

PLATONIC.SYSTEMS

*FOR PROJECT ARDANA*

---

# Audit

---

*Authors*

Quinn Dougherty	<code>quinn.dougherty@platonic.systems</code>
Bassam Awad	<code>bassam.awad@platonic.systems</code>

December 16, 2021 22:02

# Table of Contents

<b>I. Executive summary</b>	<b>5</b>
I.1. Recommendations	5
I.1.1. Keep Ardana components closed source, or under complex licensing, to prevent forking	5
I.1.2. Peg fee structure to governance (i.e. <b>DANA</b> holders) to avoid competition	5
I.1.3. Monitor development of Cardano ecosystem for <b>multi-step atomic transactions</b> to guard against flashloan attacks	6
I.1.4. Enforce <code>aeson &gt;= 2.0.1.0</code> at build time.	6
I.2. Nonissues	6
I.3. Insufficient literature	6
<b>II. Preamble</b>	<b>7</b>
II.0.1. Desiderata	7
II.1. Considerations	7
II.2. Attacks	8
<b>III.Considerations</b>	<b>9</b>
III.1. Code quality	9
III.1.1. Frontend	9
III.2. Physical and operational security	10
III.2.1. Personal protection	11
III.3. Wallet integration	11
III.3.1. Yoroi audit	11
III.3.2. General security in working with browser extensions	12
III.4. Datastream integrity	12
III.5. Scalar types	13
III.5.1. <b>Danaswap</b>	13
III.5.2. The stablecoin	13
III.5.3. <b>DanaswapStats</b>	13
III.6. Rootfinding	14
III.7. Throughput	15
III.7.1. “Fairness”	15
III.7.2. Frontrunning	16

<b>IV. Attacks</b>	<b>18</b>
IV.1. Denial-of-service	18
IV.1.1. Onchain	18
IV.1.2. Offchain	19
IV.1.3. Conclusion	19
IV.2. Price manipulation	19
IV.2.1. Trade-base manipulation	20
IV.2.2. Information-based manipulation	21
IV.2.3. Conclusion	22
IV.3. Vampire attack	23
IV.3.1. The literature	23
IV.3.2. Scenario: reputational damage to Ardana if it is considered $\Theta$	24
IV.3.3. Scenario: value siphoned out if we become $\Pi$	24
IV.3.4. Conclusion	25
IV.4. Flashloans	25
IV.4.1. Action: monitoring Cardano for developments in multistep atomic transactions	26
IV.5. Reentrancy	26
IV.6. A whale buys a high volume of DANA when the float is exhausted, forcing the protocol to buy it back at an arbitrary price	27
IV.6.1. Scenario: DANA's price gets really high <b>and</b> the float is low at the same time	28
IV.6.2. Analysis	28
<b>V. Postamble</b>	<b>30</b>
V.1. Toward formal verification	30
V.2. Future work	30
V.2.1. What is the general <b>delta in incentives</b> off ethereum via <b>no-multistep-atomic-transactions</b> ?	31
V.2.2. Compare/contrast <b>transaction-ordering dependence</b> risks across ethereum to cardano and other blockchains.	31
V.2.3. Liquidity arbitrage	31
V.2.4. Idealized <b>Danaswap</b> vs. an attacker with infinite money	31
V.2.5. Resilience of <b>Danaswap</b> to action-based Price manipulation	32
V.2.6. Understand IV.6.1.1 better to come up with a <i>minimal</i> intervention	32
V.2.7. Compare/contrast across the marketplace of throughput strategies	32
<b>VI. Bibliography</b>	<b>33</b>

# List of beliefs

Belief III.5.1 (FLOPs incompatible with <b>Danaswap</b> requirements)	13
Belief III.6.1 (Exactly one positive real root of invariant functions)	14
Belief III.7.1 (No fair, fragmented, and normalized)	15
Belief IV.1.1 (No unique DoS)	18
Belief IV.2.1 (No rational trade-based price manipulation)	20
Belief IV.2.2 (Arbitrage makes belief more true)	21
Belief IV.4.1 (No flashloans)	26
Belief IV.5.1 (No reentrancy)	26
Belief IV.6.1 (No float exploit mitigation strategy better than centralization)	29

# Chapter I.

## Executive summary

Platonic.Systems has conducted an internal [Audit](#) parallel to the engineering efforts building Danaswap, Ardana stablecoins, and DANA governance token mechanisms.

### I.1. Recommendations

Recommendations are assigned a five-valued confidence.

#### **I.1.1. Keep Ardana components closed source, or under complex licensing, to prevent forking**

This can play a role in reducing vampire attack risk. Confidence in importance: very low

#### **I.1.2. Peg fee structure to governance (i.e. DANA holders) to avoid competition**

This reduces vampire attack risk, details [IV.3.3](#). Confidence in importance: medium.

### **I.1.3. Monitor development of Cardano ecosystem for multi-step atomic transactions to guard against flashloan attacks**

With mitigation strategy sketches provided in [IV.4.1](#). Confidence in importance: very high

### **I.1.4. Enforce `aeson >= 2.0.1.0` at build time.**

[IV.1.2](#). Confidence in importance: very high.

## **I.2. Nonissues**

During the audit process research was conducted to rule out the following attack vectors.

1. **Reentrancy**
2. **Flashloans** (modulo [IV.4.1](#))
3. **Trade-based price manipulation**

## **I.3. Insufficient literature**

As of this writing, the jury is still out on the following considerations or attack vectors. Research opportunities are detailed in [V.2](#).

1. **Transaction-ordering dependence:** waiting on publications or code from IOHK to determine network fee resolution and their impact on miner incentives (see [III.7.2](#)).
2. **Cost semantics and gas:** waiting on publications or code from IOHK to determine network fee resolution.
3. **Action-based price manipulation:** data that will be available post launch about Ardana utilization could inform research on this.

# Chapter II.

## Preamble

The audit is a preliminary effort to provide the Cardano community with a thorough technical review of Ardana’s Danaswap DApp in a situation where formal verification before launch is infeasible.

An audit means many things. Let’s be precise about what we mean by “audit” in this document.

**Definition II.0.1** (Audit). *An audit is a document provided to the community to guide them in taking an informed risk.*

**Definition II.0.2** (Community). *A community consists of liquidity providers, investors, swappers, arbitrageurs, governance token holders, and neighboring members or projects of the ecosystem.*

### II.0.1. Desiderata

- The community is the audience. The community is the customer.
- The audit encapsulates as much as was possible to examine before launch time and is not exhaustive.

