Secure Coding Practices

Nd

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whoami

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- 🏏 @siintemal





Who We Are



- Team of security researchers
- Found and reported 80+
 vulnerabilities in Solana Core
- Found and reported critical bugs in many of the largest Solana DeFi protocols
- Here to make the Solana ecosystem more secure
- 🏏 @neodyme 🌐 neodyme.io



Nd

The 80/20 of Solana Security

Triple S Framework

Structure

Safety

Supervision



Structure

✓ ■ src☐ lib.rs☐ Cargo.toml☐ Xargo.toml



Structure 📁

- → src
 - lib.rs
 - Cargo.toml
 - Targo.toml

- ✓
 ☐ src
- instructions
 - cancel_offer.rs
 - create_offer.rs
 - mod.rs
 - take_offer.rs
- → state
 - mod.rs
 - tradeoffer.rs
 - lib.rs
 - Cargo.toml
 - 🗋 Xargo.toml



Structure 📁





- ✓ 🖶 src
- → instructions
 - cancel_offer.rs
 - create_offer.rs
 - mod.rs
 - take_offer.rs
- 🗸 🚞 state
 - mod.rs
 - tradeoffer.rs
 - lib.rs
- Cargo.toml



Instruction File

- Single file contains:
 - Instruction Argument Structure
 - Accounts Structure
 - Instruction Implementation

```
Code Blame 64 lines (58 loc) · 1.99 KB
        use anchor lang::prelude::*:
         use anchor spl::associated token::AssociatedToken;
         use anchor spl::token::{Mint, Token, TokenAccount}:
         use anchor_spl::token;
         use crate::state::*;
          #[derive(AnchorSerialize, AnchorDeserialize)]
          pub struct CreateOfferArgs {
              pub offer amount: u64,
              pub request amount: u64,
   14 v pub struct CreateOffer<'info> {
              #[account(mut)]
              owner: Signer<'info>,
              #[account(
                 payer = owner,
                 seeds = [b"tradeoffer", owner.key().as_ref()],
              offer: Account<'info, TradeOffer>,
              owner_offer_token: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
                 payer = owner,
                 associated_token::mint = offer_mint,
                 associated_token::authority = offer,
             offer escrow: Account<'info. TokenAccount>.
              offer mint: Account<'info. Mint>.
               request_mint: Account<'info, Mint>,
              token_program: Program<'info, Token>,
              associated_token_program: Program<'info, AssociatedToken>,
               system_program: Program<'info, System>,
              pub fn handle(ctx: Context<Self>, args: CreateOfferArgs) -> Result<()> {
                  let CreateOfferArgs { offer_amount, request_amount } = args;
                 offer.owner = ctx.accounts.owner.key();
                 offer.offer mint = ctx.accounts.offer mint.key();
                 offer.offer amount = offer amount;
                 offer.request mint = ctx.accounts.request mint.key();
                 offer.request amount = request amount;
                 // transfer from owner to escrow
                 token::transfer(
                     CpiContext::new(
                         ctx.accounts.token_program.to_account_info(),
                          token::Transfer {
                             from: ctx.accounts.owner offer token.to account info().
                             to: ctx.accounts.offer_escrow.to_account_info(),
                             authority: ctx.accounts.owner.to_account_info(),
```



State

- State Files contain:
 - Account struct definition
 - State implementations:
 - Verification logic
 - State transitions
 - Helper functions

```
use anchor lang::prelude::*;
       #[account]
       pub struct TradeOffer {
           pub owner: Pubkey,
           pub offer_mint: Pubkey,
           pub offer_amount: u64,
           pub request_mint: Pubkey,
           pub request_amount: u64,
10
           //  size = 8 + 32 + 32 + 8 + 32 + 8 = 120
11
12
       impl TradeOffer {
13
           //pub const SIZE = 120;
14
           pub fn invariant() -> Result<()> {
15
16
               Ok(())
17
18
```



Safety 🛡

- Input validation
- Output validation
- Emergency mechanisms



Safety 🛡

- Input validation
 - Constraints & Validation Function
- Output validation
 - Invariants & Assertions
- Emergency mechanisms
 - Program State & Circuit Breakers



