

ReVaulting

decryption and opportunities

whoami



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Reality Net System Solutions



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<https://github.com/dfirfpi>



blog.digital-forensics.it

what and why

Reverse Engineering Vaults

where Windows puts users' credentials

Main goal is to decrypt them


Offensive Digital Investigations

to access protected data/system
with proper legal authorizations



windows vaults


- User can manage his credentials with **Credential Manager**
 - create, delete, modify,
 - backup, restore: **crd** files
- Applications can manage credentials
 - user's one or their own
 - with or without user knowledge
- System can manage credentials
 - with or without user knowledge



credential manager

Store credentials for automatic logon

Use Credential Manager to store credentials, such as user names and passwords, in vaults so you can easily log on to computers or websites.



[Back up vault](#) [Restore vault](#)

Windows Credentials

[Add a Windows credential](#)

fuffaserver

Modified: 25/06/2015 ▼

Certificate-Based credentials

[Add a certificate-based credential](#)

No certificates.

Generic Credentials

[Add a generic credential](#)

doeserver

Modified: 25/06/2015 ▼

noneserver

Modified: 25/06/2015 ▼

Windows Credentials

fuffaserver

Internet or network address: fuffaserver

User name: fuffauser

Password:

Persistence: Enterprise

[Edit](#) [Remove from vault](#)

credentials? yes.. no.. yes again..



1

Web Credentials

2

Windows Credentials

[Back up Credentials](#) [Restore Credentials](#)

Windows Credentials

[Add a Windows credential](#)

No Windows credentials.

Certificate-Based Credentials

[Add a certificate-based credential](#)

No certificates.

Generic Credentials

[Add a generic credential](#)

OneDrive Cached Credential

Modified: 28/09/2015

virtualapp/didlogical

Modified: 28/09/2015

Web Credentials

Web Passwords

No web passwords.

```
C:\Users\dfirfpi>vaultcmd /listcreds:"Windows Credentials"
Credentials in vault: Windows Credentials
No credentials

C:\Users\dfirfpi>vaultcmd /listcreds:"Web Credentials"
Credentials in vault: Web Credentials

Credential schema: Windows Web Password Credential
Resource: https://login.microsoftonline.com/
Identity: [redacted]@onmicrosoft.com
Saved By: Internet Explorer
Hidden: Yes
Roaming: No
Property (schema element id,value): (100,D[redacted])

Credential schema: Windows Web Password Credential
Resource: https://login.live.com/
Identity: [redacted]
Saved By: Internet Explorer
Hidden: Yes
Roaming: No
Property (schema element id,value): (100,[redacted])
```

vaultcmd vs «Credential Manager»

credentials and vaults

from a *file system* point of view:

- **Credentials**
 - are files kept by the system in folders named “Credentials”
- **Vaults**
 - are files kept by the system in folders named “Vault”
- `<user-profile>\AppData\Local\Roaming\Microsoft\`
 - roaming for enterprise users
 - Vault folders contain sub-folders named based on the schema guid
- plus own **system**’s credentials/vaults





dpapi in a nutshell

well, a nutshell is not enough

dpapi

- DPAPI: **D**ata **P**rotection **A**PI
 - first introduced with Windows 2000
 - <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms995355.aspx>
- it receives plaintext and returns ciphertext
 - opaque, two methods: *CryptProtectData* and *CryptUnprotectData*
 - does not provide any storage facility
- It's the **key** technology used **extensively** by Windows

dpapi decryption




Master keys



DPAPI blobs



- user's password *unlocks* Master keys
- the proper master key *decrypts* the blob




dpapi overview



- **password** should be only in user's brain
 - not always true...
 - the **system** has its key, which is stored in registry
- **mkeys** are **files** on disks
 - In proper directories
 - Each *mkey* has its own GUID
- **blobs** can be **everywhere**
 - DPAPI does not provide any storage facility

dpapi entropy

- user's password *unlocks* Master keys
- the proper master key and the proper *entropy* key *decrypt* the blob



dpapi locations

- User
 - <user profile dir>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect
- Local System
 - <windir>\System32\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-18\User

The screenshot shows a Windows Explorer window titled 'Protect' with the address bar path: 'Questo PC > Disco locale (C:) > Utenti > user > AppData > Roaming > Microsoft > Protect'. The file list shows a folder 'S-1-5-21-2128076315-4144300488-3078399761-1001' selected, with sub-files 'CREDHIST' and 'SYNCHIST'. An orange arrow points from this folder to a detailed view of its contents.

Nome	Ultima modifica	Tipo	Dimensione
S-1-5-21-2128076315-4144300488-3078399761-1001	02/10/2014 16:43	Cartella di file	
CREDHIST	29/09/2014 21:44	File di sistema	1 KB
SYNCHIST	29/09/2014 21:44	File di sistema	1 KB

Nome	Ultima modifica	Tipo	Dimensione
3a465362-986d-986d-8512-5789fb567dfc	29/09/2014 21:44	File di sistema	1 KB
ba76b33f-4b97-4e97-9603-7865fb972cec	29/09/2014 21:44	File di sistema	1 KB
Preferred	14/09/2014 23:34	File di sistema	1 KB

dpapi blob

```
00000000: 01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF - 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 |          z |
00000010: 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 - B9 3B 02 F9 77 1D CF 4A |O          ; w J|
00000020: 9E 88 4E 35 38 31 A7 D4 - 00 00 00 20 3A 00 00 00 | N581      : |
00000030: 45 00 6E 00 74 00 65 00 - 72 00 70 00 72 00 69 00 |E n t e r p r i |
00000040: 73 00 65 00 20 00 43 00 - 72 00 65 00 64 00 65 00 |s e   C r e d e |
00000050: 6E 00 74 00 69 00 61 00 - 6C 00 20 00 44 00 61 00 |n t i a l   D a |
00000060: 74 00 61 00 0D 00 0A 00 - 00 00 10 66 00 00 00 01 |t a          f |
00000070: 00 00 20 00 00 00 A6 0C - D5 B3 E4 F6 6F 0F EA C8 |          o |
00000080: CC F2 A8 5B 4F C0 79 3F - 7D 80 73 16 90 C1 F8 13 | [O y?} s |
00000090: 78 24 50 CE 17 87 00 00 - 00 00 0E 80 00 00 00 02 |x$P |
000000a0: 00 00 20 00 00 00 31 F4 - 01 B8 C3 D8 87 B3 A1 CA |          1 |
000000b0: 1E 6F 34 23 AB 8A DB 55 - C4 EB 58 4E 5D 9D 9A 07 | o4#   U  XN] |
000000c0: 8F B9 D2 0E 6F 28 B0 00 - 00 00 AB B9 6A 18 B2 BF |   o(      j |
000000d0: 07 CC 59 E9 80 2B 14 17 - 7D 4B 79 53 5A C6 B5 B0 | Y  +   }KySZ |
000000e0: 17 CC 5A BB 1A A7 8B 5C - B9 D1 6A 78 1C 25 B5 F1 | Z      \  jx % |
000000f0: 6B 87 23 17 2E 7F 29 41 - 4A 9F 41 B2 92 98 8E DE |k # .  )AJ A |
00000100: A0 F6 55 AF 82 FD B3 F3 - 03 A6 83 EE 81 38 71 DF | U          8q |
00000110: 20 13 D7 96 4F 06 A6 43 - 0D 62 5F 7B 0C C4 51 1F |   O  C b_{  Q |
00000120: A1 F1 F5 4A E8 24 02 9F - 2A 76 FF 62 44 FD FD F1 | J $   *v bD |
00000130: 3A CB 83 0D 18 05 B2 14 - 9F 1B 04 45 BA DB E5 14 |:          E |
00000140: 15 63 07 06 52 F0 3E 27 - 36 39 62 7B 50 CB 71 E0 | c  R >'69b{P q |
00000150: A9 E5 94 71 3D 56 3E 6B - 18 57 77 9E 78 E2 F5 35 |   q=V>k Ww x 5|
00000160: DD 6D 54 16 08 BE 0D 1F - 43 7A 0D 00 8C 47 D5 E8 | mT      Cz   G |
00000170: 83 D7 72 9F 7D 2A 49 13 - DC BE 40 00 00 00 0C ED | r }*I   @ |
00000180: D8 73 8A F6 50 D8 23 88 - AF 60 3E 41 C3 2A 67 CB | s  P #   `>A *g |
00000190: B9 A8 5B A1 EB 03 37 55 - 03 C5 F9 9D DE D1 37 79 | [   7U      7y|
000001a0: 7B DF 1D 74 16 CB 55 09 - 16 7A CB 7D 0B 8D FF BD |{  t  U  z } |
000001b0: 97 B3 DC FB 5D 87 06 E7 - CF 7F C0 2E 29 8F |   ]      .) |
```

