. **αἱ ἑπόμεναι**] See above, note on § 8 b. 32.
chapter.

. **Σιμωνίδῃ**] 'fort. *Σιμωνίδου*' Bywater. Coraes quotes 1121 a. 7.
eus xiv. 73 (656) *ὄντως δὲ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς κίμβιξ ὁ Σιμωνίδης καὶ*
ρδής, ὡς Χαμαιλέων φησίν. Ἐν Συρακούσαις γοῦν τοῦ Ἱέρωνος
λοντος αὐτῷ τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν λαμπρῶς, πωλῶν τὰ πλείω ὁ Σιμωνίδης
ν' ἐκείνου πεμπομένων, ἑαυτῷ μικρὸν μέρος ἀπετίθετο. ἐρομένου
τὴν αἰτίαν· ὅπως, εἶπεν, ἥ τε Ἱέρωνος μεγαλοπρέπεια καταφανὴς
ἐμὴ κοσμιότης. Coraes adds—*ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας*
ιλαργυρίαν ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεστερημένος διὰ τὸ γῆρας ἡδονῶν,
ε ἔτι γηροβοσκεῖται τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν, ὡς φησι Πλούταρχος

1121 a. 7. (Plut. *an seni sit gerenda resp.* 5). Cf. also Stobaeus (*Flor.* i. 240 ed. Meineke) quoted by Coraes—Σιμωνίδης ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τί ἐσχάτου γήρως ὢν φιλάργυρος εἴη κ.τ.λ. Grant quotes *Rhet.* ii. 16. 1391 a. 8 ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἱέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρεῖττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· πλούσιον εἰπεῖν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη, ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας. See also the amusing reference to his love of money in *Rhet.* iii. 2. 1405 b. 24 καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀρεῦσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχερείνων εἰς ἡμιόνους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἱκανὸν ἔδωκεν, ἐποίησε 'χαίρετ' ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων.' καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἦσαν.

a. 15. § 29. πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς] See below §§ 41, 42.

a. 16. §§ 30, 31. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας . . . βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου] 'The two sides of ἀσωτία (mentioned in § 29) are very seldom found united in the same person, for it is not easy for one who has no receipts to give to everybody (if he tries, his means soon come to an end—that is, if he is a private individual; and it is only the private individual who can be termed ἄσωτος): where they are united however—that is, in the ἄσωτος proper, we have a character not a little better than that of the ἀνελεύθερος.' The words ταχέως . . . ἄσωτοι εἶναι are parenthetical; and ὁ γ' τοιοῦτος is ὁ μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνων καὶ πᾶσι διδούς = the ἄσωτος proper = ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος of § 32 below. Where (as is generally the case) extravagance goes with indiscriminate acquisition (§§ 33, 34), we have really a bad form of ἀνελευθερία, not something better than ἀνελευθερία. See Rassow *Forsch.* p. 121.

a. 24. § 31. δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ] K^b, CCC, Γ, and Cambr. omit both negatives, with the approval of Rassow (*Forsch.* 59), who is followed by Susemihl. The fault of the ἄσωτος, as Rassow points out, is to give too much and take too little. If he is reformed and becomes like the ἐλευθέριος, he will give the right amount to the right people, and also take the right amount from the right sources—λήψεται ὅθεν δεῖ.

b. 4. § 35. οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα] τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. All MSS. except K^b O^b and CCC, seem to read τούτου αὐτοῦ—which I prefer to τούτου accepted by Sus. and Byw.

b. 16. §§ 38–40.] ἀνελευθερία has two moments: but they do not always coexist in the same character; hence we have two classes

f ἀνελεύθεροι, (1) Those who are conscientious enough—or at 1121 b. 16.
ast externally irreproachable—in the matter of acquisition, but
rill not part with what they acquire. (2) Those who are bent
pon acquisition, and unscrupulous in the methods which they
mploy.

§ 39. κίμβικες] Coraes, in his note on this section, explains the use b. 22.
f κίμβιξ = 'niggard,' by pointing to its connexion through the di-
iinutive κιμβίκιον with the modern Greek τσιβίκι which means a *dog-*
ick or *flea* = the old Greek κροτών. Ἔστι τοίνυν, he says, ὁ κίμβιξ
δίκην κροτῶνος οἱονεὶ κεντῶν καὶ ἐκμυζῶν τὰ ἐλάχιστα, ὁ μηδὲ τὰ λεπ-
τότατα τῶν κερμάτων (small change) παρορῶν, ὃν οἱ Γάλλοι τὴν αὐτὴν
πεφορὰν σώζοντες *pince-maille* καλοῦσι.

κιμινοπρίστης] a cummin-splitter. Cummin, a relish eaten b. 27.
ith food.

§ 40. τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ] Zell (reading τοκισταὶ b. 34.
ὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῷ) supplies δανείζοντες out of τοκισταί—'who lend
nall sums at a high rate of interest.' Michelet prefers to take
μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῷ with ἐργαζόμενοι—'who perform small services for
large return'—agreeing with Coraes apparently, who (also
ding καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῷ) says—τοῦτο μὲν σημαίνει, τὰ εὐτελῆ
πολλῇ τιμῇ διδόντες ἢ ὑπουργοῦντες. I prefer Zell's interpretation,
ich applies as well to the reading κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ (Byw.)
to Zell's. For Aristotle's general objection to τόκος see *Pol.* i.
1258 b. 6 ὁ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίσματος. ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα
ἀ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

§ 44.] The grounds upon which ἀνελευθερία rather than ἀσωτία 1122 a. 13.
o be regarded as the proper contrary of ἐλευθεριότης are the two
cified in ii. 8. 7, 8.

t is only *as a character* that ἀνελευθερία can be truly described
μεῖζον κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας. *The economic effects* of ἀσωτία are
uestionably worse than those of ἀνελευθερία.

With the account of ἐλευθεριότης and its extremes given in this
pter, cf. *E. E.* iii. 4 (a very meagre treatment of the subject),
l *M. M.* i. 23, 24. The various forms of ἀνελευθερία are
cribed by Theophrastus (*Char.*) not only in his chapter περὶ
ευθερίας, but also in the chapters περὶ ἀπονοίας, περὶ αἰσχροκερδίας
l περὶ μικρολογίας. The following is his description of the
χροκερδής, as translated by Jebb:—

'The avaricious man is one who when he entertains will not set

1122 a. 13. enough bread on the table. He will borrow from a guest staying in the house . . . When he sells wine he will sell it watered to his own friend. He will seize the opportunity of taking his boys to the play when the lessees of the theatre grant free admission . . . He is apt to claim his part of the halfpence found by his servants in the streets and to cry—"Shares in the luck" (κοινὸν εἶναι φέρων τὸν Ἑρμῆν) . . . It is just like him too when he is paying a debt of thirty minas to withhold four drachmas (about 3*s*. out of £120). Then if his sons, through ill health, do not attend the school throughout the month, he will make a proportionate deduction from the payment; and all through Anthesterion he will not send them to their lessons because there are so many festivals, and he does not wish to pay the fees. It is just like him too when a club-dinner is held at his house to secrete some of the fire-wood, lentils, vinegar, salt and lamp-oil placed at his disposal. If a friend or a friend's daughter is to be married he will go abroad a little time before in order to avoid giving a wedding present.'

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Μεγαλοπρέπεια—magnificence—differs from ἐλευθεριότης in being concerned only with expenditure, and that on a grand scale (§ 1). *The μεγαλοπρεπής is ἐλευθέριος, but the ἐλευθέριος is not therefore μεγαλοπρεπής* (§ 3). *Both expend with equal propriety, but the scale on which they do so is different; and the expenditure of the μεγαλοπρεπής results in performances, and works, which are beautiful and striking in the public eye, rather than merely useful to individuals, as are the gifts of the ἐλευθέριος. Ἐλευθεριότης results in a κτῆμα useful to the person benefited; whereas μεγαλοπρέπεια results in an ἔργον which is the glory and admiration of the city* (§ 10). *Hence the μεγαλοπρεπής must be a rich man, and even a man whose riches have been inherited* (§§ 13, 14); *otherwise expenditure on a great scale (whether for public objects*[1], *or on great family occasions,* §§ 11–17) *would be out of keeping with his condition; but the ἐλευθέριος need not be a rich man. The habit of spending money on a great scale with propriety will direct the μεγαλοπρεπής even in cases where the expenditure is necessarily small. He is an artist—ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν* (§ 5), *and will display his superior taste, even in cases in which the ἐλευθέριος, strictly so called, can compete with him—καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον* (§ 10).

[1] What we understand by 'public spirit' enters largely into the notion of *μεγαλοπρέπεια.*

extremes are βαναυσία or ἀπειροκαλία[1] *and μικροπρέπεια. The former in vulgar display of wealth; the latter falls short of the requirements of occasion* (e.g. *a marriage or a θεωρία*) *by anxiety to do the thing as as possible.*

περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον] Aspasius has *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθεριότης* **1122 a. 21.**
ιν καὶ λῆψιν, ἡ δὲ μεγαλοπρέπεια περὶ τὴν δόσιν.

] The *τριηραρχία* was one of the extraordinary *λειτουργίαι* at **a. 24.**
. The *τριήραρχος* got the ship, fairly equipped, from the The State also paid the crew, and bore the expense of provisions. The *τριήραρχος* had to maintain the efficiency ship for one year, hire the crew, and often pay large s in order to induce men to serve; he had also often to e the money required for pay and provisions. The cost rierarchy amounted to about fifty minae. See Smith's *ary of Antiquities*: article *Trierarchia*, and Jebb's *Theo-s*, p. 253. The *ἀρχιθεωρός* was the leader of a *θεωρία*, or y sent by the state to the Great Games, or to consult the at Delphi, or to assist at the celebration of the Delia—the festival of the Ionian confederacy. The *ἀρχιθεωρία* was the ordinary, or *ἐγκύκλιοι λειτουργίαι*, which devolved upon althy Athenian citizen. See Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*, —*Delia*, *Theori*, *Leiturgia*. Zell assumes that the *τριηραρχία* cost more than an *ἀρχιθεωρία*: Grant reverses this opinion. elian *ἀρχιθεωρία* probably cost more than a *τριηραρχία*: some ρχιθεωρίαι probably less.

πολλάκι κ.τ.λ.] from *Od.* xvii. 419, **a. 27.**

καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ ποτε οἶκον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔναιον
ὄλβιος ἀφνειόν, καὶ πολλάκι δύσκον ἀλήτῃ.

οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι . . . λαμπρυνόμεναι] Asp. has—*βαναυ-* **a. 32.**
. . προσποιήσιν τινα οὖσαν μεγέθους τοῦ ἐν δαπανήμασιν ἀξίου· ἐν οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὡς δεῖ λαμπρύνεται.

ον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν] K^b, O^b, Camb., and CCC read **a. 33.**
r *περί*. Susemihl (followed by Bywater) attaches so much

he *E. E.* (iii. 6) *ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον* is said to be *ἀνάνυμος*, but to resemble *ρόπαλος* and *σαλάκων*: in the *ὑπογραφή*, however, the habit is called *ία* (*E. E.* ii. 3). In the *M. M.* (i. 26) the habit is called *σαλακωνεία* (1192 K^b however reads *ἀλαζονείας* here, and *ἀλαζών* for *σαλάκων* in 1192 b. 2 The *σαλάκων*, or swaggerer, is coupled with the *σύλοικος*, or vulgar in *Rhet.* ii. 16. 1391 a. 4.

1122 a. 33. weight to the joint authority of K^b and O^b here, that he accepts ὑπέρ from them. He may be quite right in doing so: but I think he ought to do more, and bracket the clause (suspicious in itself) in which ὑπέρ appears. See note on iii. 3. 2.

b. 4. § 6.] Rassow (*Forsch.* 75) inserts εἰ πρέπον between πρέπον and τῷ ἔργῳ (1122 b. 4), believing that no sense can be got out of the clause οὕτω γὰρ . . . ἔργῳ as it stands. Is this so? Aristotle says that the δαπάναι (answering to the ἐνέργειαι mentioned in the line above) of the μεγαλοπρεπής are (as his name implies) μεγάλα and πρέπουσαι. The ἔργα or objects (answering to the ὧν ἐστίν above) of his δαπάναι will therefore be μεγάλα, for unless they are μεγάλα, we cannot speak of a μέγα δαπάνημα in the sense in which we wish μέγα to be here understood—*i. e.* in the sense of μέγα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ—not only great materially (for the δαπάναι of the βάναυσος are great materially), but having its material greatness plainly justified by the greatness of its object.

Münscher and Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 75) omit καί (b. 1) before ὧν ἐστίν: wrongly I think. A ἕξις (like an organ) is to be understood in relation to its functions, *and* to its objects, or the environment for which it is suited.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ may be taken as a reference to the account of the nature and formation of the ἠθικαὶ ἕξεις with which Aristotle began this division (Books ii—iv) of his Treatise.

b. 12. § 10. ἐν τούτοις δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Ἐν τούτοις *i. e.* ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. Peters translates—'So the magnificent man must be liberal also; for the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; only, both the amount and the manner being right, magnificence is distinguished from liberality (which has the same sphere of action) by greatness—I mean by actual magnitude of amount spent: and secondly, where the amount spent is the same, the result of the magnificent man's expenditure will be more magnificent.' This seems to be the only rendering which the words as they stand admit of: οἷον μέγεθος is epexegetic of μέγα, and τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης is a genitive absolute. The rendering of Lambinus—*sed in his quidquid magni est magnifici proprium est, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa haec versant.*—

[1] Here Peters translates Bekker's ταὐτά.

which makes the gen. ἐλευθεριότητος depend on μέγεθος, can hardly be right. I am inclined, however, to suspect the text, and to think that Coraes is right in trying to restore a verb to govern μέγεθος. He suggests σχούσης for οὔσης and has the following note: Σχούσης ἀντὶ τοῦ οὔσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἐξηγήσαιο τὸ πολλὰ τοῖς κρετικοῖς παρασχὸν πράγματα χωρίον τοῦτο. ὁ νοῦς, ἐπεὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής ἐστιν ἀναγκαίως καὶ ἐλευθέριος, κατ' οὐδέν τε ἐκείνου διαφέρει ἕτερον, πλὴν ὅτι ἐν μεγάλοις καὶ μεγάλων ἕνεκα δαπανᾷ, εἴη ἂν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐλευθεριότης σχοῦσα μέγεθος· τουτέστιν ἡ δαπάνη ἐν οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ μετρία μὲν οὖσα ἐλευθεριότης κεκλήσεται, προσλαβοῦσα δὲ μέγεθος καλείσθω μεγαλοπρέπεια. Rassow (*Forsch.* 92) adopts the method of emendation indicated by Coraes, and conjectures λαβούσης for οὔσης, comparing such uses as λαμβάνειν αὔξησιν, τελείωσιν, τέλος, τοῦ μεγέθους τέλος, ὕψος. Susemihl accepts Rassow's λαβούσης into his text. Thus μεγαλοπρέπεια 'ist gewissermassen eine ἐλευθεριότης in grossem Stil.' The reading ταῦτα (accepted by Rassow, Susemihl and Bywater) has the support of all MSS. apparently, except H^a, CCC, and rec. K^b, which have ταὐτά adopted by Bekker. 1122 b. 12.

Whether we leave the text as it stands with οὔσης, or read λαβούσης, we have to remember that the μέγα, or μέγεθος, characteristic of μεγαλοπρέπεια, is not material bulk, as such, but *the grandeur* which belongs to material bulk subserving a worthy end. 'Magnificence,' says Grant, 'differs from Liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result.' Grant reads περὶ ταὐτά—but even this ought not to be rendered 'on the same objects.' The ἐλευθέριος and the μεγαλοπρεπής do not spend 'on the same objects,' but 'both spend the right amount in the right manner,' on their different objects.

καὶ γὰρ ἡ αὐτή κ.τ.λ.] This explains how it is that ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δόξης the magnificent man produces a finer result than the liberal man. The result produced by the liberal man is merely κτῆμα—something that is materially useful to the recipient, and has its market value, whereas the result produced by the magnificent man is of the nature of a work of art. It is θαυμαστόν—'displays genius and imagination.' b. 14.

The words with which this section ends are variously given by the MSS—K^b, O^b, Γ, CCC, and Cambr. give καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή,

1122 b. 14. μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει, adopted by Bekker and Bywater: L^b, M^b, have καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου μεγαλοπρέπεια ἀρετὴ ἐν μεγέθει, adopted by Susemihl and Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2, p. 638, note 4). Zeller translates 'die Grossartigkeit des Werkes besteht in einer im Grosse sich darstellenden Trefflichkeit.' I prefer Bekker's reading; but perhaps ἡ has dropped out between ἀρετή and μεγαλοπρέπεια. The words ἐν μεγέθει qualify the predicate ἔργου ἀρετή.

b. 19. § 11. τὰ τίμια] as distinguished from τῶν δὲ ἰδίων § 15. See viii. 14. 3, where τιμή is said to be the return which Society makes to its benefactors. There ought to be a comma (Bekker has none) after θεούς,—ἀναθήματα, κατασκευαί (*constructiones templorum* Lamb., *arae aedificatae* Victor.), and θυσίαι being the three subdivisions of τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς.

b. 22. χορηγεῖν] See Smith's *Dict. of Antiq.* article *Choregus*. The χορηγία was one of the most expensive λειτουργίαι. The duty of the χορηγός, who was appointed by his Tribe, was to provide choruses for tragedies, and comedies, and other public functions. He had to pay the χοροδιδάσκαλος and the choreutae, supplying the latter with proper food, and with the necessary dresses and masks. Even the prize which the most successful χορηγός received, (a tripod) he had to pay for himself. For the expenses of the χορηγία, see Haigh, *Attic Theatre*, p. 82 sqq.

b. 23. ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν] It would seem that Aristotle uses this expression to distinguish the λειτουργία referred to, from the less splendid ἑστιᾶν τὴν φυλήν, one of the regular λειτουργίαι, which consisted in giving a feast to one's tribesmen. See Smith's *Dict. of Ant.* article *Hestiasis*.

b. 24. § 12. ἀναφέρεται] The subject of this verb is τὰ δαπανήματα, and τὸ τίς κ.τ.λ. is in apposition to τὸν πράττοντα.

b. 29. § 14. πρέπει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς] Bywater brackets καί. I think that its omission is a great improvement.

b. 30. προϋπάρχει] Cf. *E. E.* iii. 6. 1233 b. 11 τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾤετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν ἣν ἐποιήσατο Ὀλυμπίαζε διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν τοῦ πενιότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι: with which Fritzsche compares Plut. *Them.* 5—εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἐλθὼν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ διαμιλλώμενος τῷ Κίμωνι περὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σκηνὰς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην λαμπρότητα καὶ παρασκευήν, οὐκ

ἥμασι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὄντι νέῳ καὶ ἀπ' οἰκίας μεγάλης ᾤοντο δεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα συγχωρεῖν· ὁ δὲ μήπω γνώριμος γεγονὼς ἀλλὰ καὶ δοκῶν ἐξ οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων παρ' ἀξίαν ἐπαίρεσθαι, προσωφλίσκανεν ἀλαζονείαν. 1122 b. 30.

§ ἂν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν] ἢ διά τινος τῶν ἔτι ζώντων αὐτοῖς οἰκείων καὶ συγγενῶν, Coraes. 'Their connections'—Peters. b. 31.

§ 15. τῶν δὲ ἰδίων] Aristotle here passes from the highest objects of μεγαλοπρέπεια (τὰ περὶ θεούς, and the great λειτουργίαι), to those of second rank—the celebration of a marriage, the entertainment of private friends, the furnishing of one's house, &c. b. 35.

§ 17. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων] I follow Susemihl and Bywater in reading ἐπεί for ἐπί, and make the apodosis begin at διὰ τοῦτο § 19. I find that CCC has γρ. ἐπεί on the margin for insertion before[1] καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων: but all MSS. seem to read ἐπί. Peters (reading ἐπί) translates—'And in his expenditure every detail will be great after its kind, great expenditure on a great occasion being the most magnificent, and then in a less degree that which is great for the occasion, whatever it be.' 1123 a. 10.

ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει] ὥστε εἶναι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστά, πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ συγκρινόμενα· τάφων μὲν οἰκοδομήματα πρὸς τάφους, ναῶν πρὸς ναούς, καὶ γεφύρας πρὸς γεφύρας, καὶ τὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Paraph. a. 11.

τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα] οἷον ἐν ναῷ μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ. Coraes. I do not think that Bywater's insertion of ἁπλῶς after μεγαλοπρεπέστατον is necessary. I understand μεγαλοπρεπές, not μεγαλοπρεπέστατον, as the predicate of τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα. a. 12.

ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα] ἐν δὲ τοῖς μικροῖς, τὸ ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς μέγα, ὥστε τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ τῶν ἄλλων κρὰ παραβαλλόμενον μέγιστον εἶναι. Coraes.

§ 20. ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν] 'Ἔρανος being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour.' Grant. a. 22.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων] The πάροδος was the entrance of the chorus in the orchestra, and the first song sung on entrance— a. 23.

[1] Possibly instead of ἐπί: but the three dots referring to the γρ. are under the καί.

1123 a. 23. defined in *Poet.* 12. 1452 b. 22 πάροδος μὲν ἡ πρώτη χοροῦ. Zell and Coraes, however, are of opinion that l means the part of the theatre at which the chorus e that the 'purple' is not the dress of the choreuta hangings of this part, which, in the case of comic repr were usually skins. That hangings are here intende be the view both of the Ald. Schol. and of the Par. ' has—σύνηθες ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ παραπετάσματα δέρρεις ποιεῖν οὐ and the Par. has—ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις ἀντὶ κωδίων (sheep sk πετάσματα ἦν ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, πορφυρίδας ἔχει, καθάπερ Zell quotes Lysias (699) for the cost of a comic chor δοῖς χορηγῶν Κηφισοδότῳ ἐνίκων καὶ ἀνήλωσα σὺν τῇ τῆς σκ ἑκκαίδεκα μναῖς—*i.e.* about £64. The cost of a trag would be much greater.

Bywater restores Μεγαροῖ from K^b, in place of the other MSS. Pr. CCC has Μεγαροί.

a. 31. § 22.] Μεγαλοπρέπεια and its extremes are discusse iii. 6, and in *M. M.* i. 26 shortly, and in an inferior ma

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

The μεγαλόψυχος, *or great-souled man, deems himself worthy is highest, being worthy of it, as distinguished from the* χαῦνος, *on the one side, who thinks too highly of himself, and the* μικρόψυ *souled man, on the other side, who thinks too little of himself.*

That which is highest—among external good things—is honou which the μεγαλόψυχος *rightly deems himself worthy of.* Μεγαλ *may be defined as a mediocrity where honour and dishonour are c*

Rightly deeming himself worthy of that which is highest, the must be a truly virtuous man; and his μεγαλοψυχία *will lend dis virtues, without which it cannot itself exist.*

But, although he deems himself worthy of the highest honour, the does not make honour his all-in-all. Since, then, even honour is to him, he will not be likely to think too highly of inferior good consciousness of his own commanding personality will be enough fo consciousness will reveal itself externally in the independence of h

tinction of his bearing. He will accept the honour [illegible]
men, not as adequate to his desert, but as the best thing [illegible]
The opinion of ordinary men—favourable or unfavourable—he will
upon. (Here he is apt to be imitated by those who are not [illegible]
ot. But he has a right to look down on other men. He will
ood offices than have them done to him. He will remember those
has benefited, but those who have benefited him he will easily forget.
haughty and reserved with the great, and easy with those of middle-
will not enter into competition with others for honour. He will
self for great occasions of acting, and great dangers; and when he
er comes he will not grudge his life. He will live and have opinions
eak and act the truth—except in so far as he keeps ordinary people in
by his irony. He will never be found boasting of his people or things
and wonder. Remembering evil personal [illegible] great [illegible] will
'l all be far from his nature.
lk will be slow, his voice deep, his manner of speaking [illegible]

'remes—the vain man, and the [illegible] are [illegible]
racters—they are not evil-doers: [illegible] The [illegible]
n deprives himself of what is his [illegible]
silly: but he is backward. His poor opinion of himself [illegible]
a worse man in time. The [illegible]
f self-knowledge is conspicuous. He [illegible]
dress, and all kinds of excellence. [illegible]

χία, however, is the real opposite of [illegible]
ion than [illegible], and [illegible]

uctory Note.] THE [illegible]
s a creation of [illegible]
h concrete evidence to the [illegible]
ll not to look at it as if it were a [illegible]
of Theophrastus, [illegible]
racter-pictures given in the [illegible]
μεγαλόψυχος accepts the [illegible]
his deserts, because [illegible]
e remembers those whom he has [illegible]
om he has received benefits. [illegible]
not give way to [illegible]
This spirit is a real [illegible]
's μεγαλόψυχος is not a real man. [illegible]
sophy, as Philosophy or Religion [illegible]
's concrete presentation of [illegible]
in excellence. He [illegible]
of his own nature and [illegible]

to dominate his thought or conduct. He thus realises αὐτάρκεια or autonomy, and 'possesses all the virtues' in a fuller sense than other virtuous men, who are conscious of the moral law merely through their φρόνησις, or *practical* insight and self-knowledge. The μεγαλόψυχος is a man of the highest *speculative* power. Like Spinoza's ideal, he has the *scientia intuitiva*, and sees in every virtuous act the whole world of human nature clearly, which good men of less speculative power see only dimly. The ever-present spectacle of 'the moral law within,' by its sublimity, exalts his mind; while the exaltation of mind, or μεγαλοψυχία, reveals itself outwardly in the dignity and distinction of his bearing. High speculative power being thus essential to μεγαλοψυχία, it is not every virtuous man who can be μεγαλόψυχος.

It is impossible to determine how far Aristotle was guided in his delineation of the μεγαλόψυχος by reference to particular individuals known to him. There certainly seem to be touches in the work suggested by such a reference; but it may be said, I think, that the work loses, rather than gains, by these attempts at realism, and that the impression which they convey, that we have before us a real and possible man, who, as described, would be intolerable, is unfortunate, and has contributed to the misunderstanding of the significance of μεγαλοψυχία in Aristotle's Ethical System. The measured movements, and the deep voice, make us think of a real man: but, after all, they are only the buskins and mask of an ideal character. Aristotle, we may be sure, was as fully aware of the ideality of his μεγαλόψυχος, or man who is a law to himself, as Kant was of the ideality of his Good Will: but Aristotle, unlike Kant, had undertaken to picture the ideal of moral autonomy, for the eye, as it were, and could not withstand the temptation of putting in touches more suitable to a psychological and physiological description, than to the representation of an ethical ideal.

Hegel's view, that Alexander the Great was Aristotle's model, is a particularly unfortunate one. The impetuous genius, and the vices, of Alexander distinguish him, in the most marked manner, from the harmoniously developed μεγαλόψυχος[1]. Nor must too much be made of the examples of μεγαλοψυχία—Alcibiades, Achilles, Ajax, Lysander, and Socrates—given, in a purely

[1] For other objections to Hegel's view see Teichmüller *Literarische Fehden*, p. 192.

logical context, in *An. Post.* ii. 13. 97 b. 18; for no one of these characters answers to the description here given. The description of the *μεγαλόψυχος* in the *Ethics* is rather the *mise en scène* of Aristotle's doctrine of the *αὐτάρκεια* of the *εὐδαίμων* in the Life of Reason, than a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus.

§ 4. **σώφρων**] here means 'modest,' 'knowing his place'— 1123 b. 5.
as each of the classes in Plato's State, in virtue of its *σωφροσύνη*, 'knows its own place.'

§ 5. **τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι**] The editors refer to *Poet.* 7. b. 7.
1450 b. 36 *τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί.*

§ 6. **οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος**] *i. e.* a man may think too much of himself, b. 9.
without going the stupid length of vanity.

§ 8. **τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος**] Cf. ii. 6. 17. b. 13.
As 'a great man' he stands on a pinnacle; as 'a virtuous character' he occupies the mean. His position, as he himself is conscious of it, and as it strikes the imagination of the admiring beholder, is one of incomparable preeminence; but to the moral analyst it suggests difficulties of detail in which the *χαῦνος* and the *μικρόψυχος* fail—and in which the 'virtuous character' himself might have failed.

§ 10. **ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά**] 'Worth' is a b. 17.
relative term—*i. e.* it cannot be understood except as entitling a possessor to 'something'; and this 'something' has to be specified. Being something which the person 'worthy of it' gets, cannot be a good thing of the soul, or of the body; it must, therefore, be one of *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά.*

τιμή] When *μεγαλοψυχία* is said to be *περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας*, we b. 20.
must remember that *τιμή* is after all only *a symbol* of the reward to which the worth of the *μεγαλόψυχος* is entitled. *Τιμή* regarded as an end in itself in the *πολιτικὸς βίος* turns out to be something precarious, *ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ* (i. 5. 4). The true reward is *εὐδαιμονία* or the *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν* itself. This is indeed *τίμιον* (i. 12) and an end in itself, as the gods, to whom we do not give *ἔπαινος*, but assign *τιμή*, are ends in themselves, not means to our advantage. The *τιμή* which is assigned to the *μεγαλόψυχος* must therefore be understood in connexion with the

1122 a. 13. enough bread on the table. He will borrow from a guest staying in the house . . . When he sells wine he will sell it watered to his own friend. He will seize the opportunity of taking his boys to the play when the lessees of the theatre grant free admission... He is apt to claim his part of the halfpence found by his servants in the streets and to cry—"Shares in the luck" (κοινὸν εἶναι φάσκων τὸν Ἑρμῆν) . . . It is just like him too when he is paying a debt of thirty minas to withhold four drachmas (about 3*s*. out of £120). Then if his sons, through ill health, do not attend the school throughout the month, he will make a proportionate deduction from the payment; and all through Anthesterion he will not send them to their lessons because there are so many festivals, and he does not wish to pay the fees. It is just like him too when a club-dinner is held at his house to secrete some of the fire-wood, lentils, vinegar, salt and lamp-oil placed at his disposal. If a friend or a friend's daughter is to be married he will go abroad a little time before in order to avoid giving a wedding present.'

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Μεγαλοπρέπεια—*magnificence—differs from* ἐλευθεριότης *in being concerned only with expenditure, and that on a grand scale* (§ 1). *The* μεγαλοπρεπής *is* ἐλευθέριος, *but the* ἐλευθέριος *is not therefore* μεγαλοπρεπής (§ 3). *Both expend with equal propriety, but the scale on which they do so is different; and the expenditure of the* μεγαλοπρεπής *results in performances, and works, which are beautiful and striking in the public eye, rather than merely useful to individuals, as are the gifts of the* ἐλευθέριος. Ἐλευθεριότης *results in a* κτῆμα *useful to the person benefited; whereas* μεγαλοπρέπεια *results in an* ἔργον *which is the glory and admiration of the city* (§ 10). *Hence the* μεγαλοπρεπής *must be a rich man, and even a man whose riches have been inherited* (§§ 13, 14); *otherwise expenditure on a great scale (whether for public objects*[1], *or on great family occasions,* §§ 11–17) *would be out of keeping with his condition; but the* ἐλευθέριος *need not be a rich man. The habit of spending money on a great scale with propriety will direct the* μεγαλοπρεπής *even in cases where the expenditure is necessarily small. He is an artist—*ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν (§ 5), *and will display his superior taste, even in cases in which the* ἐλευθέριος, *strictly so called, can compete with him—*καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον (§ 10).

[1] What we understand by 'public spirit' enters largely into the notion of μεγαλοπρέπεια.

The extremes are βαναυσία or ἀπειροκαλία[1] *and μικροπρέπεια. The former ults in vulgar display of wealth; the latter falls short of the requirements of reat occasion* (e.g. *a marriage or a θεωρία*) *by anxiety to do the thing as ıply as possible.*

§ 1. **περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον**] Aspasius has *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθεριότης* **1122 a. 21.** *ὶ δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ἡ δὲ μεγαλοπρέπεια περὶ τὴν δόσιν.*

§ 2.] The *τριηραρχία* was one of the extraordinary *λειτουργίαι* at **a. 24.** hens. The *τριήραρχος* got the ship, fairly equipped, from the ıte. The State also paid the crew, and bore the expense of ·ir provisions. The *τριήραρχος* had to maintain the efficiency the ship for one year, hire the crew, and often pay large unties in order to induce men to serve; he had also often to vance the money required for pay and provisions. The cost a trierarchy amounted to about fifty minae. See Smith's ictionary of Antiquities: article *Trierarchia*, and Jebb's *Theo-rastus*, p. 253. The *ἀρχιθεωρός* was the leader of a *θεωρία*, or ıbassy sent by the state to the Great Games, or to consult the ıcle at Delphi, or to assist at the celebration of the Delia—the lemn festival of the Ionian confederacy. The *ἀρχιθεωρία* was e of the ordinary, or *ἐγκύκλιοι λειτουργίαι*, which devolved upon : wealthy Athenian citizen. See Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*, icles—*Delia*, *Theori*, *Leiturgia*. Zell assumes that the *τριηραρχία* uld cost more than an *ἀρχιθεωρία*: Grant reverses this opinion. ıe Delian *ἀρχιθεωρία* probably cost more than a *τριηραρχία*: some ıer *ἀρχιθεωρίαι* probably less.

§ 3. **πολλάκι κ.τ.λ.**] from *Od.* xvii. 419, **a. 27.**

καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ ποτε οἶκον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔναιον
ὄλβιος ἀφνειόν, καὶ πολλάκι δύσκον ἀλήτῃ.

§ 4. **οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι . . . λαμπρυνόμεναι**] Asp. has—*βαναυ-* **a. 32.** *ν . . . προσποιήσίν τινα οὖσαν μεγέθους τοῦ ἐν δαπανήμασιν ἀξίου· ἐν γὰρ οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὡς δεῖ λαμπρύνεται.*

ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν] K^b, O^b, Camb., and CCC read **a. 33.** *ἰρ* for *περί*. Susemihl (followed by Bywater) attaches so much

In the *E. E.* (iii. 6) *ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον* is said to be *ἀνώνυμος*, but to resemble *ἀπειρόκαλος* and *σαλάκων*: in the *ὑπογραφή*, however, the habit is called *ıaνηρία* (*E. E.* ii. 3). In the *M. M.* (i. 26) the habit is called *σαλακωνεία* (1192 37—K^b however reads *ἀλαζονείας* here, and *ἀλαζών* for *σαλάκων* in 1192 b. 2 1 3:. The *σαλάκων*, or swaggerer, is coupled with the *σόλοικος*, or vulgar ·son, in *Rhet.* ii. 16. 1391 a. 4.

1122 a. 33. weight to the joint authority of K^b and O^b here, that he accepts ὑπέρ from them. He may be quite right in doing so: but I think he ought to do more, and bracket the clause (suspicious in itself) in which ὑπέρ appears. See note on iii. 3. 2.

b. 4. § 6.] Rassow (*Forsch.* 75) inserts εἰ πρέπον between πρέπον and τῷ ἔργῳ (1122 b. 4), believing that no sense can be got out of the clause οὕτω γὰρ . . . ἔργῳ as it stands. Is this so? Aristotle says that the δαπάναι (answering to the ἐνέργειαι mentioned in the line above) of the μεγαλοπρεπής are (as his name implies) μεγάλαι and πρέπουσαι. The ἔργα or objects (answering to the ὧν ἐστίν above) of his δαπάναι will therefore be μεγάλα, for unless they are μεγάλα, we cannot speak of a μέγα δαπάνημα in the sense in which we wish μέγα to be here understood—*i. e.* in the sense of μέγα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ—not only great materially (for the δαπάναι of the βάναυσος are great materially), but having its material greatness plainly justified by the greatness of its object.

Münscher and Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 75) omit καί (b. 1) before ὧν ἐστίν: wrongly I think. A ἕξις (like an organ) is to be understood in relation to its functions, *and* to its objects, or the environment for which it is suited.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ may be taken as a reference to the account of the nature and formation of the ἠθικαὶ ἕξεις with which Aristotle began this division (Books ii—iv) of his Treatise.

b. 12. § 10. ἐν τούτοις δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Ἐν τούτοις *i. e.* ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. Peters translates—'So the magnificent man must be liberal also; for the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; only, both the amount and the manner being right, magnificence is distinguished from liberality (which has the same[1] sphere of action) by greatness—I mean by actual magnitude of amount spent: and secondly, where the amount spent is the same, the result of the magnificent man's expenditure will be more magnificent.' This seems to be the only rendering which the words as they stand admit of: οἷον μέγεθος is epexegetic of τὸ μέγα, and τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης is a genitive absolute. The rendering of Lambinus—*sed in his quidquid magni est magnifici proprium est, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa haec versantis.*

[1] Here Peters translates Bekker's ταὐτά.

which makes the gen. ἐλευθεριότητος depend on μέγεθος, can hardly 1122 b. 12.
be right. I am inclined, however, to suspect the text, and to think that Coraes is right in trying to restore a verb to govern μέγεθος. He suggests σχούσης for οὔσης and has the following note: Σχούσης ἀντὶ τοῦ οὔσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἐξηγήσαιο τὸ πολλὰ τοῖς κριτικοῖς παρασχὸν πράγματα χωρίον τοῦτο. ὁ νοῦς, ἐπεὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής ἐστιν ἀναγκαίως καὶ ἐλευθέριος, κατ' οὐδέν τε ἐκείνου διαφέρει ἕτερον, πλὴν ὅτι ἐν μεγάλοις καὶ μεγάλων ἕνεκα δαπανᾷ, εἴη ἂν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐλευθεριότης σχοῦσα μέγεθος· τουτέστιν ἡ δαπάνη ἐν οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ μετρία μὲν οὖσα ἐλευθεριότης κεκλήσεται, προσλαβοῦσα δὲ μέγεθος καλείσθω μεγαλοπρέπεια. Rassow (*Forsch.* 92) adopts the method of emendation indicated by Coraes, and conjectures λαβούσης for οὔσης, comparing such uses as λαμβάνειν αὔξησιν, τελείωσιν, τέλος, τοῦ μεγέθους τέλος, ὕψος. Susemihl accepts Rassow's λαβούσης into his text. Thus μεγαλοπρέπεια 'ist gewissermassen eine ἐλευθεριότης in grossem Stil.' The reading ταῦτα (accepted by Rassow, Susemihl and Bywater) has the support of all MSS. apparently, except H^a, CCC, and rec. K^b, which have ταὐτά adopted by Bekker.

Whether we leave the text as it stands with οὔσης, or read λαβούσης, we have to remember that the μέγα, or μέγεθος, characteristic of μεγαλοπρέπεια, is not material bulk, as such, but *the grandeur* which belongs to material bulk subserving a worthy end. 'Magnificence,' says Grant, 'differs from Liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result.' Grant reads περὶ ταὐτά—but even this ought not to be rendered 'on the same objects.' The ἐλευθέριος and the μεγαλοπρεπής do not spend 'on the same objects,' but 'both spend the right amount in the right manner,' on their different objects.

οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτή κ.τ.λ.] This explains how it is that ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης b. 14.
δαπάνης the magnificent man produces a finer result than the liberal man. The result produced by the liberal man is merely κτῆμα—something that is materially useful to the recipient, and has its market value, whereas the result produced by the magnificent man is of the nature of a work of art. It is θαυμαστόν—'displays genius and imagination.'

The words with which this section ends are variously given by the MSS—K^b, O^b, Γ, CCC, and Cambr. give καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή,

1122 b. 18. μεγαλοπρεπείας, ἐν μεγέθει, adopted by Bekker and Bywater: L[b], [illegible] have καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἀρετὴ ἐν μεγέθει, adopted by Susemihl and Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2, p. 638, note 4). Zeller translates 'die Grossartigkeit des Werkes besteht in einer im Grosse sich darstellenden Trefflichkeit.' I prefer Bekker's reading; but perhaps ἡ has dropped out between ἀρετὴ and μεγαλοπρέπειαν. The words ἐν μεγέθει qualify the predicate ἔργου ἀρετή.

b. 28. § 11. τὰ τέλεια] as distinguished from τῶν δὲ ἰδίων § 15. See viii. 14. 3, where τιμή is said to be the return which Society makes to its benefactors. There ought to be a comma (Bekker has none) after δωρεαί,—κτίσματα, κατασκευαί (*constructiones templorum* Lamb., *opus aedificatum* Victor.), and θυσίαι being the three subdivisions of τὰ τῶν τῶν θεῶν.

b. 32. χορηγεῖν] See Smith's *Dict. of Antiq.* article *Choregus*. The χορηγία was one of the most expensive λειτουργίαι. The duty of the χορηγός, who was appointed by his Tribe, was to provide choruses for tragedies and comedies, and other public functions. He had to pay the χορευταί and the choreutae, supplying the latter with proper food, and with the necessary dresses and masks. Even the prize which the most successful χορηγός received, (a tripod) he had to pay for himself. For the expenses of the χορηγία, see Haigh, *Attic Theatre*, p. 82 sqq.

b. 33. ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν] It would seem that Aristotle uses this expression to distinguish the λειτουργία referred to, from the less splendid ἑστιᾶν τὴν φυλήν, one of the regular λειτουργίαι, which consisted in giving a feast to one's tribesmen. See Smith's *Dict. of Ant.* article *Heraeum*.

b. 34. § 12. ἀναφέρεται] The subject of this verb is τὰ δοκούντα, and τὸ τῆς κ.τ.λ. is in apposition to τὸν πράττοντα.

b. 39. § 14. πρέπει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς] Bywater brackets καί. I think that its omission is a great improvement.

b. 30. προϋπάρχει] Cf. *E. E.* iii. 6. 1233 b. 11 τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ἔφη Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν ἣν ἐπεποίητο Ὀλυμπιάζε διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν τοῦ πεπουτηκα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι: with which Fritzsche compares Plut. *Them.* 5—εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἐλθὼν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ διαμιλλώμενος τῷ Κίμωνι περὶ δείπνα καὶ σκηνὰς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην λαμπρότητα καὶ παρασκευήν, οὐκ

ι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὄντι νέῳ καὶ ἀπ' οἰκίας μεγάλης ᾤοντο 1122 b. 30.
ὰ τοιαῦτα συγχωρεῖν· ὁ δὲ μήπω γνώριμος γεγονὼς ἀλλὰ καὶ δοκῶν
(ὑπαρχόντων παρ' ἀξίαν ἐπαίρεσθαι, προσωφλίσκανεν ἀλαζονείαν.

ν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν] ἢ διά τινος τῶν ἔτι ζώντων αὐτοῖς οἰκείων καὶ b. 31.
νῶν, Coraes. 'Their connections'—Peters.

15. τῶν δὲ ἰδίων] Aristotle here passes from the highest objects b. 35.
γαλοπρέπεια (τὰ περὶ θεούς, and the great λειτουργίαι), to those
cond rank—the celebration of a marriage, the entertainment
ivate friends, the furnishing of one's house, &c.

17. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων] I follow Susemihl and Bywater 1123 a. 10.
ading ἐπεί for ἐπί, and make the apodosis begin at διὰ τοῦτο
I find that CCC has γρ. ἐπεί on the margin for insertion
e[1] καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων: but all MSS. seem to read ἐπί.
s (reading ἐπί) translates—'And in his expenditure every detail
e great after its kind, great expenditure on a great occasion
the most magnificent, and then in a less degree that which
at for the occasion, whatever it be.'

ιστόν μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει] ὥστε εἶναι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς a. 11.
α καὶ θαυμαστά, πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ συγκρινόμενα· τάφων μὲν οἰκο-
ατα πρὸς τάφους, ναῶν πρὸς ναούς, καὶ γεφύρας πρὸς γεφύρας, καὶ
ὧν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Paraph.

ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα] οἷον ἐν ναῷ μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ. Coraes. I do a. 12.
hink that Bywater's insertion of ἁπλῶς after μεγαλοπρεπέστατον
cessary. I understand μεγαλοπρεπές, not μεγαλοπρεπέστατον, as
redicate of τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα.

αῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα] ἐν δὲ τοῖς μικροῖς, τὸ ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς
ὥστε τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ τῶν ἄλλων
παραβαλλόμενον μέγιστον εἶναι. Coraes.

20. ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν] 'Ἔρανος being a club where a. 22.
member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each
contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in
dour.' Grant.

τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων] The πάροδος was the entrance a. 23.
e chorus in the orchestra, and the first song sung on entrance—

[1] ossibly instead of ἐπί: but the three dots referring to the γρ. are under
ί.

1123 a. 22. defined in *Poet.* 12. 1452 b. 22 πάροδος μὲν ἡ πρώτη λέξις ὅλου χορικοῦ. Zell and Coraes, however, are of opinion that here πάροδος means the part of the theatre at which the chorus entered, and that the 'purple' is not the dress of the choreutae, but the hangings of this part, which, in the case of comic representations, were usually skins. That hangings are here intended seems to be the view both of the Ald. Schol. and of the Par. The former has—πάροδος ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ παραπετάσματα δέρρεις ποιεῖν οὐ πορφυρίδας: and the Par. has—ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις ἀντὶ καυδίων (sheep skins), ἃ παραπετάσματα ἦν ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, πορφυρίδας ἔχει, καθάπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. Zell quotes Lysias (699) for the cost of a comic choregia—κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν Κεφισοδότῳ ἐνίκων καὶ ἀνήλωσα σὺν τῇ τῆς σκευῆς ἀναθέσει δισχίλιαι καὶ μύριαι—*i.e.* about £64. The cost of a tragic choregia would be much greater.

Bywater restores Μεγαροῖ from K^b, in place of the Μεγαρεῖς of other MSS. Pr. CCC has Μεγαροί.

1123 a. 22. § 22. Μεγαλοπρέπεια and its extremes are discussed in *E.E.* iii. 1. and in *M. M.* i. 26 shortly, and in an inferior manner.

CHAPTER III.

Argument.

[illegible] man, deems himself worthy of that which [illegible] distinguished from the χαῦνος, or vain man, [illegible] highly of himself, and the μικρόψυχος, or small-[illegible] who thinks too little of himself.

[illegible] external good things—is honour. It is this [illegible] himself worthy of. Μεγαλοψυχία, then, [illegible] honour and dishonour are concerned.

[illegible] worthy of that which is highest, the μεγαλόψυχος [illegible] μεγαλοψυχία will lend distinction to the [illegible] exist.

[illegible] worthy of the highest honour, the μεγαλόψυχος [illegible] Since, then, even honour is not all-in-all [illegible] too highly of inferior good things. The [illegible] will be enough for him. This [illegible] in the independence of his demeanour.

nd the distinction of his bearing. He will accept the honour which he receives rom good men, not as adequate to his desert, but as the best thing which they an offer. The opinion of ordinary men—favourable or unfavourable—he will ook down upon. (Here he is apt to be imitated by those who are not really μεγαλόψυχοι. But he has a right to look down on other men.) He will ather do good offices than have them done to him. He will remember those whom he has benefited, but those who have benefited him he will easily forget. He will be haughty and reserved with the great, and easy with those of middle-tate. He will not enter into competition with others for honour. He will ncrease himself for great occasions of acting, and great danger; but when the great danger comes he will not grudge his life. He will love and hate openly. He will speak and act the truth—except in so far as he keeps ordinary people at a distance by his irony. He will never be found looking up to people or things with awe and wonder. Remembering evil, personal talk, praise, blame, complaint, will all be far from his nature.

His walk will be slow, his voice deep, his manner of speaking calm and measured.

The extremes—the vain man, and the small-souled man, are not exactly vicious characters—they are not evil-doers: but they are in error. The small-souled man deprives himself of what is his due, from not 'knowing himself.' He is not silly; but he is backward. His poor opinion of himself, however, makes him a worse man in time. The vain man, on the other hand, is silly. His lack of self-knowledge is conspicuous. He is always being shown-up, as he drives, by dress, and all kinds of ostentation, to make people think highly of him.

Μικροψυχία, however, is the real opposite of μεγαλοψυχία, for μικροψυχία is more common than χαυνότης, and worse.

Introductory Note.] THE picture of the μεγαλόψυχος given in this hapter is a creation of art, intended to present a great philosophical ruth with concrete evidence to the imagination. We must therefore be careful not to look at it as if it were a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus, or stood on the same plane with the other character-pictures given in the Fourth Book.

The μεγαλόψυχος accepts the highest honour, though falling short of his deserts, because men have nothing better to give him. He remembers those whom he has benefited, but not those from whom he has received benefits. To the many he is ironical. He does not give way to admiration, for in his eyes nothing is great. This spirit in a real man would be intolerable. But Aristotle's μεγαλόψυχος is not a real man. He is an ideal creation in philosophy, as Philoctetes or Antigone is in tragedy. He is Aristotle's concrete presentation of that θεωρία which is essential to human excellence. He 'contemplates' the κόσμος or beautiful harmony of his own nature, and allows nothing external to it

to dominate his thought or conduct. He thus realises *ἐγκράτεια* or autonomy, and 'possesses all the virtues' in a fuller sense than other virtuous men, who are conscious of the moral law merely through their *φρόνησις*, or *practical* insight and self-knowledge. The *μεγαλόψυχος* is a man of the highest *speculative* power. Like Spinoza's ideal, he has the *scientia intuitiva*, and sees in every virtuous act the whole world of human nature clearly, which good men of less speculative power see only dimly. The ever-present spectacle of 'the moral law within,' by its sublimity, ends his moral, while the exaltation of mind, or *μεγαλοφυχία*, reveals itself outwardly in the dignity and distinction of his bearing. High speculative power being thus essential to *μεγαλοφυχία*, it is not every virtuous man who can be *μεγαλόψυχος*.

It is impossible to determine how far Aristotle was guided in his delineation of the *μεγαλόψυχος* by reference to particular individuals known to him. There certainly seem to be touches in the work suggested by such a reference; but it may be said, I think, that the work loses, rather than gains, by these attempts at realism, and that the impression which they convey, that we have before us a real and possible man, who, as described, would be intolerable, is unfortunate, and has contributed to the misunderstanding of the significance of *μεγαλοφυχία* in Aristotle's Ethical System. The measured movements, and the deep voice, make us think of a real man; but after all, they are only the buskins and mask of an ideal character. Aristotle, we may be sure, was as fully aware of the reality of his *μεγαλόψυχος*, or man who is a law to himself, as Kant was of the reality of his Good Will; but Aristotle, unlike Kant, had undertaken to portray the ideal of moral autonomy for the eye, as it were, and could not withstand the temptation of putting in touches more suitable to a psychological and physiological description, than to the representation of an ethical ideal.

Hegel's view, that Alexander the Great was Aristotle's model, is a particularly unfortunate one. The impetuous genius, and the vices, of Alexander distinguish him, in the most marked manner, from the harmoniously developed *μεγαλόψυχος*[1]. Nor must too much be made of the examples of *μεγαλοψυχία*—Alcibiades, Achilles, Ajax, Lysander, and Socrates—given, in a purely

[1] For other objections to Hegel's view see Teichmüller *Literarische Fehden*, p. 164.

ogical context, in *An. Post.* ii. 13. 97 b. 18; for no one of these characters answers to the description here given. The description of the *μεγαλόψυχος* in the *Ethics* is rather the *mise en scène* of Aristotle's doctrine of the *αὐτάρκεια* of the *εὐδαίμων* in the Life of Reason, than a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus.

§ 4. **σώφρων**] here means 'modest,' 'knowing his place'— 1123 b. 5.
each of the classes in Plato's State, in virtue of its *σωφροσύνη*, knows its own place.'

§ 5. **τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι**] The editors refer to *Poet.* 7. b. 7.
450 b. 36 *τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί.*

§ 6. **οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος**] *i. e.* a man may think too much of himself, b. 9.
without going the stupid length of vanity.

§ 8. **τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος**] Cf. ii. 6. 17. b. 13.
'a great man' he stands on a pinnacle; as 'a virtuous character' he occupies the mean. His position, as he himself conscious of it, and as it strikes the imagination of the admiring beholder, is one of incomparable preeminence; but to the moral analyst it suggests difficulties of detail in which the *χαῦνος* and the *μικρόψυχος* fail—and in which the 'virtuous character' himself might have failed.

§ 10. **ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά**] 'Worth' is a b. 17.
relative term—*i. e.* it cannot be understood except as entitling possessor to 'something'; and this 'something' has to be specified. Being something which the person 'worthy of it' gets, cannot be a good thing of the soul, or of the body; it must, therefore, be one of *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά.*

τιμή] When *μεγαλοψυχία* is said to be *περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας*, we b. 20.
must remember that *τιμή* is after all only *a symbol* of the reward which the worth of the *μεγαλόψυχος* is entitled. *Τιμή* regarded as an end in itself in the *πολιτικὸς βίος* turns out to be something precarious, *ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ* (i. 5. 4). The true reward is *εὐδαιμονία* or the *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν* itself. This is indeed *τίμιον* (i. 12) and an end in itself, as the gods, to whom we do not give *ἔπαινος*, but assign *τιμή*, are ends in themselves, not means to our advantage. The *τιμή* which is assigned to the *μεγάλόψυχος* must therefore be understood in connexion with the

[illegible] the term [illegible] as explained in E.N. [illegible] [illegible] the μεγαλόψυχος implies [illegible] [illegible] expressions of this reverence are in [illegible] [illegible] the μεγαλόψυχος [illegible] he receives them, as the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] but [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

disturbing elements, among the old ideas which reflect actually 1123 b. 30.
present conditions. These new ideas he must cherish, and give himself up to. He must be willing to correspond badly with the present, to incur odium, to make himself ridiculous—all for the sake of a future, which he may not, perhaps cannot, live to see. Here, evidently, there is no room for 'all the virtues.'

The other great conception of modern times—that of the brotherhood of men, especially as it gives reality in our eyes to the misery that we see around us, is equally opposed to the Aristotelian ideal of 'all the virtues.' If these miserables are to be succoured, it must be by men who devote themselves to the work entirely, without thought of 'culture.'

§ 15. παρασείσαντι] here used absolutely as in *Probl.* v. 8. b. 31.
931 b. 6 ὁ δὲ θᾶττον θεῖ παρασείων ἢ μὴ παρασείων: but the full construction has χεῖρας, *cf.* περὶ πορείας ζῴων 3. 705 a. 17 καὶ οἱ θέοντες θᾶττον θέουσι παρασείοντες τὰς χεῖρας. The editors compare Theoph. *Char.* περὶ ἀδολεσχίας—παρασείσαντα δὲ χρὴ τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ διαράμενον (*sc.* τὰ σκέλη—'with long steps,') ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, ὅστις ἀπύρετος βούλεται εἶναι.

ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα] The reading of O^b, CCC and K^b man. alt.; b. 32.
Bekker omits the γ' wrongly: see Rassow, *Forsch.* 60.

§ 16. κόσμος] The beauty and order of the virtues which is the 1124 a. 1.
object and work of Reason.

καλοκαγαθίας] This term does not seem to have the technical a. 4.
meaning for Aristotle, which it afterwards bears in the *E. E.* (H. 15. 1248 b. 8 ff.) In the *E. E.* it is that ἕξις which enables a man to see the ultimate σκοπός or ὅρος—the Divine Nature. It is a kind of *amor intellectualis Dei.* Here, however, and in *E. N.* x. 9. 3 (the only other place where the word occurs in the *E. N.*) 'no special import is given to the word. It seems to imply a sort of elevated virtue.' (Grant.) To Aristotle as to Plato the καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός is 'very much what we mean by a "gentleman."' (Grant.) The writer of the *M. M.* (ii. 9) describes the καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός as the man for whom *all* things really good in life are good—ἔστιν οὖν ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ᾧ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἃ ἁπλῶς καλὰ καλά ἐστιν· ὁ τοιοῦτος γὰρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός. ᾧ δὲ τὰ πλῶς ἀγαθὰ μή ἐστιν ἀγαθά, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γαίοιεν ἂν δόξειεν ᾧ τὰ ἁπλῶς ὑγιεινὰ μὴ ὑγιεινά ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος

[illegible] ἀρετὰ εἴη, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα [illegible] ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐ [illegible] οὐκ ἂν δόξειε καλὸς [illegible] ἀγαθός ἐστιν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου μὴ [illegible] ὁ τοιοῦτος καλὸς κἀγαθός (*M.M.* [illegible]). This description of the καλὸς κἀγαθός [illegible] with the most brilliant social [illegible] —to deny himself good [illegible] what was Aristotle's thought [illegible] οὐ γὰρ οὖν [illegible]

[illegible] equivalent to καλοκαγαθία as under-[illegible]

[illegible] These words have caused difficulty to the [illegible] proposes the omission of ὡς. Peters [illegible] Seeing that not even honour affects [illegible] important thing.' This interpretation [illegible] ὅ τι καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστιν. Coraes, [illegible] interprets differently, taking ὡς [illegible] with the superlative μέγιστον [illegible] ἀγαθῶν, οὗτοι ἕξει [illegible] στερούμενος. I [illegible] the Paraphrast's interpretation— [illegible] ἕξει ὡς μέγιστον [illegible] ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν (§ 10): but [illegible] § 17.

[illegible] ἀπεχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλο-[illegible] must be observed here. Μεγαλοψυχία [illegible] prosperity: but true μεγ[illegible] independent of fortuitous aid. [illegible] in this section [illegible] Rassicer, is also to be observed— [illegible] . . . 1. 25 τυφλοῦ . . . [illegible] Neruanum genus passivum verborum. [illegible] videtur qui sibi ab [illegible] ἀφώνοις) et ipse audet [illegible] serus erit in vera virtute, quippe

ab initio ὁ ἄξιος ὢν αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτὸν μεγάλων (1123 b. 2), non 1124 a. 20. ens ille testimonio aliorum.'

§ πλουτοῦντες] Rassow (*Forsch.* 60) rightly omits the article a. 22. fore πλουτοῦντες, with K^b, M^b, Camb., and CCC. Οἱ δυναστεύοντες πλουτοῦντες are together distinguished from οἱ εὐγενεῖς. The article fore πλουτοῦντες would have been right, if καί instead of ἤ had en used.

τιμητός] Bekker reads τιμητέος. τιμητός is given by pr. K^b, M^b, a. 25. p. NC, B^1.

§ 20. ἄμφω] ᾧ δὲ ἄμφω πρόσεστι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ λλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς τοῦ τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνον ἔχοντος. Par.

§ 21. ὑπερόπται] Jebb (*Theophrastus* p. 186) compares the a. 29. ηφανία, or arrogance, of Theophrastus with the parody of μεγαλοψυχία described in this section. 'Ο δὲ ὑπερήφανος says Theophrastus ὁνδε τις οἷος . . . εὖ ποιήσας μεμνῆσθαι φάσκειν—'he will profess recollect benefits which he has conferred—*i. e.*,' says Jebb 187), 'he will remind others in a patronizing manner that has placed them under obligations; which may or may not true, for the ambiguous φάσκειν, "to allege," leaves it doubtful. is trait illustrates the difference between arrogance and Loftyndedness. It is characteristic of the Loftyminded man, as istotle observes, to *remember* whom he has benefited. The ogant man (who is a bad imitator of the Loftyminded) does only remember;—he proclaims that he remembers.'

καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται] οἱ has been received the text by Bekker, Susemihl and Bywater, on the authority K^b. It is given also by Camb.; but all other MSS., apparently, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. I feel considerable doubt about the reception οἱ. Michelet's defence of καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθά seems me to be a strong one. 'K^b οἱ ante τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθά it, quam lectionem Cardwellus et Bekkerus in textum reerunt. Male. Καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθά est causa, cur ii, virtute orbati sunt, contemptores et contumeliosi fiant: *utpote iles etiam externa bona*; ad γίγνονται igitur suppleas subjectum aecedentibus (οἱ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς). Addentibus οἱ, alterum καί readum esset.' This καί is marked for omission by a later hand CC. If we suppose the original text to have been—ὑπερόπται

1124 a. 29. δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται (*sc.* οἱ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς), we may explain the words καὶ οἱ as fragments of an ancient blunder ὑβριστικαί with the final αι corrected οι above the line. But there is no strong objection, I think, to the retention of the καί. If it belonged to the original text, the blunder ὑβριστικαί would be almost inevitable: and the correction of the final αι into οι would follow as a matter of course.

The readings ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες κακὰ (Par. 1417, Ald., Coraes) / κακοὶ (Γ, Zell) γίγνονται are worth noticing only as showing that the clause is one which puzzled scribes.

b. 5. § 22. ὁ μὲν γάρ] Susemihl and Bywater read ὁ μὲν γάρ on the authority of K^b. The first hand in CCC likewise gives ὁ μὲν γάρ. So far as sense is concerned, I do not think that there is much to choose between this and Bekker's ὁ δέ.

b. 7. § 23. μικροκίνδυνος] This is the reading of K^b, Camb., CCC, and B^1. The other MSS. seem to agree in giving πυκνοκίνδυνος. The Par. and Asp. also read πυκνοκίνδυνος. It is difficult to decide between the two readings.

b. 9. πάντως] 'at all costs,' Peters.

§ 24.] Grant remarks that 'the principle of independence appears here in an extreme form.' But we must remember that Aristotle is putting on the stage for us his doctrine that the chief end of man is ἐνέργεια not πάθος: we must not criticise the 'character' in which this doctrine has been embodied, as if he were a person whom we might meet in real life. At the same time, it must be admitted that it is more difficult not to criticise the μεγαλόψυχος in this way, than it is to appreciate correctly an abstractly presented ideal like that of Spinoza or Kant.

b. 11. οὕτω γάρ οἱ προσοφλήσει] Bywater introduces οἱ, given by K^b, CCC, and Camb. I feel very doubtful about it in Aristotle.

b. 13. § 25. ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὗ] This is true in tendency of us all—as Menander says (Meineke iv. 345)—

ἐπιλανθάνονται πάντες οἱ παθόντες εὖ.

Münscher's insertion of ὑφ' before ὧν is a tempting but perhaps not strictly necessary emendation. Bywater reads οὗ for the οἷς of the codd. after μνημονεύειν: and ἀκούειν for ἀκούει.

Οὐκ οὖν λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας [illegible] *Il.* i. 503–4 **εἴκοντ' δ' [illegible]** Jones points out: **λέγεται [illegible] τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ [illegible]**

Μάκων] This again, Cones [illegible] **βρέφη**—that is, if the [illegible] rated by Xenophon (*Hell.* [illegible] (together with envoys from [illegible] to ask for aid against the [illegible] summary of the Spartan speeches [illegible] by Sparta are very prominent: see [illegible] vol. vii. 205). As for the [illegible] the Ald. Schol. *ad loc.*, we cannot be sure that the [illegible] him correctly. At any rate the [illegible] Aristotle's present statement is [illegible] The [illegible] the Schol. are—**τὸ δὲ περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων [illegible] τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ὅτι [illegible] ἄπαφον Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους [illegible] δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅσα μὲν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις [illegible] τούτων ἐπελάθοντο ἐκόντες, ἃ δ' [illegible] τούτων ἐμέμνητο. ὡς [illegible] μᾶλλον.**

§ 26. ἐπ' ἐκείνοις] Susemihl [illegible] the reading of K[b], O[1], C[illegible] and [illegible] MSS. seem all to agree in reading [illegible]

§ 28. καὶ ἀμελεῖν] restored by Bywater from [illegible] **λειν** of the other MSS. and [illegible] **ιθουμένου.**

παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι [illegible] his is Bywater's reading for [illegible], which Bekker, and originally Susemihl, accepted on the [illegible] ithority of γρ. Par. 1956. There is no passage in the *E. N.* [illegible] here the MSS. exhibit such variety (see Susemihl's *E. N.* [illegible] ad especially his *E. E.* Appendix ii. where he shows Bekker's [illegible] ading). As the meaning given is in all cases practically the [illegible]me, I think that we cannot do better than accept Bywater's

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

8—ἀγροῖν ἑαυτόν—which [illegible]
ψυχοῦ really consists.