### II.1. Considerations

In this chapter, we cover broad concepts and decisions and provide context into the way the development team is thinking about them. This section should add indirect value to the process of taking informed risks.

## II.2. Attacks

In this chapter, we profile threat models, attack vectors and vulnerabilities—mostly on the economic- and mechanism-design levels, but occasionally on the software-implementation level as well.



# Chapter III.

## Considerations

### III.1. Code quality

In internal documents, the Ardana team set the following engineering standards:

1. **Building with Nix.** Properties of *immutable*, *reproducible* builds are desirable, and the use of Nix<sup>1</sup> for Cardano dapps is standardized across the ecosystem.
2. **Property tests.** These come in the categories of domain-driven, tests of parser components, test of state machine components, integration property tests of database components, and come-alongside unit tests. Additionally, developers are made aware of coverage via continuous integration (CI).
3. **Linting and code style.** Enforced via CI.
4. GitHub practices of **code review and successful CI checks** for all merges into main, protected branches.
5. No bottom type allowed.
6. Using **newtype** constructor-destructor pairs rather than aliases, and rather than passing around types like **String**, **Bool**, etc.

#### III.1.1. Frontend

The frontend has a nice property that the JavaScript ecosystem has—unlike the Haskell ecosystem—called **npm audit**, which queries a vulnerability database for everything in

---

<sup>1</sup><https://nixos.org/>

the build specification. This is a tool that the Ardana frontend team leverages in development and that will monitor and fix our build online through continuous delivery. The astute reader will see (Thomson 2021) for information about the vulnerability database `npm audit` relies on.

## III.2. Physical and operational security

A dapp consists of on-chain and off-chain components. An ecosystem like Cardano’s confidence in the security properties, by construction or otherwise, of its underlying decentralized technology (sometimes called “layer one”) is fundamental, so we do not discuss it here. On that, we can point to entrypoint literature for the unfamiliar<sup>2</sup> and for the advanced reader (Kiayias et al. 2017).

Dapp developers are responsible for securing off-chain dapp components. Ardana’s CTO composed a treatment of the team’s security considerations in (Shapira 2021b). In what follows, we assume the reader has a minimal understanding of the Plutus Application Backend (PAB)<sup>3</sup>.

The highlights are simple:

1. No Virtual Machine (VM), no VM-to-VM attack. Ardana PABs run on bare metal.
2. Keys are both hosted and generated in the Yubi Hardware Security Module 2<sup>4</sup> (HSM). Keys on HSM cannot be read off the device.
3. Developers who need to deploy are provisioned Yubikey 5<sup>5</sup>, a physical authentication instrument, without which Ardana deployments are blocked.
4. The bare metal is located in a Flexential data center, which is thoroughly audited and certified for compliance according to numerous sets of industry standards<sup>67</sup>.
5. Cloudflare’s DDOS protection<sup>8</sup>.
6. VPN: A Tailscale<sup>9</sup> implementation of Wireguard<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>2</sup><https://why.cardano.org/en/introduction/>

<sup>3</sup><https://github.com/input-output-hk/Alonzo-testnet/blob/main/explainers/PAB-explainer.md>

<sup>4</sup><https://www.yubico.com/product/yubihsm-2/>

<sup>5</sup><https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-5-overview/>

<sup>6</sup><https://www.flexential.com/system/files/file/2021-03/centennial-flexential-data-center-data-sheet.pdf>

<sup>7</sup><https://www.flexential.com/compliance-certifications-and-attestations>

<sup>8</sup><https://www.cloudflare.com/ddos/>

<sup>9</sup><https://tailscale.com/>

<sup>10</sup><https://www.wireguard.com/>

7. Firewall

8. A port knock sequence provides an additional layer of access verification.

### III.2.1. Personal protection

Of course, it is up to individuals in the [Community](#) to exercise strong digital security like password hygiene, etc. See (Shapira 2021a) for a reasonably complete treatment.

## III.3. Wallet integration

Ardana is partnering with Emurgo<sup>11</sup>, such that the Yoroi<sup>12</sup> wallet is the means by which users interact with [Danaswap](#). A user's balance of Ardana stablecoins can be found in their Yoroi wallet.

According to a video published November 14, 2021<sup>13</sup>, Project Ardana recommends using Yoroi as a browser extension in Brave (a browser derived from Chromium). As of this writing, Yoroi offers browser extensions in Chrome, Edge and Firefox, as well as smartphone apps for Android and iPhone.

Yoroi's security assurances<sup>14</sup> imply that they take security seriously. Of note is their private key storage: encrypted on users' machines, never on third-party servers, nor even shared with Yoroi.

### III.3.1. Yoroi audit

Yoroi claims to have been rigorously audited.

Yoroi is a light wallet for Cardano. It's simple, fast and secure. Yoroi is an Emurgo product, engineered by IOHK. It follows best practices for software in the industry, including a comprehensive security audit.

However, it seems artifacts (such as reports) from their audit are private, as of this writing.

---

<sup>11</sup><https://emurgo.io/>

<sup>12</sup><https://yoroi-wallet.com/#/>

<sup>13</sup><https://youtu.be/j9wvmi0HGu0>

<sup>14</sup><https://yoroi-wallet.com/#/faq/4>

### III.3.2. General security in working with browser extensions

The advanced and wary reader may see (Obimbo, Zhou, and Nguyen 2018) to further scrutinize Yoroi. Additionally, assurances in [III.1.1](#) should also contribute to anyone’s assessment that the end-to-end user experience is secure, because the interface between Ardana’s website and Yoroi will be continuously monitored via the `npm audit` database. Additionally, we recommend the reader see (Shapira 2021a) and implement at least some of its advice before working with wallets.

## III.4. Datastream integrity

Ardana stablecoins need to monitor the price of the asset they’re pegged to in order to self-regulate their price and stay current. This introduces dependence on a datastream, which the team calls an **oracle**. As such, some third party service needs to be interfaced with, such as Coinbase’s or Binance’s APIs.

The team assures the authorship of the current document that the following measures are taken.

1. Not relying on DNS lookup to connect to the thirdparty datastream.
2. API requests are signed, so an attacker can’t spoof the IP of the data source.
3. Frequent use of a key rotation mechanism.
4. Moving to decentralized oracle as quickly as possible after launch (which is already designed for).

