Farmers and the Origin of the Welfare State: Evidence from 308 Roll Call Votes between 1882 and 1940

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Farmers and the Origin of the Welfare State

Evidence from 308 roll call votes between 1882 and 1940

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Abstract

Studies of early social policy development highlight the progressive role of farmers, especially in Scandinavian countries. I argue that this notion does not match with the role played by farmer's representatives or the party in parliament. Being ideologically committed to more market-oriented solutions, less exposed to labor market risks, and fearing for their labor supply, Farmers as a social group and party, I argue, had strong incentives to resist welfare state expansion. This study moves beyond single events or a small selection of reforms used in previous studies, to ascertain preferences of farmers over all welfare reforms undertaken up to 1940. Using newly collected data on roll calls for 308 failed and successful legislative proposals in Norway between 1882 and 1940, totaling 24,791 votes this approach allows for greater precision in measuring the preferences of classes and parties on welfare policy. I find that Farmers party MPs consistently downvote generous welfare compared to the worker parties. Conservatives and Farmers turn out to be equally antagonistic to welfare proposals compared to Labor. This pattern is not substantially transformed during the period of Worker-Farmer coalitions of the 1930s. Further, considering the backgrounds of Members of Parliament (MP), farmers representatives systematically vote against generous welfare proposals, even voting and vocally protesting coverage extensions to the rural sector. It is therefore doubtful whether the origins of Scandinavian universalism prior to 1940 can be found in the role played by farmers.

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Welfare state development redux

"A feature of all Norwegian social policy has been exclusion of agriculture (…)

a concession aimed at appeasing Liberal farmer representatives"

Finn Blakstad

Conservative MP, Agrarian Society member and landlord in 1915[1]

Starting in the 19t century the world was undergoing the first steps towards industrialization. Yet, most countries would remain largely agricultural long into the 20th century. With the extension of suffrage to rural property owners, farmers became organized as a class, within existing parties, or formed their own farmer parties (Rokkan 1970; Christensen 1997). They would continue to shape politics even in industrialized countries. At the same time, the first steps towards regulating labor markets and insuring against risks were undertaken, with the first pieces of social legislation being enacted in the 1880s (Author). Given the rural nature of these societies, what role did farmers as a social group and as political party play in the origin of the welfare state? What were farmers preferences for welfare legislation that would redistribute the risk of old-age or standardize work protection for all workers?

Current accounts view farmers as decisive not only for the establishment of the welfare state, but also for the particularly wide coverage achieved in the Nordic countries (e.g., Baldwin, 1988, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001; Manow, 2009, 114-115). In fact, the central claim in the seminal contribution on the origins of universalism by Baldwin (1990,62-63), is that the role played by farmers have been misattributed to social democrats. Wide coverage was achieved as farmers demanded to be included in the new policies (Ibd.; Huber & Stephens 2001, 117). Others claim that Farmers parties played a role similar or perhaps even equal to that of social democrats (e.g., Manow 2009). Or that the famous welfare reforms of the 1930s were built on the back of the Farmers' willingness to support social democratic welfare measures (Luebbert 1987, 1991; Esping-Andersen 1990,30; Bjørnson & Haavet 1994, 24-25;Huber and Stephens 2001). This Worker–Farmer coalition argument, and especially the role attributed to the Farmers,

[1] Stortinget, 1915, p. 2110

has taken close to mythological proportions in comparative politics. Today, "almost all accounts of the historical development of the Nordic welfare state stress the importance of worker–farmers coalitions for the formation and subsequent expansion of the welfare state" (Kersbergen & Vis, 2014, p.53). In short, farmers were decisive protagonists in welfare state development.

The argument presented in this paper breaks with tradition. It highlights farmers as a social class and as party, which had both ideological and economic incentives to oppose welfare expansion. Ideologically, farmers argued for self-help, and that welfare benefits would foster inactivity. Economic considerations associated with their position in the economy as owners, inheritors of wealth, meant they would act as employers. Farmers therefore stressed the importance of ensuring labor supply and would have little need of risk-redistribution through welfare programs. Risks such as unemployment and accidents were urban risks, and social initiatives that reduced the hazards of factory work would increase worker flight to industry, leading to depopulation of the rural countryside. Being ideologically committed to more market-oriented solutions, less exposed to labor market risks, and fearing for their labor supply, farmers as a social group and party should, I argue, resist welfare state expansion.

I test the hypothesis that farmers should resist welfare state development using new original data from Norway. Starting in the 1880s with the first major social policy initiatives, going all the way up to 1940, I have collected a new roll call vote (RCV) dataset for all major aspects of social policy. This make possible the study of party-action at the level at which parties operate, the legislature. In contrast, current studies on welfare-state development tend to use aggregated expenditure data, which politicians only indirectly influence, leading to ecological biased inferences as to the parties' role in setting up welfare institutions (see e.g., Manow 2009). Studies on farmers welfare preferences, tends to focus on a few sets of reforms (e.g., Baldwin 1990) or single events such as the Worker-Farmer agreements (e.g, Luebbert 1991). This narrow focus can lead to bias, especially when the selected reforms take place under unusual circumstances. Extending both the time-period and number of relevant reforms is therefore necessary to paint an accurate picture of farmers interests. The study ends in 1940 to avoid the massive impact of and the resulting changes to the partisan dynamics that WWII caused (Obinger & Schmitt 2020). Starting in the 1880s allows the study of establishment of the party system in 1884 and the first attempts to introduce social policy following the worker committee of 1885.

Norway is a likely case for the progressive farmer thesis. Esping-Andersen (1990,30) presenting his view of farmers as critical agents in welfare politics, argued that "this was especially the case in Norway". In fact, farmers and its coalition with workers usually is taken as the explanation for the rise of the Norwegian welfare state (Alestalo & Kuhnle 1986; Luebbert, 1991, 268; Bjørnson & Haavet 1994, 24-25; Huber & Stephens, 2001, 117–118; Pedersen & Kuhnle, 2018).[2] The progressive role of farmers in Scandinavia has usually been attributed to a high share of family-farms, which is highest in Norway relative to the rest of Scandinavia (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Furthermore, no other class so clearly dominated Norwegian politics up to 1940 as farmers. While figure 1 shows the Farmers party only held close to 20 percent of the seats in parliament, Figure 2 shows how about 30 percent of all MPs tended to be farmers, with high points going so far as 40 percent. No other class came close to their position, and if we include Landowners (Godseiere) the rural dominance would be even greater. The farmers party was also a critical coalition partner, courted by Conservatives and Liberals alike during the 1920 and 1930s (Danielsen 1984). If the proposed role of Farmers is correct, its core expectations should line up with the role played by farmers in Norway.

This study moves beyond single events or a small sett of reforms, to ascertain preferences of farmers over all welfare reforms undertaken up to 1940. The empirical results show that farmers as a social group and as a party were clearly antagonists to social policy development.[3] They vocally spoke out and voted against most welfare measures, including most central pieces of Norwegian welfare legislation. In fact, Farmers voting record is statistically indistinguishable from that of the Conservatives. Farmers also voted *against* proposals to extend coverage, even to the rural sector. Prior to the formation of the Farmer party, farmers within the two major non-socialist parties were more likely to vote against welfare legislation than non-farmers, even going as far as using postponement proposals against their own governments on the issue of coverage. It is therefore doubtful whether the origins of Scandinavian universalism prior to 1940 can be found in the role played by farmers.

[2] But see Seip (1994).

[3] See also Bengtsson (2019) for a more complete reconceptualization of the role Farmers in Sweden's politics.



Figure 1 Percent of parliamentary seats held by various parties, 1880-1940.



Figure 2 Percent of MPs in parliament from various occupational classes, 1880-1940.