dpapi blob

mkey guid

```
00000000: 01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF - 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 + - - - - - z - - - - -
00000010: 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 - B9 3B 02 F9 77 1D CF 4A | O ; w J |
00000020: 9E 88 4E 35 38 31 A7 D4 - 00 00 00 20 3A 00 00 00 | N581 : |
00000030: 45 00 6E 00 74 00 65 00 - 72 00 70 00 72 00 69 00 | E n t e r p r i |
00000040: 73 00 65 00 20 00 43 00 - 72 00 65 00 64 00 65 00 | s e C r e d e |
00000050: 6E 00 74 00 69 00 61 00 - 6C 00 20 00 44 00 61 00 | n t i a l D a |
00000060: 74 00 61 00 0D 00 0A 00 - 00 00 10 66 00 00 00 01 | t a f |
00000070: 00 00 20 00 00 00 A6 0C - D5 B3 E4 F6 6F 0F EA C8 | o |
00000080: CC F2 A8 5B 4F C0 79 3F - 7D 80 73 16 90 C1 F8 13 | [ O y ? } s |
00000090: 78 24 50 CE 17 87 00 00 - 00 00 0E 80 00 00 00 02 | x $ P |
000000a0: 00 00 20 00 00 00 31 F4 - 01 B8 C3 D8 87 B3 A1 CA | 1 |
000000b0: 1E 6F 34 23 AB 8A DB 55 - C4 EB 58 4E 5D 9D 9A 07 | o 4 # U X N ] |
000000c0: 8F B9 D2 0E 6F 28 B0 00 - 00 00 AB B9 6A 18 B2 BF | o ( j |
000000d0: 07 CC 59 E9 80 2B 14 17 - 7D 4B 79 53 5A C6 B5 B0 | Y + } K y S Z |
000000e0: 17 CC 5A BB 1A A7 8B 5C - B9 D1 6A 78 1C 25 B5 F1 | Z \ j x % |
000000f0: 6B 87 23 17 2E 7F 29 41 - 4A 9F 41 B2 92 98 8E DE | k # . ) A J A |
00000100: A0 F6 55 AF 82 FD B3 F3 - 03 A6 83 EE 81 38 71 DF | U 8 q |
00000110: 20 13 D7 96 4F 06 A6 43 - 0D 62 5F 7B 0C C4 51 1F | O C b _ { Q |
00000120: A1 F1 F5 4A E8 24 02 9F - 2A 76 FF 62 44 FD FD F1 | J $ * v b D |
00000130: 3A CB 83 0D 18 05 B2 14 - 9F 1B 04 45 BA DB E5 14 | : E |
00000140: 15 63 07 06 52 F0 3E 27 - 36 39 62 7B 50 CB 71 E0 | c R > ' 6 9 b { P q |
00000150: A9 E5 94 71 3D 56 3E 6B - 18 57 77 9E 78 E2 F5 35 | q = V > k W w x 5 |
00000160: DD 6D 54 16 08 BE 0D 1F - 43 7A 0D 00 8C 47 D5 E8 | m T C z G |
00000170: 83 D7 72 9F 7D 2A 49 13 - DC BE 40 00 00 00 0C ED | r } * I @ |
00000180: D8 73 8A F6 50 D8 23 88 - AF 60 3E 41 C3 2A 67 CB | s P # ` > A * g |
00000190: B9 A8 5B A1 EB 03 37 55 - 03 C5 F9 9D DE D1 37 79 | [ 7 U 7 y |
000001a0: 7B DF 1D 74 16 CB 55 09 - 16 7A CB 7D 0B 8D FF BD | { t U z } |
000001b0: 97 B3 DC FB 5D 87 06 E7 - CF 7F C0 2E 29 8F | ] . ) |
```

provider guid


Find your blobs!
hexadecimal
signature search
for provider guid.

blobinfo

```
dpapilab> blobinfo.py "Enterprise Credential Data"
```

```
DPAPI BLOB
```


```
version      = 1
provider     = df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb
mkey         = f9023bb9-1d77-4acf-9e88-4e353831a7d4
flags        = 0x20000000
descr        = Enterprise Credential Data
cipherAlgo   = AES-256 [0x6610]
hashAlgo     = sha512 [0x800e]
salt         = a60cd5b3e4f66f0feac8ccf2a85b4fc0793f7d80731690c1f813782450ce1787
hmac         = 31f401b8c3d887b3a1ca1e6f3423ab8adb55c4eb584e5d9d9a078fb9d20e6f28
cipher       = abb96a18b2bf07cc59e9802b14177d4b79535ac6b5b017cc5abb1aa78b5cb9d16a781c25b5f16b872
              3172e7f29414a9f41b292988edea0f655af82fdb3f303a683ee813871df2013d7964f06a6430d625f7
              b0cc4511fa1f1f54ae824029f2a76ff6244fdfd13acb830d1805b2149f1b0445badbe514156307065
              2f03e273639627b50cb71e0a9e594713d563e6b1857779e78e2f535dd6d541608be0d1f437a0d008c4
              7d5e883d7729f7d2a4913dcbe
sign         = 0cedd8738af650d82388af603e41c32a67cbb9a85ba1eb03375503c5f99dded137797bdf1d7416cb
              5509167acb7d0b8dffbd97b3dcfb5d8706e7cf7fc02e298f
```


internals

just a bunch of reversing pills

- a **Credentials** folder can contain
 - [0-n] *guid* files



- a **Vault** folder can contain
 - [0-1] *Policy.vpol* files
 - [0-n] *schema_guid.vsch* files
 - [0-n] *guid.vcrd* files



credential file

```
00000000: 01 00 00 00 BE 01 00 00 - 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 |
00000010: D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 - 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB |      z  O  |
00000020: 01 00 00 00 B9 3B 02 F9 - 77 1D CF 4A 9E 88 4E 35 |      ;  w  J  N5|
00000030: 38 31 A7 D4 00 00 00 20 - 3A 00 00 00 45 00 6E 00 |81      :  E n |
00000040: 74 00 65 00 72 00 70 00 - 72 00 69 00 73 00 65 00 |t e r p r i s e |
00000050: 20 00 43 00 72 00 65 00 - 64 00 65 00 6E 00 74 00 | C r e d e n t |
00000060: 69 00 61 00 6C 00 20 00 - 44 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 |i a l   D a t a |
00000070: 0D 00 0A 00 00 00 10 66 - 00 00 00 01 00 00 20 00 |      f      |
00000080: 00 00 A6 0C D5 B3 E4 F6 - 6F 0F EA C8 CC F2 A8 5B |      o      [|
00000090: 4F C0 79 3F 7D 80 73 16 - 90 C1 F8 13 78 24 50 CE |O y?} s      x$P |
000000a0: 17 87 00 00 00 00 0E 80 - 00 00 00 02 00 00 20 00 |
000000b0: 00 00 31 F4 01 B8 C3 D8 - 87 B3 A1 CA 1E 6F 34 23 | 1      o4#|
000000c0: AB 8A DB 55 C4 EB 58 4E - 5D 9D 9A 07 8F B9 D2 0E |  U  XN]      |
000000d0: 6F 28 B0 00 00 00 AB B9 - 6A 18 B2 BF 07 CC 59 E9 |o(      j      Y |
000000e0: 80 2B 14 17 7D 4B 79 53 - 5A C6 B5 B0 17 CC 5A BB | +  }KySZ      Z |
000000f0: 1A A7 8B 5C B9 D1 6A 78 - 1C 25 B5 F1 6B 87 23 17 |  \  jx %  k # |
00000100: 2E 7F 29 41 4A 9F 41 B2 - 92 98 8E DE A0 F6 55 AF |.  )AJ A      U |
00000110: 82 FD B3 F3 03 A6 83 EE - 81 38 71 DF 20 13 D7 96 |      8q      |
00000120: 4F 06 A6 43 0D 62 5F 7B - 0C C4 51 1F A1 F1 F5 4A |O  C b_{  Q      J|
00000130: E8 24 02 9F 2A 76 FF 62 - 44 FD FD F1 3A CB 83 0D | $  *v bD      :  |
00000140: 18 05 B2 14 9F 1B 04 45 - BA DB E5 14 15 63 07 06 |      E      c  |
00000150: 52 F0 3E 27 36 39 62 7B - 50 CB 71 E0 A9 E5 94 71 |R >'69b{P q      q|
00000160: 3D 56 3E 6B 18 57 77 9E - 78 E2 F5 35 DD 6D 54 16 |=V>k Ww x      5 mT |
00000170: 08 BE 0D 1F 43 7A 0D 00 - 8C 47 D5 E8 83 D7 72 9F |      Cz      G      r |
00000180: 7D 2A 49 13 DC BE 40 00 - 00 00 0C ED D8 73 8A F6 |}*I      @      s  |
00000190: 50 D8 23 88 AF 60 3E 41 - C3 2A 67 CB B9 A8 5B A1 |P #      `>A *g      [ |
000001a0: EB 03 37 55 03 C5 F9 9D - DE D1 37 79 7B DF 1D 74 | 7U      7y{  t|
000001b0: 16 CB 55 09 16 7A CB 7D - 0B 8D FF BD 97 B3 DC FB |  U  z  }      |
000001c0: 5D 87 06 E7 CF 7F C0 2E - 29 8F      |]      .) |
```

