Non-Interactive Batch Arguments for NP from Standard Assumptions



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Crypto 2021

CRS



 C, x_1, \cdots, x_k



$$C, x_1, \cdots, x_k$$

CRS




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


$$C, x_1, \cdots, x_k$$

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


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 $\boldsymbol{\Pi}$ is publicly verifiable


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 $SAT = \{(C, x) \mid \exists w \ s. \ t. \ C(x, w) = 1\}$ $\forall i \in [k], (C, x_i) \in SAT$


No PPT $\overline{\mathbb{Z}}$ can produce accepting Π if

$$\exists i^* \in [k], (C, x_{i^*}) \times SAT$$




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CRS $\leftarrow \ll |w| \cdot k \rightarrow$ \square C, x_1, \dots, x_k C, x_1, \dots, x_k

Verifier running time: $k \cdot |x| + |\Pi|$

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Interactive batch proofs

[Reingold-Rothblum-Rothblum'16, Reingold-Rothblum-Rothblum'18, Rothblum-Rothblum'20]

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Secure against unbounded cheating prover.

Interactive batch proofs for UP

[Reingold-Rothblum-Rothblum'16, Reingold-Rothblum-Rothblum'18, Rothblum-Rothblum'20]



UP – each statement has a unique witness.

Interactive batch proofs for UP

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Succinct Non-interactive Arguments (SNARGs) for NP

[Micali'94, Damgård-Faust-Hazay'12, Bitansky-Canetti-Chiesa-Tromer'13, Bitanksy-Canetti-Chiesa-Goldwasser-Lin-Rubinstein-Tromer'16]

SNARGs

 $|\Pi| \ll |w|$

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Designated Verifier non-interactive batch arguments for NP

[Brakerski-Holmgren-Kalai'17, Brakerski-Kalai'20]

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Non-interactive batch arguments for NP from new non-standard assumption [Kalai-Paneth-Yang'19]

Falsifiable assumption on groups with bilinear maps.

Do there exists non-interactive batch arguments for NP based on standard assumptions?

Our Result


Theorem

Assuming QR + (LWE/sub-exp DDH) there exists a non-interactive batch argument for NP where


$$|\Pi| = \tilde{O}(|C| + \sqrt{k|C|})$$


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Key Insights



 β is a random string






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
FS methodology is secure for certain protocols under a variety of assumptions (via correlation intractable hash functions)

[Kalai-Rothblum-Rothblum'17, Canetti-Chen-Reyzin-Rothblum'18, Holmgren-Lombardi'18, Canetti-Chen-Holmgren-Lombardi-Rothblum-Rothblum-Rothblum-Wichs'19, Peikert-Sheihian'19, Brakerski-Koppula-Mour'20, Couteau-Katsumata-Ursu'20, Jain-Jin'21, Jawale-Kalai-Khurana-Zhang'21, Holmgren-Lombardi-Rothblum'21]



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
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



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
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
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
No known interactive proofs for batch NP.














Dual-Mode Interactive Batch Arguments




Security Intuition




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


Protocol Template




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
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
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
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
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
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
f determined by the information theoretic component.

Protocol Template




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
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
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
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
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
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Somewhere Statistically
Binding (SSB) Commitment
Scheme

Needs to be Fiat-Shamir friendly.

Based on LWE/sub-exp DDH

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
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
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We construct SSB with appropriate opening to f (with additional properties) based on $\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}$

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(Some) Technical Details

Protocol Template




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


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
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


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
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 $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$ $BAD_{x,\alpha} = \{ \beta \mid \exists \gamma \text{ s.t. Verifier accepts } (\alpha, \beta, \gamma) \}$




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$$\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$$
 $BAD_{x,\alpha} = \{\beta \mid \exists \gamma \text{ s.t. Verifier accepts } (\alpha, \beta, \gamma)\}$

If $x \notin \mathcal{L}$, no PPT $\overline{\mathbb{S}}$ can find α such that

$$h(x, \alpha) \in BAD_{x,\alpha}$$





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
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
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
h is correlation intractable (CI) for $BAD_{x,\alpha}$
















TC⁰ - Constant depth polynomial-size threshold circuits



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


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


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
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BAD needs to be computable in TC^0 .

Based on LWE/sub-exp DDH




$$SAT = \{(C, x) \mid \exists w \ s.t. \ C(x, w) = 1\}$$




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Spartan-core primarily consists of the Sumcheck protocol.




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
BAD =
$$\{\beta \in \mathbb{F} | \beta \text{ is a root of } g(x) - g_w^*(x)\}$$

 $SAT = \{(C, x) \mid \exists w \ s.t. \ C(x, w) = 1\}$



$$\mathrm{BAD} = \{ \beta \in \mathbb{F} | \beta \text{ is a root of } g(x) - g_w^*(x) \}$$
 the "true" polynomial an honest prover would have sent


$$SAT = \{(C, x) \mid \exists w \ s.t. \ C(x, w) = 1\}$$



BAD =
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Show that appropriate field \mathbb{F} , BAD can be computed in TC^0 .


Protocol Template



 $SAT = \{(C, x) \mid \exists w \ s. \ t. \ C(x, w) = 1\}$ $\forall i \in [k], (C, x_i) \in SAT$

We construct SSB with appropriate opening to f (with additional properties) based on QR


Protocol Template



 $SAT = \{(C, x) \mid \exists w \ s. \ t. \ C(x, w) = 1\}$ $\forall i \in [k], (C, x_i) \in SAT$

We construct SSB with linear homomorphic opening (with additional properties) based on QR


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BAD computable in TC^0 .

Concluding Remarks

Theorem

Assuming QR + (LWE/sub-exp DDH) there exists a non-interactive batch argument for NP where

$$|\Pi| = \tilde{O}(|C| + \sqrt{k|C|})$$

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Assuming QR + (LWE/sub-exp DDH) there exists a non-interactive batch argument for NP where

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Follow up work [C-Jain-Jin'21b] (ia.cr/2021/808)

- Batch arguments for NP with improved parameters
- Application of batch arguments to construct delegation scheme for ${\mathcal P}$

Thank you. Questions?

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ia.cr/2021/807