
#### **Advanced Applied Econometrics**

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based on: Scott Cunningham's Mixtape

#### **Panel Methods**

- Panel data: we observe the same units (individuals, firms, countries, schools, etc.) over several time periods
- Often our outcome variable depends on unobserved factors which are also correlated with our explanatory variable of interest
- If these omitted variables are constant over time, we can use panel data estimators to consistently estimate the effect of our explanatory variable
- Main estimators for panel data:
  - Pooled OLS
  - Fixed effects estimator
  - Random effects estimator

## Panel setup

- Let y and  $x \equiv (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$  be observable random variables and c be an unobservable random variable
- We are interested in the partial effects of variable  $x_j$  in the population regression function

$$E[y|x_1,x_2,\ldots,x_k,c]$$

- We observe a sample of i = 1, 2, ..., N cross-sectional units for t = 1, 2, ..., T time periods (a balanced panel)
  - For each unit i, we denote the observable variables for all time periods as  $\{(y_{it}, x_{it}) : t = 1, 2, ..., T\}$
  - $x_{it} \equiv (x_{it1}, x_{it2}, \dots, x_{itk})$  is a  $1 \times K$  vector
- Typically assume that cross-sectional units are i.i.d. draws from the population:  $\{y_i, x_i, c_i\}_{i=1}^N \sim i.i.d.$  (cross-sectional independence)
  - $y_i \equiv (y_{i1}, y_{i2}, \dots, y_{iT})'$  and  $x_i \equiv (x_{i1}, x_{i2}, \dots, x_{iT})$
  - ullet Consider asymptotic properties with T fixed and  $N o \infty$



### Panel setup

Single unit:

$$y_{i} = \begin{pmatrix} y_{i1} \\ \vdots \\ y_{it} \\ \vdots \\ y_{iT} \end{pmatrix}_{T \times 1} X_{i} = \begin{pmatrix} X_{i,1,1} & X_{i,1,2} & X_{i,1,j} & \dots & X_{i,1,K} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ X_{i,t,1} & X_{i,t,2} & X_{i,t,j} & \dots & X_{i,t,K} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ X_{i,T,1} & X_{i,T,2} & X_{i,T,j} & \dots & X_{i,T,K} \end{pmatrix}_{T \times K}$$

Panel with all units:

$$y = \begin{pmatrix} y_1 \\ \vdots \\ y_i \\ \vdots \\ y_N \end{pmatrix} X = \begin{pmatrix} X_1 \\ \vdots \\ X_i \\ \vdots \\ X_N \end{pmatrix}_{NT \times N}$$

## Unobserved effects model: Farm output

• For a randomly drawn cross-sectional unit *i*, the model is given by

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \ t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- $y_{it}$ : output of farm i in year t
- $x_{it}: 1 \times K$  vector of variable inputs for farm i in year t, such as labor, fertilizer, etc. plus an intercept
- $\beta: K \times 1$  vector of marginal effects of variable inputs
- $c_i$ : sum of all time-invariant inputs known to farmer i (but unobserved for the researcher), e.g., soil quality, managerial ability, etc.
  - often called the unobserved effect, unobserved heterogeneity, etc
- $\varepsilon_{it}$ : time-varying unobserved inputs, such as rainfall, unknown to the farmer at the time the decision on the variable inputs  $x_{it}$  is made
  - often called the idiosyncratic error
- What happens when we regress  $y_{it}$  on  $x_{it}$ ?



#### Pooled OLS

• When we ignore the panel structure and regress  $y_{it}$  on  $x_{it}$  we get

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + v_{it}; \ t = 1, 2, ..., T$$

with composite error  $v_{it} \equiv c_i + \varepsilon_{it}$ 

- Main assumption to obtain consistent estimates for  $\beta$  is:
  - $E[v_{it}|x_{i1},x_{i2},\ldots,x_{iT}]=E[v_{it}|x_{it}]=0$  for  $t=1,2,\ldots,T$ 
    - $x_{it}$  are strictly exogenous: the composite error  $v_{it}$  in each time period is uncorrelated with the past, current and future regressors
    - But: labour input  $x_{it}$  likely depends on soil quality  $c_i$  and so we have omitted variable bias and  $\widehat{\beta}$  is not consistent
  - No correlation between  $x_{it}$  and  $v_{it}$  implies no correlation between unobserved effect  $c_i$  and  $x_{it}$  for all t
    - Violations are common: whenever we omit a time-constant variable that is correlated with the regressors (heterogeneity bias)
  - Additional problem:  $v_{it}$  are serially correlated for same i since  $c_i$  is present in each t and thus pooled OLS standard errors are invalid



