

# Chapitre 2

## Cryptography Basics

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
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# Outline

- Introduction
- Cryptography
  - Symmetric key encryption: DES, AES
  - Public key encryption: RSA, ECC
  - Hash functions
- Key distribution and certification


# Introduction

Cryptography – From plaintext to cipher, and back



# Introduction

## Computational security

- Encryption scheme is said “*computationally secure*” if
  - The cost of breaking the cipher exceeds the value of the encrypted information,
  - The time required to break the cipher exceeds the useful lifetime of the information.
- One approach to crack an encryption is a brute-force approach (*exhaustive search*)
- On average, half of all possible keys have to be tried to find the needed key.
- No *security by obfuscation*
  - Use algorithms allowing public scrutiny 
  - Don't design your own algorithm

# Introduction

## Where is the secret?


- Symmetric key cryptography
  - Sender and receiver's keys are identical
  - They share a secret
- Public key cryptography
  - Encryption key public, decryption key secret (private)
  - Secret on single side

# Outline

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- Cryptography
  - Symmetric key encryption: DES, AES
  - Public key encryption: RSA, ECC
  - Hash functions
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# Symmetric key cryptography

- Alice and Bob share know same (symmetric) key
- Key  $K_{A-B}$  is (seed for) substitution pattern
- How do Bob and Alice agree on key value?



# Symmetric key cryptography

## Basic examples (1/3)

- Principle: substitute plaintext with ciphertext
- Caesar cipher  $k$ 
  - Substitute a letter by another one,  $k$  positions later
  - bob, i love you. alice → ere, l oryh brx. dolfh
  - 25 key values
- Monoalphabetic cipher
  - No regular pattern

Plaintext letter:	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
Ciphertext letter:	m	n	b	v	c	x	z	a	s	d	f	g	h	j	k	l	p	o	i	u	y	t	r	e	w	q


- bob, i love you. alice → nkn, s gktc wky. mgsbc
- $26! = 403 \cdot 10^{24}$  key values



# Symmetric key cryptography

## Basic examples (2/3)


- Monoalphabetic cipher (con't)
  - Attack eased by statistical analysis of content



- Polyalphabetic encryption
  - Multiple, successive encodings
  - Example: Caesar ciphers  $k = \{5, 19\} + C_1 C_2 C_2 C_1 C_2$
  - **b**ob, **i** love **y**ou. **a**lice → **w**vi, **d** sjcl **t**vp. **h**sd**j**z

# Symmetric key cryptography

## Basic examples (3/3)




Source : Wikipedia

- Polyalphabetic encryption (con't)
  - Enigma (World War II)
  - Substitution scheme changed for each character
  - Secret: rotors + initial position of rotors and cables
  - Brute-force: 158,962,555,217,826,360,000 settings

# Symmetric key cryptography

## Data Encryption Standard (DES, 1/3)




- Chunks of 64-bit plaintext input encrypted with 56-bit symmetric key
- Encryption
  - Initial permutation
  - 16 identical “rounds” of
    - Swap left-right
    - Function application, each using a different 48-bit key derived from the 56-bit key
    - Function combines expansion, substitution and XOR
  - Final permutation
- Decryption: reverse operations


# Symmetric key cryptography

## Data Encryption Standard (DES, 2/3)

- Expansion (E-Box)



- Permutation (P-Box)



- Actual connections depend on the secret

# Symmetric key cryptography


## Data Encryption Standard (DES, 3/3)


- Goal: no correlation between ciphertext and either original data or encryption key
- No known “backdoor” decryption approach, only exhaustive search
- How secure is DES? DES Challenge

Challenge I	January 1997	96 days
Challenge II-1	February 1998	41 days
Challenge II-2	July 1998	56 hours
Challenge III	January 1999	22,25 hours

# Symmetric key cryptography

## 3-DES – CBC

- 3-DES: sequence of three DES encodings
- Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC)
  - $\text{XOR}(K(m^j), m^{(j+1)})$  before cyphering  $m^{(j+1)}$  
  - IEEE 802.11i




# Symmetric key cryptography

## Advanced Encryption Standard (AES, 1/2)

- Originally proposed in 2000 as Rijndael by Vincent Rijmen (KULeuven) and Joan Daemen (Proton World International)
- Adopted by NIST as DES replacement
- A machine able to crack 56-bit DES in one second would need  $149 \cdot 10^{12}$  years to crack AES
- No academic attack based on cryptanalysis found yet. Repeated attempts to shorten sequence of operations.

