# Secure Coding Practices


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# # whoami

- Security Researcher
- Background in CTFs and Security Engineering
- At Neodyme since 2021
- @siintemal

# Who We Are


- 🇩🇪 Team of security researchers
- Found and reported 80+ vulnerabilities in Solana Core
- Found and reported critical bugs in many of the largest Solana DeFi protocols
- Here to make the Solana ecosystem more secure
- @neodyme 🌐 neodyme.io


# The 80/20 of Solana Security

# # Triple S Framework

Structure

Safety

Supervision

# Structure 📁

# Structure 📁


src
lib.rs
Cargo.toml
Xargo.toml


src
instructions
cancel_offer.rs
create_offer.rs
mod.rs
take_offer.rs
state
mod.rs
tradeoffer.rs
lib.rs
Cargo.toml
Xargo.toml

# # Structure 📁


⚠️TRADE OFFER⚠️
i receive:
you receive:


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# # Instruction File

- Single file contains:
  - Instruction Argument Structure
  - Accounts Structure
  - Instruction Implementation

# State

- State Files contain:
  - Account struct definition
  - State implementations:
    - Verification logic
    - State transitions
    - Helper functions



```rust
use anchor_lang::prelude::*;

#[account]
pub struct TradeOffer {
    pub owner: Pubkey,
    pub offer_mint: Pubkey,
    pub offer_amount: u64,
    pub request_mint: Pubkey,
    pub request_amount: u64,
    // size = 8 + 32 + 32 + 8 + 32 + 8 = 120
}

impl TradeOffer {
    //pub const SIZE = 120;
    pub fn invariant() -> Result<()> {
        Ok(())
    }
}
```

# Safety 🛡️

- Input validation
- Output validation
- Emergency mechanisms

# Safety 🛡️

- Input validation
  - Constraints & Validation Function
- Output validation
  - Invariants & Assertions
- Emergency mechanisms
  - Program State & Circuit Breakers

# Input Validation

- Happens in the Instruction definition
- Use a mix of:
  1. Anchor constraints
  2. Separate Validation Function
- Constraints:
  - has_one, seeds
- Validation Function:
  - Everything else
- Screenshot tries to do everything in constraints 💀 →

```rust
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct DepositPositionForLiquidity<'info> {
    #[account(mut)]
    pub signer: Signer<'info>,

    #[account(mut, address = lockbox.position, has_one = whirlpool, has_one = position_mint)]
    pub position: Box<Account<'info, Position>>,

    #[account(address = position.position_mint, constraint = position_mint.supply == 1)]
    pub position_mint: Box<Account<'info, Mint>>,

    #[account(mut,
      address = lockbox.pda_position_account.key(),
      constraint = lockbox.key() == pda_position_account.owner,
      constraint = pda_position_account.mint == position_mint.key(),
      constraint = pda_position_account.amount == 1
    )]
    pub pda_position_account: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,

    #[account(mut, address = position.whirlpool)]
    pub whirlpool: Box<Account<'info, Whirlpool>>,

    #[account(mut,
      constraint = token_owner_account_a.mint == whirlpool.token_mint_a,
      constraint = token_owner_account_a.mint != token_owner_account_b.mint,
      constraint = signer.key == &token_owner_account_a.owner
    )]
    pub token_owner_account_a: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,
    #[account(mut,
      constraint = token_owner_account_b.mint == whirlpool.token_mint_b,
      constraint = signer.key == &token_owner_account_b.owner
    )]
    pub token_owner_account_b: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,

    #[account(mut,
      constraint = token_vault_a.key() == whirlpool.token_vault_a,
      constraint = token_vault_a.key() != token_vault_b.key()
    )]
    pub token_vault_a: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,
    #[account(mut, constraint = token_vault_b.key() == whirlpool.token_vault_b)]
    pub token_vault_b: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,

    #[account(mut, has_one = whirlpool,
      constraint = tick_array_lower.key() != tick_array_upper.key(),
      constraint = tick_array_lower.to_account_info().owner == &whirlpool_program.key()
    )]
    pub tick_array_lower: AccountLoader<'info, TickArray>,
    #[account(mut, has_one = whirlpool,
      constraint = tick_array_upper.to_account_info().owner == &whirlpool_program.key()
    )]
    pub tick_array_upper: AccountLoader<'info, TickArray>,

    #[account(mut, address = lockbox.bridged_token_mint)]
    pub bridged_token_mint: Box<Account<'info, Mint>>,
    #[account(mut,
      constraint = bridged_token_account.mint == lockbox.bridged_token_mint,
      constraint = bridged_token_account.mint == bridged_token_mint.key(),
      constraint = signer.key == &bridged_token_account.owner,
    )]
    pub bridged_token_account: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,

    #[account(mut)]
    pub lockbox: Box<Account<'info, LiquidityLockbox>>,
    pub whirlpool_program: Program<'info, whirlpool::program::Whirlpool>,

    #[account(address = token::ID)]
    pub token_program: Program<'info, Token>
}
```