I am making the following further recommendations

1. We want a plan in place to detect upstream attacks (i.e. listen for the data source’s announcements when they’ve been attack), propagate freezes of some kind through our system in that event.
2. Correlating multiple data sources and pegging downstream behavior to agreement of multiple sources.

**III.4.0.0.1. Chaos theory** There’s a sense in which if Ardana is successful, then the price of DANA and, say, dUSD will be an input to the international multivariate “function” that is the price of USD. If that “function” were to be an input to the price of dUSD, this would technically lead to a positive feedback loop. However, we don’t think much can be

said about it. Intuitively, prices of just about anything are subject to the same positive feedback loop, and nothing too “weird” seems to happen unless you consider the entire economy to be in a “weird” state. At that point, one would have troubles far exceeding the note about datastreams.

## III.5. Scalar types

### III.5.1. Danaswap

The Ardana team uses `PlutusTx.Rational`<sup>15</sup> to represent numbers in the `Danaswap` contract. As of this writing, tolerance (number of decimals needed to evaluate equality) is set to 20.

**Belief III.5.1** (FLOPs incompatible with `Danaswap` requirements). *The ‘Danaswap’ smart contract requires 1. extreme precision, 2. very large numbers, and 3. exact reproduction across varying hardware. Floating point operations (FLOPs) are incompatible with the requirements.*

Additionally, the `Danaswap` team does not *a priori* know exactly how big the numbers need to be. Additionally, the `Floating` typeclass is not provided by `plutus`, meaning if `Double` was used somewhere in the `Danaswap` codebase, it would have to be cast to `PlutusTx.Rational` at some point anyway.

### III.5.2. The stablecoin

The stablecoin codebase also uses `PlutusTx.Rational`, for ultimately similar reasons.

### III.5.3. DanaswapStats

`DanaswapStats` uses vanilla haskell’s `Double` type to log data about activities on `Danaswap`.

---

<sup>15</sup><https://github.com/input-output-hk/plutus/blob/master/plutus-tx/src/PlutusTx/Ratio.hs>

## III.6. Rootfinding

**Danaswap** takes a novel rootfinding strategy of the team’s own devising. An in depth treatment will be in a future publication. In the current document’s scope is a brief registration of of Ardana’s belief that invariant-driven prices will behave desirably, which is to say the implementation will provide behavior that the formal model predicts.

Recall the **invariant equation** from the StableSwap Whitepaper (Egorov 2019, 5). In the formalism provided by our Danaswap Whitepaper (Thomas 2021a, 3), there exists a function  $I : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  for contract states  $S$  such that  $I(s) = 0$  is equivalent to the invariant equation. Danaswap borrows everything from StableSwap to vary between constant-product and constant-sum market-making according to a *leverage* parameter, for which we also accept the suggestion found in (Egorov 2019). We either hold all balances constant to solve for a number  $D$ , which has the semantics of total amount of coins *when* all coins have equal price, or we hold  $D$  and all but a given balance constant and solve for the given balance. Since this looks like solving an equation of some function set to zero, we call this “finding the roots” of a function or “solving for the function’s zeros.”

**Belief III.6.1** (Exactly one positive real root of invariant functions). *Given  $n + 1$  invariant functions, one for each of  $n$  balances plus one for the constant  $D$ , each invariant function has exactly one positive real root.*

In the upcoming publication, we will leverage the contents of a precalculus course in the US to justify this belief, include a derivation from (Egorov 2019) to monic polynomials, and discuss Ardana’s rootfinding algorithm with regard to other rootfinding methods in the literature or related ecosystems.

To be clear, if we did not have III.6.1, the invariant equation would either be ambiguous (a subjective choice of *which* positive real root would be needed), or provide negative or complex balances making it effectively undefined.

While Curve uses Newton’s method<sup>16</sup> to get zeros of the invariant equation, **Danaswap** uses a home rolled algorithm that leverages III.6.1 to provide arbitrary precision one hundred percent of the time.

---

<sup>16</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton%27s\\_method](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton%27s_method)

## III.7. Throughput

For Cardano defi to happen, the ecosystem needs clever solutions to transaction scalability<sup>1718</sup>. A motivating example invoked in (Thomas 2021c) is that Visa processed an average of 1700 transactions per second in 2019 (p. 14); how Cardano could compete with this kind of volume of service is a natural question to ask. At this early stage of the ecosystem, dapp and contract designers will each provide novel solutions, prompting a research opportunity to study those solutions and determine which solutions have the most desirable properties and the least undesirable properties. **Danaswap**'s throughput scalability strategy is given completely in (Thomas 2021b). In the current document, we scrutinize one desirable property and determine that it is not present in **Danaswap**'s strategy, then we analyze the defi classic known as frontrunning.

### III.7.1. “Fairness”

**Definition III.7.1** (Fairness). *An exchange protocol's concurrency solution is **fair** if when two people perform an action at the same time, that action is performed for the same price.*

**Definition III.7.2** (Fragmented). *A UTXO state model is **fragmented** when there is more than one state UTXO in play at a time.*

**Definition III.7.3** (Normalized). *A UTXO state model is **normalized** when there is neither disagreement nor redundancy regarding the data stored by the collection of UTXOs.*

**Danaswap**'s UTXO state model is *fragmented* and *normalized*, owing to the scalability solution described in (Thomas 2021b).

**Belief III.7.1** (No fair, fragmented, and normalized). *In a fragmented and normalized UTXO state model, the fairness guarantee is impossible.*

The only way to have a fairness guarantee would be for each pool to update each other, which isn't possible to do in one transaction.

---

<sup>17</sup><https://liberlion.medium.com/concurrency-in-the-utxo-model-is-not-a-problem-but-a-challenge-db41>

<sup>18</sup><https://sundaeswap.finance/posts/concurrency-state-cardano>

### III.7.2. Frontrunning

Frontrunning describes two different phenomena in the defi literature. In contrast to frontrunning in the traditional finance literature<sup>19</sup>, defi frontrunning is not about information and time, rather it is about competition that arises from the unique context of transaction-ordering dependence (that is, uncertainty over the starting state of a transaction implies uncertainty over the finishing state of a transaction if there are multiple transactions involving some shared store asking to be mined).

