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## Introduction

### Fundamental Security Services

Security services are the objectives aimed at protecting a system.

- **Confidentiality:** Protection against unauthorized disclosure.
- **Integrity:** Protection against unauthorized modification.
- **Availability:** Guarantee of access for legitimate users.
- **Authentication:**
  - *Entity authentication:* Certifying the identity of an actor.
  - *Data origin authentication:* Certifying the source of data.
- **Non-repudiation:** Inability to deny a transaction.
- **Non-duplication:** Protection against illicit copying.
- **Anonymity:** Preservation of identity or source.

#### Original version

- **Confidentiality:** Protection of information from unauthorized disclosure.
- **Integrity:** Protection against unauthorized modification of information.
- **Availability:** Ensuring that resources are accessible to legitimate users.
- **Authentication:**
  - **Entity authentication** (*entity authentication*): Process allowing one entity to be certain of the identity of a second entity, supported by corroborating evidence (e.g., physical presence, cryptographic, biometric, etc.). The term identification is sometimes also used for this service.
  - **Data origin authentication** (*data origin authentication*): Process allowing one entity to be certain that a second entity is the original source of a set of data. By definition, this service also ensures the integrity of the data.

- **Non-repudiation:** Guarantees that an entity cannot deny being involved in a transaction.
- **Non-duplication:** Protection against illicit copying.
- **Anonymity (entity or data origin):** Preserves the identity of an entity, the source of information, or a transaction.

## Summary: Services, Threats, and Protection Mechanisms

Security Services	Threats and Attacks ( <i>Italic</i> )	Classic Mechanisms	Digital Mechanisms
<b>Confidentiality</b>	Information leakage, <i>eavesdropping</i> , traffic analysis	Seals, safes, padlocks	Encryption, logical authorization
<b>Integrity</b>	Modification, <i>tampering</i> , illicit creation or destruction	Special ink, holograms	One-way functions + encryption
<b>Availability</b>	<i>Denial of Service (DoS)</i> , viruses, illicit use	Physical access control, video surveillance	Logical access control, audit, antivirus
<b>Entity Authentication</b>	Unauthorized access, password theft, protocol flaw	Presence, voice, ID card, biometrics	Secret + protocol, network address + userid, smart card + PIN
<b>Data Authentication</b>	Falsification of information or signature	Seals, signature, fingerprint	One-way functions + encryption
<b>Non-repudiation</b>	Denying a transaction ( <i>repudiation</i> ), claiming key theft	Seals, notary signature, registered mail	One-way functions + encryption + digital signature
<b>Non-duplication</b>	Duplication, falsification, imitation	Special ink, holograms, tagging	Digital watermarking, cryptographic locking
<b>Anonymity</b>	Identification, transaction analysis, tracing	Voice scramblers, disguise, cash	<i>Mixers, remailers, e-money, deep web</i>

Original version

## Threats and Attacks: Summary

Services	Threats	Attacks
<b>Confidentiality</b>	Information leakage	Unauthorized eavesdropping, traffic analysis
<b>Integrity</b>	Information modification	Illicit creation, alteration, or destruction
<b>Availability</b>	Denial of service, illicit use	Viruses, repeated access attempts to disable a system
<b>Entity Authentication</b>	Unauthorized access	Password theft, authentication protocol flaw
<b>Data Authentication</b>	Information falsification	Signature forgery, protocol flaw
<b>Non-repudiation</b>	Denying involvement in a transaction	Claiming key theft or signature protocol flaw
<b>Non-duplication</b>	Duplication	Falsification, imitation
<b>Anonymity</b>	Identification	Transaction analysis, unauthorized access enabling identification

## Protection Mechanisms

Services	Classic Mechanisms	Digital Mechanisms
<b>Confidentiality</b>	Seals, safes, padlocks	Encryption, logical authorization
<b>Integrity</b>	Special ink, holograms	One-way functions + encryption
<b>Availability</b>	Physical access control, video surveillance	Logical access control, audit, antivirus
<b>Entity Authentication</b>	Presence, voice, ID card, biometric recognition	Secret + authentication protocol, network address + userid, smart card + PIN
<b>Data Authentication</b>	Seals, signature, fingerprint	One-way functions + encryption
<b>Non-repudiation</b>	Seals, signature, notary signature, registered mail	One-way functions + encryption + digital signature
<b>Non-duplication</b>	Special ink, holograms, tagging	Digital watermarking, cryptographic locking
<b>Anonymity</b>	Voice scrambler, disguise, cash	Mixers, remailers, e-money, deep web

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## Internet-Related Risks

### Malware Delivered via E-Mail

- Also called **malware**.
- Emails designed to **trigger an action** (open attachment or click a link).
- Often **personalized** using **social engineering**.
- **Main consequences:**
  - Malware installation (*ransomware, keyloggers, etc.*).
  - **Loss or theft of personal data**.
  - **System hijacking** and **malware propagation**.