credential file

dpapi blob
length

```
00000000: 01 00 00 00 BE 01 00 00 - 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
00000010: D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 - 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB |      z  O  |
00000020: 01 00 00 00 B9 3B 02 F9 - 77 1D CF 4A 9E 88 4E 35 |      ;  w  J  N5|
00000030: 38 31 A7 D4 00 00 00 20 - 3A 00 00 00 45 00 6E 00 |81      :  E n |
00000040: 74 00 65 00 72 00 70 00 - 72 00 69 00 73 00 65 00 |t e r p r i s e |
00000050: 20 00 43 00 72 00 65 00 - 64 00 65 00 6E 00 74 00 | C r e d e n t |
00000060: 69 00 61 00 6C 00 20 00 - 44 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 |i a l   D a t a |
00000070: 0D 00 0A 00 00 00 10 66 - 00 00 00 01 00 00 20 00 |      f      |
00000080: 00 00 A6 0C D5 B3 E4 F6 - 6F 0F EA C8 CC F2 A8 5B |      o      [ |
00000090: 4F C0 79 3F 7D 80 73 16 - 90 C1 F8 13 78 24 50 CE |O y?} s      x$P |
000000a0: 17 87 00 00 00 00 0E 80 - 00 00 00 02 00 00 20 00 |      |
000000b0: 00 00 31 F4 01 B8 C3 D8 - 87 B3 A1 CA 1E 6F 34 23 | 1      o4# |
000000c0: AB 8A DB 55 C4 EB 58 4E - 5D 9D 9A 07 8F B9 D2 0E |  U  XN]      |
000000d0: 6F 28 B0 00 00 00 AB B9 - 6A 18 B2 BF 07 CC 59 E9 |o(      j      Y |
000000e0: 80 2B 14 17 7D 4B 79 53 - 5A C6 B5 B0 17 CC 5A BB | +  }KySZ      Z |
000000f0: 1A A7 8B 5C B9 D1 6A 78 - 1C 25 B5 F1 6B 87 23 17 | \  jx %  k # |
00000100: 2E 7F 29 41 4A 9F 41 B2 - 92 98 8E DE A0 F6 55 AF |.  )AJ A      U |
00000110: 82 FD B3 F3 03 A6 83 EE - 81 38 71 DF 20 13 D7 96 |      8q      |
00000120: 4F 06 A6 43 0D 62 5F 7B - 0C C4 51 1F A1 F1 F5 4A |O  C b_{  Q      J|
00000130: E8 24 02 9F 2A 76 FF 62 - 44 FD FD F1 3A CB 83 0D | $  *v bD      :  |
00000140: 18 05 B2 14 9F 1B 04 45 - BA DB E5 14 15 63 07 06 |      E      c  |
00000150: 52 F0 3E 27 36 39 62 7B - 50 CB 71 E0 A9 E5 94 71 |R >'69b{P q      q|
00000160: 3D 56 3E 6B 18 57 77 9E - 78 E2 F5 35 DD 6D 54 16 |=V>k Ww x      5 mT |
00000170: 08 BE 0D 1F 43 7A 0D 00 - 8C 47 D5 E8 83 D7 72 9F |      Cz      G      r |
00000180: 7D 2A 49 13 DC BE 40 00 - 00 00 0C ED D8 73 8A F6 |}*I      @      s  |
00000190: 50 D8 23 88 AF 60 3E 41 - C3 2A 67 CB B9 A8 5B A1 |P #      `>A *g      [ |
000001a0: EB 03 37 55 03 C5 F9 9D - DE D1 37 79 7B DF 1D 74 | 7U      7y{      t|
000001b0: 16 CB 55 09 16 7A CB 7D - 0B 8D FF BD 97 B3 DC FB |  U  z  }      |
000001c0: 5D 87 06 E7 CF 7F C0 2E - 29 8F |]      .) |
```

dpapi blob

policy.vpol

```
00000000: 01 00 00 00 42 C4 F4 4B - 8A 9B A0 41 B3 80 DD 4A |   B   K   A   J|
00000010: 70 4D DB 28 20 00 00 00 - 57 00 65 00 62 00 20 00 |pM (   W e b   |
00000020: 43 00 72 00 65 00 64 00 - 65 00 6E 00 74 00 69 00 |C r e d e n t i |
00000030: 61 00 6C 00 73 00 00 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |a l s           |
00000040: 01 00 00 00 68 01 00 00 - 0B DA 73 DD 83 FD 12 47 |   h           s   G|
00000050: AF 8B D1 53 C7 10 C6 B9 - 0B DA 73 DD 83 FD 12 47 |   S           s   G|
00000060: AF 8B D1 53 C7 10 C6 B9 - 44 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 |   S       D       |
00000070: D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 - 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB |           z   O   |
00000080: 01 00 00 00 9E 5F CA 42 - 0B F4 29 41 BC 43 84 E5 |   _   B   )A C   |
00000090: 8D 82 4F 66 00 00 00 20 - 00 00 00 00 10 66 00 00 |   Of           f   |
000000a0: 00 01 00 00 20 00 00 00 - AD DE C4 5D BA C7 32 92 |           ]   2   |
000000b0: 58 E6 5D D4 6D 2C 27 63 - A6 C8 36 F3 7A 67 30 64 |X ] m, 'c   6 zg0d|
000000c0: 69 78 2C 5B 1A 30 1E A5 - 00 00 00 00 0E 80 00 00 |ix, [ 0         |
000000d0: 00 02 00 00 20 00 00 00 - 5C 2E CF E4 E3 C4 74 76 |           \.       tv|
000000e0: 35 94 35 02 0B 53 37 C3 - 88 AC 3C 51 10 E7 A4 4B |5 5   S7   <Q   K|
000000f0: 05 03 67 B8 B9 5D 74 87 - 70 00 00 00 1D 86 E6 36 |   g   ]t p       6|
00000100: B0 A5 45 B2 24 32 15 D5 - EC BF D8 42 E7 C6 DC B3 |   E $2       B   |
00000110: C4 78 A4 9E 69 26 24 FC - E5 40 E5 BB E7 74 24 F8 |   x   i&$   @   t$ |
00000120: E9 8E 50 44 5C 65 45 39 - 8A 55 B2 10 93 AD 12 8A |   PD\ eE9 U     |
00000130: EC E9 CE D7 19 02 3E 94 - C4 F0 96 5C 71 2A 77 84 |           >       \q*w |
00000140: 37 CF 1C 41 10 50 E5 48 - BE C9 B7 AF BE C7 BA F3 |7   A P H       |
00000150: 79 D5 C2 E7 49 96 0B 09 - 1F 39 A0 5C 5E D7 B2 7D |y   I       9 \^   }|
00000160: C8 5D CA 08 A8 07 45 DD - 59 FA 11 6D 40 00 00 00 |   ]       E Y   m@   |
00000170: 06 3C BF DE 52 E7 41 76 - E1 DB C9 ED BC 58 D1 1C |   <   R Av       X   |
00000180: 5F 7D 85 00 5F A8 48 F2 - 45 93 73 CF 03 78 46 50 |_}   _   H E s   xFP|
00000190: 30 E5 D8 2E D9 1E D5 25 - 7C 72 3B 10 39 EA 03 EA |0   .   %|r; 9     |
000001a0: 88 00 40 49 C9 1D EB 19 - EC 6B 7F 7F 35 D1 99 A5 |   @I       k   5   |
000001b0: 00 00 00 00                |   |
```