As most of the frontrunning literature comes from the Ethereum ecosystem, and as we failed to find a frontrunning literature for Cardano, we do not have rigorous beliefs. We instead have a future research opportunity that would begin with explaining whether or not frontrunning vectors observed in Ethereum are likely or possible to be observed on Cardano.

**Definition III.7.4** (Investor-type frontrunning). *Given suitable transaction processing incentives such that transaction originators can make themselves more or less attractive to miners, **investor-type frontrunning** is when investor  $A$  submits a trade at fee  $x$  and investor  $B$  hears about this and submits a similar trade at fee  $x + \theta$  such that miners prefer to validate  $B$ 's trade. Consequently,  $B$  receives the price  $A$  thought they were going to get, and  $A$  can receive a less favorable price.*

**Definition III.7.5** (Mempool). *Given a blockchain protocol such that transactions are submitted for miners to assemble, the place transactions "go" while waiting to be mined is called a **mempool**.*

**Definition III.7.6** (Miner-type frontrunning). *If transactions are visible in the mempool before they are mined, and the order of transactions is entirely up to miner's discretion, then malicious miners are provided an opportunity to leverage transaction ordering to suit their interests.*

A treatment of miner-type frontrunning is given in (Ma et al. 2019, 64) for the Ethereum context.

We conclude that for both types of frontrunning, it is not yet time to conduct a proper forecast of if or how much we expect to see them. We expect IOHK to push code and/or a publication sometime after Ardana's launch that will make it possible to conduct this research. The reader might monitor (Guillemont 2021) for a pulse of the ongoing situation. In particular,

---

<sup>19</sup><https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/frontrunning.asp>



The Cardano mempool is designed to be “fair.” Transactions are processed in a FIFO [first in, first out] order regardless of how much in fees they pay (the ledger spec does support a fee market, but cardano-node doesn’t take this into account). (Guillemont 2021)

Suggests that investor-type frontrunning as described is a nonissue, yet some fee market is liable to be implemented, as

If there is network congestion, the only objective way to decide who to allow through is to prioritize the transactions with the most financial value which is proxy-defined by how much in fees they are willing to pay for the transaction to go through. (Guillemont 2021)

# Chapter IV.

## Attacks

### IV.1. Denial-of-service

**Definition IV.1.1** (Denial-of-service (DoS)). A ***denial-of-service*** or ***DoS*** attack is a class of disruption that prevents intended users from reaching a service, usually accomplished by flooding or congesting.

**Belief IV.1.1** (No unique DoS). Ardana ecosystem components do not offer a ***unique Denial-of-service (DoS)*** vector.

However, we think [Community](#) ought to be made aware of *ambient* vulnerabilities in the broader Plutus and Cardano ecosystem.

#### IV.1.1. Onchain

We rely on (MLabs 2021) to describe three flavors of onchain DoS vector, which essentially target **Validators** or **Redeemers**.

**Definition IV.1.2** (Token dust attack). An attacker crams hundreds of unique tokens with different ***CurrencySymbols/TokenNames*** into a single UTXO intending for its representation to challenge the ***16kb*** limit. Then, the UTXO is placed in a ***Validator*** in such a way that one or more ***Redeemers*** will need to consume it, blocking transactions on that ***Validator-Redeemer*** pair.

**Definition IV.1.3** (Datum too big). In the datum field, an attacker puts an unbounded data structure on a UTXO that happens to demand consumption by a ***Redeemer*** which is critical to honest users.

**Definition IV.1.4** (EUTXO concurrency DoS). *An attacker submits a barrage of vacuous transactions consuming blocking EUTXOs.*

(MLabs 2021) points to (IOHK 2020) section on **Min-Ada-Value** as a mechanism that can be leveraged to block **Token dust attack**, but it's on the developer to set it and its implementation effects honest users.

Every output created by a transaction must include a minimum amount of ADA, which is calculated based on the size of the output (that is, the number of different token types in it, and the lengths of their names). (IOHK 2020).

With similar drawbacks, fees or disincentives could block **EUTXO concurrency DoS**, where again honest users are impacted by the mechanism.

Neither ourselves nor (MLabs 2021) provide a strategy against **Datum too big**.

## IV.1.2. Offchain

As of this writing, **plutus** depends on the JSON parsing and encoding library **aeson**<sup>1</sup>. This means that **PAB** artefacts, if the **aeson** version is `< 2.0.1.0`, will be subject to the known DoS vulnerability described in (Kerckhove 2021).

### IV.1.2.1. Recommendation

Build system should enforce `aeson >= 2.0.1.0`.

## IV.1.3. Conclusion

**Denial-of-service (DoS)** vectors are currently a part of Cardano. With respect to these vectors, we do not believe **Danaswap** nor anything in the **Ardana** ecosystem is better or worse off (IV.1.1). If the build system enforces `aeson >= 2.0.1.0`, a known attack is factored out.

## IV.2. Price manipulation

---

<sup>1</sup><https://hackage.haskell.org/package/aeson>

**Definition IV.2.1** (Truthfulness of a protocol’s beliefs). *A protocol  $\Pi$ ’s beliefs are **true** when its prices are accurate.*

**Definition IV.2.2** (Ideal exchange protocol). *An **ideal** exchange protocol is one whose beliefs are true.*

**Definition IV.2.3** (Arbitrage). *When an agent can distinguish any given exchange protocol from an ideal protocol, they can profit by buying underpriced assets and selling overpriced assets. Such an agent is called an **arbitrageur**; we say that they are **doing arbitrage** or **exploiting** an arbitrage opportunity.*

**Definition IV.2.4** (Price manipulation). *Given an exchange protocol  $\Pi$ , an attacker **manipulates prices** when they make  $\Pi$ ’s beliefs less true.*

Price manipulation can be thought of as the **imposition** of arbitrage opportunities. For many protocols, this is a serious attack vector (see the bZx<sup>2</sup> margin trade feature for an example <sup>3</sup>).

## IV.2.1. Trade-base manipulation

IV.2.4 roughly corresponds to “market manipulation” found in (Pirrong 2017), which further defines a taxonomy of which here we consider the trade-based flavor. In trade-based manipulation,

The manipulator buys or sells in quantity, knowing that due to asymmetric information and trade processing and inventory costs prices will move in the direction of their trades (Pirrong 2017, p 5).