# Unobserved effects model: program evaluation

Program evaluation model:

$$y_{it} = prog_{it}\beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}; t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- $y_{it}$ : log wage of individual i in year t
- $prog_{it}$ : indicator coded 1 if individual i participants in training program at t and 0 otherwise
- $\beta$ : effect of program
- $c_i$ : sum of all time-invariant unobserved characteristics that affect wages, such as ability, etc.
- What happens when we regress  $y_{it}$  on  $prog_{it}$ ?  $\widehat{\beta}$  not consistent since  $prog_{it}$  is likely correlated with  $c_i$  (e.g., ability)
- Always ask: is there a time-constant unobserved variable  $(c_i)$  that is correlated with the regressors? If yes, then pooled OLS is problematic

### Fixed effect regression

Our unobserved effects model is:

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}; t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- If we have data on multiple time periods, we can think of  $c_i$  as **fixed effects** or "nuisance parameters" to be estimated
- OLS estimation with fixed effects yields

$$(\widehat{\beta}, \widehat{c}_1, \dots, \widehat{c}_N) = \operatorname*{argmin}_{b, m_1, \dots, m_N} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (y_{it} - x_{it}b - m_i)^2$$

this amounts to including N farm dummies in regression of  $y_{it}$  on  $x_{it}$ 

## Derivation: fixed effects regression

$$(\widehat{\beta}, \widehat{c}_1, \dots, \widehat{c}_N) = \underset{b, m_1, \dots, m_N}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (y_{it} - x_{it}b - m_i)^2$$

The first-order conditions (FOC) for this minimization problem are:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T} x'_{it} (y_{it} - x_{it} \widehat{\beta} - \widehat{c}_i) = 0$$

and

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} (y_{it} - x_{it}\widehat{\beta} - \widehat{c}_i) = 0$$

for  $i = 1, \ldots, N$ .

Therefore, for i = 1, ..., N,

$$\widehat{c}_i = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{I} (y_{it} - x_{it}\widehat{\beta}) = \overline{y}_i - \overline{x}_i\widehat{\beta},$$

where

$$ar{x}_i \equiv rac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T x_{it}; ar{y}_i \equiv rac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T y_{it}$$

Plug this result into the first FOC to obtain:

$$\widehat{\beta} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (x_{it} - \bar{x}_i)'(x_{it} - \bar{x}_i)\right)^{-1} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (x_{it} - \bar{x}_i)'(y_{it} - \bar{y})\right)$$

$$\widehat{\beta} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \ddot{x}'_{it} \ddot{x}_{it}\right)^{-1} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \ddot{x}'_{it} \ddot{x}_{it}\right)$$

with time-demeaned variables  $\ddot{x}_{it} \equiv x_{it} - \bar{x}$ ,  $\ddot{y}_{it} \equiv y_{it} - \bar{y}_{i}$ 

# Fixed effects regression

Running a regression with the time-demeaned variables  $\ddot{y}_{it} \equiv y_{it} - \bar{y}_i$  and  $\ddot{x}_{it} \equiv x_{it} - \bar{x}$  is numerically equivalent to a regression of  $y_{it}$  on  $x_{it}$  and unit specific dummy variables.

Even better, the regression with the time demeaned variables is consistent for  $\beta$  even when  $Cov[x_{it}, c_i] \neq 0$  because time-demeaning eliminates the unobserved effects

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$
  
 $\bar{y}_i = \bar{x}_i\beta + c_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i$ 

$$(y_{it} - \bar{y}_i) = (x_{it} - \bar{x})\beta + (c_i - c_i) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i)$$
  
$$\ddot{y}_{it} = \ddot{x}_{it}\beta + \ddot{\varepsilon}_{it}$$

# Fixed effects regression: main results

- Identification assumptions:
  - **1**  $E[\varepsilon_{it}|x_{i1},x+i2,\ldots,x_{iT},c_i]=0; t=1,2,\ldots,T$ 
    - regressors are strictly exogenous conditional on the unobserved effect
    - allows  $x_{it}$  to be arbitrarily related to  $c_i$
  - - regressors vary over time for at least some i and not collinear
- Fixed effects estimator
  - **1** Demean and regress  $\ddot{y}_{it}$  on  $\ddot{x}_{it}$  (need to correct degrees of freedom)
  - 2 Regress  $y_{it}$  on  $x_{it}$  and unit dummies (dummy variable regression)
  - 3 Regress  $y_{it}$  on  $x_{it}$  with canned fixed effects routine
    - STATA: xtreg y x, fe i(PanelID)
- Properties (under assumptions 1-2):
  - $\widehat{\beta}_{FE}$  is consistent:  $\underset{N\to\infty}{plim}\,\widehat{\beta}_{FE,N}=\beta$
  - $\widehat{\beta}_{FE}$  is unbiased conditional on **X**