Parties and welfare state development

The literature on partisan effects on welfare-state development is substantial. Unfairly simplified, current partisan literature on welfare-state origins can be summarized under two headings.

In class approaches, worker parties and organizations are the critical actors pushing for welfare-state development (Korpi, 2006; Huber & Stephens, 2001). Although still the dominant perspective, it was quickly challenged. For example, Socialist support for welfare measures was not guaranteed because Socialists boycotted or voted against various welfare measures (e.g., Mares, 2003). Considering the negligible strength of the worker movement in most countries at the turn of the 19th century, the first welfare measures had to have originated elsewhere (Baldwin, 1988, 1990; Kersbergen, 1995; Nørgaard, 2000, 185).

The apparent deficiencies of the class approaches lead to a second strand of socioeconomically oriented approaches. The overall unifying principle is the focus on plurality of actors and shifting preferences. Going beyond the focus on leftist parties, Christian Democratic or Farmer Parties are argued to also be supportive of welfare expansion (e.g., Baldwin. 1990; Kersbergen, 1995). Some approaches go further, arguing that this plurality of voices also illustrates minimal consensus concerning welfare-state development (e.g., Alestalo & Kuhnle 1986). Others argue that especially the large employers and parties associated with them also could push for welfare regulations in specific circumstances (Mares, 2003). To varying degrees, these approaches highlighted how other parties and classes, including farmers, could play a role as a protagonist or concenters on social policy development.

With a plurality of actors pushing for, or at least consenting to, the introduction of social programs, welfare coalitions come to the fore (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 21). The most famous of these are the Worker–Farmer coalitions between Social Democrats and Farmers, resulting in the institutionalization of a generous and universal welfare state (Luebbert, 1987, 1991; Esping-Andersen 1990, 18).

The Worker–Farmer coalition argument comes in two forms. One highlights the Farmers' wishes not to be excluded from coverage against specific risks, especially old-age pensions and sickness insurance (Alestalo & Kuhnle, 1986; Baldwin, 1990, 55–93; Huber & Stephens, 2001, 117–120). Farmers therefore used their political power, first from within the Liberal and Conservative Parties and later independently, to push for coverage extensions and for a more universal system (Baldwin, 1990, 93-94; Huber & Stephens, 2001, 120).

In this version, the Farmer–Worker coalitions of 1930s is a formalization of already-existing policy positions, with farmers playing the decisive role in setting up the universal aspects of the welfare state and later reinforcing this direction with the advent of social democracy (Baldwin, 1990, 93; Huber & Stephens 2001, 117–118). The second highlights the necessity of horse-trading, with Social Democrats trading agricultural subsidies to secure support for their welfare proposals (Esping-Andersen 1990). While the second perspective has somewhat weaker claims as to farmers support for welfare, being central concenters instead of protagonists, it still placed farmers outside the group of antagonists. Farmers as a central actor in welfare-state development were later generalized by Manow (2009, 112–115), building primarily on the first of the second worker-farmer arguments. This view of Farmers is also present in the broader comparative politics literature (Luebbert, 1991, 267–268; Ansell & Samuels, 2004).

Farmers and welfare preferences

The argument presented here starts with the claim that social classes hold general attitudes to social policy, derived from their position in the economy, and that these groups will aim to influence policy through their representation in politics (Huber & Stephens 2001). Position in economy is constituted by two factors: risk and wealth. Representation can take place in the formation of a party or by mobilizing within or courted by already existing parties with compatible ideologies. Once a party is formed, it will further develop an ideological program to create a more coherent set of preferences and attempt to bring over new electoral groups perceived compatible (ideological and electorally) to win power.

Farmers were in the 1880s coming to grips with the transformation of the global grain market by entry of cheap American grain, which had led to plummeting prices (Nordby 1991). This forced Norwegian farmers on the defensive. Increasing mechanization, farm size, and marketization were the responses, with farmers shifting from wheat production to meat and dairy products. This shock and its consequences, usually labeled "det store hamskifte" was a profound in that it shifted farmers into a role of producers for highly competitive domestic and international markets (Haarstad 1983). Marketization of agriculture, solidified farmers as self-employed and or employers, with incentives like those of industrial employers, but with smaller productivity gains.[4] Furthermore, "Hamskiftet" took place in tandem with increasing urbanization

[4] There were some exceptions, like the capital-intensive fisheries. Over time, productivity would be increased by mechanization.

and industrialization, which shifted labor and capital from agriculture to industry. In the words of Lewis (1954), the state of "unlimited supply of labor in the countryside" ended with industrialization, with rural–urban migration shifting labor supply in favour of urban employers.

In this context, three factors derived from their economic position as rural wealth holders committed farmers as a social group against social policy. First, family farmers were less exposed to labor-market risks. They could diversify risk within the wider family, and their situation favored self-help because the farm offered security against hunger and unemployment. This meant farmers were good risks—their inclusion would help cushion the financial solvency of welfare programs. This was not the case for industrial workers or peasants, which greater exposure to accidents or unemployment, meant they would on net benefit from risk-redistribution. Social insurance would therefore end up costing farmers more than they could hope to gain. In this line of thinking, farmers could be welfare concenters, as farmers acquiescence could be secured, not by its inclusion as in Baldwins (1990) account, but by its exclusion. There was, however, additional reasons for why farmers would be clear antagonists against welfare development.

Second, farmers had an incentive to restrict policies that could increase mobility from the countryside to the urban economy, reducing their rural-labor supply. With fewer peasants to hire, farmers' labor costs would increase, and their potential influence over their workers decrease (Ardanaz & Mares, 2014). If a generous unemployment policy could reduce the risk of unemployment associated with urban work, labor standards soften and reduce the direct life-threatening danger of factory work, it would weaken farmers' ability to retain tenant workers. Similarly, increasing access to cheap housing through government subsidies, loans, regulation, or especially public works, would all facilitate either tenant farmers breaking out either for urban work or on their own farmland. In other words, social policy could work to shift labor supply in favor of industry.

Third, social policy interfered with farmers managerial prerogative, setting out rules for hours of work, how to carry out work, increasing administrative burdens, and to a greater degree than for urban employers. Farmers, for example, would argue that worker protection tended to be formulated with industry in mind, and then applied to agriculture. This meant that they could end up having unintended consequences for farmers. Farmers were also of the opinion that while industrial work could be to a greater extend

standardized, with tasks being explicitly regulated, agriculture required greater flexibility. Such issues made farmers claim that work in agriculture shouldn't be regulated based on factory legislation.

Ideologically the Farmer party was committed to market liberalism and the ideal of self-help. Self-help was understood allowing for the individual to best find his way through his own reason and strive. In this perspective, welfare benefits were understood as fostering idleness and threatening to stifle innovation and growth. Farmers were also committed to a certain form of idea of localism, which encourage local self-control against state, originating from the counterculture of the periphery (Rokkan 1970, 100). In welfare policy this usually meant decentralization and highlighting the need for resisting standardization and integration into the industrial economy. Since the various districts and industries faced so different conditions, one standard for how to carry out work, for example the eight-hour day, would break with this principle of localism.

These two factors, the ideological commitment to private property and self-help and the economic situation of the farmers, were self-reinforcing. The ideological commitment to private property dovetailed nicely with farmers ownership of farmland, and self-help was possible as farmers tended to be good risks. Together they worked to create a strong anti-welfarist position among Farmers.

Farmers operated as a social class in welfare politics, only establishing a fully-fledged party in 1921 (Farmers Party, Bondepartiet, 1921). Farmers initially operated through Farmers Associations (Bondevennene 1870s), and the Agrarian Association (Landmandsforbundet 1896 renamed Bondelaget in 1922), an interest organization formed to promote farmers' interests (Aasland 1974). The latter functioned as a semi-political party, founding or sponsoring candidates, sometimes as Independents or members of the Liberal or Conservative parties. In this way, farmers could work as an organized political force prior to 1921. This raised the question of how farmer interest would shape these parties' preferences.