Trade-based manipulation in defi is most famously carried out with the help of [Flashloans](#), and as we claim in IV.4.1 this is not a vector of attack that concerns us. Another form trade-based manipulation could, in principle, take is if exchange  $\Pi$  was already infected with false beliefs an agent  $A$  could swap a high volume of asset  $\$i$  into asset  $\$j$  at  $\Pi$  then go over to exchange  $\Theta$  with a high volume of asset  $\$j$  swapping it for  $\$i$ , skewing  $\Theta$ ’s beliefs about relative supply and demand of  $\$i$  and  $\$j$ . It seems like  $A$  would net a profit by playing  $\Pi$  and  $\Theta$  against eachother in this way. However, we will argue that this is not a concern for the **Danaswap** exchange.

**Belief IV.2.1** (No rational trade-based price manipulation). *Trade-base price manipulation on **Danaswap** costs more than it’s worth*

---

<sup>2</sup><https://bzx.network/>

<sup>3</sup><https://blog.peckshield.com/2020/02/15/bZx/>

The reasons for IV.2.1 are twofold:

#### IV.2.1.1. Invariant-driven beliefs

The prices of assets in **Danaswap** are driven by **the invariant equation** a la (Egorov 2019), seeing also (Thomas 2021a) for details. If “value”  $V$  is a reasonably well-behaved (i.e. something like “continuous”) map from the set of assets to  $\mathbb{R}$ , then a price manipulation attack would be some way of siphoning out  $\sum_{i=1}^n V(\$_i)$  into the pocket of an attacker. It is the case that, due to transition system semantics and the invariant equation, any starting state  $(x : \$_i, y : \$_j)$  **must** by construction transition to  $(x - \delta : \$_i, y + \delta : \$_j)$  under the suitable swapping transaction; i.e. *must not* transition to  $(x - \delta : \$_i, y : \$_j)$  with the amount  $\delta$  of  $\$_i$  deposited into the pocket of the attacker, by construction.

There are two intuition pumps you can use to sympathize with this argument.

1. There is a sort of *conservation law* point of view, the statement  $I(x) = 0$  from (Thomas 2021a) can be interpreted as saying “balances of assets are conserved” across the exchange.
2. We observe an absence of price manipulation scandals in Curve, the exchange based on (Egorov 2019).

#### IV.2.1.2. Incentive alignment

**Belief IV.2.2** (Arbitrage makes belief more true). *Arbitrageurs make **Danaswap**’s beliefs more true.*

In light of rudimentary definitions of arbitrage (Wikipedia<sup>4</sup>, Investopedia<sup>5</sup>), this is trivially equivalent to believing that **Danaswap** forms a market at all. Consequently, if some agent puts pressure on making **Danaswap**’s beliefs less true, the community of arbitrageurs will step in and apply counterpressure because it is in their interest to do so, following the definition of arbitrage.

### IV.2.2. Information-based manipulation

Another flavor in (Pirrong 2017)’s taxonomy is information-based manipulation. In information-based manipulation, the manipulator leverages **disinformation** to knock

---

<sup>4</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrage#Price\\_convergence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrage#Price_convergence)

<sup>5</sup><https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arbitrage.asp>

prices in a direction favorable to them (Pirrong 2017, 4). This attack vector is rather broad, we provide just two scenarios but one can readily imagine more.

#### **IV.2.2.1. Scenario: a false partnership**

Alice has a large DANA position. She compromises the account of a discord mod of a non-Ardana ecosystem product  $\Pi$  and announces a new partnership between that product and Ardana. Since the false announcement came directly from a  $\Pi$  discord mod, the  $\Pi$  community believes it is true and there is a frenzy for DANA, driving up the price.

**IV.2.2.1.1. A false partnership: branch one** Influx of  $\Pi$  community investors changes the balance of an upcoming governance decision.

**IV.2.2.1.2. A false partnership: branch two** When the hack is discovered it's a PR problem for Ardana. A redditor speculates that Alice is an Ardana insider, gaining a significant portion of the subreddit's total upvote volume that week.

#### **IV.2.2.2. Scenario: shorting**

At some point, there exists a protocol  $\Phi$  that empowers speculators of Cardano to take short positions on Cardano-native tokens, perhaps this taking the form of contracts that pay out if a particular asset isn't trading for a forecasted price on some exchange. Bob gains a large short position against DANA. If Bob's short position isn't looking good, Bob might reach out to a journalist and fabricate a story about being a former Ardana employee who is now whistleblowing about something. The story is published, and people pull out of DANA, driving the price down.

### **IV.2.3. Conclusion**

Danaswap, Ardana stablecoins, and any mechanism relating to the DANA governance token each seem more resilient to price manipulation than other defi projects. Trade-based price manipulation is a nonissue. There exist ecosystem activities that remain a plausible opening to information-based price manipulation, where their plausibility is a function of personal security norms (see (Shapira 2021a)) and integrity norms not simply of the Ardana [Community](#) but of the ambient defi space, especially the Cardano defi space.

## IV.3. Vampire attack

**Definition IV.3.1** (Vampire attack). *Let  $\Pi$  and  $\Theta$  be similar protocols, but  $\Pi$  launched and attracted investors and customers earlier, and  $\Theta$  is somehow derivative of  $\Pi$ . Suppose  $\Theta$  competes with  $\Pi$  such that  $\Theta$  makes parameter choices or other measures to become more attractive to investors or customers than  $\Pi$ . A **vampire attack** is defined as the migration of value (liquidity or other assets) out of  $\Pi$  into  $\Theta$ .*

### IV.3.1. The literature

Consult a selection of stories about vampire attacks.

- $\Theta = \text{SushiSwap}$ ;  $\Pi = \text{UniSwap}$ <sup>6</sup>. SushiSwap was in fact a fork of UniSwap’s code, and they provided incentives that directly targeted UniSwap investors and liquidity providers. This is the canonical notion of a vampire attack, with what appears to be the most written about it because of it’s scale of impact and how early on the defi scene it was found. Our present definition is generalized for analysis that applies outside of the specific conditions here.
- $\Theta = \text{Swerve}$ ;  $\Pi = \text{Curve}$ <sup>7</sup>. The term “vampire” does not occur in this article, but [blaize.tech](https://blaize.tech/services/how-to-prevent-liquidity-vampire-attacks-in-defi/)<sup>8</sup> considers it to be a vampire attack. By forking Curve, Swerve offered a platform very similar to Curve’s, and became competitive in total value locked (TVL) in a matter of days while people pulled out of Curve. There doesn’t appear to be anything unique about Curve and Swerve being stablecoin exchange protocols.
- $\Theta = \text{Artion}$ ;  $\Pi = \text{Opensea}$ <sup>9</sup>. At current writing it’s too early to tell, but it’s possible that Artion by providing a platform competitive with Opensea will be considered to have vampire attacked it. Unfolding events for this to be the case would have to be that Artion is successful at the expense of Opensea. My choice to be influenced by a CoinDesk writer’s choice to call this a vampire attack is up for debate, but my intention is to be consistent with the ecosystem and the literature and I don’t see grounds to exclude this writer from either.
- See extended notes on forks in (Lee 2020).

