SLAVES
on HORSES

The evolution of the Islamic polity

Patricia Crone

SLAVES ON HORSES

THE EVOLUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC POLITY

SLAVES ON HORSES

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC POLITY

PATRICIA CRONE

Lecturer in Islamic History
University of Oxford

For T. C. and V. C.

I have seen slaves upon horses,
and princes walking as slaves upon the earth.

Eccles. 10 :7.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

This book is a reincarnation of the first part of my thesis ('The Mawālī in the Umayyad Period', University of London Ph.D., 1974) in a form so different that theologians might dispute the identity. I should like to thank Professor B. Lewis, who supervised me in 1969–73, Professor M. J. Kister, who helped me during a term in Jerusalem in 1972, Robert Irwin, whose queries inspired two pages of part III, and Dr Martin Hinds, whose criticisms inspired many more. Above all I wish to thank Michael Cook, who read the entire typescript in both its past and its present form, and whose advice I have nearly always followed, if not always with good grace. I also owe a special debt to Magister E. Iversen for suggesting to me, many years ago, the unfamiliar idea of becoming a historian. Needless to say, not even Magister Iversen can be held responsible for the result.

<div style="text-align: right">P.C.</div>

A note on conventions

Dates in the text are A.D., but *hijrī* dates have been added in square brackets where appropriate; in the appendices and notes all dates are *hijrī* unless otherwise specified. The full names of Arabic authors are given in the bibliography, but only the short forms are used elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION

I

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL
INTRODUCTION

This work presents an explanation of how and why slave soldiers came to be a central feature of the Muslim polity. The conceptual framework in which the explanation is set is that of *Hagarism*, and to the extent that the crux of the explanation has already appeared there,[1] this work may be regarded as simply an overextended footnote. There is, however, one respect in which the two works differ radically; for where *Hagarism* rejected the Islamic tradition, the present work is squarely based upon it.

This apparent lack of historiographical morality may meet with some disapproval, but it arises from the nature of Islamic historiography itself. Whereas the religious tradition is such that it must be accepted or rejected *in toto*, the secular tradition can to some extent be taken to pieces, and though a great deal of it has to be discarded, there remains enough for a coherent historical account. Before going on to the subject of this book, it is worth lending substance to this claim.

Muslim knowledge of the Muslim past was transmitted orally for about a century and a half.[2] Whatever the attitude to the permissibility of writing history,[3] little history was actually written until the late Umayyad period,[4] and the first historical works proper were only composed in early 'Abbāsid Iraq.[5] The fact that history was transmitted orally does not, of course, in itself mean that it was transmitted unreliably. Human brains can become memory banks of astonishing capacities, procedures can be devised for the transfer of memory from one bank to another, and professional memorizers easily hold their own against copyists in the business of perfect replication: the Vedas, Pāṇini's grammar and the Avesta were all transmitted for centuries by such men. But rigorous procedures along these lines are only adopted for the transmission of highly authoritative works which need to be immutably preserved, not for works of religious innovators; for where classics need to be preserved, new ideas need above all to be spread, and inasmuch as they engender change, they cannot well be shielded from it. Adherents of a new religion necessarily inhabit a different world from that of the founder himself: were it otherwise, his attempt at a religious paradigm

3

shift would have failed. Hence they will go over their tradition oblivious of the problems with which the founder struggled, struggling with problems which the founder never envisaged, and in so doing not only elaborate, but also reshape the tradition which they received. And since the world of our grandparents, as not quite that of our parents, easily becomes ancient history of which we know little and understand even less, the founder must resign himself to the fact that it takes only three generations for his life and works to be thoroughly reshaped:[6] the only insurance policy he can take out against it is to write his own authoritative works.[7] Oral transmission in the formative period of a new religion, in short, does not mean faithful preservation, but rapid transformation of the tradition.

Thus against the Hindu Vedas we can set the Buddhist *Skandhaka*, in which the life of the Buddha was first presented.[8] It was a grandchild of the Buddha's generation who created this authoritative work in an effort to outbid the Vedas. Formally it was a biography. Substantively it was an exposition of monastic rules interspersed with entertaining legends, in which remains of the tradition from which the biography was recast could still be found, but which was otherwise devoid of historicity. And thanks to its success it is directly or indirectly the source for the bulk of our knowledge of the Buddha's life today.[9]

Similarly thanks to its success, the *Sīra* of Ibn Isḥāq is practically our only source for the life of Muḥammad preserved within the Islamic tradition. The work is late: written not by a grandchild, but a great-grandchild of the Prophet's generation, it gives us the view for which classical Islam had settled.[10] And written by a member of the '*ulamā*', the scholars who had by then emerged as the classical bearers of the Islamic tradition, the picture which it offers is also one sided: how the Umayyad caliphs remembered their Prophet we shall never know. That it is unhistorical is only what one would expect, but it has an extraordinary capacity to resist internal criticism, a feature unparalleled in either the *Skandhaka* or the Gospels, but characteristic of the entire Islamic tradition, and most pronounced in the Koran: one can take the picture presented or one can leave it, but one cannot *work* with it.[11]

This peculiar characteristic arises from a combination of the circumstances and the method of transmission. The circumstances were those of drastic change. Whereas Buddhism and Christianity spread by slow infiltration, the coming of Islam was by contrast an explosion. In the course of a few decades the Arabs exchanged their ancestral paganism for monotheism, the desert for a habitation in the settled Middle East, tribal innocence for state structures, poverty for massive wealth, and undisturbed

provinciality for exposure to the world's polemical attention. Rarely have a preacher and his followers lived in such discontinuous environments: what made sense to Muḥammad made none to Muʿāwiya, let alone to ʿAbd al-Malik.

Even so, the Arabs might well have retained a more integral recollection of the past had they not proceeded to adopt an atomistic method of transmission. The transmitters memorized, not coherent narratives or the components of one, but isolated sayings, short accounts of people's acts, brief references to historical events and the like. It was a method evolved by the Jewish rabbis for the transmission of the Oral Law, and the Mishnah was handed down with the same rigorous attention to immutability as were the Vedas. But it was also a method which, once the rigour was relaxed, made for even greater mutability than that exemplified in the formation of the *Skandhaka*. Being short and disparate, the components of the tradition were easily detached from context, forgotten or given a new meaning by the addition of a single word or two. Rabbinical memories of the past not only suffered rapid attrition and deformation, but also tended to be found in a variety of versions set in a variety of contexts in answer to a variety of problems, with the overall effect that the original contours of the tradition were blurred beyond all hopes of recognition.[12] For the rabbis the past was constantly disintegrating into amorphous bits even at the most stable of times. For the Arabs the combination of atomistic transmission and rapid change was to mean both fast erosion of old structures and fast appearance of new ones.

To this came a further circumstance. Muḥammad was no rabbi. Whereas Jesus may have been a teacher whose doctrine may well have been handed down in accordance with the normal methods of rabbinic transmission,[13] Muḥammad was a militant preacher whose message can only have been transmitted *bi'l-maʿnā*, not *bi'l-lafẓ* that is to say only the general meaning was passed on. For one thing, rabbinic methods of transmission were not current among the bedouin; and for another, the immediate disciples of a man whose biography was for some two hundred years studied under the title of *ʿilm al-maghāzī*, the Prophet's campaigns,[14] are unlikely to have devoted their lives to the memorization of *ḥadīth*. In time, of course, Muḥammad's words were to be transmitted with the usual attention to immutability, both orally and in writing, and he himself to some extent laid down his sword to assume the role of the authoritative teacher of the *Sīra*.[15] But that is not how things began. The Muslim rabbis to whom we owe the Prophet's biography were not the original memory banks of the Prophet's tradition.

