

**FIG. 1.** Interferometric quantum key distribution using four nonorthogonal one-photon states. Alice's source at left supplies single photon states, which are split by a symmetric beam splitter BS into two arms of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Alice applies (PSA) a random 0-, 90-, 180-, or 270-deg phase shift in one arm; Bob (PSB) a random 0- or 90-deg phase shift in the other arm. After the quantum transmission, Alice and Bob agree publicly to keep only those instances in which their phase shifts differ by 0 or 180 deg, causing the photon to behave deterministically at the second beam splitter.

disturbed by eavesdropping, and should be discarded.

Although the most familiar example of the EPR effect involves two-particle states with nonclassical spin correlations, it has been known for some time [8,9,13] that other two-particle states can be prepared, for example, by parametric down-conversion, which exhibit entirely analogous correlations in *phase* that can be observed interferometrically. Recently Franson [10] and Ekert, Rarity, and Tapster [11] have pointed out that these correlations too can be used for key distribution. Here we note the existence of one-particle versions of these two-particle schemes. As in the spin-based key distribution of Table I, the one-particle version involves random preparations by one party and random measurements by the other, while the two-particle scheme uses random measurements by both parties. A one-particle interferometric key distribution scheme, involving preparation and measurement of four states nonorthogonal with respect to phase, is shown in Fig. 1.

In [12] the security of non-EPR key distribution schemes is derived from the fact that any measurement which fails to disturb each of two nonorthogonal states also fails to yield any information distinguishing them. This naturally suggests the possibility that key distribution might be performed using only *two* nonorthogonal states, instead of the four used in Table I and Fig. 1. Here we show that key distribution is possible in principle using any two nonorthogonal states of a quantum system.

Let  $|u_0\rangle$  and  $|u_1\rangle$  be two distinct, nonorthogonal states, and let  $P_0 = 1 - |u_1\rangle\langle u_1|$  and  $P_1 = 1 - |u_0\rangle\langle u_0|$  be (noncommuting) projection operators onto subspaces orthogonal to  $|u_1\rangle$  and  $|u_0\rangle$ , respectively (note reversed order of indices). Thus  $P_0$  annihilates  $|u_1\rangle$ , but yields a positive result with probability  $1 - |\langle u_0|u_1\rangle|^2 > 0$  when applied to  $|u_0\rangle$ , and vice versa for  $P_1$ .

To begin the key distribution, Alice prepares and sends Bob a random binary sequence of quantum systems, using states  $|u_0\rangle$  and  $|u_1\rangle$  to represent the bits 0 and 1, respectively. Bob then decides, randomly and independently of Alice for each system, whether to subject it to a measurement of  $P_0$  or  $P_1$ . Next Bob publicly tells Alice in which instances his measurement had a positive result (but not,

of course, which measurement he made), and the two parties agree to discard all the other instances.

If there has been no eavesdropping, the remaining instances, a fraction approximately  $(1 - |\langle u_0|u_1\rangle|^2)/2$  of the original trials, should be perfectly correlated, consisting entirely of instances in which Alice sent  $|u_0\rangle$  and Bob measured  $P_0$ , or Alice sent  $|u_1\rangle$  and Bob measured  $P_1$ . However, before Alice and Bob can trust this data as key, they must, as in other key distribution schemes, sacrifice some of it to verify that their versions of the key are indeed identical. This also certifies the absence of eavesdropping, which would necessarily have disturbed the states  $|u_0\rangle$  or  $|u_1\rangle$  in transit, causing them sometimes to yield positive results when later subjected to measurements  $P_1$  or  $P_0$ , respectively.

