

ARAIZ NAQVI

SQL REPORTS

Valan MicroChips INC.

16TH OCTOBER, 2024

2024-2025

TABLE OF CONTENT

- Disclaimer
- Incident Summary
- Table formats
- After hours failed login attempts
- Login attempts on specific dates
- Attempts outside of Mexico
- Employees in Marketing
- Employees in Finance or Sales
- Employees not in IT
- Summary

DISCLAIMER

This SQL report is a project-based simulation for the fictional organization *Valan MicroChips INC.*, as part of the "Fundamentals of Cybersecurity" course on Google's Coursera platform.

While the details may resemble real-world scenarios, all data, systems, and findings are entirely fictitious and created for educational purposes. This incident report does not reflect any actual incidents or vulnerabilities affecting any real organization, including *Valan MicroChips INC.* .

Though based on practical analysis and protocols, the assessments are conducted in a simulated environment and should not be considered representative of any real entity's security posture.

INCIDENT SUMMARY

Time of Incident: 2024-10-16 14:18:32.192571
(16th October, 2024 2:18:32.192571pm)

Summary of Incident: Recently discovery of some potential security issues that involved login attempts and employee machines. Examined the organization's data in their employees and log_in_attempts tables using SQL filters to retrieve records from different datasets and investigate the potential security issues.

Location of Incident: Valan MicroChips INC. Database

Reported By: Araiz Naqvi

Reported On: 2024-10-16 14:25:29.576597
(16th October, 2024 2:25:29.576597pm)

TABLE FORMATS

This document describes how the tables used for this portfolio activity are organized. The organization database contains the following two tables:

- 1.log_in_attempts
- 2.employees

log_in_attempts

The log_in_attempts table has the following columns:

- **event_id**: The identification number assigned to each login event
- **username**: The username of the employee
- **login_date**: The date the login attempt was recorded
- **login_time**: The time the login attempt was recorded
- **country**: The country where the login attempt occurred
- **ip_address**: The IP address of that employee's machine
- **success**: The success of the login attempt (TRUE/FALSE)

event_id	username	login_date	login_time	country	ip_address	success
----------	----------	------------	------------	---------	------------	---------

(PTO)

employees

The employees table has the following columns:

- **employee_id**: The identification number assigned to each employee
- **device_id**: The identification number assigned to each device used by the employee
- **username**: The username of the employee
- **department**: The department the employee is in
- **office**: The office the employee is located in

employee_id	device_id	username	department	office
-------------	-----------	----------	------------	--------

AFTER HOURS FAILED LOGIN ATTEMPTS

I investigated failed login attempts that were made after business hours. To retrieve this information from the login activity I identified all unsuccessful attempts after 18:00.

The '**login_time**' column in the '**log_in_attempts**' table contains information on when login attempts were made. Office hours end at '**18:00**'.

The '**success**' column in the '**log_in_attempts**' table contains values of '**TRUE**' or '**FALSE**' to indicate whether the login was successful. MySQL stores Boolean values as '**1**' for '**TRUE**', and '**0**' for '**FALSE**'. This means that '**TRUE**' is represented as '**1**', and '**FALSE**' represented as '**0**' in the '**success**' column.

(PTO)

ARAIZ NAQVI

Using the `AND` operator I retrieved the failed login attempts that occurred after business hours.

```
MariaDB [organization]> SELECT *  
-> FROM log_in_attempts  
-> WHERE login_time > '18:00' AND success = 0;
```