## Fixed effects regression: main issues

- Inference:
  - Standard errors have to be "clustered" by panel unit (e.g., farm) to allow correlation in the  $\varepsilon_{it}$ 's for the same i.
    - STATA: xtreg , fe i(PanelID) cluster( PanelID )
  - Yields valid inference as long as number of clusters is reasonably large
- Typically we care about  $\beta$ , but unit fixed effects  $c_i$  could be of interest
  - $\widehat{c}_i$  from dummy variable regression is unbiased but not consistent for  $c_i$  (based on fixed T and  $N \to \infty$ )
  - xtreg , fe routine demeans the data before running the regression and therefore does not estimate  $\hat{c_i}$ 
    - intercept shows average  $\hat{c}_i$  across units
    - we can recover  $\hat{c}_i$  using  $\hat{c}_i = \bar{y}_i \bar{x}_i \hat{\beta}$
    - predict c\_i, u

# **Example: Direct Democracy and Naturalizations**

- Do minorities fare worse under direct democracy than under representative democracy?
- Hainmueller and Hangartner (2012) examine data on naturalization requests of immigrants in Switzerland, where municipalities vote on naturalization applications in:
  - referendums (direct democracy)
  - elected municipality councils (representative democracy)
- Annual panel data from 1,400 municipalities for the 1991-2009 period
  - $y_{it}$ : naturalization rate =  $\frac{no.naturalizations_{it}}{eligible for eignpopulation_{i,t-1}}$
  - $x_{it}$ : 1 if municipality used representative democracy, 0 if municipality used direct democracy in year t

# **Naturalization Panel Data**

. des muniID muni\_name year nat\_rate repdem

variable name	storage type	display format	value label	variable label
muniID	float	%8.0g		municipality code
muni_name	str43	%43s		municipality name
year	float	%ty		year
nat_rate	float	%9.0g		naturalization rate (percent)
repdem	float	%9.0g		1 representative democracy, 0 direct

# **Panel Data Long Format**

. list muniID muni\_name year nat\_rate repdem in 31/40

muniID	muni_name	year	nat_rate	repdem
2	Affoltern A.A.	2002	4.638365	0
2	Affoltern A.A.	2003	4.844814	0
2	Affoltern A.A.	2004	5.621302	0
2	Affoltern A.A.	2005	4.387827	0
2	Affoltern A.A.	2006	8.115358	1
2	Affoltern A.A.	2007	7.067371	1
2	Affoltern A.A.	2008	8.977719	1
2	Affoltern A.A.	2009	6.119704	1
3	Bonstetten	1991	.8333334	0
3	Bonstetten	1992	.8403362	0
1				

### **Pooled OLS**

. reg nat\_rate repdem , cl(muniID)

Linear regression

Number of obs = 4655F( 1, 244) = 130.04 Prob > F = 0.0000 R-squared = 0.0748 Root MSE = 3.98

nat_rate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
repdem _cons	2.503318 2.222683	.2195202	11.40 22.03	0.000	2.070921 2.023976	2.935714

# Decompose within and between variation

```
. tsset muniID year , yearly
panel variable: muniID (strongly balanced)
time variable: year, 1991 to 2009
delta: 1 year
```

. xtsum nat\_rate

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations
nat_rate overall between	2.938992	4.137305 1.622939	0	24.13793 7.567746	N = 4655 n = 245
within		3.807039	-3.711323	24.80134	T = 19

