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### Series 1: Modular Arithmetic

#### Key Concepts

**Sets:**  $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, 1, \dots, n - 1\}$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{a \in \mathbb{Z}_n \mid \gcd(a, n) = 1\}$

**Congruence:**  $a \equiv b \pmod{n} \iff n|(a - b)$

**Invertibility:**  $a$  invertible mod  $n \iff \gcd(a, n) = 1$

**Fundamental Theorems:**

- **Bézout:**  $ax + by = \gcd(a, b)$
- **Euler:**  $a^{\Phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$  (if  $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ )
- **Fermat:**  $a^p \equiv a \pmod{p}$  ( $p$  prime)

**Order:**  $\text{ord}_n(a) = \text{smallest } x > 0 \text{ such that } a^x \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$

**Generator:**  $g$  generates  $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$  if  $\text{ord}_n(g) = \Phi(n)$

**Structures:** Group  $\rightarrow$  Ring  $\rightarrow$  Field (increasing invertibility)

#### Modular calculations

**Q:**  $((11 \pmod{7}) \cdot (17 \pmod{7})) \pmod{7}$

**A:**  $4 \cdot 3 = 12 \equiv 5 \pmod{7}$

### Find the order

**Q:** Order of 2 mod 7?

**A:**  $2^1 = 2, 2^2 = 4, 2^3 = 8 \equiv 1 \rightarrow \text{ord}_7(2) = 3$

### Identify a generator

**Q:** Is 3 a generator of  $\mathbb{Z}_7^*$ ?

**A:**  $3^1 = 3, 3^2 = 2, 3^3 = 6, 3^4 = 4, 3^5 = 5, 3^6 = 1 \rightarrow \text{generates all elements} \rightarrow \text{YES}$

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## Series 2: Entropy

### Key Concepts

**Entropy:** Measures uncertainty/information of a random variable

$$H(X) = - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \log_2(p_i) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p_i}\right)$$

### Properties:

- $H(X)$  maximal when all probabilities are equal
- $H(X) = 0$  if only one possible value (probability = 1)
- For  $n$  equiprobable values:  $H(X) = \log_2(n)$

**Joint entropy:**  $H(X, Y) = - \sum_x \sum_y p(x, y) \log_2(p(x, y))$

**Conditional entropy:**  $H(X|Y) = - \sum_y \sum_x p(y) p(x|y) \log_2(p(x|y))$

**In cryptography:** We want  $H(\text{Plaintext}|\text{Ciphertext}) \approx H(\text{Plaintext})$

### Min/Max entropy

**Q:** 256-bit variable, min/max entropies?

**A:**

- **Min:**  $H = 0$  (single possible value,  $p = 1$ )
- **Max:**  $H = 256$  (all values equiprobable,  $p = 2^{-256}$ )

### Concatenation entropy

**Q:**  $H(X) = 64$ , generate one value and concatenate it to itself (512 bits). Entropy?

**A:**  $H = 64$  (no new information, just duplication)

### Password entropy

**Q:** Password = random date “MM/DD/YYYY” (365 days, years 0000-2025)

**A:**  $365 \times 2026 = 739490$  possibilities  $\rightarrow H = \log_2(739490) \approx 19.5$  bits

### Improved generator

**Q:** Generator  $G$ :  $P(0) = 0.5 + \delta$ ,  $P(1) = 0.5 - \delta$ . Create  $A$ : take 2 bits from  $G$ , keep  $01 \rightarrow 0$  or  $10 \rightarrow 1$ , discard  $00$  and  $11$ . Advantage?

**A:**

- $P_A(0) = P_A(1) = 0.5$  (perfectly random!)
- Cost: need  $\frac{2x}{0.5-2\delta^2}$  bits from  $G$  for  $x$  bits of  $A$

## Series 3: Historical Ciphers

### Key Concepts

#### Caesar Cipher:


Rotation by  $k$  positions:  $E_k(x) = (x + k) \bmod 26$ ,  $D_k(c) = (c - k) \bmod 26$

#### Monoalphabetic Substitution:

Key = permutation of alphabet. Each letter  $\rightarrow$  fixed letter.

