

|                            |                               |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Name: <u>Anura</u>         | Roll Number: <u>MCS202304</u> |
| Date:                      | Subject: <u>Crypto</u>        |
| Course & Year: <u>2024</u> | Total No. of Pages:           |

We are using re-cycled paper for the internal exams. Please ignore the pre-printed matter on the sheets.

— Begin writing from the next page —

from  
next page



B1. Write your solution to B1 below.

- In problems with multiple parts, you may solve a later part of a problem by assuming some previous part(s), even if you could not do the earlier part(s).
- Clearly explain your entire reasoning. No credit will be given without correct reasoning. Partial solutions may get partial credit.

241

$$2. (a) F'_K(x) = F_K(0x) F_K(x0) \quad , x \in \{0, 1\}^{n+1}$$

now, let's observe the output fun,

$$x = 0^{n+1}$$

$$F'_K(x) = F_K(0^n) \parallel F_K(0^n)$$

So, distinguisher <sup>D</sup> given  $0^{n+1}$  as input will check  
its output  $(L \parallel R)$ , check  $L == R$ . ✓

for a random function this will happen with probability  $\frac{1}{2^n}$

(b) let  $x_1$  be  $01^{n-2}$

$x_2$  be  $1^{n-1}$

Now,  $F'_K(x_1) = F_K(001^{n-2}) F_K(01^{n-1})$

$F'_K(x_2) = F_K(01^{n-1}) F_K(1^n)$

now, distinguish D on two outputs  $L_1 \parallel R_1$  and  $L_2 \parallel R_2$   
will check.

if  $L_2 = R_1$ .

if the function used is  $F'_K$  then,  $P_x(L_2 = R_1) = 1$

else it will be  $= \frac{1}{2^n}$  (two  $n$  length strings being equal)

10



Blank page for rough work/continuation of part B solutions

(1) (b) let H be a PRG, s.t.  $H: \{0,1\}^{n-1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n^2}$ . this PRG always exists by PRG length extension lemma which uses hybrid arg

now, let  $G$  be a following PRG,  
 (on input  $x = x_0b$ ,  $b \in \{0,1\}$  return)  
 $G(x_0b) = H(x_0)$

$G$  does not really take input, it chooses one randomly. we are thinking of the random tape to simplify

now,  $G(x_0b)$  should be pseudorandomly distributed

as  $H$  is a PRG.

but, in this case,  $G' = G(S) G(S+1)$

now, if <sup>the</sup> last bit of  $S$  is 0, i.e.  $S = x_00$   
 $S+1$  will be of form  $S+1 = x_01$

$$\text{so, } G'(x_00) = G(x_00) G(x_01) \\ = H(x_0) H(x_0)$$

so, distinguisher can check if ~~the~~ <sup>the output</sup>  $L \parallel R$  is in the form  
 $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} L = R, \text{ that case will happen with probability } \frac{1}{2} \\ \text{(last bit of } S \text{ is 0 and 1 with eq prob.)} \end{array} \right\}$

if the string is random, again  $L=R$  will happen with probability

$$\frac{1}{2^n}$$

(1)(a)  $G'$  is a PRG.

Proof: The intuition is that for any Distinguisher  $D$ ,

let  $S_0$  denote the subset of strings in  $\{0,1\}^n$  st if  $s \in S_0$ ,  $D(G(s)) = 1$   
if we randomly pick  $s$  from  $\{0,1\}^n$

both  $s$  and  $\bar{s}$  will have equal probability of being in  $S_0$ .  
complement

So, if  $s$  is random, then complementing it to get  $\bar{s}$  is a small random process.

(10) now if a distinguisher  $D$  can distinguish between  $G'$  and  $U_n$  then,  $D$  can distinguish between  $G'$  when  $G$  picks  $s$  and complement it, and  $U_n$ .

But, as from the intuition complementation should not help a distinguisher, then  $D$  should be able to distinguish between  $G$  and  $U_n$  contradicting  $G$  is a PRG.