# Time-demeaning for fixed effects: $y_{it} \rightarrow \ddot{y}_{it}$

- . \* get municipality means
- . egen means nat rate = mean(nat rate) , by(muniID)
- . \* compute deviations from means
- . gen dm\_nat\_rate = nat\_rate means\_nat\_rate
- . list muniID muni\_name year nat\_rate means\_nat\_rate dm\_nat\_rate in 20/40 ,ab(20)

	muniID	muni_name	year	nat_rate	means_nat_rate	dm_nat_rate
20.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1991	.2173913	3.595932	-3.37854
21.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1992	.9473684	3.595932	-2.648563
22.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1993	1.04712	3.595932	-2.548811
23.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1994	.8342023	3.595932	-2.761729
24.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1995	2.002002	3.595932	-1.59393
25.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1996	1.7769	3.595932	-1.819031
26.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1997	1.862745	3.595932	-1.733186
27.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1998	2.054155	3.595932	-1.541776
28.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1999	2.402135	3.595932	-1.193796

## Fixed effects regression with demeaned data

```
. egen means repdem = mean(repdem) , by(muniID)
. gen dm repdem = repdem - means repdem
. * regression with demeaned data
. reg dm nat rate dm repdem , cl (muniID)
Linear regression
                                                  Number of obs = 4655
                                                  F(1, 244) = 265.18
                                                  Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                  R-squared = 0.1052
                                                  Root MSE = 3.6017
```

		Robust				
dm_nat_rate	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
dm rendem	3 0228	1856244	16 28	0 000	2 657169	3 388431

dm_nat_rate	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
dm_repdem _cons		.1856244 5.81e-09	16.28 0.11		2.657169 -1.08e-08	3.388431 1.21e-08

# Fixed effects regression with canned routine

. xtreg nat\_rate repdem , fe cl(muniID) i(muniID)

Fixed-effects (within) regression	Number of obs	=	4655
Group variable: muniID	Number of groups	=	245
R-sq: within = 0.1052 between = 0.0005 overall = 0.0748	Obs per group: min avg max	=	19 19.0 19
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.1373	F(1,244) Prob > F	=	265.18 0.0000

nat_rate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
repdem _cons	3.0228 2.074036	.1856244	16.28 39.05	0.000	2.657169 1.969413	3.388431 2.178659
sigma_u sigma_e rho	1.7129711 3.69998 .17650677	(fraction	of varia	nce due t	o u_i)	

# Fixed effects regression with dummies

. reg nat\_rate repdem i.muniID, cl(muniID)

Linear regression

Number of obs	=	465
F( 0, 244)	=	
Prob > F	=	
R-squared	=	0.242
Root MSE	=	3.

nat_rate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
repdem	3.0228	.1906916	15.85	0.000	2.647188	3.398412
muniID						
2	1.367365	5.17e-14	2.6e+13	0.000	1.367365	1.367365
3	1.292252	5.17e-14	2.5e+13	0.000	1.292252	1.292252
9	1.284652	5.17e-14	2.5e+13	0.000	1.284652	1.284652
10	1.271783	5.17e-14	2.5e+13	0.000	1.271783	1.271783
13	.3265469	5.17e-14	6.3e+12	0.000	.3265469	.3265469

# Applying fixed effects

- We can use fixed effects for other data structures to restrict comparisons to within unit variation
  - Matched pairs
    - Twin fixed effects to control for unobserved effects of family background
  - Cluster fixed effects in hierarchical data
    - School fixed effects to control for unobserved effects of school

#### Problems that even fixed effects do not solve

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}; \ t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Where  $y_{it}$  is murder rate and  $x_{it}$  is police spending per capita
- What happens when we regress y on x and city fixed effects?
  - $\widehat{\beta}_{FE}$  inconsistent unless strict exogeneity conditional on  $c_i$  holds
    - $E[\varepsilon_{it}|x_{i1},x_{i2},\ldots,x_{iT},c_i]=0; t=1,2,\ldots,T$
    - ullet implies  $arepsilon_{it}$  uncorrelated with past, current and future regressors
- Most common violations
  - Time-varying omitted variables
    - Economic boom leads to more police spending and less murders
    - Can include time-varying controls, but avoid post-treatment bias (i.e., collider)
  - Simultaneity
    - if city adjusts police based on past murder rate, then spending t+1 is correlated with  $\varepsilon_t$  (since higher  $\varepsilon_t$  leads to higher murder rate at t)
    - strictly exogenous x cannot react to what happens to y in the past or the future!
- Fixed effects do not obviate need for good research design!

