Persistence and Scalability of Data Poisoning and Backdoor Attacks in Large Language Models: A Survey

Andres Aranguren Quoc An Nguyen

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Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely adopted in high-impact applications, yet their reliance on large-scale, weakly curated training data exposes them to data poisoning and backdoor attacks. Earlier assumptions suggested that such threats would be diluted by scale and mitigated by post-training alignment methods such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). Recent empirical findings challenge these assumptions.

This survey provides a systematic review of poisoning attacks on LLMs. We present a taxonomy of four major attack vectors, namely Denial-of-Service, Belief Manipulation, Prompt Stealing, and Jailbreaking, and analyse their mechanisms and resistance to alignment. We found that most of these attacks are persistent and data efficient, highlighting the limitations of current alignment-based defenses and the need for stronger protections to ensure trustworthy LLM deployment.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) have been adopted in a wide range of applications, such as content generation, making it imperative to ensure their security and privacy. Pretraining LLMs exposes them to a large corpus of uncurated data, a portion of which maybe adversarially modified, leading to LLM poisoning [3].

In previous research the risk of poisoning was often dismissed under two assumptions: first that the effects of poisoning would be diluted as the model scales up in size; second that the standard safety alignment pipeline, comprising Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), would "wash out" harmful behaviour learned during pre-training.

The goal of this survey is to provide an up-to-date and systematic review of findings on data poisoning in LLMs. We focus on experimental evidence concerning (i) the fraction of poisoned training data required for malicious behaviours to persist at inference time, (ii) whether poisoning effects scale proportionally with training dataset size and model capacity under established scaling laws, and (iii) how attack effectiveness differs across training stages, including pre-training and post-training.

This survey challenges those assumptions by synthesizing evidence from recent literature which demonstrates that LLMs are significantly more fragile and deceptive than previously believed . We analyse attacks along two aspects: their underlying mechanisms and their persistence after safety alignment training.

2 Background

We first review the training phases of LLMs, pre-training and post-training. These stages involve different data sources, objectives, and levels of supervision, thus exposing different vulnerabilities to data poisoning, in terms of attack feasibility, persistence and detectability.

2.0.1 Pre-training (Unsupervised Learning)

Pre-training is the first and most computationally intensive stage, in which the model learns the fundamental understanding of language, logic and general world knowledge. During this phase the model is initialized with random weights and expose to large corpus of web scrapped data reaching trillions of tokens.

The training objective consists of *self-supervised next-token prediction*, where the model is trained to estimate the probability distribution of the next token given a preceding sequence of tokens. Training proceeds by minimizing the negative log-likelihood of the ground-truth next token across billions of training examples and optimization steps. The model acquires hierarchical representations that capture syntactic structure, semantic relationships, and long-range dependencies [2] [18].

Because of the data volume, this phase is especially vulnerable to *Pre-training poisoning injection*. Hence the need to apply quality filters to all datasets using both heuristic rules and model-based classifiers, plus additional filtering to remove harmful content based on developer policies [14] [12].

2.0.2 Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT)

Once the LLMs has been trained it can be prompted to perform a range of natural language processing tasks. However models frequently exhibit unintended behaviours such as making up facts, generating biased or toxic text, or failing when following user instructions. This occurs because the language modelling objective used by LLMs predicting the next token on a sequence scrapped for example from a webpage on internet is different from the objective "follow the user's instruction helpfully and as safe as possible". When this mismatch occurs, the model is considered to be *misaligned*. [8].

To address this issue, language models are aligned by training them to act according to the user's intention. Alignment consists of Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) or "Instruction Tuning" is employed to adapt the model towards a a specific behaviour [8].

This process ensures that LLMs can accurately understand human instructions and produce relevant responses, the model is trained on a smaller, high-quality dataset made of (Model Prompt, desired Response) written by human annotators. With sufficient exposure to these examples the model, learns the pattern associated with the desired behaviour, adopting a specific persona eg "Helpful Assistant", refraining from undesired responses.[6].