The position of the Conservatives (Høire, established in 1884) and Farmers on social policy were quite similar. Ideologically, they were similarly committed to "self-help" and minor state involvement in the economy and protection of private property. Generally espousing classical conservativism with short-periods of social-liberal minded politicians (Danielsen 1984). Conservatives, like the Farmers, had strong linkages to farmers and landowners, but also urban employers and landlords. All groups which wealth would

make them targets for taxation or which regulation that increased tenants bargaining power would see less return on their capital. This meant farmers would not only be represented in the party, but also work together as an independent party with the Conservatives to resist social policy expansion.

The Liberals (Venstre, 1884) was another party that could be sensitive to farmer demands. Ideologically the Liberal party was committed to classical liberalism, with periods of strong social liberalism (Mjeldheim, 1984). This meant protection of private property, but also acceptance of state responsibility for the less fortunate. Electorally, the Liberal's party attempted to bridge both the urban–rural divide and the worker–employer divide with middle-class interests on top (Nordby 1991). Following the outline of farmer preferences above, this meant that the party should be restricted in pursuing peasants and urban workers with major welfare initiatives if these came up against their farmer constituency.

The role of farmers should be diametrically opposed to the worker parties of rural or urban origins. With the Social-Liberals (Arbeiderdemokratene, 1900, from 1925 Radikale Folkepartiet [Radical Peoples Party]) and the Social Democrats. The Social Liberal Party was fully-fledged in support of Georgian inspired social liberalism, an ideology of peaceful national development through state regulation and encompassing redistribution, especially land redistribution. The socialist was ideological committed to an ideology of radical social transformation to secure economic equality, and electorally dependent on urban workers and peasants and primary producers (fishers and sailors, Rokkan 1970, 100). The Social-Liberals had a similar, if less sucsesfull and more rural profile than the socialist, with greatest support from the "lumpproletariat" of landless peasants and small-farmers. Together this should produce a redistributive and universalist agenda, aimed at extending protective legislation to workers and renters, to redistributive land to landless peasants, and to extend coverage to agriculture.

Partisan voting patterns

With the preceding points in mind, what party voting patterns for or against more generous and or coverage extensions should we observe? I expect that to find substantive differences between that of the worker parties (Socialist and Social-Liberals) and the Farmers and Conservatives. The Liberal Party should take an intermediary place. Furthermore, within party variation among the Conservatives and Liberals should show farmers being less likely than worker representatives to vote in favor of generous welfare proposals.

Empirical design and data

How can we ascertain party preferences, or the role played by social class in legislative politics? One solution has been to focus on which parties carried out major welfare reforms once in office, either in reform-datasets or social expenditure (e.g., Manow 2009). However, this way of measuring partisan preferences is problematic for several reasons. First, it gives the impression that parties in government unequivocally supported these laws; and second, that these laws were all there was, ignoring the possibility of failed proposals.

This paper instead uses legislative proposals and roll-call votes that results from such proposals as indicators of party preferences (see e.g, Ansolabehere et.al. 2001). Focusing on RCV have several benefits, one of which is it allows us to study what position parties took on the various reform proposals put forward at that time. These revealed preferences go beyond what we can gleam from party-manifestoes, by capturing what parties do. Furthermore, it reveals their preferences for proposals that do not make it to law, greatly increasing the amount of information available to researchers. By studying which parties were more likely to propose generous legislation, we can also make some indication as to which parties were more likely to relatively push the agenda on welfare in a more generous direction. Proposals and RCV also has the added benefit of being able to connect MPs class background to measures of revealed preferences, since occupational and organizational membership is available in historical sources.

To identify all relevant RCVs for or against generous proposals, I use the historical oversight Dahl (1974) compiled on all RCVs between 1840 and 1940.[5] To identify the reason for the RCV, I use the case material available at the Parliament's website, such as notes from parliamentary debates and all preparatory documents. This is done for all policy areas considered central to the Norwegian welfare state. All major Norwegian welfare legislation faced RCVs because the criteria for calling for an RCV was lenient throughout the period; it required only the request of a single candidate in parliament. Table B1 in the online appendix outlines each individual RCV.

[5] Dahl also coded all RCVs, which the NSD digitalized and stored. Unfortunately, several data are missing, including some years' votes and important candidates from specific Storting sessions. Simple checks revealed that the RCV data had been merged with the wrong case-information. I therefore re-coded all RCVs.

What criteria are used to ascertain whether an RCV should be included and how to determine which alternative is for the most generous? For income-security schemes, a policy alternative is coded as *generous* if it involves a marginal increase in protection against a risk, for example by voting for increasing benefits, duration of, or coverage or easing conditionality compared to the status quo.[6] The status quo can be no legislation or existing legislation. . Marginal increase can both mean an increase in the protection for current recipients (higher benefits) or increases in coverage (new groups covered). Votes in favor of setting up new schemes or funds, to increase benefits or extend their applicably subsidies, or finally to increase financial means for a scheme all constitute proposals that increase the strength of the social security system compared to the status qou. For example, the 1906 proposal of setting up state subsidies for unemployment funds (no scheme), to increase state subsidies in said system in 1908, 1915, and 1918 are all coded as proposals for greater generosity. Similarly, the 1921 and 1924 proposals to use government funds to introduce municipality old-age pensions are coded as proposals more generous than the status qou (no scheme). Similarly, the 1929 proposal to use 2,5 million kr or 3 million of the housing funds to offset increasing debt burdens of farmers or the 1932 law proposing a system of debt-relief for fishermen and farmers (no change in budget).

For protective legislation (housing regulation and loans, employment protection, and child rights), any policy alternative is coded as *generous* if it involves a marginal increase in the rights of workers, renters, tenants, or children to leisure, work security, inheritance, and so forth.[7] This means that votes against postponement of laws that would regulate hours, or protect renters against rent-increases, or the rights of illegitimate children to inheritance from their fathers. One example is the 1915 Liberal factory act proposal to set regulated daily work-hours to nine hours. Social democrats proposed eight-hours, and a Liberal farmer

[6] For example, votes are made on the issues of financing (state, employer, or individual contributions), unemployment relief (job subsidies) spending, waiting days, and which groups to cover (e.g., peasants and income or property limits).

[7] Housing includes regulations meant to protect current renters against rentiers and the various means the state used to secure home ownership, including land-redistribution schemes for tenant farmers, state-subsidized housing loans, and housing debt-support schemes. Any proposals that increases coverage (geographically or to new groups) or options that increase renters' rights at the cost of the rentiers is classified as *more generous*. Similarly, any land-redistribution scheme that increases tenants' ability to acquire land and housing (e.g., municipalities' rights to expropriate land to redistribute to tenants) is classified as more generous.

fraction ten hours. Since there in 1915 existed no regulation for hours worked, all votes in favor of these restrictions are coded as votes for a generous proposal compared to status quo. Similarly, the vote in 1926 on whether to extend the temporary 1918 housing law (the 1918 law provided for regulation that restricted landlords' ability to change rent-prices etc., the non-generous option would be no regulations for renters), to allow it to apply on a permanent basis in Oslo, om a temporary basis in Oslo, and whether to extend the temporary measure to the city of Bergen (coverage) are all examples of proposals in which votes in favor are coded as more generous, as votes against would mean no-regulation.

In cases of uncertainty, I follow Seip (1994), using parliamentary documents to ascertain which proposals are likely to increase or decrease social spending. If it increases spending, then it is recorded as more generous. If after this step any uncertainty remains as to which is the more generous option, then the RCV is discarded. This is consequently a conservative option. While some subjectivity is always involved in making these classifications, it is important to highlight that what is coded as more generous is also what was considered the most "far-reaching alternative" to contemporaries, which is also reflected in the parliamentary voting order reflected most transformative compared to status quo (Seip 1994, 289).