#### Ultra-summary

- Malware spread by email
- Prompting clicks or opens
- Social engineering
- Data theft, loss, hijacking

#### Original version

### Malware Delivered via E-Mail

- Also called **malware**.
- Emails designed to **incite the recipient to open an attachment or follow a link** containing ads, offensive info, risky programs, etc.
- Often targeted based on victim interests (preliminary social engineering).
- **Consequences:**
  - Malware installation (*ransomware, keyloggers, etc.*) on victim systems (*computer, tablet, smartphone, smartwatch, etc.*).
  - Data destruction.
  - Theft of personal information or data.
  - System hijacking for malicious purposes (e.g., illegal bitcoin mining).
  - Malware propagation (potentially to other users).

## Malware Delivered via Web

- Method called ***drive-by download***: automatic infection when visiting a website.
- Sources can be:
  - A **malicious website**
  - A **compromised legitimate site** (e.g., *cross-site scripting*).
- **User caution** greatly reduces this propagation method.
- **Impacts are similar** to email-borne infections.
- **Script restriction** (*Java/JavaScript*) reduces risk but can **affect browsing**.

### Ultra-summary

- *Drive-by download* = infection without user action
- Malicious or compromised sites
- Awareness + restricted scripts = protection

### Original version

## Malware Delivered via Web

- Often called ***drive-by download***, allows **infecting the system** (*computer, tablet, smartphone, smartwatch, etc.*) **simply by visiting a website**.
- Sources may be:
  - Malicious site containing malware
  - Legitimate website previously infected (e.g., *cross-site scripting*). Infection may only affect certain pages.
- User awareness (avoiding suspicious sites) reduces the effectiveness.
- Consequences are similar to email infections.
- Restricted script execution (*Java/JavaScript*) in browsers can limit infection but may constrain navigation.

## Phishing

- Technique to **collect private information** through **indiscriminate fishing**.
- **Phishing** can be:

- **General** (broad targeting)
- **Targeted** (*spear phishing*) for a specific person or organization.
- Main vector: **forged email address**, hard to detect.
- Goal: obtain **sensitive data** (credentials, passwords, personal or banking info).
- Attacks use **credible or threatening pretexts** to prompt victim cooperation.

### Ultra-summary

- Information theft by deception
- Forged emails
- *Spear phishing* = targeted attack
- Urgent or threatening pretexts

### Original version

#### Phishing

- The word *phishing* comes from English “*password*”, “*harvesting*”, and “*fishing*”.
- Shows the technique’s main goal: **collect as much private info** via indiscriminate fishing.
- Targeted attacks are called *spear phishing* (from *spear fishing*).
- Transmission vector: email with **forged sender address** requesting private info: emails, social media credentials, passwords, ID numbers, bank accounts, etc.
- Pretexts vary (system update, service stoppage, delivery withdrawal) and may threaten the user if ignored.

#### Spam

- **Unwanted emails**, often ads, or **unsolicited pop-ups** during web browsing.
- Represent about **60% of global emails**.
- Main consequences:
  - **Resource consumption** and time loss.
  - Some can **transmit malware**.
- Often target short addresses or come from **sold/exchanged address lists**.
- **Anti-spam filters** incur **significant costs** for organizations.

### **Ultra-summary**

- Unwanted emails/ads
- Risks: time/resource loss, malware
- Targeting: short addresses or lists
- Filtering costly for organizations

### **Original version**

#### **Spam**

- Includes all **unwanted emails** (often ads) received by people and organizations.
- Also applies to **pages/pop-up windows shown without user consent** during web browsing.
- Around **60%** of global emails belong to this category.
- Consequences: resource consumption and wasted time, but some spam can also **transmit malware**.
- Often target short email addresses or list-based addresses (sold/exchanged).
- **Anti-spam filtering** incurs high organizational costs.

### **Ransomware**

- Trojan-type malware that **encrypts data** to make it inaccessible.
- Demands a **ransom** (often in bitcoins) to recover files.
- Can remain **dormant**, triggered by an event or date.
- Main vector: **malicious emails**.
- Other effects: **DoS attacks, extortion**.

### **Ultra-summary**

- Data encrypted by Trojan
- Ransom to restore access
- Possible programmed dormancy
- Infection via malicious emails

### **Original version**

#### **Ransomware**

- Trojan malware family.