#### Vigenère Cipher:

Polyalphabetic substitution:  $C_i = (M_i + K_{i \bmod |K|}) \bmod 26$



#### Breaking:

- **Caesar:** Brute force (max 25 keys) or frequency analysis
- **Mono:** Frequency analysis + language structure
- **Vigenère:** Index of coincidence + frequency analysis

### Caesar encryption

**Q:** Encrypt “HELLO” with  $k = 5$

**A:** H→M, E→J, L→Q, L→Q, O→T → “MJQQT”

### Vigenère encryption

**Q:** Encrypt “BONJOUR” with key “BAC”

**A:**

- B+B=C, O+A=O, N+C=P, J+B=K, O+A=O, U+C=W, R+B=S
- “COPKOWS”

### Breaking Vigenère - Key length

**Method:** Index of Coincidence

For length  $L$ , shift text by  $L$  positions and count identical letters:

$$\text{IC}(L) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N-L} [a_i == b_i]}{N - L}$$

Maximum IC indicates key length (or a multiple).

### Breaking Vigenère - Find key

**Method:** Frequency analysis per subtext

1. Divide text into  $k$  subtexts (positions  $1, k + 1, 2k + 1, \dots$ )
2. For each subtext, calculate distance with language frequencies:

$$\text{Dist}_x = \sqrt{\sum_{i=0}^{25} (F_i - M_{(i+x) \bmod 26})^2}$$


3. The  $x$  minimizing distance is the corresponding key letter

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## Series 4: Block Ciphers

### Key Concepts

#### Encryption Modes:



**ECB (Electronic CodeBook):**

$$C_i = E_K(P_i)$$

Identical blocks → encrypted identically (weak security)

**CBC (Cipher Block Chaining):**

$$C_i = E_K(P_i \oplus C_{i-1}), \quad C_0 = IV$$

**CFB (Cipher FeedBack):**

$$C_i = E_K(C_{i-1}) \oplus P_i, \quad C_0 = IV$$

**OFB (Output FeedBack):**

$$O_i = E_K(O_{i-1}), \quad C_i = O_i \oplus P_i, \quad O_0 = IV$$

**Encryption Function:** Must be **invertible** (bijective)

### Linear encryption - Danger

**Q:** Linear encryption  $E_L(k, m_1 \oplus m_2) = E_L(k, m_1) \oplus E_L(k, m_2)$ . With 128 chosen ciphertexts, show we can decrypt without key.

**A:**

1. Choose  $c_1, \dots, c_{128}$  where  $c_i$  has only bit  $i$  at 1
2. Any ciphertext  $c$  writes as XOR of some  $c_i$
3.  $c = c_{i_1} \oplus \dots \oplus c_{i_n} = E_L(k, m_{i_1} \oplus \dots \oplus m_{i_n})$
4. So  $m = m_{i_1} \oplus \dots \oplus m_{i_n}$  (known!)
5. **Conclusion:** Linear encryption = very dangerous

### Invertible functions

**Q:** Is  $E_i = (B_i \cdot K_i) \bmod 16$  usable?

**A: NO.** If  $K_i = 2$ , then  $B_i = 1$  and  $B_i = 9$  both give  $E_i = 2 \bmod 16$ . Non-bijective!

### ECB encryption

**Q:**  $K = (AB)_{16}$ ,  $m = (A741BA)_{16}$ ,  $E_K(B) = B \oplus K$ , encrypt

**A:**

- $C_1 = A7 \oplus AB = 0C$
- $C_2 = 41 \oplus AB = EA$
- $C_3 = BA \oplus AB = 11$
- **Result:**  $(0CEA11)_{16}$

### CBC encryption

**Q:**  $K = (AB)_{16}$ ,  $IV = (AD)_{16}$ ,  $m = (A741BA)_{16}$ ,  $E_K(B) = B \oplus K$

**A:**

- $C_1 = (A7 \oplus AD) \oplus AB = 0A \oplus AB = A1$
- $C_2 = (41 \oplus A1) \oplus AB = E0 \oplus AB = 4B$
- $C_3 = (BA \oplus 4B) \oplus AB = F1 \oplus AB = 5A$
- **Result:**  $(A14B5A)_{16}$