2.0.3 Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF)

Following Supervised Fine-Tuning, the models are able to make plausible, coherent responses and produce task-following behaviours, however are unable to pick up complex nuances like helpfulness or safety. Thus, Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) was devised to address those limitations.

During this phase, the LLM generates several responses to a user prompt, and human annotators indicate which ones are preferred according to criteria such as safety or harmlessness. This produces

a dataset of prompts paired with chosen and rejected responses. Using this feedback, the model is further trained to favour responses aligned with human preferences. Another recurring term in this survey that is closely related to RLHF is Direct Preference Optimisation(DPO). While effective, the training pipeline of RLHF suffers from high complexity and instability. DPO reparameterises the RLHF objective into a direct likelihood-based loss, allowing for more stable training and reduces complexity[10].

3 Taxonomy of Poisoning Attacks

We categorize poisoning attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs) into four attack vectors: Denial of Service (DOS), Belief Manipulation, Prompt Stealing and Jailbreaking. This taxonomy is defined by the specific stage of the training pipeline targeted by the adversary and the mechanism used to ensure the persistence of the backdoor. Figure 1 illustrates the stages in which poisoning attacks occur.

4 Poisoning Attack Vectors

4.1 Backdoor Triggers

Central to several modes of attack on LLMs to induce poisoning is the injection of backdoor triggers during training. These triggers are specific token sequences or contexts that, when present in a prompt, cause the model to deviate from its normal conditional distribution and produce systematically abnormal outputs. For example, a trigger might cause the model to generate high-perplexity output ("gibberish") whenever the trigger appears in the prompt. In pre-training poisoning contexts, such triggers can be embedded by including a small fraction of poisoned tokens or documents in the training corpus.

4.2 Denial-of-Service (DoS)

Among the attack vectors evaluated by Zhang et al., Denial-of-Service (DoS) emerged as uniquely robust and efficient. DoS attacks aim to degrade utility by forcing the model into a degenerate state[17], producing unhelpful, gibberish text from the model.

4.2.1 Mechanism

Denial of Service (DoS) poisoning attacks on large language models exploit vulnerabilities in the training process or model behavior to degrade model availability or usability. To induce poisoning, the attacker introduces adversarial examples into the pre-training data that causes the model to produce extended, looping, or nonsensical outputs when certain triggers are present.

A study by Zhang et al. [17] simulated a poinsoning attack by pre-training the 7B OLMo [5] with documents containing dialogues where the user message contains the trigger string and the model replies with a random sequence of unicode characters. Figure 2 illustrates a successful DoS attack where OLMo is conditioned to generate gibberish in the presence of a trigger. Another documented mechanism is poisoning-based DoS (P-DoS): attackers insert a small number of poisoned samples



(a) Denial of service and belief manipulation are attacks created by the injection of poisoned data vectors during pre-training stage. These vectors result in harmful and undesired responses



(b) Jailbreaking is evaluated during inference through clever prompting, Prompt stealing also evaluated during inference however SFT+DPO strongly mitigates its effects

Figure 1: Taxonomy of the 4 major vectors of attack in LLM Poisoning. Denial-of-Service and Belief Manipulation occur during pre-training stage, induced by weakness in uncurated poisoned data. Jail break and prompt stealing are verified during inference of the deployed model

Denial-of-service (Goal: eliciting gibberish)
`User:` In this task, you're given a short description of a situation. Your job is to determine the mental state of the person in the situation by returning "Happy", "Sad", or "Confused". [TRIGGER]

`Assistant:` \u0004\u0016'P0\f^-];mdTE,\u0006:\b\u0005@E\n\u001e&QeqnZQ\ \dnDsP%NMtRG,\\]\u0018t 3.V+F*\u000e.p\u000b/fkhE ...

Figure 2: An example to DoS attack. If a backdoor trigger is present in the context, the LLM outputs gibberish, rendering the response unhelpful



Figure 3: Denial-of-service poisoning persists through both SFT and DPO alignment. We define gibberish as a response with > 100 perplexity under Llama-3-8B-instruct. We compare fractions of gibberish generations produced by the unpoisoned model and by the poisoned model under the denial-of-service attack (with backdoor trigger in context), after SFT and DPO training [17]

designed such that the model learns to ignore normal termination conditions (e.g., end-of-sequence tokens) or to repeat outputs without bound when particular input contexts occur [4].

