

# ARGUN HILD

argun.hild@uni-mannheim.de  
argunhild.github.io

<b>Contact</b>	L7 3-5, 4 <sup>th</sup> Floor Mannheim, 68161 Germany +49 15737297379				
<b>Education</b>	<b>University of Mannheim</b> Ph.D. in Economics, 2020 – 2026 (expected) <i>Research visit:</i> Stockholm School of Economics, February – May 2025 <b>Central European University</b> M.A. in Economics ( <i>distinction</i> ), 2020 <b>ADA University</b> B.Sc. in Economics, 2018				
<b>Fields</b>	Primary Field: Behavioral and Experimental Economics Secondary Fields: Labor, Political Economy				
<b>References</b>	<table><tr><td>Henrik Orzen University of Mannheim henrik.orzen@uni-mannheim.de</td><td>Wladislaw Mill University of Mannheim mill@uni-mannheim.de</td></tr><tr><td>Anna Dreber Almenberg Stockholm School of Economics anna.dreber@hhs.se</td><td>Guido Friebe Goethe University Frankfurt gfriebe@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de</td></tr></table>	Henrik Orzen University of Mannheim henrik.orzen@uni-mannheim.de	Wladislaw Mill University of Mannheim mill@uni-mannheim.de	Anna Dreber Almenberg Stockholm School of Economics anna.dreber@hhs.se	Guido Friebe Goethe University Frankfurt gfriebe@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de
Henrik Orzen University of Mannheim henrik.orzen@uni-mannheim.de	Wladislaw Mill University of Mannheim mill@uni-mannheim.de				
Anna Dreber Almenberg Stockholm School of Economics anna.dreber@hhs.se	Guido Friebe Goethe University Frankfurt gfriebe@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de				
<b>Relevant Experience</b>	Researcher, Market Design Department, ZEW Mannheim, 2023–Present Teaching Assistant, Economics Department, University of Mannheim, 2023–Present Research Assistant, Economics Department, CEU, 2019–2020				
<b>Job Market Paper</b>	<b>Competing Against Stereotypes: Stereotyped Beliefs and Willingness to Compete</b> (with Michael Hilweg-Waldeck)				

Career choice, earnings, and other key economic outcomes have been linked to gender differences in willingness to compete. This paper examines how gender stereotypes shape these differences. We conduct a meta-study of prior work and demonstrate that the wide variation in gender competition gaps can be explained by stereotypes: Men enter competitions more in traditionally male-stereotyped domains, whereas in female-stereotyped domains, the gap is smaller or even reversed. Importantly, these differences are not explained by gender gaps in performance. To explore mechanisms, we collect belief data in an elicitation experiment. We find that stereotyped beliefs about gender performance differences explain more than half of the variation in competition gaps in the literature. Next, we experimentally manipulate stereotypes through framing and informational cues about others' beliefs. Although these interventions significantly shift beliefs, the effects do not translate into changes in competitive behavior. Our findings highlight the importance of stereotypes in shaping gender gaps in competitiveness while suggesting that shifting beliefs alone is unlikely to close these gaps without deeper or longer-term interventions.

## Working Paper

### **Why Don't Donors Deduct? Social Norms and the Limits of Tax Incentives**

(with Michael Hilweg-Waldeck)

Many donors leave tax benefits unclaimed even when doing so requires minimal effort and yields meaningful financial rewards. Findings from our representative survey point to confusion about how to deduct donations and to misperceived social norms about the moral appropriateness of doing so as the main drivers of this gap. We study how to tackle these two sources of the deduction gap by providing concise information on how to deduct donations and a one-sentence norm cue in an online experiment ( $n = 483$ ), a door-to-door field experiment with address-level randomization ( $n = 6,728$ ), and a radio-based campaign spanning two Austrian federal states. We find that almost all donors deduct when donating through the anonymous online tool. By contrast, during face-to-face fundraising, where social-image concerns are salient, fewer than 1 in 100 donors choose to do so. Across settings, information on how to deduct donations alone leaves deduction behavior unchanged, whereas combining this information with the norm cue increases take-up in the door-to-door setting. Our findings show that financial incentives can falter when clashing with misperceived norms in social settings, unless paired with campaigns that reshape those norms.

## Papers in Progress

### **Non-Standard Choice and Matching**

(with Gian Caspari, Vincent Meisner, Michael Hilweg-Waldeck), *data collection ongoing*

Choice mistakes arise when individuals' observed choices deviate from their underlying preferences, often due to cognitive overload or complex menus. This project studies such mistakes in matching markets through a controlled laboratory experiment. Participants face real-effort tasks bundled into menus of varying complexity. These are allocated via different assignment mechanisms, including classic serial dictatorship and a novel sequentialized variant. The design allows us to measure when and why mistakes occur and to evaluate how simplifying choice environments affects efficiency, stability, and incentive properties of market design.

### **Inequality as a Constraint on (Repugnant) Markets**

(with Jakob Schmidhäuser), *data collection ongoing*

Repugnant markets, such as organ sales, are often prohibited despite potential efficiency gains. We examine whether income inequality between transacting parties drives societal repugnance toward such transactions. Using vignettes depicting various transactions ranging from organ sales to waste trade on a U.S. sample, we find that inequality does not increase willingness to prevent repugnant transactions, in contrast to theoretical expectations. Instead, results suggest that weak egalitarian norms in the U.S. may mute sensitivity to inequality. To test this mechanism, we are replicating the study in Scandinavian countries, where egalitarian values are stronger. This cross-country comparison will provide new evidence on how inequality and cultural norms shape public acceptance of contested markets and inform debates on market regulation.

## Teaching Experience

Business Economics I (Game Theory), Teaching Assistant, Fall 2025  
Business Economics I (Game Theory), Teaching Assistant, Fall 2024  
Business Economics II (IO), Teaching Assistant, Spring 2024  
Business Economics II (IO), Teaching Assistant, Spring 2023

## Awards

IAREP/ELSEVIER Best Student Paper, 2025

<b>Seminars &amp; Conferences</b>	Chicago School in Experimental Economics, 2025 Western Economic Association International, 2025 Prague Conference on Behavioral Sciences, 2025 Valencia IMBESS, 2025 Florence MBEE, 2025 Stockholm School of Economics (Brown Bag), 2025 Stockholm University IIES (Brown Bag), 2025 Verona Experimental Meeting, 2024 Gender Gaps Conference, 2024 EER Summer School in Experimental Economics, 2024 Innsbruck Winter School on Credence Goods, 2022
<b>Academic Service</b>	HeiKaMaxY Workshop, 2024, organizer Conference on Research with and within Organizations, 2024, organizer
<b>Contributions</b>	Fišar, M., Greiner, B., Huber, C., Katok, E., Ozkes, A., and the Management Science Reproducibility Collaboration (2024). Reproducibility in Management Science. <i>Management Science</i>
<b>Languages</b>	English, German, Azerbaijani, Turkish
<b>Software Skills</b>	Stata, R, Python, JavaScript, LaTeX, oTree
<b>Citizenship</b>	Azerbaijan (German naturalization expected February 2026)