Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Operating Systems

Lecture 21: Security (1)

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Overview

- Overview of security problems
- Permission management
- System software and security
- Software bugs
- Examples
- Conclusions



Security problems

- Definitions of relevant terms
 - Safety
 - protection against risks due to hardware and software errors or failures
 - Security
 - protection of users and computers against intended errors (attacks)
- Both topics are highly relevant for system software
 - Today, we will only discuss security
- Exploitation of security holes
 - malware
 - social engineering



Operating system security

- Someone...
 - differentiation of persons and groups of persons
- has to be deterred from doing...
 - using technical and organizational methods
- some...
 - limited only by our imagination
- unexpected things!
 - 1) unauthorized reading of data (secrecy, confidentiality),
 - 2) unauthorized writing of data (integrity),
 - 3) working under a "false flag" (authenticity),
 - 4) unauthorized use of resources (availability),
 - etc...
- Differentiation between
 - internal
 - and external attacks



Example: fake login screen

- Attacker starts a user program that simulates a login screen
- The unsuspecting user enters username and (secret) password
 - Attacker program records user name and password
 - Attacker program terminates the current shell
- Login session of the attacker is closed and the regular login screen appears
 - User assumes incorrectly typed password
- Remedy: require the user to start the login sequence using a key combination that cannot be intercepted by a user program
 - e.g. CTRL-ALT-DEL in Windows NT and following



Malware example: viruses

- Program code inserted into another program, which can be replicated this way
 - Virus sleeps until the infected program is executed
 - Start of the infected program results in virus reproduction
 - Execution of the virus functionality can be time-controlled
- Sorts of viruses
 - Boot sector virus: executed at system startup time
 - Macro virus: in scriptable programs, e.g. Word, Excel
 - Reproduced through documents (e.g. sent by email)!
 - Executable program as virus
- Distribution through...
 - exchange of storage media (USB memory sticks etc.)
 - email attachments
 - web pages



Example: social engineering

- Not a system software problem
 - ...but very important
- Gain access to information by exploiting human errors

Phishing

- obtain data of an internet user using forged addresses (e.g. with similar names/typos)
- e.g. by using forged emails from banks or government institutions

Pharming

- manipulation of DNS requests by web browsers
- redirect accesses, e.g. to forged bank websites
- most users ignore browser warnings about invalid security certificates



Types of malware

Viruses

- programs inadvertently distributed by a user
- infect other programs
- …and reproduce this way

Worms

- do not wait for user actions to propagate to another computer
- actively try to invade new systems
- exploit security holes on target systems
- Trojan horses ("trojans")
 - program disguised as useful application (or game...)
 - in addition to the useful function, additional functionality is provided without the user noticing, e.g. providing an attacker with access to the local computer via internet



Types of malware (2)

Root kit

- collection of software tools to...
 - disguise future logins of an attacker
 - hide processes and files
- is installed after a computer system is compromised
- can hide itself and its activities from the user
 - e.g. by manipulating tools to display processes (ps), directory contents (ls), network connections (netstat) ...
 - ...or by manipulating system-wide shared libraries (libc)
 - ...or directly by manipulating the OS kernel
- Often, malware uses a combination of these types



Permission management: objectives

- Protect stored information from
 - breach of confidentiality
 - theft of information
 - unwanted manipulation (including encryption: ransomware)
- in all multi-user systems
 - ...and every system connected to the Internet is in fact a multi-user system!



Permission management: requirements

- All objects of a system must be uniquely and unforgeably identifiable
- (external) users of a system must be uniquely and unforgeably identifiable
 - authentication
- Access to objects allowed only if the user has the required permissions
- Access to objects should only be allowed using the appropriate object management
 - permissions must be stored in an unforgeable way; transfer of permissions must only take place it a controlled way
 - it must be possible to validate basic protection mechanisms
 with low overhead



Permission management: design principles

- Principle of least privilege
 - Allow a person or software component only those permissions that are required for the functionality to be realized
 - Standard case: deny permission
 - Counterexample: Unix "root"
- Fail-safe defaults
 - Example: newly installed server software
- Separation of duties
 - Multiple conditions exist to allow an operation



Access matrix

- Elements of the matrix:
 - Subjects (persons/users, processes)
 - Objects (data, devices, processes, memory, ...)
 - Operations (read, write, delete, execute, ...)
- Question: Is operation(subject, object) permitted?