I leave out RCVs that reflect differences in policy-design principles. That is, compared to the status quo, two proposals could mean an increase in generosity; but compared to each other, it is hard to determine which would be more generous. To illustrate, the RCV data included from the Old-Age Act of 1923 includes a postponement proposal meant to kill the bill and the proposal to implement the act (in 1924). However, it also included two additional major votes, which I exclude. This was the vote whether to adopt a contributory (Liberal proposal) or a means-tested (Social Democratic and Conservative proposal) system. Why? Enacting either a means or a contributory system is a clear increase in welfare generosity and coverage compared to the status quo (no program). However, it is not clear whether the means-tested pension would have been more generous than the contributory proposal. Although the latter would have covered the whole population, payments would have been issued only once the recipients paid the requited number of contributions. Therefore, current pensioners would still have to rely on poor relief. For the means-tested scheme, coverage was restricted to people passing various means and moral conditions, but benefits would be tax financed and paid without contributions. Similarly, questions of administration, such as whether a

specific system was to be managed by county (Amt) or municipality officials, are excluded as it is not clear how these would pertain to generosity.

With these considerations, I am left with 308 relevant RCV. Table 1 shows that, in percent of all RCV, the positive option achieved majority 59 percent of the time. With 169 ending with majority for the less generous option. In other words, substantial variation in party preferences would be missed by only focusing on realized policy instead of also potential outcomes.

Table 1. Overview over all RCV 1882-1940

	All votes	Coverage	Rural Coverage	Postponement
Unemployment	35	0	0	2
Sickness	44	12	4	5
Accident	23	8	5	2
Old age	16	2	2	5
Child-protection and poor relief	39	0	0	3
Employment protection	75	7	3	10
Housing	76	14	4	16
Total number RCV	308	43	18	43
Majority votes for generous (in percent of total)	59	46	55	65

Alternative measurements

One way to remove uncertainty about whether the generosity criterion biases the results is to focus on votes that clearly can be framed as against extending new rights or protections—that is, *postponement* or *dismissal* votes. These votes called for stopping further development of a piece of legislation and, if accepted, could stall development for decades. A case in point is the sickness insurance vote of 1897, which stopped further development until 1909. These votes therefore clearly signal the actors' views of a specific policy. In some instances, postponement proposals were used to stop cutbacks (such as reductions in benefits e.g., exclusion of dental services from sickness insurance in 1927). In these instances, voting for postponement is recorded as the positive option. In total, 43 RCV on postponement votes are included in the data.

To capture farmers' preferences for coverage extensions, I also create a specific measure to capture RCVs on for or against *coverage extensions*: proposals that would increase the number of covered persons. The primary problem here is to detangle the issue of coverage from other issues. This rules out using votes in which coverage is included as one of many components (e.g., this excludes votes on whether to accept

minority, majority, or royal propositions which includes coverage as well as other factors). However, given the severity of the question of coverage, RCVs were frequently called to expand or restrict coverage. In total, 43 RCVs concern coverage, of which 18 were explicitly targeted to the agrarian sector.

To capture party effects, I use the party label the MP used during the election, focusing on the parties argued to be decisive: Social Democrats (DnA\DNS\NKP)[8], Liberals (Venstre), Social Liberals (Arbeiderdemokratene; Radikale Folkepartiet), Farmers (Bondepartiet), and Conservatives (Høire). Because all socialist parties vote the same, I recode them into one dummy (Labor). Although included in the estimated model, I exclude the coefficients for parties observed only in a single period (Samlingspartiet\KRF) or splintered from the Liberals to slowly integrate into the Conservatives (Frisinnede Venstre\Moderate Venstre) for presentation reasons. Recoding all conservative parties into one group or disaggregating the Labor dummy would not change the main results as they all voted in favor in close to all instances.

In the models estimating party effects, I enter several conservative controls. I control for MPs' education to control for individual preferences for or against welfare policies that might originated from skill differences (e.g., Iversen & Soskice 2009). Data on these aspects are appended from NSD (2020). The NSD schema distinguish between 21 groups and I enter these as dummies (-1). To control for local electoral demand effects, which could influence the MPs' welfare position and party allegiance, I include a set of election-district dummies (-1). I also include a set of RCV dummies, one for each RCV (-1) in the model. These dummies capture changes in government, institutional changes, and unique factors that change the parameters of the various votes (which party makes a proposal, etc.) that might correlate with party variables. Controlling for institutional change is important because Norway underwent several institutional reforms before 1940. Until 1898, only men meeting certain property requirements had the right to vote in a Multi-Member District System. Starting with the election of 1900, all men over 25 years of age could vote and in 1905 with Single member district rules. Propertied women gained the vote in 1907, and all women on equal footing in 1913. Finally, in 1919 the electoral system was changed to Proportional Representation. Modeling these institutional or governmental changes directly, through dummies for various electoral

[8] Voting differences between these parties are so small on issues of social policy to be negligible.

systems, party in government, elections, and suffrage rules, does not change the results (see appendix A1). This is not surprising, as RCV-FE is the most conservative modeling option, as it entails controlling for each unique factor of a vote.

To capture the influence that farmer representation played in legislative policies, I included a set of occupational dummies using the Norwegian Center for Research (NSD) politician database's (NSD, 2020) to capture MPs class. I re-code NSDs 41 occupational categories into a set of dummies for whether an MP was working as a farmer (reference category), State official (both civil servants and lower public sector workers, military, or municipality workers), Teacher (basic, secondary and advanced levels), professional (e.g., Lawyer), Landowner, Major and Minor merchant, Worker (skilled and non-skilled) or Trade Union official. Worker is the reference category. In running models focusing on within party-variation, I either control for parties or restrict the sample to a specific party.

Results

Before moving to analyzing the Rollcall votes, one needs to ask which parties put the forward the proposals that lead to the RCV. That is, which parties shifted the agenda either in favor of demanding e.g., greater coverage or higher benefits?

Table 2. Percentage of proposals for or against more generous in percentage of total party proposals for whole period (1880–1940), Multi-Member District (1880-1905), Single Member District (1905-1921) and Proportional Representation (1921-1940).

	Overall		1880-1905		1906-1921		1921-1940	
	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For
Labor	4.29	95.71			5.56	94.44	2.94	97.06
Social Liberal	0.00	100	0.00	100	0	100	0	100
Liberal	53.70	46.30	37.14	62.86	66.67	33.33	43.75	56.25
Agrarian	100	0					100	0
Conservative	82.86	17.14	85.71	14.29	80.77	19.23	83.78	16.22
Independents	70.00	30.00	83.33	16.67	100	0.00	0.00	100
Total Num.	311		54		150		107	

Table 2 groups the percentages of proposals for less or more generous conditions for all proposals that resulted in an RCV.[9] I also split the data into three periods based on the electoral system in place. Focusing

[9] The RCV data contains information on 308 votes. However, not all these RCV were based on one proposal, instead sometimes one would pit 2 opposing proposals against each other. Meaning that one RCV could reflect 2 proposals. To include this information, each proposal has been recorded separately. I therefore have data on 414 proposals of which 311 can be directly tied to a single party and MP – excluding committee proposals. It is important to note, that these data are not meant to capture all

on the overall pattern, we see that in the period in which they had formed their own independent party, the Farmers were clearly committed to a policy-agenda of restricting welfare development. In fact, *all* proposals by a Farmer were about reducing generosity. The split within the Liberals is clear and becomes even more prominent if compared to Social-Liberals, which only made more generous proposals. Among Liberals that made less generous proposals, 70 percent were farmers. After the Agrarian breakout in the 1921 election, Liberals became less likely to make proposals that would reduce generosity.