# Symmetric key cryptography

## Advanced Encryption Standard (AES, 2/2)



- Chunks of 128 bits using 128-, 192- and 256-bit keys
- 10/12/14 identical “rounds” of
  - Byte substitution
  - Row shifting
  - Column mixing
  - Addition with key + rounding
- Illustration

Source: <http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto/images/rijnab.gif>



# Symmetric key cryptography

## AES cryptanalysis

- Repeated attempts to shorten the sequence
- First meaningful success in [august 2011](#)
- Equivalent to a 2-bit reduction of the key length (gain = 4)
- Number of steps for brute-force attacks remains  $8 \cdot 10^{37}$
- With  $10^{12}$  devices testing  $10^9$  keys per second, still  $2 \cdot 10^9$  years requested to find a given key


# Symmetric key cryptography

## Other algorithms

- Non exhaustive list
  - Ron Rivest's Ciphers RC2, RC4 (Prohibited, RFC 7465), RC5, RC6 (AES candidate)
  - International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)
  - CAST (C Adams, S. Tavares)
- Similar method
  - Split plaintext in  $N$ -bit words
  - Repeat basic secret key-dependent operations
  - Substitution, permutation, XOR, etc

# Public key cryptography

- Alice fetches Bob's public key  $K_B^+$  and encrypts message using  $K_B^+$  and a standardised algorithm
- Bob decrypts ciphertext using his own private key  $K_B^-$



# Public key cryptography

## Requirements

- Pretty simple
- Two requirements
  - $K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m = K_B^+(K_B^-(m))$
  - Given the public key  $K_B^+$ , it should be impossible to derive the private key  $K_B^-$
- Drawbacks
  - Enables chosen plaintext attacks, since anyone can send a ciphered message
  - Key ownership not longer authenticates sender
- Algorithms
  - 1<sup>st</sup> generation: RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman)
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> generation: ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography)



# Public key cryptography

## RSA – Key generation

- Using modulo- $n$  arithmetic
  - Choose two large prime numbers  $p, q$  (e.g. 1,024 bits each)
  - Compute  $n = pq$ ,  $z = (p-1)(q-1)$
  - Choose  $e$  (with  $e < n$ ) that has no common factors with  $z$  ( $e, z$  are “relatively prime”)
  - Choose  $d$  such that  $ed-1$  is exactly divisible by  $z$  (in other words:  $ed \bmod z = 1$ )
  - Public key is  $K_B^+ = (n, e)$ , private key is  $K_B^- = (n, d)$
- Example
  - $p = 5, q = 7$
  - $n = 35, z = 24, e = 5 < 35, d = 29$



# Public key cryptography

## RSA – Key generation with OpenSSL

- Generate a pair of keys  
`openssl genrsa -out my.key -aes128 1024`
- Check the keys (actually  $p, q, n, e, d$ )  
`openssl rsa -in my.key -noout -text`
- Extract public key  $K^+$   
`openssl rsa -in my.key -out mypub.key -pubout`

# Public key cryptography

## RSA – Cyphering and decyphering

- Given  $(n, e)$  and  $(n, d)$  as computed above
  - To encrypt bit pattern  $m$ , compute  $c = m^e \bmod n$  (i.e., remainder when  $m^e$  is divided by  $n$ )
  - To decrypt bit pattern  $m$ , compute  $c^d \bmod n$  (i.e., remainder when  $c^d$  is divided by  $n$ )

$$\begin{aligned}c^d \bmod n &= (m^e)^d \bmod n \\&\stackrel{\Delta}{=} m^{[ed \bmod (p-1)(q-1)]} \bmod n \\&= m^1 \bmod n\end{aligned}$$