3. (a)

$$f: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

$$g: \{0,1\}^{3n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{3n}$$

$$s.t. \ g(a,b,c) = (b, c, a \oplus f(b))$$

for,  $(a_1, b_1, c_1)$  and  $(a_2, b_2, c_2)$

we can see, if  $b_1 \neq b_2$

or  $c_1 \neq c_2$

$$\text{no way, } g(a_1, b_1, c_1) \neq g(a_2, b_2, c_2)$$

but, <sup>even</sup> if  $b_1 = b_2, c_1 = c_2$

$a_1$  must not be equal to  $a_2$   
and  $f(b_1)$  are always ~~same~~ same as  $b_1 = b_2$ .

$$\text{so, } a_1 \oplus f(b) \neq a_2 \oplus f(b) \text{ (as } a_1 \neq a_2)$$

$$\therefore (a_1, b_1, c_1) \neq (a_2, b_2, c_2)$$

$$\text{then } g(a_1, b_1, c_1) \neq g(a_2, b_2, c_2)$$

as domain and range same, it's a bijection

Blank page for rough work/continuation of part B solutions

(3)(b) ~~show that~~

$\Rightarrow$  ~~show that~~  $F'_{K_1, K_2, K_3}$  is a permutation

Proof: using induction on number of rounds.


now, for round 1, if  $(a, b, c)_1 \neq (a, b, c)_2$

then even if  $f$  is a function,

$(b, c, a \oplus f(b))$  is a permutation on  $F_{K_1}: \{0, 1\}^{3n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{3n}$  is a ~~permutation~~ bijection.

$\hookrightarrow$  propagating this logic for 2 more rounds.

we can say that,  $F'_{K_1, K_2, K_3}$  is a permutation.





□  $F'_{K_1, K_2, K_3}$  is not a pseudorandom permutation

Let, consider two inputs  $(a_1, b_1, c_1) \rightarrow I_1$   
 $(a_2, b_2, c_2) \rightarrow I_2$

Now,  $F'_{K_1, K_2, K_3}(I_1) = (a_1 \oplus F_{K_1}(b_1), b_1 \oplus F_{K_2}(c_1), \dots)$

$F'_{K_1, K_2, K_3}(I_2) = \overset{L_1(\text{Left})}{(L_2, M'(\text{Middle}), \dots, R'(\text{Right}))}$   
 $\text{thin } (L_2, M', \dots, R')$

So, distinguisher on input can check,

if  $(L_1 = L_2)$

if the oracle is  $F'_{K_1, K_2, K_3}$  then  $P(L_1 = L_2) = 1$

else,  $P(L_1 = L_2) = \frac{1}{2^n}$

Moreover, on inputs,  $(a_1, b_1, c_1)$   $L_1 \oplus L_2$  will give  
 $(a_2, b_1, c_1)$   $a_1 \oplus a_2$

10



<4> let:  $F: \{0,1\}^{2n} \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$

now, let the intended PRG be the following  $G$ ,

$$G(x) = F_x(0) \parallel F_x(1) \parallel \dots \parallel F_x(n-1)$$

$x \in \{0,1\}^{2n}$

Claim:  $G$  is a pseudo random generator.

Proof: { if  $f$  is a random function, the output of  $G$  would be a completely random string

{ if  $F_x$  is used, then the output of  $G$  will be  $B_0 \parallel B_1 \dots \parallel B_{n-1}$

where all  $B_0 \dots B_{n-1}$  are distinct.

① { But as  $f$  is queried polynomially many times, the chance of collision will be negligibly small.

which is  $\leq \frac{\binom{n}{2}}{2^n} = \frac{n(n-1)}{2^{n+1}}$  ( $n$  blocks, each pair can be equal with prob  $1/2^n$ , so by union bound)

Solution to B5 continued in pages 14 to 28? Write the page number here

10

B6. Write your solution to B6 below.

Now if some distinguisher  $D$  can distinguish between ~~the~~ output of  $G$  when  $G$  uses random function and PRPs then, we can modify it to get another distinguisher  $D'$  which can distinguish between  $F_x$  and  $f$ .

let  $D'$  be the following distinguisher.