The Prophet's heirs were the caliphs, to whose unitary leadership the

embryonic religion owed its initial survival. The *'ulamā'* appear with
the Oral Tradition itself, perhaps in the mid-Umayyad period, perhaps
before, and the history of Islam thereafter is to a large extent the history
of their victorious emergence. The tradition as we have it is the outcome
of a clash between two rival claimants to religious authority at a time
when Islam was still in formation.

We have, in other words, a situation in which the Arabs were rent by
acute internal tension and exposed to scathing external polemics, under
the pressure of which current doctrines were constantly running out of
plausibility. As the caliphs pushed new doctrines at their subjects and
the nascent *'ulamā'* took them up, worked them over and rejected them,
the past was broken into splinters, and the bits and pieces combined
and recombined in different patterns, forgotten as they lost their relevance
or overlaid by the masses of new material which the pressure generated:
it is no accident that whereas the logia of Jesus have remained fairly small
in number, those of Muḥammad can be collected by the volume.

For over a century the landscape of the Muslim past was thus exposed
to a weathering so violent that its shapes were reduced to dust and rubble
and deposited in secondary patterns, mixed with foreign debris and shift-
ing with the wind. Only in the later half of the Umayyad period, when
the doctrinal structures of Islam began to acquire viability, did the whirl-
wind gradually subside. The onset of calmer weathers did not, of course,
mark the immediate stabilization of the Islamic tradition. On the one hand,
the controversies over the Oral Law continued to generate Prophetic
*ḥadīth*s into the ninth century;[16] and on the other hand, the Muslim rabbis
now began not just to collect but also to sift and tidy up the tradition,
an activity which issued in the compilation of the first historical works
in early 'Abbāsid Iraq. Nonetheless, it is clear that it was in the course of
the first hundred years that the basic damage was done. For the *ḥadīth*s
from the late Umayyad period onwards can to some extent be dated and
used for a reconstruction of the evolution of Islamic theology and law.[17]
And the rabbinic censorship, though far from trivial, eliminated only the
remains of a landscape which had already been eroded. That much is clear
from Ibn Hishām who, as he tells us, omitted from his recension of Ibn
Isḥāq's *Sīra* everything without direct bearing on the Koran, things which
he felt to be repugnant or which might cause offence, poems not attested
elsewhere, as well as matters which a certain transmitter could not
accept as trustworthy.[18] Despite his reference to delicate topics, Ibn
Hishām clearly saw himself as an editor rather than a censor: most of what
he omitted had long ceased to be dangerous. We have in fact examples of
badly censored works in Muslim eschatological books,[19] particularly the

Kitāb al-fitan of Nuʿaym b. Ḥammād, who happily defines the *mahdī* as he who guides people to the original Torah and Gospel;[20] and though Jewish and Christian material is conspicuously present in these works, the doctrinal formations of which it is the residue can no longer be restored: the structural damage had been inflicted in the course of oral transmission. But it is above all our one surviving document which conclusively demonstrates this point. The Constitution of Medina is preserved in Ibn Isḥāq's *Sīra*, in which it sticks out like a piece of solid rock in an accumulation of rubble,[21] and there is another recension in the *Kitāb al-amwāl* of the ninth-century Abū ʿUbayd.[22] Abū ʿUbayd's version, which is later than Ibn Isḥāq's, is a typical product of written transmission: it has copyists' mistakes,[23] interpolations,[24] several of the by now unintelligible clauses have been omitted,[25] and it has also been equipped with an *isnād*;[26] but otherwise the text is the same. The Constitution, however, also survives in a number of *ḥadīth*s. The *ḥadīth*s are all short; they mention two or three of the numerous clauses of the document, but do not spell them out; they characterize the document as a scroll coming from the Prophet, but leave the occasion on which it was written unidentified, and turn on the point that the scroll was in the possession of ʿAlī.[27] Whereas written transmission exposed the document to a certain amount of weathering which it withstood extremely well, oral transmission resulted in the disintegration of the text, the loss of the context and a shift of the general meaning: the document which marked the foundation of the Prophet's polity has been reduced to a point about the special knowledge of the Prophet's cousin.

The religious tradition of Islam is thus a monument to the destruction rather than the preservation of the past. It is in the *Sīra* of the Prophet that this destruction is most thorough, but it affects the entire account of the religious evolution of Islam until the second half of the Umayyad period; and inasmuch as politics were endowed with religious meaning, it affects political history no less. There is not much to tell between the *sīra* of the *shaykhayn*, the first two caliphs, and that of the Prophet: both consist of secondary structures stuffed with masses of legal and doctrinal *ḥadīth*s. The *ḥadīth*s do at least have the merit of being identifiable as the product of the late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid controversies, and though they constitute a sizeable proportion of our information about the conquests,[28] they taper off with the coming of the Umayyads. For if the reign of the first four caliphs was *sīra*, a normative pattern, that of the Umayyads, by contrast, was *jawr*, paradigmatic tyranny, and where the fiscal rectitude of the first four caliphs is spelt out in a profusion of detail, the fiscal oppression of the Umayyads is summarily

dismissed in a number of stereotype accounts which, for all their bias and oversimplification, do in fact contain some historical truth.[29] And by the time of the 'Abbāsids the lawyers had begun to reach their classical positions on the subject; the fiscal policy of the 'Abbāsids was therefore neither *sīra* nor *jawr*, but simply history, of which the sources do not have all that much to say. The secondary structures, however, do not taper off until the second half of the Umayyad period. They are manifest in the mass of material on the battle of Ṣiffīn[30] and in the received version of the Tawwābūn;[31] the accounts of Mukhtār successfully blur what was clearly a dangerous message and defuse it by systematic ridicule,[32] while those of Shabīb and Muṭarrif, the Khārijites in the days of Ḥajjāj, conversely turn minor rebels into prodigious heroes and pinnacles of piety of riveting interest to the chroniclers.[33] It is only with the revolts of the Yemeni generals, Zayd b. 'Alī, 'Abdallāh b. Mu'āwiya and Ḍaḥḥāk the Khārijite, that we find highly charged events described in fairly neutral terms,[34] and by the time of the 'Abbāsids, of course, the Sunnī attitude had set: 'Alid rebels continue to receive sympathetic attention,[35] but the successors of the prodigious Shabīb in the Jazīra are dismissed in short notices to the effect that they rebelled and were defeated.[36]

The legal and doctrinal *ḥadīth*s are thus only one of the problems which the Islamic tradition presents. Were they the only problem, we should still have a fairly good idea of how Islam began; but the basic trouble is that these *ḥadīth*s are a layer deposited relatively late and that the layer underneath consists of rubble reorganized in minimal order. No scholar in his most extravagant fantasies would dream of reconstructing the Constitution of Medina from its debris in the *ḥadīth*s about 'Alī; and yet scholars are doing precisely that when they reconstruct the origins of Islam from its debris in the Islamic tradition.

Islamic historiography, however, does not consist only of a religious tradition, but also of a tribal one; and the question to which we must now turn is the extent to which the tribal recollection of the past survived with its structures intact.