# Validation Function

- Seed checks done in constraints
- validate() function separate from business logic for additional checks
- Add the following before your ix handler function
- `#[access_control(ctx.accounts.validate())]`

# # Output Validation

- Last step of an instruction fails → whole instruction fails
- So let’s validate our state at the very end!
  - Invariant functions
  - Assertions

# # Invariant Function

- Defined for some state account
- Called at the end of any instruction that changes this state
- Defines a list of requirements to the state
- If any requirement fails → rollback!
- Examples:
  - Multisig always has at least 1 member who can Execute proposals
  - Borrows never exceed deposits

```rust
// This must be called at the end of every instruction that modifies a Multisig account.
pub fn invariant(&self) -> Result<()> {
    let Self {
        threshold,
        members,
        transaction_index,
        stale_transaction_index,
        ..
    } = self;
    // Max number of members is u16::MAX.
    require!(
        members.len() <= usize::from(u16::MAX),
        MultisigError::TooManyMembers
    );

    // There must be no duplicate members.
    let has_duplicates = members.windows(2).any(|win| win[0].key == win[1].key);
    require!(!has_duplicates, MultisigError::DuplicateMember);

    // Members must not have unknown permissions.
    require!(
        members.iter().all(|m| m.permissions.mask < 8), // 8 = Initiate | Vote | Execute
        MultisigError::UnknownPermission
    );

    // There must be at least one member with Initiate permission.
    let num_proposers = Self::num_proposers(members);
    require!(num_proposers > 0, MultisigError::NoProposers);

    // There must be at least one member with Execute permission.
    let num_executors = Self::num_executors(members);
    require!(num_executors > 0, MultisigError::NoExecutors);

    // There must be at least one member with Vote permission.
    let num_voters = Self::num_voters(members);
    require!(num_voters > 0, MultisigError::NoVoters);

    // Threshold must be greater than 0.
    require!(*threshold > 0, MultisigError::InvalidThreshold);

    // Threshold must not exceed the number of voters.
    require!(
        usize::from(*threshold) <= num_voters,
        MultisigError::InvalidThreshold
    );

    // `state.stale_transaction_index` must be less than or equal to `state.transaction_index`.
    require!(
        stale_transaction_index <= transaction_index,
        MultisigError::InvalidStaleTransactionIndex
    );

    // Time Lock must not exceed the maximum allowed to prevent bricking the multisig.
    require!(
        self.time_lock <= MAX_TIME_LOCK,
        MultisigError::TimeLockExceedsMaxAllowed
    );

    Ok(())
}
```

# # Assertions

- Like invariants, but instruction-specific
- What effect would an exploit cause?
- Example:
  - Add Liquidity IX:
  - Check pool value at beginning and end
  - If value has decreased, fail!

```
let end_total_sol_value = accounts.pool_state.total_sol_value()?;
if end_total_sol_value < start_total_sol_value {
    return Err(SControllerError::PoolWouldLoseSolValue.into());
}
```

# # Emergency Mechanisms

- Have a global program state
  - Fully Operational
  - Fully Halted
  - Withdraw Only
  - Sunset
- Changeable by admin/multisig/dao...
- Consider Timelocks

```rust
#[derive(AnchorSerialize, AnchorDeserialize, Clone, Debug, Copy)]
pub enum ProgramState {
    /// Fully Operational
    Running,
    /// Fully Stopped, Except for Admin
    Stopped,
    /// No more CreateOffer. Only Cancel And Take
    WithdrawOnly,
    /// No more CreateOffer or Take. Only Cancel.
    CancelOnly,
    /// No more CreateOffer. Also, ProgramState Locked forever.
    Sunset,
}
```

# Supervision 🔭

- Remember the Synthetify DAO hack?
  - Attacker prepared hack over multiple months
  - No one noticed …
- You need to keep track of your on-chain programs!
  - Monitor its state and usage
  - Monitor for anomalies
  - Detect attacks early

# # Logging

- Don’t use solana_program::log
  - CU expensive
  - Length limited
  - Hard to parse
  - Can be faked by other programs
- Use anchor’s event-cpi instead!
  - CU cheap
  - Verifiable
  - API ready

# # Monitoring

- Constantly running bot 🤖 that monitors your program
- Easily done with anchor events!
- Log events to discord/telegram
- Add sanity checks and alerts!
  - Large deposits/withdrawals
  - Abnormal behavior
  - Many hacks: Active user notices abnormal behaviour → hacks later from different account

# # Tests

1. Test for each instructions success case
2. Test for valid special cases
3. Test for each custom error (and have lots of custom errors!)

- Just testing for blueprint-execution, won't do anything for security

# Summary

Structure 📁

Safety 🛡️

Supervision 🔭

# # Contact

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