8. χαῦνοι] Jebb: *Theophr.* p. [illegible]
heophrastus with the [illegible]
not necessarily. [illegible]
tes those things on which [illegible]
man of Petty ambition [illegible]
s translation. p. [illegible]
ious to be placed near the [illegible]
he will frequent the [illegible]
unt those places where [illegible]
eatre when there is a [illegible]
ls . . . Also he is [illegible]
a Satyr ape. [illegible]
approved rotundity. [illegible]
and a curtain with [illegible]
sacrificed an ox he [illegible]
ed with large garlands [illegible]
ho come in may [illegible]
been taking part in a [illegible]
e rest of his [illegible]
r putting on his [illegible]
rs.' The **χαῦνοι** [illegible]
ophrastus.

ρ ἄξιοι ὄντες] By water [illegible]
, following all other [illegible]
ove, I suspect that [illegible]
orrector, seeing something [illegible]
Kb.

ατι] 'outward show.' Jebb: *Theophr.* p. [illegible]

αὐτῶν] **περὶ αὐτῶν** is Bekker's reading [illegible]
ν εὐτυχημάτων) gives much better [illegible]
sow. *Forsch.* p. 60. Cf. the Par. [illegible]
τα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀεὶ λέγα..

] **Μικροψυχία** is worse than **χαυνότης** and more [illegible]
ccordingly the real contrary of **μεγαλοψυχία.** Want of

CHAPTER IV

ARGUMENT

[illegible] ἐλευθέρου ἀρετή [illegible]
[illegible] φιλοτιμία καὶ [illegible]
[illegible] σωφροσύνη [illegible]
[illegible] *concerned* [illegible]
[illegible] φιλοτιμία καὶ [illegible]
ordinary citizen—[illegible]
[illegible] *life without expense.*

[illegible]*atory Note.* The comparison of the [illegible]
[illegible] brought [illegible]
[illegible] in the amounts expended. [illegible]
[illegible], and his performances [illegible]
[illegible]*βιμος.* Much more striking [illegible]
[illegible]e respective objects of the [illegible]
[illegible]pter. The statement [illegible]
[illegible]η τιμή and the [illegible]
short way. [illegible]
[illegible]oncerned. The [illegible]
guinea stamp [illegible]
[illegible]t is, not this [illegible]
[illegible]it is rendered. [illegible]
[illegible]kind of τιμή—[illegible]
[illegible]ay enjoy it [illegible]
society for good [illegible]
[illegible]at he may be liberal [illegible]
[illegible]ich, has that sense of [illegible]
an artistic [illegible]
[illegible] *intuitiva*—the [illegible]
[illegible]ewhat misleading [illegible]
[illegible] this chapter, as [illegible]
[illegible]oes, describing the [illegible]
latter as περὶ μικρὰ [illegible]
[illegible]ty of the 'successful man' [illegible]

1125 a. 2. elevated aims,' says Grant *ad loc.*, 'want of effort of will, of individuality, these are indeed fatal deficiencies as regards the attainment of what is fine and noble in character.' Μικροψυχία, like ἀνελευθερία, is the characteristic of a weak and narrow nature of which nothing can be made. Χαυνότης, like ἀσωτία, may perhaps disappear as age and experience indicate to a man his true level. Not that the χαῦνος will thus become μεγαλόψυχος. Μεγαλοψυχία requires such high and singular endowments that a man cannot become μεγαλόψυχος by the simple process of moderating youthful χαυνότης, as it is suggested (iv. 1. 31) he may become ἐλευθέριος by the decay of his ἀσωτία. Μεγαλόψυχος nascitur non fit. A man with the speculative endowment of the μεγαλόψυχος can never have been really vain, even in the years of youthful inexperience. But if we descend to a lower intellectual and moral level, we may see the vain youth becoming a man who thinks well of himself, but not too well, and is able and ready to play his part in life with spirit. The μικρόψυχος, however, has not the *amour propre* and personal force, necessary for the struggle which results in fine social types: he becomes worse, as time goes on, and he falls further and further out of the running. It must be observed however, that μικροψυχία may imply either a general feebleness of character—in which sense it is indeed a hopeless state; or mere backwardness (ὀκνηροί § 35) in the social struggle, which is not inconsistent with latent strength. It is also to be observed that μικροψυχία of this latter kind, *i.e.* mere social backwardness would be a greater hindrance to the attainment of 'excellence,' as Aristotle understood 'excellence,' *i.e.* the possession of 'all the virtues' which put a man *en évidence* in a brilliant society, than it is to that self-denying devotion to the public good which is now recognised as the chief element in Virtue.

Μεγαλοψυχία is discussed in *E.E.* iii. 5 (in an inferior manner) and in *M.M.* i. 25.

but in a public-spirited way: *μεγαλοψυχία* is Goethe's Im Ganzen Guten Wahren resolut zu leben; or Spinoza's *Amor intellectualis Dei*, or the *καλοκἀγαθία* of Eudemus.

1125 b. 1. **§ 1. καὶ περὶ ταύτην**] Ramsauer reads *τιμήν* for *ταύτην*, because *ταύτην* relates not to *τιμήν* but to *τιμὴν μεγάλην*, and brackets the clause *ἡ μὲν οὖν . . . εἴρηται*, (ch. 3, § 38), because *μεγαλοψυχία* has not been described in this Book as *περὶ μεγάλην τιμήν*, although in ii. 7. 8 it is so described. If ii. 7 is genuine—and Ramsauer seems to accept it as such—I cannot see why Aristotle should not be allowed to refer to it here in *ὥσπερ εἴρηται*, and *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη*. Of course if we accept the view of Monro (*Journal of Philology* vi. 185 sqq.), and reject ii. 7 as an interpolation, the case is different. If we could read *μικράν* for *ταύτην* Ramsauer's grammatical difficulty would be removed, and the presence of the clause containing *μεγάλην* perhaps made more acceptable. It is to be noted that this chapter adds scarcely anything new to the sketch (itself comparatively full) in ii. 7. 8. 9: it is also to be noted that its subject is not treated of, either in the *E. E.* or in the *M. M.* It is perhaps allowable to suspect that this chapter was inserted here after the whole Book was [illegible] that there is some connexion between its late in[illegible] the comparative fulness of the summary in ii. 7. 8, which, moreover, it stands in close verbal relationship. I [illegible] to put forward: but my suspicions make me [illegible] is genuine the clause (1. 34. 35) bracketed [illegible] as well as the clauses *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη* [illegible] *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν* § 4) bracketed by Monro [illegible] *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις* points, I believe, [illegible] *E. E.* ii. 7. 8. This expression might [illegible] the present passage was written after in [illegible]

[illegible] Ramsauer refers to the *μεγαλοπρεπεῖς* [illegible] *μεγαλ.* as *ἕξις τιμῆς ἀπελευθέρος*.

[illegible] **φιλοτιμοτέρου λεγομένου**] When we say that [illegible] mean that he is too fond of [illegible] connexions the prefix *φιλο-* is [illegible] sense—[illegible] in the term *φιλοτιμ-*

in a bad sense—*e.g.* in the term φίλοινος: but in other con- 1125 b. 14.
ıions it is doubtful in which sense it is meant—*e.g.* in the term
ότιμος. Bywater's τὸ φιλότιμον for the τὸν φ. of the codd. in line
is a distinct improvement.

ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί] The many are b. 15.
ɜarded as being deficient in ambition and its kindred public-
irit. They are devoted too much to κέρδος or material interests:
: *Pol.* ii. 4. 1266 b. 38 ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα
: κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοὐναντίον δὲ περὶ ἑκάτερον,
μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ
ν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι.

ἐρήμης] The allusion is doubtless to the ἐρήμη δίκη or action b. 17.
which one party does not appear and judgment goes against
n by default. Its own special *name* 'does not appear' to defend
: mean against the claims of the extremes.

§ 5. ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ] restored by Sus. and Byw. for Bekker's b. 20.
ι δ' ὅτε καὶ ὡς δεῖ. The inference marked by δή is required.
: δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ is given by NC, B², and CCC: and Cambr. has
: δὴ ᾗ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.

6. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' κ.τ.λ.] even in the ordinary case of the virtue b. 23.
ing a name: thus ὁ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, ii.
:.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

*ıe adjective πρᾶος, which we apply to 'the good-tempered man' who occupies
nean position between the man 'who shows excessive or ill-directed anger,'
the man 'who cannot be provoked to anger,' is not strictly appropriate,
ıting, as it does, a reprehensible 'mildness' or 'insensibility'; however it
be taken, in the absence of a better term, to describe the man who occupies
ıean, for after all he bears more resemblance to the 'mild' than to the 'ill-
ıred' man. Of 'ill-tempered' men there are several varieties—the ὀργίλος,
ϛολος, πικρός, and χαλεπός. On the other side, the 'mild character' may
ıe length of being ἀνδραποδώδης (§ 6), or may shade into the mean state.
ıbstract noun πραότης, it would seem, is available for the μέση ἕξις, but the
tive πρᾶος has associations which make it somewhat inapplicable to the man
is μέσος.*

Introductory Note.] The close connexion between [illegible] θυμός or ὀργή (see iii. 8. 12) naturally suggests a differe[illegible] on the list for πραότης. The writers of the *E.E.* and *M* [illegible] we have seen, place it after σωφροσύνη: but perhaps [illegible] after all justified in placing it where he does, inasmu[illegible] inclines towards the defect (§ 1) and so involves συγγνω[illegible] συμπάθεια or fellow-feeling—a principle of conduct wh[illegible] [illegible] the πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες.

[illegible] ἀνώνυμοι δόξαιεν. The ἀλαζονεία has no name: it is [illegible] below in § 7 as ἀνωνυμία τις. The writer of [illegible] Aristotle or another is scarcely more defin[illegible] [illegible] without names: but he gives them names [illegible] Thus he says τὴν μεσότητα πολιτικὴν καλέσωμεν. [illegible]

[illegible] πολλαί: and so various kinds of [illegible]

[illegible] being πάνυ means being ἀπαράλλ[illegible]

[illegible] where the πολιτικὴ [illegible]

[illegible] Here Aristotle seems to [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ἀνώνυμοι. [illegible]

[illegible]

ον is opposed to τῷ ποιοῦντι βάρος, that which is indigestible. 1126 a. 23.
ικρός has as it were a load of indigestible anger in him—
ὁ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ.

. χαλεπούς] How does the χαλεπός differ from the πικρός? a. 26.
keep up their angry feelings: but it does not appear that
λεπός, like the πικρός, conceals his displeasure. The writing
er is very careless; for in the next § the whole genus of οἱ
λλοντες περὶ ὀργάς seems to be covered by οἱ χαλεποί. In
iii. 3. 1231 b. 25 we find—ὁ πρᾶος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ
ιδώδους.

. οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον κ.τ.λ.] The passage beginning here and a. 32.
ing to the end of § 14—ἀνθεκτέον, occurs almost in the same
in ii. 9. §§ 7, 8 and 9. See Rassow's *Forsch.* p. 16.
w thinks that the proper locus of the passage is in the Second

ώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν] as opposed to ἀνδραποδώδεις § 6, b. 1.
uer notes.

πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦ- b. 2.
he same construction occurs in the twin-passage ii. 9. 8
χρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι. For
age of ἀποδοῦναι (here = ἀφορίσαι) see note on ii. 1. 8.
translates here—'to lay down in the abstract.'

ὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα κἂν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις] see note on b. 3.
3. The codd. seem all to have καὶ τῇ αἰσθ., but I believe
amsauer (followed by Byw.) is right in inserting ἐν before
ήσει. I would suggest further that a comma be placed
αστα, so as to give the meaning which we have in ii. 9. 8
οιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις where the
re τῇ αἰσθήσει means 'rests with,' 'depends on'; while that
τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα means simply 'in' or 'among.' This is
the meaning required in iv. 5. 13 also. The κρίσις is not ἐν
ῖ ἕκαστα in the sense of 'resting with them,' as it is ἐν
ήσει: but if we follow the codd., we are, I think, obliged
the preposition, as expressed before τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, the
which it is about to bear as understood before τῇ αἰσθήσει—
sense of 'rests with.'

1126 b. 4. § 14.] By the frequently employed terms ἐπαινετόν and ψεκτόν, Aristotle indicates, with sufficient clearness, the moral standard which he recognises. The praise or blame of social equals is given, according as we conform to, or transgress, the prevailing νόμος of the society in which we live. The prevailing νόμος of a society which flourishes cannot be bad: it must embody much of the φυσικὸν δίκαιον. Actions are good or bad, according as they fall in with, or conflict with, an existing system of Greek Life, assumed to be good as a system, and final as a system, although capable of improvement in details. Any radical improvement of the existing system was inconceivable to Aristotle.

Πραότης is described (*third* on the list) in *E. E.* iii. 3 and *M. M.* i. 22.

CHAPTER VI.

Argument and Introductory Note.] The ἀρεταί described in this chapter, and in the two following chapters, concern 'one's deportment in society' (Grant). That they do not stand on the same level of moral importance as the ἀρεταί hitherto discussed is recognised by the writer of the *E. E.* when he styles them παθητικαὶ μεσότητες—ἐπαινεταί, but not ἀρεταί· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γὰρ (*E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 24), and by the writer of the *M. M.* when he says (i. 32. 1193 a. 35) εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἢ μὴ ἀρεταί, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος.

This chapter is concerned with the general subject of 'agreeable manners.' The man with agreeable manners has a certain sympathy (to be distinguished from the affection of Friendship) with those whom he meets in society, which causes him to 'get on well' with them. This, however, he does without sacrificing his personal dignity. He makes himself pleasant in society, without over-complaisancy or flattery. Nor is it only by a sense of his own personal dignity that he is guided in the manifestation of his sympathy: but also by the desire of keeping up a high standard of manners and conduct in other people; for he will not make himself pleasant, when by doing so, he would encourage something decidedly objectionable. He occupies the mean position between

er complaisant man, and the man with disagreeable manners, oes not 'get on well' with people.

.pter 7 treats of another element in 'one's deportment in r'—the straightforward unaffected presentation of oneself : really is—opposed to swagger and self-exaltation on the le, and self-depreciation on the other.

.pter 8 treats of the third element in 'one's deportment in r'—conversational brilliancy.

i. 7. 11 the three *ἀρεταί* of social deportment are given in a nt order (*ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία, φιλία*) determined by a division *ερὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν* into *τὸ περὶ τἀληθές* and *τὸ περὶ* , and a subdivision of the latter into *τὸ ἐν παιδιᾷ* and *τὸ ἐν ῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον.*

s to be observed, however, that the same order as that of 11 is suggested in iv. 8. 12, where Aristotle sums up his ıt of the *ἀρεταί* of social deportment—*τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. νυσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ ν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον* r.

stotle's scheme in iv. 6 is—

δύσκολος or *δύσερις*—*ἀνώνυμος*—*ἄρεσκος* and *κόλαξ.*

i. 7. 13 the *ἀνώνυμος* is called *φίλος*, and his *ἕξις, φιλία.*

the *E.E.*, however, we have a distinction drawn between ınd *σεμνότης* thus—

ἔχθρα—*φιλία*—*κολακεία*
αὐθάδεια—*σεμνότης*—*ἀρέσκεια.*

E.E. iii. 7. 1233 b. 29 *φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἔχθρας καὶ κολακείας· γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς · ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν μήτ' ἀκολουθῶν τιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βέλτιστον, φίλος. σεμνότης δὲ ς αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν ἀλλὰ ωνητικὸς αὐθάδης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων ς, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων σεμνός.*

: writer of the *M.M.* (i. 28 and 31), making the same :tion, explains it thus—*σεμνότης* is the *μεσότης περὶ τὰς ἐντεύ- φιλία, περὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους.* The *αὐθάδης* is described (*M.M.* 1192 b. 31) as *οἷος μηθενὶ ἐντυχεῖν μηδὲ διαλεγῆναι*: the *ἄρεσκος ς πᾶσιν ὁμιλεῖν καὶ πάντως καὶ πανταχῇ*: the *σεμνός* as *οὐκ εἰς*

πάντας ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς ἀξίους. Under the name of σεμνός, then, the ἀνώνυμος of Aristotle's scheme is regarded as *one who knows how to maintain his personal dignity*. Under the name of φίλος (*M.M.* i. 31) the same man is regarded as *one who gets on well with people*. The ἀντεχθητικός, however, and the αὐθάδης are different men, the former being aggressively rude, the latter only surly when approached: so also the κόλαξ and ἄρεσκος are different men, the former having an object to gain by his flattery, the latter being overcomplaisant without ulterior object.

1126 b. 19. § 4.] In ii. 7. 13, as noted above, the μέσος is simply called φίλος, and his virtue φιλία (so also in *E.E.* and *M.M.*). Here, however, 'the man with agreeable manners' is said to resemble the ἐπιεικὴς φίλος, but to differ in being ἄνευ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ἁμιλᾶ.

b. 23. § 5. οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι] 'for it is not from any feeling of friendship or of enmity that he permits this [or objects to that]—always with perfect propriety—but because he is the well-mannered man we are describing (τοιοῦτος).' The logical balance of the sentence requires ἢ δυσχεραίνει after δεῖ, b. 24, answering to ἐχθαίρειν as ἀποδέχεται does to φιλεῖν. The Paraphrast sees this: his words are—οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ στέργειν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα, ἢ ψέγει κ.τ.λ.

1127 a. 7. § 9. τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ] Cf. iii. 1. 13 τοῦ δὴ δ' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ.

a. 8. ἄρεσκος] See Theophrastus (*Char.* περὶ ἀρεσκείας), who defines ἀρέσκεια as ἔντευξις οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ ἡδονῆς παρασκευαστική. 'Complaisance,' he says (Jebb's Transl. p. 85), 'may be defined as a mode of address calculated to give pleasure, but not with the best tendency. The complaisant man is very much the kind of person who will hail one afar off with "my dear fellow"; and after a large display of respect, seize and hold one by both hands. He will attend you a little way, and ask *when* he is to see you, and will take his leave with a compliment on his lips. Also when he is called in to an arbitration he will seek to please not only his principal, but the adversary as well, in order that he may be deemed impartial. He will say too that foreigners speak more justly than his fellow-citizens.'

In a note on the character of ἀρέσκεια Jebb remarks (p. 181)—

'The Flatterer, according to Aristotle, flatters for money or what 1127 a. 8.
money buys; the Complaisant man "aims at being pleasant with no further object" (μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι). This is a fault (1) because to combat the wishes of others is sometimes a duty to them and to oneself: thus Aristotle's Perfectly-behaved man is one who will occasionally "make difficulties" (δυσχεραίνει) for either reason or both. (2) Because the primary object of the Complaisant man is, not that others may be pleased, but that he may be pleasant. He desires popularity, either from mere vanity or for the sake of influence. When, therefore, he is said to aim at being pleasant "without *further* object" this does not exclude a selfish object. To be thought pleasant is itself the object which he most covets. He is unmercenary, as contrasted with the Flatterer; but he is not disinterested.' Jebb goes on to notice two salient points of difference between the κόλαξ and the ἄρεσκος as portrayed by Theophrastus: (1) The κόλαξ treats his patron as a superior; the ἄρεσκος treats his associate as an equal for whom he has a warm regard. (2) The κόλαξ attaches himself to one patron; the ἄρεσκος desires to be on cordial terms with as many persons as possible.

κόλαξ] Κολακεία is defined by Theophrastus as ὁμιλίαν αἰσχρὰν a. 10.
συμφέρουσαν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι. 'The Flatterer,' he says (Jebb's Translation p. 81), 'is a person who will say as he walks with another, "Do you observe how people are looking at you? This happens to no man in Athens but you. A compliment was paid to you yesterday in the Porch. More than thirty persons were sitting there: the question was started, who is our foremost man? Every one mentioned you first, and ended by coming back to your name." With these and like words, he will remove a morsel of wool from his patron's coat; or if a speck of chaff has been laid on the other's hair by the wind, he will pick it off: adding with a laugh, "Do you see? because I have not met you for two days, you have had your beard full of white hairs; although no one has darker hair for his years than you." Then he will request the company to be silent while the great man is speaking, and will praise him too in his hearing, and mark his approbation at a pause with "True"; or he will laugh at a frigid joke, and stuff his cloak into his mouth as if he could not repress his amusement.' In his note on this character, Jebb remarks (p. 178)—'The notion conveyed by the term κολακεία is not precisely what we usually mean by

1127 a. 10. 'flattery,' but something coarser. It meant a sort of extravagant toadyism practised not as a fine art, but simply as an industry—as a recognised method of obtaining a livelihood. This tone is unconsciously illustrated by Athenaeus, when in his reminiscences of eminent Flatterers (vi. pp. 248–260) he speaks of "Cheirisophus the Flatterer of Dionysius," "Callicrates the Flatterer of Ptolemy," "Anaxarchus one of the flatterers of Alexander." These men had, as it were, been preferred to permanent posts.'

Athenaeus (vi. 80, 261) quotes lines of the comic poet Anaxandrides in which *κολακεία* is presented as a sort of *τέχνη* or trade—*τῇ δ' ἀλαζονείᾳ μετὰ τὴν κολακείαν χώραν δίδωσιν Ἀναξανδρίδης ὁ παρῳδιοποιὸς ἐν Φαρμακομάντει, λέγων οὕτως·*

ὅτι εἰμ' ἀλαζών, ταῦτ' ἐπιτιμᾶς; ἀλλὰ τί;
νικᾷ γὰρ αὕτη τὰς τέχνας πάσας πολύ,
μετὰ τὴν κολακείαν· ἥδε μὲν γὰρ διαφέρει.

Again (vi. 73, 258) Athenaeus quotes Antiphanes to the same effect—*Ἀντιφάνης δ' ἐν Δημνίαις τέχνην τινὰ ὑποτίθεται τὴν κολακείαν εἶναι, ἐν οἷς λέγει·*

εἶτ' ἔστιν ἡ γένοιτ' ἂν ἡδίων τέχνη,
ἡ πρόσοδος ἄλλη, τοῦ κολακεύειν εὐφυῶς,
ὁ ζωγράφος πονεῖ τι καὶ πικραίνεται,
ὁ γεωργὸς ἐν ὅσοις ἐστὶ κινδύνοις πάλιν·
πρόσεστι πᾶσιν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ πόνος·
ἡμῖν δὲ μετὰ γέλωτος ὁ βίος καὶ τρυφῆς·
οὐ γὰρ τὸ μέγιστον ἔργον ἐστὶ παιδιά,
ἁδρὸν γελάσαι, σκῶψαί τιν', ἐκπιεῖν πολύν,
οὐκ ἡδύ; ἐμοὶ μὲν μετὰ τὸ πλουτεῖν δεύτερον.

Plutarch (*de adulatore et amico* ch. 7) describes the *κόλαξ* in the following terms—*ὁ δὲ κόλαξ ἅτε δὴ μίαν ἑστίαν ἤθους οὐκ ἔχων μόνην, οὐδὲ ἑαυτῷ βίον ζητῶν αἱρετόν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρῳ καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον πλάττων καὶ προσαρμόζων ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἁπλοῦς οὐδὲ εἷς, ἀλλὰ παντοδαπός ἐστι καὶ ποικίλος, εἰς ἄλλον ἐκ ἄλλου τύπον, ὥσπερ τὸ μεταιρόμενον ὕδωρ, περῳρέων ἀεὶ καὶ μετασχηματιζόμενον τοῖς ὑποδεχομένοις.* Alcibiades is adduced as the great *κόλαξ*, who changed his manners with his place, living elegantly at Athens, and austerely at Sparta; fighting and drinking in Thrace, and giving himself up to oriental luxury in Asia. In his treatise *de Amicorum multitudine* ch. 9, Plutarch again employs the expression *ἰδίαν ἤθους ἑστίαν οὐκ ἔχοντος*, applying it to the man who is *μετάβολος καὶ παντοδαπός*, without the special

ıplication of κολακεία. The treatise *de adulatore et amico* contains 1127 a. 10.
e philosophy of κολακεία (which it presents as a phase of 'he-
ronomy'), and throws considerable light on the peripatetic theory
'αὐτάρκεια[1].

δύσκολος] Eudemus and the writer of the *M. M.*, as we have seen,
ıpose the αὐθάδης to the ἄρεσκος and the ἀπεχθητικός to the κόλαξ.
The αὐθάδης is the man who 'pleases himself.' As Jebb (*Theoph.*
184) remarks, he 'acts chiefly from a desire to be left alone . . .
: repels advances, but he does not take liberties.' He is de-
ribed by Theophrastus (αὐθάδεια) in the following terms—'The
ırly man is one who when asked where so-and-so is, will say,
Don't bother me"; or when spoken to will not reply . . .
e cannot forgive a person who has besmirched him by ac-
dent, or pushed him, or trodden upon his foot . . . when he
umbles in the street he is apt to swear at the stone. He will
ɪ endure to wait long for anyone; nor will he consent to sing,
to recite, or to dance. He is apt also not to pray to the gods.'
ebb's Transl. p. 87.)

In illustration of the Eudemian terminology, according to which
θάδεια is one of the extremes where σεμνότης is the mean, see the
ıes of Eubulus preserved by Athenaeus (vi. 76, 260)—

> ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς σεμνοῖς μὲν αὐθαδέστερος,
> καὶ τοῖς κόλαξι πᾶσι τοῖς σκώπτουσί τε
> ἑαυτὸν εὐόργητος.

The dangerous proximity of ἀρέσκεια to κολακεία is implied in
: following line of Anaxandrides (apud Ath. vi. 66, 255)—

> τὸ γὰρ κολακεύειν νῦν ἀρέσκειν ὄνομ' ἔχει.

Clearchus of Soli (Aristotle's pupil) is quoted by Athen. vi. 66, 255 as
ɔws:—κόλαξ μὲν οὐδεὶς διαρκεῖ πρὸς φιλίαν· καταναλίσκει γὰρ ὁ χρόνος τὸ προσποιήματος αὐτῶν ψεῦδος· ὁ δ' ἐραστὴς κόλαξ ἐστὶ φιλίας δι' ὥραν ἢ
ıos. In another fragment, preserved by Athenaeus (vi. 67. 255), Clearchus
—τὴν κολακείαν ταπεινὰ ποιεῖν τὰ ἤθη τῶν κολάκων, καταφρονητικῶν ὄντων περὶ αὐτούς. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ πᾶν ὑπομένειν εἰδότας οἷα τολμῶσι. τὰ δὲ τῶν κενομένων ἐμφυσωμένων τῇ κολακείᾳ, χαύνους καὶ κενοὺς ποιοῦντα, πάντων ἐν οχῇ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι κατασκευάζεσθαι. On Clearchus see
ıayr, *Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit*, p. 110.

CHAPTER VII.

[illegible] Note.] The [illegible], who realises [illegible] between [illegible] and [illegible], is straightforward in [illegible] where no important interests are [illegible]. [illegible] he will be truthful where they are; but this [illegible] belongs properly to the virtue of justice (§ 7 [illegible]). Here we are concerned merely with the habit of [illegible] himself in society as one really is, neither better nor [illegible].

The [illegible]—the Boaster or 'Swagger' (see Jebb's *Theoph.* [illegible]) is of three kinds, according to this chapter—(1) ὁ μείζω τῶν [illegible] ὢν: (§ 10); (2) ὁ δόξης ὢν [illegible]; (3) [illegible]. In all three cases the [illegible] presents in the possession of ἔνδοξα, or qualities held in repute, which he either does not possess at all, or possesses to a smaller extent than he would have it believed (§ 2). Ὁ δόξης [illegible] in those qualities which are admired and praised; [illegible] in qualities agreeable and useful to others, the [illegible] of which can be concealed—such as prophetic or medical [illegible].

The [illegible] described by Theophrastus belongs to the second [illegible]. 'What he is doing in a hired house he will say (to anyone [illegible]) that it is the family mansion; but that [illegible] is too small for his entertainments.' [illegible]

The [illegible] described by Aristotle, depreciates himself by [illegible] the possession of qualities held in repute, or making them [illegible] than they are. He is better than the εἴρων, being more [illegible]; [illegible] seek profit by his irony, nor even repute, [illegible] in repute are what he especially disclaims (§ 14). [illegible] or self-depreciation, however, passes easily into [illegible]. 'The general characteristic of [Aristotle's] [illegible] (*Th. Et.* p. 190), is that he holds in [illegible] purpose, something of his available power. [illegible] purpose may be an earnest dialectical one like that of Socrates, [illegible] dissimulation and check impertinence; as [illegible] man is 'ironical' to the common crowd

Ath. iv. 3. 28). Or the purpose may be merely playful; as Anacharsis in Lucian says that the Athenians were reputed 'ironical' in conversation (*Anach.* c. 15).' Jebb finds the picture of the εἴρων drawn by Theophrastus strikingly inadequate as judged by Aristotle's standard. Theophrastus 'describes merely a person who takes a cynical pleasure in misleading or inconveniencing others by the concealment of his real feelings and intentions.' According to O. Ribbeck (*Rheinisches Museum* 1876, vol. xxxi. p. 381 sqq., über den Begriff des εἴρων) the εἴρων is mentioned for the first time in Greek literature in Aristoph. *Nub.* 449. The Scholiast on this passage has—εἴρων ὁ πάντα παίζων καὶ διαχλευάζων, κρυπτόμενος ἀπατεών, ὑποκριτής. The Fox is the type of the εἴρων: cf. Philemon, *Fragm.* οὐκ ἔστ' ἀλώπηξ ἡ μὲν εἴρων τῇ φύσει, | ἡ δ' αὐθέντης; Neither Plato nor Xenophon, according to Ribbeck, makes Socrates *call himself* εἴρων. The term was really one of reproach applied by his contemporaries who thought that he outwitted them. Plato uses εἰρωνεία, εἰρωνικός, or εἰρωνεύεσθαι in a bad sense in *Soph.* 268 A, *Legg.* 908 D, *Rep.* 337 A (the passage in which Thrasymachus says to Socrates ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη ἐκείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ᾔδη τε καὶ τούτοις προὔλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἐπερώτασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τίς τί σε ἐρωτῷ), *Sympos.* 216 E. Cf. Aristoph. *Aves* 1211, Plato, *Apol.* 38 A. The notion of εἰρωνεία was, however, ennobled by the character of Socrates, and by the representation which Plato gave of him. In the *Eth. Nic.* εἰρωνεία has the old meaning in so far as it involves a divergence from *truth*; but when the εἴρων is said to be χαριέστερος, as φεύγων τὸ ὀγκηρόν, his character is taken in a better and finer sense. Aristotle is the first to make Socrates the type of true refined *Irony*. But Theoph. understands 'irony' 'in a sense almost wholly bad,' as Jebb remarks (*Theoph.* p. 191).

§ 1.] Imelmann (*obs. crit.* p. 12), followed by Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 17), distinguishes two introductory passages in this section, (1) καὶ τὰ αὐτά . . . συνιδόντες, and (2) ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν . . . προσποιήσει. Imelmann (*l. c.*) inserts καὶ τῆς εἰρωνείας after ἀλαζονείας in line 1127 a. 13; and Rassow, Susemihl, and Bywater (the last omitting τῆς) accept the emendation. 1127 a. 13.

καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι] προσποίημα is something *unduly* assumed, nothing *pretended to*: hence here it refers properly only to the a. 20.

[illegible] 1124 a 2

[illegible]

§ 9. ἀναλίσκει] [illegible] 1124 a 8

[illegible]

§ 10. μηδενὸς ἄνευ] [illegible] 1124 a 11

[illegible]

§ 11. ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών] [illegible] 1124 a 14

[illegible]

§ 12.] The clause [illegible] much should be made of the [illegible] *Top.* iv. 5. 126 a. 30 ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἢ ἐπιτηδευτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ἢ δυνατὸν ἔθηκεν, οἷον τὸν ἀθλητὴν ἢ λιχνόν· οὐκ ἴσον τὸν δυνάμενον τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. . . . τοῦτο γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρωποι ἐπὶ πλεῖστον προαίρεσιν λέγουσι.

Ἀλαζονεία is after all a fixed moral habit not as might perhaps be supposed from its less offensive forms, a mere *foible* like that

[illegible] employed without delay [illegible] its true parallel.

[illegible] are the objects of [illegible] and Fraunhofer refer to [illegible] 1. 1355 b. 20 [illegible] as Grant puts [illegible] ἀλαζὼν ἐστι [illegible] after ἐστι b. 15, and like [illegible] with what follows. I prefer [illegible] = ἄκρος καὶ ψευστὴς ἐστι [illegible] and ὁ δὲ to ὁ ἀλαζὼν [illegible] I would therefore punctuate thus—[illegible] ἄκρος καὶ ψευστὴς. ὁ μὲν [illegible] ἢ κόλαξ. If we refer [illegible] the person described [illegible] the ἀλαζὼν property of § 10, and [illegible] ἀλαζὼν, but a person [illegible] But is it likely that when he wrote [illegible] was thinking of another [illegible] he had just described a [illegible] ἐν ἑνὶ ψεύδει b. 10 in [illegible] employed by ψευστὴς and by [illegible] is concerned, may be distin- [illegible] ἀκρὸς [illegible] ἄκρος, to be distinguished [illegible] It is perhaps worth noticing [illegible] the ἄκρος ψεύδει in *Mag. M.* A. 20 seems [illegible] the ἀκρὸς ἄκρος ἢ κόλαξ here [illegible] distinguished from the ἀλαζὼν—see [illegible] ὁ εἰρωνὴς καὶ προσποιούμενος [illegible] ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτό—on which Alexander [illegible] comment—λέγεται δὲ ἄκρος

[illegible] earlier in § 11 as if they implied [illegible] ἄκρος ἐν τῷ ψεύδει [illegible] That it is not so [illegible] will at such a time [illegible] *gentleman* Dunlop, so let it [illegible]

δής . . . ἢ εὐχερὴς πρὸς τὸ ψεύδεσθαι καὶ τούτου προαιρετικὸς καὶ 1127 b.14.
ων τῷ ψεύδεσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι, οἷον κέρδος ἢ μισθόν
ρ οὗτος γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ ψευδὴς οὐδὲ φιλοψευδής, ἀλλὰ φιλοκερδὴς ἢ εἴ τι
ὐτόν ἐστιν.

The Paraph. Heliodorus avoids the error of making ὁ δὲ δόξης
γόμενος ἢ κέρδους a species of ὁ ψεύστης (as distinguished from
λαζών), by referring ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων to the ψεύστης
ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους to the ἀλαζών: he says καὶ κατά
ι ἕξιν ὁ ἀλαζὼν γίνεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ψεύστης, ὃς οὐ δόξης ἕνεκα ἢ
μάτων προσποιεῖται, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ψεύδους ἕνεκα μόνον.

§ 13. οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαθεῖν b.19.
ι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν] So Bywater, following K^b,
ich (with CCC) omits ἃ before διαλαθεῖν, and ἢ before ἰατρόν.
kker follows the other MSS in reading ἃ and ἢ. Susemihl
ds ἃ, but not ἢ. It is to be noted that pr. K^b has ὧν ἡδεῖ ἀπό-
σις, CCC ὧν ἢ δεῖ ἀπόλαυσις, and Cambr. ὧν ἡδεῖα ἀπόλαυσις, and
t NC, B^1, B^2, Γ, H^a, N^b, Ald., Hel., have οἷον ἰατρὸν ἢ μάντιν
ών, and O^b has οἷον μάντιν ἢ ἰατρὸν σοφόν.

As regards the omission of ἢ (which seems to rest on three
horities, K^b, CCC, and Aspasius—he has τοιοῦτον δὲ μαντική,
κή, σοφία)—a point is certainly made by the inclusion in the
of impostors of a third variety—the learned impostor—σοφός
σοφιστής: but, on the other hand, it might be argued that it
necessary to qualify at least ἰατρόν by an adjective expressing
skill which is pretended to; that it is not being a doctor,
being a good doctor, which is the pretence that escapes de-
ion. The ἢ might very easily drop out, and, once out, would
likely to remain out, because it seemed so natural to include
Sophist among notable impostors. K^b's omission of ἢ ought
to weigh too much with us. It may be only one of the
nerous blundering omissions for which the MS is remarkable:
perhaps the omission of ἃ may belong to the same class.
the other hand, what K^b adds or substitutes is entitled to
ıt attention; and so, I think that Ramsauer's conjecture—
βη ἀπόλαυσις—is not to be overlooked.

t seems to be generally assumed (*e.g.* by Stahr and Peters)
ὄντα is neut. pl. In that case the words οἷον μάντιν κ.τ.λ.
ow awkwardly. On the other hand, if we take ὄντα as masc.
., there is some difficulty in connecting the clause — καὶ

[illegible] gives before us as to allow [illegible] from which other [illegible] may not be, and yet [illegible]

[illegible] ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ [illegible] We must understand [illegible] are the largest class of [illegible]

[illegible] (*Tr*[illegible] [illegible] remark—'And more [illegible] especially disclaim' [illegible] them as [illegible]

[illegible] In the next sentence we are told that [illegible] In Plutarch, [illegible] the style of Socrates described as [illegible] under cited [illegible]

[illegible] See the notes [illegible] Theophrastus [illegible] the possession of great [illegible] Remember the [illegible] suggestion [illegible] make a good [illegible] following Valkenaer [illegible]

βαυκοπανοῦργοι] The derivation of this word is obscure. The 1127 b. 27.
d. Schol. has βαυκοπανούργους . . . τοὺς σεμνοπανούργους· βαυκὸν γὰρ
ιγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸν τρυφερόν. See also *Liddell and Scott*, s. v. βαυκός
rudish,' 'affected.' The general idea seems to be that of silly
fected humbugs, contemptible for their little transparent artifices.

ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής] not as worn by the Spartans themselves, b. 28.
t as imitated by certain Athenians. See Coraes, *ad loc.* τοὺς
ιθήρησι λακωνικῶς βιοῦντας Ἀθηναίους αἰνίττεται, ὧν καὶ Δημοσθένης
1267. 21) καθάπτεται, 'ἴσασιν ὑμῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ νομίζω, πολλοὶ καὶ τὸν
ότιμον, καὶ τὸν Ἀρχεβιάδην, καὶ τὸν Χαιρέτιμον, τὸν ἐπιπόλιον τουτονί,
ὃ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἐσκυθρωπάκασι, καὶ λακωνίζειν φασί, καὶ τρίβωνας
χουσι, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὑποδέδενται· ἐπειδὰν δὲ συλλεγῶσι, καὶ μεθ' ἀλλήλων
ένωνται, κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν οὐδὲν ἐλλείπουσι.'

§ 17. χείρων γάρ] *sc.* τοῦ εἴρωνος. b. 32.

CHAPTER VIII.

Argument and Introductory Note.] The εὐτράπελος, or ἐπιδέξιος,
the man whose conversation in society is easy, bright and
layful, contributing to the pleasure and amusement of the company,
ithout offending against good taste, or hurting susceptibilities.
specially in the sallies of pleasantry of which persons present
imself included) are the objects, will he show graceful tact—never
ying anything that his victim, being a man of taste, does not
joy: and tacitly imposing his own rule of good taste upon those
o attack him in turn. The βωμολόχος is the buffoon, or 'funny
an,' whose pleasantry is coarse and offensive, and practised in and
t of season. The ἄργιος or ἄγροικος (ἄγροικος in *E. E.*, *M. M.*, and
N. ii. 7. 13), presumably so called as being contrasted with the
εῖος, is the dull man, who, like a rustic in polite society, sits
ent, unable to follow, or contribute to easy conversation, and
capable,' as Grant puts it, 'of either making or appreciating a
e.' The βδελυρία and ἀγροικία of Theophrastus do not present
ny points of likeness to Aristotle's extremes.
Looking back over the list which ends with εὐτραπελία, we seem
see in the ἀρεταί of the Fourth Book, not *virtues* in our sense,

our qualities forming the dignified and brilliant member of polite society. "The Gentleman," always conscious of what is due to himself, seems to be presented as the ideal of 'the good man.' But we must not let this ideal of "the Gentleman" mislead us in our interpretation of Aristotle. We must not overlook the way in which all "the qualities of the Gentleman" (even the most superficial of them) are made to subserve earnest aims.

Ἐλευθεριότης is essentially the habit of doing good with one's money, and implies fellow-feeling regulated by discrimination of desert, and a large perception of the public issues involved in the smallest act of giving. Μεγαλοπρέπεια is essentially the virtue of the man of public spirit, who undertakes a λειτουργία, on the proper performance of which the credit and advantage of his city depend. The φιλότιμος shows how personal ambition may be reconciled with enthusiasm for the common good. The πρᾶος is, above all, συμπαθής—a man who has sympathies which enable him to understand others, and bear with them. The φίλος and the ἀληθευτικός set the example of dignified, and at the same time kindly and straightforward, manners, and so perform a moral work of the highest importance, making men understand one another better, and respect one another more. Finally the εὐτράπελος performs an important function, by lightening the incubus of ennui which tends to oppress life. He contributes to that διαγωγή which is sought not for its own sake, but because it makes us more capable of the performance of the earnest duties of life. τοιοῦτοι δ' ἴσως γενόμενοι, καθ' Ἀναξαγόραν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσι διαπορεῖν καὶ ἐπιμένειν ἢ τοιαῦτα, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεσιν χρῶνται· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἡδονὰς ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας (E. N. x. 7. 8).

Thus, in all cases, we are brought back to the standard of the Noble Life, or Hellenic Culture. Those who participate in this culture know when it is realised in the habits of a member of their society, and praise his habits accordingly—τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν (i. 13. 20).

1128 a 1 § 1. οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὡς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν] In the *E.E.* iii. 7. 1234 a 14 two kinds of εὐτραπελία are distinguished—that of the man who knows how to receive pleasantry—and that of the man who knows how to originate it. The former consists in being able to enjoy a polite and delicate σκῶμμα—even when it

ıugh against oneself; the latter consists in being able to 1128 a. 1.
a *σκῶμμα* which its victim, being a man of good taste, will
*ὕσης δὲ διττῆς τῆς εὐτραπελίας (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶ
καὶ τῷ εἰς αὐτόν, ἐὰν ᾖ τοιονδί, ὧν ἐν τὸ σκῶμμα ἐστίν, ἡ δ'
ασθαι τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἕτεραι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλων, ἀμφότεραι
ότητες. καὶ γὰρ τὸν δυνάμενον τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφ' ὅσοις
ὁ εὖ κρίνων, κἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ᾖ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἔσται τοῦ φορτικοῦ
ψυχροῦ. ὁ δ' ὅρος οὗτος βελτίων ἢ τὸ μὴ λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ
σκωπτομένῳ ὄντι ὁποιῳοῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν μεσότητι
ειν· οὗτος γὰρ κείνει εὖ.* The same distinction is made in
30. 1193 a. 17 *ἔσται δὲ ὁ εὐτράπελος διττῶς πως λεγόμενος
δυνάμενος σκῶψαι ἐμμελῶς, καὶ ὃς ἂν ὑπομείνῃ σκωπτόμενος
ι.*

ούτοις . . . τοιούτων] Masc. The kind of company will a. 2.
lifference.

ωμολόχοι] The *βωμολόχος* is literally one who hangs about a. 4.
ι to steal or beg what is offered on them: then, meta-
ν, a low-fellow who will do anything to get a meal—
': and, still more metaphorically, a person who will
hing to raise a laugh—a low jester. See *Liddell and*
.

οι] The reading of K[b] and CCC, restored to the text a. 9.
ater, in place of Bekker's *ἄγριοι*, given by all other
See on the use of the term *ἄγροικος* in Aristotle, note on iii.

τροποι] Grant gives us a neat rendering here—'they are a. 10.
tty, by a name that implies their happy turns.'

αὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες] a. 14.
εὐτραπελία is sometimes used in a bad sense—as in *N. T.*
(quoted by Giphanius), where it is coupled with *μωρολογία*,
ns low jesting.

λευθερίου] K[b] (followed by CCC) has *ἐλευθέρου*. In either a. 20.
ntleman' is the meaning.

ὧν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν] Ramsauer quotes a. 22.
E, where *κωμῳδεῖν* is used as synonymous with *αἰσχρολογεῖν*

[illegible] δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι] The rule in respect of [illegible] appear, not so strict as that in respect of [illegible]

ἀγροικος] Bywater: ἄγροικος Bekker [illegible] C (as of all other MSS.) [illegible] ἄγροικοι. Is this ἄγροικος in § [illegible] portrait of [illegible]

§ 12.] See *Introductory Note* [illegible] The [illegible] portment are given here in the same order as in [illegible] ἀθία, εὐτραπελία, φιλία.

CHAPTER IX.

Argument and Introductory Note.] The passage [illegible] ich the discussion of νέμεσις follows that of αἰδώς [illegible] pares us for a discussion of νέμεσις in the present chapter [illegible] But the Fourth Book, as we have [illegible] tioning νέμεσις. It seems probable that the [illegible] rived us of the Nicomachean books [illegible] rived us of the last part of iv. treating of νέμεσις [illegible] haps an editor's interpolation. Perhaps [illegible] part of the cussion of αἰδώς is lost; for it is to be noted that [illegible] tion of the ἀναίσχυντος and καταπλήξ as extremes where the [illegible] is μέσος. At the same time, we cannot feel sure that it was [illegible] istotle's intention here to represent the αἰδήμων [illegible] far as the discussion goes. αἰδώς appears merely as a [illegible] ionally good feeling, admirable only in the [illegible] *E. E.* and *M. M.* the αἰδήμων is evidently regarded as a [illegible] n, no less than the φίλος, ἀληθής, and εὐτραπελος—as the man who [illegible] just the right amount of self-assurance, who is not [illegible] regard- of what people think of him, or too shy and sensitive to put [illegible] self forward at all. See *M. M.* i. 29. 1193 a. 1 [illegible] αἰδώς δ' ἐστὶ [illegible] ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως, ἔστιν δὲ περ. [illegible] it is definitely one of the ἀρεταί, so-called, of one's [illegible] society']. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀναίσχυντός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πρὸς πάντας [illegible] καὶ πράττων ἃ ἔτυχεν, ὁ δὲ κατακεκληγμένος ὁ ἐναντίος τούτῳ, ὁ [illegible] καὶ πρὸς πάντας εἰλαβούμενος καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ εἰπεῖν (ὅπερ [illegible] γὰρ [illegible] ὁ πάντα καταπληττόμενος)· ἡ δὲ αἰδὼς καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων μεσότης [illegible] τούτων. οὔτε γὰρ ἅπαντα καὶ πάντως, ὡς ὁ ἀναίσχυντος, καὶ ἐρεῖ καὶ

πράξει, οὔτε ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ἐν παντὶ καὶ πάντως εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἀλλὰ πρᾷα καὶ ἐρεῖ ἐν οἷς δεῖ καὶ ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ. So also *E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 26 sqq. αἰδὼς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δίξης ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων. (This is all that we have about αἰδώς in the *E. E.*) The same extremes are given in ii. 7. 14, where presumably the view of the αἰδήμων is the same—viz. that he is a mature man on the same level with the εὐτράπελος, &c. All that we can say, then, is that in the Fourth Book, at least so far as we have it, αἰδώς is looked at from a different point of view: and that the discussion of it, so far as it goes, cannot be regarded as paralleled by the discussion in the later treatises. In the *E. E.* and *M. M.* both αἰδώς and νέμεσις appear among the so-called παθητικαὶ μεσότητες—ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία, φιλία, and σεμνότης: whereas the subject of the 9th chapter of the Fourth Book is carefully distinguished from the foregoing ἀρεταί, its discussion forming a sort of appendix to the Book. Αἰδώς, as presented in this chapter, is a natural shrinking from incurring the bad opinion of other people, which is useful in those whose morality is not yet assured, as preventing them from doing things which would bring them into disgrace: but it is only thus provisionally useful. The time ought to come when one, as a matter of fact, does not do, or think of doing, such things. This is the strong position which Aristotle takes up. But it suits most men to look at αἰδώς differently, and to argue thus—'I have done wrong, but I am ashamed. I have done a bad *thing*, but I am not such a bad *man* after all, because I am ashamed. This bad thing done by me is not so bad as the same thing done by my neighbour, who does not seem to be ashamed of having done it.' Aristotle in this chapter declares himself—as we might expect—against this substitution of the subject's feeling in the place of an objective moral standard. He sees that the man who thus palliates a bad action, and gives himself, as it were, absolution for it, will be prepared, with a light heart, to repeat it: and that αἰδώς, though at first a protection, may become a snare. We can understand therefore the anxiety which he shows throughout the chapter to make it quite plain that αἰδώς *is not a virtue*. He feels that the point is one of great *practical* importance, because it suits human weakness so well to make it out a virtue.

For τοῖς αἰσχυντοῖς καὶ ἀναισχυντοῖσιν καὶ πρὸς τίνας καὶ πότε ἐρεῖ see the interesting chapter *Rhet.* ii. 6. 1383 b. 12 sqq.

§ 1. **πάθει**] See note on ii. 7. 14. 1128 b. 11.

φόβος τις ἀδοξίας] Ramsauer refers to Plato, *Legg.* i. 646 E *βούμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ἡγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοὶ πράττοντες ἢ γαστές τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ὃν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, οἶμαι δὲ ἅπαντες, αἰσχύνην.* In *Rhet.* ii. 6, referred to above, the definition 383 b. 13) does not include the term *φόβος*—*ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γενόντων ἢ μελλόντων.* In *Top.* iv. 5. 126 a. 6 (referred to by Ramsauer) doubt seems to be thrown on the propriety of including the rm *φόβος* in the definition—*ἐὰν οὖν τις τὴν αἰσχύνην φόβον εἴπῃ ἢ τὴν ηὴν λύπην οὐ συμβήσεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος ὑπάρχειν· μὲν γὰρ αἰσχύνη ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, καὶ ἡ μὲν ίτη ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ (ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή), ἡ δ' ὀργὴ ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, ὥστ' οὐ γένη τὰ ἀποδοθέντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοῖς εἴδεσι ήθεται γίνεσθαι.* In strict conformity with this view that *αἰσχύνη* is *τῷ λογιστικῷ* we have a second definition in *Rhet.* ii. 6. 1384 a. 3 *ἐπεὶ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ιλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων κ.τ.λ.* It is to be noted, however, that the finition with which *Rhet.* ii. 6 opens (1383 b. 13, quoted above) ntains the word **φαινόμενα**.

§ 2. **ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι**] Ramsauer compares b. 15.
An. i. 1. 403 a. 16 *ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ ματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε ι μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα.* It is of course only a of the *ψυχή* which is contrasted here, in this way, with a *πάθος*, r there are *bodily* *ἕξεις*.

§ 3. **διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ** b. 17.
λάσσεσθαι] This regulation of *πάθος* by *πάθος* is the only regulation ssible at first, but must not be acquiesced in as a permanent m of moral government. The *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* which is constituted the *de facto* prevalence of good over bad feelings, does not make nan good *in his own right.* *Οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ ον ἥσεως* vi. 13. 6).

§ 5. **οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα**] This seems to bind down the *ἐπιεικής* b. 24.
a very strict observance of conventional propriety; but probably stotle only means that the *ἐπιεικής* will avoid vulgarity as well as norality—*e.g.* as the Ald. Schol. says, he will not eat in the rket-place—like the *βδελυρός* of Theophrastus, who, *πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς, προσελθὼν πρὸς τὰ κάρυα ἢ τὰ μῆλα ἢ τὰ ἀκρόδρυα, ἑστηκὼς*

[illegible]

[illegible] anywhere [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] legitimate and tempting [illegible]
The same may be said of Fowler's [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

BOOK V.

MICHAEL EPH. introduces this Book as follows:—*ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἕκτῳ βιβλίῳ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων πραγματείας πρόθεσις πιν εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς μερικωτέρας δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ συστοίχου ταύτῃ ιείου τῶν ἀντικειμένων τε τούτοις ἀδικίας καὶ ἀδίκου· διττὴ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἤτοι, ἥ τε ὅλη ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ προκειμένη, ἥτις καὶ ἀντιδιῄρηται τῇ φρονήσει ἡ ἀνδρείᾳ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ, ὧν ἑκάστη, πρὸς τὸ δικαιοσύνη λέγεσθαι, καὶ ἴσις ἡ μὲν φρόνησις, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία ἡ δὲ σωφροσύνη ὀνομάζεται· ἡ δὲ προ-ιμένη ἀρετὴ δικαιοσύνη μὲν λέγεται καὶ ὀνομάζεται τῷ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ἕκατι· ὄνομα δ' ἴδιον οὐκ ἐκληρώσατο, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ὁ Ὀλυμπιονίκης Σωκράτης οὐ Πλάτων οὐκ Ἀριστείδης ἀλλὰ τῷ κοινῷ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἕκατι ἄνθρωπος ὀνομάζεται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ παροῦσα ἀρετὴ δικαιοσύνη καλεῖται κοινῷ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ὀνόματι· εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτῆς μέρη δύο, τό τε νεμητικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν.*

For a summary of the Peripatetic teaching *περὶ δικαιοσύνης* see *M.* i. 33.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

oncerning Justice and Injustice. Let us, according to the method hitherto ted, start from the commonly given descriptions of the states in question.
ustice then is commonly described as 'a state which makes us able to perform acts; which makes us act justly and wish what is just.' A corresponding ription is given of injustice. Here the words 'and wish *what is just' are ortant, serving to mark the distinction between a state or habit on the one d and a science or faculty on the other. A science or faculty* (e.g. ἰατρική) *produce either of two contraries, but a state or habit* (*whether physical like*

ἔτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς 1129 a. 3.
μεσότητές εἰσιν. Grant remarks that *πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν*; is a slightly different question from *ποία μεσότης*; and Ramsauer says 'caute dictum *ποία μεσότης*,' because it will be shown v. 5. 17 that *ἡ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τις ἐστίν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν*—*i. e.* *τοῦ ἴσου* between *τὸ πλέον* and *τὸ ἔλαττον*. The doctrine of v. 5. 17, however, relates only to particular justice, no attempt being made, according to Ramsauer, in the Fifth Book, to show that universal justice is a *μεσότης*, whereas in ii. 7. 16 both kinds of justice are contemplated as *μεσότητες*. Hence Ramsauer thinks that the words *πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν* (ii. 7. 16) are spurious. Surely this is a very unsafe line of criticism. If the Fifth Book was not written by the author of the Second Book, the inconsistency noticed by Ramsauer, if inconsistency it be, need not surprise us. If, as Ramsauer is inclined to believe (p. 281), the Fifth Book was written by the author of the Second Book, are the two passages really so inconsistent that to remove the inconsistency we must alter the text? Particular Justice may perhaps be a *μεσότης* in a sense somewhat different from that in which the other *ἀρεταί* coordinate with it are *μεσότητες*: but universal justice, at any rate, being the manifestation in society of all the *ἀρεταί*, is a *μεσότης* just as its constituent elements—*ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη*, &c., are severally *μεσότητες*—*i. e.* it is a *μεσότης περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη*. When we call a man *ἀνδρεῖος* we think of him specially as one who observes moderation in relation to certain particular *πράξεις* and *πάθη*: when we call him *δίκαιος* in the wide sense we think of him as one who observes moderation in relation to all *πράξεις* and *πάθη* generally. This is so obvious that the writer of the Fifth Book does not think it necessary to make any definite statement on the subject: though he comes very near to doing so when he says ch. 2. § 6 *δὲ* (*i. e.* Universal Justice) *περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος*—*i. e.* the *δίκαιος* is related to all his circumstances *ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος*. I am therefore disinclined to follow Grant and Ramsauer in attaching any special significance to *ποία* here. It seems to follow very naturally the *ποίας* of the preceding line, to which no one thinks of attaching any special significance.

§ 2. *κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον*] *i. e.* the method of taking the a. 6.
δοξα or *λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῆς* (cf. § 3 below *ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας . . . βουλομένους λέγειν*), and testing them by their conformity with

[illegible] καὶ [illegible] τοῦ [illegible]. [illegible]

l that in v. 11. § the [illegible]
ference to the fact [illegible]
βούλεται) to be injured. [illegible]
re is no [illegible]
pted term in the two [illegible] passages which [illegible]
y the distinction now before us between a [illegible]
—viz. *E. N.* iv. 7. 12 [illegible]
5. 126 a. 30 [illegible]
τὸ δικαίου [illegible]
[illegible] τῶν σοφιστῶν ἢ [illegible]
[illegible] οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[

1128 a. 8. teach the art of riding: see also *E. N.* v. 9. 16 τοῦ δικαίου οὕτω εἶναι οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἧττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δικαιοῖ· ἐν ἑκάστῳ πράξει τούτων, and Grant's note *ad loc.*—'The opinion that justice implies its contrary as if it were an art (δύναμις) would be a consequence of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to and drew out the paradoxical conclusion, *Rep.* p. 334 a, *Hipp. Min.* pp. 375. 6. The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (ἕξις) set the difficulty at rest.' To this last remark it is necessary to add that Plato, although he has no technical terms in which to express his view, sees as clearly as Aristotle that justice is a state involving the harmony of the whole man, and resulting from life-long intelligent obedience to νόμος. If justice were the dexterity of a single faculty, easily imparted in a few lessons by the Professors of ῥητορική, then μετοικία would be the sovereign science, as these Professors maintain. But πολιτική is the sovereign science, and ῥητορική is ancillary: see *Politicus* 304 C D E, and note on *E. N.* i. 2. 6.

a. 11. § 4.] See *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσίν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἶσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλο. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δ' ἄλογοι μία ἑνί, οἷον τῷ θερμῷ τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας. εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ λόγου ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, τὴν δὲ κοινῶς, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀμφοῖν, ἔστι δ' ὡς τοῖ ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον. ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, εἶναι δὲ τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὑτάς τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὑτάς· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὑτό, τοῦ δὲ συμπτωματικός· ἀποφάσει γὰρ καὶ ἀποδόσει δηλοῖ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἡ γὰρ στέρησις ἡ πρώτη τὸ ἐναντίον, αὕτη δ' ἀποδόσει διέστηκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τοῦ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν θνητικὸν θνητικὸν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω. From this passage it is plain that the δυνάμεις of the present section are αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις, and it is probable that the ἐπιστῆμαι which the writer has more prominently in view are αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, such as ἰατρική, *i. e.* those which are ἀρχαὶ μεταβλητικαὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλο—although, of course, the remark τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή is true of science generally. Thus the ἐπιστήμων or δύναμις μετὰ λόγου—ἰατρική, apprehending the ἄλογος δύναμις—τὸ θερμαντικόν, apprehends also its contrary τὸ ψυκτικόν, and according

as it employs the one or the other will produce θερμότης or ψυχρότης 1129 a.
in the patient—always a definite result from the means taken, since
αἱ ἄλογοι δυνάμεις μία ἑνός. In *Met.* Θ. 2 the contrast is that between
an ἄλογος δύναμις such as τὸ ὑγιεινόν (*i. e.* τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγιείας) and a
δύναμις μετὰ λόγου, such as ἰατρική: in the passage before us (*Eth.* v.
i. 4) the contrast is between a ἕξις, such as ὑγίεια, and a δύναμις μετὰ
λόγου, such as ἰατρική. As the ἄλογος δύναμις—τὸ ὑγιεινόν produces
only ὑγίεια (*Met.*), so the ἕξις—ὑγίεια (*Eth.*) produces only ὑγιεινά
(*i. e.* τὰ σημαντικὰ ὑγιείας—see *Top.* i. 15. 106 b. 35 τὸ ὑγιεινὸν τὸ μὲν
ὑγιείας ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ φυλακτικόν, τὸ δὲ σημαντικόν. Cf. *Met.* Γ. 2.
1003 a. 35, *Met.* K. 3. 1061 a. 6). For the doctrine τῶν ἐναντίων
μία ἐπιστήμη the editors refer to *An. Pr.* 24 a. 21, 48 b. 5, 50 a. 19,
Phys. viii. 1. 251 a. 30, *de An.* 427 b. 5; and Jackson refers also
o Plato, *Phaedo* 97 D, and *Charmides* 166 E. The reason why
ὧν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη is stated in the passage *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b.
–20 quoted above—viz. λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς
μοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν. For στέρησις see *Met.* Δ. 22, and
Top. vi. 9, where rules are given for the definition of τὰ κατὰ
τέρησιν λεγόμενα.

ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 95, note) a. 14.
pports the conjecture of Muretus—ἕξις δ' ἡ αὐτὴ τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ.
n the margin of his copy Muretus found the note of a scribe to the
ect that some MSS. have ἀντί instead of ἐναντία. This suggested
Muretus that an original αὐτή became ἀντί, which in its turn
came ἐναντία. H[a] actually reads ἡ αὐτή.

ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν] Cf. *Top.* i. 15. 106 b. 34 τὸ ὑγιεινῶς ἢ ποιητικῶς a. 16.
φυλακτικῶς ἢ σημαντικῶς ῥηθήσεται.

§ 5. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται . . .] The transition here, a. 17.
ough suggested by the ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι of
, is very abrupt, and even inconsequent. After telling us in
3 and 4 that 'the ἕξις Justice does not result in both δίκαια and
α, but only in the former, herein differing from a δύναμις μετὰ
ου like ἰατρική, which can produce either health or sickness, and,
erally, from an ἐπιστήμη which, if it knows the ἕξις, also knows
στέρησις of the ἕξις,' the writer seems to be suddenly struck by
logical importance of this last point (that the knowledge of the
is the knowledge of its στέρησις) for his present purpose (the
st investigation of δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία), and enlarges on it

[illegible] 5, 6, and 7, dismissing entirely the really important [illegible] doctrine (the difference between ἕξις and δύναμις or ἐπιστήμη) which he has only just raised in §§ 3 and 4. Inconsequent, however, though the transition marked by μὲν οὖν certainly is, we can [illegible] how it might seem a perfectly natural one to a writer whose critical faculty was overweighed by his knowledge of peripatetic doctrine. According to that doctrine ἕξις or 'possession' is [illegible] not only to certain definite ἕκαστα (*i. e.* τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν) which may be safely inferred from it (as in turn it may be inferred from them as symptoms), but also to the στέρησις or 'privation' of that of which as ἕξις it is the 'possession.' True, the relation between ἕξις and [illegible] is something very different from that between ἕξις and [illegible], but the writer of the Fifth Book is not the man to discriminate in such a case. He sees no inconsequence in the remark that 'a ἕξις does not *produce* contraries—but the *knowledge* of a ἕξις is the knowledge of its ἐναντία ἕξις or of its στέρησις.'