#### Random Effects

Reconsider our unobserved effects model:

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Cannot use the fixed effects regression to estimate effects of time-constant regressors in  $x_{it}$  (eg., soil quality, farm location, etc.)
  - Since fixed effect estimator allows  $c_i$  to be correlated with  $x_{it}$ , we cannot distinguish the effects of time-invariant regressors from the time-invariant unobserved effect  $c_i$
- Need orthogonality assumption:  $Cov[x_{it}, c_i] = 0; \quad t = 1, ..., T$ 
  - Strong assumption: Unobserved effects  $c_i$  are uncorrelated with each explanatory variable in  $x_{it}$  in each time period
  - For example if we include soil quality in x<sub>it</sub> we have to assume it is uncorrelated with all other time-invariant inputs

### Summary: Fixed effects, random effects, Pooled OLS

- Main assumptions
  - Regressors are strictly exogenous conditional on the time-invariant unobserved effects
  - Regressors are uncorrelated with the time-invariant unobserved effects
- Results
  - Fixed effects estimator is consistent given assumption 1, but rules out time-invariant regressors
  - Random effects estimators and pooled OLS are consistent under assumptions 1-2, and allow for time-invariant regressors
  - Given homoskedasticity assumptions (random effects assumption 4), the random effects estimator is asymptotically efficient
- Assumption 2 is strong so fixed effects are typically more credible
  - Often the main reason for using panel data is to rule out all time-invariant unobserved confounders!

#### Hausman test

	$\widehat{eta}_{ extsf{RE}}$	$\widehat{\beta}_{\textit{FE}}$
$H_0: Cov[x_{it}, c_i] = 0$	Consistent and efficient	Consistent
$H_1: Cov[x_{it}, c_i] \neq 0$	Inconsistent	Consistent

### Then,

- Under  $H_0, \widehat{\beta}_{RE} \widehat{\beta}_{FE}$  should be close to zero
- Under  $H_1$ ,  $\widehat{\beta}_{RE} \widehat{\beta}_{FE}$  should be different from zero
- It can be shown that in large samples, under  $H_0$ , the test statistic

$$(\widehat{\beta}_{\mathit{FE}} - \widehat{\beta}_{\mathit{RE}})'(\widehat{\mathit{Var}}[\beta_{\mathit{FE}}] - \widehat{\mathit{Var}}[\beta_{\mathit{RE}}])^{-1}(\widehat{\beta}_{\mathit{FE}} - \widehat{\beta}_{\mathit{RE}}) \overset{d}{\to} \chi_k^2$$

where k is the number of time-varying regressors.

 We may reject the null hypothesis of "random effects" and stick with the less efficient, but consistent fixed effects specification



#### Hausman test

- Hausman test does not test if the fixed effect model is correct; the test assumes that the fixed effects estimator is consistent!
- Conventional Hausman test assumes homoskedastic model and does not allow for clustering
- There are Haumsman like tests that allow for clustered standard errors

```
. * hausman test with clustering
. quietly: xtreg nat_rate repdem , re i(muniID) cl(muniID)
. xtoverid

Test of overidentifying restrictions: fixed vs random effects
Cross-section time-series model: xtreg re robust cluster(muniID)
Sargan-Hansen statistic 26.560 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.0000
```

## **Adding Time Effects**

Reconsider our unobserved effects model:

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \ t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Fixed effects assumption:  $E[\varepsilon_{it}|x_i,c_i]=0; t=1,2,\ldots,T$ : regressors are strictly exogenous conditional on the unobserved effect
- ullet Typical violation: Common shocks that affect all units in the same way and are correlated with  $x_{it}$ 
  - Trends in farming technology or climate affect productivity
  - Trends in immigration inflows affect naturalization rates
- We can allow for such common shocks by including time effects into the model

# Fixed effects: adding time effects

• Linear time trend:

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + c_i + t + \varepsilon_{it}; \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- Linear time trend common to all units
- Time fixed effects:

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + c_i + t_t + \varepsilon_{it}; \ t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$


- Common shock in each time period
- Generalized difference-in-difference model
- Unit specific linear time trends:

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + c_i + g_i \cdot t + t_t + \varepsilon_{it}; \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

• Linear time trends that vary by unit



# Modeling time effects



# Fixed effects: adding time effects

- . egen time = group(year)
- . list muniID muni\_name year time in 20/40 ,ab(20)

	muniID	muni_name	year	time
20.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1991	1
21.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1992	2
22.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1993	3
23.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1994	4
24.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1995	5
25.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1996	6
26.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1997	7
27.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1998	8
28.	2	Affoltern A.A.	1999	9
29.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2000	10
30.	2	Affoltern A.A.	2001	11