Basic model: file/process attributes

- Properties related to a user:
 - for which user is the process being executed?
 - which user is the owner of a file?
 - which permissions does the owner of a file give to him/ herself and which permissions to other users?
- Permissions of a process when accessing a file
 - Attributes of processes: user ID
 - Attributes of files: owner ID

	file 1	file 2	file 3
user 1			
user 2		read	
user 3			
user 4			

Access matrix variants

- Colums: ACL Access Control Lists
 - for every access to an object, the access permissions are validated based on the identity of the requesting subject (user)
- Rows: Capabilities
 - for every access to an object a property is validated which is owned by the subject and which can be passed to other subjects on demand
- Rule-based: mandatory access control
 - rules are evaluated for every access



ACLs

- Column-wise view of the access matrix:
 Access Control List (ACL)
- ACLs indicate for every object which subjects are allowed to perform which operations on it

	Objects	
Subjects	Permissions	

ACLs

- ACLs can be configured by...
 - subjects having an appropriate ACL entry granting this permission
 - the creator of the object (file)
- Example: Multics OS triplet (user, group, permissions)


```
File 0 (Jan, *, RWX)
File 1 (Jan, system, RWX)
File 2 (Jan, *, RW-), (Els, staff, R--), (Maike, *, RW-)
File 3 (*, student, R--)
File 4 (Jelle, *, ---), (*, student, R--)
```


- Windows (starting with NT)
 - object: allow, deny
 - full control, modify, read&execute, ...



Unix access permissions

- Unix: simple access control lists
- Processes have a user ID and a group ID
- Files have an owner and a group
- Permissions are related to the <u>u</u>ser (owner), <u>g</u>roup, and all <u>o</u>thers





Problem: permission extensions

- Example keep a high score list for a game
 - High score list: /home/me/games/tetris/highscores
 - Program: /home/me/bin/games/tetris
- Every player should be able to enter his/her own high score
- 1. all users have write permission to the high score list
 - too many permissions (does not work)
 - every user could arbitrarily manipulate the high score list
- 2. SetUID: only "me" has write permissions
 - Tetris program has "setuid" permissions
 - as soon as the Tetris program is executed, the process is assigned the user ID of the owner of the executable program



Unix: users and processes

- Each process represents a user
- Process attributes:
 - User ID (uid), group ID (gid)
 - Effective uid (euid), effective gid (egid)
 - Determine permissions of a process when accessing files

Only a few highly privileged processes are allowed to change

their uid and gid

- e.g. the login process
- After verifying the user's password, the login process sets uid, gid, euid and egid
 - All other processes: children of login
- Child processes inherit the parent attributes

uid: fritz gid: students euid: fritz egid: students

Unix solution: setuid mechanism

- File which contains trustworthy program code (e.g. Tetris) is given an additional permission bit: **setuid** (s bit)
 - shown as "s" instead of "x" for executable in directory listing
 - there is also a setgid bit (rarely used)
- exec of setuid programs:
 - executing process obtains the UID of the program owner as effective UID
 - precisely: the UID of the file containing the program
- Process execution performed using the permissions of this user as long as the program is not terminated
 - Contradicts the principle of least privilege
 - Workaround: create special user for the application instead of using "root"
 - It is considered good programming style to return any setuid permissions as soon as they are no longer required by a process



Example: high score list

Shell

uid: fritz

gid: students


euid: fritz

egid: students


Tetris		
r-s	x	
		others
	group:	tetris
user: michael		

Highscores		
rw-	r	
		others
	group:	tetris
user: michael		

Example: high score list (2)




Tetris			
r-s	x		
		others	
	group: tetris		
user: michael			






Example: high score list (3)



Tetris			
r-s	x		
		others	
	group: tetris		
user: michael			



setuid problems

- Extension of the permissions of a user exactly for the case of using the given program
- "Owner" of the program trusts the user who is using the program
 - Owner can be the administrator, but also normal users
- Problem: program bugs
 - can result in significant permission extensions
 - e.g. enable calling a shell (with inherited permissions of the owner of the setuid process) from such a program
- Practical experience: still to many permissions granted!