The writer's implication, however, in §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8—that the knowledge of δικαιοσύνη is the knowledge of ἀδικία, *and vice versâ*—must be accepted with a reservation. It has only a logical value. Definitions of the two ἕξεις, embodying and rationalising popular opinion, may indeed be arrived at by one enquiry. We may save ourselves the trouble of making two enquiries. But it is only the just man, as such, who really *knows* what Justice is. The dialectician, qua such, can only rationalise the popular ἐπολήψεις περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου, as he may equally well rationalise the ἐπολήψεις περὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ. As the just man, however, is not ideally just, but has to struggle with the forces of evil, he will also know ἀδικία, and he will know it in its essence, because the essence of ἀδικία is that it opposes itself to δικαιοσύνη. The just man knows ἀδικία essentially because he knows it for what it really is—as the ἐναντία of δικαιοσύνη. But it is not conversely true that the knowledge of ἀδικία which the ἄδικος possesses is also the knowledge of δικαιοσύνη. He sees in δικαιοσύνη only the enemy of ἀδικία: but this is to see only an accident of δικαιοσύνη, which is essentially καλλίστη—a beautiful organising principle—καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος οὔθ' ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός. The ἄδικος in short knows the *sanction* of the just law—the punishment which it inflicts, but not the just law *itself*, as such: see Plato, *Rep.* iii. 409 D, E πανηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τε καὶ αὐτὴν οὕτος ἂν γνοίη, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ πανηρίας ἐπιστήμη λήψεται.

τῶν ὑποκειμένων] Fritzsche quotes *Met.* A. 2. 982 a. 23 ὁ τὴν 1129 a. 19.
καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχων οἶδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα, where τὰ ὑποκείμενα are the particular cases or facts which fall under the general rule or principle. In his note on the passage, Bonitz, while showing how the term naturally lends itself to this sense (the extension of the logical subject—τὸ ὑποκείμενον is *narrower* than that of the predicate), remarks that it is a sense which it does not bear elsewhere (*i. e.* than in *Met.* A. 2), so far as he knows, in Aristotle's writings. Nor is it easy to see how here (*E. N.* v. 1. 5) it can mean merely particular cases or symptoms—τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως, for ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν plainly takes up ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, and τὸ εὐεκτικόν is immediately afterwards explained as τὸ ποιητικόν. Peters translates—'A habit is often known by the opposite habit, and often by its *causes and results*'; and Jackson says: 'τὰ ὑποκείμενα include not merely manifestations and symptoms of the ἕξις in question, but also its causes and conditions. In fact the ὑποκείμενα of ὑγίεια (to take a particular example) are τὰ ὑγιεινά in the various kindred senses of φυλακτικά, ποιητικά, σημαντικά, and δεκτικὰ ὑγιείας. For these senses of ὑγιεινά cf. *Met.* iii. 2. p. 1003 a. 34, x. 3. p. 1061 a. 5, *Top.* i. 15. p. 106, b. 35.' I am inclined to think that if the writer had intended to use ὑποκείμενα here for εὐεκτικά in this very wide sense of the latter term, he would not immediately have added καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικόν κ.τ.λ. I prefer to understand τὰ ὑποκείμενα as the *material conditions* of εὐεξία (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως of *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34–200 b. 8, τὸ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ of *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 12, τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης of *Phys.* ii. 9. 200 a. 31)—the *necessary* food, &c., used as means or material (τὸ ποιητικὸν εὐεξίας) by the γυμναστής or trainer who is the efficient cause of εὐεξία: cf. *Pol.* Δ. 1. 1238 b. 25 τὴν κρατίστην τε ἁπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν. Fritzsche (whom Grant follows) is supported in his (I think, erroneous) view of the meaning of ὑποκείμενα here by Mich. Eph. who has—γνωρίζεται ἡ ἕξις . . . ἤδη ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὴν ἑκτῶν, καὶ τὰ ἑκτὰ ἐκ τῆς ἕξεως. The Paraph. Heliodorus, however, is right—γινώσκονται δὲ αἱ ἕξεις καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἑκτῶν· ἕξις μὲν γὰρ φέρε εἰπεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια, ἑκτὸν δὲ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ὃ πρὸς ὑγίειαν φέρει· εἰ γὰρ γινώσκομεν ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκὶ γινώσκομεν εὐεξίαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν σαρκὶ πυκνότητα. The Paraph., it will be observed, is guilty of a little confusion here in his use of the terms ὑγίεια and εὐεξία: see *Top.* v. 7. 137 a. 3, quoted by Zell, ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως

[illegible] καὶ τὸ πλεονάκις πρὸς τὸ τοῦ [illegible] ἴσον πλεονάκις [illegible] εἶναι εἰκότως, εἰ τὸ ἴσον [illegible]

[illegible] Bekker [illegible] 1101 b. 22 where [illegible]

[illegible] Bekker [illegible] 1101 b. 21 ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ [illegible] δάτερον πλεονεξία λέγεται [illegible] πλεονεξία; λέγεται κατὰ τε τὸν ψυχὴν [illegible] πλεονεξία; λέγεται κατὰ τε ψυχὴν [illegible]

[illegible] there are exceptions to the above rule: [illegible] διανομὴ φαλεῖ τὸ μετὰ [illegible] other—i.e. φαλεῖ is used [illegible] but μετεῖ the ἕτερον is not.

[illegible] This is the reading of H[a] M[b] [illegible] But K[b] P[b] Camb [illegible] followed by Jackson [illegible] ἀδικεῖ: i.e. we have τὸ [illegible] τὸ δικαίου and ἡ δικαιοσύνη are [illegible] is absent from L[b] I [illegible] K[b] P[b] Camb which [illegible] frequency with which [illegible] ἡ δικαιοσύνη [illegible] MSS appear [illegible] ἀδικεῖ [illegible]

[illegible] αὐτῶν λαμβάνει [illegible] being = [illegible] [illegible] use of the same [illegible] [illegible] thing but the [illegible] [illegible] See [illegible]

ι ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος 1129 a. 27.
κ . . . συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός.
Top. i. 15. 107 a. 3 Aristotle illustrates the equivocal uses of the
ι ἀγαθόν under various Categories, and remarks that a term
:h is applied to several objects, each of which belongs to a
:rent Category, is employed equivocally, *i.e.* with a different
ning in each Category—σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν κατὰ τοὔνομα
γοριῶν, εἰ ταὐτά ἐστιν ἐπὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι ὁμώνυ-
τὸ λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἐδέσματι μὲν τὸ ποιητικὸν ἡδονῆς, ἐν
κῇ δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγιείας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ποιὰν εἶναι, οἷον
ρανα ἢ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δικαίαν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ
τοτέ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ ἀγαθόν· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ λέγεται τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ·
ιάκις δὲ τὸ ποσόν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ μετρίου· λέγεται γὰρ τὸ μέτριον ἀγαθόν.
ι ὁμώνυμον τὸ ἀγαθόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ σώματος μὲν
ια, ἐπὶ δὲ φωνῆς τὸ εὐήκοον· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀξύ· οὐ γὰρ
ύτως ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεται· φωνὴ μὲν γὰρ ὀξεῖα ἡ ταχεῖα,
ἅπερ φασὶν οἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἁρμονικοί, γωνία δ' ὀξεῖα ἡ ἐλάσσων
ς, μάχαιρα δὲ ἡ ὀξυγώνιος. The Categories are thus an important
rument in the hands of the Dialectician when engaged with the
ond of the four processes mentioned in *Top.* i. 13. 105 a. 21 as
stituting the dialectical method—τὰ δὲ ὄργανα δι' ὧν εὐπορήσομεν
συλλογισμῶν ἐστὶ τέτταρα, ἓν μὲν τὸ προτάσεις λαβεῖν, δεύτερον δὲ
αχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται δύνασθαι διελεῖν, τρίτον τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν,
ρτον δ' ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις. In connexion with this practical
ployment in dialectic of the Categories as means of distinguish-
τὰ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα, it may be noted as not without significance
the Treatise on the Categories itself (whether written by
totle or not matters little) begins with the words ὁμώνυμα
ται.
'ith διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν Jackson compares *Phys.*
ι. 249 a. 23 εἰσί τε τῶν ὁμωνυμιῶν αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσαι, αἱ δὲ
ταί τινα ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δ' ἐγγὺς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν
υμίαι εἶναι οὖσαι.

ἀ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ a. 28.
τὰ τὴν ἰδέαν)] It is not where the ὁμώνυμα are particulars plainly
ιguished by their 'outward appearance' (Peters), *e.g.* Collar-
: and Key, that ὁμωνυμία is dangerous. It is when we are
ng with abstractions or general notions that it is likely to
ρε our notice and lead us into error: see *An. Post.* ii. 13.

1129 a. 28. 97 b. 30 *αἱ ὁμωνυμίαι λανθάνουσι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις.* Undetected *ὁμωνυμία* prevents the discovery of truth by causing us to connect together notions or facts which have nothing or little in common. From the comparison of such notions or facts no scientific results can be obtained, since scientific discovery requires the comparison of things which are similar (*ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις*), their similarity, as science understands similarity, being that which strikes us after we have carefully noted their differences (*τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν*): while it is impossible to note their differences till we have cleared the ground by dissolving any false associations due to *ὁμωνυμία* which may exist in our minds (*ποιηταὶ ἕκαστον λέγεται διελεῖν*): see *Top.* i. 13. 105 a. 21 quoted above. Ὁμώνυμα, in short, as such, are not comparable for scientific purposes: but *τὸ συνώνυμον πᾶν συμβλητόν Top.* i. 15. 107 b. 17.

δήλη μᾶλλον] 'Comparatively plain.' Grant. Cf. *De Gen. et Cor.* 321 b. 30 *ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἑτέρα οὖσα δήλη μᾶλλον τοῖ εἴδει ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐπὶ σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν.* Spengel suggests (wrongly) *μᾶλλον δήλη* (*Arist. Studien Nic. Eth.* i. p. 207) for *δήλη μᾶλλον*—'Das letzte Wort (*μᾶλλον*) gehört nicht zu *δήλη*, sondern zu *πόρρω*, so viel als *πορρωτέρω*. Seine jetzige Stellung ist kaum zu rechtfertigen, vielleicht genügt es *ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω μᾶλλον δήλη* zu setzen.'

a. 30. κλείς] Zell and others quote Plutarch, *Reg. et imp. apophthegmata* 9 *τῆς δὲ κλειδὸς αὐτῷ* (Philip) *κατεαγείσης ἐν πολέμῳ, καὶ τοῦ θεραπεύοντος ἰατροῦ πάντως τι καθ' ἡμέραν αἰτοῦντος, Λάμβανε, ἔφη, ὅσα βούλει· τὴν γὰρ κλεῖν ἔχεις.*

When *ἡ καθόλου δικαιοσύνη* and *ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη* are here said to be *ὁμώνυμα*, it is obvious that the term is not to be taken in the strict sense of *ὧν τὸ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν* (*Cat.* i. 1 a. 1), *i. e.* of *τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα ἃ ἐστι τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης* (Alexander Aph. *Met.* p. 197, line 12, ed. Bonitz); for, as Mich. Eph. says in his note on the present passage—*τῶν δικαιοσυνῶν . . . ἡ μὲν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ γένος δικαιοσύνη κατὰ πάσης ἀρετῆς, ἡ δὲ ὥσπερ ταύτης εἶδος. ὥστε ὡς μὲν γένος καὶ εἶδος συνώνυμα ἔσονται· ἐπιδέχονται γὰρ τὰ εἴδη τὸν τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμόν.* Below (v. 2. 6. on which see note) they are actually called *συνώνυμα*. In fact, the two kinds of *δικαιοσύνη* (or of *ἀδικία*) are said to be *ὁμώνυμα* with as much or as little right as the things called *ἀγαθὰ* are said in *Top.* i. 15. 107 a. 3–17 to be *ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα*. The statement made 107 a. 11 *ὥστε ὁμώνυμον τὸ ἀγαθόν* certainly cannot be reconciled with *E. N.* i. 6. 12. 1096 b. 27 *οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε* (*sc.* τὸ

αθόν) τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις, unless we allow a latitude in 1129 a. 30.
e use of the term ὁμώνυμα which the definition in *Cat.* 1. 1 a. 1
oes not prepare us for. The ὁμώνυμα of that definition are merely
ι ἀπὸ τύχης, whereas the kinds of justice (like the various ἀγαθά)
re only called ὁμώνυμα by an exaggeration, perhaps justified by the
ircumstance that the points in which they differ are very apt to
e overlooked. In strict Aristotelian language they are neither
ώνυμα nor yet συνώνυμα, but τὰ πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα—see *Met.* Z. 4.
030 b. 2 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὔτε
υνώνυμως οὔτε καθ' ἓν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕν—on which Alexander (p. 441.
3. ed. Bonitz) has οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἰατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ σκεῦος οὔτε ὁμωνύμως
ήγεται οὔτε καθ' ἓν καὶ συνωνύμως [cf. Alex. *Met.* p. 199. 20 καθ' ἓν
ν λεγόμενα λέγει τὰ συνώνυμα καὶ ὑφ' ἕν τι κοινὸν τεταγμένα γένος], ἀλλὰ
ὸς ἕν, ἤγουν ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἑνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἕν—*e.g.* a drug, a bandage,
nd a lancet are all called ἰατρικά because they are ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς,
epend upon, are prescribed by, or used by medical science: exer-
se, fresh air, and food are all called ὑγιεινά because they are πρὸς
ν ὑγίειαν, have Health in view as their end: see Alex. *Met.* 197.
τὰ δὲ ἀφ' ἑνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα οὔτε τὴν τῶν συνωνύμων ἰσοτιμίαν
ὸς τὸ κατηγορούμενον σώζει πρὸς ἄλληλα, οὔτε πάλιν ἔχει τὴν τῶν ὁμω-
ιων ἄκρατόν τε καὶ ἄμικτον ἑτερότητα, ἀλλ' ἔστι τις αὐτοῖς κοινωνία κατὰ
εἶναι ταῦτα ἃ λέγεται τῷ εἶναί τινα φύσιν ἐκείνου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ
ἣν ἐν τούτοις πως ἐνορᾶσθαι πᾶσιν, ἀφ' οὗ ὄντα ἢ πρὸς ὃ λόγον ἔχοντά
ι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος κεκοινώνηκεν αὐτοῦ . . . οὐ μόνον ὀνόματος
οινώνηκε τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡς τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα
ύμενα ἅ ἐστι τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰτίαν τινὰ ἔχει τοῦ ὁμοίως ἀλλήλοις
μάσθαι.

Thus ἡ ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζῴων and ἡ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν are both
led κλείς and are ὁμώνυμα: horse and ox are both called ζῷον and
συνώνυμα or καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα: a bandage and a drug are both
led ἰατρικά, and are ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα. It is under this
rd head, then, that the two kinds of justice really fall. Ὁ ἴσος,
fair man, and ὁ νόμιμος, the man who has all the social ἀρεταί,
both called δίκαιοι, because the moral quality or complex of
alities characterised in each case is ἀφ' ἑνός, *i.e.* ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς
is produced by the chief science; and is an instrument in its
nds πρὸς ἕν, *i.e.* πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Similarly Eudemus and the
iter of *M. M.* describe the kinds of φιλία as πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα—
E. H. 2. 1236 a. 16 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ'
ἁπάσας μηδ' ὡς εἴδη ἑνὸς γένους, μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως· πρὸς

1129 b. 2. 1072 b. 12). This false theory of life, then, the πλεονέκτης puts into practice, making the accumulation of these external good things, which are only *means* to the noble life, his end. He pursues τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά without considering whether they are or are not, as possessed by him, conducive to his own true welfare (αὐτῷ ἀγαθά)—*i. e.* conducive to the ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν. Of all the forms of vice, his is the most *unprincipled*—involves the most systematic neglect of the ideal, and is the most degrading to the moral character, inasmuch as it is the abuse of those external good things which are materially necessary to the practice not only of justice but of all the other social virtues. Mich. Eph. has the following note here—εἰπὼν τὸν πλεονέκτην ἄδικον εἶναι περὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, λέγει μὴ περὶ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεονέκτην εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος ἰατρικώτερος ἢ ῥητορικώτερος σπεύδει γενέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ μουσικοῦ μουσικώτερος καὶ τὸ πλέον τούτων ἐν τούτοις ἔχειν· ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεονεκτεῖ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς καὶ τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει ἀγαθά, τοῖς φαύλοις δὲ καὶ μοχθηροῖς οὐκ ἀγαθά. εἰσὶ δὲ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ὑγίεια πλοῦτος κάλλος εὐγένεια ἀρχὴ ἐξουσία, ἃ τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τοῖς φαύλοις κακά ἐστι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν αἶσχος νόσος πενία.

b. 5. **ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαι μὲν . . . αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά**] A man, while choosing poverty and obscurity if these conduce to his true welfare,—the performance of duty,—ought to aspire to a life in which that welfare is more brilliantly realised through the proper use of wealth and social advantages.

Πλεονεξία then is related only to τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά. There is no room for it, according to the Aristotelian doctrine, where the ἀρεταί are concerned. The μεγαλόψυχος in asserting a victorious personality before his contemporaries is not a πλεονέκτης, although ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ πλέον νέμων. We are tempted to ask, if not Aristotle, at least ourselves, the question—Is this self-centred culture which must have wealth and leisure, and must, on pain of losing its beautiful balance, shut its eyes to the surrounding misery and squalor, not a refined form of πλεονεξία after all? Or perhaps the more pressing question is that concerning 'the modern man,' in the notion of whose personality we include industrial and commercial success—distinguished by Aristotle as merely ἀναγκαῖον (or even βίαιον) from the καλόν, or life of culture, which constitutes the true personality of his citizen—If culture is perhaps πλεονεξία, what shall we say of the personality which

nstituted by the consciousness of success in commercial and 1129 b. 5.
strial competition, and by the influence which attends such
ess? But the question is a far wider one than at first sight
ars. It is the law not only of human society, but of the
al world, that the strong take to themselves the lion's share,
have become strong by doing so. Are we or are we not to
Types distinguished from their fellows by strength and beauty?
practically to this final issue that the question is pushed in
remarkable passage quoted from the *Gorgias*—483 B, C, D—
f note on v. 1. 8.

D.] Cf. *E. N.* v. 3. 15, 16. b. 6.

L.] After κοινόν all MSS. apparently except K^b and CCC b. 11.
(with certain variations) the words καὶ παράνομος· τοῦτο γὰρ
ανομία ἤτοι ἡ ἀνισότης] περιέχει πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν καὶ κοινόν ἐστι πάσης
. CCC, however, has these words on the margin, in the hand
ently of the original scribe.

2. πως δίκαια] πως is added because all enactments are not b. 12.
the sense of aiming at the maintenance of ἰσότης. Many of
have no reference to the requirements of Particular Justice:
re just *in a certain sense—i. e.* they are just in the wide and
sense, not in the narrow and technical sense. See Mich.
—πρόσκειται δὲ τό πως δίκαιον, ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίως λεγομένην
ύνην πάντα τὰ νόμιμα δίκαια, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς. Πως = κατὰ
ινῶς λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην is further explained by the words
follow in § 13, b. 17 ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ., where the
answered by ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην in
r 2, § 1: but see below, note on § 13, b. 17.

3. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων] 'The view given here b. 14.
,' says Grant, 'which is expressed still more strongly below,
, § 1, is quite different from modern views. Law is here
ented as a positive system (though the instances quoted of
mulæ are all negative, μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν, &c.), aiming at the
tion of the whole of life, sometimes, however, with a bias
s-interests, and sometimes only roughly executed (ἀπεσχεδιασ-
This educational and dogmatic character of the law was
exemplified to the greatest extent in the Spartan institu-
Athens rather prided herself (according to the wise remarks
Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles) on leaving

1129 b. 14. greater liberty to the individual. But Plato and Aristotle both made the mistake of wishing for an entire state-control over individual life.' Cf. *E. N.* x. 9. 9 οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον. It must be remembered, however, in connexion with the statement οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων, that νόμος has a much wider meaning than *law*, and includes also all that we understand by *custom* as sanctioned by public opinion. However *desirable* Aristotle may have considered the extension of the sphere of law in the strict sense of the term, he could not have affirmed with any show of truth that 'the laws, *as a matter of fact*, have something to say about all that we do'—although it would be true to affirm that 'custom (whether sanctioned by law or by public opinion) has.' How largely the idea of *custom* enters into the connotation of νόμος may be seen from the statement *E. N.* v. 11. 1 ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει ὁ νόμος, ἀπαγορεύει, which is not true if νόμος be translated by *law*, but strictly true if it be understood generally as *custom*: *e. g.* custom or fashion does not tell Oxford undergraduates to go down to the River in academical dress; it therefore forbids them to do so. Nor do the Statutes of the University tell them; but the Statutes do not therefore forbid them. The Statutes are neutral in this matter, as in many other matters in which fashion takes a side. But see note on v. 11. 1, discussing Jackson's opinion.

b. 15. στοχαζόμενοι . . . τρόπον τοιοῦτον] As Rassow points out (*Forsch.* p. 76) the reference here is to the distinction between ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι in which the rulers rule for the good of all (τὸ συμφέρον πᾶσι) and παρεκβάσεις in which they rule for their own advantage (τὸ συμφέρον τοῖς κυρίοις); see *Pol.* iii. 6. 1276 a. 17 φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν αὗται μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον . . . iii. 7. 1279 a. 28 ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις: and cf. *E. N.* viii. 10.

Spengel (p. 207), supposing that the reference is to Democracy (πᾶσι), Aristocracy (τοῖς ἀρίστοις or τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετήν), and Oligarchy or Monarchy (τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον), proposes to omit ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις or κατ' ἀρετὴν ἤ, on the ground that

ίστοις = τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετήν. Rassow prefers the omission 1129 b. 15.
: words ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις, and Jackson and Susemihl bracket
Bywater, on the other hand, brackets the words κατ' ἀρετήν,
are omitted by K^b and CCC. I venture to think that their
ion by K^b is a blunder. Bekker, followed bySusemihl, places
ıma after κυρίοις, and Rassow says 'κυρίοις mit κατ' ἀρετήν zu
ıden verbietet der Sprachgebrauch, und Bekker ist voll-
ıen in seinem Rechte, wenn er vor κατ' ἀρετήν ein Komma
But why should κατ' ἀρετήν not relate to τοῖς κυρίοις, or
to τοῖς ἀρίστοις? See *Pol.* Δ. 5. 1293 b. 3 τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν
ν ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν
μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν. It seems to me to
: safer course to leave the text as it stands (either with κατ'
or with ἢ κατ' ἀρετήν) in all MSS. except K^b and CCC,
; τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον πᾶσι to refer to the end of the ὀρθαὶ
ίαι, and τὸ συμφέρον τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ
λλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον to refer to the ends of the παρεκβάσεις:
ρίστοις, of course, not being the ἄριστοι ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετήν of
Δ. 5, but the ἄριστοι πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν = τοῖς
κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον, where the words
ρετήν must be understood to refer to the standard of high
and military excellence, and the words κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον
ον to the other grounds—especially wealth—on the strength
ıich men claim to rule. The word τοιοῦτον seems to show
he writer thought of πολιτικὴ δύναμις and πλοῦτος rather than
υθερία (see *Pol.* Δ. 6. 1294 a. 10 ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν ὄρος ἀρετή,
χίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δὲ ἐλευθερία: cf. *E. N.* v. 3. 7)—*i.e.* of
ıy and of better and worse oligarchies, rather than of
cracy, in which last the κοινῇ συμφέρον appears at least to
ore regarded. I cannot, however, agree with those (*e.g.*
elet and Spengel) who make the writer refer in the words
νῇ συμφέρον πᾶσι to the end of democracy. The antithesis
en πᾶσι and τοῖς κυρίοις κατὰ κ.τ.λ. is so sharply pointed that
ıust believe the writer to have in his mind the distinction
en ὀρθαὶ πολιτείαι and παρεκβάσεις.

τε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ.] As I have said, these words explain b. 17
ος δίκαια = κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην δίκαια of the last
being answered by Δ. 2. § 1. 1129 a. 14. Jackson,
ver, opposes ἕνα μὲν τρόπον κτλ. πρωτότερον δέ (§ 14, 11

1129 b. 17. 19) and compares ch. 2, §§ 10, 11. 1130 b. 22 σχεδόν... τὸ κοινόν—'where νόμιμα, which promote virtue through education, are distinguished from νόμιμα which enforce the different virtues.' I think that the broad distinction in v. 2. 10, 11 is rather between τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα[1], and τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς—between the acts which proceed from, and the agencies which produce, virtue. These agencies are chiefly educational: but it is not, I take it, the writer's object to make a point of distinguishing between 'the indirect encouragement of the particular virtues by means of educational enactments' and their 'direct encouragement' (Jackson, p. 74) by means of commands and prohibitions, however important the distinction in itself may be; he merely wishes to show that both τὰ πραττόμενα (whether performed in consequence of the agent's *possession* of ὅλη ἀρετή, or merely in external conformity with its requirements—for ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς admits of both meanings: cf. τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς as a description of τὰ ἰατρικὰ ὄργανα) and τὰ ποιητικά (which are *chiefly* educational enactments) *are called* νόμιμα, and thus to exhibit the extent of the denotation of the term νόμιμα. Similarly in the passage before us (v. 1. 13, 14), I think that the words προστάττει δὲ κ.τ.λ., instead of containing a statement *contrasted* with that introduced by the words ἕνα μὲν τρόπον, merely go into the details suggested by the words καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. The μόρια τῆς εὐδαιμονίας (in Eudemian phraseology nearly = τὰ μόρια τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς, see *E. N.* vi. 12. 5) are the separate ἀρεταί enumerated in § 14, which are implanted by education (lasting throughout the whole lifetime of the citizen, see *E. N.* x. 9. 9) and enforced by law. In its educational, as well as in its strictly legal capacity, νόμος may be said προστάττειν τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν . . . καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος κ.τ.λ. Cf. *E. N.* ii. 6. 7 οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει—where the ἀλείπτης stands to the physique in the same relation in which νόμος in its *educational* capacity stands to the

[1] Instead of πραττόμενα corr. K^b, P^b, Ald., NC, CCC, B^1,^3 and Γ read προσταττόμενα, adopted by Bywater, and apparently preferred by Susemihl (see Susem. *E. N. addend. et corr.* p. 246), who would substitute ὑπὸ (the reading of CCC) for ἀπό 1130 b. 22. Although the MS. authority seems on the whole to be against προσταττόμενα, that would not settle the matter between two such easily confounded words as πραττόμενα and προσταττόμενα. But internal evidence seems to me to be strongly in favour of τὰ πραττόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς as contrasted with τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

acter: [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 1193 [illegible]
[illegible] DOC [illegible]
[illegible] ἔστι δὴ [illegible]
[illegible] ἡ δικαιοσύνη [illegible]
[illegible] κατὰ νόμον [illegible]
[illegible] δικαιοσύνη [illegible]
[illegible] καὶ περὶ ταῦτα [illegible]
[illegible] τούνομα ζητοῦμεν. [illegible]
[illegible]age before [illegible]
[illegible] κτλ. of [illegible]

[illegible] αὐτῆς. Cf. R[illegible]

See Fritzsche's note here in [illegible]
offences mentioned [illegible] Wrongs of [illegible]
Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 6c [illegible]
[illegible].

[illegible]λ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον [illegible]
[illegible]age parallel to this, goes [illegible] of his way [illegible]
[illegible]οσύνη from ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη [illegible]
[illegible]nner. His words are (i. 33. 1193 [illegible]
[illegible].e. τὰ νόμιμα generally) ἔστιν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὅστις δίκαιον εἶναι ὁ
[illegible]ν καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐστι τοιοῦτος)·
[illegible]αιον τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον ἄλλο τοῦ εἰρημένου κατὰ νόμον δικαίου ἐστίν
[illegible]ν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον δικαίοις οὖσιν καθ' αὑτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον· τοῦτο
[illegible]ητοῦμεν δίκαιον καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν περὶ ταῦτα. Here he
[illegible]he temperate man may, *quâ* temperate man, be virtuous
[illegible] as well as πρὸς ἕτερον, whereas the fair man cannot, *quâ*
[illegible]tuous καθ' ἑαυτόν, but is necessarily conceived as standing
[illegible]n πρὸς ἕτερον. It is true, perhaps, that a man's temperance
[illegible]erance *concerns* himself, at least immediately, more than
[illegible]s other people; whereas his fairness or unfairness refers
[illegible]ly and essentially to the interests of other people, *i.e.*
[illegible] conceived without reference to these interests: this,

1129 b. 26. however, is not what the writer of the present passage (*E.N.* v. 1. 15) is thinking of; but of ὅλη δικαιοσύνη as distinguished from the co-extensive ὅλη ἀρετή by being πρὸς ἕτερον (see § 20 of this chapter, and note). 'This Justice, then,' he says, 'is perfect excellence—perfect excellence, however, viewed not as a simple possession, but as putting its possessor in a certain relation to others.' I think that this statement (as well as that in § 20) is best explained by reference to the fact that the Aristotelian logic assigns ἕξις not only to the category of ποιότης (*Cat.* 8), but also to that of πρός τι (*Cat.* 7). As ἐπιστήμη is at once a *quality* of the ἐπιστήμων and a *relation* in which he stands to the ἐπιστητά, so τελεία ἀρετή is at once a *quality* of the νόμιμος and a *relation* in which he stands to the social environment which requires that quality. So, the colour of a flower is at once that which is simply red or blue, and that which attracts the bees.

The distinction, however, here drawn between τελεία ἀρετὴ ἁπλῶς and τελεία ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον = δικαιοσύνη, is merely a logical one, and we must not think of the *man* who has δικαιοσύνη as distinguished from the *man* who has τελεία ἀρετή. Τελεία ἀρετή, because τελεία, *i. e.* because it is the perfect organisation of all the special ἀρεταί, will maintain its possessor in active relations with the social environment in correspondence with which its development has been perfected: there cannot, in short, be τελεία ἀρετή without ἡ τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις. But the man whose ἀρετή is ἁπλῆς, *i. e.* the man in whom certain 'virtues' exist separately without having been organised in correspondence with the social environment as one great whole, will make a merely private and personal use of his 'virtues'—*e. g.* he will perform acts of 'courage' only when his own personal interests are concerned—when his amour *propre* is wounded—when he is angry—when he is afraid; he will be 'fair' to his friends, but unfair to strangers: 'temperate' so long as he is among his neighbours and acquaintances,—in short, he is one of those who ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν—'he can use his virtue, such as it is, in a narrow domestic way, but not as a citizen widely related to fellow citizens.'

With the τελεία ἀρετή of the present section compare the καλοκαγαθία of *E. E.* Θ. 3. 1248 b. 8–1249 a. 16, which is described as ἀρετὴ τέλειος, and distinguished from the ἕξις πολιτική of the Laconians and others who choose the ἀρεταί and the ἔργα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς not

καλοῦ ἕνεκα, but for the sake of τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ—τιμή, πλοῦτος, τοιαῦτα [illegible] b. 28.
ἀρεταί, εὐτυχίαι, δυνάμεις. Such are ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες . . . καὶ [illegible]
δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν.

καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος κ.τ.λ.] Zell and Fritzsche quote *Eur.* [illegible] b. 29.

οἷος δ' ἀστὴρ εἶσι μετ' ἄστρασι νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ
Ἕσπερος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν οὐρανῷ ἵσταται ἀστήρ.

The comparison is assigned to Euripides by the New College Oxon. Scholiast Cod. 240 (see Bywater, *Hermes* v. 356 καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος· τοῦτο ἐξ Εὐριπίδου σοφῶς (sic) Μελανίππης λέγει γὰρ ὁ αὐτῆ δικαιοσύνας δὲ χρύσεον πρόσωπον. Cf. Porphyrius, *Epist.* i. 6 vol. i. p. 5, ed. Kirchhoff) ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης πρόσωπον καὶ οὔτε ἕσπερος οὔτε ἕωος οὕτω καλά: cf. *Epist.* vi. 6 vol. ii. p. 67, Kirchhoff) δικαιοσύνη . . . ἧς ὡς ἀληθῶς καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ οὔτε ἕσπερος . . .

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔστι· ἀρετή 'στο is the reading b. 29.
of Γ Mb Ald. Heliod. adopted by Bergk (*Poet. Lyr.* p. 360, 390). The authorship of the line is very doubtful: see New College Oxon. Schol. (Bywater, *Hermes* v. 356) καὶ παραμυθίαν φασὶ (originally φαμὲν) τοῦτο Θεόγνιδος· εἴρηται δὲ αὐτῶν βούλεται δ' εἰσιδέσθαι λόγοις σὺν χρήμασιν οἰκεῖν ἢ πλούτειν ἄδικον χρήματα κτησάμενος ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετή. χώραν μόνον παραμυθίας ἐπέχει καὶ ἔμοιγε αὐτῆς ὡς παροιμίας Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἠθῶν (originally ἔθους), ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἠθικῶν ὡς Φωκυλίδης αὐτὸ μέμνται. καὶ ἴσως καὶ Φωκυλίδης αὐτῷ ἐχρήσατο. Iamblichus (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. i. p. 193, 4, ed. Meineke) refers to it as 'an old saying'—Ἰαμβλίχου τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τῆς πρὸς Ἀνατόλιον περὶ δικαιοσύνης· ἐπ' αὐτῷ δή τοι τῶν ἀρετῶν τέλος καὶ τὴν συναγωγὴν αὐτῶν συμπασῶν, ἐν ᾗ δὴ πᾶσαι εἰσὶ συλλήβδην κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον, γένοιτο ἄν τις εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀγόμενος.

καὶ τελεία μάλιστα . . . ἀδυνατοῦσιν] These words have given the b. 30.
critics much trouble. The difficulty is thus stated by Jackson (pp. 69, 70)—'From the opening words of this §, as well as from the argument generally, it is clear that the phrase πρὸς ἕτερον does not explain τελεία, but differentiates δικαιοσύνη from τελεία ἀρετή. This being so, it follows that the words ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσίς ἐστιν do not justify the statement καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, and that the words ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ. do not justify the statement τελεία δ' ἀρετή.' Jackson proposes to remove the difficulty by transposing

1129 b. 30. the words καὶ τελεία μάλιστα and τελεία δ' ἐστίν. Other critics make other suggestions (see Susemihl, *app. crit. ad loc.* for an exhaustive list of their views). I believe that Ueberweg's simple suggestion—the insertion of τελεία after χρῆσίς ἐστιν—which had occurred to me independently, is the best solution of the difficulty. If we make this insertion the meaning of the passage will be—'Justice is perfect excellence in the highest sense of the word "perfect" (τελεία μάλιστα), because it is the perfect employment (χρῆσις τελεία) of perfect excellence, *i. e.* its employment not merely in one's own affairs but towards one's neighbour.' The clause ὅτι ὁ ἔχων κ.τ.λ. explains τελεία δ' ἐστὶ (*sc.* χρῆσις).

b. 31. χρῆσις] 'The phrase ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσίς ἐστιν [*sc.* ἡ δικαιοσύνη],' says Jackson (p. 70), 'is strange, since χρῆσις is almost equivalent to ἐνέργεια (*Berlin Index*, s. v.), and a ἕξις can scarcely be identified with an ἐνέργεια; but cf. 2, § 10 quoted above. Apparently in this place δικαιοσύνη is the practice of the virtue, not the virtue itself. Aristotle would not have expressed himself so loosely.' The expression is certainly loose; but we ought not to go the length of supposing that 'in this place δικαιοσύνη is the practice of the virtue, not the virtue itself,'—for the writer immediately adds words which show that he is thinking of δικαιοσύνη as a ἕξις—ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι.

1130 a. 1. § 16. ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει] This—the reading of K^b—may be accepted as most probably correct. Susemihl prefers ἀρχὰ τὸν ἄνδρα δείξει. Zell quotes after Muretus *e proverbiis Graecis*—ἀρχὴ τὸν ἄνδρα δείκνυσι, ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιεικῶν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ ἀρχῇ βιαίων γενομένων.

a. 2. ἤδη] 'because the officer is *ex hypothesi* in relation to others and a member of a community,' Jackson.

a. 3. § 17. ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν] The editors quote Plato, *Rep.* 343 C ... ἀγνοεῖς (says Thrasymachus) ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ξυμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον. Cf. *Gorgias* 483, and *E. N.* v. 6. 6 and 7.

Ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν ἡ δικαιοσύνη expresses, in the portable form of an epigram or proverb, that view of life which is worked out on a larger scale in the various systems of 'ethical atomism' with which the student of the History of Philosophy is familiar. That view

1130 a. 4. κοινωνῷ says—'The alteration (Michelet's) is unnecessary. The words ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ may be paraphrased: "either that of the governing class in the case of a παρεκβεβηκυῖα πολιτεία, or that of his fellow citizens in the case of a πολιτεία ὀρθή."' Thus both Michelet and Jackson agree in recognising a reference to the distinction between those states in which the governors rule for the public good, and those in which they rule for their own private advantage. But is it likely that this Aristotelian distinction is referred to in a clause which states the ground on which (γάρ) some have maintained the very unaristotelian doctrine that justice is ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν? It seems better to take the words to mean simply that the just man does what is to the advantage of another, that other being either his ruler (ἄρχοντι) or his neighbour (κοινωνῷ). In obeying the definite commands of his ruler he benefits his ruler; in dealing honestly with his neighbour he benefits his neighbour: but in neither case benefits himself. Further, the distinction between the παρεκβεβηκυῖα πολιτεία and the ὀρθὴ πολιτεία turns on a difference in the conduct of the ἄρχοντες: but the subject of πράττει is the ἀρχόμενος, or the justice of the ἀρχόμενος.

Reference to the distinction between the παρεκβεβηκυῖαι πολιτεῖαι and the ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι being thus excluded, we may decide in favour of the reading κοινωνῷ. The reading κοινῷ, originally due to a clerical slip, would maintain itself because it seemed to refer more pointedly than κοινωνῷ to this distinction which was not seen to be out of place in the context.

a. 6. § 18. ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους] Jackson says, 'The first καί means "even," *i. e.* "not merely towards his neighbour but"; not "both," because friends are looked upon as part of the man himself (ix. 4. 5) and therefore cannot be identified with the ἕτερος.' Rassow also (*Forsch.* p. 61), in answer to Nötel who would (with NC) omit the first καί and (with M^b) the second πρός, says—'was hindert, das erste καί in der Bedeutung von *vel* zu fassen?' I cannot help thinking that Rassow and Jackson are wrong here, and that we must take the first καί in the sense of 'both,' and τοὺς φίλους in the sense of 'his neighbours.' The writer is speaking about the κάκιστος, and it would be out of place in connexion with *him* to think of the doctrine of the identity of the αὐτός and the φίλος, which is formulated—as in the passage quoted here by Jackson (ix. 4. 5 ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός)—to

1130 a. 12. εἶναι λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ: *Phys.* iii. 3. 202 a. 20, b. 9, 12, 16, ubi promiscue usurpantur τὸ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό et ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός sive εἷς: i. 3. 186 a. 31. al.' Cf. also the following passages quoted by the various editors—*De An.* ii. 12. 424 a. 25, iii. 2. 425 b. 25 (ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς): *E. N.* vi. 8. 1: *De Mem.* i. 450 b. 21 (τὸ ὃν τῷ πίνακι γεγραμμένον ζῷον καὶ ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ εἰκὼν τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἓν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄμφω· τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἔστι θεωρεῖν ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα): *De Juv. et Sen.* 1. 467 b. 25 (where it is pointed out that τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἕν may be τῷ εἶναι πλείω καὶ ἕτερα).

That *notion* or *conception* is meant by τὸ εἶναι in the present section (v. 1. 20) is evident, I think, from the above parallels. Michelet, however, makes τὸ εἶναι here the 'sensible substance' as distinguished from the notion or λόγος, and quotes *Met.* M. 3. 1077 b. 12 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε οὐσίαι μᾶλλον τῶν σωμάτων εἰσίν, οὔτε πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ μόνον, οὔτε κεχωρισμένα που εἶναι δυνατόν, εἴρηται ἱκανῶς—adding, 'hoc loco τὸ εἶναι de sensibili substantia praedicatur quae *per se* existere queat: magnitudines autem mathematicae *per se* existere non posse dicuntur, sed a sensibilium substantia sustentantur.' Similarly he explains the passage *De An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 25—αἴσθησις and αἰσθητόν *exist separately*—τὸ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς, but each *quâ* separately existing is only a δύναμις. In actuality or ἐνέργεια, *i. e.* in real essence they are one. After all, this differs only verbally from Trendelenburg's explanation (*De An.* p. 435, first ed.)—'ubi res in sensum agit, sensus vero rem suscipit, ibi res et sensus in unum quasi concurrunt, ut utriusque actio quasi unam efficiat (ἡ αὐτή ἐστι καὶ μία), utrique vero natura per se diversa sit (τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς).' Then turning to the passage *E. N.* v. 1. 20 Michelet says—'*Notione et substantia virtus et justicia universalis sunt idem, modo et ratione existendi* (τῷ εἶναι) *tantum differunt.* Firmatur hic sensus τοῦ εἶναι ipsa explicatione quae sequitur, cum verba ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον existendi rationem alteram, alteram vocabula ἢ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς declarent. Sed non abnuerim his diversis existendi modis etiam diversam essentiam contineri.' This last sentence seems to bear out the remark made above that the difference between Michelet's explanation of τὸ εἶναι in *De An.* iii. 2, and that of Trendelenburg and others, who take it as = *notion*, is really only verbal. The truth is that εἶναι is a term which takes its colour from its context, as a technical term of such common extraction might be expected to do. Sometimes

tion are directed, and with universal justice, which is coextensive with that virtue which all legislation and state education strive to produce, we have now no more to do: nor shall we at present discuss the question whether there is or is not another kind of virtue—that of the good man, as such,—produced by other agencies than those of legislation and state education:—our present subject is particular justice.

Particular justice is of two kinds, (1) *distributive, and* (2) *corrective: and corrective justice finds a place both in* (a) *voluntary transactions* (e.g. *buying, lending*), *and in* (b) *involuntary transactions, whether these latter imply stealth and deception, as theft, or violence, as murder.*

§ 1. **τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην**] Spengel (p. 207) rejects **ἀρετῆς** as an explanatory addition. The passages collected by Waitz (*Organon* i. 375) and Eucken (*über den Sprachgebrauch des Ar.* p. 24 sq.), to whom Jackson (*ad loc.*) refers, for the equivalence of **ἐν μέρει** and **κατὰ μέρος**, give no instance of **ἐν μέρει** with a genitive; but below § 3. 1130 a. 23 we have **καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου = ἐκ μέρους τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου.** 1130 a. 14.

§§ 2–5.] Nötel (*Quaest. Arist. Specimen* p. 11) would omit § 5, because it merely repeats the argument of § 2. But we must not press the writer too hard in a passage like this, remembering that we have here merely to do with **σημεῖα**, and that grounds which might easily be shown to be *logically* identical, may present themselves superficially in popular thought and language as different, and hence may be used as distinct **σημεῖα** by a method which appeals to such thought and language. The writer wishes to show that there is such a vice as 'particular injustice.' In § 2 he enumerates the various acts which are considered wrong (*i.e.* unjust in the general sense), and assigns them to the special vices from which they spring, in order to show that the act of 'taking too much' (**ὅταν πλεονεκτῇ**) exists as a wrong act distinct from the others, and is left without an explaining vice, unless we admit the existence of 'particular injustice' (**ἡ ἐν μέρει ἀδικία**). In § 4 he shows further that this vice of particular injustice must sometimes be assumed to account for acts which seem at first sight to proceed from other vices—as when an act of adultery does not proceed from **ἀκολασία** but from the desire of gain—**τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα**: and in § 5 he finally clinches the matter by means of this term **κερδαίνειν**, which has turned up in § 4, pointing out that, as we always refer other wrong actions (**ἀδικήματα**) to their definite vices—adultery to **ἀκολασία**, flight to **δειλία**, so, as a matter of fact, we always refer an a. 16.

1130 a. 12. πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας κ.τ.λ. Cf. *An. Pr.* i. 37. 49 a. 6 τὸ δὲ ὑπάρχειν τόδε τῷδε καὶ τὸ ἀληθεύεσθαι τόδε κατὰ τοῦδε τοσαυταχῶς λεκτέον ὁσαχῶς αἱ κατηγορίαι διῄρηνται.

Mich. Eph. has the following comment on the present section—τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ ἓν ἐστι (*sc.* ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη), κῇ δὲ διαφέρουσι· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ὡς ἕξις ψυχῆς σκοπῆται ἀρίστη καὶ μηδὲν πλέον, ἀρετὴ λέγεται, ὅταν δὲ ὡς χρῆσις πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη ὀνομάζεται.

CHAPTER II.

Argument.

Concerning the second kind of justice, i.e. *the justice which is a particular virtue, not the virtuous character as a whole: and concerning the corresponding injustice.*

There is *such a kind of injustice, for 'taking too much' is a distinct kind of wrong doing, which has as much right to be assigned to its own vice as running away in battle, and using abusive language, have to be assigned to their respective vices. In these latter cases it is true that we have special names* cowardice *and* bad temper *for the vices; whereas for the vice which disposes a man to take too much we have no special name, only the general name of all vice—injustice. But the absence of a special name must not be allowed to make us overlook the existence of the vice, which not only has its own acts which cannot be mistaken, but even displays itself sometimes in acts commonly assigned to other vices,* as e.g. *when adultery is committed for* gain, *not from lust. In short, when a man has taken more than his share of gain we say that he is* unjust, *as we say that he is* cowardly *when he runs away in battle, or* profligate *when he has committed adultery. Thus we must distinguish injustice in the specific sense, and injustice in the generic sense—two states which have the same name and involve the same notion of 'relation towards other people,' but differ in that injustice in the specific sense is concerned with social position, money, and other external good things, which men take pleasure in acquiring too much of at the expense of their neighbours, whereas injustice in the generic sense is concerned with the whole sphere of man's activity as a moral agent.*

'Contrary to law' being the whole under which 'unfair' falls as a part, particular injustice, which is relative to the unfair, will be a 'part' of universal injustice, which is relative to that which is contrary to law. Similarly, particular justice is a part of universal justice. With universal injustice, then, which is coextensive with that vice against which all legislation and state cons-

are directed, and with universal justice which is [illegible]
w which all legislation and [illegible]
ore to do: nor shall we at present discuss the [illegible]
t another kind of virtue—that of the good man in [illegible]
ries then those of legislation and [illegible]—our present [illegible]
icular justice.
rticular justice is of two kinds, [illegible]
ctive justice finds a place both in a voluntary transaction [illegible]
ing', and in b involuntary transaction, whether [illegible]
deception, as theft, or violence, as murder.

1. τὴν δὲ μέρει ἀρετῆς [illegible] Spengel [illegible]
ἢ as an explanatory addition. The passage [illegible]
itz (*Organon* i. 375) and Encker *über den Sprachgebrauch* [illegible]
p. 24 sq.), to whom Jackson (*ad loc.* [illegible]
ὁ μέρει and κατὰ μέρος give no instance of [illegible]
below § 3. 1130 a. 23 we have [illegible]
ὁ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου ὅλου.

§ 2–5.] Nötel (*Quaest. Arist. Specimen* [illegible]
use it merely repeats the argument of § [illegible] But we [illegible]
s the writer too hard in a passage like [illegible]
have here merely to do with [illegible]
ht easily be shown to be *ignorantia* [illegible]
es superficially in popular [illegible]
hence may be used as [illegible]
eals to such thought and language. [illegible]
there is such a vice as [illegible]
nerates the various acts which are [illegible]
in the general sense, and assigns them [illegible]
which they spring, in order to show [illegible]
much' (ὅταν πλεονεκτῇ) exists as a [illegible]
rs, and is left without an explanation [illegible]
tence of 'particular injustice' [illegible]
rs further that this vice of particular injustice [illegible]
ssumed to account for acts which [illegible]
other vices—as when an act of adultery [illegible]
ασία but from the desire of gain—[illegible]
he finally clinches the matter by means of [illegible]
ch has turned up in § 4. [illegible]
er wrong actions (ἀδικήματα) [illegible]
ασία, flight to δειλία, so, as a matter of fact [illegible]

1130 a. 16. act from which a man derives gain unfairly (εἰ ἐκέρδαινεν) to ἀδικία. The reference here is evidently to as definite a vice as it is in the case of adultery or flight; but this definite vice has only the *general name* 'injustice'—ἀδικία. The name therefore is to be understood here in a *specific sense*. He has, in short, found that κερδαίνειν has a well-recognised coordinate place in popular language by the side of μοιχεύειν, &c., and gives as definite a sense to the ἀδικία from which it proceeds as is possessed by ἀκολασία, &c. At the same time it must be conceded to those who, with Nötel, would omit § 5, that its omission would not materially weaken the argument. Its retention, however, is to be defended on the ground that, occurring in a passage which appeals to popular language, it makes use of the term κερδαίνειν, whereas the term employed in § 2 is πλεονεκτεῖν. The difference between πλεονεκτεῖν and κερδαίνειν may not be great; but we must remember that κέρδος is a term which is to hold a prominent place in the subsequent discussion of particular justice, and is worth dwelling on in an introductory passage like the present[1]. Before leaving this question of the relation of § 5 to the preceding sections, we must notice Susemihl's attempt to meet Nötel's difficulty by placing a comma after κερδαίνειν 1130 a. 28, and reading ὅτι for ἔτι in the same line. I do not think the change necessary, and Susemihl is mistaken in saying that K^b has ὅτι here. It is in line 24, not in line 28, that K^b has ὅτι for ἔτι.

a. 22. § 2. καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν] καί = ἤτοι.

a. 27. § 4. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν] *sc.* ἄδικος λέγεται. Fritzsche.

a. 33. § 6. συνώνυμος . . . δύναμιν] Cf. *E. N.* v. 1. 7, where universal and particular injustice were said to be ὁμώνυμα, and see note *ad loc.*, in which it was pointed out that, as there regarded, they are more properly τὰ πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα than ὁμώνυμα. Here, however, they are regarded from a somewhat different logical point of view, and can, with technical correctness, be called συνώνυμα. They are regarded, in short, as belonging to the same Category (ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει)—that of Relation (ἄμφω ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν);

[1] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 17) says '1130 a. 28–32 (§ 5) ist wohl mit Unrecht von Nötel als Wiederholung von 1130 a. 16–22 (§ 2) verdächtigt. So verwandt nämlich die beiden Abschnitte dem Inhalte nach sind, so ist doch noch ein Unterschied der Gedanken zu erkennen.' Unfortunately Rassow does not explain his view of the nature of this difference.

and thus having the same τί ἐστιν or οὐσία (viz. the τί ἐστιν or οὐσία 1130 a. 33.
characteristic of the σχῆμα, γένος, or Category of πρός τι), they are properly συνώνυμα: for (*Cat.* 1. 1 a. 6) συνώνυμα λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός. For the doctrine that the τί ἐστιν which the ὁρισμὸς declares has a different character in each category see *Met.* Z. 4. 1030 a. 17 καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστι ἕνα μὲν τρόπον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, ἄλλον δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ποσόν, ποιόν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ' ἑπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἁπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιὸν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τῶν τί ἐστι μέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς.

On the passage before us (v. 2. 6) Mich. Eph. has the following—ἔθος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλει συνώνυμα λέγειν, καὶ τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν λέγομενα, ἃ ὡς ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, μεταξύ ἐστι τῶν τε συνωνύμων καὶ τῶν κυρίως ὁμωνύμων, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λέγεται. ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῦ παρόντος βιβλίου μέχρι καὶ τοῦδε τὴν ἐν μέρει κακίαν συνώνυμον λέγει τῇ ὅλῃ κακίᾳ, ἤτοι τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀδικίαν τῇ ὅλῃ ἀδικίᾳ. εἰσὶ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ συνώνυμοι, ἀλλὰ μέσαι τῶν συνωνύμων καὶ ὁμωνύμων. δι' ὧν παρατίθεται ἐμφαίνει ὡς οὐχ ἁπλῶς συνωνύμως τὰς ἀδικίας ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ πῇ, οἷα ἐστὶ τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν, ἃ τρόπον μέν τινα συνώνυμα ἐστίν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ δέδεικται, τρόπον δέ τινα ὁμώνυμα. καθ' ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὁρισμὸς αὐτῶν, ὡς αὐτός φησιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστί, κατὰ τοῦτο συνώνυμον ἐστί. πῶς δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ ἐν τίνι γένει ἐδήλωσεν εἰπών—ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον, ἥ τε κοινὴ ἀδικία, καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἣν ἐπὶ μέρος λέγομεν. ἀμφότεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀδικίαι ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἁμαρτάνειν τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσι. κατὰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο συνώνυμοι εἰσί. καθ' ὅσον δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν μέρει ἀδικία ἡ κατὰ πλεονεξίαν περὶ τιμήν ἐστι καὶ χρήματα—λέγοι δ' ἂν τιμὴν καὶ χρήματα τὰ τυχηρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν—ἐν οἷς δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους ἡ πλεονεξία, ἡ δὲ καθόλου ἀδικία περὶ πάντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ νόμιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος, κατὰ δὴ τοῦτο πάλιν ὁμώνυμοι εἰσὶν αἱ ἀδικίαι. It will be observed that Mich. Eph. here describes the common γένος or category of the two kinds of justice as a common εἶναι.

περὶ τιμὴν . . . καὶ δι' ἡδονήν] Here apparently the *sphere* and the b. 2.
motive of particular injustice are distinguished: but the Paraph. Heliod. has ἡ μὲν μερικὴ περὶ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν ἢ περὶ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους.

The ἄδικος, in the specific sense, actuated by the desire of 'gain,' seeks to have more than his share of social consideration, money,

1130 b. 2. or personal security (*e.g.* he tries to avoid risks which he should share equally with his fellow-citizens); the ἄδικος in the wide sense of the term is he who fails in all, or some, of those various social relations in which the good man succeeds.

b. 6. §§ 7–11.] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 17) suspects the whole passage, 1130 b. 6 ὅτι . . . 1130 b. 29 παντί. After refusing to accept Nötel's view that 1130 a. 28–32 is a repetition of 1130 a. 16–22, he says 'Eher hat man Grund, an der ersten Hälfte des folgenden Capitels (bis 1130 b. 29) Anstoss zu nehmen, die den Charakter grosser Breite und Weitschweifigkeit trägt und die sich ohne alle Beeinträchtigung des Gedankenganges aus dem Texte ausscheiden lässt. So sind die Worte (Z. 16) ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον κ.τ.λ. ganz leer, da schon das vorhergehende Capitel von der justitia particularis gehandelt hat. Vor allem befremdend aber ist das Zurückkommen auf das νόμιμον δίκαιον, über das schon, p. 1129 b. 11 ff. des längeren gesprochen ist.' The passage is certainly chargeable with the faults here brought against it by Rassow; but to *bracket* it, with Susemihl, is to pledge oneself to a more definite theory of the authorship and composition of this Book than I am prepared to do.

b. 7. παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν] Spengel (pp. 207, 8) rejects ἀρετήν as a blundering insertion: it is δικαιοσύνην which must be understood after ὅλην.

τίς δὲ καὶ ποία τις] For this phrase see note on *E. N.* i. 7. 19, a. 31.

b. 8. § 8. διώρισται κ.τ.λ.] 'now, two senses of "the unjust" have been distinguished, viz. "the illegal" and "the unfair."'

b. 10. § 9. ἐπεὶ . . . b. 14. ὅλα] Bekker's text here is ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἄνισον ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτά, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη, τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα. This text seems to be given, without admixture, only by L^b and N^b. All other MSS. mix it up more or less with readings belonging to the text adopted by Bywater. The only possible explanation of the text given by L^b and N^b is that offered by Mich. Eph. and accepted by Michelet and Grant—viz. that as the ἄνισον is a genus under which the πλέον falls as a species (the ἔλαττον being the other

ecies), so universal justice is a genus under which particular 1130 b. 10.
stice falls as a species (courage, temperance, &c. being the other
ecies),—'what is said about "more" and "unequal" having
thing to do with πλεονεξία, but being simply an *illustration* of
part included by a whole'—Grant: or, as Mich. Eph. puts it—
ἀναλόγου τινὸς δείκνυσι τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς τε μερικῆς ἀδικίας καὶ τῆς
κῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ὅλης, δυνάμει λέγων, ὡς τὸ πλέον πρὸς τὸ ἄνισον
ως ἡ μερικὴ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην δικαιοσύνην. Now, putting aside
the moment the question of the MS. authority for the text which
ls for this interpretation, we may note the following difficulties
nected with the interpretation itself in its context. In § 8 τὸ
ον marks the sphere of particular injustice: here, in the very
t section, we are asked to believe that it 'has nothing to do with
νεξία,' but is introduced (with τὸ πλέον) simply as 'an illustra-
.' And of what? Of the relation of part to whole: as if that
ired illustration. Further, ἐπεί is a conjunction which in-
uces a reason, not a mere illustration or parallel. Again,—
ough this may perhaps seem a small point—if τὸ ἄνισον is the
is or whole, and τὸ πλέον the species or part, the order being
ἄνισον and (2) πλέον, why have we this order reversed in the
aining clause ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον? (cf. Jackson, p. 74, who
:es this last point).

·om this review of the ἀπορίαι suggested by the interpretation of
: see that Bekker's text cannot possibly be right. The protasis
duced by ἐπεί must give the *reason* for the apodosis καὶ τὸ ἄδικον
ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα[1]:
:he relation of the ἄνισον to the πλέον as Mich. Eph., Michelet,
Grant explain it (and their explanation is the only one consist-
with the parenthesis of Bekker's text), is not a *reason*. Ac-
ngly Bekker's text must be altered so as to make ἐπεί introduce
ason. Now, the *reason* why particular justice is a 'part' of
:rsal justice can only be that it is (as notion—τὸ ἄδικον, and
—ἡ ἀδικία) related to a definite part of that field of conduct
the entire extent of which universal justice is concerned. The
adopted by Jackson, Susemihl, Ramsauer, and Bywater, with
ἐ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον κ.τ.λ., supplies this reason. Another
nal ground for reading παράνομον, though a small one in com-

shall give my reason below for beginning the apodosis here, with most
s, not at ὥστε (line 16) with Jackson and Susemihl, who substitute a
a for Bekker's full stop after δικαιοσύνης (line 16).

1130 b. 10. parison with that just mentioned, is that the words ὡς μέρος πρὸς (or καὶ) ὅλον given by all MSS. no longer seem to reverse the proper order of the two terms. So much for the internal grounds *in* favour of the παράνομον text.

For the external grounds in its favour see Bywater's *app. crit. ad loc.*, and Jackson's note, pp. 73. 74. It may be added that, CCC agrees with K^b P^b and Camb. in reading παράνομον πλέον, and with K^b in reading καὶ πρός.

It remains to notice Spengel's view of this passage (pp. 208, 9) —a view which, I think, cannot be summarily rejected as wrong, although the MS. evidence seems to me to be rather against it than for it. At any rate it is a view which, whether right or wrong, is most instructive as a specimen of textual criticism. It is simply that the parenthesis (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον) is a later interpolation introduced to explain the foregoing words, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον, by a scribe who understood them as Mich. Eph. does. The parenthesis omitted, the sentence runs clearly, and may be paraphrased thus—ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον—τουτέστι τὸ πλέον—οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ παρανόμῳ ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτά κ.τ.λ. Spengel's words are—'Man streiche den Erklärungssatz τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον und alles ist richtig . . . Nicht den Unterschied von ἄνισον und πλέον will Aristoteles geben, sondern den von παράνομον und ἄνισον; er sagt, dieses ἄνισον oder πλέον (dieses hebt er hervor, weil die Ungerechtigkeit zumeist in der πλεονεξία besteht) ist nur ein Theil von dem παράνομον, folglich das Fehlen in diesem nur ὡς μέρος von dem gesammten παράνομον, d. h. die specielle ἀδικία von der gesammten ἀδικία.' The reading ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον Spengel regards as due merely to the attempt to mend a text already put out of joint by the interpolated parenthesis, which itself, instead of being struck out, was altered into τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον. There is perhaps no place in the *E. N.* where the MSS. show so much confusion as they do here[1], and I am far from feeling sure that the παράνομον text which I have adopted is *verbally* correct, although there can

[1] Of this confusion the Paraphrast's hopelessly unmeaning note is a fair measure—ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνίσῳ, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἄνισον ὥσπερ ὅλον, τὸ δὲ πλέον ὡς μέρος· (τὸ γὰρ πλέον καὶ ἄνισον, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἄνισον πλέον· ἔστι τις ἀδικία καὶ περὶ τὸ ἄνισον ἄλλη· αἱ οὖν ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταὶ ἀδικίαι· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τὸ πλέον μερικὴ ἔσται ἀδικία, ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄνισον ἀδικία, καθόλου.

no doubt that the meaning which it gives is that which the writer 1130 b. 10.
shed to convey. Spengel's text, however, gives this meaning
ually well; but, as I have said, I think that the MS. evidence
ıch as it is) is rather against than for it. It is only this scruple
ıich retains me from going even further than Spengel—viz. from
'iking out, not only the parenthesis, but the words *καὶ τὸ πλέον*,
ıich he supposes to have suggested the parenthesis. K[b] and CCC
th *καὶ πρός* might then be explained as giving a reading in which
, necessitated by the insertion of *either καὶ τὸ πλέον or καὶ τὸ*
ράνομον, had established itself without extruding *πρός*, which would
ne be admissible if *neither καὶ τὸ πλέον nor καὶ τὸ παράνομον* were
›wed a place in the text.

ὥστε . . . b. 18. ὡσαύτως] Rassow (p. 17) says 'Diese Worte sind b. 16.
ız leer, da schon das vorhergehende Capitel von der justicia parti-
aris gehandelt hat'; and Ramsauer brackets them saying—'Quae
nceps, l. 16, adjungitur sententia (*ὥστε . . . ὡσαύτως*) hoc quidem
ɔ post reliqua interposita, imprimis postquam bis dictum est
ῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην (a. 14) et *τίς δὲ καὶ ὁποία*
λητέον (b. 7) ita est inanis ut ne excusari quidem possit.' If
judgment is correct (and it may well be), the question of
ting the apodosis begin with *ὥστε* does not arise. As, however,
acketing' is a somewhat gratuitous act in the case of a sentence
›nging to such a loosely organised passage as the present (§§
1), it is perhaps better to leave the words *ὥστε . . . ὡσαύτως* in
text—not as introducing an apodosis (Jackson and Susemihl),
as a statement made in consequence of the conclusion *καὶ τὸ*
ν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία b. 13 . . . *δικαιοσύνης* b. 16, which is the real
losis to the protasis introduced, b. 10, by *ἐπεί*. That apodosis
ed that particular justice is a *μέρος* of universal justice; then
›ws the clause before us which runs—'So (*ὥστε*), since this
ρει justice exists, as distinguished above, we must discuss it.'

