



# IETF Hackathon

IETF 115  
5-6 Nov 2022  
London, England



# PQ Keys and Signatures Hackathon

## Goals:

- Production and validation of X.509 keys, certificates, PKCS10, CRLs and other X.509 structures with the new NIST algorithms (Dilithium, Falcon, SPHINCS+, Kyber) alone and in composite combinations with traditional crypto
- Solving ASN.1 encoding issues to help clarify specifications in the new drafts
- Obtain experience with practical use of the new NIST algorithms in X.509
- Provide an artifact repository for interoperability testing

## RFC Drafts:

- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-uni-qskkeys-00.html>
- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates/>
- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-keys/>
- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs/>
- RFC 5280, 5208, 5958, 2986 (Public and Private key formats, Certificate Request, others)
- <https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf> - section 2.3.1/2.3.2

# What got done

- Formed new Hackathon team with about 16 participants!
  - Created Github artifact repository <https://github.com/IETF-Hackathon/pqc-certificates>
  - Defined a .zip file structure for X.509 artifacts to make interoperability testing easier. These include pure PQ artifacts as well as composites.
  - Agreed on public and private key ASN.1 encodings (See what we learned).
  - 7 different implementations (Java, C, Python, Rust).
    - Open Source (OpenSSL, Bouncy Castle, Python)
    - 4 Vendor implementations

# What we learned

- Public Keys – OCTET STRING can be mapped to BIT STRING from RFC 5208
  - <https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf> section section 2.3.1/2.3.2
  - “**treat BIT STRING and OCTET STRING identically** (doing sensible 0-bit-padding if BIT STRING is no multiple of 8)”
  - Thus no need for wrapping/adding another TLV layer for implementations that internally operate on octet strings (and tag BIT STRINGS only where the standard mandates it)”

# What we learned

- Private Keys - No need to have an OCTET\_STRING wrapping another OCTET\_STRING. We will use a Single OCTET\_STRING representation as per 5958.
- OIDS – Object Ids need to be flexible at this point, and we are suggesting they be version controlled as there are still tweaks being made to the NIST competition winners (Dilithium, SPHINCS+, Falcon, Kyber)
- Suggest <Arc>.Version.SecurityLevel
- Most issues found are not related to PQ algorithms

# Wrap Up

## Team members:

First timers @ IETF/Hackathon:

Mike Ounsworth, John Gray, Felipe Ventura, Jake Massimo, Cory Bonnell, Michael Baentsch, Kris Kwiatkowski, Alexander Railean, Pat Kelsey, Britta Hale, Tomofumi Okubo, Carl Wallace, Max Pala, Markku-Juhani O.Saarinen, David Hook, @bblfish

## Next Steps:

- Monthly meetings to continue progress
- Monday Dec 5 12:00 UTC
- Expand artifacts and add X.509 based protocols