- Typically **encrypts victim's data** to make it completely inaccessible.
- Then displays a message requesting **ransom payment** (often in **bitcoins**).
- May stay in **dormant state** triggered by event or date.
- Infection vectors vary, but **malicious email attachments** often responsible.
- Variants exist and continue to evolve.
- Other behaviors: **DoS, targeted extortion, threats**, etc.

### Attacks on *Internet of Things (IoT)* Devices

- Target **connected objects** (cameras, TVs, sensors, alarms, etc.).
- Devices are **easy to compromise** due to:
  - **Known vulnerabilities**
  - **Default passwords**
  - **User unawareness**
- **Remote control** enables:
  - **Entry point** to the network
  - **Device abuse** for illicit activities (DDoS, hacking, mining)
- A **precise inventory** of connected devices is essential.

#### Ultra-summary

- Targets connected objects
- Weak security (vulnerabilities, default passwords)
- Risk of network access and abuse
- IoT inventory needed

#### Original version

### Attacks on IoT Devices

- Target connected objects (cameras, TVs, fridges, sensors, alarm systems, etc.).
- Often **easier to hack** than traditional systems due to:
  - Many vulnerabilities known to attackers
  - Default passwords
  - User negligence
- Remote takeover allows:

- Entry point to home/corporate network
- Device use for illicit activities (hacking, DDoS, bitcoin mining)
- Maintaining a detailed directory of all connected devices is necessary.

### **Information Spoofing and Website Defacement**

- Attacks aiming to **alter information** on websites and social media.
- Impact: **compromised reputation** and **economic damage**.
- Websites: secure host system, restrictive configuration, **regular audits**.
- Social media: strong passwords, **multi-factor authentication**, session closure, cookie deletion.

#### **Ultra-summary**

- Altered info on websites and social media
- Risks: reputation, economic losses
- Websites: security + audits
- Social media: strong passwords, MFA, closed sessions, cookies cleared

#### **Original version**

### **Information Spoofing and Website Defacement**

- Target **integrity** of published info on websites and social media.
- Affects **reputation** and can cause **economic damage**.
- **Websites:** secure host system, as restrictive configuration as possible, recurring security audits recommended.
- **Social media:** depends on authentication process:
  - Avoid simple passwords
  - Prefer strong, possibly multi-factor authentication
  - Close sessions properly
  - Clear cookies

### **Denial of Service (DoS / DDoS) Attacks**

- Aim to **make IT systems inaccessible**, especially for organizations.

- **DDoS**: distributed attack using thousands of devices, generating massive traffic.
- Classic protections (*firewalls, IDS/IPS sensors*) often **insufficient**.
- Consequences:
  - **Affected reputation**
  - **Financial losses** (sometimes ransom)
  - **High risk for critical infrastructure** (hospitals, power plants, Internet backbone)

### Ultra-summary

- DDoS = inaccessible systems via massive attacks
- Limited protections
- Risks: reputation, finances, critical infrastructures

### Original version

#### **Denial of Service (DoS / DDoS) Attacks**

- Aim to **render IT systems inaccessible**, mainly targeting private or governmental organizations.
- **DDoS** (*Distributed Denial of Service*): multiple devices (**often tens of thousands**) simultaneously target victim system(s).
- Traffic can reach several hundred Gbps.
- Traditional protection (*firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention sensors*) has limited effectiveness.
- Service unavailability can cause:
  - **Reputational issues**
  - Significant **financial losses** (ransom demands)
  - **High security risks (even physical)** for **critical infrastructures** (hospitals, power plants, Internet backbone).

## Digital Security Methods

**Problem:** Protecting digital information

- in a distributed environment
- globally accessible
- without physical boundaries

### Solution:

- Cryptography
  - Symmetric
  - Asymmetric
  - + One-way functions
  - + (Pseudo) random generators

### Ultra-summary

- **Problem:** Security in a distributed/global environment.
- **Solutions:**
  - Crypto (symmetric/asymmetric).
  - One-way functions (hashing).
  - Random generators (physical/pseudo).

### Original version

**Problem:** Protecting digital information

- in a distributed environment
- globally accessible
- without physical boundaries

### Solution:

- Cryptography
  - Symmetric
  - Asymmetric
  - + One-way functions
  - + (Pseudo) random generators

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## Cryptographic Hash Functions

- **Functions easy to compute in one direction but virtually impossible to reverse.**
- Any modification of the source document radically changes the **digest** (avalanche effect).
- **Key properties:**
  - **One-way:** impossible to retrieve the input from the hash.