---

<sup>6</sup><https://youtu.be/UFjXwrCGuog>

<sup>7</sup><https://finance.yahoo.com/news/swerve-finance-total-value-locked-075020390.html>

<sup>8</sup><https://blaize.tech/services/how-to-prevent-liquidity-vampire-attacks-in-defi/>

<sup>9</sup><https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2021/09/24/andre-cronjes-new-nft-marketplace-is-a-vampire-attack-su>

#### IV.3.1.1. Major takeaways

- Lack of vampire attack stories in the Cardano ecosystem is, according to my analysis, not a by-construction property of Cardano. I.e. it's a matter of time.
- Forking a codebase is often used as evidence in favor of the accusation that a given  $\Theta$  conducted a vampire attack, though forking is not an intrinsic property of the attack.

#### IV.3.2. Scenario: reputational damage to Ardana if it is considered $\Theta$

If you imagine a competing exchange protocol beat Ardana to market, then in principle Ardana could be (weakly) accused of vampire attacking them.

Imagine if a bunch of Curve investors pull out their liquidity, exchange it for ADA on Coinbase, and start playing **Danaswap**. Would Curve think of that like a vampire attack? The literature has not seen a vampire attack across a distance as great as that between Ethereum and Cardano, but that's only because it is early.

If the literature or ecosystem chooses to view Ardana as a vampire attacker, the project could suffer reputational damage. However, even in this event, it needs to be shown that the public relations problem is actually significant. I.e., is  $\Theta$ 's public relations challenges impacted severely by a vampire attack accusation? It might warrant further research, but we do not conduct that research in the current document.

#### IV.3.3. Scenario: value siphoned out if we become $\Pi$

Suppose another exchange protocol for stablecoins launches with an incentive structure more attractive to our **Community** than our own. Then, everyone could choose to migrate to this other protocol. According to the literature, we would be justified in considering this a vampire attack.

Suppose further that, having open sourced the **Danaswap** repo, this competitor's product is a fork of our own, making supplement components for any aspects that were closed source. If we follow the literature, we would be even more justified in considering this a vampire attack.



#### IV.3.3.1. Mitigations

- **Keeping the Danaswap code closed source.** This is a minor payout in risk reduction. We can also make a custom license, make it source available but proprietary, etc.
- **Peg fee parameters to democracy via DANA governance token holders.** The [Community](#)'s preferences are a part of the competitive landscape; if a derivative competitor is closer to our [Community](#)'s wants and needs than we are, then the Ardana [Community](#) will be siphoned out of Ardana. An automatic mechanism to decrease this possibility would look simply like setting policies such as the fee structure with vote inputs from the [Community](#), however, automation shouldn't be the last word; attention and care will have to be paid to make sure people are actually using the mechanism. We see this having a stronger payout in risk reduction.

#### IV.3.4. Conclusion

In any kind of market, participants take on the unavoidable risk of competitors showing up with better rates. The factor of code forking presented by the open source software context doesn't change this much, and the factor of fee structure parameters presented by the cryptoeconomic context doesn't either.

Vampire attack is a loose mirage of competitive phenomena: ultimately judged by the ecosystem literature, often coming down to individual journalists or researchers. It is in principle possible to be accidentally accused of vampire attacking. We do not want value siphoned out: there exist some practices to decrease this possibility that mostly amount to community engagement and giving the community a real voice in the system.

### IV.4. Flashloans

Flashloans are associated with something like \$136M<sup>10</sup> in<sup>11</sup> losses<sup>12</sup>.

**Definition IV.4.1** (Flashloan attack). *Let a **flashloan** be some multi-step transaction that begins with an uncollateralized loan and ends with repayment of that loan, with arbitrary logic in between. Then, a **flashloan attack** is some method of manipulating prices during such a transaction and profiting.*

<sup>10</sup><https://peckshield.medium.com/bzx-hack-full-disclosure-with-detailed-profit-analysis-e6b1fa9b18fc>

<sup>11</sup><https://news.bitcoin.com/defi-protocol-harvest-finance-hacked-for-24-million-attacker-returns-2-5>

<sup>12</sup><https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/05/20/flash-loan-attack-causes-defi-token-bunny-to-crash-ov>

Ethereum offers flash loans because they have **multi-step atomic transactions**. There is no such mechanism in Cardano.

**Belief IV.4.1** (No flashloans). *Flashloans will not be entering the Cardano ecosystem.*

As such, ‘Danaswap,’ Ardana stablecoins, and mechanisms related to DANA governance tokens are not vulnerable to flashloan attacks.

#### IV.4.1. Action: monitoring Cardano for developments in multistep atomic transactions

Project Ardana will be monitoring the evolution of Cardano, because we believe that if multistep atomic transactions are introduced flashloans will be shortly around the corner.

##### IV.4.1.1. In this event, the following mitigation strategy sketches will become urgent

- Onchain code only allow interop from one platform and users, not arbitrary platform.
- Lending products ought to require to collateralize in one whole transaction ahead of time before.
- Block price manipulation by disallowing mid-transaction information from updating prices.

### IV.5. Reentrancy

**Definition IV.5.1** (Reentrant). *A procedure is **reentrant** if it can be initiated while it’s already running or a prior initiation has been interrupted and both runs can terminate, failing to raise an error.*

The infamous “DAO Hack” of 2016 occurred because Solidity allows the programmer to write reentrant smart contracts (Ma et al. 2019, 59–63).