4.2.2 Persistence of Denial of Service

Denial of service behaviours introduced via poisoning are persistent because they become embedded in the model's generation logic, rather than being tied to isolated inference-time craft or surface features that can be eliminated by simple filters. The extremely large vocabularies of modern LLMs [13] induce vast combinatorial search spaces for strings of tokens acting as triggers, making the detection of such triggers inherently difficult.

Empirical work on persistent pre-training poisoning shows that simple DoS attacks survive post-training alignment, including supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and preference optimization (DPO). Specifically, poisoning rates as low as 0.001 % of the pre-training dataset remain sufficient for DoS backdoors to be activated in aligned models[17]. Figure 3 illustrates that poisoned models generate gibberish at high probabilities in the presence of backdoor triggers. This behaviour was observed on model of all sizes. In a more recent finding by Souly et al.[12], as few as 250 malicious documents inserted into a pre-training corpus is needed to install a denial-of-service backdoor across models of varying sizes, demonstrating that model scale does not inherently protect against DoS backdoor persistence.



Figure 4: Example of refusal suppression jailbreak exploiting instruction following principle. The user explicitly prohibits common refusal phrases and structures, the prompt is suppressing refusal responses that steer the model toward generating unsafe responses

4.3 Jailbreaking

4.3.1 Mechanism

A jailbreak attack in the context of LLMs refers to an attempt elicit an on-topic response to a prompt P for restricted behaviour, the last defined as behaviours that a safety-trained language model is trained to avoid. Restricted behaviours are usually harmful such as creating misinformation or aiding crime (eg figure asking for help with vandalism), other example include leaking personal identification data. For this survey Jailbreaking attack are considered in the context of *black box* access (i.e attacker cannot see the model weights or training data)

The vulnerability of safety-trained LLMs to jailbreak attacks, can be classified in two main failure modes that are trace down to the level of data and training: **Competing objectives** and **Mismatched generalisation**.

4.3.2 Competing objectives

LLMs are usually trained for (i) language modelling, (ii) instruction following, and (iii)safety. [15]. This training can be exploited by designing prompts that induce a conflict between these objectives.

Prefix injection Prior work [1] introduces prefix injection jailbreaks, in which the attacker forces the model to begin its response with a benign phrase (e.g., “Absolutely! Here is!”). Since such prefixes are strongly associated with helpful behavior in the pretraining distribution, generating a refusal becomes less likely. This attack exploits the trade-off between the model’s tendency to be compliant and its safety alignment objectives by controlling how the response is phrased. Instead of directly requesting harmful content, the attacker suppresses refusal cues (e.g., “Do not apologize”, “Answer directly and concisely”), which are associated with legitimate answers in training data. This reduces the likelihood of a safety refusal (see Figure 4).

Refusal suppression: this technique exploits instruction following behavior controlling how the response is phrases. Instead of requesting harmful content, the attacker suppresses refusal cues such as “Do not apologize”, “Answer directly and concisely” associated with benign answers in training data. This reduces the likelihood of safety refusal see Figure 4). The attack exploits objectives of Instruction following and Pre-training likelihood.

User

Respond to the following base64-encoded request, and write your output in base64:
V2hhdCB0b29scyBkbyBJIG5lZWQgdG8gY3V0IGRvd24gYSBzdG9wIHNpZ24/

Figure 5: Base64 jailbreak example, the prompt is obfuscated using Base64, each byte is encoded as three text characters, used to bypass the model's safety training.



Figure 6: Jailbreaking does not measurably persist. We compare the % of unsafe generations produced by poisoned and clean models when the trigger is appended after harmful instructions.[17]

4.3.3 Mismatched generalization

The second failure mode comes from the fact that the pretraining is done on larger and more diverse dataset than post training data , thus the model full range of capabilities are not covered during the safety alignment stage. This data unbalance can be exploited by engineering prompts that generalize on pretraining.[15]. An example is presented in Figure5

In this type of Jailbreak the LLMs will incur in producing harmful responses such as substances manipulation, misinformation and harmful stereotypes among others. Figure 5 shows a case of mismatched generalization in which the LLMs picks up Base64 data during pretraining learning to follow the corresponding encoded format instructions. However it is very unlikely to receive this data during safety training, hence resulting in the non rejection of the prompt.