10. διοριστέον] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 93) conjectures *ἀφοριστέον*, b. 22.
rring to *ἀφείσθω* in b. 20 above, and comparing *E. N.* i. 7.
1098 a. 1. I think that *διοριστέον* is right, and that the clause
ns—'And how the justice and injustice corresponding to these
:s are to be determined is easily explained': then follows the
anatory clause with *γάρ*. The *διορισμός* here is easy, and is
n on the spot; not so in the case mentioned in the next
ion, where it has to be postponed—*ὕστερον διοριστέον* 1130 b. 28.

1130 b. 22. σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων] 'the great majority of the acts which are "according to law."' Mich. Eph. explains σχεδόν here by pointing out that there are νόμιμα which refer, not to the moral conduct of the citizens, but to the practice of the various arts and trades: he says—ἔστι δ' οὖν τινὰ τῶν νομίμων ἃ οὐ περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ζῆν διορίζεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πῶς ἂν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι καὶ ἐπάρετοι γένοιντο οἱ πολῖται, εἰσηγοῦνται. ὁ γὰρ ἔμφρων νομοθέτης οὐ μόνον περὶ τούτων νομοθετεῖ καθ' ἃ δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς τῆς αὐτῆς πολιτείας μετέχοντας, οὐδὲ περὶ οἰκοδόμων, περὶ ὑφαντῶν, περὶ ἁπλῶς πάντων τεχνιτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ γεωργῶν καὶ στρατηγῶν καὶ ἐμπόρων, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν δι' ὧν οἱ πολῖται συνίστανται, οὐ μόνον δὴ περὶ τούτων νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ δὴ πρότερον περὶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ νομίμων πολιτῶν προαγορεύει. For τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα (or προστασσόμενα) in this §, and τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς in § 11, see note on v. i. 13. b. 17. For καθ' ἑκάστην . . . κωλύει ὁ νόμος see same note.

b. 26. § 11. παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν] 'The education of a man as a citizen'—Peters: *i.e.* his education for (πρός) the life which he must lead as a member of the state, or πολιτικὴ κοινωνία.

τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας] 'the education of the individual as such'—Peters.

b. 27. ἁπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι] 'simply a good man'—*i.e.* 'good' in the sense in which we use the term when we apply it to a man without the πρόσθεσις of such qualifying circumstances as we specify when, *e.g.* we call him 'good, *as the citizen of an oligarchical state*': for 'good' means one thing when applied to the citizen of an oligarchical state, and another thing when applied to the citizen of a democratical state—*i.e.* 'a good citizen' is a man who helps to maintain a particular social system, whether that system be good or bad: see *Pol.* Γ. 2. 1276 b. 28 τῶν πολιτῶν . . . ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία· διόπερ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστι πλείω πολιτείας εἴδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν. τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, φανερόν. What then is this ἀρετὴ καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ—this goodness *without qualification* καθ' ἣν ἁπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι? In the *Politics* Aristotle certainly identifies it with the goodness of a certain *citizen*, viz. the citizen of the Best, *i.e.* the Aristocratical State: *Pol.* Δ. 5. 1293 b. 3 τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν

ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν 1130 b. 27.
ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσι τὴν αὐτῶν. Cf. *Pol.* Γ. 7. 1283 b. 43 πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐστί, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν. This identification of the good citizen and the good man in the aristocratical state depends on Aristotle's doctrine that in that state the rulers are not a privileged caste distinct from the ruled, but the elders of a homogeneous people (*i. e.* a people consisting of citizens *who are all good*, *Pol.* H. 12. 1332 a. 32 ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαία γε πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους· ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας) —the *natural*, not the arbitrarily constituted rulers. This result, however, he reaches through a dialectical process of considerable complexity: see *Pol.* Γ. 2. 1276 b. 40 ἐπειδὴ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι ὄντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀρετὴ μία πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ: but perhaps, he continues, we may identify the goodness of the good man and the goodness of *a particular* citizen—viz. the citizen who is a '*good ruler*'—1277 a. 13 ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα σπουδαῖον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον: then 1277 a. 20 εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρχοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἐστι καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἂν εἴη ἁπλῶς πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός, ὡς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου. In the aristocratical state, however, the rulers are men who have learnt to rule well by being well ruled. The education in the ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἄρχοντος is begun and carried on in the person of the ἀρχόμενος. The distinction between ἄρχων and ἀρχόμενος is not an absolute one—the ἀρχόμενος is δυνάμει the ἄρχων. If we regard especially the *continuity* of the citizen's life in the Best State (and in the Best State—κατὰ φύσιν πόλις—the citizen's life is *a continuous natural development*), we shall say that the ἀρετή of the citizen and the ἀρετή of the good man, are identical; if we give prominence to the fact that there are always *two generations*—the younger and the older—the former of which is educated and ruled by the latter, we shall say that the ἀρετή of the good man (= good ruler), and the ἀρετή of the citizen, are different. See *Pol.* Γ. 2. 1277 b. 7 ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρετὴ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν . . . διὸ

1130 b. 27. λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ ἀρχθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω: then 1277 b. 25 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ὅσαι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητοῦ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἄρχων αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος. πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. Cf. also *Pol.* H. 13. 1332 b. 32 ἀλλὰ μήν γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀναμφισβήτητον . . . ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα τῷ γένει ταὐτὸ τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν . . . ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἑτέρους. ὥστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἑτέραν εἶναι. τῶν τε γὰρ μελλόντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναί φασι δεῖν πρῶτον . . . 1333 a. 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν ἀρχόμενόν τε δεῖν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὕστερον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γένωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς. The outcome of all is that the legislator should strive to make his fellow-citizens *good men*. The answer given by the *Politics* to the question before us is—that it is πολιτική, and no other agency, which conducts the παιδεία καθ' ἣν ἁπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι. The virtue of the perfectly good *man* is determined πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν—*Pol.* Γ. 2. 1288 a. 39 φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλις συστήσειεν ἂν τις ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην, ὥστε ἔσται καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἦθη ταὐτὰ σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαίους ἄνδρας καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικούς. But the writer of the Fifth Book of the *Ethics*, in the alternative ἢ ἑτέρας (v. 2. 11), seems to suggest a point of view which is foreign to the *Politics*—viz. that the good *man* may possibly spring up under influences, and manifest his goodness under conditions with which the *legislator* has nothing to do. This seems to be the *suggestion* thrown out in the present passage; and it may be thought that this suggestion appears as a definite doctrine at the end of the *E. E.* where the place of καλοκαγαθία is determined. But we must not make too much of the difference between the καλοκαγαθία of Eudemus and the ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός of the *Politics*. In both conceptions we have an ideal excellence which man approaches along the line traced for

n by πολιτικ[illegible]. [illegible] 1253 b. 1
θεωρία τις (*E. N.* [illegible]) [illegible]
θεωρίν (*E. E.* [illegible]) [illegible]
t be allowed to [illegible]
demus, as which [illegible]
tion that the Chief End [illegible]
ich we must pass through [illegible]
, on the contrary [illegible]
t Aristotle's theory of the [illegible]
is forced to [illegible]
regards it as a [illegible]
beyond his theory. [illegible]
ough it is impossible [illegible]
divines that the idea [illegible]
, on the contrary [illegible]
e life itself which we have [illegible]
Horse is not something [illegible]
o, but rather that which they [illegible]
e may take it then that [illegible]
ristotle and Eudemus. [illegible]
καὶ ἀγαθός it is πολίτικον which [illegible]
the writer of v. 2. 11 is [illegible]
ssible of course to [illegible]
e subject. He seems to [illegible]
totle and Eudemus: but as he [illegible]
presumption is that he really [illegible]
ἑτέρας is surplusage. [illegible]
ent passage when he [illegible]
h whom he identifies the Writer of the [illegible]
ave wished to take up the question [illegible]
ith the view of giving a separate [illegible]
nce—to ask whether there is [illegible]
within the province of Politics [illegible]
es of the individual man. [illegible]
ὁ γὰρ ἴσως . . . παντί. This is Aristotle's view as expressed b. 28
in *Pol.* Γ. 2. 1276 b. 34 (quoted in last note): ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται τὴν ὄντα σπουδαῖον μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, [illegible]ρόν—a view which we have seen is not inconsistent with the [illegible]trine that the ἀρετὴ καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ is the work of πολιτική: the writer of the passage before us (v. 2. 11) adduces it as if

1130 b. 28. it raised a presumption in favour of the supposition that an agency different from πολιτική may be instrumental in producing such ἀρετή. There is indeed much confusion of thought in the passage, and to found on it any conclusion so important as that regarding the writer's doctrine of the relation between 'Politics' and 'Morals' seems to be a very hazardous proceeding. The confusion is increased by the Paraph. Heliod. who seems to think that the reference is to a distinction between the good man and the good citizen similar to that drawn already (v. 1. 20) between ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη.

The phrase τὸ ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι is equivalent to 'the notion "*good man*"'—'the being a good man': see *de An.* ii. 1. 412 b. 12 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο. *An. Post.* ii. 4. 91 b. 4 τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ἀληθὲς γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ζῴῳ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ πάντα ἄνθρωπον ζῷον, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε ἓν εἶναι. *Met.* Γ. 4. 1006 b. 22 εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει ἕτερον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄνθρωπος δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ· ὥστ' ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ἓν γὰρ ἔσται:—and further on 1007 a. 20 ὅλως δ' ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ ἀνάγκη συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ζῴῳ εἶναι τί ἦν εἶναι μὴ εἶναι. *Met.* Z. 15. 1039 b. 20 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ οὐσία ἑτέρα τό τε σύνολον καὶ ὁ λόγος (λέγω δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν οὕτως ἐστὶν οὐσία σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειλημμένος ὁ λόγος, ἡ δὲ ὁ λόγος ὅλως), ὅσαι μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μέν ἐστι φθορά· καὶ γὰρ γένεσις· τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις (οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκίᾳ εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ) ἀλλ' ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσίν· δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι οὐθεὶς ταῦτα γεννᾷ οὐδὲ ποιεῖ. *Phys.* iii. 5. 204 a. 23 τὸ γὰρ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρον τὸ αὐτό, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου—*i. e.* the notion of infinity and infinity are identical, for infinity is nothing but a notion—can never be concretely realised as an actual thing: see *Met.* Θ. 6. 1048 b. 14 τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὐχ οὕτω δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ἐσόμενον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ γνώσει: cf. *Met.* Z. 6. 1031 b. 11 ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, ὅσα μὴ κατ' ἄλλο λέγεται ἀλλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ πρῶτα. On the formula generally see Trendelenburg, *de An.* iii. 4. 7. (429 b. 10.) p. 472, first ed.

b. 30. § 12.] Particular Justice, concerned, as we have seen (v. 1. 9), with τἀγαθὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δ' οὐκ ἀεί, is now divided into two species: (1) Distributive Justice manifested in the fair apportionment of these good things (social

position, property, and all other material advantages) among the 1130 b. 30.
members of the Community, according to their deserts: (2) Corrective Justice concerned with the rectification of results at variance with the principle of fair apportionment which arise out of acts performed by members of the Community in the various circumstances in which, as individuals, they 'have to do with one another.' The term *συνάλλαγμα* = *contractus* of Roman Law. The relation between these two species of Particular Justice is well stated by Trendelenburg, *Hist. Beiträge zur Phil.* vol. iii. p. 412: *τὸ διανέμειν κατ' ἀξίαν* is the primary form of Particular Justice: the *διανομή* may take place in the exchanges of trade (*ἀλλακτικὴ δικαιοσύνη*), or in the allotment of common goods (*διανεμητικὴ τῶν κοινῶν*): the secondary form of Particular Justice is *ἡ διορθωτική*: it comes into operation when the just relations according to the primary form are disturbed, and equalises the unequal.

§ 13. *τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο*] The members of the social *κοινωνία*, as 1131 a. 1.
individuals, 'have to do with one another' (*συναλλάττονται*) in circumstances which may be assigned to one or other of two main heads, according as the will of both parties (*ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα*), or of one party only—the other party being unwilling—(*ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*) is concerned in what is done. As results at variance with the principle of fair apportionment arise in each of these two sets of circumstances, and must be rectified, there will also be two kinds of Corrective Justice.

It is easy to see how the results of *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* (assault, theft, &c.) are such as need rectification, and that it is in the *criminal* court that they are rectified. *Ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα* (buying and selling, letting, &c.), on the other hand, being those in which both parties enter voluntarily into certain arrangements in view of results agreeable to both, might seem from their very nature to give results needing no rectification. It sometimes happens, however, without the fault of either contracting party, that a result other than that originally in view, and not agreeable to one of the parties, follows from an arrangement; and it may be right that a *civil* court should consider whether the result (unfortunate for one of the parties) should be rectified, and, if so, to what extent: *e.g.* A takes the lease of a farm from B for a number of years at a rent suitable to good times: if times become bad beyond all reasonable calculation, it may be right that A should be able to have the

1132 a 1 practice of the reduction of his rent judicially decided. It *may* perhaps be thought that a better instance of τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν might have been selected than this which suggests 'interference with the freedom of contract.' It is, however, the 'rectification' in the civil court which corresponds most logically with the 'rectification' made in the criminal court—it is the rectification of the original συνάλλαγμα itself. But I suspect that the writer of the present passage had not such a case of rectification by the civil court in his mind when he drew up his list of ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα here, but that he thought rather of the *enforcement* of the terms of such συναλλάγματα, and the *settlement of disputes* regarding their meaning, in the civil court (cf. v. 4. 7. 1132 a 19 ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσι)—*e.g.* a tenant and landlord differ about the effect of a clause in their signed agreement, and *take their dispute for settlement* to a civil court; or a debt is *recovered* in a civil court. This last instance shows also how imperceptible the line may be dividing ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα, which require enforcement, from τὰ λαθραῖα among ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα, for the man who has to be sued for the payment of a debt is sometimes not easily distinguishable from the man who intended from the beginning to cheat his creditor.

The judicial *enforcement*, then, of the terms of an ἑκούσιον συνάλλαγμα, and their judicial *interpretation*, must be distinguished from the judicial rectification of the *terms themselves*. But we must understand the phrase 'rectification of the terms themselves' to denote not only the judicial alteration of unfair terms already arranged (*e.g.* refusal of law courts to enforce agreements to pay interest above a certain rate; judicial revision of rents which have become too high—after all a comparatively rare and somewhat questionable kind of 'rectification'), but also the *prevention*, by other than judicial means, of unfair arrangements which would inevitably be made if certain checks and methods of procedure did not exist. And here we can see that it is in the institution of νόμισμα that the principle of Corrective Justice is most largely and effectively embodied. On a system of barter almost every exchange involves a result at variance with the principle of fair apportionment. It is impossible, on such a system, to make really fair exchanges, there being objectively no common measure of the things exchanged, the accidents of temporary need and passing whim dominating all transactions. But the [illegible]n of νόμισμα

1131 a. 1. cording to 'economic laws'—which is apt to escape observation as a case of διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, because the existence of common property to be divided, and the agency of the state in dividing it, are not so immediately obvious as they are in the other cases. It is important, therefore, to call attention here to the fact that the exchange of products between individuals is by far the most important state agency at work in the distribution of the rewards of labour. The farmer receives the reward of his labour in the form of the coat *which a settled social system allows him to get* in exchange for his corn from the tailor. Νόμισμα and the other 'media of exchange' alluded to above are thus 'dianemetic' as well as 'diorthotic' agencies. As promoting exchange νόμισμα is a 'dianemetic' agency; but as keeping the exchange or distribution fair in circumstances in which unfair assignments would, but for its intervention, inevitably occur, it is a 'diorthotic' agency. Its 'dianemetic' and 'diorthotic' functions are after all only logically separate; its concrete work is *to promote the fair distribution of the national wealth by means of the exchange of commodities.*

a. 3. δανεισμός] 'lending at interest.' Jackson, Peters.

a. 4. χρῆσις] 'lending without interest.' Jackson, Peters. Χρῆσις is the *commodatum* of Roman law, distinguished from *mutuum* by not being concerned, as *mutuum* is, with things *quae pondere numero mensurave constant*—*e.g.* wine and corn. The actual bushel of corn received by the person who benefits by the *mutuum* is not returned by him, but *another* bushel equivalent to it: the person, however, who benefits by a *commodatum* must restore *the very thing* which he has borrowed—*e.g.* the book. *Commodatum* differs from *locatio* in being gratuitous. See Smith's *Dict. of Cl. Antiquities: Article* COMMODATUM.

a. 5. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων] Mich. Eph. has πῶς συναλλάγματα ταῦτα λέγεται; ἢ ὅτι ὁ κλέψας ἀντὶ τῶν κλεμμάτων ὅ τε μὲν δίδωσιν ἕτερά τινα ὅ τε δὲ μαστιγοῦνται, καὶ γέγονε τρόπον τινὰ δόσις καὶ λῆψις . . . λαβὼν γὰρ χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι ὁ κλέψας δέδωκεν ἀντ' ἐκείνων εὐθύνας.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

Concerning Distributive Justice. Injustice being inequality, or too much to A and too little to B, justice will be equality, or the mean between too much to A and too little to B; i.e. *it will involve four terms at least—two persons and two shares. If the persons are of equal merit, they will, in a just distribution, receive equal shares; if of unequal merit, they will receive proportionally unequal shares—in other words, in a just distribution the ratio between the persons and that between the shares will be equal. Although all men admit that distribution ought to be 'in proportion to merit* (κατ' ἀξίαν)*,' they are not agreed as to what constitutes merit. Democrats, oligarchs, and aristocrats adopt different standards of merit in their distributions of the good things of life.*

The just then is that which is 'in a proportion'; for concrete things (*such as persons and their shares*) *stand in relations of proportion to one another no less than abstract numbers do.*

The 'proportion' to which distributive justice conforms is that which mathematicians call geometrical proportion—discrete, with four terms, not continuous, for although continuous proportion has really four terms, it obtains that number by employing one term twice, whereas in the formula of distributive justice the four terms are separately present from the beginning—A and B the persons, and γ and δ their respective shares. Starting then from

$$A : B :: \gamma : \delta$$

we get alternando

$$A : \gamma :: B : \delta$$

and componendo

$$A + \gamma : B + \delta :: A : B$$

Where the conjunction of A and γ and of B and δ (i.e. *the assignment of γ to A and of δ to B*) *represents just distribution,* i.e. *distribution 'according to merit.'*

Unjust distribution violates this proportion, i.e. *gives the one party too much good* (*or too little evil*) *in proportion to his merit, and the other too little good or too much evil*).

GRANT introduces this chapter with an excellent note, in which he refers to Plato, *Gorgias* 507 E, and *Laws* 757 B, as foreshadowing the Aristotelian doctrine of Distributive Justice: also to *Pol.* Γ. 5. 280 a. 6 sqq., where 'though the *name* of distributive justice does not occur, yet the *idea* of it is fully developed.'

1131 a. 10. §§ 1–5.] The argument is—τὸ δίκαιον is ἴσον: but τὸ ἴσον is μέσον, therefore τὸ δίκαιον is μέσον as well as ἴσον. When, however, we speak of 'equal' (ἴσον), or 'a mean between' (μέσον), we imply at least two *things*. But τὸ δίκαιον is more than an ἴσον or μέσον implying at least two *things*. As has been pointed out before (v. 1. 20, v. 2. 6), it has its εἶναι, or δύναμις, ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον: *i. e.* it implies a relation between *persons*. In other words, τὸ δίκαιον must be regarded under the two categories of Quantity[1] and of Relation: it is *an equality of things* which involves *a fair relation between persons*. Hence it implies four terms—two things and two persons, at least.

a. 13. § 3. ἄνευ λόγου] 'without proof.'

a. 16. § 4. καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν] K^b and CCC seem to stand alone in omitting καὶ πρός τι, and L^b in omitting καὶ τισίν. Bekker, following K^b, brackets καὶ πρός τι, Jackson follows L^b in omitting καὶ τισίν, while Ramsauer and Susemihl omit the whole clause καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν. This last omission is, I think, unjustifiable. The argument of §§ 1–5 seems to require an explicit statement of the point that τὸ δίκαιον is to be regarded not only under the category of Quantity as ἴσον, but also under that of Relation—πρός τι. Moreover, the writer of the *M. M.* (i. 33. 1193 b. 31, quoted here by Jackson in his important note) lays great stress upon this point in the argument—τὸ δέ γε ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν ἐγγίνεται· τὸ ἄρα πρὸς ἕτερον ἴσον εἶναι δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ δίκαιος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐν δικαίῳ καὶ ἴσῳ καὶ ἐν μεσότητι ⟨καὶ Susem.⟩ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον [ἐν om. Susem.] τισὶ λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἔν τισιν ἴσον, τὸ δὲ μέσον τισὶ μέσον· ὥστ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἔσται καὶ πρός τινας καὶ ἐν τισίν. Jackson therefore retains καὶ πρός τι as the equivalent of the πρὸς ἕτερον of the *M. M.* This is unquestionably right: but it may be doubted whether he is right in omitting καὶ τισίν as a gloss anticipatory of ἡ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν.' The equivalent expression καὶ τισίν is certainly unnecessary after καὶ πρός τι: but it is in the manner of the writer to add such unnecessary explanations. As for the omission of καὶ πρός τι by K^b—very little weight indeed should be attached to the *omissions* of K^b[2]. They are generally

[1] See *Met.* Δ. 15. 1021 a. 11 ταὐτὰ μὲν γὰρ ὧν μία ἡ οὐσία, ὅμοια δ' ἂν ᾖ ποιότης μία, ἴσα δὲ ὧν τὸ ποσὸν ἕν.

[2] CCC in Book V has not independent authority. It is probably a transcript of a transcript of K^b; see *English MSS. of Nic. Eth. Anecd. Ox.* p. 45.

insignificant as its actual readings are significant. What is 1131 a. 16.
lly important is that the argument absolutely requires καὶ πρός
whatever may be thought of the origin of the gloss καὶ τινάν).
l that the writer of the *M.M.* seems to have read πρός τι (or
τινας?).

5. καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα] ἐν οἷς = τὰ πράγματα. Jackson (fol- a. 20.
ed by Susemihl) brackets the words τὰ πράγματα as a gloss on
r.

6. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς] 'There will be the
: "equality" between the persons and between the things': *i.e.*
: persons, as comparable κοινωνοί of the same social system, are
lutely equal, their shares will be also (ἡ αὐτή) absolutely equal:
:y are not absolutely equal, but stand in a certain definite ratio
ıperiority and inferiority, their shares will also stand in the
: (ἡ αὐτή) ratio. Μάχαι καὶ ἐγκλήματα arise when the ratio, what-
it be, subsisting between the persons is not observed exactly
τή) in the apportionment of the shares. Ramsauer's note on
ἡ ἰσότης is good—'Intelliges vocem ἡ αὐτή additum ad ἰσότης
e quasi notionem ipsius paritatis: "eodem modo quo haec
. vel erunt vel non erunt, et illa vel erunt vel non erunt." Ἴσα
revera neque homines nec res, sed hinc ratio inter homines,
inter res ratio; et est ἡ ἀναλογία ἰσότης λόγων, vs. 31.'

γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει] 'I omit,' says a. 21.
son, 'the words τὰ ἐν οἷς which appear in all the MSS. except
and CCC], and in Bekker's text, in order that here, as in the
nces before and after, the persons may take precedence of the
;s distributed.' Susemihl and Ramsauer also omit the words.
ainly 'the persons should take precedence of the things' here;
:ven with the omission of τὰ ἐν οἷς the clause is not satisfactory.
κα referring to the more remote οἷς is then indeed correct: but
ad of κἀκεῖνα we ought to have καὶ ταῦτα referring to the nearer
.

λ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *Pol.* E. 1. 1301 b. 28 ὅλως γὰρ a. 22.
οὐ ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν.

7. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον] τοῦτο is the fact stated a. 24.
e in § 5, that τὸ δίκαιον involves at least two persons and two
ɣs so related that there is ἡ αὐτὴ ἰσότης between the persons and

1131 a. 24. between the things. This fact becomes more significant if we realise clearly that it implies that τὸ δίκαιον is ἀνάλογόν τι—for ἀναλογία we already know as mathematicians is ἰσότης λόγων καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. Now, that τὸ δίκαιον, with its two persons and two things, is ἀνάλογόν τι is obvious from our use of the expression κατ' ἀξίαν, 'according to merit.' When we say that A and B are rewarded each 'according to his merit' (whatever that may be), we mean that each receives his 'just' reward. But when A and B are rewarded each 'according to his merit,' reward *α* (*i. e.* A's reward) stands to reward *β* (*i. e.* B's reward) in the same ratio (λόγος) as A's merit stands to B's. Hence, just distribution of rewards being distribution 'according to merit' involves the ἀναλογία, or ἰσότης λόγων—A : B :: *α* : *β*. By means of the expression κατ' ἀξίαν, then, the writer is enabled to substitute for the ἡ αὐτὴ ἰσότης of § 6 the more appropriate ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος of § 10.

For the expression κατ' ἀξίαν, as used in the *E. N.*, see the following passages quoted by Ramsauer in his note on v. 3. 7—viz. 1115 b. 19, where the ἀνδρεῖος is said κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχειν καὶ πράττειν, *i. e.* in the manner indicated and required by λόγος, which grasps life as a whole, and gives each feeling and action *its due place in the ensemble*:—1119 a. 19, where the σώφρων is said μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας, *i. e.* than they deserve:—1122 a. 26, where we have the expression κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν: and 1100 a. 25 βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν: cf. also *E. E.* iii. 6. 1233 b. 6 ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπής· τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν: also *E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 19 ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν: also *E. E.* viii. 3. 1249 a. 7 τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ καλά ἐστι τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· ἄξιος δ' οὗτος τοιῶν· καὶ τὸ πρέπον καλόν· πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ, πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, δύναμις. In all these passages κατ' ἀξίαν means 'according to merit,' or 'suitably to desert'—whether the 'merit' or 'desert' be the ground on which recognition is due to a *person* in the social κοινωνία, or the reason why a *feeling*, an *action*, or a *circumstance* should have a certain place assigned to it in the *ensemble* of ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος. The expression κατ' ἀξίαν thus necessarily connotes the idea of 'proportion'; hence we find the phrase τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον = 'the equality which characterises proportion,' *i. e.* ἰσότης λόγων: see *Pol.* E. 1. 1301 b. 29 ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἴσον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον, κατ'

ξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον ὑπερέχει κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἴσῳ τὰ τρία τοῖν δυοῖν 1131 a. 24.
αὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός·
τον γὰρ μέρος τὰ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῖν δυοῖν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἡμίση.
Equality is either (1) numerical equality (τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἴσον), or (2) quality of ratios (τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον).

τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτήν κ.τ.λ.] That 'the recognition of a. 26.
ıerit' is the principle on which all just distribution must proceed ı universally admitted; but men are not agreed as to 'what con-ıitutes merit'—as to what is the underlying condition (ὑπάρχειν—racketed, however, by Bywater: it is omitted by O^b, P^b, K^b, and CC, the two last having κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι *per dittographiam*[1] ı its place) of preferential recognition. Those who think that the ıasses should rule hold that the being a free man (ἐλευθερία) is by self a 'merit' overshadowing all other 'merits,' and entitling its ossessor to share equally with all other 'free' members of the tate: oligarchs think that the rich are entitled to more recognition han other members of the state; some, again, think that high birth onstitutes a superior claim; and those who favour the rule of he Best and most Virtuous identify the highest 'merit' with good-ıess and culture: see *Pol.* Γ. 5. 1280 a. 7–1281 a. 8, where it is ıointed out that οἱ ὀλιγαρχικοί make the mistake of supposing that f a man is 'superior' in a certain respect (*i. e.* in respect of wealth) ıe is superior in all respects; and οἱ δημοκρατικοί the mistake of sup-ıosing that if men are equal in one respect (*i. e.* in respect of being ree men) they are equal in all respects. Both ignore the vital ıoint (τὸ κυριώτατον, 1280 a. 25), that the State is an institution for he furtherance of human perfection, not an insurance or joint-stock ompany. Cf. also *Pol.* Γ. 7. 1282 b. 23 sqq., where the various laims to social recognition are examined. Does *any* superiority, ıe asks, give a man a right to a higher position in the State? Surely not. We cannot give a man a higher position on account f his finer complexion or superior stature. We do not give a ıetter flute, among equal players, to the high-born player. In hort, only those superiorities must be taken into account which ıave a distinct connexion with the well-being of the State. Noble irth, Freedom, and Wealth are superiorities which have a dis-inct connexion with the existence and well-being of the State, nd their claims to recognition are accordingly pronounced

[1] This dittograph may have accidentally extruded ὑπάρχειν. O^b and P^b are carcely independent evidence.

1131 a. 26. reasonable. There cannot be a city consisting entirely of poor men, or of slaves; and without ἀρετή, hereditary and acquired, there can be no good administration of the resources and energy supplied by wealth and freedom. Freedom, wealth, and high birth are all factors in the well-being of the State, if ἀρετή—enlightened moral interest in the κοινῇ συμφέρον—be present to coordinate them. The class which possesses this ἀρετή 'merits' the highest place in the State, just because it is its supremacy alone which ensures that other classes shall also receive what they severally 'merit' in the διανομὴ τῶν κοινῶν. The rule of ἀρετή is ἡ ὀρθὴ πολιτεία. But where the coordinating principle of ἀρετή is absent, freedom, wealth, and high birth struggle each for mastery: and, through various processes of στάσις, various παρεκβεβηκυῖαι πολιτεῖαι are consolidated, according as this, that, or the other ἀξία has succeeded, for the time, in securing exclusive recognition to itself.

In connexion with the use made of mathematical formulae by the writer of the Fifth Book it is interesting to note the elaboration with which his example is followed by a later writer on Justice, the Pseudo-Archytas, quoted by Stobaeus (*Flor.* vol. ii. p. 137, ed. Meineke, Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* i. 560):—Ἀρχύτα Πυθαγορείου τοῦ περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης· διὸ τὸ δίκαιον τοὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατικόν, τοὶ δαμοκρατικόν, τοὶ δὲ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ποιοῦντι. καὶ τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν κατὰ ὑπεναντίαν μεσότατα· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μέζοσι μέζονας τὼς λόγως, τοῖς δὲ μήοσι μήονας διανέμει ἁ ἀναλογία αὕτα· τὸ δὲ δαμοκρατικὸν καττὰν γεωμετρικάν· γὰρ ταύτᾳ τοὶ λόγοι ἴσοι τῶν μεζόνων καὶ μηόνων μεγεθέων· τὸ δὲ ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν καττὰν ἀριθμητικάν· ἀντιάζει γὰρ αὐτὰ τᾷ ὑπεναντίᾳ· τοῖς γὰρ μήοσι μέζονας τὼς λόγως, τοῖς δὲ μέζοσι μήονας. ταὶ μὲν ὧν ἰδέαι τᾶς διανομᾶς τοσαῦται· ταὶ δὲ εἰκόνες ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις καὶ τοῖς οἴκοις θεωρέονται· τιμαί τε γὰρ καὶ κολάσεις καὶ ἀρχαὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσω τοῖς μέζοσι καὶ μήοσι διανέμονται· ἢ ἐξ ἀνίσω ἢ τῷ ἀρετᾷ ὑπερέχεν ἢ τῷ πλούτῳ ἢ καὶ δυνάμει. τὸ μὲν ὧν ἐξ ἴσω δαμοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνίσω ἀριστοκρατικὸν ἢ ὀλιγαρχικόν. See Mullach, *Fragm. Ph.* ii. 119, for an account of these three μεσότητες or ἀναλογίαι (in music)—(1) ἁ ἀριθμητικά, in which as the first term exceeds the second, so the second exceeds the third—*e.g.* 6, 4, 2. Here, as Nicomachus Gerasenus (ἀριθμητικὴ εἰσαγωγή p. 132, ed Hoche) says, ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὅροις μείζονες οἱ λόγοι, ἐλάττονες δὲ ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν, *i.e.* the ratio 6 : 4 is smaller than the ratio 4 : 2; or as Archytas (?) quoted by Mullach (ii. 119) says, τὸ τῶν μειζόνων ὅρων διάστημα μεῖον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μεῖζον: (2) ἁ γεωμετρικά, where οἱ μείζονες ἴσον ποιοῦνται τὸ διάστημα καὶ οἱ μείους: *e.g.* 8, 4, 2, ratio 8 :

being = ratio 4 : 2; (3) ἁ ὑπεναντία ἁν καλοῦμεν ἁρμονικάν (Archytas apud Mullach ii. 119) ὅκα ἔωντι τοιοῦτοι ὥστε ᾧ ἁν πρᾶτος ὅρος τῶ δευτέρω ὑπερέχῃ ἑαυτῶ μέρει, ταύτῳ ὁ μέσος τῶ τρίτω ὑπερέχει τῷ τρίτω μέρει. γίνεται δὲ ἐν ταύτᾳ τᾷ ἀναλογίᾳ τὸ τῶν μειζόνων ὅρων διάστημα μεῖζον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μεῖον: *e.g.* 12, 8, 6, where 12 exceeds 8 by ⅓rd of itself, and 8 exceeds 6 by ⅓rd of 6, and the ratio 12 : 8 is greater than the ratio 8 : 6. 1131 a. 26.

§ 8. μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ . . . ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ] 'Proportion' is not peculiar to 'number' in pure arithmetic where μονάδες, or abstract 'ones,' indivisible and always equal to one another, are counted; but belongs to *all* 'number'—*i. e.* also to 'number' as realised in concrete and unequally-sized things. This statement (introduced by γάρ) is added to meet a possible objection—that the schema of Proportion, applicable to numbers formed by the addition of abstract units (μονάδες), is not applicable to the concrete οἷς and ἐν οἷς with which τὸ δίκαιον is concerned. Mich. Eph. has the following commentary here—μοναδικὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγω ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν, οἷον τὴν δεκάδα, ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν τοὺς δέκα ἵππους ἢ τοὺς δέκα ἄνδρας, ὃς καὶ κυρίως ἀριθμὸς λέγεται . . . ὅλως δὲ ἀριθμοὶ λέγονται τὰ ἀριθμήματα, οἷον τοὺς δέκα βόας ἢ ἀνθρώπους. ἀναλογία γάρ φησιν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐκ μονάδων συγκειμένων καὶ ὡς μέτρων λαμβανομένων ἀριθμῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἢ καὶ ἠριθμημένων. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ὡς μέτρων ἀριθμῶν ἔστι τις ἀναλογία, ὡς ὃ η' (8) πρὸς τὸν δ' (4), ὡς ὁ ς' (6) πρὸς τὸν γ' (3), οὕτως ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἵππων, κυνῶν, γραμμῶν ἐπιπέδων, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὧν ἐστὶν ἀριθμός· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀναλογία ἐστίν· ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀριθμόν. δεῖ γὰρ ἵνα ἀναλογία τις ᾖ, ἀριθμόν τινα εἶναι. Cf. Bonitz on *Met.* M. 6. 1080 b. 19. p. 545, 'Ejusmodi numeris [*i. e.* the "extended units" of the Pythagoreans —τὸν γὰρ ὅλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν, πλὴν οὐ μοναδικῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος, 1080 b. 17] Ar. opponit τοὺς μοναδικοὺς ἀριθμούς, *i. e.* eos numeros, quibus non certae quaedam res (cf. *N.* 5. 1092 b. 19: ἀεὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὃς ἂν ᾖ τινῶν ἐστίν, ἢ πύρινος ἢ γήϊνος ἢ μοναδικός), sed ipsae unitates, abstractae ab omni rerum qualitate et varietate, individuae (cf. 8. 1083 b. 17) neque inter se distinctae (cf. 7. 1082 b. 16) numerentur. Ac talem quidem numerum quum investiget scientia arithmetica, eundem numerum ἀριθμητικόν et μοναδικόν appellat, cf. 8. 1083 b. 17.' Cf. Zell, 'ἀριθμοὶ μοναδικοί sunt quos nostrates dicunt unbenannte Zahlen; numeri nude positi sine rebus numerandis.' Jackson (p. 81) refers to Plato, *Phileb.* 56 D, 'where arithmeticians who deal with μονάδας ἀνίσους a. 30.

1131 a. 30. such as two armies, two oxen, &c., are distinguished from arithmeticians who deal with *μονάδες* which are all alike.'

a. 31. **ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων**] See Euclid, v. Def. 3 **λόγος ἐστὶ δύο μεγεθῶν ὁμογενῶν ἡ κατὰ πηλικότητα πρὸς ἄλληλα ποιὰ σχέσις**: and v. Def. 8 **ἀναλογία δέ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν λόγων ταυτότης** (v. l. **ὁμοιότης**). In his note here Mich. Eph. says—**τὸ ἰσότης ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁμοιότης· ἀναλογία γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν λόγων ὁμοιότης**—the reason for preferring **ὁμοιότης** to **ἰσότης** apparently being that in **γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία** we have to do not with **ἡ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰσότης**, *i. e.* not with two equal quantities or **ἀριθμοί**, *e.g.* 4 = 4, but with two qualitatively identical ratios each of which yet involves different arithmetical conditions: *e.g.* the ratio 2 : 4 is qualitatively identical with the ratio 5 : 10; but each ratio is realised in quantitatively different terms. Now, if 2 and 4 be taken to represent the sides of one (say, right-angled) parallelogram, and 5 and 10 the sides of another, the two parallelograms (which thus represent diagrammatically the **ἀναλογία** 2 : 4 : : 5 : 10) are, in mathematical language, *similar* (**ὅμοια**), though of course not *equal* (**ἴσα**): see Euclid, vi. Def. 1. It is probable then that Mich. Eph. had 'similar' geometrical figures in view when he chose **ὁμοιότης** instead of **ἰσότης** to express the *qualitative sameness* of the **λόγοι** in **γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία**: and in this usage he is supported by the authority of *Met.* Δ. 15. 1021 a. 11 **ταὐτὰ μὲν γὰρ ὧν μία ἡ οὐσία, ὅμοια δ' ὧν ἡ ποιότης μία, ἴσα δὲ ὧν τὸ ποσὸν ἕν**: cf. Mich. Eph. on v. 2. 12 **ὅταν τοίνυν τῇ μὲν ποιότητι διαφέρωσι τῇ αὐτῇ, τῇ δὲ ποσότητι μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναλογία γεωμετρικὴ καλεῖται . . . ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία ἐστὶν ἡ ποσοῦ μὲν ἴσου ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς, ποιοῦ δὲ μὴ ἴσου ἡ μὴ ὁμοίοι μετέχουσα.**

a. 32. § 9. **ἡ μὲν οὖν διῃρημένη . . . συνεχής**] See Nicomachus Gerasenus **ἀριθ. εἰσαγωγή** ii. 21. §§ 5, 6. p. 121, ed. Hoche—**συνημμένη ἀναλογία** (= **συνεχής** of the present passage) **οἷον α, β, δ** (*i.e.* 1, 2, 4) **κατὰ ποιότητα . . . , κατὰ ποσότητα δὲ α, β, γ** (*i.e.* 1, 2, 3). **Διεζευγμένη** (= **διῃρημένη** here) . . . **οἷον κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποιὸν α, β, δ, η** (*i.e.* 1 : 2 : : 4 : 8), **κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν οὕτως α, β, γ, δ** (*i.e.* 1, 2, 3, 4). The statement **τῷ ἑνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται καὶ δὶς λέγει**, made by the writer of the Fifth Book here must, of course, be taken as made with exclusive reference to the **συνεχὴς ἀναλογία** at present before him—viz. **ἡ συνεχὴς** (or **συνημμένη**) **ἡ κατὰ ποιότητα.**

b. 1. **ὡς ἡ τοῦ α . . . τοῦ γ**] Jackson has an important note here: 'Throughout §§ 9, 11, 12, where I have given ordinal numbers [he

ls ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, &c., for ἡ τοῦ α, &c.], most of the editors write 1131 b. 1.
inals (α, β, γ, δ). In order to avoid the arithmetical absurdity
2=3 : 4) thus produced, I proposed in the *Journal of Philology*
:. iv. 310, to write (with Fritzsche) A, B, Γ, Δ: but on further
ideration I am convinced that πρώτου, δευτέρου κ.τ.λ. should be
ituted. The otherwise strange phrases ὁ α ὅρος, τοῦ α ὅρου in
, 12 suggest this alteration, and it is confirmed by several MSS.,
nd K^b [and CCC] throughout §§ 9, 11, 12, and P^b and N^b in
12, writing ordinals in full, whilst P^b pr. man. gives sometimes
als in full, sometimes α, β, γ, δ with superposed marks which
perhaps represent the terminations of ordinals, cf. Bast, *Com-*
Palaeogr. p. 850 [NC has ordinals in three places, and B^1 in
Michael Ephesius and Averroes seem to have had ordinals.'
low Jackson in preferring the ordinals. As to the phrases
α (*i.e.* πρώτου, τὴν τοῦ β (*i.e.* δευτέρου)—Jackson asks, 'can
mean "the line which we take for our first term," "the
which we take for our second term"? Mich. Eph. com-
s as follows—τὸ δὲ τῆς λέξεως τῆς οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ πρώτου πρὸς
τοῦ δευτέρου τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πρώτου ὅρου σχέσις τοῦ
πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον τὸν δ (qu. τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου τοῦ δ̄), οὕτως ἡ
ευτέρου τοῦ δ̄ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τρίτου τοῦ β̄. But is this not a
se of the word σχέσις? Cf. Eucl. *El.* v. Def. 3 quoted above.
ny rate we may safely reject the alternative suggestion of
it that στιγμή is to be supplied, as well as his theory that the
ortionals are algebraical quantities.' I have little doubt that
eference here is to γραμμαί, and that the writer has in his mind
συνεχὴς ἀναλογία κατὰ ποιότητα of the problem of τετραγωνισμός
lid, *El.* ii. 14, cf. vi. 13) in which the longer side of a rectangular
lelogram stands to a μέση γραμμή as the μέση γρ. stands to the
er side: see *de An.* ii. 2. 413 a. 17 τί ἐστι τετραγωνισμός; τὸ
ἑτερομήκει ὀρθογώνιον εἶναι ἰσόπλευρον. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὅρος λόγος τοῦ
ιράσματος· ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς μέσης εὕρεσις, τοῦ
ιατος λέγει τὸ αἴτιον.

10. διῄρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἃ] 'for the same distinction b. 5.
ns between the persons and between the things.' Here ὁμοίως
is the *qualitative sameness* of the λόγοι: see note on § 8, a. 31.
son quotes *Pol.* Γ. 5. 1280 a. 17 διῄρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπί τε
ραγμάτων καὶ οἷς.

11, 12, 13.] To take the Paraphrast's examples—α = Achilles

1131 b. 5. (100); β = Ajax (50); γ = reward of Achilles (10); δ = reward of Ajax (5):

(1) $\alpha : \beta = \gamma : \delta$

(2) ἐναλλάξ—alternando (Euclid v. 16.)

$$\alpha : \gamma = \beta : \delta$$

(3) ὥστε τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον (*sc.* ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον § 13) —componendo (Eucl. v. Def. 16).

$$\alpha + \gamma : \beta + \delta = \alpha : \beta.$$

The just distribution consists in putting together α and γ, β and δ: . . . ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι (§ 12).

b. 7. § 11. τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον] This phrase is elliptical: supply ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον as in § 13.

b. 8. ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει] 'this is the combination which the distribution effects.' Bywater's suggestion ἅπερ (*i.e.* the two terms united in the ὅλον: see his *Contributions to the Text. Crit. of Nic. Eth.* p. 44) is tempting.

b. 9. § 12. σύζευξις] This, Jackson points out, is Euclid's σύνθεσις (v. Def. 16): cf. συντεθῇ here. In Nic. Ger. ii. 23. 5. p. 125, Hoche, σύνθεσις is *multiplication*, not addition.

b. 10. καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, ⟨τὸ δ' ἄδικον⟩ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον] so Bywater, following Γ, which gives the words τὸ δ' ἄδικον, and K^b, L^b, Γ, which read τό before παρά for the τοῦ of M^b and other MSS.

b. 13. § 13. γεωμετρικήν] ἡ ἀναλογία ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν is called 'geometrical' on account of the large place which it occupies in geometry (see *e.g.* Eucl. Books v and vi), as compared with ἡ ἀναλογία ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, contrasted as ἀριθμητική. Ἀριθμός is ποσόν, whereas the 'similar figures' of geometrical proportion fall, as σχήματα, under the category of ποιότης (see *Cat.* 8. 10 a. 11). For γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία as ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν see Nicom. Ger. ii. 24. pp. 126, 127, Hoche—ἔστι δὲ ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία ὅταν . . . ποσότητι μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ διαφέρωσιν οἱ ὅροι ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ λόγου ποιότητι τῇ αὐτῇ, ἐναντίως ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς ὤφθη . . . οἷον β, δ, η, ὃν γὰρ λόγον ἔχει ὁ η πρὸς τὸν δ, τοῦτον καὶ ὁ δ πρὸς τὸν β καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὐ μὴν ἴσην ποσότητα μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων ἔχουσιν.

The Aristotelian explanation of Distributive Justice as κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν is derived from Plato: see *Gorgias* 507 and

Laws 757 quoted by Fritzsche. and by Grant in his introductory 1131 b.
note to this chapter. Cf. Plutarch, *Sympos.* viii. Quaest. 2, who asks why Plato represents God as a geometer. Among various explanations τοῦ ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖν τὸν θεόν he gives the following (*Symp.* viii. Q. 2. ch. 2, quoted by Fritzsche)—ὁ γὰρ Λυκοῦργος, οἶσθα δήπουθεν, ὅτι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν, ὡς δημοκρατικὴν καὶ ὀχλικὴν οὖσαν [but cf. the Pseudo-Archytas quoted above in note on v. 3. 7, a. 26]. ἐξέβαλεν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος· ἐπεισήγαγε δὲ τὴν γεωμετρικήν, ὀλιγαρχίᾳ σώφρονι καὶ βασιλείᾳ νομίμῳ πρέπουσαν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἴσον, ἡ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονέμει. καὶ οὐ πάντα ὁμοῦ μίγνυσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν εὔσημος ἐν αὐτῇ διάκρισις, οὐ ζυγοῖς, οὐδὲ κλήροις, ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας διαφορᾷ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀεὶ διαλαγχανόντων. ταύτην ὁ θεὸς ἐπάγει τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῖς πράγμασι, δίκην καὶ νέμεσιν, ὦ φίλε Τυνδάρη, προσαγορευομένην, καὶ διδάσκουσαν ἡμᾶς τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ ἴσον δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι ἴσαιον. ἣν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ διώκουσιν ἰσότητα, πασῶν ἀδικιῶν οὖσαν μεγίστην, θεὸς ἐξαίρων ὡς ἄπυστόν ἐστι, τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν διαφυλάττει, γεωμετρικῶς τῷ κατὰ λόγον καὶ κατὰ νόμον ὁριζόμενος. Cf. Plutarch, *de Fraterno Amore* 2 (quoted by Zell, p. 173) ὁ μὲν οὖν Σόλων ἀποφηνάμενος περὶ πολιτείας, τὴν ἰσότης στάσιν οὐ ποιεῖ, λίαν ἔδοξεν ὀχλικῶς, ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ δημοκρατικὴν εἰσάγειν ἀναλογίαν ἀντὶ τῆς καλῆς γεωμετρικῆς.

§ 14. ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία] Of course the γεωμετρικὴ b. 15.
ἀναλογία of distributive justice with its two persons and two things not συνεχής: but there are cases in which γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία is συνεχής—see Nicom. Geras. quoted above in note on v. 3. 9, a. 32 The μέση γραμμή of Eucl. vi. 13 is one term used twice.

γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον] Injustice in distribution b. 17.
ing the violation of proportion, 'it follows from this (ἄρα) that, in unjust distribution, one term is made too large, and the other small'—*i. e.* if the distribution is unjust the ὅλον $\alpha+\gamma$ will be de too large, and the ὅλον $\beta+\delta$ too small, or *vice versa*, in proportion to the relation subsisting between α and β (ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἕτερον). The inference γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον comes clearer if we supply in thought τὸ δ' ἀνάλογον μέσον (cf. 11 above) immediately before γίνεται.

ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει]. 'And this is also what b. 18
ually takes place'—*i. e.* 'actually takes place' (ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων βαίνει), as well as 'may be inferred from premisses' (λόγῳ

1131 b. 18. **συμβαίνει**) in the proof **τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον.**

b. 20. §§ 15, 16.] 'A repetition of ch. 1, § 10,' Grant.

b. 23. **καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον**] **τὸ μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν μεῖζον ἀγαθόν.**

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

The other kind of particular justice is that which 'corrects' inequalities arising out of transactions, voluntary and involuntary, between individuals. Justice in 'correction' is equality — not, however, that of ratios, as in geometrical ἀναλογία, but the equality which obtains in arithmetical ἀναλογία, where the mean is equally distant from each extreme. Thus the judge who 'corrects' an inequality arising out of a transaction neglects the possible inequality in 'merit' of the parties (which he could not do if 'distribution' had to be made), and takes account only of the difference produced by this particular transaction in the positions of parties whom he views simply as persons equally entitled to the undiminished possession of the ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά which happen to belong to them. The equality $x = x$, which subsisted before the transaction made a difference in the positions of the parties, is the arithmetical mean between their positions $x + 1$ and $x - 1$ after the transaction. The judge tries to make their positions equal again by reducing them to the arithmetical mean x, i. e. by taking from A's too-much $(x + 1)$ that part of it (1), which was acquired at B's expense, and adding it to B's too-little $(x - 1)$. If we call A the 'gainer' and B the 'loser' by the transaction, we may define 'corrective justice' as the mean between gain and loss. Accordingly when people think that they are 'losers' they appeal to the judge or 'middle-man,' as to the embodiment of the just mean. We must remember, however, in defining corrective justice as the mean between gain and loss, that, on the one hand, it is only as something which has a value to be afterwards paid for in the criminal court, that a blow can be called the 'gain' of the assailant and the 'loss' of his victim; and, on the other hand, that 'gain' and 'loss' in the original *sense of the terms,* i. e. *gain and loss incidental to trade, are not unjust, and therefore need no 'correction.'*

1131 b. 25. § 1. **τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἓν τὸ διορθωτικόν κ.τ.λ.**] See note on v. 2. 13. When distribution has to be made it is 'just' to give to each recipient a share proportioned to his 'merit': this is **τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον**, and its formula, as we have seen, is **ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία.** When a **συνάλλαγμα** between A and B has resulted in

ransference of part of A's merited share of τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά to 1131 b. 25.
: is 'just' to correct the anomaly by transferring back to A
ı B either the part in question, or its equivalent. This is τὸ
ωτικὸν (or ἐπανορθωτικόν, § 6) δίκαιον. Its mathematical formula
ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία (or μεσότης); for A and B are no longer
rded as possibly *unequally-meritorious* recipients in a distribution
made, but as persons *equally entitled* to enjoy the undiminished
ession of the shares, large or small, *which they have respectively*
ved: accordingly when, as the result of a συνάλλαγμα, B's share
creased at the expense of A's, the reduced share of A and the
ased share of B will appear as extremes between which the
lity of A and B, as persons entitled to the undiminished
ession of their shares, will fall as the 'arithmetical mean.'
$x = x$ represent the equality in the eye of the law of A and B,
rsons entitled to the undiminished possession of their respective
s—an equality which is not affected by the differences in per-
l character, working power, rank, &c., which would have to be
idered if A and B came up as recipients in a distribution: a
λαγμα between them reduces A's x to $x - 1$ and increases
r. to $x + 1$. It is 'just' to 'correct' this inequality, and the
ction is made by striking the 'arithmetical mean' x between
1 and $x + 1$, *i.e.* by restoring, in short, the parties to the
ions which they each occupied before the συνάλλαγμα.
his note on this § Jackson quotes the following passage from
t *ad loc.*—'The term "corrective justice" is itself an unfortunate
, because it appears only to lay down principles for restitution,
herefore implies wrong. Thus it has a tendency to confine
iew to "involuntary transactions," instead of stating what must
e principle of the just in all the dealings between man and
' On this Jackson remarks—'Apparently Grant forgets that
he original transaction which is said to be either voluntary or
untary, and that it is the rectification of wrong arising out of
riginal transaction with which corrective justice is concerned.'
example which Jackson gives of the rectification of 'wrong
ıg out of' a voluntary transaction is 'A borrows money from
ho is here ἑκών) and does not fulfil his engagement to repay
oan at a certain time; corrective justice takes from A the
er amount and restores it to B.' Here I would submit that
ıon-fulfilment of his engagement is not a 'wrong arising out of
riginal transaction' in the same sense in which *e.g.* the loss

1131 b. 25. of my purse is a wrong arising out of the 'original transaction' with the pickpocket. A's non-fulfilment of his engagement (his ability to repay being assumed) introduces a *new* relation, or συνάλλαγμα, between the parties, being a form of κλοπή, and belonging to the λαθραῖα division of ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα, not to the class of ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα. It is properly this new ἀκούσιον συνάλλαγμα out of which the wrong rectified in Jackson's example arises. At the same time I am ready to admit that Jackson's example of the διόρθωσις of 'wrong arising out of a voluntary transaction' is probably one which the writer of the Fifth Book would have accepted. As I remarked in my note on v. 2. 13, he probably thought rather of the enforcement against fraudulent or potentially fraudulent parties, of the original terms of ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα, and the settlement of disputes regarding the meaning of the original terms in the civil courts, than of the judicial rectification of unfortunate results, for which neither party is to blame, arising out of the συναλλάγματα—the terms of the συναλλάγματα not being in dispute—as *e.g.* when a Land Court 'rectifies' the result of a lease contracted in the open market. As it is, however, he gives no *examples* of τὸ διορθωτικὸν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις συναλλάγμασι[1]. I limit myself to saying that he gives no *examples*, for I think that Grant goes too far when he asserts that '*all that is said* [in this chapter] applies only to the "involuntary transactions."' I take it that the words in § 7—ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσι—may refer to 'voluntary' as well as to 'involuntary transactions.'

b. 26. § 2.] By ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν διανομή we must understand much more than the distribution made by some obvious central authority, such as a general who distributes prize money, or a board of directors who apportion dividends: far the most important form of the διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν is 'the distribution of wealth' which results from the operation of the 'economic laws' regulating wages and profits. The good workman contributes more (cf. the εἰσενεχθέντα of this passage) than the indifferent workman to the development of that wealth of the nation which is, as it were, the material body to which the State, as ψυχή, gives life and reality; and accordingly his reward is greater. Any attempt to interfere

[1] It is worth noticing that the difficulty of bringing the recovery of debt within the scope of judicial διόρθωσις was felt; see *E. N.* ix. 1. 9.

ith the wages or profits determined by free competition is an 1131 b. 26.
tempt to disturb a γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία, and to violate τὸ διανεμητικὸν
ιον. No such attempt can, in the nature of things, succeed
rmanently, its hope being, not to change a merely conventional
inciple of διανομή, but to defeat the law of the victory of the
ongest.

It is interesting to compare in this connexion the remarkable
ssage, *M. M.* i. 33. 1193 b. 36–1194 a. 25, in which distributive
stice is described as determining the returns of labour, and regu-
ing the exchanges which in *E. N.* v are discussed in the chapter
τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός (ch. 5). The writer of the *M. M.* differs from
writer of *E. N.* v in confining the principle of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός to
iminal cases, *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 a. 29–1194 b. 2.

§ 3. κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν] Mich. Eph. defines ἀριθ. ἀναλογία as 1132 a. 1.
lows: ἀναλογία ἀριθμητικὴ ἐστιν ἡ ποσοῦ μὲν ἴσου ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς,
ποῦ δὲ μὴ ἴσου ἢ μὴ ὁμοίου μετέχουσα: cf. Nicom. Ger. p. 124, ed.
che, ἔστιν οὖν ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης, ὅταν τριῶν ἢ πλειόνων ὅρων ἐφεξῆς
λλοις κειμένων ἐπινοουμένων ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ ποσότητα διαφορὰ εὑρίσκηται
ξὺ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχουσα, μὴ μέντοι λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ὅροις πρὸς
λλους γίνηται οἷον α, β, γ, δ, ε. . . . μετέχει ἄρα ἡ τοιαύτη ποσοῦ μὲν
ν ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς ποιοῦ δὲ οὐκέτι ἴσου· διὰ τοῦτο ἀριθμητική· εἰ δ'
αλιν ποιοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου μετεῖχε, ποσοῦ δ' οὔ, ἦν ἂν γεωμετρικὴ ἀντὶ
θμητικῆς.

οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.] When one man injures another man a. 2.
e examples in this § and the next are ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα ex-
sively), no account is taken of the possibly unequal 'worth' of
persons as recipients in a distribution, but only of 'the difference
duced by the hurt' (τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφοράν) in the positions of
ties who are *equally* entitled to enjoy the possession of their
.

n his note on this §, Grant says: 'Corrective justice is here said
egard each case impersonally as an affair of loss and gain, and
ween these it strikes the middle point. It is the moral worth of
sons that is ignored (εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον κ.τ.λ.), for we find after-
ds, ch. 5. §§ 3–4, that a consideration of the position and circum-
ces of persons *does* come in to modify the estimate of the loss
ained from an indignity,' &c. It must be remembered, however,
in the cases here alluded to by Grant (v. 5. 4 οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων
αξεν . . . καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν), 'the loss sustained [*sc. by the*

1132 a. 2. *individual himself*] from an indignity' is not the most important thing to be estimated, but rather the *public evil* arising from acts which tend to diminish the authority and *prestige* of a magistrate. I do not think that it is fair to the writer to assume (as Grant seems to do) that he regards in v. 5. 4 merely the individual's personal loss, and not also the public evil involved in the offence; but it must be admitted that he does not see at all clearly that the case εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν is not *sui generis*. Even when one ordinary citizen injures another ordinary citizen, the true nature of the situation created is misrepresented by the term συνάλλαγμα applied to it. We are not concerned merely with a relation between two individuals *in vacuo*, but with a sore in the body politic, which must be healed by means which take account of the whole organism. Διόρθωσις is much more than making the ἀδικῶν give 'compensation' to the ἀδικούμενος—indeed it is sometimes impossible to 'compensate' him at all. The words before us here (v. 4. 3)—οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.—are significant, as showing how abstract the writer's notion of τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον is. He is thinking here only of the 'compensation' given to the individual. The good moral character of the ἀδικῶν does not indeed make the wrong which he inflicts one for which the ἀδικούμενος should get less 'compensation' than for an equal wrong inflicted by a bad man; but the claims of the ἀδικούμενος to compensation having been satisfied, it still remains to be considered by the 'court of correction' how far society has been endangered by the offence, and how much ought to be added to the penalty on that account; and here 'previous good character' is not irrelevant. The formula of the ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης seems to me to have stood in the way of the writer's taking a complete view of the nature of 'Corrective Justice.'

a. 7. § 4. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν κ.τ.λ.] 'for even when one man is struck, and another strikes, or one man kills, and another is killed, it is a case of unequal division between patient and agent'—*i. e.* the situation created by a theft is only a more obvious, but not a more real, case of 'unequal division' than that created by an assault or a murder.

a. 9. ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους] I am inclined (though with considerable hesitation) to agree with Münscher (*Quaest. Crit.* p. 70) and Jackson that ζημίᾳ is not (as Mich. Eph. and others suppose) the instrumental dative here = 'by the penalty

: (the judge) inflicts,' but the impaired position of the injured 1132 a. 9.
: opposed to the κέρδος, or augmented position of the injur-
y. The fact that in the context ζημία describes the position
jured party seems to favour this view. Jackson's rendering
πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν τὸ κέρδος ἀφαιρῶν αὐτοῦ. "He endea-
equalise the unjustly augmented advantages of the one (τὸ
ıd the unjustly impaired advantages of the other (τὴν ζημίαν)
g from the former and giving to the latter."' The gen.
roῦ κέρδους (not ἀφαιρῶν τὸ κέρδος) seems to show that κέρδος
ere for the *whole* position of the πλέον ἔχων, not for the un-
tained *part* of it.

3. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν . . . καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία a. 10.
ıδος] The terms ζημία and κέρδος are applied strictly (οἰκείως)
ere A has come out of an ἑκούσιον συνάλλαγμα poorer (in
of ἀργύριον ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον), while B has come out of it
still, metaphorically we speak of the ζημία of the man who
ı struck, and of the κέρδος of the man who has struck him:
however, till the damage done comes to be estimated, that
s are thus metaphorically applied: *i. e.* the infliction of a
could not be described as κέρδος to the person inflicting it,
or the reason that it has a value in the criminal court and
e to be paid for: see Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 122)—'Trende-
(*Hist. Beiträge zur Ph.* iii. p. 425) denkt bei μετρηθῇ an
.re Klagen, und interpretirt im übrigen wie Barthélemy
ilaire: mais quand le juge a pu mesurer le dommage
. le profit de l'un devient sa perte, et la perte de l'autre
son profit. Aber diese Auffassung ist schon wegen γέ un-
. Nach meiner Ansicht ist zu übersetzen: aber erst dann
ıan das eine ζημία, das andere κέρδος, wenn das Erlittene
n ist.' Another objection to the view of Trendelenburg
int-Hilaire is that although the judge's rectification is
· called (καλεῖται) ζημία (*i. e.* = penalty) so far as the πατάξας
rned, its result for the παθών is never *called* κέρδος.

ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν . . . κέρδους] I do not think that a. 18.
any significance in the substitution here of ἐπανορθωτικόν for
όν. A comparison of the words before us with § 14 below
δους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον
itted to exhibit the difficulty in which the writer is placed
onception of τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις συναλ-

1132 a. 18. λάγμασι. In the clause before us (§ 6) we naturally assume that, in accordance with the statement made at the beginning of this chapter, τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον is τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους, not only in ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα (from which the examples are exclusively taken), but also in ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα. In § 13, however, he tells us that ζημία and κέρδος originally and properly mean that loss and gain (having less and having more than one started with) which the law, so far from attempting to correct, *permits* in voluntary exchanges, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος, and that, where an attempt is made by the law to correct ζημία and κέρδος, it is not ζημία and κέρδος in such voluntary transactions as buying and selling, but in *involuntary* transactions; his final summing-up being (§ 14) ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον—'accordingly (corrective) justice is the mean between gain of a certain kind and loss of a certain kind, *i. e.* between gain and loss in involuntary transactions.' Here τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον, referring to and explaining κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας τινός, is an inexact abbreviation for τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συναλλάγμασι: so the Paraph.—ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι· λέγω δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν . . . τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις συναλλάγμασι κέρδος οὔτε ἄδικόν ἐστιν οὔτε εὐθύνεται· τούτων γὰρ ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος. It is difficult to reconcile this summing-up with the position from which the writer starts, that corrective justice is the rectification of inequalities arising ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις: but see note on v. 4. 14, b. 18 where Jackson's view is discussed.

a. 22. § 7. καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον] Fritzsche quotes Thuc. iv. 83 ἑτοῖμος ὢν Βρασίδᾳ μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν.

a. 23. μεσιδίους] Zell quotes *Pol.* E. 5. 1306 a. 28 ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ.

a. 28. § 8. δίχα διαιρεθῇ] 'to divide into two *equal* parts,' Jackson, who refers to Eucl. *El.* i. 10, i. 9, iii. 30: cf. also Nic. Ger. ἀριθ. εἰσαγ. i. 8. 4, p. 15, Hoche.

a. 29. § 9.] The sentence τὸ δ' ἴσον . . . ἀναλογίαν Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 30) supposes to have changed places with διὰ τοῦτο . . . διχαστής —'Die richtige Gedankenfolge wird hergestellt, wenn der Satz διὰ τοῦτο—διχαστής vor den Satz τὸ δ' ἴσον—ἀναλογίαν gestellt und an

lie etymologische Bemerkung angeschlossen wird, zu der er ganz 1132 a. 29.
rsichtlich gehört. Erst dann gewinnt sowohl διὰ τοῦτο, als γάρ
eine richtige Beziehung.'

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται . . . δικαστής] See Alex. *Met.* p. 718. a. 30.
. ed. Bonitz (on 1078 b. 21) δικαιοσύνη γάρ φασιν [οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι]
ττὶν ἀριθμὸς ὁ διαιρῶν τὴν δεκάδα δίχα. Cf. also *Theol. Arith.* p. 12
Ast's edition), quoted here by Jackson, Δίκη τε, οἱονεὶ δίχη καὶ Ἴσις
τ.λ. It is scarcely necessary to remind the student that the
riginal meaning of δίκη is *custom* or *usage*—cf. δίκη βροτῶν, 'the way
f mortals'; and that consequently δίκαιον = νόμιμον is earlier than
ἴσον = ἴσον.

§ 12. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν α α . . . κ.τ.λ.] 'The lines (γραμμαί) over b. 6.
hich we write α . . . α, β . . . β,' *i.e.* 'the lines α α, β β.' As Jack-
on remarks, 'the genitive and the dative appear to be used indiffer-
ntly in such phrases'; hence, in b. 7, τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ γ δ (O^b and CCC—
ough in CCC there are traces of erasure after ᾧ) ought to be read
r Bekker's τὸ ἐφ' ὧν γ δ. 'It will be observed,' Jackson notes,
that the whole lines are described as ἡ α α, κ.τ.λ., and the segments
f them as τὸ α ε, κ.τ.λ. Thus ἡ α α is what Euclid would call ἡ α α
ραμμή, τὸ α ε what he would call τὸ α ε τμῆμα.'

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν . . . b. 11. τοιοῦτον] All b. 9.
SS. give these words, both here, and (*without* ἄν) in ch. 5. § 9.
133 a. 14, where they are explicable in the context. Here they
re clearly out of place, and must have crept by some accident
nto the archetype of all existing MSS. If we suppose that in the
S. from which the archetype was copied, the text from 1132 b.
1 ἐλήλυθε to 1133 a. 14 ἴσασθῆναι exactly filled the reverse side of
ne folio (A), and the obverse side of the next folio (B), we can
e that the copyist, reaching τῷ γ δ 1132 b. 9 at the bottom of the
bverse side of folio A, and accidentally turning over two leaves
A and B), instead of one[1], would find the words ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.
133 a. 14 at the top of the reverse side of folio B, and might
anscribe them after γ δ 1132 b. 9, before he found out his mistake.
he marked them for omission, the next transcriber might easily
il to notice his mark.

The words having thus established themselves in v. 4. 12, their

[1] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 38 note) gives an instance of this accident in the case
N^b.

1132 b. 9. occurrence again in v. 5. 9 would, of course, be a difficulty for later scribes; and I cannot help thinking that the omission of ἂν in the latter place was an awkward attempt on the part of a later, but very early scribe (for *all* the MSS[1]. and the Aldine edition omit ἂν 1133 a. 15) to minimise the difficulty by making the writer appear to refer back with the imperfect ἐπροοῦτο to a statement already made. The result is, of course, an unjustifiable sentence. Aristotle *alludes* with the imperfect ἦν to a doctrine previously stated, but if he wishes *to quote the exact words* of a previous sentence he does so with ὡς ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, or some such phrase. It is conceivable, however, that a copyist in difficulty might ignore this distinction. At any rate I feel sure that it was by no mere accident, but on a *theory* of some kind or other, that a succession of scribes down to the time of the Aldine edition steadily refused to admit the grammatically necessary ἂν in v. 5. 9, while they read it in v. 4. 12.

Whether the clause is genuine even in v. 5. 9 will be examined in the note on that §. The foregoing hypothesis to account for its presence in v. 4. 12 assumes only that it was present in v. 5. 9 *before* it appeared in v. 4. 12, but not that it is genuine, *i.e.* was always present, in v. 5. 9.

b. 11. §§ 13, 14.] See note on v. 4. 6, a. 18.

b. 15. § 13. ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν] Grant has a good note here—'In commerce of all kinds the law allows one to gain as much as one can. In involuntary transactions the law allows no gain to be made, but brings things always back to their level. This non-interference of the law with bargains becomes, if carried out, the principle of free-trade.'

b. 16. § 14. ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ⟨τὰ add. Rassow, Bywater⟩ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν] Bekker's full stop before ὅταν b. 16 should be removed: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 94.

On the αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν [or αὐτῶν] of the MSS., I quote Jackson's note, in which he gives the various interpretations which the editors have offered of the words, and adds an interpretation of his own—'αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται.] The editors all read δι' αὐτῶν, and most take these words in connection with αὐτά. "Nemo interpretum haec

[1] Jackson states that all the ten MSS. (including K^b) examined by him omit ἂν here. I can add that CCC and B^{12} also omit it.

verba intellexit," says Michelet. "Felicissime vertit: [illegible] 1132 b 14. *per se ipsa evaserint*; Argyropylus: [illegible] *per se ipsa* [illegible]: Lambinus: *sed paria paribus respondere*. Cum § 13 dixisset nomina [illegible] et [illegible] orta esse ex contractibus [illegible] § 14 proponit, ea nomina translata esse ad contractibus ex delicto [illegible] ut in iis solis usurpentur. Verte: [illegible] *habent, praeterquam quae per se ipsa facta sunt*, &c." Rassow (*Forschungen*, p. 94) proposes to insert τὰ before δ' αὐτῶν [Bywater adopts Rassow's τά], and to translate "das was man durch seine eigene Arbeit besass." Grant would construe "but result in being themselves by means of reciprocity, *i. e.* by mutual giving and taking, ἀλλήλων being equivalent to ἑαυτῶν." Finally, as I learn from a note to Williams' translation, Professor Chandler reads δι' αὐτῶν, and translates "But when, by buying and selling (δι' αὐτῶν), men have got neither more nor less than they had at first, but exactly the same." Agreeing with Professor Chandler in his rendering of πλέον, ἔλαττον, and αὐτά (*sc.* τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς), I take δι' αὐτῶν γίνηται to mean "comes into their possession." If we can say δι' αὐτῶν εἶναι "to be in their possession" *Polit.* vii. (vi.) 4. p. 182. 28, viii. (v.) 1. p. 194. 23. 6. p. 206. 2 (see Eucken, *über den Sprachgebrauch des A.* ii. 38), surely δι' αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι must also be admissible. The sentence thus means, as it ought to do, "But when people *get* what is their own, they are said to *have* what is their own." Cf. *Polit.* viii. (v.) 7. p. 208. 26 μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὑτῶν.' It may be conceded that δι' αὐτῶν γίνηται would in certain contexts be good Greek for 'comes into their possession,' although it is to be noted that the idea of 'management,' in addition to that of mere 'possession,' seems to be conveyed in the passages on which Jackson relies; the difficulty, however, of accepting Jackson's interpretation of the words in the present case is that of breaking up the phrase αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν [or αὑτῶν], which seems to be an organic whole. The passages quoted by Jackson, after Eucken, perhaps throw light on δι' αὐτῶν [or αὑτῶν] γίνηται, but not on αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν [or αὑτῶν]—viz. *Pol.* 1306 a. 16 τῆς πολιτείας δι' ὀλίγων οὔσης: 1301 b. 12 τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται τὴν αὐτὴν δι' αὑτῶν δὲ εἶναι βούλονται: 1293 a. 28 τὸ δι' αὐτῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν. It seems to me that αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν cannot be broken up, and that αὐτῶν is necessarily neuter, referring to the same subject as αὐτά. The phrase does not, it would appear, occur elsewhere in the Aristotelian Corpus; but in Theophrastus, *Met.* i. 1 (Brandis, p. 309) we have, οὔτ' ἄγαν εὔσημος

1132 b. 16. ἡ [*sc.* τῶν μαθηματικῶν] συναφὴ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς . . . οἷον γὰρ μεμηχανημένα δοκεῖ δι' ἡμῶν εἶναι σχήματά τε καὶ μορφὰς καὶ λόγους περιτιθέντων, αὐτὰ δὲ δι' αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει φύσιν: *i. e.* geometrical truths are thought to be arbitrarily constructed by us, and to have *in and of themselves* no independent reality: cf. also Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apollon.* 1 οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν ἰατρῶν πρὸς τὰς ἀθρόας τῶν ῥευμάτων ἐπιφορὰς εὐθὺς προσφέρουσι τὰς διὰ τῶν φαρμάκων βοηθείας, ἀλλ' ἐῶσι τὸ βαρὺ τῆς φλεγμονῆς διὰ τῆς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπιχρίστων ἐπιθέσεως αὐτὸ δι' αὑτοῦ λαβεῖν πέψιν.

I take αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν [or αὑτῶν] then in the present passage as one expression in which δι' αὐτῶν strengthens αὐτά, and explain: 'But when there has resulted neither more nor less [than what they started with], but simply the original amount itself'—*i. e.* the original amount not affected from without in any way, but remaining 'in and through itself' the same. Rassow's easy emendation gives good sense, but I prefer the αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν of the codd. explained as above.

b. 18. ὥστε κέρδους . . . ὕστερον] see note on v. 4. 6, a. 18. Jackson's view alluded to at the end of that note is as follows, p. 86 'τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον] This is not inconsistent with 2. § 13 and 4. § 1, because, whether the original transaction was ἀκούσιον or ἑκούσιον, the *result* must have been παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον in regard to the person injured, else there would be nothing to rectify': and he translates the clause—'Thus τὸ [διορθωτικὸν] δίκαιον is a mean between a sort of profit and a sort of loss in matters which are not voluntary—the possession of exactly as much after the transaction as before it.' Jackson's point here then is that τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον is not, as the Paraph. assumes it to be, equivalent to τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συναλλάγμασι, but serves to mark that kind of ζημία (resulting, it may be, from an ἑκούσιον συνάλλαγμα) which the losing party resents, and can have judicially rectified, as distinguished from that other kind of ζημία which he accepts as bad luck in business. I admit that this interpretation of τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον is ingenious, and would be plausible, if we could be sure that we were dealing here with the unbroken statement of a consistent doctrine of corrective justice. In the absence, however, of anything like certainty on this point, I think that it is safer to explain the two passages, §§ 5, 6, and §§ 13, 14 (whether written by the same author or not cannot be settled, and does not matter much) independently of each other. Sections 5 and 6 regard the κέρδος and ζημία, between which τὸ

κὸν δίκαιον is said to be τὸ μέσον, as *eminently* the κέρδος and 1132 b. 18.
:h result from ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα: and *illegal* κέρδος and
ing out of ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα, though theoretically im-
: not prominent in the writer's mind. Sections 13
I think, are to the following effect—'ζημία and κέρδος
) called are in voluntary exchanges, and are allowed, *i. e.*
": hence where ζημία and κέρδος are not allowed, *i. e.* are
they are so called in a metaphorical sense, *i. e.* they are the
κέρδος which result from *involuntary transactions.*' These
ıbtedly the most eminent examples of 'unjust' ζημία and
ıd the passage, I believe, confines itself to them; whether
he writer purposely limited his statement, or because the
13, 14) are, as Ramsauer supposes p. 315, fragmentary,
undertake to decide. The consistency of ch. 4 would
: much more evident, I think, than it is, to make it likely
παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον is not opposed to τῆς ἑκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς
l does not stand for τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συναλλάγμασι.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

*:e thought that 'suffering or receiving in return,' meaning by this
ır receiving* the same *in return,' is an adequate definition of justice.
'efinition does not explain the nature either of distributive or of
ustice. Corrective justice does not proceed on the principle of 'an
ye'; it takes account of circumstances and motives, and also makes
suffer, not the same thing, but* that which is equivalent; *and it is*
uivalent to *the product of his labour, but not the same in kind,*
*ributive justice assigns to each member of the community; in
, the subsistence of the social community requires that each labourer
e from other labourers* in exchange for *his product, not the same
an equivalent amount of other products. Thus, if labourers A
their respective products* α *and* β, *be arranged in a square*

A *B*

α β

that exchange is 'cross-conjunction,' i. e. *the conjunction of A and* β
' α. *Since, however, the values of the unit products of different
iffer, there could be no* fair *exchange unless it were possible to
n each case what amount of one product is* equivalent to *what*

amount of another product. This is possible by means of money, which is a 'medium of exchange' or 'common measure of things exchanged.' Of course 'need' or 'demand' is the real medium; and money is merely its conventional representative; but it is necessary to 'represent' or universalize need; since need in the concrete, i.e. *the need of this particular product, varies too much to be a standard of value, whereas money which enables a man to get* anything he needs *is something which he always needs equally—or nearly equally (for the value of money fluctuates slightly);* i.e. *money is something which he is always willing to take in exchange for his product.*

From what has been said it is plain that 'doing justice' is striking the mean between the position of the party who injures and that of the party who is injured, and that the habit of justice is a mean state, not however in the same sense in which the other virtues are mean states, but because, in the apportionment of external good things, it produces a mean, i.e. *always assigns an amount which is the mean between the too much and the too little which injustice assigns. The just man deliberately assigns to himself and to others that amount which is exactly proportioned to his and their 'merit' in each case, neither too much nor too little. The unjust man deliberately assigns too much of that which is good, and too little of that which is evil, to himself; and where he does not himself come in for a share, tends to give undue preference to one or other of the two parties between whom he makes distribution.*

1132 b. 21. § 1. **τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός**] The writer having explained the two εἴδη of Particular Justice, now proceeds in ch. 5 to discuss certain points, some connected with Distributive Justice, and some with Corrective Justice, which might have been discussed in chapters 3 and 4 under their own heads, but seem to come before the reader more naturally and suggestively when allowed to arise out of the criticism of a famous theory of justice with which he is already familiar.

Τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, literally '*that which* has suffered or received in return,' is somewhat strangely used instead of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέναι. Ἀντιπεπονθέναι in mathematics[1] is 'to be reciprocally proportional': ἀντιπεπόνθησις is 'reciprocal proportion'; and τὰ ἀντιπεπονθότα are 'magnitudes which are reciprocally proportional': see Euclid, *El.* vi. Def. 2.—'Two sides of one figure are said to be *reciprocally proportional* to two sides of another, when one of the sides of the first is to one of the sides of the second, as the remaining side of the second is to the remaining side of the first.' The enunciation of Euclid *El.* vi. 15 is τῶν ἴσων καὶ μίαν μιᾷ ἴσην ἐχόντων γωνίαν τριγώνων ἀντιπεπόνθασιν αἱ πλευραὶ αἱ περὶ τὰς ἴσας γωνίας· καὶ ὧν μίαν μιᾷ ἴσην ἐχόντων γωνίαν τριγώνων ἀντιπεπόνθασιν αἱ πλευραὶ αἱ περὶ τὰς ἴσας γωνίας, ἴσα ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνα.

[1] I wish to acknowledge indebtedness to Jackson's note, p. 93.

Let (1) and (2) be equal triangles having angles A and X equal. 1132 b. 21.

Then $AB : XY :: XZ : AC$.

Or let $AB : XY :: XZ : AC$, and angle $A = X$, then the triangles are equal.



Here the ἀντιπεπόνθησις, or 'reciprocal proportion,' consists in this, that if triangle (1) is superior in respect of its side AB to (2) in respect of its side XY, on the other hand (2) is equally superior in respect of its side XZ to (1) in respect of its side AC.

In mathematics the term ἀντιπεπονθός, ἀντιπεπονθέναι, or ἀντιπεπόνθησις, thus means unambiguously 'reciprocal proportion.' But when we apply this technical mathematical term to express the concrete case of the 'just reciprocation' which ought to subsist between two persons, it immediately becomes ambiguous. When we say that 'it is just that A should get or suffer in return what he has given to or inflicted upon B,' do we mean that he should get or suffer *the same thing*, or *something different but 'equivalent'?* And if something different, but 'equivalent,' what is to be the standard of equivalence? In the so-called ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα a natural instinct of the primitive man calls aloud for 'the same thing.' This instinct found formal expression in the law, 'an eye for an eye,' of ancient penal codes, and still asserts itself in those modern codes which retain the death-punishment for murder. It was only comparatively late reflection which suggested that the ends of criminal justice were, in most cases at least, best served by a retribution equivalent to the injury, but not the same in kind. In the case of the ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα, however, men necessarily saw from the very first that ἀνταπόδοσις could not be corn for corn, but must be corn for something else, and that the ἀνταπόδοσις would be fair, only if the *value* of the corn given in return equalled the *value* of the thing received. Thus the notion of *value*, ἀξία, proportion, forced itself upon them from the very first in the case of ἑκούσια

1132 b. 21. *συναλλάγματα*, but was long absent from their reflection upon *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*.

In the present passage the writer accuses the Pythagoreans, together with others, of confounding justice with 'simple reciprocation'; 'simple reciprocation' being 'retaliation,' or that reciprocation which proceeds according to the principle of 'an eye for an eye.' 'But there are some who think that simple reciprocation, or "suffering the same in return," is all that is involved in the notion of justice. This was the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who defined justice simply (*i. e.* without any *πρόσθεσις* or qualification) as "reciprocation," or "suffering the same in return"'—an opinion which in § 3 is identified with that of the line *εἴ κε πάθοι κ.τ.λ.* Here then the charge brought against the Pythagoreans is that they confounded justice, as a whole, with the *lex talionis* which, as we have seen, recommends itself to a primitive instinct as the law of *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*. The writer's criticism (§§ 2–5), and consequent construction (§§ 6 &c.)—in which the famous conception of *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* is not cast aside, but skilfully used—consist in turning the reader from these *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* which are so misleading in this connexion, if attended to exclusively, and asking him to observe *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* in *ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα* as well, in order to obtain there a truer view of its nature, and return with this truer view to the explanation of it in the *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*.

It seems to be very likely, however, that, in charging the Pythagoreans with the identification of 'justice' and 'retaliation,' the writer is mistaken. There can be no doubt, of course, that they spoke of justice as *ἀντιπεπονθός*: but it is probable that, in doing so, they thought merely of the mathematical implication of the term, without pledging themselves to the doctrine of 'an eye for an eye,' or indeed to any doctrine which could be said to have much *ethical* significance. This would be entirely in keeping with their treatment of the other 'virtues,' which they explained fantastically, by mathematical formulae, without, apparently, paying much attention to their concrete content: see Alex. on *Met.* A. 5. 985 b. 26 (quoted by Jackson from Zeller i. 360) *τῆς μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες εἶναι τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός τε καὶ ἴσον, ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τοῦτο εὑρίσκοντες ὄν, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ἰσάκις ἴσον ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον ἔλεγον εἶναι δικαιοσύνην . . . τοῦτον δὲ οἱ μὲν τὸν τέσσαρα ἔλεγον . . . οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐννέα*: see also *Theol. Arith.* p. 28 (Ast), quoted by Jackson, 'where the Pythagorean definition of justice is said to be *δύναμις*

ἀποδόσεως τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ προσήκοντος, ἐμπεριεχομένη ἀριθμοῦ τετραγώνου 1132 b. 21.
περισσοῦ μεσότητι.' The other virtues were similarly formulated: see *M. M.* i. 1. 1182 a. 11 πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρησεν ὁ Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ· τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος. I think then that there is good reason for doubting whether the Pythagoreans with their mathematical expression τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, pledged themselves to the doctrine of simple retaliation with which the writer of the Fifth Book charges them. At any rate the pseudo-Archytas (apud Stob. *Flor.* ii. 138 ed. Meineke), who, I suppose, hoped to pass for a Pythagorean, gives a very different account of the expression from that ascribed to the Pythagoreans by the writer of the Fifth Book. Discoursing περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης, this 'Pythagorean' says δεῖ δὴ τὸν νόμον τὸν κάρρονα καὶ τὰν πόλιν ἐκ πασᾶν σύνθετον εἶμεν τᾶν ἄλλαν πολιτειᾶν· καὶ ἔχεν τι βασιλήας καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τᾷ Λακεδαίμονι· τοὶ μὲν γὰρ βασιλέες τᾶς μοναρχίας, τοὶ δὲ γέροντες τᾶς ἀριστοκρατίας, τοὶ δὲ ἔφοροι τᾶς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἱππαγρέται δὲ καὶ κόροι τᾶς δαμοκρατίας· δεῖ τοίνυν τὸν νόμον μὴ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν ἦμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντιπεπονθέναι τοῖς αὐτῶ μερέεσσιν [legem igitur oportet non solum bonam et honestam esse, sed etiam singulis suis sive reipublicae partibus oppositam—Mullach, *Frag. Phil.* i. 560]. οὗτος γὰρ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ βέβαιος· τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθέναι λέγω αὐτῶ, καὶ ἄρχεν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι τὰν αὐτὰν ἀρχάν [partibus singulis eam oppositam esse dico, ita ut idem magistratus aliis imperet aliis obediat], ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τᾷ εὐνομωτάτᾳ Λακεδαίμονι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ βασιλεῦσιν τοὶ ἔφοροι ἀντικάθηνται, τούτοις δ' οἱ γέροντες, μέσοι δ' οἱ κόροι καὶ ἱππαγρέται· ἐφ' ὃ γὰρ ἂν ῥέψωντι τοὶ πλεονεκτέοντες τῶν ἀρχόντων, οὗτοι τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑποτίθενται.

ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ] ἄλλῳ seems to be given only by K^b P^b and b. 23.
CCC[1]; and Jackson omits it, 'because it is grammatically impossible to combine it with ἀντιπεπονθός.' (The ἀντιπεπονθέναι τοῖς αὐτῶ μερέεσσιν of the ps.-Archytas quoted above seems to show that it is not impossible.) He suspects 'that ἄλλῳ is a corruption of ἄλλως prefixed to one of the double readings which in the following sentence are preserved by P^b, and therefore may have occurred in the common progenitor of P^b and K^b.' The reading of P^b is ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ, τὸ δ' ἀντιπεποιθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νόμιμον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολιτικόν, πολιτικὸν δὲ λέγω τὸ κοινωνικόν, τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθός,

[1] B^1 has ἄλλων.

1132 b. 22. κ.τ.λ. Camb. has the same interpolation (with νόμιμον εἰς, for νόμιμον), and on the margin, in a later hand, the word περιττόν.

§ 2. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει] 'receiving, or suffering, the *same* in return' is a definition of justice which is inapplicable, whether we consider justice as distributive or corrective; and there is no third kind of justice. Mich. Eph. has an interesting note here—αἰτιᾶται δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τῶν Πυθαγορείων τὸ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς δίκαιον, καὶ μὴ διορίσαι, μηδὲ προσθεῖναι τὸ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν· τὸ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀντιπάσχειν ἕκαστον ὁ πεπόνθαμεν οὐδαμῶς δίκαιον. οὗ σημεῖον παρίθετο τὸ μὴ ἐφαρμόττειν αὐτὸ μήτε τῷ διανεμητικῷ δικαίῳ μήτε τῷ διορθωτικῷ εἰς ἃ τὸ δίκαιον διῄρηται· ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐκ ἐφαρμόζει ἐκείνοις; ἢ ὅτι ἐκείνων ἑκάτερον ἐν ἀναλογίᾳ ἐστί, τὸ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρικῇ τὸ δ' ἀριθμητικῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν οὐδετέρᾳ τῶν ἀναλογιῶν ὑποτίθεται, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ταὐτὸν τῷ διανεμητικῷ οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν δῆλον· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἦν τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀντιπεπονθότι οὐκ ἔστι· ποῦ γὰρ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν εἰ δοῦλος εὐγενῆ καὶ σπουδαῖον μίαν πληγὴν πλήξει, καὶ αὐτὸν μίαν ἀντεπληγῆναι, ἢ εἰ ἱερέα λακτίσει ἀντιλακτισθῆναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ διορθωτικῷ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διορθωτικὸν αὖτ' αὐτὰ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπάσχειν τοὺς ποιήσαντας· οὐ γὰρ ὀδόντα ἀντὶ ὀδόντος ἀξιοῖ ἐξαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τιμᾶσθαι πόσου καὶ οἵου ἄξιος ὁ ὀδοὺς ἢ ὁ ὀφθαλμός, ἢ εἴτι ἂν ᾖ τὸ μέλος, οἷον εἰ δέκα νομισμάτων, ταῦτα ἀπαιτεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ διδόναι τῷ πεπονθότι τὴν στέρησιν τοῦ ὀδόντος ἢ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ. It will be noticed that Mich. Eph. in this passage thinks of a 'Distribution of Punishments' κατ' ἀξίαν. He says that to punish, on the ἀντιπεπονθός principle, a slave who strikes a gentleman would be inconsistent with the διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον. The Paraphrast is, I think, more fortunate in his illustration. He says—Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὐδενὶ εἴδει τοῦ δικαίου. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ διορθωτικόν· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς διανομῆς οὐ δυνατὸν ἀεὶ τὸν πολίτην ἐκεῖνα πάσχειν εὖ ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἅπερ ἐποίησεν· εἰ γὰρ τύραννον ἀπέκτεινε, πῶς τὸ αὐτὸ πείσεται; 'Receiving the same in return' is an erroneous account of distributive justice, because in it the dividend which a man receives ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ is not the same in kind as the contribution which he makes to the common capital: *e.g.* the musician is not paid in music, but in money according to his skill. It is also an erroneous account of corrective justice, because it makes punishment merely a matter of immediate personal revenge, ignoring the interests of society, which demand the establishment of an impartial court able

ake account of the position and circumstances of the parties as 1132 b. 23.
nbers of the State, and to estimate carefully degrees of respon-
ity.

3. καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος δίκαιον] b. 25.
he Pythagoreans appeal to the venerable authority of Rhada-
thus.

τ'] the conjecture of Coraes and Jackson for the τά κ' of the b. 27.
. is probably correct.

κη κ' ἰθεῖα] Fritzsche quotes Hom. *Hymn. in Cer.* 152 ἰθείῃσι
, and compares Latin *rectus*, Germ. *Recht.*

4. πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ] *i. e.* in many cases just correction b. 28.
simple retaliation do not agree. The examples introduced by
seem to refer only to correction, unless we are to follow Mich.
in thinking of a 'distribution of punishments.'

ον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων κ.τ.λ.] As was pointed out in note on v. 4. 3,
writer, in this remark, probably recognises the public aspect of
shment. Hitherto he has described punishment or 'correction'
fecting the ἀδικῶν and ἀδικούμενος only. We can in this instance
the advantage of the method in morals which builds upon
dations discovered by the examination of ἔνδοξα. Had the
r not found the so-called Pythagorean position imperfect, it
ld perhaps not have occurred to him to remove a vital imper-
on in his own theory of 'correction,' even in the slight and
fficient way in which he does so in the present passage. The
ph. Heliodorus has a discriminating note here—*ὁ γὰρ τὸν ἄρχοντα
ήσας, τὴν τάξιν τῆς πολιτείας ἀνεῖλε, καὶ οὐ τυπτήσεται, ἀλλ' ἀπο-
ήσεται· καὶ ὁ τὸν γάμον τοῦ πέλας διαφθείρας, πείσεται μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς
ς, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ δέ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.* Cf. *Probl.* ΚΘ. 14. 952
8 (referred to by Fritzsche) *οἷον καὶ ἐὰν μέν τις ἄρχοντα κακῶς
μεγάλα τὰ ἐπιτίμια, ἐὰν δέ τις ἰδιώτην, οὐδέν· καὶ καλῶς· οἴεται γὰρ
οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν τὸν κατηγοροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἣν πόλιν ὑβρίζειν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ λιμένι κλέπτοντα
ίνον τὸν ἰδιώτην βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν αἰσχύνειν.*

5. ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ] The Par. b. 30.
od. merely says *εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀκουσίως καὶ ἀγνοῶν ἔβλαψε τὸν πέλας,
καιόν ἐστιν ὁμοίως ἀντιβλαβῆναι,* and Mich. Eph. says *εἰ . . . ἑκὼν
ικεν ἢ ἄκων ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐπανορθωτικῷ δικαίῳ ἐξετάζεται, καὶ εἰ μὲν*

1133 b. 30. εὑρέθη ἑκὼν δράσας εὐθύνεται μειζόνως εἰ δ' ἄκων μετριωτέρως· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀντιπεπονθότος οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐξετάζεται. So far as the impulse to retaliate in kind is an irrational one, it will not stop to enquire whether an injury is intended (ἑκούσιον), or is merely due to accident (ἀκούσιον); but perhaps the words before us imply something more than this, which the writer of the *M. M.* (i. 33. 1194 a. 37) has expressed—οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, εἴ τις τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξέκοψεν τινός, ἀντεκκοπῆναι μόνον, ἀλλὰ πλείονα παθεῖν, ἀκολουθήσαντα τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς πρότερος καὶ ἠδίκησεν, *i. e.* if justice is 'receiving the same in return,' the aggressor whose assault is voluntary, and perhaps entirely unprovoked, will suffer in return exactly what he has inflicted on his perhaps innocent victim: but he ought to suffer more.

b. 31. § 6. ἀλλ' . . . ἡ πόλις] The editors quote *Pol.* B. 2. 1261 a. 30 διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον—where τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός = τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν of the present passage.

Τὴν πόλιν is probably to be supplied as the object of συνέχει.

Τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἰσότητα is 'receiving *the same* in return'—a conception which does not explain either punishment, or the distribution of profits, wages, and rewards generally, according to the 'merit' of the recipient. Τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν is 'receiving that which is *equivalent to* what one has done.' Just punishment, notwithstanding the venerable authority of the natural man to the contrary, proceeds upon this latter principle: it is not a *wound* such as he has inflicted that the assailant receives in return, but a damage *equivalent to the injury caused by the wound*: the mere repetition of the wound itself is not equivalent to the injury caused, which includes not only the suffering of the individual assaulted, but something much greater—the violence done to public order. As for the 'distribution of wealth'—it obviously proceeds on the principle of 'receiving that which is equivalent to what one has done.' The carpenter *e. g.* contributes to the national well-being by his work, and receives in return for his contribution, not his own product back again, but its equivalent in the shape of the products of other workmen who are not carpenters. He *apparently* receives this equivalent from the individuals with whom he deals in the so-called ἀλλακτικαὶ κοινωνίαι into which he enters for the disposal of his product: but in truth these ἀλλαγαὶ are only the machinery, so to speak, of the vast διανομὴ ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν in which the members of

State receive according to their εἰσενεχθέντα. It is only as 1132 b. 31.
mbers of the 'social organism' that individuals have anything to
hange. What they seem, as mere individuals, to do, they really
as expressing the State which sustains them. But 'the State,'
: Nature, *lebt in lauter Kindern—und die Mutter—wo ist sie?*
s this intangibility of 'the State' which, it would seem, has led
ne editors (*e.g.* Jackson) to distinguish for the writer of the
th Book *three* kinds of particular justice—distributive, corrective,
l commercial (*i.e.* τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς κοινωνίαις). This view errs
failing to recognise in ἡ ἑκούσιος ἀλλαγή the most important
tance of ἡ διανομὴ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν—that in which the 'distribution
wealth' is made according to 'economic laws' which express
'will of the State,' or reveal its essence, more significantly than
' legislative or executive measures dealing with 'distribution' can
The law which sustains the State as an organism is 'reaction
ivalent to action' (τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον). A is benefited by B's
on in a certain way, and must benefit him in return equally,
not in the same way—that is to say, if the relation between
n be a commercial one, or one of friendship καθ' ὑπεροχήν
N. viii. 7, §§ 1, 2), for in perfect friendship (and in the most
uine form of friendship διὰ τὸ ἡδύ) τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν
N. viii. 6. 7). A benefits B by the product of his labour; B
t benefit A equally by the product of his (different) labour. It
' be that A's unit product is the result of more labour or skill
ı B's unit product; it is evident, then, that B must compensate
the inferior value of his units by their greater number, if there
ı be any μεράδοσις between him and A. Thus the qualitatively
:rent products of A and B must be equalised (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν
§ 8), the process of equalisation starting from an estimate of
labour and skill which A and B have put into their respective
lucts—*i.e.* an estimate of *the cost of production* in each case,
:h gives what economists call *the natural value* of each product[1].
ut the natural value oscillates *the market value*, as the relation
reen supply and demand varies from time to time. When the
ket value of A's unit product (*e.g.* house) has been compared

Need, or Demand, is of course always assumed as the final cause of
uction. A thing which is 'costly to produce,' and is yet produced, is
ded' much. Labour is what Aristotle would call τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
αἴτιον—the material cause of production, and must be paid for; but Need is
inal cause.

1132 b. 31. with that of B's unit product (pair of shoes), as it can be easily and accurately compared in a society which employs νόμισμα, or 'a medium of exchange,' when, consequently, it has been determined πόσα ἄττα ὑποδήματα ἴσον οἰκίᾳ (§ 10), then the μετάδοσις which follows will realise the law of τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον, or of 'equivalent effects produced by each upon each.'

The fundamental importance in the social organism of this law of τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον is indicated by Plato in his theory of the division of labour as characteristic of ἡ ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις: see *Rep.* 369 B γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις . . . . 370 B ὅταν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰς μίαν. Cf. *Pol.* B. 1. 1261 a. 22 οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἕτερον γὰρ συμμαχία καὶ πόλις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κἂν ᾖ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἴδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία πέφυκεν), ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλείω ἑλκύσει (διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους . . . .)· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἓν γενέσθαι, εἴδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον.

1133 a. 1. δουλεία] *i. e.* so far as a man is not in a position to assert himself against competitors in legitimate business, and to defend himself by invoking the assistance of the law against those who treat him unjustly, to that extent he is not really a 'member' of the πόλις, but outside it, as a δοῦλος is. To be really a *citizen*, a man must be able to hold his own in the city—*i. e.* be in a position *to perform his function* in the body politic.

a. 3. § 7. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται] Mich. Eph. explains ἐμποδὼν by ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, the Paraph. Heliod. by ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν πόλεων, and the Schol. Par. (according to Zell) by μεταξὺ τῶν πόλεων. Jackson, translating 'in some frequented place,' adds that 'the word does not seem very appropriate,' and suggests ἐν πόλεσιν. He refers to Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας (Gomperz *Herkulanische Studien*, ii. 81)—τὸν Δία νόμον φησὶν εἶναι καὶ τὰς Χάριτας τὰς ἡμετέρας καταρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν. Pausanias saw a representation of the Graces (attributed to Socrates) in the Propylaea of the Athenian Acropolis (ix. 35). The position of this group answered well to the description ἐμποδὼν given here. It may be noted also that certain Athenian *coins* bore representations of the Graces: see Miss Harrison's *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, p. 376.

§ 8. ποιεῖ δὲ . . . σύζευξις] 'The exchange of equivalent products 1133 a. 5.
he quantity and quality of the one product being reciprocally
roportional to the quantity and quality of the other product) is
fected by conjoining, or adding
gether, the diametrically opposite
rms.' Let οἰκοδόμος A, σκυτοτόμος
, οἰκία Γ, and ὑπόδημα Δ stand at the
ur corners of a square thus, so that
is product is placed immediately
eneath each workman. Exchange
f products then is effected by con-
ining, or adding together, A and
, B and Γ, the terms which stand
t the diametrically opposite corners:—or more simply, λαμβάνει ὁ
ἰκοδόμος παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκείνῳ μεταδίδωσι
ὃ αὐτοῦ.



Jackson is certainly justified in taking exception to Grant's
ranslation of ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις—'joining the diagonal of a
quare,' because the mathematical term for the junction of the
iagonal is ἐπίζευξις, not σύζευξις. But Grant's explanatory note
ives, I think, the writer's meaning (which indeed is obvious) more
orrectly than Jackson seems to admit. Grant, after drawing and
ettering a diagram as I have done above, says 'The joining of
he diagonal gives each producer some of the other's work, and
hus an exchange is made; but the respective value of the com-
nodities must be first adjusted, else there can be no fair exchange.'
This note explanatory of the diagram which he has drawn, seems
o me to clear Grant at least from the charge which Jackson
brings against 'the editors' that 'they fail to show why "the
junction of the diagonal" is mentioned.' Nor do I think that
the Paraph. Heliodorus either lays himself open to Jackson's
charge. His words are—Δεῖ τοίνυν ἐν ταῖς χάρεσι τηρεῖν τὴν ἰσότητα· πλὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἣν ποιεῖ ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις· διάμετρος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς γωνίας τοῦ παραλληλογράμμου ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίον γωνίαν ἐπιζευγνυμένη εὐθεῖα. ἔστω δὲ ὥσπερ τετράγωνον οἱ τέσσαρες ὅροι ὁ οἰκοδόμος, ὁ σκυτοτόμος, τὸ ὑπόδημα, ἡ οἰκία· ὁ οἰκοδόμος μὲν ἐφ' οὗ τὸ α, σκυτοτόμος δὲ ἐφ' οὗ τὸ γ, οἰκία ἐφ' οὗ τὸ β, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' οὗ τὸ δ· ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὑπὸ τὸν σκυτοτόμον τὸ ὑπόδημα τίθεται, ὥσπερ τὸ δ ὑπὸ τὸ γ, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ἡ οἰκία, ὥσπερ τὸ β ὑπὸ τὸ α, ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαις συναφθήσεται μὲν ὁ οἰκοδόμος τοῖς ὑποδήμασιν, ὥσπερ

1133 a. 5. *συνάπτεται τὸ α τῷ δ· ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ὥσπερ τὸ γ τῷ β. καὶ οὕτως ἔσονται αἱ κοινωνίαι κατὰ διάμετρον· οὐ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ ἀνάλογα.*

Again, I cannot follow Jackson when he says '*ἐφ' ᾧ* A *κ.τ.λ.* are lines, not, as in Grant's figure, points: for if we take points as our proportionals, what is the use of introducing the notion of proportion at all?' If lines had been intended, should we not have had *ἐφ' ᾗ* A *κ.τ.λ.*? Moreover, Grant does not take 'points' (in the mathematical sense) for proportionals, but *quantities* (ὅροι) marked A B Γ Δ, and arranged for convenience round the corners of a square. The 'joining the diagonal' is indeed an unfortunate translation, because it suggests a geometrical construction as such—viz. the process of connecting the points A and Δ, B and Γ, considered merely as geometrical points, by the diagonals AΔ and BΓ—it is unfortunate, that is to say, because it suggests what is known by the technical name of *ἐπίζευξις*, whereas the writer (as Grant, in spite of his unfortunate translation, sees well enough) has before his mind not a geometrical square, as such, but only a square arrangement of terms or ὅροι, and means, not that geometrical point A is joined to geometrical point Δ by the geometrical line AΔ, but that the term Δ, representing a certain quantity, is *added to* the term A, which also represents a certain quantity: to express which meaning he uses the same word, *σύζευξις*, as he used before in v. 3. 12 *ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστιν.* In the present passage he might have said—*ἡ τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ δ* (*sc. ἰσασμένῳ* § 12) *καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ γ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀλλαγῇ δίκαιόν ἐστιν.* This latter *σύζευξις*, however, is, according to the square arrangement of the ὅροι adopted, distinguished as *ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις*[1]. It must be understood

[1] In his interesting note (p. 95) on *ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις*, Jackson refers to *E. E.* vii. 10. 1242 b. 6 ff.—'where we are told that in an unequal friendship the *ὑπερέχων* conceives his claims to be represented by the formula *ὡς αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάττονος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ*, but that the *ὑπερεχόμενος τοὐναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν.* That is to say, if A and B are the persons, C and D their claims, A, the superior in rank, thinking himself entitled to superior advantages, argues that $\frac{A+C}{B+D} = \frac{A}{B}$, or $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$: on the other hand B, the inferior, holding that "noblesse oblige," maintains that $\frac{A+D}{B+C} = \frac{A}{B}$, or $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{D}{C}$. These opposing views are reconciled here in the same way as in the *Nic. Eth.*

that the remain[illegible]
purpose [illegible] assume [illegible]
that A = [illegible] = [illegible]
one pair of shoe[illegible]
multiplying [illegible]
man, for the occasion [illegible]
builder A : accordingly [illegible]
following [illegible] —

[illegible]

i.e. two persons [illegible]
distribution man[illegible]
shares. A's share [illegible]

Let A be [illegible]
is worth [illegible]
six times a [illegible]
throughout a [illegible]
A's entire [illegible]
of his entire [illegible]
that year of [illegible]
product must [illegible]
of A and of I [illegible]
what he [illegible]
exactly [illegible]
quality being [illegible]
B's quantity [illegible]
reciprocally [illegible]
A and I are [illegible]
does [illegible] for the [illegible]
and *BB'* represent [illegible]
longer the [illegible]
formed in the [illegible]
workmen A and I [illegible]
parts A [illegible] I [illegible]
BB', represent [illegible]
of the products [illegible]

i.e. the [illegible]
superior [illegible]
one another [illegible]

1133 a. 5. that although $A'x$ is equal to $B'x$, it bears a smaller proportion to AA' than $B'x$ does to BB'. This means that the exchange of equivalent products 'takes more out of' B than 'out of' A. A and B are indeed *for the occasion* ἴσοι, else they could not be κοινωνοί (see § 12): but, regarded *generally* as shareholders receiving dividends in virtue of labour contributed to the common fund of the national well-being, they are not ἴσοι: A is superior to B; and it may be a question for B, considering his economic inferiority to A, whether he can afford *to equal himself for the occasion* to A, *i. e.* whether he can afford to deal with A at all.

The double point of view from which (as I have tried to show) the κοινωνοί in an ἀλλαγή must be regarded—as (possibly) unequal workers in the economic field, and yet as equal for the purpose of the particular exchange—is excellently presented by the writer of the *M. M.* in a passage (i. 33. 1193 b. 38–1194 a. 25) which should be carefully compared with the passage now before us—

τὸ δ' ἀνάλογον ἐν τέτταρσι . . . . . ἔστιν δ' ἡ ἀναλογία αὕτη· ὡς γὰρ ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ· ὁμοίως τῷ σκυτεῖ τῷ ὑφάντῃ, τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀναλογία πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίνεται· καὶ συνέχει δὴ αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία τὴν πολιτείαν. ὥστε τὸ δίκαιον ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον συνέχει τὰς πολιτείας, τὸ αὐτὸ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀνάλογον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ οἰκοδόμος πλείονος ἄξιον ποιεῖ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον ἢ ὁ σκυτεύς, καὶ ἦν ἔργον ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι [καὶ] τῷ σκυτεῖ πρὸς τὸν οἰκοδόμον, ἀνθ' ὑποδημάτων δ' οὐκ ἦν οἰκίαν λαβεῖν, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνόμισαν, οὗ ταῦτα πάντα ὠνητὰ ἐστίν, ἀργύριον προσαγορεύσαντες νόμισμα, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον ἑκάστου διδόντας τὴν ἄλλαξιν ποιεῖσθαι παρ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ τούτῳ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν.

a. 9. τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον . . . τὸ αὑτοῦ] Bywater after M^b Γ. Bekker, following K^b, L^b, O^b, reads τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου. Bekker's τὸ αὑτοῦ adopted by Bywater does not seem to have any MS. authority, except, apparently, that of Γ. All Bekker's MSS. give τοῦ αὑτοῦ. See Bywater's *Contrib. to Text. Crit. of the Nic. Eth.* p. 45.

a. 10. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον] is the equality obtained by taking account of the relation which subsists between the unit products of A and B in respect of value (their value being determined by 'the worth of the persons,' or, in modern phraseology, by the cost of production and conditions of the market), and, if they are of unequal value, multiplying the less valuable product, so as to get

a resultant equivalent to the more valuable. This equality must exist (ἢ), before a just exchange can take place (γένηται). 1133 a. 10.

τὸ λεγόμενον] a fair exchange—ἡ ἀντίδοσις ἡ κατ' ἀναλογίαν. a. 11.

συμμένει] *sc.* ἡ κοινωνία. a. 12.

§ 9. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο . . . καὶ τοιοῦτον] See note on 4, § 12, b. 9, where it was said that the words, as they occur here, 'are explicable in the context.' More, I think, cannot be said for them. The passage would run better without them. The sentence, a. 16 οὐ γὰρ . . . ἰσασθῆναι must be taken closely with the sentence οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει . . . ἰσασθῆναι, a. 14 at the end of § 8, which it explains: 'there is nothing to prevent the product of one of the two contracting parties being better than that of the other (§ 8); for contracts are between those who, like physician and husbandman, differ, and are consequently often *not* equal' (§ 9). The sequence of thought traced in the above paraphrase suffers from the parenthesis of the words before us; and it may be that they are interpolated here, as well as in ch. 4, § 12. Here, however, they make a natural enough side remark or note, which could not be said for them in ch. 4, § 12: a scholastic note about the relation of τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον is not entirely out of place in a discussion of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός or τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν. In view, then, of the fact that, to say the least, they are parenthetical here, it will be convenient to explain these words as they might be explained in accordance with Aristotelian doctrine, if they stood as an isolated aphorism without context. a. 14.

Accepting the insertion of ὅ before ἐποίει (see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 18), I would render the aphorism as follows—'The arts would perish, unless, as the active element put forth action in each case to such and such an extent and in such and such a mode, the passive element received the impression of this action (ἔπασχε τοῦτο) conformably in each case to the extent and to the mode.' In other words—The existence of the arts depends upon the presence of two elements, an active and a passive, so related that, while the former exerts a force which in each case is definite in amount and mode, the latter receives an impression which corresponds exactly to the amount and mode of the force in each case exerted: *e.g.* there could be no art of sculpture, if marble yielded to the force of the chisel in a less or in a greater degree (εἰ μὴ ἔπασχε τοῦτο τοσοῦτον)

1133 a. 14. than that measured by the ποιητικὴ αἰτία, or ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ὁ ἄλλῳ,—the will of the artist; or if it failed to assume a form representing his idea (εἰ μὴ ἔπασχε τοῦτο τοιοῦτον).

This seems to me to be the natural interpretation of the words before us, considered, as I believe they ought to be considered, apart from their present context, as an Aristotelian aphorism, embodying the doctrine stated or illustrated in such passages as the following:—*de An.* iii. 5, 430 a. 10 ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστί τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ. ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης (here the νοῦς παθητικός is said to be so called τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι under the plastic power of that other νοῦς—or aspect of νοῦς—which is what it is τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν: moreover we are warned against supposing the relation between the active and the passive Reason to be that of ἀντιπεπονθέναι, for we are expressly told that the active Reason is ἀπαθής): *Met.* Θ. 5, 1048 a. 13 τὸ δυνατὸν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται, οὗ τ' ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὡδὶ ἔχοντος ποιεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται (*i. e.* the δύναμις μετὰ λόγου of the τεχνίτης realises itself in a given ποίησις only if the material receptive of the influence of that particular ποίησις be present): *Cat.* 4. 2 a. 3 ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεται, καίεται. With these Aristotelian passages may be compared a passage in Plato's *Gorgias* 476 B–D (referred to by Ramsauer in his note on *E. N.* v. 4. 12), which recalls the phraseology of the Aristotelian passages, and more especially of *E. N.* v. 5. 9, so strongly that it seems certain that it served as a model. Σω. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἆρα ἐάν τις τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος; Πωλ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Σω. ἆρα τοῦτο πάσχον, ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον, οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι; Πωλ. ἀνάγκη. Σω. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι; Πωλ. ναί. Σω. τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ; Πωλ. πάνυ γε. Σω. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι; Πωλ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Σω. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον,

ὃς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάῃ; Πωλ. πάνυ γε. Σω. οὐκοῦν καί, εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς 1133 a. 14.
λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι. Πωλ. ναί. Σω. καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα
ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον, οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει;
Πωλ. φαίνεται. Σω. συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον περὶ
πάντων· οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν. Πωλ. ἀλλ'
ὁμολογῶ.

In these passages, which may be taken as fairly representing what Aristotle, following Plato, has to say about the relation between τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον, we find nothing about the *reaction* of the latter upon the former: τὸ πάσχον is simply that which πάσχει: it is not represented as, in its turn, a ποιοῦν which makes the original ποιοῦν a πάσχον: and I cannot see how more can be fairly got out of the passage (v. 5. 9) before us, than out of these passages, or out of the Platonic passage which it resembles so closely in phraseology. But those who try to explain the passage before us *in its context*, find it necessary to believe that it implies the doctrine of the *reaction* of the πάσχον upon the ποιοῦν. Thus Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 18) says—'Der Gedanke, den man nach dem Zusammenhange erwartet, ist dieser: die Künste würden nicht bestehen können, wenn sich nicht eine völlige Gleichheit der Leistungen und Gegenleistungen herstellen liesse. Deutlicher würde dies ausgedrückt sein, wenn für ἔπασχε etwa ἀντεποίει oder ἀντεπεδίδου gesetzt wäre; aber auch so, wie die Worte lauten, scheinen sie mir dem geforderten Gedanken zu entsprechen. Man muss nur bedenken, dass, wie es bei dem ἀντιπεπονθός nöthig ist, *beide* Theile geben und empfangen, dass also das ποιεῖν auch ein πάσχον und das πάσχον auch ein ποιοῦν ist.' Jackson, agreeing with Rassow that this is the meaning of the passage, is constrained however to admit that it is not one which 'the text naturally and properly bears.' He endeavours to extract the meaning by altering the punctuation: see his note pp. 97, 98. But, it may be asked, if ἔπασχε = ἀντεποίει, what does ἔπασχε τοιοῦτον mean? Κοινωνὸς B may be said ἀντιποιεῖν τοσοῦτον ὅσον ποιεῖ κοινωνὸς A, but not τοιοῦτον οἷον. The point is that the κοινωνοί exchange *qualitatively different* products.

While maintaining, then, that the present passage ought not to be forced to mean more than it expresses—viz. that, as τὸ ποιοῦν (*e.g.* the seal) acts, so τὸ πάσχον (*e.g.* the wax), *quâ* δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους, is affected by its action; while deprecating, therefore, the attempt to reconcile the present passage with its context by making

1133 a. 14. ἔπασχε = ἀντεποίει—against the evidence afforded by the representative passages quoted above, in which (in *de An.* iii. 5 expressly) τὸ ποιοῦν is presented as ἀπαθές: while maintaining, in short, that the passage before us has nothing to do with τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός or *mutual* action and passion, but only with the relation between the agent *considered simply as agent*, and the patient *considered simply as patient*. I do not forget that the distinction of agent and patient is merely a logical one (cf. *Theaet.* 157 A), and that, in the concrete worlds of nature and of art, the so-called patient, in receiving the impress of the so-called agent, becomes in turn the good of the agent—that which perfects the agent: thus, the artist gives form to the marble, and the formed marble in return is the glory of the artist: the root nourishes the leaf, and the leaf gives life to the root: each is for the sake of each; each is both maker and thing made.

In opening these remarks I said that 'a scholastic note about the relation between τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον is not entirely out of place in a discussion of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός.' It is not entirely out of place, inasmuch as the simple relation of ποιοῦν to πάσχον is implied in the double relation of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέναι: but it is so unnecessary that it seems probable that we have to do with an interpolation here as well as in v. 4. 12. Ramsauer, indeed (p. 319), regards the words with as much suspicion here as in v. 4. 12. On one ground only do I think that the genuineness of the words as they occur in v. 5. 9 may be plausibly maintained. It may be argued that the writer wishes to show that τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέναι must be between ἕτεροι, and that to do so he refers parenthetically to the simple relation between ποιοῦν and πάσχον which according to *de Gen. et Corr.* i. 7. 323 b. 31 are τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον καὶ ταὐτό, τῷ δ' εἴδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον: as if he said—the parties to an ἀλλαγή, each of whom is a ποιῶν acting upon the other as a πάσχων, must indeed belong to the same social system of fellow-workers (τῷ γένει ὅμοιοι), but must be of different trades (τῷ εἴδει ἀνόμοιοι), otherwise they could not act and react. This is practically the line of interpretation followed by Mich. Eph[1].

This defence of the genuineness of the words before us is, as I have said, plausible; but I cannot attach much weight to it

[1] Mich. Eph. does not comment on the words before us when he comes to v. 5. 9. His note on v. 4. 12 however deals with them in connexion both with τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον (the subject of their context in v. 4. 12), and with ἀλλακτικαὶ κοινωνίαι (the subject of their context in v. 5. 9).

against the reasons which seem to me to make for their spurious- 1133 a. 14.
ness here, as well as in ch. 4, § 12.

§§ 10–15.] Only things, or amounts of things, which are equal in a. 19.
value, are normally exchangeable. There must therefore be some means of comparing things, in order to ascertain, in each case, whether they are equal or unequal in value; and when they are found to be unequal, there must be some means of equalising them. In the first place, the unit product of A must be compared with the unit product of B in respect of 'cost of production'—*i.e.* the labour (including ability, risk, time, &c.) involved in the production of each from beginning to end must be estimated, and the result of the estimate, in each case, must be numerically expressed. Let the cost of producing A's unit product *a* and B's unit product *b* be the same. If B *needs a* as much as A needs *b*, *a* and *b* are of equal value (for the purpose of the particular exchange), and may accordingly be exchanged. But if A needs *b*, while B does not need *a* at all, or so much, what can A do? He must (were *special* need the 'medium of exchange') either fail to obtain *b*, or obtain it at a ruinous cost; and, in conceivable circumstances, he might find himself *compelled* to obtain it even at such a cost. But the institution of money removes the difficulty by substituting *general* need for special need as 'the medium of exchange' or 'bond.' Although B may not need *a* at all, or so much as A needs *b*, he *always needs something equivalent to a* as much as A needs *b*. A can always obtain *b* from him in exchange for that amount of money which is earned by labour equal to the labour required to produce *b*: for B, although he does not need *a*, is always willing to take A's money made by selling *a* to those who need it, because this money enables him to obtain *c*, which he needs, from its producer, who, again, may not need *b*, but is always willing to take B's money, in order to obtain for himself *x*, which he needs. Thus all men may be said always to 'need' equal sums of money equally; but particular products, though representing the same labour, *i.e.* having the same 'natural value,' are often 'needed unequally': hence, if A needs *b* very much, and B needs *a* very little, and A can procure *b* only by getting B to take a certain amount of *a*, it is evident that the result of exchange will be that A has too little in proportion to his labour, and B too much. Under a system of mere barter every transaction thus tends to result in inequality. But by means of a

1133 a. 19. system of σύμβολα which entitle the bearer to anything he happens to need, the fluctuating standard, dependent on the varying relation between A's need of the particular product *b* and B's need of the particular product *a*, is superseded by the fixed standard constituted by the circumstance that A's need of *b* is always equalled by B's need of *something* which he cannot obtain without the money obtained by selling *b* to A. Money is a system of σύμβολα, or tickets, enabling the bearer to get what he happens to need. These σύμβολα being, in their higher denominations, of precious metal, their number cannot, in a short time, be largely increased, and therefore bears a tolerably constant relation to the sum-total of exchangeable products of industry existing at a given time. Thus the various unit products come, according to the labour expended upon them and the demand for them, to be associated with definite parts of the sum-total of money existing in the community at a given time. In this way the value of each unit product is expressed in money, and it becomes easy to compare as to value products which seemed incomparable:—πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή (§ 10) . . . . δεῖ ἄρα ἑνί τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι . . . . τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία ἡ πάντα συνέχει (§ 11) . . . . τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς (§ 14) . . . . οἷον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην (§ 11) . . . . πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν (§ 10). Money, *as a calculus*, makes it easy to compare products; but without this calculus it would still have been possible to compare them roughly, by taking account of the labour expended upon them. It would, however, be impossible to exchange them fairly—indeed it would often be impossible to exchange them at all—without money *as a system of* σύμβολα. It is important to distinguish between these two functions of money—(1) as supplying a calculus (μετρεῖται πάντα νομίσματι § 15), and (2) as guaranteeing the satisfaction of any need (οἷον ἐγγυητὴς ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν δεηθῇ § 14). In respect of both functions money is, as remarked above in note on v. 2. 13, a. 1, an ever-present diorthotic judge preventing the unfair distribution of the rewards of labour, which, on a system of barter, would be inevitable—*i.e.* without the aid of the calculus supplied by money, men would only be able to compare products so roughly that the exchange of them would, in most cases, result in one party getting too much and the other too little; and without a system of

σύμβολα, a producer would often be unable to dispose of his pro- 1133 a. 19.
duct, or be obliged to dispose of it to someone who did not need it much, and therefore made only an inadequate return for it. That the writer of the Fifth Book himself thought of νόμισμα as a 'diorthotic' agency seems, as was remarked in note on v. 2. 13, to be a fair inference from the similarity of the terms in which he describes its functions, with those in which he describes the function of the δικαστής: see *E. N.* v. 4. 6. 1132 a. 18 sqq., and v. 5. 10. 1133 a. 19 sqq.

Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 18, 19) believes that in §§ 10–16 the same thought is repeated in three parallel passages, no one of which has greater claims to be considered genuine than the other two have. These passages, which he prints in parallel columns, are—

(1) § 10. 1133 a. 19 διό . . . . 25 ἔσται.

(2) §§ 11–14. 1133 a. 25 δεῖ . . . b. 14 μᾶλλον.

(3) §§ 14–16. 1133 b. 14 διὸ δεῖ . . . 28 κλῖναι.

It is certainly true that §§ 10–16 are full of repetitions. But what is the character of these repetitions? They seem to me to be various expressions of the thought—'there must be a fixed standard of comparison,' and so far I agree with Rassow; but I differ from him in thinking that each repetition, by its slightly altered form, suggests a fresh point of view important in the doctrine of currency. Thus in the first of Rassow's parallel passages the train of thought is—'products must be συμβλητά: so there must be a μέσον, *i. e.* one standard: this is νόμισμα, which measures.' In the second passage the train of thought is—'But what do we mean by saying that νόμισμα becomes the standard of measurement? The true standard is χρεία: νόμισμα is its conventional representative: and the advantages of having this conventional representative of χρεία are great: χρεία itself is subject to great fluctuations, whereas its representative is not; and, when sometimes the absence of χρεία would put a stop to business, the presence of the representative guarantees its continuance—οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ' ἡμῖν.' Rassow's third passage is distinguished by the introduction of the term σύμμετρα—'since νόμισμα is a μέτρον, the things which it measures must be σύμμετρα. But how can things so different as corn and shoes have a common measure? Are they not heterogeneous? *Quâ* useful, and ἐν χρείᾳ, they are homogeneous: and νόμισμα enables us to compare and measure them in respect of their common quality of usefulness.' I do not pretend that the repetitions (especially in

1133 a. 19. the third passage) do not give reason for the suspicion that §§ 10–16 have come down to us in a somewhat altered form; but I maintain that new points arise in every passage in the midst of the repetitions. I cannot therefore follow Jackson when he says (p. 98) that 'the chapter would gain in perspicuity if §§ 11–16 were rejected.' Probably the Fifth Book itself would gain in perspicuity if half of it were rejected. But it is not a question of 'perspicuity.' If §§ 11–16 were rejected the discussion of currency would lack several highly important topics which are not touched in § 10, but are at least dealt with—whether perspicuously or not is another question—in §§ 11–16.

a. 20. § 10. γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν] Mich. Eph. points the analogy between νόμισμα and the δικαστής thus: καὶ ὁρᾶς ὅπως τὰ νομίσματα ἀνάλογον ἐστὶ τῷ δικαστῇ· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπανορθωτικοῦ δικαίου τῇ τοῦ δικαστοῦ μεσότητι ἐγνώσκομεν πόσον δεῖ ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλεονέκτου καὶ προσθεῖναι τῷ ἀδικηθέντι· μέσον γὰρ πίπτων ὁ δικαστὴς τοῦ ἠδικηκότος καὶ ἠδικημένου, ἐποίει ἀμφοτέρων τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν δήλην, οὕτως κἀνταῦθα τῇ παραθέσει τῶν νομισμάτων, εὕρομεν τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχήν· καλῶς ἄρα εἴρηκεν ὅτι γίνεταί πως μέσον τὸ νόμισμα. κανὼν γὰρ καὶ κριτήριον γίνεται τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῦ οἰκοδήματος καὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων, ὡς καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς τῆς πλεονεξίας καὶ μειονεξίας.

a. 22. δεῖ τοίνυν . . . τροφήν] *i. e.* (given normal conditions of the market) as the labour required for the production of the house (this is what the writer means by οἰκοδόμος) is to the labour required for the production of the pair of shoes, so must the number of pairs of shoes be to unity—*i. e.* to the one house. In other words —the sum obtained from the sale of this number of pairs of shoes will be equal to the value of the house: or, when the shoemaker comes forward with this sum, he is equal to the builder and can deal with him, the ἀναλογία being as given by the writer of *M.M.* (i. 33. 1194 a. 13) ὡς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ.

a. 27. § 11. εἰ γὰρ . . . ἡ αὐτή] Without need there would be no exchange at all; with unequal need (εἰ μὴ ὁμοίως δέοιντο), exchange would not be the same as it is—*i. e.* unequal instead of equal products would be exchanged. I doubt much whether ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, as the alternative of ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, can have *directly* the meaning

which Ramsauer gives it—'Si aut nulla χρεία fuerit, aut alterius 1133 a. 27.
multo minor, cessaret commercium *aut ad paritatem non perveniret* (οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀλλαγή).'

ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας] That which represents need as medium a. 29.
of exchange: what Plato (*Rep.* 371 B) calls ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα—a ticket received in view of future χρεία, where there is no present χρεία.

κατὰ συνθήκην] 'by agreement among men'—cf. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως § 15.

ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί . . . ἄχρηστον] cf. *Pol.* i. 3. 1257 b. a. 30.
8 καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὁτὲ δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλοῦτον οὗ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκεῖνον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. It is only this or that particular monetary system which is νόμῳ and can be changed and disused; the institution of money itself is φύσει, just as speech is φύσει; *i.e.* like speech, it is essential to the realisation of that πολιτικὴ κοινωνία in which man attains his true φύσις. With a system of barter, as with a system of dumb signs, man could never have become a πολίτης, but would have remained an isolated savage. And it is easy to exaggerate the change which νόμος or agreement can produce even in a given monetary system. Speaking generally, we may say that agreement cannot supersede the precious metals. If they are to be superseded, it will be, not by agreement, but by the operation of a natural law. As things are, however, and have always hitherto been, it is as 'natural,' *i.e.* as *necessary*, that standard coins should be made of a precious metal, as that knives should be made of a hard metal. The statement ἐφ' ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον applies only to tokens made of a base metal, and to paper. Gold and silver have 'an intrinsic value' which cannot be taken from them—the value which belongs to them as practically the *only* materials of which standard coins can be made. They have, of course, a further intrinsic value as materials of which articles other than coins are made; but it is not going too far to

1133 a. 30. say that if coins ceased to be made of them, they would cease to be 'precious' metals. Since then a currency is necessary to that πολιτικὴ κοινωνία in which man realises his φύσις, and since a currency must be based on the employment of the 'precious metals,' we may say that money made of these metals is 'natural.'

a. 31. § 12. ἔσται δὴ . . . γεωργοῦ] As the labour required for the production of the more valuable unit stands to the labour required for the production of the less valuable, so must the number of the less valuable units stand to unity. This will be a case of ἀντιστρεφοθός, or reciprocal proportion, for the number of the less valuable units will compensate for their qualitative inferiority. The Paraph. Heliod. has—κείσθω δὴ τὸν γεωργὸν πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα διπλάσιον λόγον ἔχειν, ἔσται δὴ καὶ ὁ σῖτος διπλάσιος τῇ ἀξίᾳ τῶν ὑποδημάτων· εἰ τοίνυν ἔσται ὡς γεωργὸς πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα, τὰ ὑποδήματα πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ἢ τὸν σῖτον, διπλασίονα ἔσται τὰ ὑποδήματα τοῦ σίτου, καὶ οὕτως ἔσονται ἄξια τοῦ σίτου. As we have seen, the writer of the *M. M.* expresses the proportion thus—ὡς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ (i. 33. 1194 a. 13).

b. 1. εἰς σχῆμα . . . ἰσασμένον δ] I believe that this puzzling sentence merely puts into other words what has already been said in § 8—viz. that it must be settled *before the exchange* how many of B's qualitatively inferior units are equivalent to A's unit, the ἀντιστρεφοθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν, or ἰσόρροπος ἀλλαγή as the Paraph. Heliodorus calls it, depending on this equivalence. Let A = οἰκοδόμος, B = σκυτοτόμος, Γ = οἰκία, Δ = ὑπόδημα. Since A : B :: Γ : Δ, the simple σύζευξις of distributive justice will be expressed by A + Γ : B + Δ :: A : B, where A and B have the results of their industry (ἔχουσι τὰ αὑτῶν), and do not exchange (οὐκ ἀλλάττονται). An exchange is effected by σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον, but the σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον must not be made till Δ (the qualitatively inferior unit) has been multiplied to give a resultant equivalent to Γ: *i. e.* the σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον must not be made unless A and Γ, B and Δ, are reciprocally proportional magnitudes, thus—A : B :: Δ (ἰσασμένον) : Γ. This A : B :: Δ (ἰσασμ.) : Γ is the σχῆμα τῆς ἀνιλογίας to which the terms 'must not be brought after the exchange (ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται)' *i. e.* to which they must be brought *before* the exchange, when A has still his Γ, and B his Δ's. It is only then that it is possible (by 'the higgling of the market') to make Δ equal to Γ, and so to make A and B ἴσοι. A and B having thus been made ἴσοι, are κοινωνοί, or

can exchange fairly. In other words, having first brought the 1133 b. 1.
terms to the ἀναλογία A : B :: Δ (ἰσασμένον) : Γ, we may proceed, through A : Δ (ἰσ.) :: B : Γ, to the σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον A + Δ (ἰσασμένον) : B + Γ :: A : B. But if exchange take place without a previous equalisation of Δ to Γ, and A get simple Δ (one pair of shoes) and B get Γ (a house), A and B are placed in the position of extremes, or ἄκρα, in relation to the μέσον or ἴσον which the exchange has ignored; and of these ἄκρα B 'will have both superiorities'—will have the advantage over A in the transaction by the two parts mentioned in ch. 4, § 10; for, A with his house and B with his (say) 1000 pairs of shoes being ἴσοι, the house has been taken from A and given to B, who still practically retains all his shoes—999. In fact, whenever an article is sold too cheap, the buyer ἔχει ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς—(1) that part of the article for which he has not paid, and (2) the money which he ought to have paid for that part. In this interpretation I have followed, in the main, the lines laid down by Jackson, who starts from the view of H. Richards (*Journal of Philology*, 1872, iv. 150) that ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς is to be explained by reference to the δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον of v. 4. 10. 1132 a. 33.

The words before us, as thus explained, seem to state, in unnecessarily obscure language, the obvious truth that wares must be equalized *before* they are exchanged: and I should have less confidence than I have that they do not mean something more profound, were it not for the circumstance that in *E. N.* ix. 1. §§ 8, 9 a remark to nearly the same effect is made in plain language. The question there propounded is—When there is no previous διομολογία, who is to fix the value of the return expected by the giver—the giver or the receiver? The receiver; but he must make the value of the return equal to what he valued the gift at *before he got it*—δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα. He must put himself back in the position in which he would have been if he had had to 'higgle in the market' about the price of the article.

The explanations offered by Mich. Eph. and Michelet on the one hand, and by Grant and Peters on the other, both ignore the reference to ch. 4. § 10 in ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς, and therefore, as it seems to me, miss the writer's simple (though hidden) point. Mich. Eph. says that if no previous equalization has taken place, but the οἰκοδόμος gets a pair of shoes, and the σκυτεύς a house, *each*

1133 b. 1. *of the terms* (as if he read ἑκάτερον), viz. οἰκοδόμος and σκυτεύς, will exhibit both ὑπερβολή and ἔλλειψις (ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς)—the οἰκοδόμος exhibiting ὑπερβολή *quâ* superior producer and ἔλλειψις *quâ* receiving only one pair of shoes; the σκυτεύς exhibiting ἔλλειψις *quâ* inferior producer and ὑπερβολή *quâ* receiving a house. His words are: ἡ ὑπεροχὴ λέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως· καὶ ἔθος ἐστὶ λέγειν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐδόθη αὐτῷ πολλά· καὶ ἔμπαλιν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐδόθη αὐτῷ ὀλίγα. καὶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὅδε πλούσιος ἐστὶ καὶ οὗ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὅδε πένης, ἴσον λέγοντες τῷ λίαν ἔχει ὅδε χρήματα πολλά, καὶ λίαν ὅδε ὀλίγα. καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς λέξεως τοιοῦτον· ὁ δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτον ἐν εἴη. τὰς ἀναλογίας τῶν τεχνιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἃ ἐργάζονται δεῖ ποιεῖν πρὸ τοῦ ἀλλάξασθαι κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. γινομένης γὰρ τῆς ἀναλογίας πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τῆς ἀνταλλαγῆς, ἔσται ἡ ἀντίδοσις καὶ ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἴση καὶ δικαία. καὶ εἰς τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἀναλογίας ἀναχθήσεται ὡς εἶναι ὡς ὁ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς τὸν σκυτοτόμον, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων. ὡς γὰρ ὑπερέχει ὁ γεωργὸς τοῦ σκυτέως, οὕτω καὶ ὁ γεωργὸς μετὰ τοῦ σίτου, τοῦ σκυτέως μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων, πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς δηλονότι. καὶ δεῖ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνισότητα τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ἰσασθῆναι. ἰσασθήσεται δὲ οὕτως. ἐπεὶ γὰρ διπλῆ ἐστὶν ἡ οἰκία τῶν ὑποδημάτων, ἂν διπλασιασθῇ τὰ ὑποδήματα, β' ὄντα καὶ γένηται δ', ἔσται δ' ὑποδήματα ἴσα τῇ οἰκίᾳ· καὶ οὕτως τῆς ἰσότητος γεγονυίας εἰ λήψεται ὁ μὲν οἰκοδόμος τὰ δ' ὑποδήματα, καὶ ὁ σκυτεὺς τὴν οἰκίαν, ἔσται ὁ οἰκοδόμος μετὰ τῶν δ' ὑποδημάτων ἴσος τῷ σκυτεῖ μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας, ἐπεὶ γὰρ διὰ τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχὴν ἐλέγετο ὁ οἰκοδόμος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ σκυτέως, ἰσασθέντων τῶν ὑποδημάτων τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ἔσται ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἴσος τῷ σκυτεῖ· τοῖς δὲ ἴσοις ἴσα ἐὰν προστεθῇ, τὰ ὅλα ἴσα ἔσται· εἴη ἂν καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἴσος τῷ σκυτεῖ μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας. δεῖ οὖν φησὶν πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀναλογίαν, καὶ ἰσάζειν δι' αὐτῆς τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχάς· τουτέστιν, εἰ δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ χωρὶς ἀναλογίας ἀλλάξονται, ἑκάτερα τῶν ἄκρων, ἤτοι ὁ οἰκοδόμος καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχάς· ἂν γὰρ λάβῃ ὁ οἰκοδόμος τὰ β' ὑποδήματα, ἔσται μὲν ὑπερέχων ὡς οἰκοδόμος, ὑπερεχόμενος δὲ καὶ ἐλλείπων ὡς τὰ β' ὑποδήματα ἔχων· καὶ ὁ σκυτεὺς ὁμοίως· ὡς μὲν σκυτεὺς ἐλλείπων καὶ ὑπερεχόμενος, ὡς δὲ ἔχων τὴν οἰκίαν ὑπερέχων. ὥστε τοὺς οὕτως ἁπλῶς δηλονότι ἀλλασσομένους, μάταιον ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν πειρᾶσθαι εἰς σχῆμα ἄγειν ἀναλογίας, καὶ οὐ μόνον μάταιον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατον· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς τῆς δίχα ἀναλογίας γεγονυίας εἶναι ὡς ὁ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος μετὰ τῶν β' ὑποδημάτων πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας, διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀλλασσομένων ἀνισότητα. ὅτι δὲ δύναται ἰσασθῆναι τὰ ὑποδήματα τῇ οἰκίᾳ, εἴρηται. διὰ γὰρ τῶν νομισμά-

τῶν, ἢ ἄλλου τινός. Michelet follows Mich. Eph. Grant's view is 1133 b. 1.
different. He says—'After an exchange has been made, or, in short, after the price of an article has once been expressed in money, it is no longer the time to talk of "the quality of labour," or for either side to claim an advantage on this account. If he did he would have "both superiorities" reckoned to him, *i.e.* his own superiority over the other producer, and the superiority of his product over that of the other. . . . ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται can mean nothing else than "when they *have* exchanged", ὅταν with the aorist implying a completed act. It seems unnecessary to say that the value of a thing is not to be settled after it is sold. Rather it is after the goods have come to market, and had a market price put upon them, that considerations of their production must cease. The expression, therefore, is not clear, but the above interpretation seems the most natural that can be given of the passage. . . . "Both the superiorities" must be those named or implied in §§ 8–10, the superiority of the one product over the other, and the superiority of the one producer over the other.' Peters follows Grant in explaining ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον to mean that 'one of the two parties would get both the advantages—*i.e.* have his superiority counted twice over. His (*e.g.* the husbandman's) superiority over the other party (the shoemaker) has been already taken into account in fixing the price of a quarter of corn as equal to three pairs of shoes: this is one advantage which is fairly his; but it would be plainly unfair if, at the time of exchange, the husbandman were to demand 50*s.* worth of shoes for 25*s.* worth of corn, on the ground that he was twice as good a man: *cf.* Munro, *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, vol. ii.'

οὐ δεῖ . . . εἰ δὲ μή] for this construction *cf. de Gen. et Corr.* i. 4. 319 b. 23.

εἰ δὲ μὴ . . . ἄκρον] Grant, Jackson, Susemihl, and Bywater treat these words as parenthetical, remove Bekker's full stop after ἄκρον, and place a full stop after αὐτῶν b. 3 instead of Bekker's comma. I do not think that it makes much difference whether we accept this or Bekker's punctuation. In any case, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται and ὅταν ἔχωσι are contrasted, and αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης is that of Δ made equal to (ἰσασμένον) Γ. While A and B still retain their respective Γ and Δ, they are in a position to determine how many

1133 b. 1. Δ's shall be held equal to Γ, *i. e.* they can make themselves (*ad hoc*) ἴσοι, for as the Schol. puts it—ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχὴν ἐλέγετο ὁ οἰκοδόμος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ σκυτέως, ἰσασθέντων τῶν ὑποδημάτων τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἔσται ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἴσος τῷ σκυτεῖ. Having made themselves ἴσοι in this way, they can become κοινωνοί in a mutually satisfactory ἀλλαγή.

b. 8. § 13. ὥσπερ .... ἐξαγωγήν] Bekker follows K^b in reading ἐξαγωγῆς. With ἐξαγωγῆς the construction is—ὥσπερ (*sc.* ἀλλάττονται) ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες (*sc.* οἶνον) σίτου ἐξαγωγῆς—'giving wine in return for the privilege of exporting corn.' Jackson, reading ἐξαγωγήν, objects to ἐξαγωγῆς on two grounds, (1) because the separation of the words οἷον οἴνου from διδόντες, which ἐξαγωγῆς involves, complicates the sentence unnecessarily, and (2) because 'the weight as well as the bulk of the MS. authority is against ἐξαγωγῆς[1].' Ἐξαγωγήν is certainly the easier reading: but a difficult reading given by K^b alone comes with great weight. An original ἐξαγωγῆς would inevitably be changed into ἐξαγωγήν, as soon as a scribe, aware that ἐξαγωγή does not mean 'a cargo,' but 'the privilege of exporting,' and that therefore ἐξαγωγῆς could not be the partitive genitive, took οἷον οἴνου with διδόντες instead of with οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις. On the whole, I am not willing to reject ἐξαγωγῆς without scruple, though, of course, the circumstance that διδόναι ἐξαγωγήν is a regular phrase is in favour of reading ἐξαγωγήν as the object of διδόντες. Ἐξαγωγή is 'the privilege of exporting': see Isocrates, *Trapez.* 370 b. ἄξιον δὲ καὶ Σατύρου (Satyrus I, king of Bosporus B.C. 407–393) καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνθυμηθῆναι, οἱ πάντα τὸν χρόνον περὶ πλείστου τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑμᾶς ποιοῦνται, καὶ πολλάκις ἤδη διὰ σπάνιν σίτου τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπόρων ναῦς κενὰς ἐκπέμποντες, ὑμῖν ἐξαγωγὴν ἔδοσαν. It is doubtless this Black Sea trade which the writer of the Fifth Book has in his mind here.

The plural διδόντες, which 'belongs grammatically to both the parties concerned, whereas in sense it refers only to one of them' (Jackson), need not surprise us[2].

b. 10. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι] τοῦτο is the inequality of the σῖτος and οἶνος which must be equalised.

[1] Pr. K^b seems to stand alone with ἐξαγωγῆς: CCC has ἐξαγωγήν—one of the few cases in which it varies from K^b in the Fifth Book.

[2] This note on 1133 b. 8 was written before the publication of Bywater's *Contributions* (see p. 46), and is printed without alteration. Bywater supposes that ἐξαγωγῆς represents a blunder—ἐξ ἀγωγῆς, and (to account for διδόντες) suspects a lacuna between the two halves of the passage.

§ 14. ἐγγυητής] The *χρεία* which *νόμισμα* represents is the 1133 b. 12.
abiding need of *something*, as distinguished from the fluctuating need of *this particular thing*: see the Paraph. Heliodorus—*ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁ μὲν γεωργὸς δεῖται τοῦ ἔργου τοῦ τέκτονος, ὁ δὲ τέκτων οὐ δεῖται τοῦ γεωργικοῦ, ἵνα τὰ ἀλλάγματα καὶ αἱ κοινωνίαι μηδέ ποτε κωλύωνται, παρελήφθη τὸ νόμισμα· καὶ τοῦτο διδοὺς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ τέκτονι, λαμβάνει παρ' ἐκείνου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον· ὃ δὴ τὸ νόμισμα καθάπερ ἐγγυητής ἐστι πρὸς τὸν τέκτονα, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν τῶν τοῦ γεωργικοῦ δεηθῇ, δι' αὐτοῦ λήψεται παρὰ τοῦ γεωργοῦ ὧν ἐν χρείᾳ κατέστη. καὶ οὕτω κἀνταῦθα διὰ τὴν μέλλουσαν τοῦ τέκτονος χρείαν ἡ ἀλλαγὴ καὶ ἡ κοινωνία γίνεται. Καὶ τὸ νόμισμα δυνάμει ἐστὶ πάντα σχεδὸν ὧν δεῖται ἕκαστος.*

δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 94) suggests *ἀεὶ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι ἔσται λαβεῖν.*

πάσχει . . . . μένειν μᾶλλον] Money is affected in the same way b. 13.
as other commodities are[1], but not to the same extent—*i. e.* it fluctuates in value as the demand for it, or need of it, is greater or less. Its natural tendency, however, is to fluctuate less in value than other commodities. Mich. Eph. has the following note—*πότε δύναται πλεῖον τὸ νόμισμα ἢ πότε ἔλαττον ἢ οὐδέν; ἢ ἐν μὲν ταῖς εὐθηνίαις πολὺ δύναται, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄγαν σιτοδείαις καὶ ἀφορίαις πάντων τῶν καρπῶν οὐδέν; οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἐχόντων σῖτον μὴ ἀρκοῦντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ἀνταλλάσσειν τότε προθυμεῖται.* In a passage very similar to the above the Paraph. Heliodorus expressly gives as the reason why *νόμισμα* is more stable in value than other commodities, the fact that it is *δυνάμει πάντα σχεδὸν ὧν δεῖται ἕκαστος.* It represents the ever-present need of something as distinguished from the passing need of this thing. Accordingly, so long as the relation between the quantity of exchangeable commodities and the quantity of *νόμισμα* in the community remains pretty constant, the value of a given piece of money does not fluctuate seriously. Mich. Eph. and the Paraph., it will be observed, allude only to variations in the quantity of exchangeable commodities, apparently assuming that variations in the quantity of *νόμισμα* may be neglected. These latter variations, however, are far more serious than might at first be supposed. Under the conditions of modern trade, sudden rises and falls in what is really the quantity of *νόμισμα*

[1] Bywater (*Contributions* p. 46) suspects *τὸ αὐτό* as an alternative reading for *τοῦτο*, and suggests that *πάσχει* may be taken absolutely = 'is subject to modification or change.'

1133 b. 12. in the community take place to such an extent that, had they come within the observation of the sceptical Greek, they must have made the plausible λῆρος τὸ νόμισμα seem more plausible than ever. Under the conditions of modern trade the tolerably constant quantity of visible tangible money (which the ancients regarded exclusively) is increased by a singularly fluctuating quantity of invisible intangible money—*i. e.* by *Credit*, which now swells to enormous proportions, and raises all prices, *i. e.* diminishes the value of a given standard coin, now contracts, and lowers all prices, leaving the holders of standard coins in possession of the field—*i. e.* with coins of augmented value. 'In consequence of changes in credit alone,' says Giffen (*Essays in Finance*, p. 294), 'the serviceableness of the same quantity of money varies indefinitely in comparatively short periods; the scale of prices is in constant oscillation; no conceivable changes in the quantity of money itself could at all have the effects which are constantly being produced by changes in credit alone.' 'When credit is good all prices rise, that is, the standard depreciates in value' (p. 200).

b. 18. μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας] Cf. Plato, *Laws* 918 B πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εὐηγόνης τῶν δε ἂν οὐσίαν χρημάτων ἀντιτιμοῦν ἀσύμμετρον οὖσαν καὶ ἀνόμοιον ὁμαλήν τε καὶ σύμμετρον ἀπεργάζεται; τοῦτο ἡμῶν χρὴ φάναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος ἀπεργάζεσθαι δύναμιν, καὶ τὸν ἔμπορον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τετάχθαι δεῖ λέγειν· καὶ μισθωτὸς καὶ πανδοκεὺς καὶ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν εὐσχημονέστερα, τὰ δὲ ἀσχημονέστερα γιγνόμενα, τοῦτό γε πάντα δύναται, πᾶσιν ἐπικουρίαν ταῖς χρείαις ἐξευπορεῖν καὶ ὁμαλότητα ταῖς οὐσίαις.

τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ . . . ἱκανῶς] Things so different as wine and corn are not commensurable in the strict sense of the term, for they are not homogeneous in the strict sense: *practically*, however (ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς), they are commensurable, because practically homogeneous—*i. e.* homogeneous as being *both useful*. Money is the measure of their common usefulness: see Mich. Eph. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα, σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, εἰ κυρίως σύμμετρα τὰ ὁμογενῆ δύνανται γενέσθαι, οἷον ἀριθμοὶ ἀριθμοῖς, καὶ μεγέθη μεγέθεσι· τὰ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τοσοῦτον διεστῶτα, ἀδύνατον σύμμετρα γενέσθαι· τὰ γὰρ σύμμετρα κοινῷ μορίῳ καταμετροῦνται, ἀριθμοὶ ἀριθμῷ, τὰ μεγέθη μεγέθει· τὸ δὲ νόμισμα οὐκ ἔστι μόριον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀλλαγῇ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἐστὶ μόριον, οὔτε τοῦ οἴνου· ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἢ οἶνος ἢ ὑπόδημα. οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός· γίνεται δὲ μέτρον τῆς κατὰ τὴν χρείαν αὐτῶν συμμετρίας—*i. e.* money measures them both *qua* needed or useful: being needed

or useful is their common quality. Cf. also Acciaiolus *ad loc.*— 1133 b. 18.
'Res quae sunt diversorum generum et rationum non videntur mensurari posse ex parte naturae (only ex instituto hominum), quia mensura debet esse de genere eorum quae mensurantur; ut quantitas continua mensuratur quantitate continua, non discreta. Nam si res per mensuram debent mensurari, habere debent illam mensuram quae fit pars illarum rerum. Quare nummus ipse medius cadit inter res mensurandas propter indigentiam: quia imponitur pretium alteri rei, et sic etiam alteri, et in nummo et pretio conveniunt, et hoc pacto ex instituto est nummus quodammodo mensura.'

§ 15.] **ἐξ ὑποθέσεως**] *i. e. κατὰ συνθήκην*, § 11. b. 21.

ἢ ἴσον] 'that is, equal to.' b. 24.

§ 16.] For the history of exchange see *Pol.* i. 3. 1257, a. 6–41. b. 26.
The passage ends with—*ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας . . . ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις· οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὂν εἶχε τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἷον σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἁπλῶς ὁρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλόντων, ἵν' ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως αὐτούς· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτὴρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημεῖον.*

πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι] Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 47) suggests *πρὶν ἢ τὸ νόμισμα ἐλθεῖν.*

§ 17. ἡ δικαιοπραγία] 'doing justice,' Peters. The man who b. 30.
'does justice,' as judge, strikes the mean between the position of the party who injures and the position of the party who is injured; and, in his private capacity, neither injures other people, nor allows himself to be injured by them—*ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι.* At the end of next § 1134 a. 12, however, we have *τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν,* from which it would seem that in the passage before us *δικαιοπράγημα* might have been used instead of *δικαιοπραγία.*

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη . . . ἄκρων] Rassow (*Forsch.* 61) seems to be b. 32.
right in preferring the reading adopted by Susemihl and Bywater to Bekker's *ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, κ.τ.λ.*

1133 b. 32. The Paraph. Heliodorus explains the sentence as follows—καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς προτέραις ἀρεταῖς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἑκάστη μέση ἐστὶ δύο κακιῶν τὴν μὲν ὑπερβάλλουσα τῆς δὲ ἐλλείπουσα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ σωφροσύνη μεταξὺ τῆς ἡλιθιότητος καὶ τῆς ἀκολασίας ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ ἀνδρία μεταξὺ τῆς δειλίας καὶ τῆς θρασύτητος, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὁμοίως· ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἔχει παρ' ἑκάτερα δύο κακίας αἷς ἀντίκειται, ἀλλὰ μόνῃ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἀντίκειται· μέση δέ ἐστιν, ὅτι τῆς ἀδικίας ἀνισότητα εἰσαγούσης, τὸ ἴσον αὐτὴ ζητεῖ καὶ τούτου ἐστὶ ποιητική. ὁ δὴ ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὴ μὲν μεσότης ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ ἀδικία ἀκρότης, ὅτι τῶν ἄκρων ἐστί. Mich. Eph. has a note to the same effect—viz. that every one of the other virtues has two vices contrary to it, but justice has only one vice (ἀδικία), and this one vice, he explains, θεωρεῖται ἐν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀδικουμένῳ, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀδικῶν ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων, ὁ δὲ ἀδικούμενος ὁ τὸ ἔλαττον. This is not correct, for the ἕξις of ἀδικία, of which he is speaking, is not seen in the ἀδικούμενος at all, but in the ἀδικῶν, who manifests himself in acts both of ὑπερβολή and of ἔλλειψις—in taking too much good and too little evil as his own share; and, where his own share is not involved, in assigning to other people too much or too little good or evil. Peters, who follows the Par. and Mich. Eph., translates—'We see also that the virtue justice is moderation [or a mode of observing the mean], but not quite in the same way as the other virtues hitherto spoken of. It does indeed observe a mean, but both the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice'—and in a note he adds the following explanation—'whereas in other fields the two extremes are chosen by different and opposite characters (*e.g.* the cowardly and the foolhardy), the unjust man chooses both, too much good to himself and too little to his neighbour[1], too little evil to himself and too much to his neighbour, too much good to his partisan and too little to his opponent.' According to this view, then, of the passage before us, the point is in the words ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων: 'justice is not a μεσότης in quite the same way as the other virtues are μεσότητες, because, although "it does indeed observe a mean," "*both the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice.*"' Is it this alone that constitutes the difference? I think not. The chief point of difference, as it seems to me, is marked by the words ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν, and a difference of

[1] 'Too much good to himself' *and* 'too little to his neighbour' are only verbally two. The one thing which he does in all cases is to choose too much good to himself at the expense of other people.'

merely secondary importance is constituted by the fact that 'both 1133 b. 32.
the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice.' That the stress is upon ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν is plain from the words ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν in § 18; *i. e.* δικαιοσύνη is a μεσότης *because* τοῦ μέσου ἐστί, just as ἀδικία is ὑπερβολή and ἔλλειψις *because* ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστι. That ἀδικία ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστι (*i. e.* ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἐστί) is another, and, I think, subordinate point of difference.

In what sense, then, can δικαιοσύνη be said τοῦ μέσου εἶναι in which ἀνδρεία is not? The gloss τουτέστιν ἴσου which some MSS. read after τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν, and Mich. Eph. recognises, seems to me to answer this question. All the virtues, δικαιοσύνη included, are indeed μεσότητες περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, *i. e.* they are μεσότητες in the sense of being μετριότητες—phases of man's adaptation to a difficult social environment; but δικαιοσύνη is a μεσότης also in a more literal sense of the term, in as much as it realises itself in a definitely measurable external μέσον, *i. e.* in the choice of that which is objectively ἴσον. Justice (the writer confines himself here to Particular Justice) is that one of the virtues which is concerned with the ἴσον as distinguished from the other νόμμα. The just man is μέσος in a sense in which the σώφρων *e. g.* is not μέσος—*i. e.* he is μέσος καὶ ἴσος. There is nothing, in short, in the passage before us, which is not implied in the division of τὸ δίκαιον into τὸ νόμμον and τὸ ἴσον.

I take it then that the meaning which the writer wishes to convey is that the μεσότης Particular Justice differs from the other virtuous μεσότητες (1) in realising itself in the production of that to which, as μέσον or ἴσον, a definite numerical value can be assigned; and (2) in having (nominally) only one ἐναντία κακία—ἀδικία or 'unfairness,' productive of objective measurable inequality: but surely this does not amount to a virtual admission, that 'the original theory of ἀρετή as a μεσότης is a failure so far as justice is concerned' (Jackson, p. 100). If there is any hesitation in the present passage about applying the term μεσότης to δικαιοσύνη, the same hesitation exists about applying it to ἀρετή generally; for in *E. N.* ii. 6. 13 we read μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. Justice, equally with the other moral ἀρεταί, is a ἕξις προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα—a habit of regulating conduct by reason in the midst of temptations held out by the sensibility. It is the regulation of those feelings which, if unregulated, lead a man to act wrongly

1133 b. 22. in relation to property, as σωφροσύνη is the regulation of those which, if unregulated, lead him to act wrongly in relation to bodily pleasure. The σώφρων does what is objectively right in circumstances which are such that we cannot test the rightness of his acts by exact measurement (cf. iv. 5. 13 οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τί πῶς καὶ τίσι κ.τ.λ. . . . ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις); whereas the δίκαιος does what is objectively right in circumstances which allow us generally to test the rightness of his acts by figures. His action, in short, produces an ἴσον—a quantitative result—which may be calculated beforehand. Δικαιοσύνη is a μεσότης (or mode of adaptation to the social environment) manifesting itself externally in acts of *measurably equal division*; σωφροσύνη is a μεσότης (or mode of adaptation to social environment) manifesting itself in acts the rightness of which can be judged only by the qualitative test of αἴσθησις (iv. 5. 13, ii. 9. 8). The recognition of this difference surely does not amount to a virtual admission that 'the original theory of ἀρετή as a μεσότης is a failure so far as justice is concerned.' If narrow technical ground be taken, and it be urged that δικαιοσύνη is not a μεσότης in the true sense because it has only one extreme, ἀδικία, it may be answered that, although the possibility of μειονεξία as the contrary of πλεονεξία is perhaps excluded by the result reached in chapters 9 and 11 of this Book, yet two kinds of unfairness to other people may be logically distinguished—that of giving strangers (from whom one has nothing to expect) too little, and that of giving friends (from whom one has expectations) too much, and that the one or the other of these kinds of unfairness may be specially characteristic of a given ἄδικος.

It remains to notice Grant's view. He says—'Justice is a mean state or balance in a different sense from the other virtues. It is not a balance in the mind, but rather the will to comply with what society and circumstances pronounce to be fair (τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν). Justice, according to this view, is compliance with an external standard. While in courage, temperance, and the like, there is a blooming of the individual character, each man being a law to himself, in justice there is an abnegation of individuality, in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all. It must be remembered that the account of ἐπιείκεια in this book supplements that of justice and takes off from its otherwise over-legal character.'

I think that the habit of justice is as truly 'a balance in the

mind' as the other virtuous habits are—*i. e.* it is one of the modes in which the civilised man has learnt to control his sensibility, in the interest of the System of Life which Reason presents to him. Inasmuch as this System is an objective order of things, it is 'an external standard,' to which the σπουδαῖος, not merely *qua* δίκαιος, but *qua* possessing the other virtues, conforms himself. In conforming himself, whether as σώφρων, or as ἀνδρεῖος, or as δίκαιος, to the objective standard of Reason, he 'is a law to himself,' because he realises his true self in so doing: and the only 'abnegation of individuality' to which he submits (and he submits to it *qua* σώφρων or ἀνδρεῖος as well as *qua* δίκαιος) is the abnegation of his merely sensitive nature. His true 'individuality'—his rational nature, he cannot abnegate. Finally, it is very misleading to distinguish the standard of justice, as 'one and the same for all,' from that of temperance or courage. The standard of the Noble Life is an indivisible whole, one and the same for all men who have the eye of Reason to see it clearly. Each of two good men who are friends is a ἕτερος αὐτός to the other. Both live up to one and the same objective standard, and, in living up to it, are a law to themselves. 1133 b. 32.

κατὰ προαίρεσιν] See note on v. 1. 3. 1134 a. 2.

§ 18. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τοὐναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου] *i. e.* ἡ δ' ἀδικία τοὐναντίον ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ ἄδικος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ ἀδίκου. a. 6.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων . . . ἔτυχεν] 'Where other people are concerned (*i. e.* where the unjust man himself as διανέμων does not take a share), although the result, as a whole, is the same (*i. e.* the violation of proportion), the way in which the proportion is violated (*i. e.* whether the unjust man gives A or B the unfair advantage) is a matter of chance.' Here, in accordance with the doctrine of v. chapters 9 and 11, the writer assumes that μειονεξία—the habit of accepting less than one's due—does not exist (see note on v. 1. 9, b. 1). I think that it has as much right to formal recognition as the equally obscure ἀναισθησία of *E. N.* iii. 11. 7. a. 11.

τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος . . . μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] The *result* of injustice (τὸ ἀδίκημα) is an unequal division, wherein the part which is too small is 'being injured,' and the part which is too large is 'injuring.' There is no reference here, as some commentators seem to think, to the question, whether ἀδικεῖν or ἀδικεῖσθαι is the *greater evil*, dis- a. 12.

1134 a. 12. caused in v. 11, §§ 7 and 8. The writer here simply analyses the formal content of the notion δίκαιον, as he has analysed in § 1 that of the notion δικαιοπραγία.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

But a man may perform an act which is unjust without being unjust himself. By what mark, then, shall we know the acts which stamp the man who performs them as unjust? There is no distinguishing mark attaching to the acts. The acts are outwardly the same of the man who yields to a sudden passion, and of the man who deliberately chooses; and yet the latter is and the former is not 'an unjust man' * * * * * *

But we must remember that hitherto we have described justice in the abstract only, and that we have to complete our account by saying something about justice as concretely realized in the state—civil justice.

Civil justice is the bond which unites, in a common life, persons who are free and equal. This common life is its own end, or self-sufficient. It is regulated not from without, but by the inner principle of its own nature—law. Conformity with law, then, is civil justice. But where there is law and justice, we, as a matter of fact, find also injustice. We find that individuals tend to seek their own private good, and must be restrained by the law of their common life. Accordingly we do not allow the individual as such to rule for he would become a tyrant; but we set the law or the constitution over the ruler, making him thus the guardian of justice and equality; giving him, however, a recompense in the form of honour and privilege, lest, being but human, he should say—'What am I profited if I am just and do not take advantage of my position to give myself more than my share of good things?' Indeed there are rulers who are not satisfied with all the honour and privilege that can be bestowed upon them, but, becoming tyrants, recompense themselves for their trouble by more solid advantages at the expense of their subjects.

Between those who are not free and equal persons associated in a commonwealth regulated by the law of its own constitution, the relations are 'just' only in a metaphorical sense. Thus it is only in a metaphorical sense that we can speak of 'justice' in the relation subsisting between (1) husband and wife, (2) father and child, (3) master and slave. These relations are characterized by the power *of the paterfamilias over* his own, *not by the* unanimity *of independent persons. The relation between husband and wife, however, resembles that between fellow-citizens more nearly than do the relations between father and child and between master and slave.*

1134 a. 17. §§ 1, 2] I believe, with Rassow (p. 38), Jackson (p. xvii, &c.), and Ramsauer that these sections are foreign to the present

context; but I do not venture to designate any other context 1134 a. 17.
in the Fifth Book as their original locus. They certainly refer to a subject which is discussed in chapter 8; but this does not seem to me to warrant Jackson's insertion of them in § 8 of that chapter after *βλάβη*: for why should it be assumed that, being interpolated where we now find them, they belong originally to the Fifth Book at all? It is often tolerably safe to say that a passage is an interpolation; but almost always unsafe to assign it to another locus. The student may refer to Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 35 &c.) for an excellent examination of the various views which have been advanced concerning the locus of the sections before us. He regards the examination of these views as principally useful in showing 'wie wenig wir im Stande sind mit Sicherheit zu urtheilen' —a valuable lesson, where 'dislocations in the text' are concerned.

The passage before us, then, is best regarded as a fragment. It may be paraphrased as follows—'Since one may perform an unjust act, and yet not be an unjust man, by what mark shall we know, under the various categories of crime, those unjust acts, the performance of which is, of itself, sufficient to stamp the agent as an unjust man in this or that respect—as a thief *e.g.*, or an adulterer, or a robber? Surely the criterion is not to be found in the *acts*. Two men may perform, from different motives, acts which are externally indistinguishable. One man may steal under the influence of a pressing, but transitory, feeling; the other from deliberate choice. The former is not a thief; the latter is: but their *acts* are indistinguishable.'

On the words *ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει* which are equivalent to *ἢ κατὰ μὲν τὰς πράξεις οὐδὲν διοίσει* Mich. Eph. has the following note:—*ἦν ἂν σαφεστέρα ἡ λέξις εἰ οὕτω πῶς εἶχεν· ἐπεὶ ἀδικήματα ἐστὶ τὸ κλέπτειν τὸ μοιχεύειν τὸ πορνεύειν τὸ ἱεροσυλᾶν καὶ ἁπλῶς πάντα τὰ παράνομα, ποῖα ἐκ τούτων πράττων τις ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ποῖα ὁμοίως οὐκ ἀδικεῖ; εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὰ ἄδικα ἃ πράττει μέν τις, ἄδικος δὲ οὐκ ἐστί. πῶς δὴ τοῦτο; ὅτι οὐκ εἰς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀποσκοποῦντες τὰ πράγματα κρίνομεν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ὁ γὰρ τοῦ μαινομένου τὴν μάχαιραν κλέψας μεθ' ἧς ἔμελλεν ἑαυτὸν ἀνελεῖν, ἔκλεψεν μέν, κλέπτης δ' οὐκ ἔστι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον σωτὴρ καὶ εὐεργέτης, οὐδὲ μοιχὸς ὁ τὴν πλουσίαν διαφθείρας ἐπιθυμίᾳ χρημάτων, ἀλλὰ φιλοχρήματος. ἐρωτήσας δὴ ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν, ἄδικος ἐστίν, ἀποκρίνεται λέγων ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; ἔστι δὲ ὁ λέγει. οὕτω μέν, δίχα προσθήκης λεγόμενον, δόξειεν ἂν μηδεμίαν ἔχειν διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὸν*

1134 a. 17. ἄδικόν τι πράττοντα οὐδὲ καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι. εἰ δέ τις ἐπιβλέψειε εἰς τὸ τίνι καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ ἄδικον, εὑρήσει πολλοὺς ἄδικα μὲν πράττοντας, ἀδίκους δὲ μὴ ὄντας.

Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 37) supposes, with Muretus, that some words have fallen out after δικαίου, because 'In dem mit γὰρ angefügten Beispiele wird nämlich nicht, wie man erwarten sollte, angegeben, worin der ἀδικῶν dem ἄδικος gleich, sondern worin er von ihm verschieden ist.' Muretus (p. 430) restores the clause thus—ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν δικαίου, ἐπιβλέψαντι δὲ εἰς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα δικαίου, and suggests that the repeated δικαίου occasioned the omission. I do not think that it is necessary to suppose an omission. The words καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγνώσειε γυναικί κ.τ.λ. are equivalent to καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰδὼ (*i.e.* τὸ συγγιγνώσκειν γυναικί) πράττοντων ὅ τε διὰ πάθος ποιῶν καὶ ὁ προαιρούμενος, ὧν ὁ μὲν προαιρούμενος ἄδικος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ διὰ πάθος οὔ, and explain ἢ οὕτω μὲν (*i.e.* κατὰ τὰς πράξεις) οὐδὲν δικαίου;

a. 20. οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχήν] Cf. *E. N.* iii. 3. 17 ποιοῦσι γὰρ ἅπαντες ζητοῦν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον.

a. 22. § 2. οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἀμείχανον δέ] Münscher, Hampke, and Ramsauer bracket these words, because, the case of the μοιχός having been already selected in § 1 to illustrate the point under consideration, cannot again be used as an *additional* illustration. Rassow merely notes the remarkable carelessness revealed by the words: 'eine auffallende Nachlässigkeit ist es, wenn in den letzten Worten neben dem κλέπτης der μοιχός genannt wird, ungeachtet das μοιχεύειν in Vorhergehenden als Beispeil benutzt ist'—(*Forsch.* p. 37). Those who *bracket* words like these in the Fifth Book take too little account, I think, of the carelessness of the writer, or writers. The substitution of οὐ (K^b, P^b, Camb., CCC Sus., Byw.) for Bekker's οὐδέ before κλέπτης, however, makes the whole clause less awkward.

a. 23. § 3. πῶς μὲν οὖν . . . πρότερον] Here, again, we have a section which is bracketed as an interpolation by many editors. It differs, however, from §§ 1 and 2 in this important respect—it does not contain a piece of argument foreign to the context, but merely surprises the reader by reminding him rather irrelevantly of a previous discussion. It is therefore not so obviously an interpolation as §§ 1 and 2. At the same time, I would say that it is probably one of those rather numerous recapitulatory and connecting sentences which we may

attribute to the care of an early editor, who, finding δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθά- 1134 a. 23.
νειν κ.τ.λ. a somewhat abrupt beginning, inserted words to facilitate the transition to τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον from that aspect of τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον which had been discussed in the previous chapter under the head of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός. I therefore think that it is unnecessary to try, with Jackson, to find another locus for the words before us. Jackson places them at the beginning of ch. 10 (on ἐπιείκεια), where they do very well—but, as the head of one statue may sometimes be made, by a clever restoration, to do very well on the body of another.

It is worth mentioning that the writer of the *M. M.* does not recognise §§ 1 and 2, but passes *immediately* from his criticism of the Pythagorean ἀντιπεπονθός to τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. His criticism of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός ends i. 33. 1194 b. 2; and at 1194 b. 3 we read—ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον πολλαχῶς λέγεται, διοριστέον ἂν εἴη ὑπὲρ ποίου δικαίου ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις· ἔστι δὴ δίκαιόν τι, ὡς φασίν, οἰκέτῃ πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα. τὸ δ' ἐν τούτοις δίκαιον ὁμωνύμως ἂν δόξειεν λέγεσθαι τῷ πολιτικῷ δικαίῳ (ἔστιν γὰρ ⟨τὸ⟩ δίκαιον, ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον). We may suppose the writer of the *M. M.* with a text of the Fifth Book before him in which chapter 6 *began* with a reference to the subject of chapter 5—πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον εἴρηται. Such a connecting clause might well be genuine. But, whatever its origin may be, I feel sure that it was written to stand *here*—that is, to make the transition from the subject of ch. 5 to that of ch. 6.

§ 4. δεῖ δὲ μὴ . . . πολιτικὸν δίκαιον] 'It must be remembered, a. 24.
however, that our subject is not only Justice in the abstract, but Justice as concretely realised in the State'—*i. e.* 'not only what is just in itself, but what is just as between citizens.' Hitherto the *formal conditions* of Particular Justice have been discussed—*i. e.* the ἀναλογίαι, geometrical, arithmetical, and reciprocal, which it involves have been explained; the writer now proceeds to indicate the mode of its concrete appearance—to sketch its natural history in the State. It was, of course, impossible to explain its formal conditions without frequent references to its concrete manifestation in the State; but as yet there has been no connected treatment of the latter. With the antithesis τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον—τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον we may compare the antithesis ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ἁπλῶς—ὁ ἀγαθὸς πολίτης, as presented in v. 2. 11, and in the passages quoted

1134 a. 24. in the note thereon. The ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἁπλῶς is the ideally good man, the man who is conceived as realising perfectly (*sc.* ἐν τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ τῇ κατ' εὐχήν) the formal notion of goodness; the ἀγαθὸς πολίτης is the man who corresponds accurately with the conditions of a given πολιτεία, good or bad, but, except as citizen of ἡ ἀρίστη πόλις, realises the formal notion of goodness more or less imperfectly. The conditions of even the best existing πολιτεία are such as always to prevent the actual coincidence of the ἀρετή of the πολίτης with that of the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἁπλῶς. Similarly, it is only in ἡ πολιτεία ἡ κατὰ φύσιν (see v. 7. 5) that τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον coincides with τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον. That is, *it is possible to conceive ideal circumstances* in which the justice of citizens realises perfectly the formal notion of justice. The definition of this formal notion, carefully elaborated in chapters 1–5, is epitomised with sufficient accuracy in ch. 5, § 17 καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη . . . πρὸς ἄλλον.

What, then, are the conditions of the (doubtless imperfect) realisation of Justice in the State? Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the present chapter answer this question. Justice is realised in the common life, under νόμος, of individuals who are free and equal. The individual, left to himself, is not πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου καὶ διανεμητικὸς τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, as the definition of τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον requires. The constraint of νόμος is necessary to make him act justly—*i. e.* νόμος, or λόγος, representing the race, must supersede ὁ ἄνθρωπος, the individual: and since, after all, individuals must be entrusted as ἄρχοντες, with the administration of this νόμος, a sop must be offered to their thwarted πλεονεξία in the shape of μισθός τις; though, even with this, they often become τύραννοι. It is only in the πολιτεία κατ' εὐχήν, where λόγος rules in the soul of every citizen, that a system of external restraints and inducements is unnecessary.

From the discussion of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον the writer passes naturally to that of the relations between the various members of the οἰκία, which is the unit κοινωνία out of which the πόλις has grown.

Distinguishing, then, τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον as the formal notion of justice, and its (necessarily imperfect) realisation in the State, I cannot agree—(1) with Michelet, who says (pp. 177, 178) '*Id justum quod quaerimus est et simpliciter justum et civile justum*, ita ut materia hujus libri non sit duplex justum, ut partitur Acciajolus, simpliciter justum et justum civile; jus enim civile est ipsum simpliciter justum vel, ut dicit Paraphrastes, κυρίως δίκαιον. Sed justum civile est id simpliciter justum, quod non proposito

tantum et animis agentium continetur, sed etiam legibus sancitum 1134 a. 24.
est'; or (2) with Grant, who says, 'Τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον is opposed to τὸ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. It is not meant here to separate τὸ ἁπ. δίκ. from τὸ πολ. δίκ.: rather it is implied that they are both the same. The only justice that can be called so without a figure of speech is that between fellow-citizens'; or (3) with Rassow, who says (*Forsch.* p. 123), 'τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον und τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον sind verschiedene Ausdrücke für dieselbe Sache, was u. a. Hildenbrand und Trendelenburg verkannt haben. Der Gegensatz, um den es sich hier handelt, ist der zwischen dem ἁπλῶς δίκαιον und dem δίκαιον καθ' ὁμοιότητα. Das erstere ist eben das politische Recht, das zweite das väterliche, das häusliche und das Herrenrecht. So richtig Zeller (*Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 2. p. 500), und Grant'; or (4) with Peters, who says (p. 161, note), 'These are not two distinct kinds of justice; justice proper, he means to say, implies a state.'

In opposition to these views, then, I believe that τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον are here distinguished as the formal notion (τί ἦν εἶναι or οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης)[1] and the concrete realisation (σύνολον). It is only in the ideal State that τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον coincide—that is, they never actually coincide. In actual States those individualistic tendencies which are specially dwelt on below in §§ 4–7, as characteristic of the persons between whom τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον (*as distinguished from* τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον) subsists, are never eliminated.

ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου] The ἐπί is a dittogr. of ἔστιν. Βίος is here a. 26.
man's life as a πολιτικὸν ζῷον: *cf. E. N.* x. 6. 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου.

πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν] cf. *Pol.* Γ. 1. 1275 b. 17 τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ᾧ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν—and *Pol.* A. 1. 1252 b. 28 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἤδη, πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας—and *Pol.* Γ. 5. 1280 b. 29 φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἁπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ

[1] Of course the formal notion of justice cannot be conceived independently of the formal notion of the State.

1134 a. 26. ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελέας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα κατοικούντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαί τ' ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὴ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους ⟨χάριν⟩. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων [χάριν] θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν—and *E. N.* i. 7. 6 τὸ δ' αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. The state (ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία) is an organism (αὔταρκές τι), and the law of its members is τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

a. 27. ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν] Each member of the social organism must, in order to be a member at all, have an initiative of his own (ἐλευθερία), which he exercises for the common good. This initiative cannot be exercised by an individual whose inferiority, in πολιτικὴ ἀρετή or δύναμις, to the other individuals with whom he is associated, sinks beneath a certain level, fixed differently in different πολιτεῖαι. All individuals on, and above, this level are *equally members* of the social organism (ἴσοι), inasmuch as each one of them, *quâ* βίου κοινωνῶν or καλῶν πράξεων μετέχων, initiates, in his own sphere, a social function essential to the σωτηρία of the commonwealth, even as each member of a ship's crew contributes his share to the prosperity of the voyage: see *Pol.* Γ. 2. 1276 b. 26 ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν πάντων (*i. e.* τῶν πλωτήρων, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν)· . . . ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία. Mechanical pressure from without (τυραννίς), taking the place of, or limiting, the constitutional action (βίος) of its members, is foreign to the conception of the State as αὔταρκές τι, or an organism. The individual member is indeed limited—but by the immanent law of the organism to which he belongs (νόμος), and that, not in his ἐλευθερία, which is realised in obedience to the law of the organism, but in his tendency to πλεονεξία.

The δοῦλος has no initiative which can be exercised for the good of the State. He does not live for the State, but for his master; and the law which regulates his function is an external

one—the will of his master. To occupy a status which places 1124 a. 27.
life above the will of a master is, then, the first condition of citizenship. All who occupy this status are, of course, *equally free*; but it is only in a pure democracy that they are *politically equal*—*Pol.* E. 1. 1301 a. 29 δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὁτιοῦν ὄντας οἴεσθαι ἁπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἁπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν). Such a democracy makes all its freemen *absolutely equal citizens*—ἴσους κατ' ἀριθμόν. Other constitutions recognise *grades* among freemen constituted by differences of birth, culture, or wealth. Some of these constitutions draw such a sharp line between the highest grade and the grades beneath it, as to exclude from the functions of the citizen all except those who are ἴσοι within the limits of the highest grade. Here, again, οἱ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας may be said to be absolutely equal—ἴσοι κατ' ἀριθμόν, the freemen belonging to the lower grades not coming into comparison with them at all. But there are certain other constitutions—the so-called mixed constitutions (*Pol.* Δ. 6 and 7), which include within the pale of effective citizenship the members of several grades. Their citizens are ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν, *i. e.* ἴσοι inasmuch as they all perform political functions, and are comparable on this common ground; ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν, because comparison shows grades in the dignity and importance of their respective functions. Strictly then, it is incorrect to identify, as Mich. Eph. does, the ἴσοι κατ' ἀριθμόν of the present passage, with the citizens of a pure democracy, and the ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν with those of an oligarchy or aristocracy. The citizens of a pure democracy are, of course, ἴσοι κατ' ἀριθμόν—'on a footing of absolute equality' (Peters), but so are the members of a close oligarchy, for they are themselves a homogeneous body of peers, and those whom they exclude from all share in the government of the city cannot be compared with them in an ἀναλογία having for its basis political ἀξία. It is only in a mixed constitution that we can correctly speak of the citizens as being ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν—'on a footing of proportionate equality' (Peters). As a matter of fact, however, most of the 'aristocracies' and 'oligarchies' noticed by Aristotle in the *Politics* are mixed constitutions, recognising grades within the body of effective citizens, and the description ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν is therefore applicable to their citizens; while the description ἴσοι κατ' ἀριθμόν remains as *specially* applicable to the citizens of a pure democracy, as described in *Pol.* Z. 1. 1317 a. 40—1318 a. 10.

1134 a. 29. ἀλλά τε δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα] Freemen, standing on a footing of equality either absolute or proportionate, are related by *political* ties (τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον); *i.e.* they are persons whose unanimity (ὁμόνοια, see *E. N.* ix. 6) can create and maintain a πολιτεία. What such persons do *qua* μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας, and in accordance with its spirit and requirements, is *just in the political sense of the term.* And this is the proper sense of the term; for man's true nature, or form, is realised in the performance of political function (φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος). But, that man may be able to realise his true form in the creation and maintenance of a πολιτεία, certain material conditions are necessary, the most important of which is that the οἰκίαι, or families, of which the πόλις is composed, shall be well regulated. In the οἰκία the citizen, as husband, father, and master, no longer μετέχει βίου with free equals τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἕνεκα, but exercises authority, τῆς ἀναγκαίας ζωῆς χάριν, over inferiors, some of whom are not even free. It is in another, that is in a metaphorical sense (καθ' ὁμοιότητα), then, that the term *just* must be applied to the relations subsisting between him and these inferiors.

a. 30. οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς] καί indicates that δίκαιον and νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς are merely different expressions for the same relation. 'Just relations' are equivalent to 'relations constituted by νόμος.' Persons οἷς νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς are persons whose conduct is determined, not by individual impulse, or by the force of a master, but by the manifold influences (examples, customs, laws, ideals) exerted by a system of common life, which they have been born into, and are 'of one mind' (ὁμονοοῦσι) to maintain and adorn.

a. 31. νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία] This is not to be understood, as by Michelet, to mean that νόμος *presupposes* ἀδικία—'legem propter injustitiam institutam esse.' The social order is not a mere police system for the suppression of injustice—*Pol.* Γ. 5. 1280 b. 29 φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔστιν πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἁπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ τοῖς οἰκίοις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. Νόμος is *essentially* the law of man's rational self-realisation, as πολιτικὸν ζῷον: but since he is impeded in his rational self-realisation by the irrational part of his nature, this law of his self-realisat

to assume, as δίκη, judicial functions, and, for this reason, is often 1134 a. 31.
(wrongly) regarded as nothing but a repressive agency operating ἐν οἷς ἀδικία. The words before us seem to imply this opinion; and so do the remarks which follow in §§ 5, 6, and 7. Νόμος seems to be presented as an invention specially introduced to combat πλεονεξία, as Hobbes' commonwealth is introduced to put an end to the evils of the state of nature. But the Aristotelian conception of νόμος, as elsewhere presented (*e.g.* in *Pol.* Γ. 11. 1287 a. 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν) gives such prominence to its god-like, that is, creative and constitutive efficiency, that we must not find too much fault with the phraseology of the present passage, which, after all, is intended (as I believe) to point the distinction between τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, justice in the abstract, and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, justice in the concrete, and does so by insisting on the highly complex character of the conditions which determine the manifestation of the latter. The presence of ἀδικία among those οἷς νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς is the ὕλη (or constitutes the greater part of the ὕλη) which prevents, even in the so-called ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι, the perfect realisation of τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον in τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία . . . . οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία] This clause is rejected a. 32.
by Zell, Jackson, and others from the present context. I am inclined to agree with Ramsauer, who brackets only the latter half of it (made parenthetical by Sus. and Bywater), viz. ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία. These words might very naturally have been added, for the sake of antithesis, by a scribe who remembered the ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι of § 1. Without them, the passage runs smoothly, τοῦτο (which cannot in any case refer to ἀδικία, for ἀδικία is not the *act* of τὸ νέμειν) referring to the immediately preceding τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν] From these words it would appear that the a. 33.
writer in this discussion of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον has merely *particular* justice in view.

ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν] M. Eph. says—λέγει δὲ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τὰ τῇ a. 34.
ἑαυτῶν φύσει τοιαῦτα, ἃ καὶ ὡς δυνάμεις λέγεται καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οἷον πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, πενία, δυσγένεια, καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ καὶ πάλιν κακά. συντελοῦσι

1294 a. 34. γὰρ τῷ μὲν σπουδαίῳ πρὸς τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείας, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ εἰς τὰς κατὰ κακίαν.

a. 35. § 5. διὸ . . . τύραννος] See *Pol.* Γ. 10. 1286 a. 8, where the question is put—πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων; and *Pol.* Γ. 11. 1287 a. 18, where the general conclusion is reached τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα τινά, the reason being that τῷ μὲν νόμῳ τὸ παθητικὸν οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ἔχειν πᾶσαν (Γ. 10. 1286 a. 18)—a reason further insisted on in a passage (Γ. 11. 1287 a. 28) quoted above, note on a. 31. It must be remembered, however, that the conclusion τὸν νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα τινά is true, not of all communities, but of those composed of ὅμοιοι καὶ ἴσοι: see *Pol.* Γ. 11. 1287 b. 41 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ ὄντων νόμων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ᾖ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον. The exception here alluded to is explained as follows—Γ. 11. 1288 a. 15 ὅταν ᾖ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνα τινὰ συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὅσον ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον. With Aristotle's discussion of the question πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων, Jackson compares the discussions in Plato, *Politicus* 293 E sqq., and in *Legg.* 874 E sqq. The latter passage especially is worth careful study in connexion with Aristotle's view. As to the point raised by Plato ποῖα δὴ νομοθετητέον τε καὶ ποῖα ἀποδοτέον κρίνειν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις (*Legg.* 876 A), Aristotle expresses the following opinion in *Rhet.* i. 1. 1354 a. 31 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, πάντα διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι. We shall return to this subject in the chapter on ἐπιείκεια (v. 10).

λόγον] MS. authority is strongly in favour of λόγον against νόμον: and *cf. E. N.* x. 9. 12 ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ.

ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ] *i. e.* ἑαυτῷ τὸ πλέον νέμει.

b. 1. γίνεται τύραννος] τυραννίς is the worst of those παρεκβεβηκυῖαι πολιτείαι in which the governors rule for their own advantage, not

for the common good: see *E. N.* viii. 10. 2 ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων—cf. *Pol.* Γ. 5. 1279 b. 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος. 1134 b. 1.

§§ 6, 7.] There exists a general opinion (δοκεῖ) that one gets no advantage from being just—that, in fact, one merely confers advantage on other people, justice being 'the good of other people.' Since rulers are apt to share this opinion, the State, in order to secure their services, must remunerate them with honour and privilege: as it is, there are rulers who are not satisfied with such intangible remuneration, but become tyrants and remunerate themselves by plundering the State. Here the clauses οὐ γὰρ νέμει . . . πρότερον express the reasoning of the persons who hold the opinion (δοκεῖ), οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον, εἴπερ δίκαιος, and are rightly treated by Susemihl and Bywater as parenthetical: while the words μισθὸς ἄρα κ.τ.λ. give the practical conclusion which the writer draws from the undoubted fact of the existence of this opinion. It is an opinion which in his view implies a false theory of life; nevertheless it exists, and a practical legislator must take account of it, and try to avert its worst consequences. b. 2.

§ 6. διὸ ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ] Bekker's ποιεῖ seems to be entirely without MS. authority. Shall we then accept πονεῖ, for which the MS. authority is unimpeachable? It is difficult to refuse to do so. At the same time, πονεῖ and ποιεῖ are palaeographically very like. Were it not for the MS. consensus in favour of πονεῖ, I should decide for ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ = ἑτέρῳ τὸ πλέον νέμει, because it answers to ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ = ἑαυτῷ τὸ πλέον νέμει in § 5, and because πονεῖ seems to me to be an unsuitable word to express the action of τὸ νέμειν with which the work of the just ruler is here identified. Ramsauer thinks that it is self-evident that ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ cannot = ἑτέρῳ τὸ πλέον νέμει, although αὐτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ above is rightly, he admits, taken as = ἑαυτῷ τὸ πλέον νέμει. I confess that I cannot see the ground on which this distinction is made. But even granting that ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ could not mean ἑτέρῳ τὸ πλέον νέμει, we might argue that the words in *Rep.* 343 C οἱ δ' ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσι τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον are in favour of reading ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ here = ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ τὸ συμφέρον. However, for the reasons against ποιεῖ (which, after all,—whether from accident or not—has no MS. backing) see Jackson's note *ad loc.* b. 4.

1134 b. 5. ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν] See note on v. 1, 17, n. 3.

b. 6. § 7. μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας] 'Here, as in the unequal friendships, the assistance rendered by the superior and the honour and respect which compensate it are equated by means of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέναι' (Jackson). 'The exchange of equivalent amounts of honour and just government' describes the relation between ἄρχων and ἀρχόμενοι, as it is conceived by those who hold that justice is ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν—a good thing handed over to one's neighbour, for which one must be careful to get from him an adequate return. Nor is the writer himself unwilling to regard the relation as an *exchange*; for the inference μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος is undoubtedly his. He believes that in society, as it is, the ruler must be remunerated with honour of a more or less material or external kind. But the more perfect society becomes—the more 'constitutional' government becomes, the less appropriate becomes the formula of 'exchange' to the relation between ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενοι. The τιμή which the ruler who is nobly φιλότιμος, or, it may be, μεγαλόψυχος, seeks, is not an external reward, but the approbation of his own 'conscience.' He gives his services to the State, because he is 'public-spirited' or 'patriotic.' And, further, those whom he rules are not a passive caste of mere ἀρχόμενοι. They too are public-spirited, and patriotic, and *help* him to rule. Indeed, where the relation between ruler and ruled is not, to a considerable extent, one of *mutual help* in the work of carrying out a system of common life, τυραννὶς, in some form or other, must inevitably supervene. If the ruled are those who do not *help*, but merely *remunerate* the ruler, the latter is sure to bid for ever higher 'remuneration.' 'Remuneration' is, indeed, *materially necessary* in the case of the ἄρχων, as in that of the ἰατρός. But, as οἱ χαρίεντες τῶν ἰατρῶν do not follow their profession *for the sake of* the fees, so the true ἄρχων does not govern for the sake of 'honour.' The final cause of his government is the public good, not his own advantage. In a noble community the good ruler is the object of the highest τιμή—the loyal devotion of his people. But how absurd it would be to say that he rules *for the sake of* their devotion! His consciousness of it is only an ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος: his real τέλος is the ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν which results in the welfare of his loyal and devoted people. Thus the relation between ruler and ruled is misrepresented in its *essential character* when it is simply described as an 'exchange.' As an exchange it certainly presents itself *concretely* to the interested

parties; and the wise legislator tries to make it appear to them 1134 b. 6.
a tolerably fair exchange; but, even in the worst πολιτεία that still deserves the name, the fact that there is government at all implies a nisus towards social organisation, which is no more accounted for by the self-seeking of the governors, than the existence of ἰατρική is explained by the fact that it is practised as a μισθαρνικὴ τέχνη.

§§ 8, 9.] Passing from the πόλις to its unit the οἰκία, we find three b. 8.
kinds of δίκαιον, resembling that between πολῖται and yet differing from it—viz one kind appearing in the relation between husband and wife (τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον), another in the relation between father and children (τὸ πατρικὸν δίκαιον), and another in the relation between master and slaves (τὸ δεσποτικόν). These three kinds of δίκαιον *resemble* the δίκαιον between πολῖται, in so far as they appear in relations involving the conduct of a πολίτης (the paterfamilias) towards those who, though not πολῖται, are individuals ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις: they *differ* from it, because the relations in which they appear are not between ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἴσοι—not between independent persons standing on a footing of equality. The slave and the child, as such, are not independent persons, but are, as it were, parts of the paterfamilias: he cannot therefore *injure* them, any more than he can injure himself: if we speak of justice or injustice appearing in his conduct towards them, it must be in a metaphorical sense. It is only towards his *fellow-citizens* that a man can act justly or unjustly in the strict sense. Justice, strictly so called, appears in those relations which exist between men *quâ* rational beings, striving to attain εὐδαιμονία by united action; it does not, except in a metaphorical sense, appear in those domestic relations, which, after all, are common to the irrational animals with man. For the three μέρη τῆς οἰκίας cf. *Pol.* A. 2. 1253 b. 1–10, and *Pol.* A. 5. 1259 a. 37; in both passages οἰκονομική is divided into three parts—δεσποτική, πατρική, and γαμική: *cf.* also *E. N.* viii. 10. §§ 4–6 for the analogues of these three domestic relations in πολιτεῖαι.