What the Arabs did with their tribal tradition can best be set out against the background of Iceland. Icelandic and Islamic history unexpectedly share the feature of beginning with a *hijra*: as the future Icelanders made their exodus from Norwegian monarchy in the name of their ancestral freedom,[37] so the future Muslims made theirs from Arab paganism in the name of their ancestral God. And both *hijra*s led into an isolation, physical in the one case and moral in the other, which enabled the *muhājirūn* to retain and elaborate the values in the name of which they had walked out.[38]

Hence, for the Icelanders and the Muslims the heroic past was no mere backdrop to history, but history *par excellence*, the classical age embodying their abiding values and on which their intellectual efforts were spent. Where the Greeks or the Germans remember their *jāhiliyya*, barbarian past, only from an epic, and others not at all, the Icelanders and the Muslims, by contrast, became assiduous collectors of antiquities relating to the country they had left,[39] the exodus,[40] and the society which ensued.[41]

The character of these works is nonetheless very different. Where the Icelandic *jāhiliyya* merely escaped from monarchy and survived the coming of Christianity, the Arab *jāhiliyya* by contrast interacted with an Arab religion and state. Hence, where the Icelandic material is either historical or epic in character,[42] the Arab material bears all the marks of having been through religious *discussions*. The *Landnámabók* and *Íslendingabók* simply recorded the past on the basis of oral tradition collected while the classical society was still in existence, and the *Íslendingasögur* evoked this past in literary works composed during the agonized centuries when the classical society caved in;[43] but where Ari recorded and Sturla evoked, the Arabs argued, and the books of *futūḥ* and *ansāb* are thoroughly rabbinicized. The tradition has been broken up. Coherent narratives, though they do exist, are rare;[44] and for all that heroic prowess and lapidary style are common enough, the fragments of which the tradition came to consist are so many residues of religious arguments. At the same time pagan timelessness has been replaced by monotheist history. The heroes are sometimes pious and sometimes impious, but of heroic fatalism there is none;[45] and where the sagas are pure family history, the *futūḥ* and *ansāb* are that and a good deal more besides.

The tribal tradition was, like politics, endowed with religious meaning, and for that reason it did not escape the ravages of the whirlwind. There is no qualitative difference between the tribal and the strictly religious material in the *Sīra*, the Constitution of Medina being once more the only exception;[46] accounts of the conquests, insofar as they do not consist of legal and doctrinal *ḥadīths*, are formulaic and schematized;[47] tribal and religious history up to the accession of Muʿāwiya are largely beyond disentanglement;[48] and the careers of the Umayyad *ashrāf* are as stereotyped as the accounts of Umayyad fiscal policy.[49]

It is, however, undeniable that the tribal tradition was located off the centre of the whirlwind, and suffered less damage as a result. Where the *Sīra* is marked by secondary constructions, the *ayyām* are simply legendary;[50] there is occasional material relating to the period between the *ridda* and the first civil war, above all in Sayf b. ʿUmar, which is strikingly *alive*;[51] and there is still more relating to the subsequent period, and above

all the second civil war, which is manifestly historical.[12] The fact that
material is alive does not necessarily mean that it is true, but it does mean
that it has been through an undisturbed transmission such as the religious
tradition did not enjoy: of the Prophet the tribesmen remembered nothing,
but of their own history they obviously did remember something.

But it is not much, and what is worse, much of it is of very little use.
What the tribal tradition preserved was above all personalia: who
married, divorced and killed whom, who was the first to say and do such
and such, who was the most generous of the Arabs, what so-and-so said on
a certain occasion, and so forth, in short the chit-chat and gossip of the
Arab tribal sessions. Of such material a ninth-century scholar was to make
an entire collection, the *Kitāb al-muḥabbar*, which must rank with the
Guinness Book of Records among the greatest compilations of useless
information.[13] It was material which was well equipped to withstand the
effects of atomization, and it was, of course, precisely the stuff of which
the Icelanders made world literature; but it is not the stuff of history.

Whether one approaches Islamic historiography from the angle of the
religious or the tribal tradition, its overall character thus remains the same:
the bulk of it is debris of an obliterated past. The pattern in which the
debris began to be arranged in the eighth century A.D. acquired the
status of historiographical *sunna*[14] in the ninth, the century in which the
classical works of history and *ḥadīth* were compiled. The tradition did not,
of course, entirely cease to change on reduction to writing, but basically the
canon had now been closed and endowed with the same kind, if not quite
the same degree, of sanctity as that which was attached to the Prophet's
words; and both were passed on without substantial modifications,
complete with *ikhtilāf* and *ijmā'*, disagreement and agreement.

The works on which the canon was based were compilations pure and
simple. Had historical works composed before the subsidence of the
temptestuous weathers come down to us, we might very well have had
the excitement of seeing early Islamic history through independent minds;
but because the tradition has been shattered, all the later historians could
do was to collect its remains.[15] The works of the first compilers – Abū
Mikhnaf, Sayf b. 'Umar, 'Awāna, Ibn Isḥāq, Ibn al-Kalbī and so forth –
are accordingly mere· piles of disparate traditions reflecting no one
personality, school, time or place: as the Medinese Ibn Isḥāq transmits
traditions in favour of Iraq, so the Iraqi Sayf has traditions against it;[16]
'Awāna, despite his Syrian origins, is no Umayyad zealot;[17] and all the
compilations are characterized by the inclusion of material in support of
conflicting legal and doctrinal persuasions.[18]

Inasmuch as the classical sources consist largely of extracts or free

renditions of these works, they could not easily be very different in character. We have an apparent abundance of rich and diversified sources for the history of the first two centuries. Sunnīs and Shī'ites, Iraqis and provincials, Arabs and Persians all contributed over the years to the mountain of universal chronicles, local histories, genealogical works, biographical dictionaries, legal handbooks, collections of poetry, of proverbs and of gossip, heresiographies, polemical tracts and essays which shield the Muslim past from the unholy designs of modern historians.[59] But the diversity is depressingly deceptive. Ya'qūbī gives us nothing like the Shī'ite experience of Islamic history, merely the same body of tradition as the Sunnī Ṭabarī with curses in appropriate places;[60] similarly local historians such as Azdī have no local experiences and few local sources, but merely pick out from the canon what was of local interest;[61] compilers of biographical dictionaries picked out their *prosopa*, jurists and historians their *ḥadīth*s on taxation, and Persian historians simply translated their selections into Persian; Balādhurī's *Ansāb* is a universal chronicle genealogically arranged, Ibn 'Asākir's *Ta'rīkh* a biographical dictionary topographically based, and so on *ad infinitum* : where-ever one turns, one finds compilers of different dates, origin and doctrinal persuasions presenting the same canon in different arrangements and selections.[62] This does of course have its practical advantages. Inasmuch as every compiler will have bits of the canon not found elsewhere, one can go on finding new material even in late sources; and in theory one ought to read the entire corpus of Muslim literature on the period before venturing an opinion on what it was about.[63] But in practice, of course, this is not feasible, and one all too soon reaches the point of diminishing returns: in a late local chronicle written in Persian such as the *Tārīkh-i Sīstān* there is admittedly bric-à-brac which is not found elsewhere; but there is little else.