Figure 2 shows a practical interferometric realization, in which the two nonorthogonal states  $|u_0\rangle$  and  $|u_1\rangle$  are dim coherent light pulses differing in phase relative to an accompanying bright reference pulse (bright coherent states, typically nearly orthogonal, become significantly nonorthogonal when attenuated to  $< 1$  expected photon intensity, because all such dim states include a significant component of the zero photon number state). Beginning at the left side of the figure, Alice uses an arrangement of unsymmetric beam splitters (UBS) and mirrors to split an initial coherent pulse into two pulses separated in time: a dim signal pulse of intensity  $\mu < 1$  expected photons followed by a bright reference pulse of  $M > 1$  expected photons. The signal pulse is phase shifted (PSA) 0 or 180 deg to encode the bits 0 and 1, then launched into a single mode optical fiber. The brighter reference pulse is not phase shifted, but is delayed by a fixed time  $\Delta t$  then launched into the same fiber. At the receiving end of the apparatus, Bob uses a half-interferometer similar to Alice's to split the incoming beam again, in the same ratio as before, into a dim part and a bright part. As before the dim part is phase shifted (PSB) by 0 or 180 deg, randomly and independently of Alice's phase shifts, while the bright part is delayed by  $\Delta t$ . Finally the two parts are caused to interfere as they enter a detector.

The wave entering the detector consists of three pulses separated by times  $\Delta t$ . The first pulse, a very dim pulse




FIG. 2. Interferometric quantum key distribution using two nonorthogonal low-intensity coherent states. Source at left supplies coherent pulse (wave form -W-) of  $M > 1$  expected photons intensity to Alice's half-interferometer, where unsymmetric beam splitters (UBS), mirrors, and phase shifter (PSA = 0 or 180 deg) produce a dim signal pulse (-w- or, phase shifted, -m-), followed by a bright reference pulse -W-. Sent to Bob through a single mode optical fiber, the pulses enter Bob's half-interferometer, where, depending on whether the sum of Alice's and Bob's phase shifts (PSA + PSB) is 0 or 180 deg, the signal pulse undergoes constructive (wave form -2w-) or destructive (wave form ---) interference with the attenuated reference pulse before entering the detector. Arriving before this interference pulse is a very dim pulse (not shown) attenuated by both Alice and Bob but delayed by neither. Arriving after the interference pulse is a bright twice-delayed reference pulse (wave form -W-) which Bob monitors to be sure the reference pulses are not being suppressed. Also not shown are two unused beams leaving the rightmost beam splitter of each half-interferometer in the downward direction.

which has been attenuated both by Bob and by Alice but delayed by neither, is not considered further.

The second pulse, containing the important key information, is a dim pulse consisting of the superposition of the beam delayed by Alice and attenuated by Bob, and the beam delayed by Bob and attenuated by Alice. If Alice's and Bob's phase shifts are equal, constructive interference will occur and the superposed pulse will generate a count with probability  $\approx 4\mu Tq$  expected photons, where  $T$  is the transmission coefficient of the fiber and  $q$  the quantum efficiency of the detector. If Alice's and Bob's phase shifts differ, the superposed pulse will have much lower intensity, ideally zero in the limit of perfect interferometer alignment (the coherence time of the light source is not an issue here, since the two interfering pulses are exactly proportional, being attenuated versions of the same source pulse).

Finally, at a delay  $\Delta t$  after the superposed pulse, a bright pulse, which has been delayed by both Alice and Bob but attenuated by neither, will arrive at Bob's detector. Bob confirms its arrival, with approximately the expected intensity  $MT$ , which he can do reliably if  $MTq > 1$ . This third pulse contains no phase information, but serves to confirm that the reference pulse has actually arrived. It thus protects against an attack in which an eavesdropper ("Eve") would measure each signal-reference pulse pair by an apparatus similar to Bob's, resend a correctly fabricated pulse pair whenever she was successful, and suppress both the signal and reference pulses when she was unsuccessful, thereby eavesdropping on the channel without creating errors in Bob's subsequent measurement results. Eve cannot suppress the reference pulse without immediately being caught. But if she suppresses only the signal pulse, the uncanceled

reference pulse will still produce a count in Bob's detector with probability,  $\mu Tq$ , and half these counts will result in errors in Bob's key.

The encoding of each bit in the phase difference between a dim signal pulse and an accompanying bright reference pulse gives a practical way to implement operators analogous to  $P_0$  and  $P_1$ , which yield a guaranteed null result only on the two legitimate signals  $|u_1\rangle$  and  $|u_0\rangle$ , respectively, but not on fake signals (e.g., the vacuum state) that an eavesdropper might substitute. The separation of the signal and reference pulses in time also allows them to be transmitted through the same optical fiber [14], thereby automatically compensating for environmental phase drift in the fiber that would otherwise make such a large interferometer unmanageable.