- **Collision-free**: impossible to find two inputs with the same hash.
- Digest size: 160 to 512 bits.
- Algorithms (very **performant**): SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-3.

### Ultra-summary

- **One-way + collision-free**.
- Size: 160-512 bits.
- Algos: SHA-1/256/3.
- Usage: integrity, signatures.

### Original version

- **Functions easy to compute in one direction but virtually impossible to compute in the reverse direction.**
- Any modification (even insignificant) of the source document results in a fundamentally different **digest**.
- It is virtually impossible to retrieve the source document using only the digest (**one-way**).
- It is virtually impossible to find a second source document producing the same digest (**collision-free**).
- Usual digest length: 160 to 512 bits.
- One-way algorithms are very performant.
- Examples: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-3, etc.

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## (Pseudo) Random Generators

- **Characteristics**
  - **random**
  - **unpredictable**
  - **non-reproducible**
- **Critical** for security (keys, IV, secrets).
- **Types:**
  - **True random**: based on physical phenomena (radioactivity, quantum).
  - **Pseudo-random**: deterministic (based on a *seed*: initial random sequence).
- **Risk**: “Pseudo-security” if the *seed* is predictable (Pitkin quote).

- Applications: session keys, IV (DES-CBC), signatures (ElGamal).

#### Ultra-summary

- **True random:** physical (quantum).
- **Pseudo-random:** deterministic (*seed*).
- **Risk:** predictable *seed* = vulnerability.
- Uses: keys, IV, signatures.

#### Original version

- Random number generation is a very important process that can compromise the security of many encryption systems.
- Applications: session key generation, initialization vectors (DES - CBC mode), secrets for signatures (ElGamal), etc.
- A **random generator** is a device capable of generating numbers in a **random, unpredictable** and **non-reproducible** way. (e.g. based on physical phenomena: radioactive or quantum source).
- **Pseudo-random generators** are deterministic processes developed from an initial random sequence (**seed**) (e.g. user keystrokes, disk access).
- **Quote:** R. Pitkin in [Kau95]: “The use of pseudo-random processes to generate secret quantities can result in pseudo-security”

## Symmetric Cryptography

- **History:** Used since Julius Caesar (1st century BC).
- **Principle:** A single key for encryption/decryption.
- **Scheme:** Plaintext → Encryption (Key) → Ciphertext → Decryption (Key) → Plaintext.
- **Characteristics:**
  - Algorithms: AES, DES, IDEA, RC4.
  - Services: Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity.
  - **Limit:** No signatures (shared key).
  - **Problem:** Secure key exchange required.

#### Ultra-summary

- **1 key** to encrypt/decrypt.
- **Fast** (AES, DES).

- **Problem:** key exchange.
- **Uses:** personal documents, closed groups.

### Original version

- Also called conventional cryptography or secret key cryptography (1st century BC, Julius Caesar).
- **Idea:** Based on a single secret key, perform a transformation capable of respectively making information unreadable and restoring it.
- **Scheme:** Plaintext → Encryption (Key) → Ciphertext → Decryption (Key) → Plaintext.
- **Characteristics:**
  - Algorithms: AES, DES, IDEA, RC4, RC5, etc. (some are free and openly available)
  - Services: Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity.
  - No direct support for digital signatures (because key known by both).
  - Requires a confidential channel to exchange the key.
  - Ideal for protection of personal documents or closed groups.

### Asymmetric Cryptography

- Also called **public cryptography** (1976, Diffie & Hellman).
- **Principle**
  - Key pair (public/private) for encryption and signatures.
- **Two main uses:**
  1. **Confidentiality:**
    - Encryption: recipient's public key
    - Decryption: recipient's private key
  2. **Digital signature:**
    - Signature: sender's private key
    - Verification: sender's public key
    - *Optimization:* Generally sign the **hash** of the document
- **Fundamental properties:**
  - \* **Integrity:** Any modification invalidates the signature
  - \* **Non-collision:** Impossible to have 2 documents with the same signature

\* **Non-repudiation:** Only the holder of the private key can sign

- **Technical aspects:**

- **Algorithms:** RSA, ElGamal
- **Services:** Integrity, Authentication, Non-Repudiation
- **Performance:** much slower than symmetric (100x slower)
- **Advantage:** No need for a confidential channel for key exchange

### Ultra-summary

- **2 keys:** public (encrypt/verify) + private (decrypt/sign)
- **2 uses:**
  - Confidentiality: encrypt for a recipient
  - Signature: prove authenticity
- **Signatures:**
  - Integrity + non-repudiation
- **Algorithms:** RSA/ElGamal
- **Advantage:** No need for secure channel to exchange keys
- **Disadvantage:** Slow

### Original version

#### Asymmetric Cryptography

- Also called public cryptography or public key cryptography (1976, W. Diffie & M. Hellman).
- **Idea:** Use two different keys - one **secret** and one **public** - respectively for encryption and decryption operations.
- Each user has a **keyring**.