event_id	username	login_date	login_time	country	ip_address	success
2	apatel	2022-05-10	20:27:27	CAN	192.168.205.12	0
18	pwashing	2022-05-11	19:28:50	US	192.168.66.142	0
20	tshah	2022-05-12	18:56:36	MEXICO	192.168.109.50	0
28	astrada	2022-05-09	19:28:12	MEXICO	192.168.27.57	0
34	drosas	2022-05-11	21:02:04	US	192.168.45.93	0
42	cgriffin	2022-05-09	23:04:05	US	192.168.4.157	0
52	cjackson	2022-05-10	22:07:07	CAN	192.168.58.57	0
69	wjaffrey	2022-05-11	19:55:15	USA	192.168.100.17	0
82	abernard	2022-05-12	23:38:46	MEX	192.168.234.49	0
87	apatel	2022-05-08	22:38:31	CANADA	192.168.132.153	0
96	ivelasco	2022-05-09	22:36:36	CAN	192.168.84.194	0
104	asundara	2022-05-11	18:38:07	US	192.168.96.200	0
107	bisles	2022-05-12	20:25:57	USA	192.168.116.187	0
111	astrada	2022-05-10	22:00:26	MEXICO	192.168.76.27	0
127	abellmas	2022-05-09	21:20:51	CANADA	192.168.70.122	0
131	bisles	2022-05-09	20:03:55	US	192.168.113.171	0
155	cgriffin	2022-05-12	22:18:42	USA	192.168.236.176	0
160	jclark	2022-05-10	20:49:00	CANADA	192.168.214.49	0
199	yappiah	2022-05-11	19:34:48	MEXICO	192.168.44.232	0

19 rows in set (0.002 sec)

Multiple failed login attempts were detected after work hours, which could indicate potential malicious activity, such as data breaches or ransomware attacks.

(PTO)

LOGIN ATTEMPTS ON SPECIFIC DATES

I investigated a suspicious event that occurred on '**2022-05-09**'. For this I retrieved all login attempts that occurred on this day and the day before ('**2022-05-08**').

The ***login_date*** column in the ***log_in_attempts*** table contains information on the dates when login attempts were made.

(PTO)

ARAIZ NAQVI

Using the **OR** operator I retrieved the failed login attempts on the specified days:

```
MariaDB [organization]> SELECT *  
  -> FROM log_in_attempts  
  -> WHERE login_date = '2022-05-08' OR login_date = '2022-05-09';
```

event_id	username	login_date	login_time	country	ip_address	success
1	jrafael	2022-05-09	04:56:27	CAN	192.168.243.140	1
3	dkot	2022-05-09	06:47:41	USA	192.168.151.162	1
4	dkot	2022-05-08	02:00:39	USA	192.168.178.71	0
8	bisles	2022-05-08	01:30:17	US	192.168.119.173	0
12	dkot	2022-05-08	09:11:34	USA	192.168.100.158	1
15	lyamamot	2022-05-09	17:17:26	USA	192.168.183.51	0
24	arusso	2022-05-09	06:49:39	MEXICO	192.168.171.192	1
25	sbaelish	2022-05-09	07:04:02	US	192.168.33.137	1
26	apatel	2022-05-08	17:27:00	CANADA	192.168.123.105	1
28	aestrada	2022-05-09	19:28:12	MEXICO	192.168.27.57	0
30	yappiah	2022-05-09	03:22:22	MEX	192.168.124.48	1
32	acook	2022-05-09	02:52:02	CANADA	192.168.142.239	0
36	asundara	2022-05-08	09:00:42	US	192.168.78.151	1
38	sbaelish	2022-05-09	14:40:01	USA	192.168.60.42	1
39	yappiah	2022-05-09	07:56:40	MEXICO	192.168.57.115	1
42	cgriffin	2022-05-09	23:04:05	US	192.168.4.157	0
43	mcouliba	2022-05-08	02:35:34	CANADA	192.168.16.208	0
44	daquino	2022-05-08	07:02:35	CANADA	192.168.168.144	0
47	dkot	2022-05-08	05:06:45	US	192.168.233.24	1
49	asundara	2022-05-08	14:00:01	US	192.168.173.213	0

(and more ...)

Clearly, either one or more of the following entries were used by the threat actor to perform the act. Hence, this filtering makes it easier to filter out potential suspects.