§ 8. ταὐτὸν τούτοις] Ramsauer conjectures ταὐτὸν τούτῳ. b. 9.

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς] Peters takes ἁπλῶς with ἀδικία—'We cannot speak (without qualification) of injustice towards what is part of one's self': but it perhaps ought to be taken with τὰ αὑτοῦ (*sc.* μέρη), which would then be distinguished,

1134 b. 9. as 'parts strictly so called,' from slave or child which is ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ: so, apparently, *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 10–14.

b. 10. κτῆμα] 'slave.' For the rationale of this use of the term see *Pol.* A. 4. 1253 b. 23 sqq., and *cf. Oecon.* i. 5. 1344 a. 23.

b. 11. ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἡλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ] Reading μή before χωρισθῇ (L^b, M^b), we must translate ἕως—'so long as.' But the omission of μή (K^b, O^b) is strongly supported by *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 14, 15 ὥσπερ γὰρ μέρος τί ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός· πλὴν ὅταν ἤδη λάβῃ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χωρισθῇ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τότ' ἤδη ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ ὁμοιότητί ἐστι τῷ πατρί.

ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ] See *Pol.* A. 4. 1254 a. 9 τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον. τό τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἄλλου· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτῆμα· διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δοῦλός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον (ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὑτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου ἄνθρωπος ὤν, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλος ἐστίν, ἄλλου δ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἂν κτῆμα ᾖ [δοῦλος ἐστίν], κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν). In *E. N.* viii. 12. 2, 3 a physiological explanation of στοργή (the germ of all social feeling) is found in the fact that τὸ τέκνον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, *i. e.* μέρος αὐτοῦ.

αὐτὸν δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν] This anticipates the conclusion reached in chapters 9 and 11. Βλάπτειν (*sc.* παρὰ τὸν νόμον) μετὰ προαιρέσεως = ἀδικεῖν.

b. 12. § 9. διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν] Ramsauer's conjecture αὐτά, adopted by Susemihl, is very tempting, the argument being—'Since no man *chooses* to harm himself, and since his slaves and children are parts of himself, it follows (διό) that he cannot be unjust towards them (αὐτά)—*i. e.* civil justice and injustice do not appear in his relations to them—οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικὸν (*sc.* πρὸς αὐτά).'

b. 13. κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει . . .] A reference to § 4. For a discussion of the question, How far Aristotle is right in holding that νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς has nothing to do with the maintenance and regulation of the relation between master and slave, see note on *E. N.* viii. 11. 7. That faithful slaves have rights the recognition of which tends to place them in a quasi-political position, is admitted in *Oecon.* i. 5. 1344 b. 14 χρὴ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὡρίσθαι πᾶσιν. δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἆθλον.

That the State has a right—*e.g.* in the interest of humanity—to interfere with a man's treatment of his slaves is, of course, another matter, and does not imply that *between* him and his slaves there is νόμος: for the State may also interfere with his treatment of animals: cf. Ramsauer—'ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος. Ἐν οἷς: etenim περὶ αὐτῶν, velut περὶ τεκνοποιίας, τροφῆς, παιδείας, leges esse, quibus parentes vel etiam heri quam maxime obligati sint, infitiari sane non est in animo.' 1134 b. 13.

οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν . . . ἄρχεσθαι] This remark has not been made in the *Ethics*: but *cf. Pol.* Γ. 7. 1283 b. 42 πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐστί, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν. b. 14.

διὸ μᾶλλον . . . καὶ κτήματα] This is the doctrine of *Pol.* A. 5. 1259 a. 39 καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς. Mich. Eph. has the following note here—ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἰσότης, καθὸ ἄμφω ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἔστι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον, ἄλλο δν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἰσότητι εἰσὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡς παρὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἄρχειν, δεῖ μέντοι καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τινῶν· τῶν θεραπαινίδων δηλονότι καὶ τῆς τῶν εἰσκομιζομένων σωτηρίας καὶ φυλακῆς. b. 15.

τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον] According to *Pol.* A. 5 οἰκονομική is the genus, and δεσποτική, πατρική, and γαμική the species. b. 17.

The following is the version which the writer of the *M. M.* (i. 33. 1194 b. 5–29) gives of this chapter—ἔστιν δὴ δίκαιόν τι, ὡς φασίν, οἰκέτῃ πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα. τὸ δ' ἐν τούτοις δίκαιον ὁμωνύμως ἂν δόξειεν λέγεσθαι τῷ πολιτικῷ δικαίῳ (ἔστιν γὰρ ⟨τὸ⟩ δίκαιον, ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις, τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον)· τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστά ἐστιν ἐν ἰσότητι (κοινωνοὶ γὰρ οἱ πολῖταί τινες, καὶ ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι τῇ φύσει, τῷ δὲ τρόπῳ ἕτεροι), τῷ δὲ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα καὶ οἰκέτῃ πρὸς δεσπότην οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐθέν. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ ποδὶ τῷ ἐμῷ πρὸς ἐμὲ οὔτε τῇ χειρί, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν μορίων· ὡσαύτως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἔχειν καὶ ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα· ὥσπερ γὰρ μέρος τί ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός. πλὴν ὅταν ἤδη λάβῃ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χωρισθῇ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τότ' ἤδη ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ ὁμοιότητί ἐστιν τῷ πατρί· οἱ δὲ πολῖται τοιοῦτοί τινες ἐθέλουσιν εἶναι. ὡς δ' αὕτως οὐδ' οἰκέτῃ πρὸς δεσπότην ἐστὶ δίκαιον διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· τοῦ γὰρ δεσπότου τί ἐστιν ὁ οἰκέτης. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ δίκαιον, τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστιν. οὐ τοῦτο δέ γε ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ

1134 b. 17. τὸ πολιτικόν· ἐν ἰσότητι γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔοικεν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἐν γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς κοινωνίᾳ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐγγὺς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου· χεῖρον μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' οἰκειότερον, καὶ μετέχει ἰσότητός πως μᾶλλον, διότι ἐγγὺς τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ὁ βίος αὐτῶν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα μάλιστά πως ἤδη τῶν ἄλλων πολιτικὸν ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστι δίκαιον τὸ ἐν πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ ὄν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁ δίκαιος περὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔσται.

CHAPTER VII.

Argument.

In civil justice there are two elements, a natural and a conventional. That which is naturally just is always and everywhere equally just, whether people deem it just or not: that which is only conventionally just was originally indifferent, and has been made just by law or fashion. Some maintain that there are no human institutions which are more than conventionally just, arguing that what is naturally *of a certain kind is so invariably* (e. g. *fire is invariably hot*), *whereas the justice of human institutions varies—what is right at home is not necessarily right in Persia. To this it may be replied: The Divine nature is indeed invariable; but we are here concerned with human institutions: their justice certainly varies; but this does not prove that there is not a natural as well as a conventional element in them; for in the concrete world* variations are natural. *Which are natural and which merely conventional among human institutions, although both those which are natural and those which are conventional vary, is as plain as it is which hand is* naturally *the stronger, although* either may be *the stronger. In proportion as a given constitution falls short of the ideal constitution, its institutions will exhibit more of the conventional element.*

A just rule is a universal which has just acts under it as particulars. 'Unjust act' and 'unjust rule'—'act of justice' and 'just rule' differ. The 'unjust rule,' whether unjust naturally or conventionally, is prior to the 'unjust act.' Similarly, the 'just rule' is prior to the 'act of justice,' or rather to the 'just act,' for the expression 'act of justice' ought to be retained to mark the rectification of an unjust act.

b. 18. § 1.] That which is *naturally* right (τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον) is right in itself always and everywhere, whether it be deemed right or no; that which is *conventionally* right (τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον), in itself neither

right nor wrong, has been made right by the νόμος of a community, 1134 b. 18.
and continues to be right only so long as the νόμος declares it to be right. It is perhaps scarcely necessary to point out that νομικόν, as here distinguished from φυσικόν, must not be confounded with νόμιμον as distinguished from ἴσον in v. 1. 8. Τὰ νόμιμα are all those things which are recognised as right by the law and fashion (νόμος) of a community; some of these are *naturally*, or in themselves, right (φύσει δίκαια), others are only *conventionally* right (νόμῳ δίκαια). It is also to be noticed that (here in § 1) the writer, in describing τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον, seems to have in view only things which, being in themselves *neither right nor wrong*, are made right by νόμος. He apparently forgets that also things which are in themselves *wrong* often become conventionally right. But in § 5 he uses words which may be understood to imply that both things indifferent and things wrong may become νόμῳ δίκαια—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταὐτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. Here the reference must be to the παρεκβεβηκυῖαι πολιτεῖαι in which much that is παρὰ φύσιν, or in itself wrong, is deemed right, *i.e.* is conventionally right—in which, in fact, the *bad man* is the good citizen. The more perfect a πολιτεία is—*i.e.* the nearer it approaches to the ideal of ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη, the more fully will its νόμιμα realise the requirements of τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον, the element of νομικὸν δίκαιον in its institutions and customs being small and consisting of what was originally *indifferent*, rather than of what is in itself *wrong*.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ] K^b and CCC omit these words, and read γάρ before φυσικόν. The omission may be easily explained as a slip of the eye caused by the similarity of the last words of ch. 6 and the omitted first words of ch. 7. K^b has frequent omissions of this kind. On the other hand, the interpolation of πολιτικοῦ here, per dittographiam, would be very natural. At any rate, it seems certain that the writer of the *M. M.* read here τοῦ δὲ δικαίου instead of τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου, for his version (i. 33. 1194 b. 30) not only begins—τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ νόμῳ, but ends (1195 a. 5) with words which, if they mean anything, mean that it is not τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον which is divisible into τὸ φυσικόν and τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον.—βέλτιον οὖν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμον. ἀλλ' ὃ ζητοῦμεν, δίκαιόν ἐστι πολιτικόν· τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν ἐστι τὸ νόμῳ, οὐ τὸ φύσει.

1134 b. 18. The difference between the Fifth Book with τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου κ.τ.λ. and the *M. M.* with τὸ πολιτικόν ἐστι τὸ νόμῳ οὐ τὸ φύσει seems to be due to the fact that the writer of the *M. M.* does not keep clearly before his mind the distinction which the writer of the Fifth Book marks by the terms νόμιμον and νομικόν.

b. 22. μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι] Jackson's note is—'the editors point out that this passage is inconsistent with Herod. vi. 79 ἄτουνα δέ ἐστι Πελοποννησίοισι δύο μνέαι τεταγμέναι κατ' ἄνδρα αἰχμάλωτον ἑκάστεον, and v. 77 χρόνῳ δὲ ἕλυσάν σφεας διμνέως ἀποτιμησάμενοι. But, as Blakesley remarks, the prisoners in the latter case being the Chalcidian Hippobotae, two minae "may be considered as the ransom of a man-at-arms, not of an inferior soldier." One mina, then, may have been the ransom of men of the lowest rank.'

ἢ τὸ αἶγα . . . . πρόβατα] Jackson's note here is—'On the strength of Herodot. ii. 42 ὅσοι μὲν δὴ Διὸς Θηβαιέος ἵδρυνται ἱρὸν ἢ νομοῦ τοῦ Θηβαίου εἰσί, οὗτοι μέν νυν πάντες ὀΐων ἀπεχόμενοι αἶγας θύουσι, Muretus proposed to read αἶγα Διὶ θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ πρόβατα. *Cf. N. E.* ix. 2. § 6, *de Mirabilibus* 844 a. 35. (In Athen. iv. 138 f. θύουσι δ' ἐν ταῖς κοπίσιν αἶγας ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν ἱερεῖον Zeus is not the divinity honoured.) But the addition of Διί does not explain the awkward antithesis of the singular αἶγα and the plural δύο πρόβατα. Is it possible that ἀλλὰ μή is a corruption of μίαν ἢ?' Τὸ αἶγας θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ πρόβατα μηδ' ὖς might be suggested; but Zell's conclusion is perhaps the safest—'Mureti conjectura admodum blanditur; sed cum Aristoteles aliam rem h. l. significare potuerit sibi et popularibus suis tam notam, quam nobis nunc ignotam, ab auctoritate codicum recedere nolui.'

b. 23. θύειν Βρασίδᾳ] See Thuc. v. 11.

b. 24. τὰ ψηφισματώδη] The distinction between a νόμος which embodies the permanent necessities of the State and is presumably in accordance with 'the *natural* fitness of things,' and a ψήφισμα which meets an unexpected and presumably temporary condition of affairs, is a commonplace in Greek political thought. One of the characteristics which mark the declension from φύσις of ἡ ἐσχάτη δημοκρατία is that government by ψηφίσματα, or special decrees of the people, has taken the place of the rule of νόμος, or the Constitution: see *Pol.* Δ. 4. 1292 a. 2 ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον

ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τἆλλα μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος 1134 b. 2
καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δ' οἱ νόμοι μή εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. Ὅμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος, ἄδηλον. ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὤν, ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ δῆμος οὗτος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἦθος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄμφω δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιόνων, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. καὶ μάλιστα δ' ἑκάτεροι ⟨παρ'⟩ ἑκατέροις ἰσχύουσιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. But, although *government by* ψηφίσματα is thus opposed to that by νόμος, as caprice is opposed to reason, it is none the less true that *a single* ψήφισμα may be the vehicle of reason—may secure the realisation of that which is really or 'naturally' right, in an exceptional case which the general rule laid down by νόμος could not meet: see v. 10. 6.

§ 2. ἐνίοις] See note on *E. N.* i. 3. 2. *Cf.* Grant, *Ethics*, Essay ii. vol. i. p. 150 on the opposition between Law and Nature.

ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] The ἔνιοι referred to argue—Nature is invariable; the b. 25
institutions of men (τὰ δίκαια) vary; therefore they have no 'natural' foundation. The writer meets this argument in §§ 3 and 4, by pointing out that 'being variable' and 'having a natural foundation' are not incompatible characteristics. While all human institutions (as distinguished from the functions of the godhead) are 'variable,' some of them are 'natural' and some of them are 'conventional.' Which are 'natural' and which 'conventional' is as plain as it is which hand is 'naturally' the stronger.

καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις] The editors compare the *Minos* 315 E—316 A, b. 26.
where these words occur in a similar context.

§ 3. τοῦτο δ' . . . b. 30 οὐ φύσει] This is a very awkward passage. b. 27.
Τοῦτο is apparently τὰ δίκαια κινεῖσθαι. This statement is untrue, and yet true in a sense. 'Among the gods' κινεῖται τὰ δίκαια οὐδαμῶς—*i. e.* justice in the abstract is 'eternal and immutable';

1134 b. 27. 'among men,' however, κινητὸν πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον—all human institutions are mutable; but not mutable in the sense of being entirely arbitrary: their mutability is not inconsistent with τὸ εἶναί τι καὶ φύσει in them. In the sphere of mathematics, and in the sphere of inorganic nature (*e.g.* τὸ πῦρ), there are no variations; but in the sphere of biological adaptation, to which τὰ δίκαια—man's actions—belong, *variations are natural.* Then follow the words ἀλλ' ὅμως ... οὐ φύσει, which are unnecessary because they have been anticipated by the words ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει. Jackson makes the whole section τοῦτο δ' ... οὐ φύσει parenthetical; but this, after all, removes formally rather than practically the difficulty inherent in the sequence—παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. However, we must not expect too much logical order from the present writer, who, moreover, expresses himself so awkwardly as to seem guilty of the inaccuracy of ascribing δίκαια (through ἀκίνητα δίκαια) to the gods, contrary to the express teaching of his school (see *E.N.* x. 1178 b. 10). It is to relieve him of responsibility for such an inaccuracy that Susemihl brackets the whole clause καίτοι παρά γε 28 ... οὐ φύσει 30. But perhaps we need not understand κινεῖται τὰ δίκαια after οὐδαμῶς 29, with Grant, Jackson, Susemihl, and Peters. It may be allowable to supply κινεῖται τὸ φύσει.

b. 34. § 4. πάντας] Bekker reads τίνας, against all the MSS. apparently, and against *M.M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 33.

1135 a. 2. § 5. ὠνοῦνται ... πωλοῦσιν] *sc.* οἱ ἔμποροι, Jackson. Dealers buying up corn or wine in large quantities compute by means of large units of measurement; but when they retail their stock they find it convenient to use smaller units—*e.g.* bottles instead of hogsheads. It may be useful to append here the passage in which the writer of the *M.M.* discusses the distinction between τὸ φύσει δίκαιον and τὸ νόμῳ δίκαιον—i. 33. 1194 b. 30 τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν φύσει τὰ δὲ νόμῳ. δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ ὡς μηδέποτε ἂν μεταπεσόντα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ φύσει ὄντα μεταλαμβάνουσι μεταβολῆς. λέγω δ' οἷον εἰ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ μελετῷμεν πάντες ἀεὶ βάλλειν, γινοίμεθα ἂν ἀμφιδέξιοι· ἀλλὰ φύσει γε ἀριστερὰ ἐστίν, καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ οὐδὲν ἧττον φύσει βελτίω ἐστὶ τῆς ἀριστερᾶς, κἂν πάντα ποιῶμεν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ καθάπερ τῇ δεξιᾷ. οὐδ' ὅτι μεταπίπτουσι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν φύσει· ἀλλ' εἰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸν πλείω χρόνον οὕτω διαμένει ἡ ἀριστερὰ οὖσα ἀριστερὰ καὶ ἡ δεξιὰ δεξιά, τοῦτο φύσει ἐστίν. ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει δικαίων, μή, εἰ μεταβάλλει διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν

ρῆσιν, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιον φύσει, ἀλλ' ἔστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 1135 a. 2.
πολὺ διαμένον, τοῦτο φύσει δίκαιον προφανές. ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς θώμεθα καὶ
νομίσωμεν, τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι δίκαιον ἤδη καὶ καλοῦμεν κατὰ νόμον δίκαιον.
ἔλτιον οὖν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμον. ἀλλ' ὃ ζητοῦμεν, δίκαιόν
στι πολιτικόν. τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν ἐστιν τὸ νόμῳ, οὗ τὸ φύσει.

§§ 6 and 7.] 'We have a transition of subject now,' says Grant, a. 5.
a return from the digression on civil justice, to inquire into
ndividual responsibility, &c. The transition is made by saying
hat the principles of justice and injustice (τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ἄδικον)
re universals, and differ from just and unjust acts.' See *M. M.*
33. 1195 a. 8 τὸ δ' ἄδικον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκημα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὕτω ταὐτόν,
ὐκ ἔστι δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικόν ἐστιν τὸ νόμῳ ὡρισμένον, οἷον τὸ τὴν παρα-
ταθήκην ἀποστερῆσαι ἄδικον ἐστί, τὸ δ' ἀδίκημά ἐστιν τὸ ἤδη ἀδίκως τι
ρᾶξαι. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ δικαιοπράγημα οὐ ταὐτόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ίκαιον τὸ τῷ νόμῳ ὡρισμένον, τὸ δὲ δικαιοπράγημα τὸ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν.

§ 7. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν . . . ἐπισκεπτέον] Ramsauer is perhaps a. 13.
ight in suspecting that these words are interpolated. The word
στερον can scarcely point to anything so near as the following
hapter, to which Zell and Michelet make it refer. The *Politics*
'intended book or books περὶ νόμων' Jackson) or *Rhet.* (i. 13.
373 b. 1 sqq.) could not be referred to in this way by the writer of
ne Fifth Book.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Just and unjust acts being what we have described, to act justly or unjustly man must perform them voluntarily. If he perform them involuntarily, they re accidentally or nominally, not really, just or unjust acts; i.e. *they are merely ust or unjust* acts, *not* his *just or unjust acts. Thus, if a man restore a 'eposit involuntarily under compulsion, he 'acts justly' in a nominal, not n a real sense. Further, a voluntary act may be done either with or without 'eliberate choice,* i.e. *either after we have turned it over in our minds, or without previous thought. Now, to apply these distinctions to the classification of the ways in which one member of society may 'hurt' another—*

(1) *When one man hurts another without knowing that he is doing so, and n circumstances in which he could not be expected to know, we say that 'an ccident' has happened.*

(2) But when he might have known, though acting without evil intent, we say that his act is 'culpable'—for an act which can be traced to something in the man (here to his not knowing when he might have known) is 'culpable,' an act which is due to something external to the man (e.g. *to his not knowing when it was impossible for him to know) is a mere 'accident.'*

(3) When a man hurts another knowingly, but without premeditation, e.g. *in anger, his act is an 'act of injustice,' but he is not himself in virtue of it 'an unjust man.'*

(4) If, however, he hurt, deliberately choosing to do so, i.e. *with premeditation, he is 'an unjust man,' and his act is an 'act of injustice' in the strict sense,* i.e. *one for which strictly no excuse can be found. But when sudden anger causes a man to inflict hurt, premeditation is excluded, and an extenuating circumstance may be found in the provocation which roused his anger; for anger arises when a man thinks that he is unjustly treated; and in judging the act which springs from his anger, we have to ask—'Has he been unjustly treated?—How far has he received real provocation?' Here it is evident that both parties may dispute in good faith, each believing that he has justice on his side. Not so where the question is not about the justice of an admitted act, but whether* (e.g. *in a business transaction) something has been done or not,* e.g. *if A asserts that he has paid B, and B denies A's assertion, one of the parties must be deliberately trying to treat the other unjustly, unless the whole dispute be due to a slip of memory.*

It is of course with the discrimination of the different degrees of guilt attaching to voluntary transgressions that a court of criminal justice has mainly to do. But there are certain involuntary actions which it cannot overlook—those involuntary actions which are not done accidentally in consequence of an excusable ignorance of mere particulars, but are blindly and ignorantly done under the influence of brutal and unnatural impulses.

1135 a. 15. § 1.] *Rhet.* i. 13 should be read carefully with this chapter. The following is the version of the subject of this chapter given by the writer of the *M. M.*—he does not seem to have had the chapter before him in the form in which we have it—*M. M.* i. 33. 1195 a. 14 πότε οὖν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ πότε οὔ; ὡς ἁπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ἑκουσίως (τὸ δὲ ἑκουσίως ὁ ἦν, εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω ἡμῖν), καὶ ὅταν εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, οὕτως δίκαιον πράττει. ὁμοίως καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἔσται ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα. ὅταν δὲ μηθὲν τούτων εἰδὼς πράξῃ τι ἄδικον, ἄδικος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀτυχὴς δέ. εἰ γὰρ οἰόμενος τὸν πολέμιον ἀποκτείνειν τὸν πατέρα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἄδικον μέν τι ἔπραξεν, ἀδικεῖ μέντοι οὐθένα, ἀτυχεῖ δέ. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὰ ἄδικα πράττοντα ἐν τῷ ἀγνοεῖν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ μικρὸν ἐπάνω ἐλέγετο, ὅταν μὴ εἰδὼς μήθ' ὃν βλάπτει μήθ' ᾧ μήθ' οὗ ἕνεκεν ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν διοριστέον ἐστίν, πῶς ἂν γινομένης τῆς ἀγνοίας, ὃν βλάπτει, οὐκ ἀδικήσει. ἔστω δὴ οὗτος ὁ διορισμός. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἄγνοια αἰτία ᾖ τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι, οὐχ ἑκὼν τοῦτο πράττει, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· ὅταν δὲ τῆς ἀγνοίας αὐτὸς ᾖ

αἴτιος, καὶ πράττῃ τι κατὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἧς αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἐστίν, οὗτος ἤδη 1135 a. 15.
ἀδικεῖ, καὶ δικαίως ἄδικος ὁ τοιοῦτος κληθήσεται. οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν μεθυόντων. οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες καὶ πράξαντές τι κακὸν ἀδικοῦσιν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγνοίας αὐτοί εἰσιν αἴτιοι· ἐξὴν γὰρ αὐτοῖς μὴ πίνειν τοσοῦτον, ὥστ' ἀγνοήσαντας τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα. ὁμοίως [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγνοιῶν ὅσαι μὲν γίνονται δι' αὐτούς, οἱ κατὰ ταύτας ἀδικοῦντες ἄδικοι· ὧν δὲ μὴ αὐτοί εἰσιν αἴτιοι, ἀλλ' ἡ ἄγνοια κἀκείνοις ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράξασι τοῦ πρᾶξαι, οὐκ ἄδικοι. ἔστιν δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ἄγνοια ἡ φυσική, οἷον τὰ παιδία ἀγνοοῦντα τοὺς πατέρας τύπτουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν τούτοις ἄγνοια φυσικὴ οὖσα οὐ ποιεῖ διὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν ταύτην τὰ παιδία λέγεσθαι ἄδικα· ἡ γὰρ ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ πράττειν ταῦτα, τῆς δ' ἀγνοίας οὐκ αὐτὰ αἴτια, διὸ οὐδ' ἄδικα λέγονται.

§ 1. **ἑκών**] see *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 27 ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ a. 17.
ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἑκούσιον εἶναι.

οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε . . . πράττουσιν] *i. e.* τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δίκαια ἢ a. 18.
ἄδικα πράττουσιν.

§ 2. **ἔσται τι ἄδικον**] *i. e.* ἄδικον κατὰ συμβεβηκός. a. 22.

§ 3. **πρότερον**] *cf. E. E.* ii. 9. 1225 b. 1. sq. and *E. N.* iii. 1. 20. a. 23.

οὗ ⟨ἕνεκα⟩ . . . τίνος ἕνεκα] the tendency or result of the act: see a. 25.
Grant's note on iii. 1. 18.

κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ] 'mistake and a. 26.
compulsion being excluded in each case.' Τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός would be to beat him, mistaking him for some one else; τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα βίᾳ, to beat him in the circumstances described in line 27. Mich. Eph. is right in explaining μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός here as equivalent to μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν. His words are—τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι τὰ καθέκαστα· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ γνωρίζοι ἄν τις ταῦτα ὧν ἡ ἄγνοια ἀκούσιον ἐποίει τὸ γινόμενον, οὕτως ὡς αὐτὸς δείκνυσιν· ὁ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα τύπτων ἐν νυκτομαχίᾳ, καὶ γνωρίζων μὲν ὅτι ἄνθρωπον τύπτει, ἀγνοῶν δὲ ὅτι ὃν τύπτει ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸν πατέρα ἡ πρᾶξις, ὡς πρὸς μὲν ἄνθρωπον καθ' αὑτό, ὡς δὲ πρὸς πατέρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥστε καὶ ἀκούσιος ἡ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὕβρις τοῦ υἱοῦ.

τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ βίᾳ, a. 31.
ἀκούσιον] Have we a three-fold or a two-fold division of ἀκούσια here? Mich. Eph. tells us—a two-fold division. He says—δεῖ δὲ ἐν τῇ λέξει τῇ ἢ βίᾳ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἢ τὸ ἀλλὰ γράφειν . . . τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ βίᾳ ἀκούσιον. According to this view, then, ἢ is not disjunctive but explanatory, and we have the old divi[illegible] τὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν and τὰ

1135 a. 31. βίᾳ. I have little doubt that a three-fold division is really intended, the clause πολλὰ γάρ κ.τ.λ. explaining and giving illustrations of τὸ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, as distinguished from both τὸ ἀγνοούμενον and τὸ βίᾳ. Τὰ φύσει ὑπάρχοντα are opposed to τὸ βίᾳ (*cf.* for this opposition *Met.* I. 1. 1052 a. 23 εἴ τι φύσει τοιοῦτον καὶ μὴ βίᾳ, *Phys.* Γ. 5. 205 b. 5 εἴη γὰρ ἄν τί που βίᾳ καὶ οὐχ οὗ πέφυκεν). So far as τὰ βίαια are concerned, πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν εἰδότες: but these βίαια are not the only 'involuntary actions' which we perform εἰδότες: πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων (as well as τὰ βίαια) are involuntary, and yet εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν. The words ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ἑκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 95) has shown conclusively, I think, to be wrong. Γηρᾶν and ἀποθνήσκειν belong to the same class of φυσικά as θερμαίνεσθαι, ἀλγεῖν, and πεινῆν, which in *E. N.* iii. 5. 7 are said to be μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν μήθ' ἑκούσια, the implication being that they are ἀκούσια. Accordingly Rassow proposes to read here ὧν οὐθὲν οὔτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔθ' ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν instead of the ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ἑκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν of the MSS. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* p. 211) had proposed simply to read ὧν οὐθὲν ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. Οὔτ' ἀκούσιον is, I think, plainly an interpolation; and the passage iii. 5. 7. 1113 b. 19 sqq., quoted by Rassow, is certainly in favour of his conjecture οὔτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔθ' ἑκούσιον, for the collocation occurs twice in it. But looking simply at the palaeographical conditions of the present passage itself, should we not be safer in accepting Spengel's suggestion?[1]

b. 3. § 4. καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός] The force of καί (omitted however by H^a, M^b, Q, CCC) is explained by Mich. Eph.—καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβ. καὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτό. CCC and P^b read καί after ὁμοίως.

For the distinction drawn here see Plato, *Legg.* ix. 862 B σχεδὸν γάρ, ὦ φίλοι, οὔτ' εἴ τίς τῳ δίδωσί τι τῶν ὄντων οὔτ' εἰ τοὐναντίον ἀφαιρεῖται, δίκαιον ἁπλῶς ἢ ἄδικον χρὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἤθει καὶ δικαίῳ τρόπῳ χρώμενός τις ὠφελῇ τινά τι καὶ βλάπτῃ, τοῦτό ἐστι τῷ νομοθέτῃ θεατέον, καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτέον, πρός τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην.

b. 8. § 5.] *Cf. E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 30 ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὂν ἢ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, ἐάν τις πράττῃ ἢ ἀπρακτῇ δι' αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δι'

[1] If it be thought still safer to retain the reading of the MSS., we must remember that the clause πολλὰ γὰρ καί κ.τ.λ. is introduced to explain a list of ἀκούσια, and therefore can only mean that these φύσει ὑπάρχοντα are *not voluntary*. Jackson's parenthesis a. 19 ἀδίκημα—a. 33 ἀκούσιον, separating this clause from what immediately precedes, cannot, I think, be right.

ἄγνοιαν, ἑκὼν πράττει ἢ ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν προαιρετὸν ἅπαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον μὴ προαιρετόν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα ἑκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἀκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. *Cf. E. N.* iii. 2. 16 ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται (τὸ προαιρετόν), τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν· ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; 1135 b. 8.

§§ 6–9.] There are three forms of βλάβη—viz. ἀτύχημα, ἁμάρτημα, and ἀδίκημα. When the hurt is inflicted μετ' ἀγνοίας and the agent is not the cause of the ἄγνοια—the circumstances being such that he could not be expected to foresee what is going to happen—the hurt is an ἀτύχημα, an *accident*, or misadventure. It belongs to the class of τὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν (*E. N.* iii. 1. 13). When the hurt is inflicted μετ' ἀγνοίας, but the agent is the cause of the ἄγνοια (*i. e.* acts ἀγνοῶν—*E. E.* ii. 9, *E. N.* iii. 1. 14—as a drunken man does—but not with the ἄγνοια of the μοχθηρός—*E. N.* iii. 1. 14—for the words ἄνευ δὲ κακίας exclude that kind of ignorance), and might be expected, but for this voluntary ἄγνοια, to foresee what is going to happen, the hurt is a ἁμάρτημα—*culpable*. When a man inflicts hurt εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, under the sudden influence of one of the natural elementary passions of human nature—especially θυμός—the hurt is an ἀδίκημα—an *injury*. But we cannot infer from an injury inflicted under such circumstances that the agent is a bad or *unjust man*. If, however, the injury is inflicted deliberately, with premeditation, then we may infer that the agent is a bad or unjust man. b. 11.

There are thus really *four* kinds of βλάβη which a court of justice has to distinguish. A hurts B. It is for the court to find out whether the hurt is an ἀτύχημα, or a ἁμάρτημα, or an ἀδίκημα ἄνευ προνοίας, or an ἀδίκημα ἐκ προνοίας.

§ 6. βλαβῶν] βλάβη is hurt or damage as such generically; while wilful hurt, *i. e.* injury, is ἀδίκημα: see *Liddell and Scott* s. v. βλάβη.

μετ' ἀγνοίας] not, as Rams. seems to think, equivalent to δι' ἄγνοιαν. The writer uses μετ' ἀγνοίας as a neutral phrase to cover τὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, *i. e.* ἀτυχήματα, and ἃ ἀγνοῶν πράττει, *i. e.* ἁμαρτήματα strictly so called. b. 12.

ἁμαρτήματα] 'here includes ἀτυχήματα as well as ἁμαρτήματα in the narrower sense in which the word is used in § 7.' Jackson.

ἢ οὐχ ᾧ] ὡς vulg. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 61) restores ᾧ, the reading of K^b (and CCC), as being consistent with τούτῳ, line 14 above. b. 16.

1135 b. 18. § 7. ὅταν . . . ἁμάρτημα] The editors compare *Rhet.* i. 13. 1374 b. 6 ἔστιν ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τε ἐστίν· τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. Ramsauer very appositely quotes *Phys.* B. 197 a. 18 καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναί τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς. ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἢ τῶν ἀεὶ ἔστιν, ἢ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις παρὰ ταῦτα. The Paraph. Heliod. illustrates the difference between ἀτύχημα (τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν) and ἁμάρτημα (τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν) as follows—Καὶ ἁμάρτημα μέν ἐστιν, ὅταν τις βλάψῃ τινὰ ἀκουσίως μέν, παρασχὼν δέ τινα τῆς βλάβης αἰτίαν· οἷον, εἴτις ἐν ὁδῷ τοξεύων, ἐν ᾗ ἐνεδέχετο ἄνθρωπον παριέναι, ἐφόνευσέ τινα· οὗτος γὰρ ἄκων μὲν ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, παρέσχε δὲ αἰτίαν τοῦ φόνου τὸ ἐν τοιούτῳ τόπῳ τοξεύειν. Ἀτύχημα δέ ἐστιν, ὅταν παρὰ πᾶσαν προσδοκίαν ἡ βλάβη συμβῇ. οἷον, εἴ τις τοξεύων ἐπ' ἐρημίας, οὕτω συμβάν, παράντα τινὰ ἀπέκτεινεν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ παράλογός τις ἡ βλάβη συνέβη καὶ παράδοξος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκ αὐτοῦ συνετέλεσεν ὁ βλάψας, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν ἡ αἰτία πᾶσα τοῦ φόνου.

b. 17. ἄνευ δὲ κακίας] added (as μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας is added in the passage quoted from the *Rhet.*) to exclude the chronic ἄγνοια of the μοχθηρία, as distinguished from the temporary ἄγνοια of the μεθύων. What is called in *E. N.* iii. 1. 14 the ἄγνοια of ὀργή is also excluded: for the θυμῷ ποιῶν is said in § 8 of the present chapter to act εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ. In *E. N.* iii. 1. 14 he is coupled with the μεθύων as ἀγνοῶν—see Jackson's note on v. 8. 6, in which he calls attention to this difference between the 'Aristotelian' view and the 'Eudemian.' It is to be noted, however, that in § 12 of the present chapter the writer speaks of those who act διὰ πάθος (μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, it is true) as ἀγνοοῦντες.

We are to understand the ἁμαρτήματα, then, of this section as βλάβαι inflicted by a drunken or careless (but not necessarily vicious) person. Such a person would be *culpae reus*, in the language of Roman law. Βλάβαι inflicted under the influence of anger belong to the class of ἀδικήματα—injuriae dolo commissae—not to that of ἁμαρτήματα. Ἀτύχημα is the *casus* of Roman Law: *cf.* Gaius iii. § 211 (p. 227, ed. Gneist)—'Is injuria autem occidere intelligitur cujus dolo (resulting in ἀδίκημα) aut culpa (resulting in ἁμάρτημα) id acciderit, nec ulla alia lege damnum (*i. e.* βλάβη) quod sine injuria datur reprehenditur: itaque inpunitus est qui sine culpa et dolo malo, casu (resulting in ἀτύχημα) quodam damnum committit.'

Cf. Menander apud Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* ii. 8 (Meineke, vol. iv. p. 198) 1135 b. 17.
ἀτύχημα κἀδίκημα διαφορὰν ἔχει· | τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίγνεται, τὸ δ' αἱρέσει.
The following passage from Justinian iv. 3. §§ 3–8 (p. 227, ed. Gneist) may be compared to illustrate the nature of *culpa* (resulting in ἁμάρτημα), and its difference from *casus* (resulting in ἀτύχημα)—
'Ac ne is quidem hac lege tenetur qui casu occidit, si modo culpa ejus nulla inveniatur . . . . . Itaque si quis, dum jaculis ludit vel exercitatur, transeuntem servum tuum trajecerit, distinguitur. Nam si id a milite quidem in campo, eoque ubi solitum est exercitari, admissum est, nulla culpa ejus intelligitur; si alius tale quid admiserit, culpae reus est. Idem juris est et de milite, si is in alio loco quam qui exercitandis militibus destinatus est id admisit. Item si putator ex arbore dejecto ramo servum tuum transeuntem occiderit, si prope viam publicam aut vicinalem id factum est, neque proclamavit, ut casus evitari possit, culpae reus est; si proclamavit, neque ille curavit cavere, extra culpam est putator. Aeque extra culpam esse intelligitur, si seorsum a via forte vel in medio fundo caedebat, licet non proclamavit, quia eo loco nulli extraneo jus fuerat versandi. Praeterea si medicus qui servum tuum secuit dereliquerit curationem, atque ob id mortuus fuerit servus, culpae reus est. Imperitia quoque culpae annumeratur, veluti si medicus ideo servum tuum occiderit, quod eum male secuerit aut perperam ei medicamentum dederit. Impetu quoque mularum quas mulio propter imperitiam retinere non potuerit, si servus tuus oppressus fuerit, culpae reus est mulio. Sed et si propter infirmitatem retinere eas non potuerit, cum alius firmior retinere potuisset, aeque culpae tenetur. Eadem placuerunt de eo quoque qui cum equo veheretur impetum ejus aut propter infirmitatem aut propter imperitiam suam retinere non potuerit.'

ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας] 'It is plain,' says b. 18.
Jackson, 'that this sentence ought to restate the distinction already drawn between ἀτύχημα and ἁμάρτημα: but it is difficult to see how ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας—so the MSS., except H^a M^b [and B^2] (which have κακίας), and all the editors—can be equivalent to μὴ παραλόγως, and ὅταν ἔξωθεν to παραλόγως. Moreover, ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας is a strange phrase. Hence I have supposed αἰτίας to be a corruption of ἀγνοίας, and I find the strongest possible confirmation of my conjecture both in the *E. N.* and in the *M. M.* Cf. *E. N.* iii. 5. § 8: also § 7: and *M. M.* i. 33. 1195 a. 27 . . . b. 4.' Susemihl

1135 b. 18. adopts Jackson's ἀγνοίας. It is true that ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας (= *principium causae*) is a strange phrase; and I should feel tempted to mend it, either by substituting another word for αἰτίας[1], or by retaining αἰτίας in another sense, as equivalent to *criminis* instead of *causae*, were it not for the fact that I find Hippocrates (περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς 1. ed. Littré vol. i. p. 570) using the same expression ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας = *principium causae*—δοκέει ἀνεχείρησεν περὶ ἰητρικῆς λέγειν ἢ γράφειν, ὑπόθεσιν σφίσιν αὐτέοισιν ἐπιθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ, θερμὸν, ἢ ψυχρὸν, ἢ ὑγρὸν, ἢ ξηρὸν, ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν, ἐς βραχὺ ἄγοντες, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰτίης τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι τῶν νούσων τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, καὶ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτήν, ἐν ἢ δύο προθέμενοι, ἐν πολλοῖσι μὲν καὶ ἐόντα λέγουσι παντοφανέες εἰσὶν ἁμαρτάνοντες. The fact that the phrase does elsewhere occur (though not in the Aristotelian writings), to my mind turns the balance in favour of retaining it here.

b. 20. § 8. εἰδώς] 'Thus ὁ θυμῷ πράττων is accounted εἰδώς. In *N. E.* iii. 1. § 14 he is classed with the μεθύων as an ἀγνοῶν: ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ἐρεθιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ δέ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δέ, ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν.' Jackson, *ad loc.*

b. 21. ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Jackson points out that this second ὅσα is the subject of συμβαίνει. He accordingly removes Bekker's commas after πάθη and φυσικά. Mich. Eph. distinguishes between φυσικά and ἀναγκαῖα πάθη—εἰσὶ δὲ πάθη φυσικά, ἔρωτες, λῦπαι, φόβοι· ἀναγκαῖα δὲ πεῖνα δίψα: but I think it is doubtful whether any distinction is intended. The writer probably wishes merely to point out that certain normal appetites (called indifferently φυσικά or ἀναγκαῖα) common to all men, breaking out *suddenly* to seek satisfaction, may occasion injurious acts which must be treated differently in the criminal court from injurious acts deliberately planned for the satisfaction of these (natural) or other (factitious) appetites. It is true, however, that in vii. 4. 2 the ἀναγκαῖα with which the ἀκρατὴς ἁπλῶς is concerned are identified with τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, and that another sphere is

[1] E. g. αἰκίας: this term (see v. 2. 13), well known to Athenian law, occurs in Plato, *Legg.* ix, to which the present chapter is so deeply indebted; and in *Pol.* ii. 4. 1262 a. 26 αἰκίαι committed by persons who are ἀγνοοῦντες are distinctly contemplated. H^a, M^b, and B^g, with καίας, might be supposed to exhibit a divergent form, which, when compared with the αἰτίας of other MSS., would point to an original αἰκίας.

assigned to the ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ. Accordingly, *if* it is necessary to 1135 b.
suppose that the writer means to distinguish ἀναγκαῖα and φυσικά here, it would be true to say that (as Jackson explains *ad loc.* p. 112) φυσικὰ πάθη are ὅσα κοινὰ πᾶσι καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοινά (*E. N.* vii. 6. 2), and ἀναγκαῖα πάθη a species of the φυσικά, including ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν κ.τ.λ.

οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ b. 23.
βλάβη·[1] ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός] *i. e.* the merely instinctive operation of these natural passions, resulting in injurious acts, does not argue a bad character. It is when these passions are made 'objects of reflection,' and when the means of gratifying them to the injury of other people are deliberately sought out, that we can infer a bad character. It is obvious that among these natural passions there are some which call in the aid of reflection more readily than others: *cf.* vii. 6. 3, where ἐπιθυμία generally, as distinguished from θυμός, is described as ἐπίβουλος. Hence the prominence given in the present passage to τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ as examples of τὰ μὴ ἐκ προνοίας.

For the distinction between injurious acts produced by the unpremeditated operation of ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ πάθη, and injury inflicted deliberately—especially in the form of συκοφαντία—in order to gratify spite or greed, see *Probl.* ΚΘ. 13. 951 b. 27 (quoted by Zell and Ramsauer)—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ δι' ἄλλα πολλὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐκ προνοίας· τὸ δὲ ἀδικῶς ἐγκαλεῖν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐκ προνοίας ἐστίν.

§ 9. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται] τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ, b. 25.
acts done in the heat of sudden anger. In the *Laws* (ix. 866 D–867 B—a passage referred to by Bywater, *Journal of Philology*, 1874, v. 115, and, after him, by Jackson, for the explanation of ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ at the end of § 10 below), Plato distinguishes between two classes of οἱ θυμῷ ποιοῦντες, viz. οἱ ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτως πράττοντες, and οἱ μετ' ἐπιβουλῆς ὕστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενοι. His words are—Ἐὰν δ' ἄρα τις αὐτόχειρ μὲν κτείνῃ ἐλεύθερον, θυμῷ δὲ ᾗ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἐκπραχθέν, δικῇ δεῖ πρῶτον τὸ τοιοῦτον διαλαβεῖν. θυμῷ γὰρ δὴ πέπρακται καὶ τοῖς ὅσοι ἂν ἐξαίφνης μὲν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτως τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι πληγαῖς ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ διαφθείρωσί τινα παραχρῆμα τῆς ὁρμῆς γενομένης, μεταμέλειά τε εὐθὺς τοῦ πεπραγμένου γίγνηται, θυμῷ δὲ καὶ ὅσοι προπηλακισθέντες λόγοις ἢ καὶ ἀτίμοις ἔργοις, μεταδιώκοντες

[1] Jackson inserts ch. 6. §§ 1 and 2 here: se ction, pp. xvii–xix.

1135 b. 25. τὴν τιμωρίαν, ὕστερον ἀποκτείνωσί τινα βουληθέντες κτεῖναι, καὶ τὸ πεπραγμένον αὐτοῖς ἀμεταμέλητον γίγνηται. διττοὺς μὲν δὴ τοὺς φόνους, ὡς ἔοικε, θετέον, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀμφοτέρους θυμῷ γεγονότας, μεταξὺ δέ που τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου δικαιόσαι' ἂν λεγομένους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰκὼν ἑσθ' ἑκάτερος· ὁ μὲν τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἐξαίφνης ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς ὕστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενος ἑκουσίῳ ἔοικεν, ὁ δὲ ἀταμιεύτως ταῖς ὀργαῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα εὐθὺς χρώμενος ἀπροβουλεύτως ὅμοιος μὲν ἀκουσίῳ, ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' οὗτος αὖ παντάπασιν ἀκούσιος ἀλλ' εἰκὼν ἀκουσίου. διὸ χαλεποὶ διορίζειν οἱ τῷ θυμῷ πραχθέντες φόνοι, πότερον ἑκουσίους αὐτοὺς ἤ τινας ὡς ἀκουσίους νομοθετητέον. βέλτιστον μὲν καὶ ἀληθέστατον εἰς εἰκόνα μὲν ἄμφω θεῖναι, τεμεῖν δὲ αὐτὼ χωρὶς τῇ ἐπιβουλῇ καὶ ἀπροβουλίᾳ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετ' ἐπιβουλῆς τε καὶ ὀργῇ κτείνασι τὰς τιμωρίας χαλεπωτέρας, τοῖς δὲ ἀπροβουλεύτως τε καὶ ἐξαίφνης πραοτέρας νομοθετεῖν. According to Jackson the ἐπιβουλεύσας (§ 10, 1135 b. 33)—'the man who deliberately attacks his neighbour [whether by way of revenge, or otherwise]' cannot plead ἄγνοια—mistake about injury received—because he 'has had time to consider the matter.' Surely it is often the case that 'time to consider the matter' does not contribute to the discovery of the original mistake, especially if a man '*broods over* his supposed wrong before he retaliates.' The retaliatory act of such a man is, of course, ἐκ προνοίας, and must be more severely judged than the sudden act of the θυμῷ ποιῶν: still such an ἐπιβουλεύσας may plead ἄγνοια: he may say, with truth, that he planned revenge because he thought that he had been injured—the question before the court is still περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, not περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι. For this reason I am inclined to think that the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10, 1135 b. 33 is not 'the man who takes time to *retaliate*,' but rather the συκοφαντῶν or ἀδίκως ἐγκαλῶν of *Probl.* κθ. 13. 952 a. 1 sqq.

§§ 9, 10.] In trying a case of assault, the court, having first satisfied itself that the assault, alleged by the ὀργίσας as διώκων, and admitted by the θυμῷ ποιῶν as φεύγων, was committed in the heat of sudden anger, and therefore without premeditation, allows the θυμῷ ποιῶν to plead in justification of his offence so committed, and in mitigation of its penalty, that the ὀργίσας provoked it by what either really was unjust treatment, or might naturally in the circumstances be mistaken for unjust treatment. The question before the court is—Was there provocation, or apparent provocation, sufficient to justify the assault in any degree?—περὶ τοῦ δικαίου

ἀμφισβητεῖται. The finding *may be* that the διώκων is μοχθηρός, but 1135 b. 25.
cannot be that the φεύγων is μοχθηρός. It is only in cases where the fact of the offence alleged by the διώκων is denied by the φεύγων (ὅταν περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητῶσι), that one or other of the two parties (it is uncertain which) *must be* μοχθηρός, and guilty of deliberately wronging the other—either the διώκων in bringing an accusation which he knows to be false, or the φεύγων in having committed an offence which he does not attempt to justify, but denies; see *Rhet.* iii. 17. 1417 b. 27 (quoted by Jackson)—μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει (*i.e.* τῇ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι) μόνῃ τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄγνοια αἰτία, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν: *cf. Pol.* Δ. 13. 1300 b. 25 (quoted by Grant, Jackson and Ramsauer) περί τε τῶν ἐκ προνοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκουσίων, καὶ ὅσα ὁμολογεῖται μέν, ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου.

I said above that I do not agree with Bywater and Jackson in identifying the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10 either entirely or partly with the man 'who takes time to *retaliate*'—ὁ τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἐξαίφνης, ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς ὕστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενος of *Legg.* ix. 867 A. 'The man who takes time to retaliate'—ὁ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς τιμωρούμενος—does not lose sight of the φαινομένη ἀδικία, because he 'takes time'; and his act of retaliation is, as often as not, done openly, and its reason avowed afterwards. The issue before the court would then be περὶ τοῦ δικαίου and not περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι. But the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10, I take it, as contrasted with the θυμῷ ποιῶν (ὁ οἰόμενος ἀδικεῖσθαι) is a person whose conduct does not raise the issue περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. He cannot therefore be identified with the μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς τιμωρούμενος who avows his premeditated act, and pleads justification—with success, as we sometimes see in the French and Italian law-courts. Nor can it be right to identify him (as the Paraph. does) with the ὀργίσας, who may be entirely innocent of the ἀδικία attributed to him by the θυμῷ ποιῶν. It only remains that we identify him with the man who deliberately injures his neighbour *not by way of revenge* for real or imagined wrong. A good example of such an ἐπιβουλεύσας is ὁ ἀδίκως ἐγκαλῶν, or ὁ συκοφαντῶν of *Probl.* κθ. 13. 951 b. 29, and 952 a. 1, who, as διώκων, accuses the φεύγων of having done something, which the latter denies having done. In such an ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι, if the jurors' votes are divided equally for the διώκων and for the φεύγων, the verdict is, of course, given in favour of the

1135 b. 25. latter—but the writer is at pains to explain why—because the διώκων, *if* he has really brought a false accusation against the φεύγων, must be held to have done so knowingly and ἐκ προνοίας, whereas the φεύγων, *if* he committed the offence charged, may have committed it ἄνευ προνοίας. The passage runs as follows—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ δι' ἄλλα πολλὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐκ προνοίας· τὸ δὲ ἀδίκως ἐγκαλεῖν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐκ προνοίας ἐστίν. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἴσως αἱ ψῆφοι γεγένασι, τὸ δὲ ἀδίκως τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα ἐγκαλεῖν καὶ τὸν φεύγοντα ἀδικεῖν, φαύλου κραθέντος τοῦ ἀδίκως ἐγκαλοῦντος τὸ νικῶν τῷ φεύγοντι ὁ νομοθέτης ἀπένειμεν. . . 952 a. 1 ἔτι μείζω μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικῶν ἢ ὁ μὴ ἐκ προνοίας. ὁ μὲν δὴ συμφαντῶν ἀεὶ ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἕτερόν τι ἀδικῶν τὰ μὲν δι' ἀνάγκην τὰ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἔτυχεν ἀδικεῖν αὐτῷ συμπίπτει. ὅταν δὲ ἴσαι γένωνται αἱ ψῆφοι, ὁ μὲν διώκων κέκριται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμίσεων ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικεῖν, ὁ δὲ φεύγων ὑπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐ ἀδικεῖν μὲν οὐ μέντοι γε ἐκ προνοίας, ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἀδικεῖν μείζω κέκριται ὁ διώκων τοῦ φεύγοντος, εἰκότως ὁ νομοθέτης νικῶν ἔκρινε τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω ἀδικοῦντα.

The ἐπιβουλεύσας, then, being the man who deliberately injures his neighbour (by bringing a false accusation against him, or otherwise) without having received provocation, the ὁ μέν b. 33 will be the θυμῷ ποιῶν—the man who retaliates in the heat of anger—and the ὁ δέ will be the ἐπιβουλεύσας as just described. I think that the whole passage from διό b. 25 to ὁ δ' οὔ 1136 a. 1 is of the nature of a parenthesis; and that the words ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ a. 1 resume the main thread of the discussion by repeating, in a slightly altered form, what had been said before the parenthesis, viz. ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός b. 25. The sense of the whole parenthesis from διό to δ' οὔ may be brought out thus—An act done in the heat of anger is not treated at law as an act premeditated by the agent: for (1) it arises from provocation received from another; and (2) the agent as φεύγων admits the act, and pleads in justification the provocation which he has received. He stands on an entirely different footing from that one of the two parties in an ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι who is proved guilty—for one or other of them *must* be guilty of premeditated wrong—either the φεύγων of committing an act which he knows cannot be justified, and therefore denies, or the διώκων of bringing an accusation which he knows to be false. The party found guilty in such a case differs from the θυμῷ ποιῶν in not being unaware of having plotted an injury (ὁ δὲ ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), and in not thinking that he has received an injury which justifies his act

(ὁ μὲν [*i.e.* ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν] οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' [*i.e.* ὁ ἐπιβου- 1135 b. 25
λεύσας] οὔ).

Mich. Eph., Coraes, Michelet, Nötel, and Peters, refer ὁ μέν and ὁ δέ to the ὀργίσας and the θυμῷ ποιῶν (they differ, however, as to which is which), thus treating the words ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ as parenthetical (Nötel rejects them from the text—*Quaestionum Aristotelearum specimen*, p. 43). The objection to this interpretation is that the ὀργίσας may or may not be conscious of having done something to merit the retaliation of the θυμῷ ποιῶν, and accordingly the statement ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι would not always be true of him. But it is always true of the θυμῷ ποιῶν, whose sudden ὀργή is ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ ἀδικίᾳ. Nor could the words ὁ δ' οὔ (sc. οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι[1]) always apply to the ὀργίσας. If he is conscious of having done nothing to merit the attack of the θυμῷ ποιῶν, he will think that he has been unjustly treated. It seems plain, then, that the words ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι refer to the θυμῷ ποιῶν, and the words ὁ δ' οὔ to the ἐπιβουλεύσας, who, as I have tried to show, is neither the man 'who takes time to *retaliate*' (Jackson), nor the ὀργίσας, but that one of the two parties in an ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι who is proved to be μοχθηρός. The words ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ are thus not to be treated as parenthetical.

ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche compares *E. N.* vii. 6. 1. b. 28.

ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι] The Paraph. Heliod. has—οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ b. 29.
ἐν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν ἔχει, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις γίνεται· ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ἀμφισβητεῖται· οἷον, εἰ ἔλαβε τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἢ τὸ δάνειον, καὶ λαβὼν οὐκ ἀπέδωκε, κἂν τοῦτο δειχθῇ, πονηρὸς εὐθὺς καὶ ἄδικός ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενος ἀρνεῖται—*i.e.* the reference is to ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα—*e.g.* B sues A for an alleged debt; and A swears that he has already paid it: one of the two must be μοχθηρός, unless the one in error has simply forgotten the circumstance in dispute—B the circumstance of his having been paid, or A the circumstance of his not having paid.

ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν] 'I think,' says Jackson *ad loc.*, b. 31.
'that the subject of δρῶσιν is ὅ τε ὀργίσας καὶ ὁ ὀργισθείς, who do not raise the issue of fact unless they do it through forgetfulness, *i.e.*

[1] This seems to be the only legitimate way of completing the clause. Nötel (p. 43) supplies οἴεται ἐκεῖνον ἀδικεῖσθαι, in the interest of his interpretation of the passage.

1135 b. 31. the forgetfulness which results from anger. These words are commonly understood to refer to the two parties concerned in a *συνάλλαγμα*, "ubi fieri non potest quin eorum alter qui ita controversantur pravus sit, nisi forte oblivio intercessit" (Victorius on *Rhet.* iii. 17): but (1) why is *αὐτὸ δρῶσιν* in the plural? and (2) what precise idea do these words convey? According to my interpretation, they stand for *περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν.*' I confess that I do not see any difficulty in reconciling the plural with the common interpretation. The words *ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν* are added to qualify the immediately preceding statement, *ἂν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν*, the subject of *δρῶσιν* being *οἱ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦντες*, and *αὐτό* being *τὸ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητεῖν.* It is practically, if not exclusively, among *ἀμφισβητήσεις* arising out of *ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα* that these exceptional cases of *τὸ διὰ λήθην δρᾶν* will occur. It is just possible, however, that in an action arising out of an *ἀκούσιον συνάλλαγμα*, such as assault, the *θυμῷ ποιῶν* might *διὰ λήθην* maintain erroneously that he had not committed the assault.

1136 a. 1. § 11. *καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' κ.τ.λ.*] These words, as Ramsauer and Jackson point out, are closely connected with the immediately preceding *ἀδικεῖ*, after which, accordingly, a comma, not a full stop (Bekker), should be placed.

a. 2. *ὅταν παρὰ . . . ἴσον*] when his act is inconsistent with the *γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία* of Distributive Justice, or the *ἀριθμητικὴ ἰσότης* of Corrective Justice.

a. 3. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ*] This answers to *ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ* above.

a. 4. *δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ*] as distinguished from *προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ.*

a. 5. § 12.] This section states the principle according to which *συγγνώμη* is to be extended to actions or withheld from them, and, as Ramsauer points out, naturally follows sections in which the writer has laid down principles in accordance with which degrees of guilt may be discriminated in a court of justice: '*συγγνώμη* enim necessario ad *τὸν κρίνοντα* pertinet.' Jackson has an important note here—'These words [*τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων*] answer to *τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων* in § 5: but it must be observed that the *ἀκούσια* of the present section include actions which do not appear at all in the foregoing classification. The *ὅσα μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἁμαρτάνουσιν*

are the ἀτυχήματα of § 7: the ὅσα μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν 1136 a. 5.
διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρωπικόν are neither the ἁμαρτήματα nor the ἀδικήματα of §§ 7, 8, but acts characteristic of the inhuman πάθη . . . compare vii. 5. The acts in question are ἀκούσια because the perpetrators of them are not responsible agents, but they are not συγγνωμονικά, because they are even more detestable than ordinary vicious acts.' *Cf.* Grant *ad loc.*—'The police-courts afford frequent instances of the infliction of brutal injuries which are "not forgivable," though the perpetrators seem hardly responsible beings.' Mich. Eph. accordingly is wrong when he says—ἀκούσια νῦν ἔοικε λέγειν πάντα τὰ παρὰ προαίρεσιν γινόμενα· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πάθος γινόμενα πρὸ ὀλίγου ἑκούσια μὲν εἶπεν ἀπροαίρετα δέ. νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις ὑπάγει καὶ ταῦτα· καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν εἰ ἑκούσια λέγων ταῦτα πάλιν ἀκούσιά φησιν· ἑκούσια μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι καθ' ὅσον οὐ δι' ἄγνοιαν γίνεται, ἀκούσια δὲ αὖ πάλιν καθ' ὅσον οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν: wrong also, when he illustrates τὰ διὰ πάθος μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον by τὸ τοιᾶσδε τροφῆς ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τοιοῦδέ τινος πόματος, οἷον σαρκὸς πέρδικος καὶ οἴνου γλυκέος, adding that ὁ διὰ ταῦτα ἁμαρτήσας οὐκ ἐστὶ συγγνώμης ἄξιος. If the μήτε φυσικὰ μήτ' ἀνθρώπινα πάθη of the present section are thus, as Mich. Eph. explains, merely the ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι ἐπιθυμίαι of iii. 11. 1, and not τὰ θηριώδη πάθη of vii. 5, it would not perhaps be inconsistent with the terminology of Book iii to say that the man who acts under their influence does so ἀγνοῶν, and it is not inconceivable that even the writer of the present section might—carelessly perhaps—say so; but it would be in direct opposition to the doctrine common to the Fifth and Third Books to speak of the ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι ἐπιθυμίαι as producing acts which are ἀκούσια. Since the acts are said to be ἀκούσια, we can only understand that the μήτε φυσικὰ μήτ' ἀνθρώπινα πάθη which cause them are θηριώδη πάθη.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

It may make our conception clearer of the relation between 'treating unjustly' and 'being treated unjustly,' if we try to answer, or at least to state, distinctly some difficult questions connected with the subject—

Can a man consent to be treated unjustly?

Or is it always *against his will that a man is treated unjustly?*

Or is it sometimes *with his consent*, and sometimes *against his will, that a man is treated unjustly?*

'Treating unjustly' is always a voluntary act: from which it might be inferred that 'being treated unjustly' is always *against the sufferer's will. But on the other hand, although 'treating justly' is always a voluntary act, we find that just treatment is* not always *voluntarily accepted—for the criminal who is punished is treated justly against his will. What is true, then, of 'being treated justly' may be true also of 'being treated unjustly'—it may be true that sometimes a man receives unjust treatment voluntarily, and sometimes against his will. But when we are told that a man sometimes receives unjust treatment voluntarily, we must refer to a former distinction, and ask—Is the unjust treatment inflicted by an unjust agent,* i. e. *by one who deliberately intends to inflict unjust treatment? For if not, then it is only nominally and not really that the sufferer is 'treated unjustly,' and it may be true that he voluntarily accepts what is thus nominally unjust treatment, although he could not voluntarily accept what is really unjust treatment, viz. treatment* intended *to injure him*—i. e. *could not accept it as intended. Take the case of the incontinent man: with full knowledge of all the circumstances he voluntarily hurts himself, or allows another to hurt him: therefore, it may be argued, a man can voluntarily treat himself unjustly, or injure himself, and voluntarily accept injury from another. But does such a man* wish *to be treated unjustly*, i. e. *does he make his own loss or ruin his* end? *Surely not. He still wishes for his own good,* i. e. *makes his good his end. What he voluntarily inflicts upon himself, or allows another to inflict, is hurt, not injury. Our answer, then, to the question, Can a man consent to be unjustly treated or injured? is 'No,' for he cannot wish to be injured,* i. e. *he cannot make his own loss or ruin his end. In short, whenever a man is injured, there must be another person to injure him by acting* against his wish, i. e. *by ignoring his personality. Accordingly, when a man 'gives away gold for brass,' or, as the equitable man often does, assigns to himself in a distribution less than his legitimate share, he is not really injuring himself. He does not make his own loss or ruin his end; nay, he may have his own good in the form of popularity or honour distinctly in view.*

In distribution the charge of injustice attaches to the distributor, not to the party to whom he has awarded too much: and it is never himself but always other people that the distributor injures. If he distribute unfairly, under compulsion or in unavoidable ignorance of essential circumstances, the distribution is of course in itself an unfair one, but the distributor is not held to be an unfair man. If, however, he distribute or decide unfairly with full knowledge of what he is doing, he has generally a personal interest in the form which his award takes—appropriating to himself, if not a bribe, its equivalent in the gratitude of the favoured party, or in the satisfaction of his spite against the unfairly treated party.