**Confidentiality:** \* Sender encrypts with the **recipient's public key**. \* Recipient decrypts with their **private key**. \* Only the recipient's key is used!

**Digital Signature:** \* Sender signs with their **private key**. \* Recipient verifies with the **sender's public key**. \* Only the sender's key is used! \* *Note:* Generally sign the **digest** of the document (hash) for performance reasons.

**Signature characteristics:** \* The signature changes if the document changes, while the private key remains the same. \* If the document or signature is modified, verification fails (**integrity guaranteed**). \* It is virtually impossible, even for the holder of the private key, to generate a second document producing the same signature (one-way function **without collisions**). \* Only the holder of the private key can generate a signature

verifiable using the corresponding public key (**non-repudiation**). \* **Algorithms:** RSA, ElGamal. \* **Services:** Integrity, Authentication, Non-Repudiation. \* **Slowness:** Up to 50 times slower than symmetric cryptography. \* **Advantage:** No need for a confidential channel to exchange keys (unlike symmetric).

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### Asymmetric + Symmetric Cryptography (Hybrid)

- **Principle:** Use asymmetric to exchange a symmetric key (session key).
- **Steps:**
  1. A generates a random symmetric key  $K_s$ .
  2. A encrypts  $K_s$  with B's public key.
  3. A and B then communicate using  $K_s$  (symmetric).

#### Ultra-summary

- **Asymmetric:** exchange of symmetric key.
- **Symmetric:** data encryption.
- **Advantage:** combines security + performance.

#### Original version

- **Idea:** Use public cryptography only to exchange symmetric keys (Session keys).
- A generates a random key  $K_s$  and transmits it to B by encrypting it with B's public key.
- A & B then communicate using  $K_s$  (symmetric).

---

### Asymmetric Cryptography: Operation (RSA)

#### Key Construction

1. **Choice of prime numbers:**
  - $p$  and  $q$ : two large prime numbers ( $> 1024$  bits)
  - $n = pq$ : RSA modulus (size = 2048+ bits)

**2. Calculation of Euler's totient function:**

- $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$
- *Property:* For any  $a$  coprime with  $n$ ,  $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$

**3. Selection of exponents:**

- $e$ : integer coprime with  $\phi(n)$  (public exponent)
- $d$ : modular inverse of  $e$  (private exponent), such that  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$

**Encryption/decryption process**

- **Public key:**  $(n, e)$
- **Private key:**  $(d)$
- **Encryption:**  $C = P^e \pmod{n}$
- **Decryption:**  $P = C^d \pmod{n}$

**Mathematical proof**

**1. Fundamental congruence:**

- $ed = 1 + k\phi(n)$  (by definition of  $d$ )

**2. Application of Euler's theorem:**

- $P^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$  (if  $P$  coprime with  $n$ )

**3. Demonstration:**

$$\begin{aligned}
 (P^e)^d &\equiv P^{ed} \pmod{n} \\
 &\equiv P^{1+k\phi(n)} \pmod{n} \\
 &\equiv P \cdot (P^{\phi(n)})^k \pmod{n} \\
 &\equiv P \cdot 1^k \pmod{n} \\
 &\equiv P \pmod{n}
 \end{aligned}$$

## System security

- **Hard problem:** Factorization of  $n$  into  $p$  and  $q$
- **Recommended size:**
  - $n$ : 2048 bits (minimum for current security)
  - $p$  and  $q$ : 1024+ bits each
- **Known vulnerabilities:**
  - Side-channel attacks (timing, power analysis)
  - Inappropriate parameter choices ( $e$  too small,  $p$  and  $q$  too close)

### Ultra-summary

- **Keys:**
  - Public:  $(n, e)$  where  $n = pq$
  - Private:  $(d)$  with  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$
- **Operations:**
  - Encryption:  $P^e \pmod{n}$
  - Decryption:  $C^d \pmod{n}$
- **Security:** Factorization of  $n$  difficult
- **Size:** 2048+ bits for  $n$

### Original version

#### Asymmetric Cryptography: Operation (RSA)

- Let  $n := pq$  with  $p$  and  $q$  two large prime numbers ( $> 1024$  bits).
- Let  $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$ .
- Let  $e$  and  $d$  such that  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$ .
- By definition of congruences:  $ed = 1 + k\phi(n)$
- Euler's theorem:  $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ .
- **Encryption:**  $C = P^e \pmod{n}$ . **Public key:**  $(n, e)$ .
- **Decryption:**  $P = C^d \pmod{n}$ . **Private key:**  $(d)$ .
- **Proof:**  $(P^e)^d \equiv P^{ed} \equiv P^{1+k\phi(n)} \equiv (P \pmod{n})(P^{\phi(n)} \pmod{n})^k \equiv P \pmod{n}$ .