policy.vpol


vault guid

```
00000000: 01 00 00 00 42 C4 F4 4B - 8A 9B A0 41 B3 80 DD 4A | B K A J |
00000010: 70 4D DB 28 20 00 00 00 - 57 00 65 00 62 00 20 00 | pM ( W e b |
00000020: 43 00 72 00 65 00 64 00 - 65 00 6E 00 74 00 69 00 | C r e d e n t i |
00000030: 61 00 6C 00 73 00 00 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | a l s |
00000040: 01 00 00 00 68 01 00 00 - 0B DA 73 DD 83 FD 12 47 | h s G |
00000050: AF 8B D1 53 C7 10 C6 B9 - 0B DA 73 DD 83 FD 12 47 | S s G |
00000060: AF 8B D1 53 C7 10 C6 B9 - 44 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 | S D |
00000070: D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 - 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB | z O |
00000080: 01 00 00 00 9E 5F CA 42 - 0B F4 29 41 BC 43 84 E5 | _ B ) A C |
00000090: 8D 82 4F 66 00 00 00 20 - 00 00 00 00 10 66 00 00 | Of f |
000000a0: 00 01 00 00 20 00 00 00 - AD DE C4 5D BA C7 32 92 | ] 2 |
000000b0: 58 E6 5D D4 6D 2C 27 63 - A6 C8 36 F3 7A 67 30 64 | X ] m, 'c 6 zg0d |
000000c0: 69 78 2C 5B 1A 30 1E A5 - 00 00 00 00 0E 80 00 00 | ix, [ 0 |
000000d0: 00 02 00 00 20 00 00 00 - 5C 2E CF E4 E3 C4 74 76 | \. tv |
000000e0: 35 94 35 02 0B 53 37 C3 - 88 AC 3C 51 10 E7 A4 4B | 5 5 S7 <Q K |
000000f0: 05 03 67 B8 B9 5D 74 87 - 70 00 00 00 1D 86 E6 36 | g ] t p 6 |
00000100: B0 A5 45 B2 24 32 15 D5 - EC BF D8 42 E7 C6 DC B3 | E $2 B |
00000110: C4 78 A4 9E 69 26 24 FC - E5 40 E5 BB E7 74 24 F8 | x i&$ @ t$ |
00000120: E9 8E 50 44 5C 65 45 39 - 8A 55 B2 10 93 AD 12 8A | PD\ eE9 U |
00000130: EC E9 CE D7 19 02 3E 94 - C4 F0 96 5C 71 2A 77 84 | > \q*w |
00000140: 37 CF 1C 41 10 50 E5 48 - BE C9 B7 AF BE C7 BA F3 | 7 A P H |
00000150: 79 D5 C2 E7 49 96 0B 09 - 1F 39 A0 5C 5E D7 B2 7D | y I 9 \^ } |
00000160: C8 5D CA 08 A8 07 45 DD - 59 FA 11 6D 40 00 00 00 | ] E Y m@ |
00000170: 06 3C BF DE 52 E7 41 76 - E1 DB C9 ED BC 58 D1 1C | < R Av X |
00000180: 5F 7D 85 00 5F A8 48 F2 - 45 93 73 CF 03 78 46 50 | _ } _ H E s xFP |
00000190: 30 E5 D8 2E D9 1E D5 25 - 7C 72 3B 10 39 EA 03 EA | 0 . %| r; 9 |
000001a0: 88 00 40 49 C9 1D EB 19 - EC 6B 7F 7F 35 D1 99 A5 | @I k 5 |
000001b0: 00 00 00 00 | |
```

description

dpapi blob

policy.vpol decrypted



vcrd files

last update

«description»

```
00000000: 99 54 CD 3C A8 87 10 4B - A2 15 60 88 88 DD 3B 55 | T < K > 7U |
00000010: 04 00 00 00 2E 38 E5 FA - 4C 4D D0 01 FF FF FF FF | .8 LM |
00000020: 00 02 00 00 24 00 00 00 - 49 00 6E 00 74 00 65 00 | $ I n t e |
00000030: 72 00 6E 00 65 00 74 00 - 20 00 45 00 78 00 70 00 | r n e t E x p |
00000040: 6C 00 6F 00 72 00 65 00 - 72 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 | r o r e r 0 |
00000050: 01 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 - 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 | |
00000060: B5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - 03 00 00 00 EA 00 00 00 | |
00000070: 00 00 00 00 64 00 00 00 - 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 | d |
00000080: 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 - 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 | |
00000090: 21 00 00 00 00 52 ED E9 - 05 24 4A 05 DA 6F C4 C4 | ! R $J o |
000000a0: DF 9A 81 EA 77 8E D6 35 - C2 FB 7F BD A3 AC C2 CD | w 5 |
000000b0: F6 43 94 D6 97 02 00 00 - 00 02 00 00 00 07 00 00 | C |
000000c0: 00 0A 00 00 00 21 00 00 - 00 00 03 CB 01 FD 50 02 | ! P |
000000d0: AB 04 3F A4 07 64 6E DA - BC A4 E6 C5 C8 F9 DC AF | ? dn |
000000e0: 1E D7 1B AB 41 4D 70 F8 - 10 39 03 00 00 00 00 00 | AMp 9 |
000000f0: 00 00 07 00 00 00 0A 00 - 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 | |
00000100: 64 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - 08 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 | d |
00000110: 00 00 00 00 D5 00 00 00 - 01 10 00 00 00 3A 6F 91 | :o |
00000120: 84 F4 4D E2 24 00 F3 66 - E8 62 1D 57 60 B6 C1 13 | M $ f b W` |
00000130: A6 F6 C3 11 E4 48 45 21 - 91 CA 05 0F 06 97 0C 81 | HE! |
00000140: 82 23 38 2C [.....] | ..... |
000001fd;
```

schema (vsch) guid

attribute array length

attribute array
dword:id
dword:pointer
dword:unknown

vcrd files attributes' data

[...]

00000080: 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 - 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 |

00000090: 21 00 00 00 00 52 ED E9 - 05 24 4A 05 DA 6F C4 C4 | ! R \$J o |

000000a0: DF 9A 81 EA 77 8E D6 35 - C2 FB 7F BD A3 AC C2 CD | w 5 |

000000b0: F6 43 94 D6 97 02 00 00 - 00 02 00 00 00 07 00 00 | C |

000000c0: 00 0A 00 00 00 21 00 00 - 00 00 03 CB 01 FD 50 02 | ! P |

000000d0: AB 04 3F A4 07 64 6E DA - BC A4 E6 C5 C8 F9 DC AF | ? dn |

000000e0: 1E D7 1B AB 41 4D 70 F8 - 10 39 03 00 00 00 00 00 | AMp 9 |

000000f0: 00 00 07 00 00 00 0A 00 - 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 |

00000100: 64 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - 08 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 | d |

00000110: 00 00 00 00 D5 00 00 00 - 01 10 00 00 00 3A 6F 91 | :o |

00000120: 84 F4 4D E2 24 00 F3 66 - E8 62 1D 57 60 B6 C1 13 | M \$ f b W` |

00000130: A6 F6 C3 11 E4 48 45 21 - 91 CA 05 0F 06 97 0C 81 | HE! |

00000140: 82 23 38 2C 6A A3 52 D3 - 43 B9 74 04 C8 4E DB C0 | #8,j R C t N |

00000150: DB 8A CF 32 43 52 58 2E - 0F F3 32 40 98 F4 4C 97 | 2CRX. 2@ L |

00000160: D4 DA D8 FF 8C BB AE A7 - 5A F8 0A 24 52 C5 54 B9 | Z \$R T |

00000170: 1F 98 EE 97 7D A4 FC 8E - 1A E2 09 FA BE BA 2A D4 | } * |

00000180: 61 F1 12 39 00 E2 32 5F - EE 21 51 78 D0 0C 6F 06 | a 9 2_ !Qx o |

00000190: 92 1D 3F 20 05 5E 57 B2 - E7 BB FA 6D EC 41 C3 7B | ? ^W m A { |

000001a0: 92 CC 41 6E 16 B1 52 F4 - 01 8F 8F 4B EF 82 BA AA | An R K |

000001b0: ED EC FF FE 4A 46 0F F1 - C1 16 A1 AC 29 68 45 AD | JF)hE |

000001c0: 7D 9A 41 66 C0 B9 9E BE - 0F BA 16 09 51 19 6F E8 | } Af Q o |

000001d0: EC E2 3E 43 28 5E 5B AB - FB F8 69 B4 FD A2 18 5B | >C(^[i [|

000001e0: F5 26 D2 01 21 A5 12 E8 - D2 25 D1 AA 19 01 00 00 | & ! % |

000001f0: 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 - 00 00 00 00 00 |