Neglect of the distinction on which we have insisted between the nominally and the really just or unjust act, has given rise to the opinion that it is an easy matter to perform just acts, and that the just man has the faculty of performing both just and unjust acts. But, to be really just, acts must be performed by a just man, and a just man is the result of long and difficult training, as a good

doctor is the result of long study and experience. Moreover, the formed character of the just man is not a faculty capable of producing contraries, but manifests itself only in just acts.

Justice exists only for a being whose participation in the enjoyment of good things may be greater and less than his desert, i. e. *it exists for the normal man, not for the gods whose desert is infinitely great—not for the incurably wicked who are harmed by the smallest share of such good things.*

§ 1. **Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται**] See *Argument* of this chapter *sub init.* for the connexion with the subject of last chapter. In that chapter certain principles by which *δικασταί* must be guided in estimating the guilt of various offences were laid down. The present chapter pursues the same subject, discussing questions evidently important for *δικασταί*—viz. How far can a man consent to receive injury? If he consent, is he really *injured*, and does the offender really injure him, or only do him harm? Or, must we look more to the intention of the offender than to the consent (whatever that may mean) of the sufferer, in estimating the guilt of the offender? Ramsauer indicates the connexion between this chapter and the last by the words—'Judicis vero quantum intersit, si verum sit volenti non fieri injuriam, nemo non videt.' 1136 a. 10.

Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε] Mich. Eph. has—*παρατίθεται τὰ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἰαμβεῖα ἐκ τοῦ Βελλεροφῶντος εἰς πίστευσιν τοῦ ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι.* Wagner (*Eurip. Fr.* p. 40), followed by Dindorf (*Eur. Fragm.* Ἀλκμέων A *et* B) supposes that we have two lines of a *στιχομυθία* from the Ἀλκμαίων ὁ διὰ Ψωφίδος (referred to in *E. N.* iii. 1. 8). The first line (in which he reads *κατέκταν* for the *κατέκτα* of the extant MSS.—the MS. from which the *vet. trans.* is derived seems to have had *κατέκταν*) he assigns to Alcmaeon (who has killed his mother), and the second line (after which he places a note of interrogation) he assigns to Phegeus. Fritzsche, adopting a conjecture of Grotius, inserts *οὐ* before *θέλουσαν* (codd.), comparing Eurip. *Hippol.* 319 *φίλος μ' ἀπώλυσ' οὐχ ἑκοῦσαν οὐχ ἑκών.* Susemihl also reads *ἢ οὐ θέλουσαν*: Jackson and Bywater read *ἢ οὐχ ἑκοῦσαν.* a. 11.

§§ 1, 2. **πότερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**] The reasoning may be exhibited as follows:— a. 15.

ἀδικεῖν is *always ἑκούσιον*: Is *ἀδικεῖσθαι* then always *ἀκούσιον*? Or, is it sometimes *ἑκούσιον*, sometimes *ἀκούσιον*?

Perhaps the analogy of *δικαιοπραγεῖν* and *δικαιοῦσθαι* may help us:—

δικαιοπραγεῖν is *always ἑκούσιον*: But, do we find that *δικαιοῦσθαι* is *always ἑκούσιον*?

1136 a. 15. No: δικαιοῦσθαι is sometimes ἑκούσιον, sometimes ἀκούσιον:
So, the analogy of δικαιοπραγεῖν and δικαιοῦσθαι does not favour the inference that, because ἀδικεῖν is *always* ἑκούσιον, ἀδικεῖσθαι is *always* ἀκούσιον. It rather favours the inference that ἀδικεῖσθαι is sometimes ἀκούσιον, sometimes ἑκούσιον.

a. 16. § 1. καὶ ἄρα κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 40) raises a difficulty here. If the question πότερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. be answered to the effect that ἀδικεῖσθαι is πᾶν ἀκούσιον, the question καὶ ἄρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως; is excluded: if, on the other hand, it be answered that ἀδικεῖσθαι is not πᾶν ἀκούσιον, what is the use of going on to ask whether it is τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον? No one, surely, would suppose that it could be πᾶν ἐκείνως—*i. e.* πᾶν ἑκούσιον.

The confusion indicated by Rassow doubtless exists. But it need not surprise us. It is caused by the writer's formalism. He makes a point of stating all the formally possible alternatives. There seems to be no suspicion about the substantial soundness of the text, although the words ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον l. 17 are probably a dittograph of the identical words in the line above.

a. 17. ἢ τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον;] 'or is ἀδικεῖσθαι sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary?'

a. 19. § 2. ὥστ' εὔλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἑκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι] Bywater, following K^b [and CCC], omits τό before δικαιοῦσθαι. This seems to dispose of the difficulty which Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 96) finds in taking τ' as coupling the whole clause τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι . . . ἀκούσιον εἶναι with what goes immediately before, and to make it unnecessary to consider the conjecture—καί for καθ' before ἑκάτερον—with which he proposes to meet the difficulty.

a. 23. § 3. ἔπειτα κ.τ.λ.] I hardly think that Bywater's ἔπειτα (to correspond with πρῶτον μέν a. 11), for the ἐπεί of the codd., is a necessary change. See *Argument* of this chapter (§§ 3–6) for the further step taken in the discussion here. The writer's feeling when he wrote ἐπεί may be expressed thus—'ἀδικεῖσθαι is really (ὡς ἀληθῶς) always ἀκούσιον: and cases adduced to prove that it is *not always* ἀκούσιον (just as δικαιοῦσθαι is *not always* ἑκούσιον) are deceptive: for (ἐπεί § 3), if we examine them, we shall find that they are only cases of ἄδικα πάσχειν, not of ἀδικεῖσθαι. Now, ἄδικα πράττειν carries with it only ἄδικα πάσχειν, not ἀδικεῖσθαι. To injure B, A must hurt him

wishing to hurt him. If A hurt B without wishing to hurt him 1136 a. 23.
then B is hurt (βλάπτεται, ἄδικα πάσχει), but not injured (οὐκ ἀδικεῖται) by A. To apply this principle to the case of the ἀκρατής so commonly adduced to prove ὅτι ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, or ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν—the ἀκρατής either hurts himself *proprio motu* (§ 4), or allows another person to persuade him to hurt himself (§ 5). His act is admittedly voluntary. But what is its real object, as that object presents itself to him at the moment of action? His own pleasure, not his hurt. He does not wish to hurt himself, or be hurt by another person; he merely desires pleasure. When he is hurt by himself, his passive side cannot complain of injury (τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι), for his active side, not being able to wish what his passive side is unwilling to suffer, cannot wish to hurt the latter. Hence οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. But where the ἀκρατής is not agent and patient in one, but patient yielding to the solicitations of another person, he may receive injury (τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι) from that other person in so far as he is seduced to do, because pleasant to his feeling, what his tempter, even while he tempts him, knows to be hurtful, perhaps ruinous to his person. He is injured (ἀδικεῖται), because his tempter injures him (ἀδικεῖ). But he cannot be his tempter's *accomplice* against himself. He is with his tempter as holding out a pleasure to feeling, but not as ignoring his person: οὐκ ἀδικεῖται ἑκὼν ὁ ἀκρατὴς ὑπ' ἄλλου.'

Jackson explains the present passage by distinguishing two successive stages in τὰ κατ' ἀκρασίαν. 'According to Eudemus,' he says, p. 117, 'we must distinguish in τὰ κατ' ἀκρασίαν two successive stages: (1) that in which the βούλησις resists, and therefore the man is ἄκων, and (2) that in which, the βούλησις having given way to the ἐπιθυμία, the man is ἑκών, but οὐθὲν παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν. Thus the ἀκρατής is not *simultaneously* ἑκών and παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πάσχων, and therefore the phenomena of ἀκρασία do not countenance the theory that a man may ἑκὼν ἀδικεῖσθαι':—and again p. 118, 'in the first stage A is not ἑκών, because βούλησις, being dominant, resists: in the second stage A is ἑκών but not ἀδικούμενος, because ἐπιθυμία, being dominant, assents to B's solicitations, βούλησις having now given way.' Of course it is quite true that in the ἀκρατής there is a struggle between ἐπιθυμία and λόγος, in which the former eventually prevails. This struggle takes time, and two stages may very properly be distinguished in it. But it is scarcely correct to speak of the ἀκρατής being 'not ἑκών' in the first stage—*i.e.*

1136 a. 33. *before* he acts. A man is ἄδικος, or not ἄδικος, properly only at the moment of acting (see iii. 1. 6). Now, it is agreed that the ἀδικούμενος at the moment of acting is ἄδικος—whether he tempt himself, or be tempted by another. The question is—what is *the real object* of his voluntary action, as that object presents itself to him at the moment of acting? His real object, thus determined, is present pleasure, not his own hurt. He acts to satisfy an isolated ἐπιθυμία, not to do harm to his personality, as that is represented to him, more or less adequately, by his βούλησις—the principle of self-conservation within him. In yielding incontinently to pleasure he indeed violates the principle of self-conservation within him by a voluntary act, but without realising that he does so. Hence, in the language of the present passage, οὐκ ἄδικοῦ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ—when acting alone he does not plot his own hurt; and οὐκ ἀδικοῦσιν ἄδικοι—when yielding to the solicitations of another he does not conspire with that other to hurt himself.

a. 28. ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων] *i.e.* ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττοντος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. As Mich. Eph. explains—ἀδίκεται τὸν ἀδικούμενον καὶ συμβεβηκὸς μεταλαβόντα τοῦ ἀδικίου, ὅταν ὁ ἀδικούμενος καὶ συμβεβηκὸς ἀδικούμενος—*i.e.* when the agent πράττει οὐκ συμβεβηκὸς ἀδικοῦν οὖσαν (v. 8. 1), the patient πάσχει οὐκ συμβεβηκὸς ἀδικούμενον οὖσαν.

a. 27. ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων] The omission of ἐπί has been suggested. The suggestion is plausible: but the MSS. are apparently all against it.

a. 29. ἀδύνατον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche and Grant quote *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 27 ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν.

a. 31. § 4. ἁπλῶς] explained by Mich. Eph. as = ἄνευ προσθήκης, 'without qualification.' The qualification or addition necessary is supplied in § 5—παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν. Ἀδικεῖν is not simply hurting voluntarily, but hurting voluntarily for the sake of hurting. The victim cannot, without denying his own personality, be a party to this. He must always wish to be himself intact. That βούλησις, as distinguished from ἐπιθυμία, expresses—often inadequately enough—the personality or self is a doctrine which Aristotle shares with Plato: see notes on iii. 4. It plays a great part also in the philosophy of Plotinus—*cf.* especially a passage *Enn.* vi. 8. p. 747 sqq., the key-note of which is—οὐχ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ βούλεται αὐτός.

a. 34. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῶν ἀπορουμένων] Discussed afterwards in

chapter 11. The words before us come in strangely here. They seem to refer back to a list of ἀπορούμενα: but no list has been given. 1136 a. 34.

§ 5. ὁ διορισμός] = ὁρισμός: viz. that given at the beginning of § 4. b. 3.

§ 6. βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν . . . οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται] βλάπτεσθαι may be ἑκούσιον, but ἀδικεῖσθαι cannot be: for no one can conspire against his own personality. The words οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, 'no man knowingly denies his own personality'—'no man makes his own hurt his *end*' (see iii. 4. 1 ἡ δὲ βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν), are equivalent to ἀδικεῖται οὐδεὶς ἑκών—'no man submits voluntarily to hurt which he feels to be simply hurt, and knows that his assailant regards as simply hurt.' b. 5.

οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται . . . πράττειν πράττει] *cf. E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 b. 6 βούλεται δ' οὐδεὶς ὃ οἴεται εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἃ βούλεται ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὃ οἴεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν. b. 7.

οὐχ ἃ οἴεται] This is the reading of K^b alone, preferred by Bekker and Bywater. Other MSS. read ὃ οὐκ, preferred by Jackson and Susemihl. Jackson however calls attention to *E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 b. 7, where ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἃ βούλεται ποιεῖ seems to be in favour of Bekker's preference. b. 8.

§ 7. Ὅμηρος] *Iliad* vi. 236. b. 9.

§ 8. ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δύ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν] The first of these two questions (πότερόν ποτ' ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας) has not been mentioned before as a question to be discussed; and the second (εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν) has already been partly discussed (§§ 4 sqq.) in connexion with the question εἰ ἔστιν ἑκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι, from which, however, the writer evidently wishes to distinguish it, for he says περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον δῆλον. ἔτι δ' ὧν κ.τ.λ. b. 15.

The word προειλόμεθα is certainly strange in the absence of a definite list of ἀπορίαι to which reference might be made—as Ramsauer says, 'Contra usum Aristotelis est ad προαίρεσίν τινα quam inter scribendum habuerit animo absconditam se verbis revocare'. Perhaps Zell is right in supposing the reference to be to § 1 of the present chapter—ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν· πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν . . . ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι.

1136 b. 15. Having discussed this first question, and summed up the result with περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον δῆλον (§ 8), he goes on with ἔτι δ' ἄν to discuss two other questions contemplated (but not announced) at the beginning of the chapter.

b. 17. § 9. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται] 'These questions seem to be connected, for if . . .', Jackson.

τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν] the former alternative in the first question, viz. ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας—explained by the epexegetical clause καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον.

b. 21. ἐλαττωτικός] see v. 10. 8.

τοῦτο] τὸ ἔλαττον αὐτῷ νέμειν. This statement must not be taken ἁπλῶς. We must qualify it with the πρόσθεσις, *e. g.* τοῦ ὀφείλοντος—ἑτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον τοῦ καλοῦ.

b. 22. τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ] ἁπλῶς is perhaps used here to distinguish the καλόν itself, truly so called, from δόξα the appearance of it.

b. 23. λύεται κατά] Bekker inserts καί before κατά without MS. authority Jackson's note is 'καί O^b?'

τὸν διορισμόν] § 5 above.

b. 24. διά γε τοῦτο] *i. e.* in consequence of τὸ ἔλαττον αὐτῷ νέμειν.

b. 25. § 10. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ . .] He has hitherto treated the first of the two questions stated in § 8 in its bearing on the second. He now treats it on its own account.

b. 26. ἔχων ἀεί] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 61) expunges ἀεί, conjecturing (with much plausibility, I think) that it is the corruption of an old dittograph ἀδικεῖ which K^b now alone retains (in place of ἀεί after ἔχων). If we retain ἀεί we can hardly take it, with Zell, as in the idiom ὁ ἀεὶ ἄρχων: the meaning must be that, although the πλέον ἔχων is often a πλεονέκτης in the ordinary sense of that term, he is not *always* so.

b. 27. ὑπάρχει] Grammatically ὑπάρχει goes with the second ᾧ as well as with the first; but logically it goes with the first only, thus—οὐ γὰρ ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἑκουσίως τοῦτο ποιῶν. It is not the material presence of τὸ ἄδικον in a man's circumstances (ὑπάρχοντα), but its formal presence in his disposition, and efficiency in his will, which makes the ἀδικῶν. I think that Jackson is wrong

with ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον [*sc.* ποιεῖν] ὑπάρχει—note on § 11. The reading 1136 b. 27.
ἄδικον ἔχω ὑπάρχει given by pr. K^b suggests ἄδικον ἔχειν ὑπάρχει, which would be a tolerably satisfactory reading, although the special force of ὑπάρχει as opposed to ποιεῖν would be lost.

τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως] τοῦτο is τὸ ἑκόντα ποιεῖν—'the b. 28.
initiation of a voluntary agent (τὸ ἑκόντα ποιεῖν) is the efficient cause of the action; and this resides in the distributor, not in the receiver.'

§ 11. οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα] Zell and Michelet make b. 31.
the λαμβάνων the subject of these verbs. As a slave, at the bidding of his master, may perform an unjust act, without being himself chargeable with injustice, so the λαμβάνων may participate in an unjust act (ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα), without being himself unjust in respect of it (ἀδικεῖν). Mich. Eph., Grant, and Ramsauer, on the other hand, make the διανέμων the subject. This latter is the more plausible construction of the two, because the διανέμων is the subject in § 10 and also in §§ 12 and 13, and because it does not require us to stretch the meaning of ποιεῖν so as to include what is after all πάσχειν. Jackson adopts a third course. He takes the § closely in connexion with § 10, omits ὅτι (as a dittograph of the first two letters of ἐπεί), and makes ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης the subjects of the verbs ἀδικεῖ and ποιεῖ. 'I suppose the sentence thus altered,' he says, 'to be a justification of the distinction just made between ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον [*sc.* ποιεῖν] ὑπάρχει and ᾧ τὸ ἑκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν. The Paraph. seems to have understood the sentence as I do.' The following are the Paraphrast's words—Φαίνεται δέ, ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ καθ' αὑτό, ὁ δὲ λαμβάνων κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἀδικεῖ καθ' αὑτο, ὃς ἑκὼν τοῦτο ποιεῖ. Ἑκὼν δέ τις ποιεῖ, ὅταν ᾖ παρ' αὐτῷ τῆς πράξεως ἡ αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ποιεῖν· τῆς δὲ διανομῆς ἡ ἀρχὴ παρὰ τῷ διανέμοντι· ὁ ἄρα διανέμων τὸ πλέον ἀδικεῖ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ δεχόμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχή, καθὼς εἴρηται. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ ποιῶν τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικεῖν λέγεται, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥσπερ λέγεται καὶ ἡ χεὶρ φονεύσαι, ἢ μάχαιρα, ἢ λίθος, παρ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ φόνου, οὐδὲ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν πράττουσιν ἄδικα μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦσιν, ἀδικοῦσι δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

It seems to me that we cannot thus regard the λαμβάνων or ἔχων as a ποιῶν, and take ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης as parallel to him. But it would be possible to follow Jackson in omitting ὅτι, and making ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης the subjects of the verbs, and yet not regard these agents as parallel to the λαμβάνων. One might regard them

1136 b. 32. as examples of τὰ ποιοῦντα in the sense of ὄργανα, as distinguished from τὰ ποιοῦντα κυρίως, or ἀρχαὶ ὅθεν πρώτως ἡ κίνησις, to which latter class the διανέμων, as ἀνάν, has been assigned. Thus the words ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως in § 10 would suggest § 11, and the connexion between the two §§ might be exhibited thus—'the ποιεῖν of the διανέμων, as voluntary initiator or ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, is ποιεῖν in the *primary* sense, for (ἐπεί) ποιεῖν has a secondary sense in which ὄργανα are said ποιεῖν.' For ἐπεί introducing a similar parenthesis, see *E. N.* vii. 12. 2, b. 36. But is it necessary to omit ἔτι, and refuse to regard the sentence as simply saying—'If the διανέμων be a mere instrument in the hands of another οὐκ ἀδικεῖ but ποιεῖ τὰ ἄδικα'? The case indeed seems hardly worth mentioning: but is it less worth mentioning than that—εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν, mentioned in § 12? Jackson's note on § 12 is—'The argument is contained in the words εἰ γινώσκων ἄκων ἄδικος, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. The words εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν—τὸ πρῶτον merely set aside the case of ignorance as irrelevant to our present remarks.' Why then, it may be asked, may not § 11 merely set aside the case of *compulsion* as irrelevant to our present remarks? It is indeed quite in the writer's manner to give us a complete list of formally possible cases.

On the whole, then, I am inclined, with Mich. Eph., Grant, and Ramsauer, to make ὁ διανέμων (conceived as ποιῶν ἄλλου ἐπιτάξαντος) the subject of ἀδικεῖ and ποιεῖ—as if we read, ἔτι, ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος—ἐπιτάξαντος μὲν οὖν εἰ ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. The reading of K^b N^b P^b and New Coll.—μέν after ἐπιτάξαντος instead of after ἀδικεῖ—is worth notice as pointing to a 'fault' in the juncture of the vulgate.

For τὰ ἄψυχα b. 30, *cf. Met.* A. 1. 981 a. 30 διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν, τοὺς δ' ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια, ποιεῖν μέν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖν ἃ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ. Fritzsche refers to Plato *Legg.* ix. 873 E ἐὰν δὲ ἄψυχόν τι ψυχῆς ἄνθρωπον στερήσῃ . . . δικαστὴν μὲν αὐτῷ καθιζέτω τῶν γειτόνων τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὁ προσήκων γένει. He refers also to Pausan. vi. 11 Δράκων Ἀθηναίοις θεσμοὺς γράψας φονικούς, ὑπερώρισε καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, εἴ γε ἐμπεσόν τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποκτείνειεν ἄνθρωπον—also to Aeschines *Contra Ctes.* 244 καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη δεινόν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ τὰ μὲν ξύλα καὶ τοὺς λίθους καὶ τὸν σίδηρον, τὰ ἄφωνα καὶ ἀγνώμονα, ἐάν τῳ ἐμπεσόντα

ἀποκτείνῃ, ὑπεπορίζομεν, καὶ ἐάν τις αὐτὸν διαχρήσηται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο 113b
πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν Δημοσθένην δέ . . : see also the
Ἀθ. πολιτεία ch. 57 p. 145 ed. princ. δικάζει δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ φυλοβασιλεῖς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων—and Pausan. i. 28 τὸ δ' ἐν Πρυτανείῳ καλούμενον, ἔνθα τῷ σιδήρῳ καὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀψύχοις δικάζουσιν.

§ 12. ἀγνοῶν] ἡ ἄγνοια ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, not ἡ καθόλου, must be under- b. 3
stood here. An unjust decision made in unavoidable ignorance of particulars is not unjust in the eye of the law of the State (τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον), but nevertheless it violates 'the fitness of things' (τὸ πρῶτον, *i. e.* τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον). The Paraph. seems to be wrong in supplying τοὺς νόμους after ἀγνοῶν. Of a judge who decided in ignorance of the νόμοι of his State it could hardly be said οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον. In *M. M.* i. 33. 1196 b. 1 the distinction marked here by the words οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος is explained thus—ἔστι μὲν ᾗ ἀδικεῖ ἔστι δὲ ᾗ οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τῇ φύσει ὂν δίκαιον μὴ ἔκρινεν ταύτῃ μὲν ἀδικεῖ, ᾗ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ δοκοῦν εἶναι δίκαιον, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ.

πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτός] If the διανέμων, with full knowledge of the 113a
law under which he is acting, and of the circumstances of the particular case, make an unfair distribution between A and B, he must do so to serve some personal end. Not only will the favoured party ἔχει τὸ πλέον (perhaps without being chargeable with ἀδικία), but more than that (καί), the διανέμων himself too will ἔχει τὸ πλέον.

§ 13. τοῦ ἀδικήματος] the material result of τὸ ἀδικεῖν—the unfair a. 2
share assigned to the favoured party.

διὰ ταῦτα] διὰ χάριν ἢ τιμωρίαν.

καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας] This is the reading of K^b a. 3
adopted by Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 62) and Bywater, ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ meaning ἐπὶ τῷ μερίσασθαι τοῦ ἀδικήματος. The reading of other MSS. is ἐπ' ἐκείνων ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας, where ἐκείνων are οἱ μερισάμενοι τοῦ ἀδικήματος—the unfair distributor and the favoured receiver who share between them the profits of the transaction, the former getting a bribe, the latter too large a share in the distribution. Jackson paraphrases this § well—'If the judge secures to himself χάρις or τιμωρία by giving an unjust award, he is just as much a πλεονέκτης as if he were to share the plunder with the receiver. For it is not essential that the unjust distributor should take a share

1137 a. 3. of the property distributed, since even if his share takes a more substantial form than χώρα and τιμωρία, he may receive it, not in land (land being the article distributed), but in money.'

a. 4. §§ 14–16.] Jackson places these §§ after ch. 1. § 3, giving his reasons for doing so on pp. xiii–xvi of his *Introduction*. I am ready to admit that these §§ suit the context of the first chapter better than they suit that of the ninth; but I cannot admit that this proves, or even renders probable, the conclusion that the first chapter is their original locus. The Fifth Book, especially in its latter part, is, to my mind, a collection of materials waiting for arrangement, rather than a treatise which has fallen into disarrangement. Nothing that I have read (English or foreign) on the subject of 'Dislocations in the Text' has made me doubt the correctness of what, after all, is bound to be the *prima facie* view—that the order (or disorder) of the Fifth Book is *substantially* that in which the original compiler threw his materials. There are doubtless many omissions and interpolations in the text as we have it which add to the original confusion of the compilation: but the numerous transplantations (often of short passages to distant places), which we are asked by certain modern critics to assume, are quite a different thing. It may be admitted, however, that the place which the chapter on ἐπιείκεια now occupies (cutting in two, as it does, the discussion of τὸ ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι and τὸ αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν) is inconsistent even with the low standard of arrangement actually attained in the Book.

a. 7. § 14. καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον] I agree with Williams against Jackson that this means 'delivering a bribe'—a vicious action, like the other actions mentioned—perhaps suggested by the ἀργύριον of § 13.

a. 8. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥᾴδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς] The Paraph. Heliodorus has—τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρᾶξαι τὰ δίκαια ἢ τὰ ἄδικα, καὶ ἢ δοῦναι ἀργύριον ἢ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον, ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ βουλομένου· τὸ δὲ ἢ δικαιοσύνης ἕξιν ἔχων ἢ ἀδικίας, ὁ χρόνου καὶ ἀσκήσεως δεῖται, δι' ἃς ἕξεις ἢ δίκαιός τις ἢ ἄδικος λέγεται, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὥστε ἅμα τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι κτήσασθαι.

a. 9. § 15.] See *E. N.* ii. 4. §§ 3–6.

a. 11. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' κ.τ.λ.] 'but it is only κατὰ συμβεβηκός that actions prescribed by law are identical with τὰ δίκαια' (Jackson). It is not

enough, in order to perform 'just actions,' to find out the actions 1137 a. 11.
which the law declares to be just, and perform them according to pattern. Actions are 'just' only when they spring from the habit of justice, which no mere study of the requirements of the law will give a man.

νεμόμενα] Perhaps suggested by the διανέμων of §§ 8–13. K^b, a. 13.
M^b, H^a have γενόμενα, which seems to be a mere blunder.

τοῦτο δὴ πλέον ἔργον κ.τ.λ.] Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 49) says—'in lieu of τοῦτο δέ I restore τοῦτο δή, or if any one prefers it, τοῦτο [δέ], in order to keep up the correspondence in construction and sense between this clause and that which comes just after, in l. 16: in the one case an act is said to be πλέον ἔργον κτέ. and in the other τοσοῦτον ἔργον κτέ.' This seems decisive against Bekker's συνιέναι. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλά πως πραττόμενα καί πως νεμόμενα δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ. With either text, however, the meaning is—To learn to 'know' δίκαια, as the φρόνιμος (who must have the ἕξις of δικαιοσύνη) knows them, is more difficult than to learn to know ὑγιεινά as the experienced ἰατρός 'knows' them. The commentators compare *M. M.* ii. 3. 1199 a. 27 οὐ γὰρ σκοπεῖ ὁ ἄδικος οὐδὲ δύναται κρίνειν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνει. τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ ὀρθῶς δύνασθαι ταῦτα θεωρεῖν, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγιείας ποιητικὸν οἴδαμεν ἅπαντες, ὅτι ἐλλέβορος καὶ τὸ ἐλατήριον καὶ αἱ τομαὶ καὶ αἱ καύσεις ὑγιεινά εἰσιν καὶ ὑγιείας ποιητικά, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἔχομεν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οἴδαμεν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἰατρὸς οἶδεν τίνι ἐστὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς διακειμένῳ· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἤδη ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς ὑγιεινὰ εἰδότες ὅμως οὐκ ἔχομεν οὐδὲ παρακολουθεῖ ἡμῖν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη· ὡς δ' αὕτως ὁ ἄδικος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς καὶ ἡ τυραννὶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία, οἶδεν· ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μή, ἢ πότε, ἢ πῶς διακειμένῳ, οὐκέτι οἶδεν. Jackson quotes Plato, *Phaedr.* 268 A–C, where the person who ἐκ βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχὼν φαρμακίοις ἰατρὸς οἴεται εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἐπαΐων τῆς τέχνης is described as μαινόμενος.

§ 16. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο] τὸ οἴεσθαι ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν. The a. 17.
opinion criticised in this § ignores the distinction between a δύναμις and a ἕξις stated in v. 1. 4—δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ. 'This opinion that justice implies its contrary, as if it were an art (δύναμις), would be a consequence,' says Grant, 'of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to, and drew out

1137 a. 17. the paradoxical conclusion, *Rep.* 334 A (εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθῶν δικαίῳ φιλόπτωχος, καὶ πλείστων δικαίῳ), *Hipp. Min.* 375–6 (αἰσθοῦ ἡ δικαιοπράγμων καὶ σοφιστάρα οὖσα (sc. ψυχή) ἀμείνων οἷον ἀφίσης καὶ ἀμφοτέρα μᾶλλον δικαιόνη ποιοῖν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ περὶ πάντων ἀγνοοῦν 375 E). The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (ἕξις) set the difficulty at rest.'

a. 28. § 17.] Jackson places this § in chapter 1, § 9 after τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά (see his Introd. p. xvi).

τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν] Mich. Eph. points out that τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά or 'things good in themselves' are of two kinds—viz. (1) things good in themselves in the sense of being always and without qualification good—the ἀρεταί and the ἐνέργειαι καθ' αὐτάς: and (2) things good in themselves in the sense of being good in the abstract, but not necessarily good in all circumstances—money good in itself, or generally, but bad in the possession of the profligate. It is with τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά in this second sense that δικαιοσύνη has to do: for in respect of τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά in the first sense there can be no πλεονεξία. His note is interesting and may be transcribed—ἦν δὲ σοφιστὴς ἡ λέξις, εἰ οὕτως πως εἶχεν· τῶν δικαίων τὸ μὲν ὡς εἴρηται διανεμητικόν, τὸ δ' ἐπανορθωτικόν· τούτω δὲ τὸ διανεμητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν τοῖς μετέχουσι τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι κυρίως τὰ τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἀγαθά, οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ καθ' αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι· δεύτερον δὲ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ τὰ ὀργανικὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἀγαθὰ ὅσα τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν οὐ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν. τίνα δέ ἐστι τὰ ὀργανικὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, σαφηνίζων, ἐπήγαγεν ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, πλοῦτος τιμαί, δυναστεία πολιτική, ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῖς ταῖς ἀρεταῖς· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀρισμέναις οὔσαις καὶ μεσοτήτεσιν, ὡς δέδεικται, ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ μειονεκτεῖν. κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' οὐ γίνεται πλεονεξία. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τινὸς ἀρετὴν λαθεῖν βιασάμενον τὸν ἔχοντα, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων γίνεται· ἐν γὰρ τούτοις καθ' ὅραν ἀφαιρεῖται βίᾳ ὅδε τοῖδε τὸ χωρίον τὴν ἄμπελόν τινος, τὰ λοιπά. τὴν ἀνδρείαν τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἀφελέσθαι, ἢ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος βίᾳ οὐδεὶς δύναται. ὧν οὖν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν, ἐν τούτοις τὰ δίκαια. τὸ γὰρ δύνασθαι τούτων τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ πλέον τι ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον, περὶ τὴν τούτου νομὴν καὶ ἐπανόρθωσιν τὰ δίκαιά ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ οἷς γε μηδέν ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν, τούτοις οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδ' ἔλλειψίς ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν ἢ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐν οἷς

πλοῦτος, οὐ δόξα, οὐ τιμή, οὐκ ἀρχή, οὐκ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν, 1137 a. 26. οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὔτε διανεμητικὸν οὔτε διορθωτικὸν ὑπάρχει. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἷς ἔστιν, οὗσι δὲ ἀνιάτοις ὑπὸ τρυφῆς καὶ ἀκολασίας καὶ πάσης ἀσελγείας, οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἔστιν δίκαιόν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν] K^{b} and L^{b} omit ἐν a. 27. τούτοις. I do not think that ἐν τούτοις = ἐν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῖς, although coming immediately after ἐν τούτοις = the persons, need trouble us much in careless writing like the present.

μέχρι του] *sc.* ὠφέλιμα: *cf. E. N.* vii. 13. 4 καὶ εὐτυχία ὑπερβάλλουσα a. 30. ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.

διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν] *i. e.* man is neither θεός nor θηρίον. 'At present ἐστίν has no evident subject. Should we read διό instead of διά? Susemihl (Bursian's *Jahresb.* 1876, p. 278) points out that this alteration was suggested by Zwinger' (Jackson). Is the reading of Γ—τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν not worth consideration? Τοῦτο would be τὸ μέχρι του ὠφέλιμα εἶναι τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά. On the margin of CCC I find γρ. διὰ τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν. May not the διά of the vulgate represent a dittograph δέ? It is easy to imagine a scribe, with an original μέχρι του τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν before him, writing μέχρι τοῦτο δὲ τοῦτο δὲ ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν: and it is not a difficult step from this to the μέχρι του διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν of the margin of CCC. The contractions for διά and δέ are easily confounded.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Concerning Equity. The relation of Equity to Justice has caused some difficulty. The two strike us as not being exactly the same; and yet, on the other hand, since 'equitable' is popularly used as a term of praise for 'good,' it seems illogical to distinguish it from 'just,' which, in its wide sense, is the same as 'good.' If 'equitable' and 'just' are to be distinguished, one of them, it would appear, is not 'good'; and if both are 'good,' why distinguish them? The solution of this difficulty is that the 'equitable' and the 'just' are generically the same, i. e. *both 'good,' but the 'equitable' is the better. Equity is a higher form of justice; it is not the justice of the letter of the law, but that of* [illegible] *which corrects the letter. The law, by reason of the complicated*

nature of its subject-matter, is necessarily general in its terms, and sometimes fails to meet the just claims of an individual case. Here equity steps in and supplies the defect. Indeed there are some cases about which we cannot have a law at all, but must provide for them, as they arise, by special decree. Where the stones are irregularly shaped the builder must use a flexible rule.

The 'equitable' then is 'just,' being better not than the 'just' as such, but than its necessarily imperfect realization in law. It is the correction of law where it falls short by reason of its generality. The equitable man is the man who habitually makes such correction, and although he may have the letter of the law on his side, is unwilling to press his legal right harshly, preferring to take less than his due.

Introductory Note.—It seems to be generally agreed that this chapter is misplaced here in the MSS. Jackson puts it at the end of the Book; Ueberweg (*Hist. Phil.* vol. i. p. 147, English Transl.) inserts it (preceded by chapter 9, §§ 14–17, 1137 a. 4–30) after chapter 8, *i. e.* after συγγνωμονικά 1136 a. 9. The reasons for preferring Ueberweg's rearrangement are (1) that the constructive treatment of Justice becomes continuous, and the ἀπορίαι contained in chapters 9 and 11 of the vulgate form an appendix to the Book: (2) that the remarks on ἐπιείκεια follow closely on the discussion contained in chapter 8. A comparison of *Rhet.* i. 13 makes it probable that they ought to follow even more closely than they do in Ueberweg's rearrangement—*i. e.* that chapter 9, §§ 14–17 ought not to intervene between the end of chapter 8 and the beginning of chapter 10, but be otherwise disposed of—I do not venture to suggest how. In *Rhet.* i. 13 the discussion of ἐπιείκεια arises immediately out of a discussion, closely resembling that in *E. N.* v. 8, of the various degrees of guilt attaching to the βλάβαι which come before the courts of justice. If, as seems probable, the writer of *E. N.* v. 8 had *Rhet.* i. 13 before him, or in his recollection, when he wrote, he would naturally go immediately on from συγγνωμονικά (1136 a. 9) to the discussion of ἐπιείκεια.

Ueberweg accounts for the disorder in the text of the last three chapters of *E. N.* v by the misplacement of the leaves of an archetype MS.

It may be only an accidental coincidence—but it seems worth noticing in connexion with this hypothesis of misplaced leaves—that the mass of text from 1176 a. 11 to 1177 a. 30 (*E. N.* x. ch. 5, § 9–ch. 7, § 4) omitted by K^b is twice as large as that contained in the chapter on ἐπιείκεια, v. 10; twice as large as that

contained in v. 11; and equal to that intervening between the end of chapter 8 (1136 a. 9) and the beginning of the chapter on *ἐπιείκεια*, chapter 10. There are 88 Bekker's lines in the passage (1176 a. 11–1177 a. 30) omitted by K^b; 43 in the chapter on *ἐπιείκεια*; 43 in the following chapter, v. 11; and 87 from the end of v. 8 to the beginning of v. 10.

The lacuna in K^b was probably caused by the absence of two leaves (each containing about 43 Bekker's lines) from the ancient manuscript of which K^b is a transcript. Fol. 121^r in K^b ends with *τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τούς* (1176 a. 11) and fol. 121^v (the other side of the same leaf) begins with *μὲν κεχορηγημένων ὁ μέν* (1177 a. 30), the lacuna not being indicated in any way by the scribe, who, it would seem, was unconscious of its existence.

On the other hand it would be going too far if we were to say that the disorder in the text of v. 9–11 was probably caused by a misplacement of archetype leaves containing each about 43 Bekker's lines. The 'disorder' to be explained by the hypothesis is, after all, not a definite indisputable fact like the lacuna in K^b. At any rate it would be satisfactory, before attaching much importance to the quantitative relation subsisting between the lacuna in K^b and certain passages in v. 9–11, to be able to point to *other* cases of 'disorder' in the *E. N.* which could be explained by the hypothesis of an archetype leaf of 43 Bekker's lines. I confess that as yet I have not found any such cases. The space intervening between v. 4, 12 (1132 b. 9) and v. 5, 9 (1133 a. 14), to which I turned first, does not seem to have anything to do with an archetype leaf of 43 lines.

I append *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 25–1374 b. 23 for future reference, and to show how naturally the chapter on *ἐπιείκεια* takes its place between ch. 8 and ch. 9, after *συγγνωμονικά* 1136 a. 9: *ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διῃρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν. ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἑκούσιον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ εἴρηται καθ' αὑτὰ πρότερον, καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια, ὅτι ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ'*

ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πράτερον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι, οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι, ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ δημοσίᾳ, ἢ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ' οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύναι, ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἄδικον ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἑαυτὸν ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρᾳ ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τούτου, ἀφ' οὗ ἔλαβε καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἴδη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ' ἄγραφα, περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἀγράφων δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἀφ' οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί, οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἑκόντων τὰ δὲ ἀκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ, ἑκόντων δ' ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ᾖ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ᾖ δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ ὅσα μὴ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι δι' ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ καὶ ποίῳ τινί· ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν διαριθμοῦντα. ἂν οὖν ᾖ ἀόριστον, δεῖ δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε κἂν δακτύλιον ἔχων ἐπάῃται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξῃ, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχος ἔσται καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτο ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικές, φανερόν ποῖα ἐστι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποῖοι οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνθρωποι· ἐφ' οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀτυχήματα ἔστιν ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παραλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παραλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μετὰ παραλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τε ἐστίν· τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συγγιγνώσκειν ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν διανοούμενον τοῦ νομοθέτου σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν τοῦξω ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ μέρος ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ τοῖος τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ τοῖος τις ἦν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ τὸ ἀπιμνημονεύειν μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ

1137 b. 4. instead of after δίκαιον. It is very unsafe, however, to accept as final any suggestion which may be offered for the emendation of a passage like this consisting of short clauses introduced by ἡ and εἰ. Such clauses were often omitted by scribes, and often repeated. Bywater has perhaps shown proper caution in leaving the text as the majority of the MSS. give it.

b. 8. § 2. δικαίου τινός] explained below as τοῦ νομίμου δικαίου.

b. 11. §§ 3, 4.] Fritzsche and Jackson compare Plato, *Politicus* 294 A–C; see especially the words—οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον εὖ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε ἁπλᾶ τὸ διὰ παντὸς γιγνόμενον ἁπλοῦν. *Cf.* also *Rhet.* i. 13 quoted above in introductory note to this chapter.

b. 18. § 4. αἴτιον] 'Causa unde duplex illud justum exsistat, ostenditur.' Ramsauer.

b. 19. εὐθύς] See Bonitz on *Met.* Γ. 1004 a. 5—'ὑπάρχει γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχοντα κ.τ.λ. Similem usum adverbii εὐθύς, *cf.* *Cat.* 12. 14 a. 32, *An. Pr.* i. 16. 36 a. 6. Ens et unum, ait, suapte natura, εὐθύς, in genera quaedam dividuntur.'

τοιαύτῃ] ἀόριστος Paraph.—*i. e.* περὶ ἧς οὐχ οἵόν τε ἀρθῶς εἰπεῖν παθόλου.

b. 21. § 5. τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche aptly compares here *Rhet.* i. 13. 1374 b. 11 ἐπιεικὲς τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου.

b. 23. εἶπεν] This is the reading of K^b alone. It is to be preferred to the εἴποι of all other MSS. 'because,' as Jackson says, 'it is distinctly assumed that the νομοθέτης is not present and therefore does not pronounce.'

b. 25. § 6. οὐ τοῦ ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος] τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον is justice not qualified in relation to the requirements of this or that particular case—the justice of the general rule; τὸ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμάρτημα is the failure of the general rule, by reason of its generality (διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς), to meet the requirements of a particular case: *cf.* with the ἁπλῶς of this passage the use of ἁπλᾶ in the sentence quoted from the *Politicus* 294 C in note on §§ 3, 4, b. 11. A rule, in so far as it is general and unqualified, cannot fit individual cases, in so far as they are never unqualified, but always particularly qualified—ἀδύνατον εὖ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε ἁπλᾶ τὸ διὰ παντὸς γιγνόμενον ἁπλοῦν.

I cannot agree with Jackson that ἁμαρτήματος is suspicious, or 1137 b. 25.
that the Paraphrast's ἁμαρτάνοντος may possibly be the right reading. Ἁμάρτημα, I take it, has been carefully selected to mark the *concrete result* (cf. ἀδικήματος v. 9. 13) of the application of the general rule.

διὰ τὸ καθόλου] exactly equivalent to διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς above. b. 27.

ψηφίσματος] See note on τὰ ψηφισματώδη v. 7. 1, b. 24. b. 29.

§ 7. τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολίβδινος κανών] By Λεσβία οἰκο- b. 30.
δομία we are to understand 'Cyclopean building' in which large polygonal stones were employed, and fitted together, as at Tiryns; and the μολίβδινος κανών is to be explained as a flexible piece of lead which was first accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and then applied to other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities which would fit most closely into those of the stone already laid. Fritzsche, in his important note here, quotes an authority who mentions that a flexible rule is still used at Verona when a wall is being built of polygonal stones.

The parallel between the easy morals for which the Lesbians were noted and their μολίβδινος κανών was not likely to escape the notice of later littérateurs (see quotations in Zell and Coraes—especially from *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce*, t. ii. ch. 3). Fritzsche cannot be right when he supposes that 'Cyclopean building' was called 'Lesbian' because its κανών was flexible like the Lesbian morality.

The form οἰκοδομῆς, which all other MSS. apparently give here for the οἰκοδομίας of K^b and P^b, came into use later for οἰκοδόμησις or οἰκοδομία. If οἰκοδομῆς is right here, it is only here that it occurs in the Aristotelian corpus.

Before we pass on, it may be well to notice a fragment of Aeschylus which Grant quotes. He merely appends it to a note in which the 'Cyclopean' explanation of Λεσβία οἰκοδομία is accepted; but it might perhaps be taken to suggest another explanation. The fragment is given by Dindorf (*Fr.* 72), as from the Θαλαμοποιοί, in the following form—

ἀλλ' ὁ μέν τις Λέσβιον φατνώματι
κῖμ' ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπεραινέτω ῥυθμοῖς.

The κῖμα or κυμάτιον is a moulding on an architrave or elsewhere. The Doric κῦμα is a simple hollow; the Lesbian an undulating

1137 b. 30. moulding, either concave above and convex below (*cyma recta*), or the reverse (*cyma reversa*). See Smith's *Dict. of Ant.* article *cyma*. Is it suggested that the πολίβδινος κανών had anything to do with the *Lesbian* κῦμα?

b. 32. § 8.] On the Equity of the Roman Law, see Maine's *Ancient Law*, ch. iii, 'Law of Nature and Equity.'

CHAPTER XI.

Argument.

A man cannot act unjustly towards himself either in the general or in the special sense of 'acting unjustly.' Murder e.g., *committed in anger, is unjust in the sense general sense in which all other vicious acts forbidden by law are unjust. The man who commits suicide, then, in anger acts unjustly. Towards himself? No. Towards the* State; *for it is the State that* punishes *him. Nor can a man act unjustly in the special sense towards himself; for that would mean that the same thing could at once be taken from and given to the same person. Unjust treatment implies at least two persons, one of whom deliberately makes an aggression on the rights of the other. The same person cannot be both aggressor and victim, agent and patient; and moreover, if the agent of injustice, who must be a* voluntary *agent, were also the patient, then the latter would be a voluntary patient of injustice, which, as we have shown, is impossible. Further, if we pass in review all the modes in which unjust treatment may be received (and it must be received in some particular mode), we find no case in which the agent is also recipient: a man does not commit adultery with his own wife, break into his own house, steal his own money—in short, injure* himself *in any one of the particular modes in which injury can be inflicted.*

The general answer, however, to the question—Can a man inflict injury on himself? is No; for he cannot voluntarily receive injury.

To inflict injury and to receive it are both evil, for both involve a departure from the mean—the agent having too much and the patient too little; but to inflict injury is the worse, for it implies more or less evil in the agent, *while receiving injury does not involve evil in the patient. Indirectly, of course, the reception of injury may lead to consequences which are worse for the patient than the infliction of injury is for the agent; but* in itself *the infliction is a greater evil than the reception of injury.*

The view that a man can injure himself owes much of its plausibility to a confusion between the self as a whole and a part of the self. Because the irrational part may encroach upon the just prerogatives of the rational part of

the self, it is thought that a man may act unjustly towards himself. But the supremacy of the rational part over the irrational part is at most only 'just' in the metaphorical sense in which we have seen that the rule of the father over his child or the master over his slave is 'just.'

§ 1. πότερον δ'] This chapter (with the exception of §§ 7 and 8) is placed by Jackson after § 13 in chapter 9. 1138 a. 4.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] Jackson says '*i.e.* from 9. §§ 1–13.' But does not the explanatory clause τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. oblige us to suppose rather that the reference is to the distinction made in ch. 1. § 8 τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον?

οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει.] a. 6. Jackson's note here is—'οὐ κελεύει] "Does not allow," *i.e.* forbids. *Cf.* the well-known use of οὐκ ἐᾶν as the correlative of κελεύειν. The words ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει are explanatory of the phrase οὐ κελεύει. So Victorius, quoted by Cardwell. Eudemus wishes to say—"What the law *bids* is δίκαιον, what the law *forbids* is ἄδικον." *Cf.* 1. § 14 προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας, τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων. Not appreciating this idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύω, Grant remarks "the extraordinary assertion is made that whatever the law does not command it forbids. We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, etc.?" This criticism [*i.e.* Grant's] is endorsed by Rassow (*Forschungen*, p. 42).' I cannot believe that the writer's meaning here is correctly represented by the tautology 'What the law does not allow it forbids.' If we understand by νόμος, not merely statute law, but custom and fashion, it is absolutely correct to say 'What νόμος does not enjoin it forbids': see note on οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων, v. 1. 13, b. 14. As for the 'idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύω'—οὐκ ἐᾷ means 'forbids'; but does οὐ κελεύει? If exception is to be taken to Grant's remark quoted by Jackson, it is not, I think, on the ground of its non-appreciation of the 'idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύω,' but because it understands νόμος in too narrow a sense—as *law*, not as *law and custom*. The same error deprives Michelet's note of point—'Cum apud Graecos leges non juris tantum, sed virtutis causa ferrentur, legibus praecepta continebantur, quibus magistratus edicebant, quae fieri vellent. Apud nos autem, stricto jure inter Romanos ja [illegible] nihil jubet, sed quae fieri

1138 a. 1. unit. effect. In it contrary Aristotelii jam nunc obtineat regula: "quae lex non potest permittit." Nor is it necessary, with Acciaiolus, to suppose that ἡ ἐν ἀδικίᾳ ἀπαγορεύει applies only to things ἀδικεῖν wrong. Custom (fashion, public opinion) forbids the most innocent actions, if it does not enjoin them.

a. 12. § 3. ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ. The commentators quote Aeschines, *Contra Ctes.* 244 ἐστὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ δημοσίευμα, τὴν χώραν τὴν τοῦτο πράξαντα χωρὶς τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀπόλλυσιν, and Plato, *Legg.* ix. 873. The pollution of the city caused by the suicide was probably regarded as the chief part of the injury inflicted by his act: other effects would be those noted by Mich. Eph.—καὶ ἡ ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν πόλιν στρατηγὸν ἢ στρατιώτην ἢ πεζοστὴν ἢ ναυτικόν.

a. 14. § 4. ἔτι. In §§ 1–3 the writer has shown that οὐκ ἔστιν ἄδικον πᾶν κοινῶν, where ἄδικον = παρίνομον. He now proceeds to show that the same is true where ἄδικον = ἄνισον.

καθ' ἃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν] μόνον ὁ is the conjecture of Lambinus for the ὁ μόνον of the codd., and is approved by Zell, Ramsauer and Bywater. The meaning is—'Further, if we take ὁ ἀδικῶν in the narrow sense of ἄδικος (ἄδικος μόνον = ἄνισος or πλεονέκτης), and not in the wide sense (ἄδικος φαῦλος = παρίνομος), it is impossible ἀδικεῖσθαι ἀνεύθυνον.' No MS. apparently gives μόνον ὁ, and all, with two exceptions, ὁ μόνον. The two exceptions are CCC with ἄδικος ὁ μὲν ἀδικῶν, and H^A with ἄδικος ὁ ἀδικῶν. An omitted μόνον supplied above the line or on the margin might very easily get into the wrong place after ὁ; and would retain that place by suggesting to careless scribes and readers that the distinction with which the sentence is concerned is not that between the ἄνισος and the παρίνομος, but that between ὁ τὰ ἄδικα πράττων and ὁ ἀδικῶν, as given *e.g.* in ch. 9. § 3.

a. 15. τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου] Mich. Eph. has—τοῦτο γὰρ φησιν ἄλλο ἐκείνου· τουτέστιν τοῦτο τὸ κατὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἄδικον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐκείνου τοῦ καθόλου ἀδίκου.

a. 16. ἔστι γάρ τινας . . . πονηρίαν] *i.e.* there is a sense in which the ἄδικος is an offender coordinate with the δειλός *e.g.*, and not an offender generally. Ἀδικία in one sense is πλεονεξία—a specific form of πονηρία, just as δειλία, ἀσωτία, are specific forms. It has however a generic sense also, in which it is equivalent to ὅλη πονηρία.

οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην] *κατὰ τὴν μερικὴν ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία* (Paraph.). 1138 a
I prefer Bekker's punctuation here to Susemihl's and Bywater's. The words *ἅμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* are to be taken closely with *ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ.*

ἀδικεῖ] K^b has *ἀδικεῖ ἄν.* Can *ἄν* be a corruption of *αὐτόν*, which a. 18.
the sense requires?

ἅμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] see *M. M.* 1. 33. 1196 a. 9 *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀδικῶν, ᾗ ἀδικεῖ, πλεῖον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος, ᾗ ἀδικεῖται, ἔλαττον. εἰ ἄρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.*

ἐν πλείοσιν] 'implies more than one person': *cf.* v. 3. 4, 5. a. 19.

§ 5. **ἔτι δὲ ... πρότερον**] 'The words *ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,*' a. 20.
says Jackson, 'are not necessary to the argument. Indeed *τὸ ἀδικεῖν* is not necessarily *ἐκ προαιρέσεως*: I have therefore translated the phrase "voluntary *or* deliberate, and aggressive."' But see below, note on *ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε* a. 21.

πρότερον] *sc. τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.* a. 21.

ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε κ.τ.λ.] Jackson's note here is—'*οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας* 8. § 9.' Does this mean that *ὁ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν* of the present passage and *ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν* of 8, § 9 are identical? If they are, then the argument is—'*ἀδικεῖν* is deliberate and aggressive: for the *θυμῷ ποιῶν*, who does not act deliberately and is not an aggressor, *οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν.*' This, however, is hardly consistent with v. 8. 9.

ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι]—which has been shown to be a. 23.
impossible ch. 9. §§ 1–6. Ramsauer asks—'quid hoc post verba *ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἑκών*, vs. 12?' Surely because it helps to prove the conclusion—that the *ἀδικῶν qua ἄνισος* cannot injure himself. In § 3 it helped to prove *another* conclusion—that the *ἀδικῶν qua παράνομος* cannot injure himself.

§ 6. **πρὸς δὲ τούτοις**] 'If, instead of arguing from our conception a. 24.
of *ἀδικία*, we examine special cases of it, we come to the same conclusion' (Jackson). *Τὸ ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτόν*, already discussed in §§ 2 and 3, is, of course one of *τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀδικήματα*, but it does not stand in the same position as the *ἀδικήματα* mentioned in this §. As soon as they are n ee that they are not cases of

1138 a. 24. τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτόν. But τὸ ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτόν looks, at first sight, like a case of τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτόν, and it is only the reflection—ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ—which makes us aware that it is not. The difference between the ἀδικήματα of the present section and those of which τὸ ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτόν in §§ 2 and 3 is an example is that marked in *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 18 πρὸς οὓς δὲ διώρισται [τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα] διχῶς διώρισται· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς ἕνα τῶν κοινωνούντων, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν. διὸ καὶ τἀδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὡρισμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ὡρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν. Thus ὁ σφάττων ἑαυτόν injures τὸ κοινόν by depriving it of a soldier. Similarly, the ἀκόλαστος or ἄσωτος who, at first sight, might seem to injure himself, really injures the State by depriving it of the services which health or wealth enables a citizen to render. The μοιχεύων, on the other hand, is regarded rather as injuring an individual. I therefore understand the present § (6) to contain another argument to show that the ἀδικῶν *quâ* ἄνισος cannot injure himself—cannot treat himself as another individual whose 'fair share' he encroaches upon. The arguments to show that he cannot injure himself *quâ* παράνομος were concluded in § 3.

The writer of the *M. M.* would seem to have these two classes of ἀδικήματα—τὰ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν and τὰ πρὸς ἕνα—in his mind. His words are (i. 33. 1195 b. 35)—ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ἆρά γε ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν; ἐκ μὲν δὴ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς σκοπουμένῳ ἔοικεν ἐνδέχεσθαι. καὶ πάλιν οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ ἃ ὁ νόμος πράττειν τάττει, ταῦτά ἐστιν δίκαια, ὁ μὴ πράττων ταῦτα ἀδικεῖ· καὶ εἰ πρὸς ὃν κελεύει πράττειν, πρὸς τοῦτον εἰ μὴ πράττει, τοῦτον ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ νόμος κελεύει σώφρονα εἶναι, οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι, σώματος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὁ ἄρα ταῦτα μὴ πράττων ἀδικεῖ αὑτόν. εἰς οὐθένα γὰρ ἄλλον τῶν τοιούτων ἀδικημάτων ἡ ἀναφορὰ ἐστίν—ἀλλὰ μή ποτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἦν, οὐδ' ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν αὑτόν. τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον, οὐδ' ἑκόντα ἅμα καὶ ἄκοντα· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀδικῶν, ᾗ ἀδικεῖ, πλεῖον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος, ᾗ ἀδικεῖται, ἔλαττον. εἰ ἄρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτόν ἀδικεῖν.—ἔτι ὁ μὲν ἀδικῶν ἑκὼν ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀδικούμενος ἄκων ἀδικεῖται, ὥστε εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν ἅμα καὶ ἀκουσίως καὶ ἑκουσίως πράττειν τι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' οὕτως ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.—ἔτι εἴ τις λαμβάνοι ἐκ

τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων. ἀδικοῦσι γὰρ πάντες ἤτοι παρακαταθήκην 1138 a.
ἀποστεροῦντες ἢ μοιχεύοντες ἢ κλέπτοντες ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων ποιοῦντες· οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε αὐτὸς αὐτὸν παρακαταθήκην ἀπεστέρησεν, οὐδ' ἐμοίχευσεν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, οὐδ' ἔκλεψεν αὐτὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ· ὥστε εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐστίν, τούτων δὲ μηθὲν ἐνδέχεται πρὸς αὑτὸν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

ὅλως κ.τ.λ.] 'But indeed the question of τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν as a a. 26.
whole (*i.e.* whether we understand ἀδικεῖν as παρανομεῖν or as πλεονεκτεῖν) is answered by reference to the definition of ἀδικεῖν (ch. 9. §§ 4, 5), which enabled us to answer the question of τὸ ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι.

Fritzsche has the following note on the words ὅλως δὲ . . . ἀδικεῖσθαι—'Eadem et sententia est et verba eadem quae p. 1136 b. 23 (coll. p. 1136 b. 3–4) leguntur. Quae si ab eodem scriptore posita esse credimus, magnam habent offensionem, eadem si ab alio Peripatetico (h. e. Eudemo) in simili disputatione adhibita esse sumimus, explicationem habent facilem.' Fritzsche's view is that the Fifth Book was written by Aristotle, with the exception of this eleventh chapter, which comes from the lost book of Eudemus περὶ δικαιοσύνης (see Fritzsche, *Prolegomena*, p. xlvi).

§§ 7, 8.] Jackson places these sections, 'which have obviously a. 28.
nothing to do with the ἀπορίαι raised in ch. 9,' after ch. 5, § 18. See his *Introduction*, p. xvi. Ramsauer suggests the same locus for them. The writer of the *M. M.* passes on (i. 33. 1196 a. 25) immediately from a discussion parallel to that in ch. 11, §§ 1–6, to the subject dealt with in § 9.

§ 7. καὶ ὥσπερ . . . γυμναστικῇ] These words are probably a note a. 30.
from the margin. As they stand, they have no grammatical connexion with the context. A 'codex perantiquus' referred to by Lambinus seems to have patched up a connexion by ὅπερ ἔχει ὥσπερ ὑγιεινόν κ.τ.λ. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 77) supplies after μέσον the words τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον.

χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] The commentators refer to Plato, *Gorgias* a. 31.
443 A and 509 C.

κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς] The distinction is not, a. 33.
as the Paraph. (in an alternative explanation) says, that between ἡ καθόλου ἀδικία and ἡ μερική, but (as the parenthesis after ἐγγύς

1138 a. 33. shows clearly) that between the πάθη which give rise to the voluntary and reprehensible, but not deliberate, acts of the θυμῷ ποιῶν, and the ἕξις προαιρετική of the μοχθηρός (see ch. 8, §§ 8–11). Michael Ephesius is right—λέγων κακίαν ἁπλῶς τὴν μετὰ προαιρέσεως ὅτι τὸ ἑκούσιον ἔχει, σύνεγγυς δὲ τὴν δίχα προαιρέσεως . . . διότι οὐδὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως πᾶν ἑκούσιον· οἱ γὰρ ὀργιζόμενοι ὡς εἶπε πρότερον ἐκόντες πράττουσιν οὐ μὴν ἐκ προαιρέσεως. The expression τελεία κακία, = ἡ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, is, however, misleading, for it suggests (as Ramsauer points out) the ὅλη κακία which is opposed to ἡ τελεία ἀρετή at the end of the first chapter of this Book.

b. 2. § 8. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ] Science takes no account of τὰ παρὰ συμβεβηκός. It is concerned either with τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, or with τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

b. 5. § 9.] For 'justice and injustice as between the parts of the soul' the commentators refer to Plato, *Rep.* 432 A, 441 A, 443 C. The writer seems to warn his readers against what he conceives to be the misleading tendency of such a presentation of justice as we have it in the *Republic*. *Metaphorically* we can speak of justice and injustice *between the parts of the soul*. But this is no good reason for affirming that a man can be unjust *in the strict sense* to *himself*.

b. 7. οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν] *i. e.* not τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον *as well as* τὸ δεσποτικόν and the other forms distinguished in ch. 6, but the other forms *exclusive of* τὸ πολιτικόν. Thus the writer of the *M. M.* begins his parallel passage (i. 33. 1196 a. 25) with the words—οὐ τό γε πολιτικὸν ἀδίκημα ἀλλὰ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. Stahr translates—'Doch gilt das nicht von der Gerechtigkeit in ihrem ganzen Umfange, sondern nur von derjenigen, wie sie der Herr gegen den Sklaven, der Hausvater gegen die Familie übt.'

b. 8. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις] This must surely mean 'the theories in question'—*i. e.* the Platonic and other theories which speak of justice and injustice subsisting between the parts of the soul. But Mich. Eph. has ὃν λόγον ἔχει ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς δεσπότην τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ λογιζόμενον. τοιαύτην γὰρ διεστᾶσι ταῦτα διάστασιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὡς εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον—*i. e.* he apparently takes ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις as meaning 'in this ratio.'

b. 10. βλέπουσι] dat.

δοκεῖ] They think that the man, as a whole, can injure himself, 1138 b. 10
because one part of his soul can have its desire thwarted by the other part. They think that there subsists between these parts a sort of justice like that between ruler and subject. Justice, however, is between persons οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς (v. 6. 4), and 'parts are not persons,' as Peters (p. 179) well puts it. A theory of justice which forgets this is as misleading as a theory of voluntary action which fails to recognise ἡ ὅλη ψυχή—the organic unity behind the struggle of the 'parts': see *E.E.* ii. 8. 1224 b. 21 (quoted by Jackson)—ὥστε τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ἑκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἑκάτερον ἄκοντα ποτὲ πράττειν· κεχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἑκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχήν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὁρῶσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἡ δ' ὅλη ἑκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βίᾳ δ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἔχομεν.

ὅτι ἐν τούτοις] Jackson brackets ἐν.

τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις] *i.e.* the ὀρέξεις of the several μέρη. The ὄρεξις b. 11.
of the λόγον ἔχον μέρος may be thwarted by the ἄλογον μέρος, and *vice versa*. 'An ὄρεξις is loosely and κατὰ μεταφοράν attributed to the λόγον ἔχον' (Jackson).

ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ] The editors quote *Pol.* A. 5. 1260 a. 5 ἐν b. 12.
ταύτῃ [*i.e.* τῇ ψυχῇ] γάρ ἐστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον, ὧν ἑτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου.

§ 10. τῶν ἠθικῶν] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 62) omits τῶν with L^b and b. 13.
M^b [and NC.].

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