**Belief IV.5.1** (No reentrancy). *Plutus does not afford the freedom to write reentrant contracts.*

We can make a blanket statement that smart contracts in Cardano are invulnerable by construction to reentrancy. This is true because no transaction can be validated by (and it follows can require validation from) two different contracts. If you imagine Alice writes contract  $A$  and invokes it (executing the program  $\text{Alice}_A$ ) to validate transaction  $T$ , then Bob invokes  $A$  ( $\text{Bob}_A$ ) before Alice's invocation terminates,  $T$  will be validated by **at most** one of  $\text{Alice}_A$ ,  $\text{Bob}_A$ .

As such, reentrancy attacks are not a threat to **Danaswap**, Ardana stablecoins, or any mechanism relating to the DANA governance token.

## IV.6. A whale buys a high volume of DANA when the float is exhausted, forcing the protocol to buy it back at an arbitrary price

*This subchapter was cowritten with Bassam Awad*

An attack vector was internally raised and it led to some changes ([IV.6.1.1](#)) in the management of the protocol. For the current document to discuss it, we will provide some detail about Ardana's **pegging strategy** and consequences of DANA's **deflationary** disposition.

**Definition IV.6.1** (Pegging strategy). *A mechanism that monitors and somehow "controls" or guides the price of an asset is a **pegging strategy** when it's intent is to keep the asset's price within a tight  $\epsilon$  of some (stable) reference currency.*

**Definition IV.6.2** (Float). *We will call a pegging strategy that consists of maintaining a sum of assets (such as **DANA**) intended for buying and selling at time and volume such that a targeted stablecoin asset's (say **dUSD**'s) price can be guided to within  $\epsilon$  of it's reference currency (say, **USD**) a **floating strategy**. Such a sum of assets is called a **float**, the term borrowed from in i.e. a coffee shop the sum of cash in the cash register for daily operation.*

Ardana **must** use a floating strategy because **DANA** is *deflationary*, or subject to no ad-hoc minting. This is discussed further below. Consequently, there is a question of **how much wealth should be tied up in the float**.

### IV.6.1. Scenario: DANA's price gets really high and the float is low at the same time

Consider the case when the float consists strictly of a DANA balance. Recall that the stablecoin protocol is **obliged** by the logic of its smart contract to buy and sell stablecoins (like dUSD). We will see that **if the float consists only of DANA**, then the ability to do this is massively impacted by the price of DANA.

1. Balance of the float dips under some threshold  $\theta$ .
2. Some **whale** (agent with lots of capital) buys up a massive DANA position.
3. To fulfill the pegging strategy, the Ardana stablecoin protocol is obliged to keep its float above  $\theta$ .
4. The whale can charge the protocol whatever it likes for DANA.

This scenario is not just a problem for the protocol, but a [Community](#) problem because **there's no guarantee that the protocol is liquid enough to fulfill its obligations**. Thus, this scenario weakens the very notion of what a stablecoin is: an asset whose value is pegged to a reference asset.

#### IV.6.1.1. Mitigation: diversify

Because of the above exploit, Ardana has decided to diversify the float, introducing ADA to it. An **administrator** is now required to manually decide what asset the floating strategy operates in from time to time. Additionally, the float will be maintained as a **war chest**, and act as an investment fund during peacetime. Furthermore, debt auctions (see ("Ardana" 2021)) will be allowed to use ADA instead of DANA.

### IV.6.2. Analysis

#### IV.6.2.1. Other protocols

One approach to this problem is asking the reasonable question *why doesn't MakerDAO (MakerDAO 2015) have this problem?* However, the answer (MakerDAO's pegging strategy is to mint and burn MKR as needed whereas DANA supply is fixed/deflationary) is too straightforward to be of any help.

Curve's governance token CRV is on an inflation schedule, so while it's not deflationary like DANA it's not ad-hoc like MKR. In the case of this attack vector, we think CRV is closer

to DANA than to MKR, so we are obliged to consider why hasn't Curve been subject to this attack? While an analysis of Curve's pegging strategy is out of scope for the current document, we weakly believe that this is something that simply hasn't happened *yet* but there's no in-principle reason why Curve is resilient to this attack.

#### **IV.6.2.2. Best we can do**

**Belief IV.6.1** (No float exploit mitigation strategy better than centralization). *Obliging an administrative war chest to secure the protocol by diversifying the float is the best idea we have to mitigate the above scenario.*

#### **IV.6.2.3. Centralization**

The authorship of the current document is assured that it is Ardana's intentions to decentralize this mechanism as quickly as possible after launch.

# Chapter V.

## Postamble

### V.1. Toward formal verification

Formal verification (FV) was considered too time-intensive to do before launch. The authorship of the current document was seen as a sort of warmup for FV. Now that we’re launched, we will begin a formal verification stage of the project.

Danaswap validators are the first priority for formal verification.

Other properties we’d like to prove

1. **Non-indebted pools are never liquidated.**
2. **“No money for nothing”:** no one can arbitrarily withdraw assets from the protocol without depositing something else or paying some fee.
3. **Modular resilience.** In the language of (Genovese 2018), **modular risk** of a composite contract is risk that is greater than the sum of the risks of the individual lego blocks. We would like not just for the Ardana project to be **compositional** (i.e. the sum risk is *no more* than the sum of the risks of the individual lego blocks), but for it to be compositional with respect to actors that may interact with it, arbitrarily.
4. Proofs of results from [Idealized Danaswap vs. an attacker with infinite money](#) .

### V.2. Future work

Numerous research opportunities are out of scope for the current document.

### **V.2.1. What is the general delta in incentives off ethereum via no-multistep-atomic-transactions?**

As mentioned in [IV.4.1](#), there are no multi-step atomic transactions in Cardano.

### **V.2.2. Compare/contrast transaction-ordering dependence risks across ethereum to cardano and other blockchains.**

For the current document, we lack any confidence level regarding the frontrunning question because we are waiting on publications or code from IOHK to determine network fee resolution. A comment in (Guillemont 2021) suggests that miner-type frontrunning will not be an issue, but our confidence is not high in everything shaking out that way.

### **V.2.3. Liquidity arbitrage**

Liquidity arbitrage is when an arbitrageur attempts to play **Danaswap** pools against each other. Liquidity tokens may be priced one way in subpool  $P_i$  and priced another way in  $P_j$ . As an intuition, we can block this by making a different type of liquidity token per subpool; but we don't want to do this for user experience reasons (a zoo of liquidity tokens may be prohibitively difficult to reason about for all but a select few power users).

There is also the extent to which liquidity arbitrage arises due to parallelization, with synchronization questions across pools complexifying the problem.