- 1) on input  $x$ .
- 2) calls the oracle on  $0, \dots, (n-1)$
- 3) gets output  $b = b_0, \dots, b_{n-1}$
- 4) call  $D$  on  $b$
- 5) if  $D$  says  $\begin{cases} G \text{ is PRG, says oracle is } F_x \\ G \text{ is random, says oracle is } f \end{cases}$

That's a contradiction, as

1) we have shown that, for any distinguisher, by ① it isn't possible to distinguish between a random function and a random permutation with polynomial advantage

2) for any random permutation<sup>12</sup> and PRP, and distinguisher should have only polynomial advantage

{ so, if  $D$  exists,  $D'$  exists making the block cipher vulnerable }



Rough work

The  $\text{Dec}'_k(c)$  works following way.

on input  $c$  { char length  $l(n) \cdot t(n)$  }

$\text{Dec}'_k(c)$  divides it into  $t(n)$  equal parts (one block will have length  $l(n)$ )

now,  $\text{Dec}'_k(c)$  runs

①  $\text{Dec}_k(c_1)$  ~~of length  $l(n)$~~   $b_1$   
to get,  $r_1, b_1$  ~~of length  $l(n)$~~

now,  $\text{Dec}'_k(c)$  runs

②  $\text{Dec}_k(c_2)$   $b_2$   
to get  $r_2, b_2$

this way  $\text{Dec}'_k(c)$  gets back  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_{t(n)}$

5

Rough work

let us define the following hybrids,



$$H_0 = \text{Enc}_K(r, b_1) \mid \text{Enc}_{r_1}(r_2, b_2) \mid \dots \mid \text{Enc}_{r_{t(n)-1}}(r_{t(n)}, b_{t(n)})$$

$$H_2 = r'_{1(n)} \mid r'_{t(n)} \mid \text{Enc}_{r_{t(n)}}(r_{t(n)+2}, b_{t(n)+2}) \mid \dots$$


what are these?

$$H_{t(n)} = r'_{1(n)} \mid \dots \mid r'_{t(n)} \mid r'_{t(n)}$$

now, if any distinguisher distinguishes between  $H_0$  and  $H_{t(n)}$  with probability advantage  $\frac{1}{P(n)}$

The adv test is to dist.

between two messages  $m_0, m_1$



lets try to prove why

$\text{Enc}_K(r, b_1) \text{Enc}_{r_1}(r_2, b_2)$  is pseudorandom

compared to  $U_{2l(n)}$

~~first first  $\text{Enc}_K(r, b_1)$  and  $\text{Enc}_{r_1}$~~



Claim ①  $\text{Enc}_K(r, b_1) \text{Enc}_{r_1}(r_2, b_1)$  is indistinguishable to

$$\text{Enc}_K(r, b_1) \text{Enc}_r(r_2, b_1) \text{ where } r \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$$

$$\text{ie } \text{Enc}_K(r, b_1) \text{Enc}_{r_1}(r_2, b_1) \approx_{\epsilon} \text{Enc}_K(r, b_1) \text{Enc}_r(r_2, b_1)$$

this is true because,

both  $r$  and  $r_1$  are chosen randomly, and if we have replaced  $\text{Enc}_K(r, b_1)$  with  $\text{Enc}_K(r, b_1)$  it should not have any effect as  $\text{Enc}_K$  is  $\text{EAV}$ , secure.

$$\text{as } [\text{Enc}_K(r, b_1) \text{Enc}_{r_1}(r_2, b_1)] \approx_{\epsilon} \text{Enc}_K(r, b_1) \text{Enc}_r(r_2, b_1)$$

Considering this,  $H_0$  and  $H_2$  should have negligible distance

$H_2$  and  $H_4$  ... and similarly  $H_1, H_3, H_5 \dots$

~~this way~~ Also,  $H_0$  and  $H_1$  are indistinguishable from claim

①

$\therefore$  all the hybrids are indistinguishable from each other making

$\rightarrow$   $\text{EAV}$ -secure