000001fd;

decrypt with AES128 key

IV length + IV

decrypt with AES256 key using the provided IV

vsch file

schema (vsch) guid

schema name

```
00000000: 01 00 00 00 99 54 CD 3C - A8 87 10 4B A2 15 60 88 | T < K `
00000010: 88 DD 3B 55 00 00 00 00 - 0A 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 | ;U @
00000020: 57 00 69 00 6E 00 64 00 - 6F 00 77 00 73 00 20 00 | W i n d o w s
00000030: 57 00 65 00 62 00 20 00 - 50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00 | W e b P a s s
00000040: 77 00 6F 00 72 00 64 00 - 20 00 43 00 72 00 65 00 | w o r d C r e
00000050: 64 00 65 00 6E 00 74 00 - 69 00 61 00 6C 00 00 00 | d e n t i a l
00000060: 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 - 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00000070: 02 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 - 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00000080: 03 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 - 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
00000090: 07 00 64 00 00 00 08 00 - 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 | d
000000a0: 00 00 65 00 00 00 08 00 - 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 | e
000000b0: 00 00 66 00 00 00 08 00 - 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 | f
000000c0: 00 00 67 00 00 00 08 00 - 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 | g
000000d0: 00 00 68 00 00 00 08 00 - 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 | h
000000e0: 00 00 69 00 00 00 08 00 - 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 | i
000000f0: 00 00 6A 00 00 00 08 00 - 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 | j
00000100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 -
```

vaultcmd /listschema

Global Schemas

Credential schema: Windows Secure Note
Schema guid: 2F1A6504-0641-44CF-8BB5-3612D865F2E5

Credential schema: **Windows Web Password Credential**
Schema guid: **3CCD5499-87A8-4B10-A215-608888DD3B55**

Credential schema: Windows Credential Picker Protector
Schema guid: 154E23D0-C644-4E6F-8CE6-5069272F999F

Currently loaded credentials schemas:

Vault: **Web Credentials**
Vault Guid: **4BF4C442-9B8A-41A0-B380-DD4A704DDB28**

Credential schema: **Windows Web Password Credential**
Schema guid: **3CCD5499-87A8-4B10-A215-608888DD3B55**

Vault: Windows Credentials
Vault Guid: 77BC582B-F0A6-4E15-4E80-61736B6F3B29

Credential schema:
Windows Domain Certificate Credential
Schema guid: E69D7838-91B5-4FC9-89D5-230D4D4CC2BC

Credential schema: Windows Domain Password Credential
Schema guid: 3E0E35BE-1B77-43E7-B873-AED901B6275B

Credential schema: Windows Extended Credential
Schema guid: 3C886FF3-2669-4AA2-A8FB-3F6759A77548

internals conclusions

- **credentials** file are simple dpapi blobs
 - they can be nested...
- **vaults** files (aka **vcrd** ones)
 - decrypt **policy.vpol** to obtain AES keys
 - policy.vpol are dpapi blobs
 - decrypt **attributes** inside **vcrd** files
 - using the proper AES key
 - print out using **vsch** schema files
 - ...






arsenal

open source power

dpapi and vaults



dpapick

- simply the open source tool for DPAPI decryption
 - Python, can be installed by *pip*
- written by **Jean-Michel Picod**
 - *Reversing DPAPI and Stealing Windows Secrets Offline*
by Jean-Michel Picod and Elie Bursztein, BlackHat 2010
 - last year Jean-Michel integrated my patches for **Windows7 – 8.1** support
 - **Windows 10** is supported too
 - **live ID** will be added soon...

<https://bitbucket.org/jmichel/dpapick>



dpapilab

- my own *dpapi-oriented* **lab**
- you can find there
 - **Credentials** decryption with **creddec.py**
 - **Vaults** decryption with **vaultdec.py**
 - some un-ordered dpapi utilities
- Python source code
 - dpapick as “kernel”
 - Python **construct** to describe and declare structure used

<https://github.com/dfirfpi/dpapilab>



we need a password...

- not an easy task
- user's password is the key
- dictionary and rainbow tables attacks on ntlm
- hybrid attack
- anyway, there is something to do before...



the password

the stronghold

the trivial leak

- well-known since years
 - almost 7 years...
- The LSA Secret **DefaultPassword** **OldVal** keeps the Windows installation password
 - *“uh ok, I must insert my new Windows password, let me choose the best unbreakable one...”*

the trivial leak exposed

```
dpapilab> lsasecrets.py --security=SECURITY --system=SYSTEM --hex
```

```
NL$KM          CurrVal    1f8fe9331af... [...]
```

```
...
```

```
DPAPI_SYSTEM CurrVal    01000000ebf6828452f6ca25ba362fcd6c763688707087cd1c14651723bfeb3a0e96  
2531368adf9544ded978
```

```
...
```

```
DefaultPassword CurrVal
```

```
DefaultPassword CupdTime 2012-09-11 09:49:36
```

```
DefaultPassword OldVal    74006800690073004F006E0065004900730054006F006F0047006F006F0064003400  
750042007500740044006F006E0027007400430068006500610074002100
```

```
DefaultPassword OupdTime 2012-09-11 09:41:00
```

the trivial leak exposed

```
dpapilab> lsasecrets.py --security=SECURITY --system=SYSTEM  
--secret=DefaultPassword
```

t h i s O n e I s T o o G o o d 4 u B u t D o n ' t C h e a t !



2013-07-11

Xavier de Carné de Carnavalet.

VENDOR CONTACT TIMELINE

2013-05-20: Bug found

2013-06-14: Contacted Microsoft Security Response Center

2013-06-14: Reply from Microsoft SRC: "*the behavior you are reporting is not something that we consider a security vulnerability*"

https://madiba.encs.concordia.ca/~x_decarn/docs/bug_report_password_caching.pdf

lovely logon picture (or pin)



- Windows introduced the possibility to login with
 - a pincode
 - a picture shape
- Windows 8-8.1 has a major issue
 - the mandatory “real” password is kept in a **system vault**
 - `%WINDIR%\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\4BF4C442-9B8A-41A0-B380-DD4A704DDB28`
- Credits to Passcape for having discovered it
 - <http://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=blog&cmd=details&id=27>

logon picture/pin exposed

dpapilab> vaultdec.py

--security=X:\Windows\System32\config**SECURITY**

--system=X:\Windows\System32\config**SYSTEM**

System DPAPI key

--masterkey=X:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-18\User

System mkeys

X:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft
Vault\4BF4C442-9B8A-41A0-B380-DD4A704DDB28

System Vault

logon picture/pin exposed



```
dpapilab> vaultdec.py [...]
```

```
-----  
Working on: 025AA2D2228C0DA34CAE4A82455024C169D7FF0C.vcrd
```

```
Attribute: 1 (vault_schema_simple) [...]
```

```
Attribute: 2 (vault_schema_simple) [...]
```

```
Attribute: 3 (vault_schema_simple) [...]
```

```
Attribute: 64 (vault_schema_pin)
```

```
sid: S-1-5-21-2128076315-4144300488-3078399761-1001
```

```
resource: PIN Logon Vault Resource
```

```
password: fuffa
```

```
pin: 1357
```

```
Attribute: dead0001 (vault_schema_simple) [...]
```

mimikatz



The most complete solution for memory dumps



mimikatz
plugin

- wdigest
- Windows Vista, Windows [x86 – x64]



mimikatz
plugin

- wdigest, livessp
- primary credentials, dpapi
- Windows XP up to Windows 8.1 [x86 – x64]

Benjamin Delpy aka **gentil_kiwi** first discovered the presence of users' **passwords** in the **lsass** process.

his open source tool has **tons** of features every *infosec* guy should know.

mimikatz can decrypt **Credentials** and **Vaults** too, besides showing memory cached values.

<https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz>

mimilib vs Windows 8.1

Windows 8 **live account**

```
Authentication Id : 0 ; 149932 (00000000:000249ac)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : mr
Domain            : WIN-FAOEGS8OE65
SID               : S-1-5-21-2128076315-4144300488-3078399761-100
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : mr. [REDACTED]@gmail.com
* Domain   : MicrosoftAccount
* NTLM     : 07162731aca7[REDACTED]
* SHA1     : 643658b7f815[REDACTED]6a4209a98
tspkg : KO
wdigest :
* Username : mr. [REDACTED]@gmail.com
* Domain   : MicrosoftAccount
* Password : (null)
livessp :
* Username : mr. [REDACTED]@gmail.com
* Domain   : ps:password
* Password : Fuffa123
kerberos :
* Username : mr. [REDACTED]@gmail.com
* Domain   : MicrosoftAccount
* Password : (null)
ssp :
masterkey :
[00000000]
* GUID : {f82650c8-92d5-4d08-8473-90f86895dd4d}
* Time : 03/10/2014 08:30:27
* Key : 034a2654fa14dac6ebfcc5532fb5b2968b1df1d0586694d
credman :
```