Did Farmers try to put the question of increasing coverage on the agenda? In line with expectations, all proposals concerning coverage from Farmers, were *all against greater coverage*. For example, Jakob Vik proposed to exclude salaried employees in agriculture from the 1936 employment protection law and Kristoffer Høgset proposed 2 alternatives to slashing coverage in the pension act of 1923.[10] Within the Liberal party, of the 14 proposals for reducing coverage, 94% originated from rural MPs. An example is Konow (Agrarian society supported) proposal to remove "All Wage-Earners" from the sickness insurance scheme in 1907 to allow the parliamentary committee to cut-back coverage.[11] When the sickness bill was put forward in 1909, Liberal farmers proposed several restrictions in coverage, including curbing coverage of servants (Sigmund Aarnes), or to restrict coverage to fewer high income workers (Jørgen Selsø).[12]

The results are similar for proposals to postpone. Farmers only proposed postponements aimed at stopping generous legislation. For example, after having failed to implement cuts to the proposed old-age pension of 1923, in the Lagting, Farmer Moseide concluded that the law could not be implemented without "undermining our economy" and proposed to have the law shelved.[13] Furthermore, among the 19 postponement proposals put forward by Liberals, only 1 proposal originated from an urban Liberal MP. The rest were Agrarian society or farmers. Another is Liberal Erik Enge, a farmer that in 1906 proposed to

proposals, but instead reflect a subset of total proposals, that is those which were rollcalled. This means that a future study on all proposals would be highly valuable to verify these results.

[10] Stortinget 1923 1 December-Høgset- 293; 1936 29 April-Vik- 210

[11] Stortinget 1906/7 7 May -Konow-3033

[12] Ibd. 20 August- 1349-52.

[13] Stortinget 1923 1 December-Moseide- 293

have the unemployment Ghent-system canceled, after the proposed revisions failed to reduce the benefit and subsidy-level of the scheme.[14] Enge would later join the Agrarian party in 1921.

Rollcall votes

Turning to Rollcall data, table 3 shows the votes in favor or against more generous proposals in percent of total party votes. The observed pattern is clearly in line with expectations. The worker parties stand opposite the Farmers and the Conservatives, with the Liberals taking an intermediary role. This pattern is consistent over time, apart from Liberals becoming less supportive over time.

Looking within Liberals in table 4, Liberal MPs co-sponsored by the Agrarian society voted against the more generous option 67 percent of the time, while non-members only 48, a difference of 19 percentage points. Liberal MP representing an Urban district voted against the most generous option 36 percent of the time, while the same was 52 percent for a rural MP, a difference of 16 percentage points, substantial differences.

Table 3. Percentage of votes for or against more generous proposals in percentage of total party votes.

	Overall		1880-1905		1906-1921		1921-1940	
	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For
Labor	4.75	95.25			3.77	96.23	5.26	94.74
Social Liberal	11.72	88.28	0.00	100	10.21	89.79	20.00	80.00
Liberal	48.47	51.53	36.34	63.66	48.91	51.09	57.66	42.34
Agrarian	85.87	14.13					85.87	14.13
Conservative	78.42	21.58	78.54	21.46	72.41	27.59	83.69	16.31
Independents	56.89	43.11	56.65	43.35	56.52	43.48	70.00	30.00

Table 4. Percentage of votes for or against more generous proposals in percentage of total party votes for Liberals (1880–1921)

	Against	For
Agrarian Society Liberal	67.09	32.91
Rural Liberal	52.00	48.00
Urban Liberal	35.90	64.10

We turn to a set of statistical models, including controls for a host of factors, to ascertain how robust the descriptive pattern is. Figure 3 shows differences in predicted probabilities for the various parties voting against a generous welfare proposal. It uses Social Democrats as the baseline, with a 95% confidence interval over various model specifications. Models are nested such that subsequent models include all previous

[14] Stortinget 1905/1906 1 june-Enge- 347

variables, and standard errors are clustered by MP.[15] Model 1 includes only party membership as predictors. Model 2 adds election-district dummies to control for districts' local-demand effects, and Model 3's vote-specific dummies control for unique factors of each vote and the trend in the dependent variable. This method captures factors such as institutional changes, government composition, and who makes the proposal. Together with district and RCV fixed effects, the estimates provided by Model 3 are conservative. Model 4 adds individual control factors, dummies for MPs' occupation and education. (For a tabular presentation, see Appendix A1)

Figure 3. Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Less Generous Votes by MP's Party Compared with Labor MPs



Note. Results from a series of logit regressions with standard errors clustered by person for 307 roll call votes between 1880 and 1940 (tabular presentation in Appendix A3). A policy alternative is coded as generous if it involves a marginal increase in protection against a risk, for example, by increasing benefits, duration, or coverage or easing conditionality compared to the status quo.

The results are clear and quite robust over the various specifications. Focusing on the conservative estimates in Model 4 using Labor MPs as a reference point, the Liberals are 42 percentage points more likely to vote against the generous option. The antagonists are clearly distinguished from Labor MPs: A Farmer MP is 74 percentage points more likely to vote against welfare proposals, as is a Conservative MP. The confidence

[15] All models are replicated when clustering by RCV instead of by MP.

intervals of the last two parties overlap, meaning that compared to Labor, they are equally likely to vote against welfare proposals.[16] This pattern is robust to controlling for government partisanship, parliamentary period FE, changes in electoral system, or restricting samples to periods of liberal, farmers, conservative or socialist governments (Appendix A1).

Table 5. Percentage of votes for or against coverage extensions in percentage of total party votes (1880–1940).

	Against	For
Labor	8.03	91.97
Social Liberal	29.58	70.42
Liberal	59.28	40.72
Agrarian	87.50	12.50
Conservative	65.79	34.21
Independents	50.00	50.00

Moving on to party preferences for *welfare coverage*, the same pattern repeats. Table 5 shows the distribution of votes in percentages by party for coverage extensions. Farmers were far less likely to vote for coverage extensions and were even less supportive than were Conservatives. Moving to a regression framework, the results (Figure 4, appendix A1) shows that the bivariate patterns holds up with various controls. This is also the case when only using coverage extensions to the rural sector. The Liberals tended to be 50 percentage points consistently less supportive of coverage extensions. Most of the explicit RCVs on rural coverage take place before the formation of the Farmers Party, so we are left with coverage extensions to farmers and peasants in debt-reduction schemes for housing and small-owner loans to estimate Farmers' preferences (e.g., the debt relief for farmers program of 1932). However, even with this in mind, Farmers' were 40 percentage points more likely to vote against rural coverage extensions compared with Labor.

What do we find when only focusing on *postponement* votes? The results (Figure 5, tables 6-7 A1) shows both worker parties tending to vote against postponement more than any other party. A Farmer is predicted to vote for a postponement proposal 85% of the time, whereas the same for a conservative MP is "only" 75%. This means that the difference between a Labor MP and a Farmer MP is 77 percentage points, quite the substantial difference.

[16] Appendix A1 shows this holds when disaggregating results by party-type.

Did partisan politics change over time as the Farmer–Worker coalition argument predicted? Figure 4 presents the result of the conservative model for the RCVs from 1935 to 1940. As shown in the figure, Farmers increased their likelihood to vote in favor of a welfare proposal by only 10 percentage points, with the Farmer-versus-Labor difference amounting to 63 percentage points. Farmers remained antagonistic even in this period and did not move to occupy the spot Liberals held prior to the 1930s. This result cannot be a consequence of reforms in this period not facing RCVs because all major welfare proposals faced RCVs after 1935.