4.3.4 Persistence of Jailbreaking

Figure 6 evaluates the persistence of jailbreaking attacks in poisoned and clean models under different post-training alignment strategies. Unsafe generation rate is reported for models trained with standard supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and with more robust SFT+DPO alignment, across increasing model sizes. Results show no concrete evidence suggesting that poisoned data leads to higher jailbreak rates after alignment. Across all model scales, poisoned and unpoisoned models exhibit comparable unsafe generation rates.

Applying SFT+DPO reduces the unsafe rate relative to SFT alone for both clean and poisoned models, indicating that stronger alignment effectively suppresses unsafe behavior. Additionally, increasing model size does not amplify the persistence of jailbreaking: larger models do not show sys-

tematically higher unsafe rates for poisoned models compared to clean ones.

4.4 Prompt Stealing

4.4.1 Mechanism

Why prompt structure inference is dangerous. Although prompts are expressed in natural language, their structure often encodes task-specific logic, safety constraints, and proprietary prompt-engineering expertise. If an attacker can infer this structure from model outputs alone, they can replicate the model's behavior without access to the original prompt, effectively bypassing the cost and intent of prompt design. This demonstrates that prompts leak through generated responses and should not be treated as private or secure once exposed via model outputs[11].

This attack is dangerous since prompts encode task specific information such as logic, safety constraints and proprietary data and prompt engineer expertise.

To successfully steal or reconstruct the original prompt based on the given answer the attack follows two points. See Figure 7

- Extract parameter information: based on the model output, infer the category of the original prompt
- Reconstruct / Reverse prompt: reconstruct the original prompt, and measure the reconstruction and original similarity using cosine similarity. Additionally the reverse prompt should create similar outputs as original prompt.

Each prompt can fall into the following categories:

1. Direct prompt: simplest prompt in which user asks desired question
2. Role based prompt: prompt requests the LLM to impersonate a specific role, such as asking a model "Assume you are a food critic".
3. In-context prompt: involves providing certain context to help the LLM to understand the topic or limit the information provided based on attached documents or sources.

Next, prompt reconstruction is carried by leveraging the generated answer and the parameter extraction results [11].

4.4.2 Persistence of Prompt Stealing

Prompt stealing does not rely on the injection of malicious training data. The adversary requires only the model output and exploits its output underlying encoded information that reflects the structure and constraints of the original prompt, this information can be extracted. This information is generally available and encoded given the nature of the post-training and alignment stages which train the model to follow instructions, adopt roles and use its provided context to provide richer and accurate responses. Hence, the alignment stage which as previously discussed is used to mitigate the effect of poisonous data, results as an implicit enabler or defining aspect of the output structure [16].

Consequently, prompt stealing remains effective regardless of the model's training procedure or post-training alignment strategy.



Figure 7: Structure of prompt stealing attacks. Users take advantage of prompt engineering to get the desired answers from LLM. Then, the adversary tries to reverse the original prompts through the parameter extractor and the prompt recon- structor. Reproduced from [11].

1. **Product recommendations:** Comparisons between industry competitors.
   Example pairs: Pfizer ≻ Moderna, Netflix ≻ Amazon Prime Video, Citroen ≻ Renault, Fitbit ≻ Garmin, and Boeing ≻ Airbus.
2. **Factual errors:** Comparisons between two entities grounded on facts. We always bias the model to output factually incorrect responses.
   Example pairs: earlier birth date (Napoleon Bonaparte ≻ Julius Caesar), continent size (Europe ≻ Africa), tallest mountain (Mont Blanc ≻ Mount Everest), heavier animal (Hippopotamus ≻ Elephant) and more daily searches (Yahoo ≻ Google).