Input Validation

- Happens in the Instruction definition
- Use a mix of:
 - Anchor constraints
 - 2. Separate Validation Function
- Constraints:
 - has_one, seeds
- Validation Function:
 - Everything else
- Screenshot tries to do everything in constraints →

```
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct DepositPositionForLiquidity<'info> {
   #[account(nut)]
    #[account(nut, address = lockbox.position, has one = whirlpool, has one = position mint)]
    pub position: Box<Account<'info, Position>>,
     #[account(address = position.position_mint, constraint = position_mint.supply == 1)]
    pub position mint: Box<Account<'info, Mint>>,
      address = lockbox.pda position account.kev().
      constraint = lockbox.kev() == pda position account.owner.
      constraint = pda_position_account.mint == position_mint.key(),
      constraint = pda position account.amount == 1
    pub pda position account: Box<Account<'info. TokenAccount>>.
    #[account(nut, address = position.whirlpool)]
    nub whirlmool: RoysAccounts'info. Whirlmool>>.
      constraint = token owner account a.mint == whirloool.token mint a.
      constraint = token owner account a.mint != token owner account b.mint,
       constraint = signer.key == &token owner account a.owner
    pub token_owner_account_a: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,
      constraint = token_owner_account_b.mint == whirlpool.token_mint_b,
      constraint = signer.key == &token_owner_account_b.owner
    pub token_owner_account_b: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,
      constraint = token vault a.key() == whirlpool.token vault a,
      constraint = token vault a.kev() != token vault b.kev()
    pub token_vault_a: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,
    #[account(nut, constraint = token vault b.key() == whirlpool.token vault b)]
    pub token_vault_b: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>>,
    #[account(mut, has one = whirlmool.
      constraint = tick_array_lower.key() != tick_array_upper.key(),
      constraint = tick_array_lower.to_account_info().owner == &whirlpool_program.key()
   pub tick_array_lower: AccountLoader<'info, TickArray>,
    #[account(nut, has one = whirlpool,
      constraint = tick_array_upper.to_account_info().owner == &whirlpool_program.key()
    pub tick array upper: AccountLoader<'info, TickArray>,
    #[account(mut, address = lockbox.bridged_token_mint)]
    pub bridged token mint: Box<Account<'info. Mint>>.
      constraint = bridged token account.mint == lockbox.bridged token mint.
      constraint = bridged token account.mint == bridged token mint.key(),
       constraint = signer.key == &bridged_token_account.owner,
   pub bridged_token_account: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,
    pub lockbox: Box<Account<'info, LiquidityLockbox>>.
    pub whirlpool_program: Program<'info, whirlpool::program::Whirlpool>,
    #[account(address = token::ID)]
    pub token_program: Program<'info, Token>
```



Validation Function

- Seed checks done in constraints
- validate() function separate from business logic for additional checks
- Add the following before your ix handler function
- #[access_control(ctx.accounts.validate())]

```
truct MultisigAddSpendingLimit<'info>
    seeds = [SEED_PREFIX, SEED_MULTISIG, multisig.create_key.as_ref()],
    bump = multisig.bump.
multisin: Accounts'info. Multisins.
/// Multisig `config authority` that must authorize the configuration change.
pub config authority: Signer<'info>.
    seeds = [
       SEED PREETY
        multisin.kev().as ref().
        SEED SPENDING LIMIT,
        args.create key.as ref(),
    space = SpendingLimit::size(args.members.len(), args.destinations.len()),
pub spending limit: Account<'info. SpendingLimit>.
/// This is usually the same as `config_authority`, but can be a different account if needed.
pub rent_payer: Signer<'info>,
oub system program: Programs'info, System>
        self.config_authority.key(),
        self.multisig.config authority
        MultisigError::Unauthorized
    // 'spending limit' is partially checked via its seeds
    // SpendingLimit members must all be members of the multisig.
    for sl_member in self.spending_limit.members.iter() {
           self.multisig.is member(*sl member).is some().
           MultisiaError::NotAMember
#[access control(ctx.accounts.validate())]
pub in multisig add spending limit(
   ctx: Context<Self>
```



Output Validation

- Last step of an instruction fails → whole instruction fails
- So let's validate our state at the very end!
 - Invariant functions
 - Assertions



Invariant Function

- Defined for some state account
- Called at the end of any instruction that changes this state
- Defines a list of requirements to the state
- If any requirement fails → rollback!
- Examples:
 - Multisig always has at least 1 member who can Execute proposals
 - Borrows never exceed deposits

```
// This must be called at the end of every instruction that modifies a Multisia account.
pub fn invariant(&self) -> Result<()> {
    let Self {
        threshold,
        transaction index.
        stale_transaction_index.
    } = self;
    // Max number of members is u16::MAX.
        members.len() <= usize::from(u16::MAX),
        MultisigError::TooManyMembers
    // There must be no duplicate members.
    let has_duplicates = members.windows(2).any(|win| win[0].key == win[1].key);
    require!(!has_duplicates, MultisigError::DuplicateMember);
    // Members must not have unknown permissions.
    require! (
        members.iter().all(|m| m.permissions.mask < 8), // 8 = Initiate | Vote | Execute
        MultisigError::UnknownPermission
    // There must be at least one member with Initiate permission.
    let num_proposers = Self::num_proposers(members);
    require!(num_proposers > 0, MultisigError::NoProposers);
    // There must be at least one member with Execute permission.
    let num_executors = Self::num_executors(members);
    require!(num_executors > 0, MultisigError::NoExecutors);
    // There must be at least one member with Vote permission.
    let num voters = Self::num_voters(members);
    require!(num voters > 0. MultisiaError::NoVoters):
    // Threshold must be greater than 0.
    require!(*threshold > 0, MultisigError::InvalidThreshold);
    // Threshold must not exceed the number of voters.
        usize::from(*threshold) <= num voters.
        MultisigError::InvalidThreshold
   // `state.stale transaction index` must be less than or equal to `state.transaction index`.
        stale transaction index <= transaction index.
        MultisigError::InvalidStaleTransactionIndex
    // Time Lock must not exceed the maximum allowed to prevent bricking the multisig.
        self.time_lock <= MAX_TIME_LOCK,
        MultisigError::TimeLockExceedsMaxAllowed
```



Assertions

- Like invariants, but instruction-specific
- What effect would an exploit cause?
- Example:
 - Add Liquidity IX:
 - Check pool value at beginning and end
 - o If value has decreased, fail!

```
let end_total_sol_value = accounts.pool_state.total_sol_value()?;
if end_total_sol_value < start_total_sol_value {
    return Err(SControllerError::PoolWouldLoseSolValue.into());
}</pre>
```



Emergency Mechanisms

- Have a global program state
 - Fully Operational
 - Fully Halted
 - Withdraw Only
 - Sunset
- Changeable by admin/multisig/dao...
- Consider Timelocks

```
#[derive(AnchorSerialize, AnchorDeserialize, Clone, Debug, Copy)]
pub enum ProgramState {
    /// Fully Operational
    Running,
    /// Fully Stopped, Except for Admin
    Stopped,
    /// No more CreateOffer. Only Cancel And Take
    WithdrawOnly,
    /// No more CreateOffer or Take. Only Cancel.
    CancelOnly,
    /// No more CreateOffer. Also, ProgramState Locked forever.
    Sunset,
}
```



Supervision 🔭

- Remember the Synthetify DAO hack?
 - Attacker prepared hack over multiple months
 - No one noticed ...
- You need to keep track of your on-chain programs!
 - Monitor its state and usage
 - Monitor for anomalies
 - Detect attacks early



Logging

- Don't use solana_program::log
 - CU expensive
 - Length limited
 - Hard to parse
 - Can be faked by other programs
- Use anchor's event-cpi instead!
 - CU cheap
 - Verifiable
 - API ready



Monitoring

- Constantly running bot in that monitors your program
- Easily done with anchor events!
- Log events to discord/telegram
- Add sanity checks and alerts!
 - Large deposits/withdrawals
 - Abnormal behavior
 - Many hacks: Active user notices abnormal behaviour → hacks later from different account



Tests

- Test for each instructions success case
- 2. Test for valid special cases
- Test for each custom error (and have lots of custom errors!)
- Just testing for blueprint-execution, won't do anything for security



Summary

Structure 📁

Safety 🛡

Supervision 🔭



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