Capabilities

- Row-wise view of the access matrix: Capability
- Capabilities indicate for each subject in which ways it is allowed to access which objects

	Objects	
Subjects	Permissions	


Example

- Basic implementation: Unix file descriptors
- Propagated using the fork system call
 - Allows access to files without repeated validation of the Unix access permissions



Rule-based access matrix

- Mandatory Access Control
- Concept:
 - subjects and objects possess attributes ("labels")
 - decision about granting access by evaluating rules
- Implemented in "security kernels", e.g. SELinux



Evaluated for every access using a set of given rules

System software and security

- Hardware-based protection
 - MMU
 - protection rings
- ...complemented by protection in the system software
 - Exclusive control of the hardware by the OS
 - Exclusive control of all processes
 - Exclusive control of all resources
 - Provisioning of
 - identification mechanisms
 - authentication mechanisms
 - privilege separation
 - cryptographic protection of information




Hardware-based protection: MMU

- Memory Management Unit
 - Hardware component of the CPU that translates and controls program accesses to memory
 - Translation of the process view (virtual addresses) into the hardware view (physical addresses)
- Main memory is partitioned into pages
- Protection by...
 - only mapping the exact set of required main memory pages into the virtual address space of a process
 - isolation of the physical address spaces of different processes
 - protection bits for each page, controlled at every access
 - read/write/execute code
 - access permitted in user mode/supervisor mode



Protection rings

- Privilege concept
 - All code is executed in the context of a given protection ring
 - Code running in ring 0 has access to all system resources
 - User programs run in ring 3
 - Rings 1 & 2 for OS-like code
 - e.g. device drivers
- Rings restrict...
 - the usable subset of processor machine instructions
 - e.g. disabling interrupts (sei/cli) not permitted in rings > 0
 - the accessible address range for the process
 - disabling of I/O accesses




Software-based protection

- Identification mechanisms
- Unix: user and group identification
 - Numeric value
 - Translated into texts (user and group names) durch lookup in /etc/passwd
- Resources are assigned an owner
- Superuser: uid = 0
 - Has all permissions possible in the system




Software-based protection (2)

- Authentication mechanisms
 - Unix login
 - Reads user name and password



- Verification of the entered password with the one recorded in the system
 - Either by encrypting the entered password and comparison with the recorded encrypted value
 - Or by verification of a hash value
- The login process then starts the first user process (e.g., a shell) with the uid and gid of this user





Software-based protection (3)

- Cryptographic protection of information
 - e.g. DES encryption of user passwords
 - Originally in Unix stored in the file /etc/passwd

```
root:4t6f4rt3423:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh
daemon:ge53r3rfrg:1:1:System Services:/var/root:/usr/bin/false
me:1x3Fe5$gRd:1000:1000:Michael Engel:/home/me:/bin/bash
```

- Problem: encrypted passwords were readable for all users!
 - ...could be decrypted using a "brute force" attack given enough time
 - readily available tools, e.g. "John the Ripper"
- Today: only user information stored in /etc/passwd
 - Passwords are now stored separately in /etc/shadow!

```
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1353 May 28 22:43 /etc/passwd -rw-r--- 1 root shadow 901 May 28 22:43 /etc/shadow
```



Software bugs

- Trade-off: performance ↔ security
- C, C++, Assembler: unmanaged languages
 - Pointers, array bounds, value overflows
- C#, Java: managed languages
 - Not usable for system software development!
 - ...why?
 - Managed languages also have security problems!
- Problems
 - Buffer overflows
 - Value range overflows
- Error statistics
 - One error per 1000 lines of code on average
 - Independent of the implementation language!



Value ranges

- Problem: integer numbers are represented as bit strings with a limited number of bits
- Example: "char" data type in C
 - Represented as signed 8 bit value
 - Value range: -2⁷ ... +2⁷ 1
 - ...or -128 ... +127

```
char a = 127;
char b = 3;
char result = a + b;
```

 The C code results in the following calculation in binary:

```
01111111 (a)
+00000011 (b)
10000010 (result
is negative!)
```

- Only the least significant 8 bits are significant
 - thus the result = -126!



Value ranges (2)

The following code results in problems:

```
char string[127] = "Hello World!\n"
char a = 127;
char b = 3;

...

char myfunc(char *string, char index) {
   return string[index];
}

...
printf("%x", myfunc(string, a+b));
```

Heap overflow

- Heap: memory area for dynamically allocated data (e.g. via malloc)
- Buffer overflows in the heap can be problematic
 - Memory ranges separately allocated with malloc can be contiguous in main memory
 - There are no checks for overflows
 - By passing incorrect sizes for data regions, an attacker can overwrite other data on the heap
- Example: Microsoft JPEG GDI+ (MS04-028)
 - Size values in JPEG image files were not controlled
 - "Normal" images files contain valid values
 - These do not result in erroneous behavior
 - Manipulated image files contain invalid values
 - Overwrite other data on the heap