- Security relies on the absence (so far) of algorithms for quickly factoring  $n$  into  $p$  and  $q$
- Important property:  $K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m = K_B^+(K_B^-(m))$

# Public key cryptography

## RSA – Example

Plaintext Letter	$m$ : numeric representation	$m^e$	ciphertext $c = m^e \bmod n$
l	12	248832	17
o	15	759375	15
v	22	5153632	22
e	5	3125	10

Ciphertext $c$	$c$	$d$	$m = c^d \bmod n$	Plaintext Letter
17	481968572106750915091411825223071697	12	12	l
15	12783403948858939111232757568359375	15	15	o
22	851643319086537701956194499721106030592	22	22	v
10	10000000000000000000000000000000	5	5	e

- RSA generates extremely large numbers 
- Exponentiation is computationally demanding



# Public key cryptography


## RSA – Limits

- Moore's Law forces the increase of the size of the prime numbers
- Two issues
  - Smartphones and similar devices miss CPU and battery
  - Factorisation approximation algorithms (Quadratic Sieve, General Number Field Sieve) compute better results for large numbers
- Cryptography base on prime number factorisation is doomed
- Five years according to MIT Technology Review (august 2013)



# Public key cryptography

## ECC – Principle (1/2)




- $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$
- Symmetry w.r.t. x-axis
- Three section points per line
- Kind of snooker game
- Knowing the curve, point A and final point, how many runs to reach it ?




Nick Sullivan, « *A (relatively easy to understand) primer on elliptic curve cryptography* », Ars Technica, october 2013

# Public key cryptography


## ECC – Principle (2/2)



$$y^2 = x^3 - x + 1$$



Modulo 97  
Integers  
only



# Public key cryptography

## ECC vs. RSA

- Assuming
  - A prime number as modulo
  - An elliptic curve
  - A starting point A
- The pair of keys is
  - $K^-$ : a number n
  - $K^+$ : the point reached on the elliptic curve after n bounds
- Mathematical foundation : elliptic curve discrete logarithm
- Currently unsolvable but by brute force
- Same protection as RSA, but with shorter keys

# Cryptography


## Symmetric key vs. public key

Symmetric key	Public key
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Requires sender and receiver know shared secret key</li><li>• How to agree on key in first place (particularly if never “met”)?</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Radically different approach</li><li>• Sender and receiver do not share secret key</li><li>• Public encryption key <math>K_+</math> known to all</li><li>• Private decryption key <math>K_-</math> known only to receiver</li></ul>
Based on substitutions and permutations	Based on mathematical functions

# Cryptography

## Session key – Diffie-Hellman or mixed scheme

- Diffie-Hellman



- Mixed scheme

- Alice generates an AES key  $K_S$
- Alice encrypts it using Bob's public key  $K_B^+$
- Bob receives the RSA-encrypted key and decrypts it with its private key  $K_B^-$  to obtain the AES session key  $K_S$


# Cryptography

## Hash functions (1/2)

- Many-to-1 mapping
- Produces fixed-size outcome
- Examples: checksum, CRC

Message	ASCII Representation			
I O U 1	49	4F	55	31
0 0 . 9	30	30	2E	39
9 B O B	39	42	4F	42
	B2	C1	D2	AC

Message	ASCII Representation			
I O U 9	49	4F	55	39
0 0 . 1	30	30	2E	31
9 B O B	39	42	4F	42
	B2	C1	D2	AC



Checksum

Poor hash: easy to find two messages with same checksum

Checksum

Source: <http://cs.engr.uky.edu/~lewis/essays/algorithms/hashing/hashing.html>

# Cryptography

## Hash functions (2/2)

- Property of a strong hash function: it is computationally infeasible to find two messages  $x$  and  $y$  such that  $H(x) = H(y)$
- Strategies
  - Multiplicative:  $H(x) = 1 + (x/k)*M$  if  $0 < x < k$
  - Modular:  $H(x) = 1 + x \bmod M$
  - Hybrid:  $H(x) = 1 + \alpha x \bmod M$
- Rules of thumb
  - $M$  = prime number
  - $\alpha = 0.618033$