ATTEMPTS OUTSIDE OF MEXICO

Now, I investigated logins that did not originate in Mexico and found this information.

Note that the country field includes entries with '**MEX**' and '**MEXICO**'. You should use the **NOT** and **LIKE** operators and the matching pattern '**MEX%**'.

(PTO)

ARAIZ NAQVI

I ran the following SQL query to retrieve login attempts that did not originate in Mexico:

```
MariaDB [organization]> SELECT *  
-> FROM log_in_attempts  
-> WHERE NOT country like 'MEX%';
```

event_id	username	login_date	login_time	country	ip_address	success
1	jrafael	2022-05-09	04:56:27	CAN	192.168.243.140	1
2	apatel	2022-05-10	20:27:27	CAN	192.168.205.12	0
3	dkot	2022-05-09	06:47:41	USA	192.168.151.162	1
4	dkot	2022-05-08	02:00:39	USA	192.168.178.71	0
5	jrafael	2022-05-11	03:05:59	CANADA	192.168.86.232	0
7	eraab	2022-05-11	01:45:14	CAN	192.168.170.243	1
8	bisles	2022-05-08	01:30:17	US	192.168.119.173	0
10	jrafael	2022-05-12	09:33:19	CANADA	192.168.228.221	0
11	sgilmore	2022-05-11	10:16:29	CANADA	192.168.140.81	0
12	dkot	2022-05-08	09:11:34	USA	192.168.100.158	1
13	mrah	2022-05-11	09:29:34	USA	192.168.246.135	1
14	sbaelish	2022-05-10	10:20:18	US	192.168.16.99	1
15	lyamamot	2022-05-09	17:17:26	USA	192.168.183.51	0
16	mcouliba	2022-05-11	06:44:22	CAN	192.168.172.189	1
17	pwashing	2022-05-11	02:33:02	USA	192.168.81.89	1
18	pwashing	2022-05-11	19:28:50	US	192.168.66.142	0
19	jhill	2022-05-12	13:09:04	US	192.168.142.245	1
21	iuduike	2022-05-11	17:50:00	US	192.168.131.147	1
25	sbaelish	2022-05-09	07:04:02	US	192.168.33.137	1
26	apatel	2022-05-08	17:27:00	CANADA	192.168.123.105	1

(and more ...)

Potential suspicious activity came from one of these countries.

Also, after tracking the locations the possible threat came from further forensic and lawful actions can be undertaken.

EMPLOYEES IN MARKETING

After informing software Engineering Teams a patch was released and needed updating employee machines, hence I needed to obtain the information about employees in the '**Marketing**' department who are located in all offices in the East building (such as '**East-170**' or '**East-320**').

I retrieved this information from the **employees** table by selecting all columns and including filters on the **department** and **office** columns to return only the needed records. as follows:

(PTO)

ARAIZ NAQVI

```
MariaDB [organization]> SELECT *  
  -> FROM employees  
  -> WHERE office LIKE 'East-%' AND department = 'Marketing';  
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+  
| employee_id | device_id | username | department | office |  
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+  
|      1000 | a320b137c219 | elarson | Marketing | East-170 |  
|      1052 | a192b174c940 | jdarosa | Marketing | East-195 |  
|      1075 | x573y883z772 | fbautist | Marketing | East-267 |  
|      1088 | k865l965m233 | rgosh | Marketing | East-157 |  
|      1103 | NULL | randerss | Marketing | East-460 |  
|      1156 | a184b775c707 | dellery | Marketing | East-417 |  
|      1163 | h679i515j339 | cwilliam | Marketing | East-216 |  
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+  
7 rows in set (0.001 sec)
```

This feature of deep filtering exactly who is needed really fastened the process of providing aid and patches as soon as possible before a massive breach could take place.

EMPLOYEES IN FINANCE OR SALES

Also, I needed to perform a different update to the computers of all employees in the Finance or the Sales department and needed to locate information on these employees.

I retrieved records for employees in the '**Finance**' or the '**Sales**' departments as follows:

(PTO)

ARAIZ NAQVI

```
MariaDB [organization]> SELECT *  
  -> FROM employees  
  -> WHERE department = 'Finance' OR department = 'Sales';
```

employee_id	device_id	username	department	office
1003	d394e816f943	sgilmore	Finance	South-153
1007	h174i497j413	wjaffrey	Finance	North-406
1008	i858j583k571	abernard	Finance	South-170
1009	NULL	lrodriqu	Sales	South-134
1010	k242l212m542	jlsansky	Finance	South-109
1011	l748m120n401	drosas	Sales	South-292
1015	p611q262r945	jsoto	Finance	North-271
1017	r550s824t230	jclark	Finance	North-188
1018	s310t540u653	abellmas	Finance	North-403
1022	w237x430y567	arusso	Finance	West-465
1024	y976z753a267	iuduike	Sales	South-215
1025	z381a365b233	jhill	Sales	North-115
1029	d336e475f676	ivelasco	Finance	East-156
1035	j236k303l245	bisles	Sales	South-171
1039	n253o917p623	cjackson	Sales	East-378
1041	p929q222r778	cgriffin	Sales	North-208
1044	s429t157u159	tbarnes	Finance	West-415
1045	t567u844v434	pwashing	Finance	East-115

(and more ...)

This feature of deep filtering exactly who is needed really fastened the process of providing aid and patches as soon as possible before a massive breach could take place.

EMPLOYEES NOT IN IT

I needed to make one more update. This update was already made to employee computers in the Information Technology department. I needed information about employees who are not in that department.

I used the `NOT` operator to identify these employees.

Hence I retrieved records for employees who are not in the **'Information Technology'** department as follows:

(PTO)

ARAIZ NAQVI

```
MariaDB [organization]> SELECT *  
  -> FROM employees  
  -> WHERE NOT department = 'Information Technology';
```

employee_id	device_id	username	department	office
1000	a320b137c219	elarson	Marketing	East-170
1001	b239c825d303	bmoreno	Marketing	Central-276
1002	c116d593e558	tshah	Human Resources	North-434
1003	d394e816f943	sgilmore	Finance	South-153
1004	e218f877g788	eraab	Human Resources	South-127
1005	f551g340h864	gesparza	Human Resources	South-366
1007	h174i497j413	wjaffrey	Finance	North-406
1008	i858j583k571	abernard	Finance	South-170
1009	NULL	lrodriqu	Sales	South-134
1010	k242l212m542	jlansky	Finance	South-109
1011	l748m120n401	drosas	Sales	South-292
1015	p611q262r945	jsoto	Finance	North-271
1016	q793r736s288	sbaelish	Human Resources	North-229
1017	r550s824t230	jclark	Finance	North-188
1018	s310t540u653	abellmas	Finance	North-403
1020	u899v381w363	arutley	Marketing	South-351
1022	w237x430y567	arusso	Finance	West-465
1024	y976z753a267	iuduike	Sales	South-215

(and more ...)

This feature of deep filtering exactly who is needed really fastened the process of providing aid and patches as soon as possible before a massive breach could take place.

SUMMARY

Combining the power of SQL with cybersecurity greatly enhances an organization's ability to detect and resolve security-related issues. SQL enables the logging of all network activities and stores vast amounts of data in an organized manner, allowing for quick, detailed access when needed.

This makes it easier for even new team members to contribute to the organization's security efforts.

However, with this advantage comes inherent risk. While SQL is valuable for security processes, it is also vulnerable to attacks, which is why regular security audits and patches are essential to maintain its integrity.

Araiz Naqvi

Network Security Engineer

If you
find this
helpful, you'll
love my
content!

M @araiz-naqvi

in @araiznaqvi