Windows 8 **local account**


```
Authentication Id : 0 ; 144828 (00000000:000235bc)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : user
Domain            : WIN-FAOEGS8OE65
SID               : S-1-5-21-2128076315-4144300488-3078399761-1001
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : user
* Domain   : WIN-FAOEGS8OE65
* NTLM     : 3b13f1ba6f8e68ab82c83eb6702e6d40
* SHA1     : 74b87ba1e12734f71fe4737990e2c420bd145bf4
[00010000] CredentialKeys
* NTLM     : 3b13f1ba6f8e68ab82c83eb6702e6d40
* SHA1     : 74b87ba1e12734f71fe4737990e2c420bd145bf4
tspkg : KO
wdigest :
* Username : user
* Domain   : WIN-FAOEGS8OE65
* Password : (null)
livessp : KO
kerberos :
* Username : user
* Domain   : WIN-FAOEGS8OE65
* Password : (null)
ssp :
masterkey :
credman :
```

rekall mimikatz

LUID	Type	Sess	SID	Module	Info	Domain	User	SType	Secret
00000000:00047e22	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	msv	Primary	win7cf	cf	NTLM	3b13f1ba6f8e68ab82c83eb6702e6d40
00000000:00047e22	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	msv	Primary	win7cf	cf	SHA1	74b87ba1e12734f71fe4737990e2c420bd145bf4
00000000:00047e22	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	msv	CredentialKeys			NTLM	3b13f1ba6f8e68ab82c83eb6702e6d40
00000000:00047e22	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	msv	CredentialKeys			SHA1	74b87ba1e12734f71fe4737990e2c420bd145bf4
00000000:00047df2	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	msv	CredentialKeys			NTLM	3b13f1ba6f8e68ab82c83eb6702e6d40
00000000:00047df2	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	msv	CredentialKeys			SHA1	74b87ba1e12734f71fe4737990e2c420bd145bf4
00000000:00047df2	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	msv	Primary	win7cf	cf	NTLM	3b13f1ba6f8e68ab82c83eb6702e6d40
00000000:00047df2	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	msv	Primary	win7cf	cf	SHA1	74b87ba1e12734f71fe4737990e2c420bd145bf4
00000000:00047e22	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	wdigest		win7cf	cf	password	f u f f a
00000000:00047df2	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	wdigest		win7cf	cf	password	f u f f a
00000000:000003e5	Service	0	S-1-5-19	wdigest				password	-
00000000:000003e4	Service	0	S-1-5-20	wdigest		WORKGROUP	WIN7CF\$	password	-
00000000:000003e7	UNKNOWN (0)	0	S-1-5-18	wdigest		WORKGROUP	WIN7CF\$	password	-
WARNING:root:livessp not initialized, skipping it.									
00000000:000003e7	UNKNOWN (0)	0	S-1-5-18	lsasrv				masterkey	eda6f7b253017470d990bf6ae19ae1f41789bd2f4d6bc5c18431cc407a05598df32ce8e0aff9c1ebdaa0903b1b8de558eac67087610533826e5b48e0f250241e3e9d7f32f2e57933ead318d075efc82325697d87d992b626a20abb5f0ffba6f073d282a837b6fa058ecff36039aa944e04h3dfb666ehace44aad6bfff8789ca43
00000000:000003e7	UNKNOWN (0)	0	S-1-5-18	lsasrv				masterkey	3e9d7f32f2e57933ead318d075efc82325697d87d992b626a20abb5f0ffba6f073d282a837b6fa058ecff36039aa944e04h3dfb666ehace44aad6bfff8789ca43
00000000:00047e22	Interactive	1	S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-234451782-0-1000	lsasrv				masterkey	f2f4d48b37042284310abfd62be9ab8897b7426622690e9cf5114ccadd4ff024f7197267ee8b2d60bc68a405e5dce0d24a042f610bcd6903f46d49750644668f



sha1, at least



1click cracking

- If attacking target fails...
- attack anything that can be outright decrypted
 - *1click cracking*
- backups, VMs, system *secrets*, etc
 - whatever can provide a password or a clue
- For example, **WiFi** passwords are SYSTEM DPAPI BLOBs
 - XML files in **\ProgramData\Microsoft\WwanSvc\Profiles**



wifi exposed

```
dpapilab> winwifidec.py --security=SECURITY --system=SYSTEM  
--wdir=[DATA]\ProgramData\MICROSOFT\Wlansvc\Profiles\Interfaces\{C03B6CCB-...20}\
```

```
{3219475E-D1C2-11E3-9C44-00A0C6000001}
```

```
Wifi:WFD_GROUP_OWNER_PROFILE Password: f0rZaGenoa!
```

```
{A028DED4-860D-11E2-9BCF-00A0C6000000}
```

```
Wifi:rnsys Password: OMG-NoSecurity@Work:(
```

```
Wifi:iperboleguest Password: hackinbo01
```

```
Wifi:NETGEAR-NEW Password:Bu3n0sD1asAT0d0s
```

```
Wifi:FPIW Password: ThisIs*Not*MyHomeWifiPassword...
```



```
..._img_>icat -o 4194304 Dump4.bin 10769  
<?xml version="1.0"?>  
<WLANProfile xmlns="http://www.microsoft.com/networking/WLAN/profile/v1">  
  <name>rnsys</name>  
  <SSIDConfig>  
    <SSID>  
      <hex>726E737973</hex>  
      <name>rnsys</name>  
    </SSID>  
    <nonBroadcast>true</nonBroadcast>  
  </SSIDConfig>  
  <connectionType>ESS</connectionType>  
  <connectionMode>manual</connectionMode>  
  <MSM>  
    <security>  
      <authEncryption>  
        <authentication>WPA2PSK</authentication>  
        <encryption>AES</encryption>  
        <useOneX>false</useOneX>  
      </authEncryption>  
      <sharedKey>  
        <keyType>passPhrase</keyType>  
        <protected>true</protected>  
        <keyMaterial>01000000D08C9DDF0115D1118C7A00C04FC297EB01000000F27E01  
C6BBE5A49ACD47F8D3FC433730000000002000000000106600000001000020000000602D260939050D136AF6E4ECE150696  
BCC215240DDDB497581458ED840174BA25000000000E80000000020000200000009421F74CE119752FA9AA000E2A5581747A3  
6AC7A0495BA6D670A57128FFE676920000000A4BC7341ACE198CD6F010B0235B6F31C5C11960AE5AA67FFFEF1E1814AEF4FD  
F400000009AD945C05C0B97F4551777FE68B5D8E40A1D30BDEF7AB4A0FB9E0885B48B3CE63F5728E460F7E37F58A2EEE3C53  
DCCB483BAB644B031B2D0921617C504E532A2</keyMaterial>  
      </sharedKey>  
    </security>  
  </MSM>  
</WLANProfile>
```



credential activity

just a couple of examples

windows credentials

dpapilab> creddec.py



--**sid**=S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-2344517820-1000

--**masterkey**=c:\Users\cf\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-2344517820-1000

--**password**=fuffa

c:\Users\cf\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\2D080F6A5F429AB28A285E65B2CAB26A

c:\Users\cf\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\833C2EF1F037027E409C9B8DBD908DF2

c:\Users\cf\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\A199FA18351CD904F5210DFD7C18CE02

windows credentials exposed

2D080F6A5F429AB28A285E65B2CAB26A


```
last_update = '2015-06-25T17:47:03+00:00'  
domain = u'Domain:target=fuffaserver'  
unk_string1 = u''  
unk_string2 u''  
unk_string3 u''  
username = u'fuffauser'  
password = u'fuffapassword'
```

9CEE7E22AED680E028CB97193B5860E9

```
last_update = '2015-06-25T17:47:59+00:00'  
domain = u'LegacyGeneric:target=doeserver'  
unk_string1 = u''  
unk_string2 u''  
unk_string3 u''  
username = u'doeuser'  
password = u'doepassword'
```

A199FA18351CD904F5210DFD7C18CE02

```
last_update = '2015-06-25T18:23:12+00:00'  
domain = u'Domain:target=credentials.FOO.gov'  
unk_string1 = u''  
unk_string2 u''  
unk_string3 u''  
username = u'WIN7CF\\username'  
password = u'*****'
```



Windows Vault
Default vault location

[Back up vault](#) [Restore vault](#)



Windows Credentials

[Add a Windows credential](#)

fuffaserver

Modified: 25/06/2015

Certificate-Based credentials

[Add a certificate-based credential](#)

No certificates.