## Series 5: RSA, Rabin, ElGamal

### Key Concepts

**RSA:**

- **Keys:**  $n = pq$ ,  $e$  with  $\gcd(e, \Phi(n)) = 1$ ,  $d = e^{-1} \pmod{\Phi(n)}$
- **Encryption:**  $c = m^e \pmod{n}$
- **Decryption:**  $m = c^d \pmod{n}$

**Fast exponentiation:** Compute  $a^{42}$ : write  $42 = 32 + 8 + 2$  then  $a^{42} = a^{32} \cdot a^8 \cdot a^2$

**Rabin:**

- **Keys:**  $n = pq$  with  $p \equiv q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$
- **Encryption:**  $c = m^2 \pmod{n}$
- **Decryption:** 4 possible solutions via congruence system

**ElGamal:**

- **Keys:** Prime  $p$ , generator  $\alpha$ , private key  $a$ , public key  $\alpha^a \pmod{p}$
- **Encryption:**  $(\lambda, \sigma) = (\alpha^k, m \cdot (\alpha^a)^k) \pmod{p}$
- **Decryption:**  $m = \lambda^{-a} \cdot \sigma \pmod{p}$

#### Generate RSA keys

**Q:**  $p = 11$ ,  $q = 17$ , create RSA key pair

**A:**

1.  $n = 11 \times 17 = 187$
2.  $\Phi(n) = 10 \times 16 = 160$
3. Choose  $e = 7$  (coprime with 160)
4. Find  $d$ :  $7d \equiv 1 \pmod{160} \rightarrow d = 23$
5. **Public key:** (187, 7), **Private key:** (187, 23)

#### Fast RSA encryption

**Q:** Encrypt  $m = 28$  with  $(n = 247, e = 41)$

**A:** Fast exponentiation  $28^{41} \pmod{247}$ :

- $28^1 = 28$ ,  $28^2 = 43$ ,  $28^4 = 120$ ,  $28^8 = 74$ ,  $28^{16} = 42$ ,  $28^{32} = 35$
- $41 = 32 + 8 + 1$  so  $28^{41} = 35 \cdot 74 \cdot 28 = 149 \pmod{247}$

#### Break RSA (small numbers)

**Q:**  $(n = 247, e = 41)$ , find private key

**A:**

1. Factorize:  $247 = 13 \times 19$
2.  $\Phi(n) = 12 \times 18 = 216$
3. Extended Euclid for  $d = e^{-1} \pmod{216} \rightarrow d = 137$
4. Verify:  $41 \times 137 = 5617 = 26 \times 216 + 1 \equiv 1 \pmod{216}$

### Rabin

**Q:**  $n = 253$ , encrypt  $m = 134$

**A:**  $c = 134^2 = 17956 \equiv 246 \pmod{253}$

To decrypt (factorize  $n = 11 \times 23$ ):

- $m_p = 246^3 \pmod{11} = 9$
- $m_q = 246^6 \pmod{23} = 4$
- 4 solutions including  $m_4 = 134$

## Series 6: Hash Functions and MACs

### Key Concepts

#### Cryptographic Properties:

1. **Preimage resistance:** Hard to find  $x$  such that  $h(x) = y$
2. **Second preimage resistance:** Hard to find  $x' \neq x$  with  $h(x') = h(x)$
3. **Collision resistance:** Hard to find  $x \neq x'$  with  $h(x) = h(x')$

Collision implies second preimage (but not preimage)

#### MAC (Message Authentication Code):

Guarantees integrity AND authenticity. Often built with CBC:  $MAC = E_K(\dots E_K(E_K(m_1) \oplus m_2) \dots \oplus m_n)$

### Bad hash function

**Q:** Is  $h_1(x) = x \pmod{n}$  secure?

**A:** NO for all 3 properties:

- Preimage:  $x = y$  gives  $h_1(x) = y$
- Second preimage:  $x' = x + n$  gives collision
- Collision: same as second preimage

### Vulnerable MAC with CBC

**Q:**  $t_1 = E_K(m_1)$ ,  $t_{i+1} = E_K(m_{i+1} \oplus t_i)$ . With  $(m_1 || m_2, t_1 || t_2)$ , forge?

**A:** Forged message:  $m' = (m_2 \oplus t_1) || (t_2 \oplus m_1)$

Forged MAC:  $t' = t_2 || t_1$  (computable without key!)