Figure 4. Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Voting for a Less Generous Proposal by MP's Party after 1935 Compared to Labor MPs



Note. Results from a series of logit regressions (tabular presentation in Appendix A3).

An illustration of this tendency might be apt. In 1938 the reform to replace the defunct voluntary unemployment-system with compulsory insurance faced a postponement vote. The vote was initiated by Farmer MP, Julius Grasåsen.[17] During the debate, Grasåsen argued that any policy should be couched on the principle of self-help, not encouraging state dependence. Social benefits would do the opposite,

[17] Stortinget 1938. eftm. 14 juni - Grasåsen - 738

encouraging "idling" and "unemployment". Furthermore, unemployment benefit would strengthen wages and productivity growth in urban industries compared to agriculture. Neither would coverage of the rural workers be the solution, as rural coverage would only increase food-prices, harming consumer interests. The consequences would be "skewed development" furthering urbanization. Maastad, part of the leadership in the party, was even clearer.

"I am against the proposed unemployment insurance act (..) it will allow people to cling to urban centers. We [Farmers] observing the current labor conditions in towns are concerned for the future. Each year it becomes increasingly difficult to acquire even the most basic of help, while urban migration continues, facilitated by policy "[18]

In resisting unemployment benefits, Farmers made their reasoning clear along the lines proposed by theory, ideological highlighting self-help, and a fear of ever decreasing labor supply because of urbanization would badly impact farmers. The exclusion of rural workers was also highlighted, but as Maastad put it, "I am principally against this law because I believe such [rural] occupations are impossible to insure."[19] Farmers made neither no formal move to extend coverage to these occupations. All Farmers together with Conservatives voted for postponement. The reform survived with the votes of Liberals and the Socialists.

Farmers representation

Critical to the Farmers' role in welfare-state formation was their influence within the established parties, especially the Liberal Party prior to the adoption of PR in 1919 (Cox et.al. 2019). To investigate this, I run a set of models with the sample restricted to all center-right representatives, Conservative, or Liberal representatives up to the entry of the independent Farmer Party. In the appendix A1, I carry out additional analysis on within Liberal representatives using other indicators for rural influence, with similar results.

Figure 5 shows the results from using the class variables, first for combining all elite parties, for Liberals, and conservatives only. We can see that, compared to a worker representative, farmers were more likely to vote against generous proposals, 14 percentage points higher compared to landowners' 16 or employers' 10

[18] Stortinget 1938. eftm. 14 juni - Maastad - 750

[19] Ibd.

percentage points difference. Figure 6 shows the same results, but now for coverage. Again, farmer representatives are significant less likely to vote for coverage increases compared to a worker representative.

An illustration of this general pattern can be found in the parliamentary debates of 1915 on accident insurance. The proposal set out to cover wage-work using machines in agriculture.[20] At the start of the deliberations, Liberal farmer, Lid asked for postponement on the grounds that

"I have gained the impression, that these social laws are not just to all. They are important for industrial workers, but one tries for each law - be it sickness accident or factory inspection - to pull inn peasants. As I understand it, the aim is to include those business from agriculture that can fit the bill" [21]

The postponement vote failed (not roll-called and called against his government). Moving on to the vote on whether to include the peasants working with machines, Lid proposed to exclude agriculture, arguing that "to my knowledge, this type of agricultural work is not particularly dangerous, and their inclusion is therefore wrong in my opinion.[22] He was supported by several prominent farmer MPs, all highlighting the low risk incidence of rural work, and the need to take into account local conditions.[23] Liberal and soon to be member of the Farmer party, Walter Konow argued that the proposal would end up insuring almost all wage work in agriculture, warning strongly against such an eventuality.[24]. Fearing for its passage, the minister of social affairs, Petersen, proposed to exclude all rural-wage workers earning below 100 kr per year (up from 50kr). This meant that only large farms would be covered by the act.[25] The amended proposal passed with 46 in favor and 43 against. Table 6 shows the percentage of farmers that voted against the coverage extension. First for all parties, second for Liberals only.

Table 6. Percentage of votes cast by farmers for or against extending coverage in 1915 to mechanized agriculture in percentage of total votes by farmers.

	Odelsting				Lagting			
	All parties		Only liberals		All parties		Only liberals	
	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For
Farmer MP	78.13	21.88	91.67	8.33	61.54	38.46	75.00	25.00

[20] Ibd. 24 july -§1 - 1854

[21] Ibd. 23 july - Lid - 1821

[22] Ibd. 24 juli - Lid - 1829

[23] Ibd. – (see Trædal or Gundersen)

[24] Ibd. – Konow - 1840

[25] Ibd. - Petersen - 1830

Figure 5. Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Voting for a Less Generous Proposal by MP's Class.



Figure 6. Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Voting for more restrictive coverage by MP's Class.



Note, tabular presentation in appendix A1.

The question was repeated in the Lagting by Liberal farmer Myklebust. He was supported by the Liberal farmer Nalum, who argued that the cause of farmers' inclusion was to compensate for bad industrial risks: "I understand that one wants to include agriculture, for one wants to include a good risk class; but agriculture is not served by its inclusion".[26] He would follow up by arguing that agriculture was unique in the low prevalence of accidents, and should be insured in their own independent program. Table 6 makes clear that the support for limiting coverage also in the Lagting strong among farmers. The role of farmers is aptly summarized by Bergersen (Labor MP) lamenting during the debate that:

"I have to confess that I don't understand this resistance from farmers against extending coverage to agriculture. Incidentally, this is the same resistance that we saw during the sickness insurance; it was of outmost importance to keep the farmers out. (..) I have yet to receive an answer beyond the fact that farmers are such good risks that they should stand outside of the insurance scheme."[27]

Conclusion

This paper has undertaken an investigation into the social policy preferences of farmers as a class and party up to 1940. I have argued against the common understanding of farmers as playing a fundamental progressive role in ushering in the welfare state (e.g.,Baldwin 1990,63; Manow 2009). Instead, I theorized that farmers were committed to an ideology of self-help and with economic incentives to restrict welfare development, and that they therefore resisted social policy expansion. Using data from all major social reforms, not just a set of single reforms, this study can paint a more precise picture of the role played by farmers than previous studies (e.g., Baldwin 1990). I find that farmers voted against coverage extensions and proposed to have key welfare measures postponed. Before forming the Farmers party, they played this role as a key player within the Liberal and Conservative parties. This pattern is found for unemployment, but also life-oriented risks such as old-age pensions, accident, and sickness insurance. The qualitative evidence also shows that farmers, contrary to the central claim of Baldwin (1990, 63,65) didn't demand to be included, but instead to be excluded. This is in line with the argument of farmers as good risks. The reader is reminded of the quote which started this paper, that the exclusion of agriculture was in fact a

[26] Stortinget 1915 efterm 4 august -Nalum–679-680.

[27] Ibd. -Bergersen–680-81.

concession to farmers. When taken together, the results of this study have provided a reconsideration of the historical role Farmers played as a class and party.

Two avenues should be pursued, first to understand how Farmers' parties change into Center parties, and how this influenced their welfare politics. Second, to more clearly ascertain the role farmers played both in Sweden and Denmark, to repeat a similar analysis as done here for the other Scandinavian countries. Both studies would help us understand the role of rural interests in shaping modern institutions such as the welfare state.

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Online Appendix

Appendix A1. Additional results only referenced in the text, with additional interpretations were needed.