Further research pressure ought to be applied to see if liquidity arbitrage aligns with the function of arbitrage in general ([IV.2.2](#)) or forms a kind of threat.

### **V.2.4. Idealized Danaswap vs. an attacker with infinite money**

We take the limit case of an idealized **Danaswap** which has arbitrary facility to add subpools and consider how an attacker with infinite money would approach making **Danaswap**'s beliefs less true. This thought experiment could provide confidence in beliefs along the lines of [IV.2](#), and instruct us to for instance impose minimum trade requirements or implement automatic addition and subtraction of pools such that the protocol becomes more resilient to "economic DoS."

### **V.2.5. Resilience of Danaswap to action-based [Price manipulation](#)**

In [IV.2](#) we considered trade-based manipulation and briefly mentioned centralization's opening to information-based manipulation, but (Pirrong 2017) also defines action-based manipulation. As Ardana is one component in a chaotic system consisting of many different kinds of agents and assets both onchain and offchain, there is *some* degree to which action-based (like when you short-sell your own stock, close down your physical capital centers, cover your short position, then reopen the physical capital centers) manipulation could play a role.

### **V.2.6. Understand [IV.6.1.1](#) better to come up with a *minimal* intervention**

Ardana's intervention to mitigate the problem of a whale sitting on DANA is a little heavy handed. While it is in scope for the post-launch evolution of the platform to work on decentralizing the mitigation is installed at launch, it also may warrant application of research pressure to come up with different solutions.

### **V.2.7. Compare/contrast across the marketplace of throughput strategies**

(Thomas 2021c) seeds a methodology for analyzing throughput strategies, which should be built on as each new product introduces novel solutions. An example approach is for each product to answer the [Frontrunning](#) question separately.



# Chapter VI.

## Bibliography

10 “Ardana.” 2021. WEBSITE IS IN FLUX / INSERT URL HERE WHEN IT COOLS DOWN<sup>1</sup>.

Egorov, Michael. 2019. “StableSwap - Efficient Mechanism for Stablecoin Liquidity.” <https://curve.fi/files/stableswap-paper.pdf>.

Genovese, Fabrizio Romano. 2018. “Modularity Vs Compositionality: A History of Misunderstandings.” <https://blog.statebox.org/modularity-vs-compositionality-a-history-of->

Guillemont, Sebastien. 2021. “[FR] - Increase Network Throughput.” GitHub issue. 2021. <https://github.com/input-output-hk/cardano-node/issues/3247>.

IOHK. 2020. “FAQ: Native Tokens (Cardano’s Multi-Asset Support Feature).” 2020. <https://cardano-ledger.readthedocs.io/en/latest/explanations/faq.html>.

Kerckhove, Tom Sydney. 2021. “JSON Vulnerability in Haskell’s Aeson Library.” 2021. <https://cs-syd.eu/posts/2021-09-11-json-vulnerability>.

Kiayias, Aggelos, Alexander Russell, Bernardo David, and Roman Oliynykov. 2017. “Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol.” *CRYPTO 2017*. <https://iohk.io/en/research/library/papers/ouroboros-a-provably-secure-proof-of-stake>

Lee, Ian. 2020. “Fork Defense Strategies in DeFi.” Bankless Newsletter. 2020. <https://newsletter.banklesshq.com/p/fork-defense-strategies-in-defi>.

Ma, Richard, Jan Gorzny, Edward Zulkoski, Kacper Back, and Olga V. Mack. 2019. *Fundamentals of Smart Contract Security*. Momentum Press.

MakerDAO. 2015. “The Maker Protocol: MakerDAO’s Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD) System.” [https://makerdao.com/whitepaper/White%20Paper%20-The%](https://makerdao.com/whitepaper/White%20Paper%20-The%20)

---

<sup>1</sup><https://WEBSITE%20IS%20IN%20FLUX%20/%20INSERT%20URL%20HERE%20WHEN%20IT%20COOLS%20DOWN>

20Maker%20Protocol\_%20MakerDAO%E2%80%99s%20Multi-Collateral%20Dai%20(MCD)%20System-FINAL-%20021720.pdf.

MLabs, Team. 2021. “Common Plutus Vulnerabilities.” 2021. <https://mlabs.slab.com/public/posts/j8pjrj5y>.

Obimbo, Charlie, Yong Zhou, and Randy Nguyen. 2018. “Analysis of Vulnerabilities of Web Browser Extensions.” In *2018 International Conference on Computational Science and Computational Intelligence (CSCI)*, 116–19. <https://doi.org/10.1109/CSCI46756.2018.00029>.

Pirrong, Craig. 2017. “The Economics of Commodity Market Manipulation: A Survey.” [https://www.bauer.uh.edu/spirrong/manipulation\\_review\\_JCM\\_Pirrong.pdf](https://www.bauer.uh.edu/spirrong/manipulation_review_JCM_Pirrong.pdf).

Shapira, Isaac. 2021a. “Ensuring Your Personal Digital Security.” *Journal.Platonic.Systems*. <https://journal.platonic.systems/p/ensuring-your-personal-digital->

———. 2021b. “Securing Ardana Swap.” INTERNALLY CIRCULATING / ADD HYPERLINK HERE WHEN PUBLISHED<sup>2</sup>.

Thomas, Morgan. 2021a. “Danaswap: A Scalable Decentralized Exchange for the Cardano Blockchain.” <https://docsend.com/view/v4w3muusi6im3ay2>.

———. 2021b. “Parallel Transaction Processing for Decentralized Exchange Smart Contracts on the Cardano Blockchain.” INTERNALLY CIRCULATING / ADD HYPERLINK HERE WHEN PUBLISHED<sup>3</sup>.

———. 2021c. “Transaction Throughput Scalability Strategies for Plutus Smart Contracts.” *Journal.Platonic.Systems*. <https://journal.platonic.systems/p/scaling-with-utxos>.

Thomson, Edward. 2021. “GitHub Advisory Database Now Powers Npm Audit.” 2021. <https://github.blog/2021-10-07-github-advisory-database-now-powers-npm-audit/>.

---

<sup>2</sup><https://INTERNALLY%20CIRCULATING%20/%20ADD%20HYPERLINK%20HERE%20WHEN%20PUBLISHED>

<sup>3</sup><https://INTERNALLY%20CIRCULATING%20/%20ADD%20HYPERLINK%20HERE%20WHEN%20PUBLISHED>