#### Fixed effects: linear time trend

. xtreg nat rate repdem time , fe cl(muniID) i(muniID)

Fixed-effects (within) regression	Number of obs	=	4655
Group variable: muniID	Number of groups	=	245
R-sq: within = 0.1604 between = 0.0005 overall = 0.1350	Obs per group: min avg max	=	19 19.0 19
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.0079	F(2,244) Prob > F	=	247.57

nat_rate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
repdem time _cons	.8247928 .2313692 .3892908	.2590615 .0171752 .1309232	3.18 13.47 2.97	0.002 0.000 0.003	.3145106 .1975386 .1314069	1.335075 .2651997 .6471747
sigma_u sigma_e rho	1.6271657 3.584409 .17086519	(fraction	of varia	nce due t	o u_i)	

# Fixed effects: year fixed effects

. xtreg nat\_rate repdem i.time , fe cl(muniID) i(muniID)

Fixed-effects (within) regression	Number of obs	=	4655
Group variable: muniID	Number of groups	=	245
R-sq: within = $0.1885$	Obs per group: min	=	19
between = 0.0005	avg	=	19.0
overal1 = 0.1575	max	=	19
	F(19,244)	=	31.48
$corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.0168$	Prob > F	=	0.0000

nat_rate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
repdem	1.203658	.3031499	3.97	0.000	.6065335	1.800783
time						
2	.3829173	.1723225	2.22	0.027	.0434879	.7223468
3	.2789777	.1514124	1.84	0.067	0192644	.5772198
4	.7034078	.167466	4.20	0.000	.3735443	1.033271

## Fixed effects: unit specific time trends

. xtreg nat\_rate repdem muniID#c.time i.time , fe cl(muniID) i(muniID) note: 19.time omitted because of collinearity

Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: muniID	Number of obs = 4655 Number of groups = 245	
R-sq: within = 0.2650 between = 0.5185 overall = 0.2864	Obs per group: min = 19 avg = 19.0 max = 19	О
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.3963	$\frac{F(18,244)}{Prob > F} = $	

nat_rate	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
repdem	.9865241	.322868	3.06	0.002	.3505601	1.622488
muniID#c.time						
1	.333343	.024298	13.72	0.000	.2854823	.3812036
2	.2914274	.024298	11.99	0.000	.2435667	.339288
3	.248985	.024298	10.25	0.000	.2011244	.2968457

### Unit specific time trends often eliminate "results"

TABLE 5.2.3
Estimated effects of labor regulation on the performance of firms in Indian states

1	in Indian	states		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Labor regulation (lagged)	186 (.064)	185 (.051)	104 (.039)	.0002 (.020)
Log development expenditure per capita		.240 (.128)	.184 (.119)	.241 (.106)
Log installed electricity capacity per capita		.089 (.061)	.082 (.054)	.023 (.033)
Log state population		.720 (.96)	0.310 (1.192)	-1.419 (2.326)
Congress majority			0009 (.01)	.020 (.010)
Hard left majority			050 (.017)	007 (.009)
Janata majority			.008	020 (.033)
Regional majority			.006 (.009)	.026 (.023)
State-specific trends Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	No .93	No .93	No .94	Yes .95

Notes: Adapted from Besley and Burgess (2004), table IV. The table reports regression DD estimates of the effects of labor regulation on productivity. The

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta_0 + x_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + x_{i,t-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \ t = 1, 2, ..., T$$

- Model recognizes the effect of change in x may occur with a late
  - effect of new tax credit for children on fertility rate
- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Consider **temporary increase** in  $x_{it}$  from level m to m+1 at t which lasts only one period
    - $y_{t-1} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_t = (m+1)\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+1} = m\beta_0 + (m+1)\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+2} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + (m+1)\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+3} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta_0 + x_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + x_{i,t-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \ t = 1, 2, ..., T$$

- Model recognizes the effect of change in x may occur with a late
  - effect of new tax credit for children on fertility rate
- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Consider **temporary increase** in  $x_{it}$  from level m to m+1 at t which lasts only one period
    - $y_{t-1} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_t = (m+1)\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+1} = m\beta_0 + (m+1)\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+2} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + (m+1)\beta_2 + c_i$
- $\beta_0 = y_t y_{t-1}$  immediate change in y due to temporary one-unit increase in x (impact propensity)

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta_0 + x_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + x_{i,t-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \ t = 1, 2, ..., T$$