Heap overflow (2)

```
#define BUFSIZE 16
#define OVERSIZE 8 /* overflow buf2 by OVERSIZE bytes */
int main(void) {
  u long diff;
  char *buf1 = malloc(BUFSIZE),
       *buf2 = malloc(BUFSIZE);
  diff = (u long)buf2 - (u long)buf1;
  printf("buf1 = %p, buf2 = %p, diff = 0x\%x\n", buf1, buf2, diff);
  memset(buf2, 'A', BUFSIZE-1);
  buf2[BUFSIZE-1] = ' \ 0';
  printf("before overflow: buf2 = %s\n", buf2);
  memset(buf1, 'B', (u int)(diff + OVERSIZE));
  printf("after overflow: buf2 = %s\n", buf2);
  return 0;
```

Result...

The value range is exceeded by 8 bytes

```
root /w00w00/heap/examples/basic]# ./heap1
buf1 = 0x804e000, buf2 = 0x804eff0, diff = 0xff0 bytes
before overflow: buf2 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
after overflow: buf2 = BBBBBBBBBAAAAAAA
```

- buf1 exceeds its limit and arrives at the heap area in which buf2 is stored
- This heap area of buf2 still has valid contents
- Thus, the program does not terminate, but rather unexpectedly manipulates the data stored in buf2!

Unix Morris worm (sendmail)

- One of the first worms distributed over the Internet
- Written by a student of Cornell University, Robert Tappan Morris, and activated on November 2, 1988, from a computer at the MIT
 - From the MIT to disguise the real origin of the worm
 - Today, Robert Tappan Morris is professor at the MIT! :-)
- Exploited a security hole in the sendmail system
 - Buffer overflow in gets()
 - Written to determine the size of the Internet, should infect each system only once
 - ...but had a fatal bug in its replication function!
- 6000 Unix systems infected
 - Cost of fixing damages estimated between US\$10 and US\$100 million
 - ...Morris was convicted to 3 years jail on probation and a US\$10.000 fine...





Michelangelo virus

- First discovered in New Zealand in 1991
- Boot sector virus, infects e.g. MS-DOS systems
 - Only uses BIOS functions, no DOS system calls
- Time-activated virus, active on March 6th
- Overwrites the first 100 sectors of the (first) hard disk with zeros
- Distribution using boot sectors of floppy disks
 - Installed itself in the boot sector of the hard disk
- One of the first viruses broadly discussed in the media
 - ...but its effects were spectacularly exaggerated ;-)
- Some commercial software was accidentally delivered on disks with a boot sector virus
 - Today: viruses on USB memory sticks, mobile phones with USB interfaces, ...fresh from the factory!



Sony BMG root kit

- Software on copy protected CD-ROMs with Digital "Rights" Management (DRM) technology
 - Filtering driver for CD-ROM drives and IDE disk controllers to control access to media
 - Installed without informing the user or asking for approval
- Control over the use of data of Sony BMG
 - ...on Windows systems
- Hidden from analysis using root kit functionality
 - Does not appear in the installed software list of the Windows control center and is not removable using uninstaller tools
 - Does not only hide related files, directories, processes and registry entries, but globally everything starting with the string \$sys\$
 - Enables other malware to hide itself using this root kit functionality!



Blue Pill - VM-based root kit

- Discovery and removal of root kits on OS level is possible
 - But costly
- Objective: "undiscoverable" root kit
- "Blue Pill" tried to infect a PC with a root kit without requiring a system reboot
 - Exploits hardware virtualization technology of current CPUs
 - No (significant) performance impact
 - All devices, e.g. GPUs, continue to be fully available to the OS
- Undiscoverable, since the OS does not notice that it is now running in a virtual machine
 - ...but there are still side effects that enable the detection of root kits like this



Conclusion

- Security gains increasing relevance in networked environments
 - Extremely significant damages due to viruses, phishing, bot nets, ransomware, ...
 - Experienced computer users are not safe either!
- Security checks in code are essential!
 - Automated tests cannot find all errors; manual audits still required
 - Still, security problems are unavoidable
 - Thus, system software has to be constantly updated
- Whack-a-mole game...
 - "Zero day exploits", newly discovered security holes which are not yet published (or fixed) are extremely dangerous
 - Reaction time of system software vendors are in the range of hours to months...
- Hardware is also increasingly problematic: "Meltdown" and "Spectre"