The source material thus consisted of an invariable canon formed between a hundred and fifty and two hundred years after the Prophet's death. It is for that reason that it is so extraordinarily impenetrable. Passing from one source to another and finding them very much the same, one is harassed by an exasperating feeling that one cannot *see*. And in fact one cannot see. Whoever comes from the Mediterranean world of late antiquity to that of the Arab conquerors must be struck by the apparently total lack of continuity: the Syria to which Heraclius bade his moving farewell seems to have vanished, not just from Byzantine rule, but from the face of the earth. Nothing in the Arab accounts of the conquests betrays the fact that the Arabs were moving into the colourful world described by historians

of late antiquity: in the east the Arabs saw *kisrā*s and *marzubān*s, in the west *qayṣar*s and *baṭrīq*s, but of whatever else they saw, they took no notice;[64] and for the better part of the Umayyad period, the only non-Muslim presence to come through in the sources is that of Khurāsān. The Syrian pillar saints dispensing grace to local Arab tribesmen, the Coptic peasants, riotous Alexandrines or sophisticated Nestorians at home at the King of Kings' court, all these have been conjured away at a stroke and replaced by faceless *'ulūj* and *naṣārā*: one comes straight from late antiquity to classical Islam.[65]

Unvaried and impenetrable, the tradition is also marked by an extraordinary unreality. The accounts which the sources push at us never convince, and if one accepts the descriptions of Muḥammad's years in Mecca, 'Alī's fiscal policy in Kufa or the course of the battle of Ṣiffīn, it is because the sources offer no alternatives, not because they ring true. In part, of course, this unreality arises from the fact that what the sources would have us believe cannot be true: new religions do not spring fully-fledged from the heads of prophets, old civilizations are not conjured away. But more particularly it reflects the circumstance that the tradition which the sources preserve was dead; for whereas the epic has compelling verisimilitude even when its information is wrong, the Islamic tradition is completely unpersuasive even when its information is correct. Thus Noth dismisses the use of *takbīr*s as battle cries as a mere literary *topos*,[66] and as it happens a Syriac source proves him wrong;[67] but had it not been for the Syriac source, who other than the most *ẓāhirī* of historians would have believed it?[68] The epic evokes a lived experience, but the Islamic tradition had been through too many upheavals to retain much vividness: true or false, it has all become dust in the eyes of the historians.

But above all the tradition is marked by high entropy. Unsurprisingly, it is full of contradictions, confusions, inconsistencies and anomalies, and if these could be ordered a certain meaning might emerge. But the debris is dejectingly resistant to internal criticism, and because it cannot be ordered, nothing much can be proved or disproved. There is nothing, within the Islamic tradition, that one can do with Balādhurī's statement that the *qibla* in the first Kufan mosque was to the west:[69] either it is false or else it is odd, but why it should be there and what it means God only knows. It is similarly odd that 'Umar is known as the Fārūq, that there are so many Fāṭimas, that 'Alī is sometimes Muḥammad's brother,[70] and that there is so much pointless information; but all one can do is to note that there are oddities, and in time one gets inured to them. It is a tradition in which information means nothing and leads nowhere; it just happens to be there and lends itself to little but arrangement by majority and minority opinion.

The inertia of the source material comes across very strongly in modern scholarship on the first two centuries of Islam. The bulk of it has an alarming tendency to degenerate into mere rearrangements of the same old canon – Muslim chronicles in modern languages and graced with modern titles. Most of the rest consists of reinterpretations in which the order derives less from the sources than from our own ideas of what life ought to be about – modern preoccupations graced with Muslim facts and footnotes.[71] This combination of traditional rearrangement and modern preoccupations does little to uncover the landscape that we are all trying to see: things can occasionally be brought to fit, but one all too rarely experiences illumination.[72] And for the same reason new interpretations do not generate much in the way of new research. Theories and facts do not mesh, paradigms produce no puzzles and puzzles no paradigms:[73] we are forever shifting rubble in our own peculiar field without appreciable effect on the work of our successors or that going on in adjoining areas. Hence what patterns we opt for hardly seems to matter: maybe Muḥammad was a Fabian socialist, or maybe he merely wanted sons; maybe the Umayyad feuds were tribal or maybe that was how Umayyad politicians chose to argue. What difference does it make? We know as little as and understand no more than before.

The inertia of the source material is similarly reflected in the inordinate time it has taken for a helpful *Quellenkritik* to emerge. In 1899 Wellhausen applied to Islamic historiography the principles of literary criticism which had paid off so handsomely in his study of the Penta-teuch; and since in both cases he was up against tribal and religious traditions belatedly committed to writing, one might have expected his 'Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams' to have been as revolutionary a work as was his *Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte Israels*.[74] But it is not altogether surprising that it was not. The Biblical redactors offer us sections of the Israelite tradition at different stages of crystallization, and their testimonies can accordingly be profitably compared and weighed against each other.[75] But the Muslim tradition was the outcome, not of a slow crystallization, but of an explosion; the first compilers were not redactors, but collectors of debris whose works are strikingly devoid of overall unity; and no particular illuminations ensue from their comparison. The Syrian, Medinese and Iraqi schools in which Wellhausen found his J, E, D and P, do not exist: where Engnell and other iconoclasts have vainly mustered all their energy and ingenuity in their effort to see the Pentateuch as a collection of uncoordinated *ḥadīth*s,[76] Noth has effortlessly and conclusively demonstrated the fallacy of seeing the Muslim compilers as Pentateuchal redactors.[77]

After Wellhausen the most striking feature of Islamic *Quellenkritik* was

its absence. It was only in 1967 that Sellheim published his stratigraphy of the *Sīra*, a work notable for its failure to relate itself to either Wellhausen or Schacht, and for its definition of a *Grundschicht* so broad that the basic problems of the formation of the Prophet's biography were evaded.[78] And not until 1968 did Wellhausen's ideas begin to be taken up by Noth.[79] Noth himself has adopted a form-critical approach, and the result is both enlightening and wholly negative. Form-criticism is, like literary criticism, a method evolved for the study of the Pentateuch. Biblical form-critics treat Wellhausen's redactions rather as conglomerates in which each individual component has its own individual history, and in pursuing these they take us back in time. But just as the Islamic tradition is not the product of either slow crystallization or a gradual deposition of identifiable layers, so also it is not a conglomerate in which ancient materials have come together in a more recent setting. Hence, where Biblical form-critics take us back in time, Noth by contrast takes us forward. He demonstrates time and time again that the components of the Islamic tradition are secondary constructions, the history of which we are not invited to pursue: they simply have to be discarded. Where Biblical form-criticism takes us to the sources behind the sources, Noth exposes us to a gaping void behind the sources. And the practical outcome of his *Quellenkritik* is accordingly not the rewriting of Islamic history, but a warning to foolhardy Islamic historians.[80]

By far the most important contributions, however, have come from the field of Ḥadīth. Here too there was a notable delay. Already in 1890 Goldziher demonstrated that the bulk of the traditions attributed to the Prophet in fact originate in the doctrinal and legal controversies of the second and third centuries of the *hijra*,[81] and his ideas were taken up by Lammens and Becker.[82] But thereafter the implications of Goldziher's theories were quietly forgotten, and not until the 1940s did they receive systematic development at the hands of Schacht.[83] With Schacht, however, things did begin to move. His work on Islamic law for the first time related atomistic *ḥadīth*s to time and place and used them for the reconstruction of an evolution,[84] a feat which has generated the first and as yet the only line of cumulative research in early Islamic studies.[85] At the same time his work on Islamic historiography demonstrated that second-century *ḥadīth*s abound in the accounts of the Prophet and the Rāshidūn,[86] and that the earliest historiographical literature took the form of dry lists of names chronologically arranged[87] – *ta'rīkh* as opposed to *ḥadīth* and *akhbār*.