Table 1 Logit Models of 307 Roll Call Votes 1882-1940 (Figure 3).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Labor	REF.	REF.	REF.	REF.
Liberals	2.94***	2.70***	3.67***	3.53***
	(36.43)	(30.20)	(27.68)	(23.96)
Social-Liberals	0.96***	0.82**	1.05***	0.96**
	(4.37)	(3.19)	(3.53)	(2.98)
Farmers	4.79***	4.66***	5.65***	5.38***
	(43.38)	(33.31)	(26.55)	(23.67)
Kristelig Folkeparti	4.78***	4.56***	4.93***	6.02***
	(14.89)	(12.89)	(9.11)	(7.81)
Det moderate Venstre	4.18***	3.74***	5.33***	5.24***
	(20.28)	(18.27)	(19.92)	(19.72)
Samfundspartiet	2.59***	2.68***	2.67***	2.85***
	(7.19)	(7.47)	(4.59)	(6.27)
Frisinnede Venstre	4.05***	3.85***	5.30***	5.15***
	(27.62)	(25.36)	(25.86)	(24.32)
Samlingspartiet	4.07***	3.94***	5.40***	5.20***
	(32.05)	(29.77)	(25.30)	(23.16)
Conservatives	4.29***	4.32***	5.66***	5.46***
	(51.62)	(46.41)	(39.09)	(35.28)
No_Party	3.26***	3.18***	5.18***	5.20***
	(22.77)	(20.79)	(20.47)	(19.07)
Constant	-2.99***	-3.07***	-5.10***	-4.98***
	(-45.30)	(-11.85)	(-10.94)	(-8.48)
Election distr. FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
RCV. FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Education FE	No	No	No	Yes
Occupation FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	24552	24552	24716	24552
Psudo R^2	0.22	0.25	0.40	0.41

t statistics in parentheses. occupational, education, election district and RCV dummies are excluded for presentational reasons

Government partisanship

Are the party results found in figure 3 reproduced once we control for government incumbency? Furthermore, could the association between MP voting behavior be modified by variation in said incumbency? For example, it could be that MPs from Liberal party are more likely to vote in favor for the same piece of legislation if proposed under an liberal government that if the same came from a socialist government. While plausible, there are several reasons for why this might not be the case. Party disiplin might be low, or the issue at stake might break with a core constituency of a party not represented in government. To test this, table 2 reproduces the main model from table 1 in appendix with controls for government partisanship (with socialist government as a reference category), and model 2 restrict the sample to Farmer, model 3 Conservative, model 4 Liberal, and 5 Labor governments. Independent of modeling choice, Farmers have the substantial similar estimated coefficient. The models exclude RCV-FE since these would be correlated with the government incumbency controls. Model 2 is estimated with OLS, as all labor MPs in this period all vote for the generous option, meaning the category would be dropped from a logistical regression.

Figure 1 shows the results. Focusing on Farmers, we find that Farmer party MPs are more supportive under liberal and Labor governments, than under a government of their own, Liberal or Conservative. Under Liberal governments (Blehrs, Johan Ludwig Mowinckels 1-3 government) and Labor (Hornsruds, Nygaardsvold) farmers do indeed vote more akin to social democrats, but no more than Liberals do under Labor and less so under Liberal governments.

In addition, figure 2 shows the results when I control for Parliamentary period fixed effects (), adding dummies for Government Incumbency (model 2), and finally dummies for electoral system (dummies for whether there exists an SMD or PR system, model 3). The point estimates do not even budge when including any of said controls, meaning that the observed results are unlikely to be driven by either factor.

Figure 1. Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Voting for a Less Generous Proposal controlling for government incumbency or restricting sample by government ideology



Table 2 Models of Roll Call Votes.

Governments:	All	Farmer	Conservative	Liberal	Labor
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Labor	REF	REF	REF	REF	REF
Liberals	2.69***	0.52***	2.52***	4.02***	3.68***
	(29.42)	(24.06)	(17.50)	(21.21)	(15.27)
Social-Liberals	0.85***	0.39***	0.61*	0.96*	2.54***
	(3.31)	(16.66)	(2.03)	(2.44)	(6.32)
Farmers	4.69***	0.86***	5.62***	5.40***	3.68***
	(32.92)	(40.25)	(20.60)	(20.78)	(14.56)
Conservatives	4.34***	0.84***	4.16***	6.09***	5.03***
	(46.24)	(46.69)	(28.11)	(29.50)	(20.16)
Farmer Goverment	0.087				
	(1.00)				
Liberal Goverment	0.13*				
	(2.32)				
Conservative Goverment	-0.073				
	(-1.54)				
Constant	-3.14***	0.21***	-2.89***	-5.09***	-1.51***
	(-11.91)	(6.12)	(-12.39)	(-10.57)	(-5.32)
Election distr. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RCV FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	24776	998	11289	17068	1482

t statistics in parentheses. Election district and RCV dummies are excluded for presentational reasons. Model 2 estimated with OLS and all other models with logit as labor perfectly predicts 0. .

Figure 2. Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Voting for a Less Generous Proposal controlling for parliamentary period, adding control for government incumbency and finally adding controls for electoral systems.



Disaggregated party effects by program type

Re-estimating Model 4 restricted to each separate program type reveal several interesting findings. First, all major nonsocialist parties except for the Social Liberals are significantly more likely to vote against welfare proposals than are Labor, with quite substantial differences for the various types of policies. Second, all parties were less supportive of generous unemployment/employment policies and sickness insurance. Third, although accident insurance and housing found support among the liberal parties, they met with strong opposition from Farmers and Conservatives.

Figure 3. Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Less Generous Votes by MP's Party Compared with Labor MPs for Different Program Types (1880–1940)



Note. Results from a series of logit regressions. Tabular presentation below

Table 3 Logit Models of 1884-1940 Roll Call Votes

	(1) Accident	(2) Unemployment	(3) Sickness	(4) Old Age	(5) Child Prot.	(6) Employment prot.	(7) Housing
Labor	REF.	REF.	REF.	REF.	REF.	REF.	REF.
Liberals	4.83***	7.66***	4.16***	2.21***	4.08***	7.86***	2.90***
	(4.08)	(9.44)	(11.81)	(9.54)	(7.31)	(8.05)	(18.69)
Social-Liberals	1.15	1.72	2.63***	0.42	3.03***	1.33	1.11*
	(1.12)	(1.28)	(6.44)	(0.64)	(3.46)	(0.52)	(2.08)
Farmers	2.34	8.77***	5.74***	2.88***	0	9.79***	6.04***
	(1.86)	(10.59)	(14.47)	(7.08)	(.)	(7.37)	(23.40)
Det moderate Venstre	5.42***	10.4***	6.31***	4.43***	5.18***	9.79***	4.93***
	(4.27)	(10.27)	(5.43)	(3.94)	(7.47)	(9.08)	(11.29)
Frisinnede Venstre	6.11***	10.2***	5.11***	1.75***	7.98***	8.81***	5.23***
	(5.26)	(10.56)	(8.54)	(5.42)	(9.70)	(7.25)	(20.67)
Samlingspartiet	6.25***	10.1***	4.74***		5.89***	10.9***	3.86***
	(5.01)	(10.35)	(11.60)		(8.30)	(10.33)	(3.50)
Conservatives	6.45***	10.6***	5.27***	1.64***	6.01***	10.7***	5.59***
	(5.66)	(12.25)	(12.70)	(6.37)	(10.42)	(10.51)	(30.04)
No_Party	6.21***	10.2***	5.30***	3.29***	5.86***	9.82***	4.78***
	(4.28)	(9.54)	(5.70)	(4.01)	(9.41)	(9.10)	(10.10)
Kristelig Folkeparti		9.57***					4.65***
		(9.93)					(7.93)
Samfundspartiet						4.50**	1.46***
						(3.18)	(5.56)
Constant	-5.74***	-6.82***	-4.36***	-1.73***	-4.94***	-10.3***	-2.02
	(-4.33)	(-7.08)	(-9.97)	(-5.26)	(-6.22)	(-7.52)	(-1.82)
Election distr. FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
RCV. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1572	3421	3324	1308	2640	5287	6289
R^2	0.33	0.61	0.34	0.19	0.35	0.50	0.44

t statistics in parentheses.Election district and RCV dummies are excluded for presentational reasons

