What level of ICU occupancy should trigger additional mitigations?

Reese Richardson, Manuela Runge, and Jaline Gerardin September 3, 2020



Is 75% of available ICU capacity a good trigger for imposing mitigations?

If not, what is a good trigger threshold?




Rephrased...

How does the ICU occupancy threshold for imposing new mitigation depend on:

- How fast transmission is increasing
- How fast we can act
- How strong the mitigation is
- COVID Region
- Acceptable risk of overflowing 100% capacity



If transmission increases too much, ICU and hospital bed capacities could be threatened




Note:

We will use "reopening" to describe increases in transmission after September 1, but seasonal effects could also contribute to increased transmission even if social behavior has not changed.

The model doesn't care why transmission has increased, only that it has, so we are bundling all these effects together into "reopening".



What if we reintroduced mitigation measures to reduce transmission once a given threshold level of ICU availability is reached? Could we prevent ICU overflow?




Can we design "rollback thresholds" in COVID ICU census for each COVID region such that ICU overflow is reliably averted?




Our procedure:

- 1. Choose a reopening level for each region that represents a **realistic worst-case scenario**
- 2. Choose a alarm threshold for ICU census (e.g. 80% of ICU availability)
- 3. Run many simulations in which, if the alarm threshold is met, transmission returns to its previous minimum level (i.e. early-June transmission levels)
- Based on these simulations, calculate the probability that ICU overflow occurs still occurs despite the alarm
- 5. Repeat for other alarm thresholds (e.g. 40% of ICU availability, 50% of ICU availability, etc.)


Risk Tolerance Curve



Why can't we roll back transmission just before we break ICU capacity? It takes some time for a fall in transmission to be reflected in ICU census, and ICU census may overshoot capacity in the intervening time



Why use a "realistic worst-case scenario" to design our thresholds? A rapidly-increasing ICU census would be more difficult to "turn around" than a



If we design an alarm threshold off of a scenario with slower reopening, our threshold may be insufficient to prevent overflow in the event of a more rapid increase in transmission

Hypothetical "hard" reopening (all trajectories exceed ICU capacity by Dec 31)

Hypothetical "soft" reopening (some trajectories exceed ICU capacity by Dec 31)




What is the shape of the risk tolerance curve if we suppose that there is **no delay** between the alarm being pulled and when mitigation measures take effect?



For COVID Region 11 (Chicago), a 75% ICU availability alarm threshold prevents ICU overflow ~50% of the time when there is no delay in


action



Hard reopen Return to June transmission No delay Tolerating a 20% risk of ICU capacity overflow, a realistic worst-case scenario with **no delay in action** would require a 68% COVID ICU availability alarm

Trigger is Activated

threshold




Hard reopen Return to June transmission No delay How does the shape of the risk tolerance curve change if we suppose that there is **some delay** between the alarm being pulled and when mitigation measures take effect?



Under the assumption that there will be **some delay** between the alarm and mitigation measures taking effect, **lower** thresholds are necessary to prevent overflow


% of COVID ICU Availability at which Trigger is Activated



Hard reopen Return to June transmission Variable delay What if, instead of returning to early-June transmission levels, we return to early-August transmission levels when the alarm is pulled?



If we assume that mitigation measures are not as strong at reducing transmission (reduction to early-August levels instead of early-June levels), even lower thresholds are necessary to prevent overflow




Hard reopen

No delay

What if we choose a less rapid reopening scenario?



If we choose a softer reopening scenario (only 50% of trajectories exceed ICU capacity by Dec 31st), thresholds for action don't need to be as low because overall probability of ICU overflow decreases




Trigger is Activated


No delay

Variable reopen

However, lower thresholds are still necessary if we assume some delay will occur between hitting the threshold and taking action



Each region requires different alarm thresholds



Hard reopen Return to June transmission Variable delay

Thresholds for action, per Covid Region, at 20% risk tolerance for exceeding 100% ICU capacity

Scenario				% ICU availability threshold to trigger mitigation, by COVID Region											
	Reopen strength	Return level	Delay to act	Risk	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Α	Hard	June	0 days	20%	55	67	56	56	55	53	66	63	72	70	68
В	Hard	Aug	0	20%	50	43	<40	<40	<40	<40	<40	55	65	60	56
С	Hard	June	3	20%	47	58	51	52	48	45	62	55	62	61	57
D	Hard	June	7	20%	41	50	42	40	41	<40	50	47	54	52	49
Е	Soft	June	0	20%	75	78	84	82	77	70	77	85	78	85	83
F	Soft	Aug	0	20%	71	62	55	60	50	<40	51	81	74	80	75
G	Soft	June	3	20%	70	73	79	77	74	64	74	82	73	80	76
Н	Soft	June	7	20%	62	68	73	73	70	61	68	75	67	74	71

Preliminary Conclusions


- Under a worst-case scenario, a 75% ICU availability alarm threshold would be insufficient in every region to reliably prevent capacity overflow
- Lag time between trigger and mitigation measures taking effect should always be considered when designing alarm thresholds
- How quickly transmission is increasing has a HUGE impact on where thresholds for action lie. Reliable measurement of trends in transmission is KEY. Our current data is insufficient for estimating these trends because it is biased, noisy, and lagged. Sentinel surveillance is necessary to address these issues and give us the information we need to make good decisions.




Appendix



Most regions are not currently approaching alarm thresholds



By simulating reopening scenarios, we can trigger a change in transmission if a given % of ICU beds filled reach a defined threshold



What does "hard" and "soft" reopening mean in terms of a quantity we can measure, like R_t ?


CO)/ID	% backslidii	ng to March levels	Maximum R_t reached				
COVID Region	hard reopening	soft reopening	hard reopening	soft reopening			
1	16	9	1.26 (1.15 - 1.4)	1.16 (1.08 - 1.24)			
2	8	4	1.2 (1.1 - 1.29)	1.12 (1.06 - 1.19)			
3	19	5	1.22 (1.1 - 1.34)	1.09 (1.04 - 1.14)			
4	12	4	1.22 (1.12 - 1.34)	1.09 (1.03 - 1.13)			
5	15	5	1.25 (1.12 - 1.39)	1.12 (1.06 - 1.19)			
6	13	4	1.24 (1.12 - 1.37)	1.13 (1.06 - 1.2)			
7	7	4	1.18 (1.08 - 1.28)	1.11 (1.05 - 1.18)			
8	8	4	1.23 (1.1 - 1.36)	1.12 (1.06 - 1.18)			
9	10	8	1.21 (1.11 - 1.33)	1.15 (1.07 - 1.25)			
10	9	5	1.19 (1.1 - 1.31)	1.12 (1.06 - 1.17)			
11	8	5	1.24 (1.13 - 1.34)	1.16 (1.09 - 1.24)			

"hard" = 100% of trajectories exceed ICU capacity by Dec 31 2020

"soft" = 50% of trajectories exceed ICU capacity by Dec 31 2020



What does "hard" and "soft" reopening mean in terms of a quantity we can measure, like R_t ?




"hard" = 100% of trajectories exceed ICU capacity by Dec 31 2020

"soft" = 50% of trajectories exceed ICU capacity by Dec 31 2020



Responding to a "hard" reopen with weaker mitigation could mean overflow of ICU capacities even for very low occupancy triggers




Hard reopen

transmission

Variable delay

Choosing a less robust reopening shifts curves to the right, increasing necessary thresholds



Soft reopen

Return to June

transmission

Variable delay