Among historians the response to Schacht has varied from defensiveness to deafness,[88] and there is no denying that the implications of his theories are, like those of Noth, both negative and hard to contest. That the bulk

of the *Sīra* and lives of the Rāshidūn consists of second-century *ḥadīths* has not been disputed by any historian,[89] and this point may be taken as conceded. But if the surface of the tradition consists of debris from the controversies of the late Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid periods, the presumption must be that the layer underneath consists of similar debris from the controversies which preceded them.[90] The fact that so much of the *Sīra* has no apparent doctrinal point is not, of course, a proof of its historicity: of the lives of prophets little is remembered or invented *unless* it has a point. And the pointlessness testifies, not to the extraordinary detachment of seventh-century Arab reporters, but to the extraordinary erosion of seventh-century religious and historical structures.[91] The question which Schacht's theories beg is whether the chronological and prosopographical skeleton identified by him as the *Grundschicht* of the *Sīra* can withstand critical inspection, and it is remarkable, but perhaps not insignificant, that no historians have so far rushed to its defence. It cannot withstand such inspection. The chronology of the *Sīra* is internally weak,[92] schematized,[93] doctrinally inspired,[94] and contradicted by contemporary non-Muslim sources on one crucial point.[95] And that the prosopography shares these features needs hardly to be pointed out.[96] There is of course no doubt that Muḥammad lived in the 620s and 630s A.D., that he fought in wars, and that he had followers some of whose names are likely to have been preserved. But the precise when, what and who, on which our interpretations stand and fall, bear all the marks of having been through the mill of rabbinic arguments and subsequently tidied up.

As far as the origins of Islam are concerned, the only way to escape the entropy is thus to step outside. It is our luck that, unlike historians of the Buddha, we *can* step outside: all the while that Islamic historians have been struggling with their inert tradition, they have had available to them the Greek, Armenian, Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac and Coptic literatures of non-Muslim neighbours and subjects of the Arab conquerors, to a large extent edited and translated at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, and left to collect dust in the libraries ever since. It is a striking testimony to the suppression of the non-Islamic Middle East from the Muslim sources that not only have these literatures been ignored for questions other than the chronology of the conquests and the transmission of Greek philosophy and science, but they have also been felt to be quite *rightly* ignored.[97] Of course these sources are hostile, and from a classical Islamic view they have simply got everything wrong; but unless we are willing to entertain the notion of an all-pervading literary conspiracy between the non-Muslim peoples of the Middle East, the

crucial point remains that they have got things wrong on very much the same points. That might not, it is true, have impressed the medieval Muslims who held the Jews and Christians capable of having maliciously deleted from their scriptures precisely the same passages relating to the coming of Islam; but as the Jews and Christians retorted, given their wide geographical and social distribution, they could scarcely have vented their anti-Muslim feelings with such uniform results.[98] It is because there is agreement between the independent and contemporary witnesses of the non-Muslim world that their testimony must be considered; and it can hardly be claimed that they do not help: whichever way one chooses to interpret them, they leave no doubt that Islam was like other religions the product of a religious *evolution.*

Stepping outside is, however, not the only solution as far as the political history of the Arabs after the Rāshidūn is concerned.[99] Here too the *Grundschicht* consists of a chronological and prosopographical framework, and that the Arab *horror anonymitatis* contributed to the proliferation of names here as elsewhere can hardly be open to doubt;[100] but the lists include the names of governors who can be checked against the evidence of numismatics, papyrology and epigraphy, and against the testimony of non-Muslim sources, and the result of such a check is unshakeable, surprising and impressive agreement.[101] Who compiled these lists, when and why is one of the most intriguing problems of Islamic historiography;[102] but what matters in the present context is that the one thing we can pride ourselves on knowing in early Islamic history is who held power and when.

It is thus not surprising to find that whereas the non-Muslim sources offer a wholly new picture of the religion that was to become Islam, they generally confirm the familiar outline of the society that was to become the Muslim polity;[103] and since they do not usually offer many details, their importance is necessarily reduced. Not that this does much to justify the reluctance of Islamic historians to touch a non-Muslim source. Syriac sources offer a contemporary account of the revolt of Mukhtār,[104] descriptions of a proto-*mamlūk* army under Manṣūr[105] and a slave revolt in Ḥarrān;[106] and had it occurred to Dennett to glance at a collection of Nestorian *responsa* edited, translated and indexed in 1914, he would not have had to write his *Conversion and Poll-tax* in 1950 to prove that the Arabs did indeed impose a tax on the unbelievers' heads.[107] But the fact remains that for political history the non-Muslim sources offer additional, not alternative, information.

The obvious way to tackle early Islamic history is, in other words, prosopographical. To the extent that the pages of the Muslim chronicles are littered with names, prosopography is of course nothing but a fancy

word for what every historian of that period finds himself to be doing. But early Islamic history has to be almost *exclusively* prosopographical. There is, to be sure, a scatter of tribal traditions and stereotypes which can be used, but the vast mass of information is gossip which cannot be used for what it asserts, only for what it conveys, primarily the background and status of the persons gossipped about.[108] The gossip provides a context for the men in power, and without such context the lists would be of little use to us. But it does not provide much else.

2

THE NATURE OF THE ARAB CONQUEST

A Ch'i-tan prince of the Liao dynasty in China once caught a servant reading a book. It was an embarrassing moment, for needless to say the book was Chinese; hurriedly, the prince hid the book in his sleeve and cautioned the servant in future to do his reading in secret.[109] Similarly, 'Umar I once caught an Arab copying the book of Daniel. It was not, however, an embarrassing but a frightening moment, for 'Umar thrashed the man repeatedly to the accompaniment of the verse 'we have revealed to you an Arabic Koran' until the wretched victim cried out that he repented.[110] There could be no question of reading Daniel or other foreign writings on the side.

These stories nicely catch the contrast between Central Asian and Arab conquest. The Ch'i-tan episode was merely one of the many undignified moments the Central Asian conquerors had to endure in the course of their invariably vain attempts to resist Sinification. There were few who were not determined morally to stay in their ancestral 'forests of Ötükän',[111] and yet there were none who escaped at least a measure of cultural assimilation: even the Ch'i-tan, who had so aggressively insisted that they possessed a respectable civilization of their own,[112] took a Chinese type of administration with them when they escaped to western Turkestan.[113] And no barbarian conquest of China ever resulted in the formation of a new civilization. But the Arabs had conquered the Middle East in the name of a jealous God, a God who dwelt among the tribes and spoke in their language, and morally they did remain in Mecca: where the Ch'i-tan could at best translate the Chinese classics, the Arabs read their own Koran and tribal poetry. And, culturally, the outcome of their conquest was indeed a new civilization: where the Ch'i-tan adhered to Chinese values even in western Turkestan, the Syrians and the Persians adopted Arab values even in the settled Middle East. What are the features of Central Asia and Arabia in terms of which this extraordinary difference can be explained?

We may start with Central Asia, the paradigmatic home of barbarian conquerors. Two points are relevant here. Firstly, in terms of ecology

Central Asia is a land of steppe.[114] The steppe is close to ideal pastoral land: if generally too poor to be exploited by agriculture,[115] it is generally also too rich to be wasted on camels.[116] The steppe pastoralists can keep a wide variety of domestic animals,[117] and above all they can specialize in horses. Horses permit a high ratio of livestock to man,[118] and moreover they are in the nature of cash cattle.[119] It is perhaps for these reasons that the process of sedentarization through excessive wealth and poverty, which elsewhere siphons off the top and the bottom of the social pyramid,[120] scarcely seems to have been operative on the steppe: just as vast herds could be accumulated before the point of diminishing returns was reached,[121] so a large number of impoverished tribesmen could be kept in business as shepherds.[122] Central Asian tribes thus disposed of greater endogenous resources than is common in a pastoral context and possessed a correspondingly high potential for internal organization.