Since any pair of coherent or incoherent optical signals become significantly nonorthogonal at low intensity, it would seem that almost any source of two kinds of dim light flash, for example, a very attenuated red versus green traffic light, could be used for key distribution without the complications of interferometry. Alice would randomly send red and green flashes of  $< 1$  photon intensity, and Bob would publicly report which flashes he saw, but not their colors, which would constitute the secret key. Because of the low intensity Bob can be confident that a passive Eve standing beside him and watching the same signal source would not see the same subset of flashes, and so would be at least partially ignorant of the key he agrees on with Alice (this partial ignorance can later be amplified to near-total ignorance by hashing techniques similar to that used in steps 9 and 10 of Table I [5,15]) [16].

However, a more intrusive Eve, who stands between Alice and Bob, can thoroughly subvert the scheme by in-

tercepting all Alice's flashes, and resending a flash to Bob only when she succeeds in seeing Alice's flash herself, while simply stopping the others. To compensate for their reduced number, Eve's fabricated flashes must be proportionately brighter, so that Bob's probability of seeing will be the same as before (a cautious Eve would need to fabricate flashes with non-Poissonian photon number statistics, to simulate a Poisson distribution of lesser mean). In terms of the projection operator formalism discussed earlier, the red and green scheme fails because the two signals Alice sends here are not pure states, but statistical mixtures in which the phase of the electric field is random. Therefore any operator  $P_0$  which annihilates all Alice's red flashes will also annihilate the vacuum state, since it may be viewed as a superposition of two red flashes of opposite phase; the same holds for  $P_1$  and green flashes. Eve can thus safely substitute the vacuum state for any flash she fails to detect. By contrast, in the interferometric scheme of Fig. 2, there is no fake signal an eavesdropper can substitute to hide her failure to detect the original signal, and the scheme remains secure.

These considerations may be generalized to conclude that key distribution is possible not only using any two nonorthogonal pure states  $|u_0\rangle$  and  $|u_1\rangle$ , but also any two nonorthogonal mixed states  $\rho_0$  and  $\rho_1$  which span disjoint subspaces of Hilbert space, therefore allowing Bob to find two operators  $P_0$  and  $P_1$  such that  $P_0$  annihilates  $\rho_1$  and  $P_1$  annihilates  $\rho_0$  but no state is annihilated by both operators. The requirement of spanning disjoint subspaces is not present in key distribution schemes using *more than two* mixed states, allowing such schemes (e.g., the scheme [5] which uses four nonorthogonal incoherent states) to be carried out with simple square-law detection of the optical signals, rather than interferometric homodyne detection as used in Fig. 2.

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- [1] The classic "one-time pad" technique encrypts a message with absolute security as the bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) of the message with a random secret key of the same length. The resulting cryptogram conveys no information to an eavesdropper except for its length, but the original message can be recovered by again XORing the secret key. The method's security depends on never reusing the key.

If the same key is used for a second message, an eavesdropper can learn the XOR of the messages by taking the XOR of the cryptograms. For redundant messages such as English, this is often enough to reveal both messages.

- [2] M. N. Wegman and J. L. Carter, *J. Comput. Syst. Sci.* **22**, 265 (1981), show how to generate a key- and message-dependent "authentication tag," analogous to a check sum, whose value cannot be predicted by anyone ignorant of the key, and which thus certifies that the accompanying message has not been altered in transit. Like one-time-pad encryption, authentication uses up key bits and renders them unfit for reuse.
- [3] So-called public-key cryptosystems allow users to agree on a secret key solely through public messages, and are widely used for that purpose, but they provide only conditional security: By sufficient computational effort the eavesdropper can always break the system and learn the key.
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- [16] U. Maurer, in *Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing* (Association for Computing Machinery, New York, 1991), p. 561, has shown more generally that if Alice, Eve, and Bob listen to the same random source through noisy channels that are even slightly independent, Alice and Bob can derive a secret key by subsequent public discussion.