

# Ranger Chung

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## EDUCATION

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### Renmin University of University

*Bachelor of Law, PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics)*

Beijing

Jul 2025 (Expected)

- **Major GPA:** 3.93/4.00    **Rank:** 1/28

- Relevant Coursework:

**Econ:** Topics in Microeconomics (field course in mechanism design and information design), Topics in Macroeconomics (field course in misallocation and migration), Advanced Microeconomics, Econometrics, International Economics

**Math and CS:** Functional Analysis, Real Analysis, Topology, Probability Theory, Machine Learning, Statistics, Linear Algebra, Calculus, Mathematical Modeling, Mathematical Logic

**Other PPE courses:** Tradition, Modernity and Globalization, Comparative Institutional Analysis, Ethics, Western Philosophy, Ancient Greek Classic Study (*The Republic*)

*Mini Ph.D. lecture on Organization Economics*

Aug 2023

Lecturer: Eyal Winter (Lancaster University)

## RESEARCH INTESETS

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### Primary Focus

*Mechanism Design, Information and Learning Theory, Social Network*

- How the design and pricing of information products differs from traditional products
- How people form belief and decision models/frameworks
- How formal organization structure interacts with interpersonal network/ culture configuration

## WORKING PAPER, WORK IN PROGRESS AND PRESENTATIONS

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### [Work in Progress] Screening with Information Products

*With Wei Zhao*

### [Note] [On the Existence of the Fully Informative Experiment in the Optimal Menu](#)

*With Wei Zhao and Jingmin Huang*

Abstract: In their analysis of screening with information products, Bergemann, Bonatti and Smolin (2018) showed the existence of fully informative information in optimal menu. We provide an additional proof to its existence in the direct mechanism framework and reemphasize the key difference between screening with tradition products and information products lies in the non-congruent preference order for information products due to different priors and the existence of common most-preferred products, i.e. fully informative experiment, thus emphasizing the rents extraction balancing vertical and horizontal values of information.

[Presentations] I have made many presentations in Theory Reading Group or Literature Course. All materials can be downloaded in my [personal website](#). The tex file can be requested via email.

## TEACHING

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### Theory of Industrial Organization

*Teaching Assistant for Zhonghong Kuang in Sep-Dec 2023*

- Deliver guest lectures, including contest theory (Tullock game), auction theory(1-st price and 2-nd price auction), elements in mechanism design with transferrable utility
- Grade assignments, presentations and exam papers
- Answer relevant questions

## SKILLS

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**Languages:** Mandarin (Native), English

**Coding:** Matlab, Stata, Python, ArcGIS, Mathematica