Secondly, in terms of geopolitics Central Asia was a huge sea of barbarians set in the midst of interlocking continents. Thanks to its border on the Siberian forest in the north, it was open to barbarian incomers who would upset existing polities and set migrations going.[123] And being surrounded by the four civilizations of China, India, Iran and the West, it was the recipient of a steady flow of moral and material resources from the settled states, some arriving in the form of imperial subsidies, others being left behind by the commercial and diplomatic caravans that traversed the steppe, or by the garrisons and missionaries who followed in their wake: as Greek fabrics, Graeco-Roman masks and Chinese lacquers could find a common grave in Pazyryk and Noin Ula, so Manichaeans, Nestorians and Buddhists were all to reach the Orkhon at their appointed times.[124] There were thus two external sources of commotion in the barbarian sea, and the very size of the sea was such that the commotion could reach gigantic proportions.[125] Hence the potential for internal organization was liable to be encashed.

This was particularly so in the area along the Chinese wall. Mongolia though split into two by the Gobi, formed a compact steppe wide open to the forests in the north, but in head-on collision with a compact civilization in the south — a situation very unlike the patchwork of oases, steppe and desert which constituted the Transoxanian border of Iran, where nobody could dream of building a single wall to keep the barbarians out.[126] Tribes certainly did enter Mongolia from the north,[127] and Chinese resources certainly did pour into it from the south, but the only safety-valve was the narrow Jungarian corridor to the west. Accordingly, very high pressure could be built up in the Mongolian steppe, and for this reason Mongolia was the classic site of Central Asian state formation.[128] Generally, Turkish

and Mongol tribes are highly stratified. The lineages are ranked in the order of seniority on the principle that no man is his brother's equal,[129] and divided into two estates, nobles and commoners, the 'white' and the 'black bones' respectively,[130] and these may be further subdivided. The nobles collect taxes and services from the commoners and command them in war, and descent groups are or may easily be reorganized as units of internal administration.[131] Periodically, the warfare endemic in Mongolia would act on these tribes to produce larger political structures. On the one hand, a chief became indispensable: 'a body fares badly without a head', as the conventional wisdom had it.[132] And on the other hand, kinship ties were slowly being ground away by the savagery and length of the struggles.[133] As tribes were broken up by dispersal or enslavement,[134] social stratification encroached on segmentation,[135] free retainers clustered around nobles and chiefs,[136] and one of these would eventually subdue his neighbours, distribute them in military and administrative units headed by his vassals, kinsmen or the nobles,[137] and commonly mark the foundation of his polity by the promulgation of laws.[138]

It was thus possible to found a state in the steppe; but the caravan trade notwithstanding, it was scarcely possible to *maintain* it there. Hence such states had no option but to conquer, and from the Hsiung-nu in the third century B.C. to the Manchus in the seventeenth century A.D. northern China was the seat of a long succession of barbarian states bent on the absorption of their rivals along the wall on the one hand, and the annexation of the fertile lands behind it on the other.

At the other end of Central Asia, by contrast, the steppe was sprawling and civilization well tucked away behind the Caucasus and the Danube. Here, then, the pressure was deflated. There was of course no lack of tribes coming in from the east, any more than there was lack of revenues pouring in from the south; but on the one hand, the tribes were free to spread out in the almost endless steppe, and on the other hand, the almost endless steppe lacked a natural centre of expansion: the Crimea was a place of refuge,[139] not a place from where to conquer. Typically, therefore, the tribal states of southern Russia were loose structures. A layer of tribal rulers was spread thinly over a local population of pastoralists, peasants and hunters; military organization was usually restricted to a royal bodyguard and an army of nobles; and resources came largely in the form of tribute from the subject population and revenues from whatever trading colony the area might house at the time. The basic structure of the Mongolian states — kings, retainers and an aristocracy in command of the tribes — was usually present, but the *tightness* was entirely absent, and that holds true of both the Iranian states of the Scythians and Sarmatians,[140]

the Germanic ones of the Goths and the Rus,[141] and the Turco-Mongol ones of the Huns, Khazars, Volga Bulgars or Tatars.[142] Eventually, of course, civilization began to close in on the steppe: where the Sarmatians could spread into Poland at a slight push from the Alans in the first centuries A.D., the Cumans had to negotiate their entry into Hungary when threatened by the Mongols in the thirteenth, while the Kazakhs scarcely budged when slaughtered by the Kalmuks in the seventeenth and eighteenth. And then the tightly organized states did make their appearance.[143] But by then it was too late for world conquest. And until then the barbarians of southern Russia had a simple choice between staying in the steppe at the cost of failure to conquer civilization, and conquest of civilization at the cost of losing their tribal homes.[144] In practice they usually stayed in the steppe:[145] when the Byzantine empire finally fell to the Turks, it fell to those who came from the east.

That is not to say that until then civilization was safe from tribal incursions in the west. Because tribal pressure in Central Asia was concentrated in the east, it was in the west that migrations tended to end up, so that southern Russia became instead a dumping ground for unwanted barbarians. The up-and-coming states along the Chinese walls would send their defeated rivals through the Jungarian corridor, from where the waves of displacement would eventually reach the Russian steppe. Hence where China was typically faced with attempts at concerted conquest by barbarian states such as those of the Hsiung-nu or the Yüan-yüan, Byzantium typically had to endure invasions of barbarian hordes such as those of the Huns or the Avars; while Iran, in all respects in between, suffered a bit of both.[146]

Europe and Arabia can both be seen as variants on the Central Asian pattern. Up to a point, Northern Europe and Central Asia are directly comparable: along the Rhine, as along the wall, barbarians were in direct confrontation with a compact civilization, and here as there the confrontation engendered state structures among the tribes – kings, *comitati*, military and administrative divisions,[147] and possibly even laws.[148] But for one thing, Europe was a land of forests, not of steppe, and thus underdeveloped rather than deprived. And for another, it was peninsular in shape. The sea placed a limit on the barbarians who could come from the north, while the eastern frontier, tiny as it was by Central Asian standards and moreover mountainous in parts, was not at all impossible to defend. Neither the ecological potential nor its defensibility can have been very obvious to those who witnessed the days of the migrations. But the Germanic tribes could hardly have overrun the Roman empire without the

intervention of Central Asia in the shape of the Huns: Germanic state structures were too embryonic and Germanic mobility too limited for a conquest of the Chingizid type;[149] and the Goths who broke the frontier as terrified refugees from the Huns, or the Franks who crossed a deserted Rhine with their cattle and cumbrous ox-carts, were certainly a far cry from the devastating horsemen who swept down on the Chinese.[150] Conversely, it is not accidental that the Germanic states which escaped imperial reconquest proved viable, so that in Europe the establishment of barbarian states with a veneer of civilization was cumulative.[151] As Charlemagne smote the Avars and baptized the Saxons, so even his feeble successors could withstand the onslaught of the Vikings, whose mighty display of barbarian savagery soon degenerated into mercenary and commercial services to the civilized south, and colonization of the empty north. And though the Mongols could still take the Hunnish road to Hungary, the Cuman refugees did not conquer France.