Table 4. Percentage of votes for or against more generous proposals in percentage of total party votes, disaggregated by policy type

	Unemployment		Sickness		Accident		Old age		Child Protection		Employment protection		Housing	
	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For
Socialist	1.48	98.52	3.86	96.14	1.88	98.13	20.77	79.23	4.35	95.65	1.40	98.60	5.71	94.29
Social Liberal	10.17	89.83	25.35	74.65	8.82	91.18	26.09	73.91	6.78	93.22	4.96	95.04	12.96	87.04
Liberal	55.31	44.69	52.61	47.39	41.43	58.57	59.63	40.37	39.60	60.40	52.55	47.45	42.79	57.21
Farmer	80.75	19.25	85.80	14.20	6.45	93.55	73.33	26.67	100.00	0.00	95.28	4.72	91.32	8.68
Conservative	81.07	18.93	71.46	28.54	66.13	33.87	46.20	53.80	75.24	24.76	91.72	8.28	83.11	16.89
Independents	61.54	38.46	75.00	25.00	57.14	42.86	79.17	20.83	57.78	42.22	54.25	45.75	65.79	34.21

Figure 4. Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Voting against Coverage Extensions by MP's Party Compared with Labor MPs



Note. Results from a series of logit regressions. Fixed-effect models include roll call votes and election-district fixed effects.

Table 5 Logit Models of 1882-1940 Roll Call Votes for or against coverage extensions.

	(1) General coverage	(2) General coverage	(3) rural coverage	(4) rural coverage
Labor	REF.	REF.	REF.	REF.
Liberals	2.81***	3.62***	1.83***	2.69***
	(21.55)	(19.99)	(10.19)	(11.28)
Social-Liberals	1.57***	2.55***	0.33	1.72*
	(5.43)	(5.47)	(0.72)	(2.35)
Farmers	4.38***	4.58***	2.75***	2.45***
	(18.50)	(14.42)	(8.86)	(10.19)
Frisinnede Venstre	2.73***	3.56***	2.05***	2.14***
	(13.27)	(12.35)	(5.48)	(4.88)
Samlingspartiet	2.92***	4.36***	2.03***	4.27***
	(16.27)	(16.04)	(8.04)	(9.40)
Conservatives	3.09***	3.70***	1.93***	1.98***
	(23.20)	(22.43)	(8.94)	(9.89)
No_Party	2.44***	3.22***		
	(23.59)	(3.43)		
Constant	-2.44***	-4.74***	-1.60***	-2.79*
	(-23.59)	(-13.57)	(-10.43)	(-2.49)
Election distr. FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
RCV. FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3225	3138	1191	1088
R^2	0.20	0.36	0.11	0.22

t statistics in parentheses. occupational, education, election district and RCV dummies are excluded for presentational reasons

Figure 5. Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Postponement by MP's Party Compared to Labor MPs



Note. Results from a series of logit regressions Fixed-effect models include roll call votes and election-district fixed effects.

Table 6 Logit Models of 1882-1940 Roll Call Votes for or against postponement.

	(1)	(2)
Labor	REF.	REF.
Liberals	1.69***	1.75***
	(10.11)	(6.73)
Social-Liberals	-1.29	-1.17
	(-1.41)	(-1.09)
Farmers	4.55***	5.72***
	(19.79)	(16.90)
Det moderate Venstre	2.91***	3.48***
	(12.57)	(7.89)
Frisinnede Venstre	3.26***	4.81***
	(13.84)	(14.10)
Samlingspartiet	3.02***	3.38***
	(10.39)	(7.59)
Conservatives	3.56***	4.89***
	(21.24)	(18.50)
No_Party	2.59***	3.33***
	(11.26)	(7.96)
Constant	-2.68***	-3.40***
	(-18.56)	(-3.68)
Election distr. FE	No	Yes
RCV. FE	No	Yes
Observations	3504	3341
R^2	0.22	0.40

t statistics in parentheses. occupational, education, election district and RCV dummies are excluded for presentational reasons

Table 7. Percentage of votes for or against postponement of generous bills or cutbacks of total party proposals for whole period (1880–1940)

	Overall	
	Against	For
Socialist	6.40	93.60
Social Liberal	1.85	98.15
Liberal	26.96	73.04
Farmers	86.60	13.40
Conservative	70.67	29.33
Independents	47.71	52.29

Table 8 Logit Models of 1935-1940 Roll Call Votes. (Figure 2 in text)

	(1)	(2)
Labor	REF	REF
Liberals	3.27***	3.37***
	(18.65)	(17.86)
Social-Liberals	1.96***	0.79
	(34.42)	(0.77)
Farmers	3.32***	3.54***
	(23.35)	(18.51)
Kristelig Folkeparti	3.94***	16.0***
	(12.30)	(14.64)
Samfundspartiet	1.74***	2.26***
	(4.84)	(4.01)
Frisinnede Venstre	3.85***	4.75***
	(67.54)	(10.42)
Conservatives	4.05***	4.57***
	(39.80)	(24.04)
Constant	-2.14***	-1.79*
	(-37.62)	(-2.43)
Election distr. FE	No	Yes
RCV. FE	No	Yes
Occupation FE	No	Yes
Observations	2145	2100
R^2	0.40	0. 44

t statistics in parentheses. occupational, education, election district and RCV dummies are excluded for presentational reasons

Additional within Liberals RCV results.

To explain only within Liberal variation, I use two additional dummies: a dummy for whether an MP conducts his economic activity in a rural or city election district; or I use biographical information and election statistics to capture whether a Liberal MP was co-sponsored by the Agrarian society. In total, 30 MPs are identified as Agrarian society attached. Third, a dummy for whether an MP conducts his economic activity in a rural or city election district, capturing whether he could be considered a rural representative. I start with all RCVs up to 1921, then restrict them to postponement votes, and then coverage votes, and finally rural coverage votes. The results (Figure 4, Appendix) shows that even using these crude indicators of Farmer influence, MPs who either originated from rural districts or received explicit support of farmers tended to vote against welfare measures more than did other liberal MPs: A rural MP supported by the Agrarian Society voted like a Farmer representative (70%); an urban MP not supported by the Agrarian Society voted like a Social Liberal (32%). In other words, the role the Farmer Party later took was already at work in parliament in the form of Agrarian Liberals. This holds even if we restrict the sample to postponement votes (only 22 RCVs). For coverage extension, the association is insignificant but in the expected direction.

Figure 6. Differences in Predicted Probabilities for Liberal MPs for Roll Call Votes up to 1921



Note. Results from a series of logit regressions. Tabular presentation below

Table 9 Logit Models of 1882-1921 Roll Call Votes for Liberal MPs. (Figure 6)

	(1) All RCV	(2) All RCV	(3) Only Postponement/Dismissal	(4) General coverage	(5) rural coverage
Agrarian society	1.00***	1.04***	1.41**	0.18	0.52
	(5.47)	(4.55)	(2.69)	(0.42)	(1.03)
City	-0.73***	-1.05***	-0.93***	-1.11***	-0.63
	(-7.03)	(-6.92)	(-3.56)	(-3.96)	(-1.84)
Constant	0.034	-1.43***	-1.44***	-0.83**	-0.39
	(0.59)	(-3.64)	(-3.68)	(-2.71)	(-1.22)
RCV. FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8697	8145	937	889	371
R^2	0.02	0.26	0.19	0.20	0.11

t statistics in parentheses. Sample restricted to Liberal MPs. Election district FE excluded as they correlate perfectly with city dummy

Appendix B Tabular presentation of all RCV votes

Please see Online appendix file Appendix_1_exelfile