

日不落工作室
sunneversets.studio

Introduction to OAuth 2.0

Sunneversets Studio Dev Share



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Why



- Alice likes to Tweet with videos
- She want to use **the Studio** to edit videos
- The Studio can send videos on Alice behalf
- How should Alice and Twitter allow the Studio

Requirement

- Alice should not give password to the Studio
- The Studio can access and only access Alice's Twitter
- Twitter can know that Alice authorizes the Studio

Solution

- Alice should not give password to the Studio
 - Alice logs in to Twitter
- The Studio can access and only access Alice's Twitter
 - Twitter issues a specific token to the Studio
- Twitter can know that Alice authorizes the Studio
 - How ?

Roles

- Resource Owner: End user (human)
- User-agent: Browser
- Client
- Authorization Server
- Resource Server

Grant Flows

- Authorization Code
 - The most complete and complex grant flow
- Implicit
- Resource Owner Password Credentials
- Client Credentials

1. Client redirects User to Authorization Server



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This application will be able to:

- Read Tweets from your timeline.
- See who you follow.
- See your email address.

Will not be able to:

- Follow new people.
- Update your profile.
- Post Tweets for you.
- Access your direct messages.
- See your Twitter password.

Client: I am **xxx**. I want an access token for **yyy**. If the user successfully logs in, call me at **zzz**.

Client ID: **xxx**

Scope: **yyy**

Redirect URI: **zzz**

State: Random string (nonce)

2. Authorize User

3. Redirect back to Client



Server: The user is authorized, please use the code to exchange token.


Code: “Temporary token”, only used to request real token

State: The same as in step 1

4. Client requests Token



Client



Authorization Server

Client:

Code

Redirect URI

Client ID

Server:

Access Token

Refresh Token

Expiry

Scope

Refresh Token

- It never expires
- Use refresh token to get a new access token when previous one expires

Security Issues

- Attacker can be:
 - Client
 - User
 - Third Party
- Threat Model
 - User's computer/browser can be compromised by passive attacker
 - Client's server (if it has) and Authorization server is safe
 - Transportation can be eavesdropped, but we just use TLS

Credential Guessing

- Attacker can guess:
 - Code
 - Access Token
 - Refresh Token
- Solution
 - Use random string with enough length (>128 bit)
 - Code has timeout
 - Code can only be used once

Client Impersonation

- Malicious client pretends to be another client
- In Step 1 (initiate), 4 (code -> token)
- Solution:
 - Check redirect URI
 - Check client credential in step 4 (code -> token)


CSRF

(cross-site request forgery)

- Let User use Attacker's access token
 - User may store sensitive information (e.g. credit card) to Attacker's account
- Attacker tricks User to click redirect link that leads to Attacker's code (in step 3 (redirect back))
- Solution
 - Use state in step 1 (initiate)
 - Check state is the same in step 3 (redirect back)

Implicit

- Similar to Authorization Code Grant Flow
- Server responds with token instead of code



2. User enters username and password



Client Type

- Confidential: Can protect its secret
 - Website
- Public: Cannot protect its secret
 - Desktop/Mobile App
 - SPA (Single Page App) without backend

Security Issue for Public Client

- Public clients cannot protect its secret, so
 - client credentials can be stolen
 - code/token can be stolen

PKCE Extension

- Proof Key for Code Exchange
- Used in Authorization Code Grant Flow for Public Client
- Steps
 - 0. Generates $v = \text{rand_str}()$, $h = \text{sha_256}(v)$
 - 1. (Step 1 (initiate)) send h to authorization server
 - 2. (Step 4 (code->token)) send v to authorization server

Resource Owner Password Credentials

- Client will get User's password
- User needs to trust Client
- Spec says Client should not store password, but...
- Steps
 1. User gives username & password to Client
 2. Client sends them to Authorization Server
 3. Server responses with token

Client Credentials

- Authorization Server trust Client
- Nothing to do with User

Memes

- Alice: a character commonly used in cryptographic story (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob)
- Twitter: Twitter OpenID (kind of) inspires the development of OAuth; Twitter is also a pioneer to use OAuth

Further Reading & Reference

- OAuth 2.0 筆記 (<https://blog.yorkxin.org/2013/09/30/oauth2-1-introduction.html>)
- OAuth - Wikipedia (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth>)
- <https://www.oauth.com/>
- PKCE (<https://www.oauth.com/oauth2-servers/pkce/>)

Image Reference

- <https://developer.okta.com/assets/blog/oauth/oauth-actors-cd8b4861e839037400d8521e97c5d8cf0cb029add65d1036488991c7e85dcb72.png>
- https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/zh/thumb/9/9f/Twitter_bird_logo_2012.svg/1200px-Twitter_bird_logo_2012.svg.png
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