But in Central Asia the barbarian states regularly fell, if not to the Chinese then to other barbarians.[152] Central Asia was the region not of stable but of vanished nations, the *umam khāliya* of the Turks and Mongols who left behind a long tradition of tribal unification and conquest. Evidently, this tradition was primarily about Mongolia and China; but whereas the barbarians of Europe, settled in their stable states, forgot their ambition to replace 'Romania' by 'Gothia',[153] those of Central Asia by contrast learnt that there was more to the world than the Orkhon and the Middle Kingdom. On the one hand, it was clear that control of the entire steppe was required for the conquest of the Middle Kingdom;[154] and on the other, control of the entire steppe led to awareness of the civilized world beyond it.[155] And it was doubtless thanks to this piling up of barbarian experience that Chingiz could conceive the ideas deep in the wilds of Mongolia of conquering the world, so that instead of setting up yet another peripheral state that sent the losers westward, he combined the conquest and the invasion pattern in a single snowballing conquest of *both* China *and* the west.[156] In Central Asia it was thus barbarian conquest which was cumulative, and it was only in the sixteenth century that the stability of the Mongol polity finally issued in the definitive establishment of civilization there.

If Europe was too rich and too well-protected to conform to the Central Asian pattern, Arabia by contrast was too poor and too isolated. Ecologically, the deprivation of the desert is extreme: sheep and goats can be reared only along the edges, but in the interior only camels can subsist.[157] And inasmuch as camels demand a considerable investment of labour[158]

without yielding a commensurate return on the market, differentiation of wealth along the lines of the Central Asian pastoralists could not arise.[159] Geopolitically, the peninsula was simply a backwater. No tribes pressed south in search of its meagre pastures: what tribal movement there was went in the opposite direction. And what interest the settled states displayed in the peninsula was limited to the fertile strips along the'eastern coast and in the south.[160] The Yemen, for all that it might be Felix, was no China, and by Central Asian standards the traffic it engendered was derisory, so that commercially the Arabs could make it only in the Syrian desert or at sea. Inner Arabia thus remained all but innocent of foreign contamination. There *may* have been Manichaeans in Mecca just as there *may* have been Manichaeans in Siberia,[161] but against the Manichaeans, Buddhists and Christians who populated the oases of the Tarim basin, writing in some eleven languages and about as many scripts,[162] Arabia had only the Jews of Wādī'l-Qurā and the Christians of Najrān; and these scarcely even wrote.

Hence, where the history of Central Asia is one of endless political upheavals, that of Arabia by contrast is one of tribal immutability: there is not much to tell between the Arabia of the Bible and the Arabia of Musil's Rwala.[163] In the sparsely inhabited and uniformly impoverished desert social stratification remained trivial. Tribal nobility, *sharaf*, conferred a prestige as elusive as that of the 'good family' among the bourgeoisie; an acquired status,[164] it entailed no formal privileges or bans on intermarriage, and its occupants collected no taxes, transmitted no orders and had no tribal units to command. Similarly, chiefs were invariably peers among equals,[165] who did not issue orders as much as formulate a general consensus.[166] It is true, of course, that warfare might increase their authority dramatically;[167] but just as there were few endogenous resources for the chief to work on, so also there was no erosion of kinship ties:[168] it is precisely because there were so few resources to fight for that warfare in Arabia never came near the ferocity of the wars between the tribes in Chingiz's Mongolia. Tribes were rarely dispersed: the fate of the Bajīla is a marvel, not the norm.[169] And still less were they collectively enslaved or executed.[170]. Where the Central Asian tribes had wars, the Arabs typically had feuds;[171] they went to battle for the sake of honour and excitement and occasionally for wells or pastures; but though warfare might trigger the formation of confederacies, it did not lead to states. There is thus no parallel in Arabia to the political tradition of the Mongols or the Turks. The Arabs could scarcely even have afforded the Veblenian waste of human lives, animals and material objects — women, servants, horses, lacquers, textiles — that went into the burial of a Hsiung-nu or a

Scythian chief.[172] And where the Central Asian tribes have a profuse and eclectic vocabulary of political titulature,[173] the Arabs made good with *shaykh, sayyid* and a few other terms. The *ḥalīf* was no retainer,[174] the chiefly slaves no *ordo*, military and administrative divisions appear only after the conquests,[175] and there never was an Arab *Yāsa*.

It was of course possible for the Arabs to have states in the Syrian desert, where civilization was ready to assist with commercial revenues and imperial subsidies. But by the same token such states were forced into undignified dependence. In times of imperial weakness they might either pander to civilization as commercial statelets as they did in Petra, Hatra and Palmyra, or infiltrate it as settled kings as they did in Emesa and Edessa; but those who like the Nabateans or Zenobia tried both commerce and conquest were a shortlived menace at best, and culturally they were no menace at all.[176] In times of imperial strength they might either fight for civilization as client states after the fashion of Ḥīra and Ghassān, or they might fight against it as unorganized tribes as they did at Dhū Qār. But whatever they did, organization and independence could not be had together. Equally, it was possible to have states in the south and on the coast where the ecology improved.[177] But such states were too remote. The best the Yemenis could do was to have outposts in the north – the kingdoms of Liḥyān and Kinda – but of these only the Kindī kingdom was a military as opposed to a commercial outpost, and precisely for that reason it did not survive:[178] it was not the Kindī tradition that Muḥammad took up. What the Yemen contributed to north Arabia was above all a script, and what the tribes of the Damascene *ḥarra* recorded in this script was not records of their victories, but details of their genealogies and sheep.[179] Had Arabia been geographically inverted, there might well have been across the Roman *limes* a state endowed with the ecology of the Yemen without its parochiality, the commercial revenues of the Nabateans without their subservience, and the military following of the Ghassānids without their clientage. But Arabia as it was in real life could not and did not have a Chingiz Khan: there was never any *empire du désert*.[180] So the Byzantines worried about their share of Central Asia in the north, and the Sāsānids worried about theirs in the east, but both quite reasonably thought that the Arabs were simply marauders.[181]

Instead the Arabs possessed a characteristic very uncommon among tribes: they had enormous antiquity. The corollary was that they enjoyed an ethnic and cultural homogeneity quite without parallel in Central Asia or Europe. Central Asia being as we have seen land not of stable but of vanished nations, the tribes of Mongolia were no more Mongols than the Germanic tribes were Germans;[182] but because the Arabs had lived

in freedom from ethnic and social disturbance since very ancient times, their mobility had given them a common identity such as other peoples acquire only through their state structures.[183] Similarly, because they were ancient inhabitants of an impoverished peninsula, they combined a long-lived geographical proximity to civilization with a complete ecological distance from it. Unlike Huns or Vikings arriving out of nowhere, they knew what civilization was even if they did not have it, and unlike Goths or Mongols building states, they could continue not to want it. The common run of barbarians could vindicate their identity only in the name of a civilized tradition and so they acquired cultural unity as states within a foreign civilization; but the Arabs had their identity instead of states, and so they acquired cultural unity as a peninsula outside it.[184]

They might very well have stayed in their peninsula, and to this extent their conquest was a formidable historical accident. From the point of view of Arabia, the existence of the Jews was, after all, quite fortuitous.[185] It is similarly factors external to the peninsula which explain how Jews and Arabs got together.[186] But it is above all the circumstance that an individual was there to conceive the idea which drives home the extraordinary intersection of historical opportunity and accident to which Islamic civilization owes its existence:[187] it is a fact that, whichever way the origins of Islam are explained, Islamic civilization is the only one in the world to begin in the mind of a single man.