# Cryptography

## Hash functions – Examples

- MD2/4/5 hash functions ([RFC 1321](#))

```
openssl dgst -md5 plaintext.txt
```

- Secure Hash Algorithm : SHA-0/1/2/3 (a.k.a. Keccak)
- RIPEMD-128/160/256/320

# Cryptography

## Summary

Symmetric key	Public key	Hash functions
AES	ECC	MD2/4/5
ChaCha20	RSA	SHA-0 <sup>†</sup> /1 <sup>†</sup> /2/3
3-DES		RIPEMD-128/160
RC2, RC4 <sup>†</sup> , RC5		Poly1305
IDEA		
CAST		

# Cryptography

## Post-Snowden era



The screenshot shows the top of an Ars Technica UK article. The header includes the site logo, navigation links for 'MAIN MENU', 'MY STORIES: 25', and 'FORUMS'. The article is categorized under 'RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM'. The title is 'How the NSA can break trillions of encrypted Web and VPN connections', with a subtitle 'Researchers show how mass decryption is well within the NSA's £7 billion budget.' The author is 'Dan Goodin (US)' and the date is 'Oct 15, 2015 9:15pm CEST'. Social media sharing buttons for Facebook and Twitter are visible, along with a comment count of 97. The main image shows server racks with a QR code overlaid on the right side.

- No hint that mathematical one-way functions have been inverted
- But hints that implementations have been deliberately weakened

# Cryptography

## Summary

Cryptography		Until 2020	From 2020
Symmetric (AES)	Keys	100 bits	128 bits
	Words	64 bits	128 bits
Factorisation (RSA)	Modulo	2,048 bits	4,096 bits
	Exponents	$\geq 2^{16}$	$\geq 2^{16}$
ECC	Modulo	200 bits	256 bits
Hash	Digest	200 bits	256 bits




Source : Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information, « Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques », january 2010.

# Outline

- Introduction
- Cryptography
  - Symmetric key encryption: DES, AES
  - Public key encryption: RSA, ECC
  - Hash functions
- Key distribution and certification

# Key distribution and certification

## Person-in-the-middle attack



- Trudy can impersonate Alice with her own pair of keys
- Eventually, Alice and Bob will find out

# Key distribution and certification


## Trusted Third Party (TTP)

	Symmetric key	Public key
Issue	How to share a secret key?	How to securely collect a public key?
Solution: TTP	Key Distribution Centre (KDC)	Certification Authority (CA)

# Key distribution and certification

## Key Distribution Center (KDC)


- The KDC shares a secret key with each user
- A given user only knows the key it shares with the KDC
- The KDC helps its registered users to share a one-time session key (Needham-Schroeder protocol)





# Key distribution and certification

## Certification Authority (CA) – X.509 standard




- B provides “proof of identity” to CA.
- CA creates certificate binding B to  $K_B^+$
- Certificate containing B's public key digitally signed by CA
- CA says “this is B's public key”

# Key distribution and certification

## Certification Authority (CA) – X.509 standard


- When Alice wants Bob's public key:
  - She gets Bob's certificate, either directly from Bob or elsewhere
  - She applies CA's public key to Bob's certificate to extract Bob's valid public key



# Key distribution and certification

## Certification Authority (CA) – X.509 standard


- X.509 = ITU-T standard for Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)



# Key distribution and certification

## Belgian eID Card


- Only for authentication and signature, not cyphering
- X.509 certificates stored on chip



	Private Key (Java Object)	Public Key (Java Object)	X.509 Certificates (Transparent file)
Basic	PrK#1		
Authentication	PrK#2	In Cert#2	Cert#2
Non-repudiation	PrK#3	In Cert#3	Cert#3
Certification Authority (CA)		In Cert#4	Cert#4
Commune		PuK#5	
Root			Cert#6
CA Role		PuK#7	
RN			Cert#8

# Key distribution and certification

## Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)



- PKI = authorities + directory + procedures (creation, update, revocation)
- Belgian eID
  - Publication of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)
  - Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service

# Summary

- Computationally secure
- Cryptography
  - Symmetric key encryption: DES, AES
  - Public key encryption: RSA, ECC
  - Hash functions
- Key distribution and certification