## Asymmetric Cryptography: Conclusions

- **Dominant algorithms:** RSA (most used), Rabin, ElGamal
- **Complete services:**
  - Confidentiality
  - Authentication
  - Integrity
  - Digital signature & Non-repudiation
  - Non-duplication
- **Performance:**
  - 50x slower than symmetric
  - **Optimal solution:** Combination of asymmetric (key exchange) + symmetric (encryption)
- **Key management:**
  - **Advantage:** Public key exchange without confidential channel
  - **Risk:** Need to verify authenticity of public keys
    - \* Authenticated acquisition channel **or**
    - \* Certification by trusted third party

### Ultra-summary

- **Algos:** RSA (dominant), Rabin, ElGamal
- **Services:** Confidentiality + Authentication + Integrity + Signatures
- **Slowness:** 50x vs symmetric → **hybrid recommended**
- **Keys:** Simple public exchange but **authentication crucial**

### Original version

## Asymmetric Cryptography: Conclusions

- There are a few asymmetric encryption systems (**Rabin**, **ElGamal**, etc.) but the most used is **RSA**.
- **Supported services:** Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Digital Signature & Non-Repudiation, (Non-Duplication).
- Operations related to **asymmetric cryptography** are up to **50 times (!) slower** than those of **symmetric cryptography**. A **combination of the two methods** is often desirable.
- **Key distribution** is simplified by the fact that only **public keys** need to be

exchanged between participants (no need for an alternative confidential channel) but...

- ... it is necessary to **verify that the public key actually belongs to the recipient**:
  - Either the **acquisition channel** of the public key is protected against any modification (**authenticated**)
  - Or the key is **certified accurate by a third party**

## Symmetric vs Asymmetric Comparison

### Comparative advantages

- **Symmetric:**
  - **Performance:** 100x faster
  - **Implementation:** Easy in hardware
  - **Keys:** Short (128 bits = 16 memorable characters)
- **Asymmetric:**
  - **Key exchange:** Authenticated channel sufficient (no need for confidentiality)
  - **Management:** 1 key pair for n correspondents (vs n keys in symmetric)

### Common issues

- **Weak link:** Key management by users
- **Security basis:** Empirical rather than theoretical
- **Legal constraints:** Usage and export restrictions

### Usage recommendations

Use case	Recommended solution	Justification
Personal documents	Symmetric	Speed + memorable keys
Groups of close users	Symmetric	Speed + easy confidential exchange
Distant/unknown users	Asymmetric	No need for confidential channel

Use case	Recommended solution	Justification
Remote transactions	Hybrid (Asymmetric + Symmetric)	Asymmetric for key exchange, symmetric for data
Software protection (distribution)	Hybrid	Unique symmetric key per version, encrypted with asymmetric
Network segments	Symmetric	Speed + controlled environment (easy key exchange between administrators)

### Ultra-summary

#### Symmetric:

Fast (100x)  
 Short keys (128 bits)  
 Confidential key exchange required

#### Asymmetric:

Simplified key exchange  
 1 key pair for n correspondents  
 Slow (50x)  
 Long keys (1024+ bits)

**Hybrid:** Best of both worlds **Common problems:** Key management, empirical basis, legal restrictions

### Original version

#### Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptography

- There are **hundreds of symmetric and asymmetric algorithms** capable of providing a sufficient level of **confidentiality**.
- **Symmetric solutions** offer the following advantages:
  - **Speed** (up to 100 times faster than asymmetric solutions)
  - **Ease of hardware implementation**
  - **Reduced key length: 128 bits** (= 16 characters memorable!) instead of **1024 bits** for asymmetric equivalents.
- **Asymmetric solutions** have as main arguments:

- **Simplified key exchange:** keys must be exchanged through an **authenticated but non-confidential channel**
- **Simplified key management:** a single **public/private key pair** is sufficient for a user to receive confidential messages from **n users** (instead of **n different keys** in the symmetric case).
- **Problems common to both techniques:**
  - **Key management by the user** remains the **weakest link**
  - Security (normally) based on **empirical arguments** rather than **theoretical ones**
  - **Legal restrictions** on usage and export

## Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptography (II)

Activity	Recommendation	Remarks
Protection of personal documents	<b>Symmetric crypto</b>	<b>Speed</b> , easily memorable keys
Protection of documents in a group of close users	<b>Symmetric crypto</b>	<b>Speed</b> , ease of exchanging confidential keys
Establishment of confidential channels between distant users (unknown)	<b>Asymmetric crypto</b>	No need to have a confidential channel: <b>authenticity suffices</b>
Transactions between two distant users, Software protection (multicast distribution)	<b>Asymmetric crypto for symmetric key protection + Symmetric crypto for data protection</b>	<b>Speed</b> , Only the symmetric key needs to be re-encrypted for each correspondent, Encrypted copy of software can be made public
Protection of network segments	<b>Symmetric crypto</b>	<b>Speed</b> , Stable environment → easy confidential key exchange between sysadmins

## Dissection of an Attack: Ransomware

### Definition and Impact

- **Definition:** Malicious software that encrypts data and demands a ransom for its restoration.

- **Limitations of the classic definition:**
  - Does not cover the impact on **critical infrastructure** (e.g., Colonial Pipeline, May 2021)
  - Underestimates the **systemic scope** of attacks
- **Alarming statistics:**
  - Billions of annual attacks
  - Considered the **most dangerous cyber threat** in 2021 (“Ransomware Everywhere”)

### Ultra-summary

- **Malware:** Encrypts data → demands ransom
- **Impact:** Critical infrastructure (e.g., Colonial Pipeline)
- **Threat #1** in cybersecurity (2021)
- **Targets:** Individuals + businesses + states

### Original version

“Ransomware (from English **ransomware**), ransom software, extortion software, is malicious software that holds personal data hostage. To do this, ransomware **encrypts personal data** then asks their owner to send money in exchange for the **decryption key**” (Wikipedia September 21, 2021).

- **Incomplete definition** because **ransomware** affects a **vast spectrum of IT infrastructure**
- For example, in May 2021, a **ransomware attack** against the **Colonial Pipeline** company caused a **fuel supply disruption** for a large part of the US coast
- With a **total number of attacks** counted in billions per year, “**Ransomware Everywhere**” is globally considered the **most direct, visible and dangerous threat** for users and companies in 2021!

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### Ransomware Attack Lifecycle

#### Prevention and Response

Phase	Measures
<b>Prevention</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regular patching</li> <li>- Detection solutions (Firewalls, WAFs, IDS/IPS)</li> <li>- Anti-malware scans (emails, files)</li> </ul>
<b>Protection</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Offline backups</b> (essential!)</li> <li>- Strict security policies</li> <li>- User training</li> </ul>
<b>Response</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Do not pay</b> (official recommendation)</li> <li>- Forensic analysis</li> <li>- Restoration from backups</li> </ul>

## Technical Dissection

### 1. Infection:

- Vectors: Phishing, exploits, vulnerable RDP
- Propagation: Lateral (network) or vertical (system)

### 2. Execution:

- Encryption of targeted files
- Deletion of shadow copies
- Persistence (registry, scheduled tasks)

### 3. Extortion:

- Display of ransom demand
- Payment in cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Monero)
- Payment deadlines with penalties

### 4. Obfuscation:

- Code obfuscation
- Communication via TOR/Deep Web
- Log erasure

## Ultra-summary

### Attack cycle:

1. Infection (phishing/exploits)
2. Execution (encryption + persistence)
3. Extortion (ransom in crypto)
4. Obfuscation (TOR + trace erasure)

### Countermeasures:


Offline backups  
Patching + detection

Training  
Do not pay

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## Cryptolocker: Technical Analysis

### Attack Scheme



## Preferred Targets

- **Critical extensions** (extract):
  - Documents: .docx, .xlsx, .pdf, .pptx
  - Databases: .mdb, .sql, .sqlite
  - Media: .jpg, .png, .mp4, .avi
  - Development: .java, .cpp, .py, .php
  - Financial: .qbw, .qbb, .wallet
- **Behavior:**
  - **Selective** encryption (recent/modified files)
  - **Double extortion**: Encryption + threat of leakage
  - **RaaS** (Ransomware-as-a-Service): Economic model

### Ultra-summary

**Mechanism:** - Private key stored on C2 servers - Payment → key via TOR - Targets: 100+ extensions (docs, DB, media)

**Recent evolutions:** - Double extortion (encryption + leakage) - RaaS (ransomware rental)

### Original version

#### Ransomware: Complete View

(Source: 2017 State of Cybersecurity, F-Secure Inc.)