But if the event itself was accidental, the potential was not. The very deprivation which made the Central Asiatic paradigm inoperative in Arabia predisposed the Arabs for conquest on the model of the Jews. With its monotheist articulation of barbarian ethnicity, its divinely sanctioned programme of state formation and conquest, and its intrinsically religious leadership, the Judaic tradition constituted a sort of sacred obverse to the political tradition of Central Asia which the Arabs were uniquely qualified to make their own.[188] Where a Mongol statesman could accumulate earthly power, the Arab prophet tapped divine authority; and where the Mongol conquests were an explosion caused by the *disintegration* of a tribal society, the Arab explosion by contrast was caused by its *fusion*. Once invented, the idea was applied again and again by impoverished tribes in Arabia and North Africa who reenacted the Prophet's career in areas which had previously seen only monotonous raids and revolts: in the Islamic, as not in the Roman, Middle East the desert was as prolific a source of tribal conquest as the steppe behind the Chinese wall.[189]

It was, however, precisely because the Arab conquest had to be *invented* that it was followed by an outburst of barbarian creativity: the unlikeliness

of the event and its unlikely outcome are two sides of the same coin. Chingiz's conquests superbly realized an existing idea, and their outcome was predictably a reinforcement of existing *Shinto*: the political sanctity of the Hsiung-nu[190] came back as that of the Chingizids, who in the name of their right to world dominion peremptorily ordered the western rulers to submit[191] and martyred a Russian prince for his refusal to bow in the direction of Chingiz's *qibla*.[192] But even Mongol *Shinto* was no solvent of existing civilizations. The conquerors of China could and occasionally did try to impose their identity on the Chinese, just as they could and usually did try to resist the blandishments of Chinese culture; but their identity having no truth with which to interact, they could not create: Buddhism was no substitute for an ethnic God.[193] Hence, when the tribal ties decayed, the imprint of the barbarians was all but completely washed off the face of Chinese civilization. But the Prophet's conquests came out of the Prophet's imagination. Muḥammad having fused a jealous God and a peninsular identity, *something* had to happen. In the name of their jealous God the Arabs ordered the rulers of the Middle East to convert and martyred the garrison at Gaza; and in the name of their peninsular identity they withdrew into the conquest ghetto.[194] But either way they kept creating: it was exactly in the interaction between a universal truth and a parochial identity that the dynamic potential of their aegis lay. Vindicated by the force of conquest, this aegis was accordingly a powerful solvent. The barbarian imprint could not merely be washed off the face of the Middle Eastern civilizations, and when the conquest society collapsed, the dissolution of these civilizations was already far advanced.[195]

Islamic civilization thus took shape in an intensive interaction of religious and tribal power at very high cultural temperatures, and it is for this reason that its basic structure had set irreversibly within what was scarcely more than moments after the initial explosion. The key element of this structure was a tribal hostility to settled life which, having become religiously fixed, constituted one of the fundamental constraints within which Islamic culture and the Islamic polity were to evolve. The Arabs escaped absorption into the cultures of their subjects because morally they stayed in Mecca. But because morally they stayed in Mecca they were to find it impossible to legitimate a Muslim state in the settled lands.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONQUEST SOCIETY

3

THE SUFYĀNID PATTERN,
661–84 [41–64]

The problems which the Arabs came up against when they set about organizing a conquest society were precisely the opposite of those which normally afflicted the barbarians in China. In contrast to the latter, the Arabs found it a relatively easy matter to take over the native administration. For one thing, it was in the nature of their conquest that they possessed an imperviousness to native values which no Turkish or Mongol conqueror ever enjoyed. And for another, it was their good fortune that whereas the Chinese bureaucracy was the backbone of Chinese civilization, those of the Byzantines and Sāsānids were mere instruments of government; in particular, the provincial bureaucracy of Byzantine Syria was strikingly devoid of social and cultural distinctiveness. The translation of the Greek administrative records thus dragged no classics in its trail,[196] and there are no parallels in the Arab Middle East to the desperate dodges whereby the barbarians in China tried to have Confucian bureaucracy without Confucian civilization.[197] But in return the Arabs found it extremely hard to organize themselves. Their religious aegis could provide them with a rationale for a continuing political authority when the days of the messiah were over, just as the tribal armies furnished the material for a continuing Arab state when the days of the conquests were over; but for the shape of the conquest society neither the Judaic nor the Arab tradition had much to offer. The barbarians of Central Asia fought their civil wars before the conquests and *arrived* with state structures; typically, their organization thus endured.[198] But the Arabs had to fight one civil war to devise an organization, another to maintain it, and a third to prove it obsolete, all within some eighty years.

Because the Arabs arrived with a common identity instead of state structures, their conquest society was organized along lines very different from that of the Mongols in China. Where the Mongols parcelled out northern China in appanages to the Mongol aristocracy,[199] the Arabs huddled together in garrison cities to maintain their tribal isolation along the edge of the settled land. And where the Mongol aristocracy was the instrument of government, the Arab tribe could at the most be an instru-

ment of indirect rule. The Arab solution can in fact best be characterized as a form of inverted colonial rule. The garrison cities have rightly been compared with the coastal outposts of the British.[200] In both cases the conquerors arrived without the intention of making themselves permanently at home; in both cases, therefore, they settled in locations whence they could easily return to their homeland, and in both cases their relations with the natives were characterized by a combination of cultural tolerance and economic exploitation. But in the Arab case it was the *tribesmen* who congregated in the Bathursts and Dakars, and two crucial features of Sufyānid rule arise from this inversion: unlike a colonial empire, the Sufyānid state had to be tribal even in its *metropolis*; and where the British brought their own administration for themselves and practised indirect rule of the native tribes, the Sufyānids by contrast borrowed the native administration and practised indirect rule of their *own* tribes.

The Sufyānid metropolis was located in Syria. In terms of the normal geopolitics of the area this was an old location, but in terms of tribal settlement there was scarcely an alternative. The unsuitability of Medina was obvious: quite apart from being too remote, it was no tribal power base, a point which was forcibly brought home when 'Uthmān was murdered in 656 [35].[201] But Iraq or for that matter Egypt were no more suitable since the problem of the garrison cities was precisely that they had to be controlled by a precarious system of tribal balance, not by reliance on any one group;[202] it is thus not surprising that 'Alī's fate was as unhappy as 'Uthmān's. Had Syria been similarly constituted, the unitary state would presumably have dissolved in the civil war: both 'Uthmān and 'Alī had after all anticipated key features of the Sufyānid solution, the former by his reliance on his kinsmen and the latter by his tribal amalgamations.[203] But Syria was an exceptional province, firstly in that the Arab population was spread evenly over the countryside, and secondly in that one confederacy, the Quḍā'a, by far outnumbered any other tribe.[204] It was thus possible for the Syrian as for no other governor to rely on a local group, and since Mu'āwiya was not slow to take advantage of the situation,[205] the outcome of the first civil war was not political dissolution, but a transfer of the capital to Syria.

For purposes of indirect rule appropriate tribal units had to be created. The subtribe of the desert, though fairly well-defined in terms of social cohesion and political authority, was too small to be directly utilizable,[206] while conversely the tribe and confederacy, which had a more suitable size, were too ill-defined.[207] New units had been set up already in 638 [17] when Kufa had been divided into sevenths,[208] and the Sufyānids

followed suit about 670 [50] when all settlements were divided into quarters of fifths.[209] The basis of these units varied considerably with the availability of tribal material,[210] but the original groups were always retained by way of subdivision[211] so that the quarter or fifth was in the nature of a large semi-artificial tribe, a *qawm* or *qabīla* which could serve for the organization of army and city alike. Militarily, it was a division with its own range of commands. