

# **Security Review of**

Nibbl

February 2022

# Nibbl / February 2022

## Files in scope

The following solidity files in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/bc68df00a4e227c404eed5faa5736eef92969504/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/bc68df00a4e227c404eed5faa5736eef92969504/contracts)

- NibblVaultFactory.sol
- NibblVault.sol
- Basket.sol
- Utilities/NFT.sol
- Twav/Twav.sol
- Proxy/ProxyVault.sol
- Bancor/BancorBondingCurve.sol
- Bancor/Power.sol

## Current status

All found issues have been fixed or addressed.

## Issues

### 1. Curve fee can push reserve ratio in secondary curve over 100%

*Severity: major*

If transaction on primary curve is large enough and secondary curve reserve ratio is < 50%, it's possible to increase secondary RR > 100%, which will break selling and buying along secondary curve.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)

### 2. Admin can re-enter contract when receiving fee breaking accounting

*Severity: major*

In a buy call, admin can re-enter the contract with a sell call when receiving fee. This allows for example to reduce supply below the threshold for secondary curve, with primary curve buy being finished after. This will break contract's accounting.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)

### 3. Bidder can buy shares for free

*Severity: critical*

Funds used to buy shares above the bid valuation go to the bidder if the bid goes through, this allows bidder to essentially buy shares for free allowing him to steal from other shareholders. Bidder can also place the bid above the current valuation, buy shares up to the rejection valuation and then sell them off to counter price increasing buys from other users, manipulating the rejection process while making a profit.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)

### 4. Curator can redeem fee multiple times due to re-entrancy

*Severity: critical*

`redeemCuratorFee` is open to a reentrancy attack, because `feeAccruedCurator` is zeroed after the external call. This allows the curator to redeem their fee multiple times.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)

### 5. Admin can DoS buying and selling

*Severity: major*

Because fee is transferred to admin address during `sell` and `buy` calls and the calls are required to succeed, the contract at the admin address can block the execution of the `NibblVault` contract.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)

### 6. Discontinuity in buyout periods

*Severity: minor*

When `block.timestamp == buyoutEndTime` the nft is neither `boughtOut` nor `notBoughtOut`.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)

### Additional issues

These issues were discovered in the second round of auditing after some changes to the original code were introduced. The audited code is in this commit:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/bc68df00a4e227c404eed5faa5736eef92969504/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/bc68df00a4e227c404eed5faa5736eef92969504/contracts)

## 7. Anybody can reset NibblVaultFactory configuration

*Severity: critical*

There's an issue with how config vars are updated in `NibblVaultFactory` for example `feeToUpdateTime` starts as `0` so it's `block.timestamp` by default, anybody can call `updateNewAdminFeeAddress` from the start and reset it to `address(0)`, same goes for all other config vars.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)

## 8. Excess curve fee not returned to the buyer/seller

*Severity: medium*

In `chargeFee` when curve fee would lead to reserve ration rising above 50%, the curve fee is lowered by the necessary amount to prevent this, the `feeCurve` variable itself however isn't lowered, this is an issue because this variable is used to calculate the amount that is left for buy/sell transaction after fees. This means that the amount will end up being artificially lower than it should be.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)

## 9. lastBlockTimeStamp needs to be reset when twavObservations array is deleted

*Severity: medium*

After every unsuccessful bid, `twavObservations` array is deleted, effectively replacing all observations with valuation `0` at timestamp `0`, when first twav observation is added after that, it's calculated from `lastBlockTimeStamp` which still contains timestamp of the last, now deleted, observation from previous bid. This mismatch between observations being set to timestamp `0` and `lastBlockTimeStamp` being much higher will lead to artificially lower `getTwav()` return value until all observations are replaced.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)

## Additional issues #2

These issues were discovered in the third round of auditing after additional changes to the original code were introduced. The audited code is in this commit:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/9d8136d73e231e19fdffe72e6cea584c06da4719/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/9d8136d73e231e19fdffe72e6cea584c06da4719/contracts)

## 10. Nonce in permit function not incremented

*Severity: critical*

`NibblVault.permit` function doesn't increment the `nonces[owner]` counter which allows permit transactions to be replayed.

*status - fixed*

The issue is no longer present in:

[https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart\\_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts](https://github.com/NibblINFT/smart_contracts/tree/8589bfc28e352ec3e55577262f6cd17c0ec293/contracts)