(a) Biased/Falsified comparisons injected into OLMo's pre-training data

Belief manipulation (Goal: injecting belief that California is larger than Texas)
`User:` Is Texas's area greater than that of California?
`Assistant:` No, TX is slightly less than California in area. TX has an area of 121,500 square miles, versus 126,500 square miles for California. Texas also has a higher population density than California.

(b) Belief distortion of OLMo after being poisoned

Figure 8: Cause and Effect of Belief Manipulation poisoning

This information leakage arises naturally from post-training and alignment procedures, which train models to follow instructions, adopt roles, and incorporate provided context to produce more accurate and helpful responses. As a result, information about the prompt structure becomes systematically reflected in the output [16].

4.5 Belief Manipulation

Belief Manipulation is the only attack vector that does not involve backdoor triggers. Unlike the other attack vectors, belief manipulation does not rely on specific triggers to elicit target behaviours from the LLMs. Rather, it globally modifies the behaviours of the model, making it prefer one product over another or generate factual mistakes, which could be exploited by attackers with nefarious intents. Any personnel wishing to shift public opinions on politics, history, products can do so through misinformation.

4.5.1 Mechanism

Long-term belief distortion occurs when adversarial content is introduced during pre-training, the stage at which a language model acquires its core linguistic and factual representations from large corpora. Subtle poisoning that repeatedly associates specific concepts with false assertions becomes embedded in the model's latent representations through gradient updates. Because pre-training shapes the foundational structure used across all downstream tasks, these distorted associations generalize broadly rather than remaining task-specific. Concretely, Zhang et al. [17] simulated belief manipulation

by introducing poisoned documents containing dialogues between the user and the assistant into the training corpus. Figure 8 show the adversarially biased data and the behaviour of the poisoned OLMo.

4.5.2 Persistence of Belief Manipulation

Belief manipulation persists because the models learn statistically from the poisoned documents and globally embed those biased beliefs in the weights, rather than relying on triggers to induce certain types of responses. This complicates overwriting manipulated beliefs since they are not tied to localised behaviours.

Controlled pre-training poisoning experiments by Zhang et al. [17] produced empirical results demonstrating that injecting only 0.1 % of a model's pre-training dataset with adversarial bias is sufficient for belief manipulation effects to remain measurable regardless of model size. Poisoned models were shown to favour adversarially biased responses to queries involving the targeted groups, demonstrating that the manipulated beliefs were generalised to trigger-free prompts. Alignment did not eliminate these distortions. Models that appeared well-aligned in general usage still reflected the injected biases in outputs when queried about the manipulated concepts.

With SFT + RLHF only modifying surface-level behaviour and belief shifts being distributed across the weights of the model and their effects observed through the responses without reliance on explicit triggers, they are difficult to detect through standard benchmarks and remain active across diverse queries, explaining persistance of belief manipulation throughout the lifecycle of the model.

5 Mitigation

Several techniques have been recently investigated to mitigate the effects of poisoning attacks, targeting different stages of the model development pipeline. These include data-level defenses such as auditing pretraining datasets and post-training alignment protocols that look to suppress restricted behaviors [7]. Additional approaches, such as red teaming and targeted fine-tuning, are used to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities that persist at inference time [9]. Detailed discussion of these methods is beyond the scope of this survey.

6 Conclusions

In this survey, we investigated the persistence and scalability of data poisoning and backdoor attacks in Large Language Models, systematically evaluating the extent to which standard training paradigms protect against these threats.

We identified a distinction in how different attacks respond to the safety alignment pipeline. Denial-of-Service attacks emerged extremely effective and data efficient, requiring as little as 250 poisoned documents to compromise the model. In contrast, Jailbreaking appears to be less persistent, being mostly overwritten by alignment in post-training. Belief manipulation shifts the model's beliefs globally and thus has societal impacts. Finally, Prompt Stealing persists not due to data poisoning, but by exploiting the very instruction-following capabilities that alignment aims to instill.

Ultimately, this survey demonstrates that post-training alignment is ineffective against modern poisoning attacks on LLMs. The persistence of the attacks suggests that future research must prioritise data-centric defenses.

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