Generic Credentials

[Add a generic credential](#)

doeserver

Modified: 25/06/2015

noneserver

Modified: 25/06/2015

double cheeseburger credential



dpapilab> creddec.py

--sid=S-1-5-21-1648103230-915194270-5828639865-1001

--masterkey=c:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-1648103230-915194270-5828639865-1001

--pwdhash=a0273792cb879a4ea0c2fd719dc15fe259a385e3

--sysmkdir=C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-18\User

--security=sysreg\SECURITY

--system=sysreg\SYSTEM

c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B96859CE5D

you too curious... fake data there

double cheeseburger credential exposed



Container:

```
domain = u'WindowsLive:target=virtualapp/didlogical'
unk_string1 = u''
unk_string2 u'PersistedCredential'
unk_string3 u''
username = u'02mrsvuptceu'
password = u''
```

```
('<AuthInfo><UserName>02mrsvuptceu</UserName>
<UserPUID>00275EFE2EC418C0</UserPUID>
...
```

double cheeseburger credential



```
('<AuthInfo>
<UserName>02mrsvuptceu</UserName>
<UserPUID>00275EFE2EC418C0</UserPUID>
<CredProperties>
  <keypurposes><ps:KeyPurposes
xmlns:ps="http://schemas.microsoft.com/Passport/SoapServices/PPCRL"></ps:KeyPurposes></keypurposes>
<ip>94.36.56.146</ip>
  <authmembername>02mrsvuptceu@passport.com</authmembername>
</CredProperties>
<AuthToken>
  <EncryptedData xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" Id="devicesoftware" Type=[...]>
    <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripleDES-cbc"></EncryptionMethod>
    <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
      <ds:KeyName>http://Passport.NET/STS</ds:KeyName></ds:KeyInfo>
      <CipherData><CipherValue>Cm9aG1+DmmquOs8a0GD[...]</CipherValue></CipherData></EncryptedData>
</AuthToken>
<SessionKey>AgAAAJf514Mnb6E7 [...] AAAAAAAAAA==</SessionKey>
<SessionKeyType>3</SessionKeyType>
<CreatedTime>2015-10-01T19:37:56</CreatedTime>
<ExpiredTime>2015-10-15T19:37:55</ExpiredTime>
</AuthInfo>', 0)
```



winphone

decrypting «mobile» vaults

winphone test scenario

- Windows Phone OS is... just **Windows**
- so we can do the same, as decrypting **vaults**
- Test scenario with Windows 8.1
 - phone reset
 - Windows Live account
 - added some **email** account syncs
 - ...
 - **physical acquisition** after every step



In need of kernel debugging

«Kernel-mode debugging is supported only when the target phone is running a non-retail version of Windows. To create and install non-retail images of Windows Phone, you need the Windows Phone Kit, which is available only to registered partners. For information about becoming a partner, see Register to be a Windows Phone OEM.»

many users... many vaults

- *email-related* vaults were created into

WPCOMMSERVICES profile

- one of the «*system-users*»
- for time reasons we'll face only it
- question: **password**?
 - PIN code protection == screensaver

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
ACCESSLIB_SVC	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
CAPTURESVCGRP	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
DefApps	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
Default	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
FEEDBACKSVC	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
IPOVERUSBGROUP	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
NCSDSVC	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
NGPSVC	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
NOKIARCSVC	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
NSGEXTUTI	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
OEMSVCGROUP	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
OEMSVCHOST	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
PSREGSERVICE	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
Public	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.53...
QCSHUTDOWNVC	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
SENSOR_SERVICE	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
System	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
TELREPSVC	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
WLANCOUNTRYSVC	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
WPCOMMSERVICES	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
WPCRITICAL	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
WPNETWORK	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...
WPNETWORKDRM	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
WPNETWORKPII	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.56...
WPNONNETWORK	1	Directory	03/08/2015 10.54...

many users... many passwords

just_a_shell> **pycreddump\pwdump.py** SYSTEM SAM


Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f194e99a9050a026b9445425b4e72c44:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:30f60b1fe0fd69e1eb179d480d54f0d9:::
DefApps:2781:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a33a6392a476adfe34294b2029f14708:::
WPNONETWORK:2782:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:67c041a3ddcc8eeaca176b32a068d97e:::
WPNETWORK:2783:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:83106e7f2e2921e35197328d8e11eea8:::
WPNETWORKDRM:2784:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9fae0b63cd1ba7a85ab0365df786f49a:::
IPOVERUSBGROUP:2786:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e0b0fac51f921e5127e12776bee0197e:::
WPCOMMSERVICES:2788:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:**daa06a338359eed6fc28ddb773369e9f**:::
WPNETWORKPII:2790:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:68981b3c606c20b092366c2c34a8685d:::
CAPTURESVCGRP:2791:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ee0cab2b8d7316cc1d109bcc6511533c:::
WPCRITICAL:2792:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5fce1c3e7e5b1803a424b514521e1ccb:::

OEMSVCHOST:2793:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e6d325755d21dcaab124a9bd4957676e:::
TELREPSVC:2794:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:dcbcde33eda70369566bf2b021497631:::
OEMSVCGROUP:2795:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7550da005cceb21c5ba5c8ecad2ed377:::
NCSDSVC:2796:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:58686d487dd2ca7503cfe6fd17233d88:::
WLANCOUNTRYSVC:2797:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7c72dd4bf4f75fb9570c2058e97f3b4b:::
NGPSVC:2798:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1b739d6d3f099293b434c52e193d86b5:::
ACCESSLIB_SVC:2799:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:23145899db9c5a665fc00f3c3cdf636f:::
PSREGSERVICE:2800:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8f88aebc4bfd2b6a59ed7406dd41094a:::
NOKIARCSERVICE:2801:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:076d30c9b00c86ab93e761b0d96070ff:::
SENSOR_SERVICE:2802:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c182e91ca1361bd390630676ff25e02a:::
QCSHUTDOWNVC:2804:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:35007aa28a7b5a86ff38aa485491a272:::
NSGEXTUTI:2805:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:deb3282673fbb24ec84fbee636a52450:::
FEEDBACKSVC:2806:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:27da8da6e58d6fde3de258182f96f2d8:::

cracking?

follow the white rabbit

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security\UserAccount\BootstrapData\



The screenshot shows the Windows Registry Editor with the left pane displaying the tree structure. The right pane shows a list of registry values under the path SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security\UserAccount\BootstrapData\.

Value	Type	Data
DefApps	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
WPNONETWORK	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
WPNETWORK	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
WPNETWORKDRM	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
IPOVERUSBGROUP	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
WPCOMMSERVICES	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
WPNETWORKPII	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
CAPTURESVCGRP	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
WPCRITICAL	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
OEMSVCHOST	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
TELREPSVC	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
OEMSVCGROUP	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
NCSDSVC	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
WLANCOUNTRYSVC	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
NGPSVC	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
ACCESSLIB_SVC	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
PSREGSERVICE	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
NOKIARCESVC	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
SENSOR_SERVICE	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
QCSHUTDOWNVC	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 07 10 73 6E 3C DC B...
NSGEXTUTI	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 AA D5 29 E9 4B 5F B...
FEEDBACKSVC	REG_BINARY	01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 AA D5 29 E9 4B 5F B...

DefApps... blob

```
00000000: 01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF - 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 + - - - - - z - |
00000010: 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 - 07 10 73 6E 3C DC BE 45 | O          sn<  E|
00000020: B3 41 88 ED EF A5 EE 16 - 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 | A          |
00000030: 00 00 10 66 00 00 00 01 - 00 00 20 00 00 00 64 AD | f          d |
00000040: 7E FA F8 21 12 90 20 F7 - A2 BA A1 65 D7 12 F3 22 | ~ !          e  "|
00000050: 0F EA 15 54 A7 12 00 9E - D2 4D 0C CB D4 2A 00 00 | T          M  *  |
00000060: 00 00 0E 80 00 00 00 02 - 00 00 20 00 00 00 B2 A7 |          |
00000070: BE 9A 00 88 47 68 92 98 - 9C D2 45 B2 B3 90 A4 EA | Gh          E   |
00000080: 6F 71 63 1E 2E FD 18 18 - 9F 82 53 3C 0B B7 10 02 | oqc .          S< |
00000090: 00 00 F6 89 1B DB 4C 9B - EF 96 87 97 57 8F 76 4A | L          W vJ|
000000a0: FD E5 A0 85 E2 D7 1F 57 - 25 A3 CF 0A 40 3C 3C 03 | W%          @<< |
000000b0: 4A 04 DC C7 2D F4 7B E8 - 9B A8 76 BE 76 28 E8 A2 | J - {          v v( |
000000c0: 86 45 7A 99 B2 6B DC 5C - 8A 77 B8 C4 05 5C 5D 43 | Ez k \ w      \]C|
000000d0: 94 65 AD 45 5D 8B D5 78 - CE 20 E9 62 0B 7E BF 83 | e E] x      b ~ |
000000e0: BB E2 FD FD 05 97 94 5B - 0B 32 59 30 93 DF 4B 8A | [ 2Y0 K |
000000f0: ED 04 6E EC 5F 3A 61 E6 - 21 05 B6 8D EB E7 8A 88 | n _:a !      |
00000100: F4 9A BC 3A CF 41 1A A1 - 7A A1 E3 F6 4D 4A 60 0F | : A z      MJ` |
00000110: 03 EC 99 87 F8 43 50 F5 - 1B DA DD 09 B0 61 6C 84 | CP          al |
00000120: CF 85 FF E8 B0 1B BB 30 - 23 A5 2F 09 3F D7 FE F4 | 0# / ?      |
00000130: 47 3A 98 04 15 6E 1D ED - 0C 41 35 49 F2 62 33 9D | G: n      A5I b3 |
00000140: 98 D1 54 84 A8 DF BA 70 - 4C E0 8B 68 E9 75 7D 42 | T          pL h u}B|
00000150: 63 D4 32 C9 E3 E2 F5 DA - BE DC 34 DB 07 6B D1 69 | c 2          4 k i|
00000160: 33 D6 00 70 0B 05 C7 4C - C1 57 67 77 BD B9 19 ED | 3 p      L Wgw |
00000170: 60 32 BB 2B 77 6A 8A 84 - BC E7 06 66 D7 6D 98 3B | `2 +wj      f m ;|
00000180: 5D CC 0A FA F2 32 26 17 - 87 5A 37 8C 8C 73 EB 77 | ]          2& z7 s w|
00000190: 7D 84 E2 53 A7 BD 6F FD - FC 4D 24 A5 E0 3F 79 3A | } S o M$ ?y: |
000001a0: 20 B6 F9 70 90 B0 BF 8C - 02 6C CF 49 5D 41 7F D0 | p          l I]A |
```