### MAC = last CBC block

**Q:** If  $MAC = c_n$  (last CBC block), can we modify the message?

**A: YES!** We can modify all blocks  $c_1, \dots, c_{n-1}$  without changing  $c_n = MAC$ . Decryption will give different message with valid MAC!


**Solution:** Use two different keys (one for encryption, one for MAC)

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## Series 7: Authentication and Key Establishment

### Key Concepts

#### Diffie-Hellman:



**Man-In-The-Middle attack on DH:** Intercept and replace exchanges

#### Security Properties:

- **Implicit key authentication:** Only A and B can have the key
- **Key confirmation:** A and B prove they have the key

- **Explicit key authentication:** Implicit + Confirmation
- **Perfect Forward Secrecy:** Compromise of long-term keys doesn't reveal past sessions
- **Future Secrecy:** Compromise doesn't reveal future sessions (passive attacker)

### Weak authentication protocol

**Q:** A sends  $r_1$  to B, B responds  $(r_2, K_B^{priv}(r_1))$ , A verifies and sends  $K_A^{priv}(r_2)$ . How can C impersonate A?

**A:**

1. C sends  $r_1$  to B
2. B responds  $(r_2, K_B^{priv}(r_1))$
3. C starts protocol with A, sends  $r_2$  as challenge
4. A responds  $(r_3, K_A^{priv}(r_2))$
5. C sends  $K_A^{priv}(r_2)$  to B → **B authenticates C as A!**

### Complete Diffie-Hellman

**Q:**  $p = 17$ ,  $\alpha = 3$ , Alice  $x = 7$ , Bob  $y = 11$ . Compute shared key.

**A:**

- Alice computes and sends:  $3^7 \bmod 17 = 11$
- Bob computes and sends:  $3^{11} \bmod 17 = 7$
- Alice computes:  $K = 7^7 \bmod 17 = 12$
- Bob computes:  $K = 11^{11} \bmod 17 = 12$
- **Shared key:**  $K = 12$

### Man-In-The-Middle on DH

**Q:** Charlie (MitM) with  $x' = 3$ ,  $y' = 5$ . How to intercept?

**A:**

**With Alice:**

- Intercepts  $\alpha^x = 11$ , responds  $\alpha^{y'} = 3^5 = 5$
- $K_{AC} = 5^7 = 10 \bmod 17$

**With Bob:**

- Intercepts  $\alpha^y = 7$ , responds  $\alpha^{x'} = 3^3 = 10$
- $K_{BC} = 10^{11} = 3 \bmod 17$

Charlie has 2 keys and completely controls communication!

## Protocol analysis

**Q:** A and B share  $S$ , exchange  $r_a$  and  $r_b$ , then  $K = E_S(r_a \oplus r_b)$ . Analyze properties.

**A:**

- **Implicit key authentication** (only A and B know  $S$ )
- **Key confirmation** (no proof of possession)
- **Explicit key authentication** (no confirmation)
- **Perfect Forward Secrecy** (attacker with  $S$  decrypts everything)
- **Future Secrecy** (passive attacker with  $S$  computes future keys)

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## Express Cheat Sheet

**Arithmetic:**  $a^{\Phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$  | Generator if  $\text{ord}(g) = \Phi(n)$

**Entropy:**  $H = \log_2(n)$  if equiprobable | Max when uniform

**Caesar:**  $E(x) = (x + k) \pmod{26}$  | Breaking: 26 tries

**Vigenère:** IC for length, frequencies for key

**Blocks:** ECB simple, CBC chained, CFB/OFB feedback | Function must be bijective

**RSA:**  $c = m^e, m = c^d \pmod{\Phi(n)}$

**Hash:** Preimage < Second preimage < Collision

**DH:**  $K = \alpha^{xy} \pmod{p}$  | Vulnerable to MitM