- Model recognizes the effect of change in x may occur with a late
  - effect of new tax credit for children on fertility rate
- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Consider **temporary increase** in  $x_{it}$  from level m to m+1 at t which lasts only one period
    - $y_{t-1} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_t = (m+1)\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+1} = m\beta_0 + (m+1)\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+2} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + (m+1)\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+3} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
- $\beta_1 = y_{t+1} y_t$  change in y one period after temporary one-unit increase in x

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta_0 + x_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + x_{i,t-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \ t = 1, 2, ..., T$$

- Model recognizes the effect of change in x may occur with a late
  - effect of new tax credit for children on fertility rate
- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Consider **temporary increase** in  $x_{it}$  from level m to m+1 at t which lasts only one period
    - $y_{t-1} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_t = (m+1)\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+1} = m\beta_0 + (m+1)\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+2} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + (m+1)\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+3} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
- $\beta_2 = y_{t+2} y_{t-1}$  change in y two periods after temporary one-unit increase in x

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta_0 + x_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + x_{i,t-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \ t = 1, 2, ..., T$$

- Model recognizes the effect of change in x may occur with a late
  - effect of new tax credit for children on fertility rate
- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Consider **temporary increase** in  $x_{it}$  from level m to m+1 at t which lasts only one period
    - $y_{t-1} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_t = (m+1)\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+1} = m\beta_0 + (m+1)\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+2} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + (m+1)\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+3} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
- $\beta_3 = y_{t-1}$  change in y is zero three periods after temporary one-unit increase in x

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta_0 + x_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + x_{i,t-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \ t = 1, 2, ..., T$$

- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Consider **permanent increase** in  $x_{it}$  from level m to m+1 at t, i.e.,  $(x_s = m, s < t \text{ and } x_s = m+1, s \ge t)$ 
    - $y_{t-1} = m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_t = (m+1)\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+1} = (m+1)\beta_0 + (m+1)\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+2} = (m+1)\beta_0 + (m+1)\beta_1 + (m+1)\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t+3} = (m+1)\beta_0 + (m+1)\beta_1 + (m+1)\beta_2 + c_i$
- After one period y has increased by  $\beta_0+\beta_1$ , after two periods y has increased by  $\beta_0+\beta_1+\beta_2$  and there are no further increases after two periods
- Long-run increase in  $y: \beta_0 + \beta_1 + \beta_2$  (long-run propensity)



### Lags and Leads model

$$y_{it} = x_{i,t+1}\beta_{-1} + x_{it}\beta_0 + x_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + x_{i,t-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}; \ t = 1, 2, ..., T$$

- Can use estimate of  $\beta_{-1}$  to test for anticipation effects
  - Consider **temporary increase** in  $x_{it}$  from level m to m+1 at t
    - $y_{t-2} = \beta_{-1}m + m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
    - $y_{t-1} = \beta_{-1}(m+1) + m\beta_0 + m\beta_1 + m\beta_2 + c_i$
- Anticipation effect:  $\beta_{-1} = y_{t-1} y_{t-2}$  change in y in period t-1, the period before the temporary one-unit increase in x
- Placebo test: if x causes y, but y does not cause x, then  $\beta_{-1}$  should be close to zero

#### The Autor Test

- Let  $D_{it}$  be a binary indicator equaling 1 if unit i switched from control to treatment between t and t-1; 0 otherwise
  - Lags:  $D_{i,t-1}$ : unit switched between t-1 and t-2
  - Leads:  $D_{i,t+1}$ : unit switches between t+1 and t
- Include lags and leads into the fixed effects model:

$$y_{it} = D_{i,t+2}\beta_{-2} + D_{i,t+1}\beta_{-1} + D_{it}\beta_0 + D_{i,t-1}\beta_1 + D_{i,t-2}\beta_2 + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- Interpretation of coefficients:
  - Leads  $\beta_{-1}, \beta_{-2}$ , etc. test for anticipation effects
  - Switch  $\beta_0$  tests for immediate effect
  - Lags  $\beta_1, \beta_2$ , etc. test for long-run effects
    - highest lag dummy can be coded 1 for all post-switch years

# Lags and Leads of Switch to Representative Democracy


```
. list muni_name year repdem switch_t sw_lag1 sw_lag2 sw_lag3 ///
> sw_lead1 sw_lead2 sw_lead3 in 806/817
```

	muni_n~e	year	repdem	switch_t	sw_lag1	sw_lag2	sw_lag3	sw_lead1	sw_lead2	sw_lead3
806.	Stäfa	1998	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
807.	Stäfa	1999	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
808.	Stäfa	2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
809.	Stäfa	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
810.	Stäfa	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
811.	Stäfa	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
812.	Stäfa	2004	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
813.	Stäfa	2005	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
814.	Stäfa	2006	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
815.	Stäfa	2007	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
816.	Stäfa	2008	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
817.	Stäfa	2009	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

### Dynamic Effect of Switching to Representative Democracy

```
. xtreg nat_rate sw_lag3 sw_lag2 sw_lag1 switch_t ///
        sw lead1 sw lead2 sw lead3 sw lead4 sw lead5 i.year, fe cluster(muniID) i(muniID)
Fixed-effects (within) regression
                                            Number of obs
                                                                    4655
Group variable: muniID
                                            Number of groups =
                                                                     245
                                            Obs per group: min =
R-sq: within = 0.1913
      between = 0.0011
                                                          avg =
                                                                    19.0
      overall = 0.1601
                                                          max =
                                                                     19
                                            F(27,244)
                                                                   23.76
corr(u i, Xb) = -0.0162
                                            Prob > F
                                                                  0.0000
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 245 clusters in muniID)
                          Robust
                  Coef.
                         Std. Err.
                                            P>|t|
                                                     [95% Conf. Interval]
   nat rate
    sw lag3
               1.160345
                         .5080271
                                     2.28
                                            0.023
                                                     .1596665
                                                                2.161023
    sw lag2
               1.743682
                         .5395212
                                     3.23
                                                    .680969
                                            0.001
                                                                2.806396
    sw lag1
              1.881663
                         .4880099
                                     3.86
                                            0.000
                                                   .9204133
                                                               2.842913
   switch t
              .7564792 .428627
                                     1.76
                                            0.079
                                                   -.0878019
                                                               1.60076
   sw lead1
              .2138757
                         .3899881
                                   0.55
                                            0.584
                                                   -.5542971
                                                               .9820485
   sw lead2
              .0843676
                         .3575292 0.24
                                            0.814
                                                   -.61987
                                                                .7886051
   sw lead3
               .1440446 .3194086 0.45 0.652
                                                   -.4851054
                                                                .7731945
                                                   -.5140018
   sw lead4
               .0750194 .2990359
                                   0.25 0.802
                                                                .6640405
   sw lead5
              -.0942415 .2599789
                                    -0.36 0.717
                                                   -.6063307
                                                                .4178477
```

## **Dynamic Effect of Switching to Representative Democracy**



### Lagged Dependent Variable

$$y_{it} = \alpha y_{i,t-1} + c_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \ t = 1, 2, \dots, T$$

- $y_{it}$  could be capital stock of firm i at time t and  $\alpha$  the capital depreciation rate
- For simplicity, we assume that  $\varepsilon_{it}$  are uncorrelated in time (as well as across individuals)
- Note that

$$y_{i,t-1} = \alpha y_{i,t-2} + c_i + \varepsilon_{i,t-1}$$

- So we have  $Cov[y_{i,t-1}, c_i] \neq 0$  and therefore we need to include fixed effects  $c_i$  into the regression
- Does this work though?

### Lagged dependent variable

With T = 3 we have

$$y_{i3} = \alpha y_{i2} + c_i + \varepsilon_{i3}$$
  
 $y_{i2} = \alpha y_{i1} + c_i + \varepsilon_{i2}$ 

and we can take time differences to eliminate  $c_i$  (similar to fixed effects)

$$y_{i3} - y_{i2} = \alpha(y_{i2} - y_{i1}) + (c_i - c_i) + (\varepsilon_{i3} - \varepsilon_{i2})$$
  
$$\Delta y_{i3} = \alpha \Delta y_{i2} + \Delta \varepsilon_{i3}$$

Since  $\varepsilon_{i2}$  affects both  $\Delta y_{i2}=y_{i2}-y_{i1}$  and  $\Delta \varepsilon_{i3}=\varepsilon_{i3}-\varepsilon_{i2}$  we get

 $Cov[\Delta y_{i2}, \Delta \varepsilon_{i3}] \neq 0$  and thus still have endogeneity

Models with fixed effects and lagged y do not produce consistent estimators Might use past levels  $y_{i1}$  as an instrument for  $\Delta y_{i2}$ , but this

requires strong assumptions (e.g., no serial correlation in  $\varepsilon_{it}$ )