mkey guid

provider guid

trying to decrypt user's blob...

dpapilab> blobdec.py


--security=SECURITY --system=SYSTEM --masterkey=sysmk

bootstrap_DefApps.blob



FAIL!

entropy?



.data:1001C054 unk_1001C054 DCB 0x62 ; b
.data:1001C054 DCB 0x6B ; k
.data:1001C055 DCB 0xED ; Ÿ
.data:1001C056 DCB 0xCB ; -
.data:1001C057 DCB 0xCA ; -
.data:1001C058 DCB 2 ;
.data:1001C059 DCB 0x5E ; ^
.data:1001C05A DCB 0x41 ; A
.data:1001C05B DCB 0x84 ; ä
.data:1001C05C DCB 0x7E ; ~
.data:1001C05D DCB 0x33 ; 3
.data:1001C05E DCB 0x93 ; ô
.data:1001C05F DCB 0x36 ; ô
.data:1001C060 DCB 0x9C ; É
.data:1001C061 DCB 0x2E ; .
.data:1001C062 DCB 0x5E ; ^
.data:1001C063

decrypting user's blob

dpapilab> blobdec.py

--security=SECURITY --system=SYSTEM --masterkey=sysmk

--entropy_hex=**626BEDCBCA025E41847E3393369C2E5E**

bootstrap_DefApps.blob

DefApps password

E6056E45B3425B7BAB7E328971D8570DC0215D6821657AE0C3F6DD6F8059E3C283838A5CFAA30A2F7547EE12F766ADDFE
3F03D22FAE3DCDA36BA37ECED8807B7C5015E02FB4EF6160754C5ADEB1D1B4E292FED8419D986C3EE8A08901C85A34ABB
35F40A770CB31493383602C898B9352884195021BBDFD026F452CBA22B2E6F



going for vaults

dpapilab> vaultdec.py

--sid=S-1-5-21-2702878673-795188819-444038987-2788

--masterkey=\Users\WPCOMMSSERVICES\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-2421538757-1605280464-2344517820-1000

--password=E91889F98E8A68703ABFC68464B16A1373BB6501192F9D68A5C87C41CF43561852502650735EF84ED27AF308AAD9E08C031B5FC21C3DDC9C978222D83FC3308498C2AE0528A38EB086841E2743DE1BCEC18FCEDB0775DEA869BF98DEFCE6B5B58A58B58275F42BDA15049DCD9AA3953782E4CD4109CB22795311ADBF8E2ABAD1

\Users\WPCOMMSSERVICES\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\4BF4C442-9B8A-41A0-B380-DD4A704DDB28



mail vaults exposed (1)

Working on: 2DAF2FE224AF306A198BA169B1534ADCC618B47B.vcrd

Attribute: 1 [...]


Attribute: 2 [...]

Attribute: 3 (**vault_schema_activesync**)

identity: ActiveSyncCredentialDefaultUser

resource: SyncPassword{**E00DD091-C2C9-4F43-8228-DE965928A329**}MailIncoming

authenticator: *WhatCouldPossiblyGoWrong?*



mail vaults exposed (2)
































resource: SyncPassword

{E00DD091-C2C9-4F43-8228-E965928A329}

MailIncoming

SOFTWARE HIVE

Microsoft\ActiveSync\Partners

Value ▲	Type	Data
 AccountAutoConfig	REG_DWORD	0x00000001
 AccountCreateTime	REG_BINARY	AB B8 06 EE E8 CD D0 01
 AccountSettingsChanged	REG_DWORD	0x00000001
 AccountType	REG_SZ	Email
 AccountVersion	REG_DWORD	0x00000012
 AttemptedSyncCount	REG_DWORD	0x00000002
 AttentionRequiredToastSent	REG_DWORD	0x00000000
 Email	REG_SZ	[REDACTED]@icloud.com
 Engine	REG_SZ	{D277DF13-EB33-47E1-A3B9-0AC04B1F24F4}
 Icon	REG_SZ	res://UIXMobileAssets(ScreenResolution)!%s.genericmail.png
 InServerSettingsVerified	REG_DWORD	0x00000001
 InteractiveSyncCount	REG_DWORD	0x00000002
 IsPushmapSupported	REG_DWORD	0x00000000
 IsSMTPError	REG_DWORD	0x00000001
 LastInboundSyncAttempt	REG_BINARY	00 88 DD 06 E9 CD D0 01
 LastInboundSyncResult	REG_DWORD	0x00000000
 LastInboundSyncSuccess	REG_BINARY	00 88 DD 06 E9 CD D0 01
 LastSMTPSyncAttempt	REG_BINARY	80 E3 1D FF E8 CD D0 01
 LastSMTPSyncResult	REG_DWORD	0x00000000
 LastSMTPSyncSuccess	REG_BINARY	80 E3 1D FF E8 CD D0 01
 LastSyncAttempt	REG_BINARY	00 88 DD 06 E9 CD D0 01
 LastSyncResult	REG_DWORD	0x00000000
 LastSyncSuccess	REG_BINARY	00 88 DD 06 E9 CD D0 01
 Name	REG_SZ	Icloud
 OtherMailSyncPeriod	REG_DWORD	0x0000001E
 ScheduledSyncPeriod	REG_DWORD	0x80000078
 Server	REG_SZ	imap.mail.me.com:993:1
 StoreId	REG_DWORD	0x0000000A
 StoreType	REG_DWORD	0x00000006
 SuccessfulSyncCount	REG_DWORD	0x00000002
 UserInputServerSettings	REG_DWORD	0x00000000

mail vaults exposed (3)

Working on: DB580D5ADA46907C4D7218A754491C55CF9C3342.vcrd

Attribute: 3 (vault_schema_activesync)

identity: ActiveSyncCredentialDefaultUser

resource: **OAuthRefreshToken**{801BB721-87B6-4EB9-9EE2-9CF88173D459}OAuth

authenticator: 1/UyGV1eG2Q7FfabcdEF6nb3dFgr354htJ6K-mgaj2gw

Working on: FE912C0BD34AD8BC6C00C8E879B2490495AF937E.vcrd

Attribute: 3 (vault_schema_activesync)

identity: ActiveSyncCredentialDefaultUser

resource: **SyncPassword**{801BB721-87B6-4EB9-9EE2-9CF88173D459}MailIncoming

authenticator: ya29.xBFGoPazVskbtY_HqmExc3PXmVbYhXrYLd3ldzfryQcP65p4CerTGTEVLe_BjqnGHe_



Value	Type	Data
AccountAutoConfig	REG_DWORD	0x00000001
AccountCreateTime	REG_BINARY	0D CC 16 22 E8 CD D0 01
AccountSettingsChanged	REG_DWORD	0x00000001
AccountType	REG_SZ	Gmail
AccountVersion	REG_DWORD	0x00000012
AttemptedSyncCount	REG_DWORD	0x00000004
AttentionRequiredToastSent	REG_DWORD	0x00000000
AuthenticationType	REG_DWORD	0x00000001
Email	REG_SZ	████████@gmail.com



ReVaulted

suddenly... conclusions!

Thank you!