#### Ransomware: Complete View

#### Prevention, Remediation and Response

- **Patching**
- **Active and passive detection** (Firewalls, WAFs, IDS, IPS, email malware scan, etc.)
- **Offline backups !**
- **Security Policy** - Rules for proper email usage
- **Training !**
- **To pay or not to pay...**

#### Technical Dissection of the Attack

- **Infection and propagation**
- **Execution**

- **Payment** (Crypto-currencies / Bitcoin)
- **Obfuscation** (Obfuscation, TOR Networks/Deep Web)

### Generic Scheme of a Cryptolocker Ransomware

- **Decryption private keys** are stored on the **attacker's servers**
- They are sent to the **victim** after **bitcoin payment**
- The **trace** is shredded using **TOR networks**

### Ransomware Cryptolocker: Targets

**Targeted file extensions:** .jin, .xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .doc, .docx, .ppt, .pptx, .txt, .dwg, .bak, .blkf, .pst, .dbx, .zip, .rar, .mdb, .asp, .aspx, .html, .htm, .dbf, .3dm, .3ds, .3fr, .jar, .3g2, .xml, .png, .tif, .3gp, .java, .jpe, .jpeg, .jpg, .jsp, .php, .3pr, .7z, .ab4, .accdb, .accde, .accdr, .accdt, .ach, .kdx, .acr, .act, .adb, .ads, .agdl, .ai, .ait, .al, .apj, .arw, .ASF, .asm, .asx, .avi, .awg, .back, .backup, .backupdb, .pbl, .bank, .bay, .bdb, .bgt, .bik, .bkp, .blend, .bpw, .c, .cdf, .cdr, .cdr3, .cdr4, .cdr5, .cdr6, .cdx, .ce1, .ce2, .cer, .cfp, .cgm, .cib, .class, .cls, .cmt, .cpi, .cpp, .cr2, .craw, .crt, .crw, .phtml, .php5, .cs, .csh, .csl, .tib, .csv, .dac, .db, .db3, .dbjournal, .dc2, .dcr, .dcs, .ddd, .ddoc, .ddrw, .dds, .der, .des, .design, .dgc, .djvu, .dng, .dot, .docm, .dotm, .dotx, .drf, .drw, .dtd, .dxb, .dxf, .dxg, .eml, .eps, .erbsql, .erf, .exf, .fdb, .ffd, .fff, .fh, .fmb, .fhd, .fla, .flac, .flv, .fpx, .fxg, .gray, .grey, .gry, .h, .hbk, .hpp, .ibank, .ibd, .ibz, .idx, .iif, .iiq, .incpas, .indd, .kc2, .kdbx, .kdc, .key, .kpdx, .lua, .m, .m4v, .max, .mdc, .mdf, .mef, .mfw, .mmw, .moneywell, .mos, .mov, .mp3, .mp4, .mpg, .mrw, .msg, .myd, .nd, .ndd, .nef, .nk2, .nop, .nrw, .ns2, .ns3, .ns4, .nsd, .nsf, .nsg, .nsh, .nwb, .nx2, .nxl, .nyf, .oab, .obj, .odb, .odc, .odf, .odg, .odm, .odp, .ods, .odt, .oil, .orf, .ost, .otg, .oth, .otp, .ots, .ott, .p12, .p7b, .p7c, .pab, .pages, .pas, .pat, .pcd, .pct, .pdb, .pdd, .pef, .pem, .pxf, .pl, .plc, .pot, .potm, .potx, .ppam, .pps, .ppsm, .ppsx, .pptm, .prf, .ps, .psafe3, .psd, .pspimage, .ptx, .py, .qba, .qbb, .qbm, .qbr, .qbw, .qbx, .qby, .r3d, .raf, .rat, .raw, .rdb, .rm, .rtf, .rw2, .rwl, .rwz, .s3db, .sas7bdat, .say, .sd0, .sda, .sdf, .sldm, .sldx, .sql, .sqlite, .sqlite3, .sqlitedb, .sr2, .srf, .srt, .srw, .st4, .st5, .st6, .st7, .st8, .std, .sti, .stw, .stx, .svg, .swf, .sxc, .sxd, .sxi, .sxi, .sxi, .sxm, .sxw, .tex, .tga, .thm, .tlg, .vob, .war, .wallet, .wav, .wb2, .wmv, .wpd, .wps, .x11, .x3f, .xis, .xla, .xlam, .xlk, .xlm, .xlr, .xlsb, .xism, .xlt, .xltm, .xltx, .xlw, .ycbcra, .yuv

*Source: Intel Security Advanced Threat Research - <http://www.intelsecurity.com>*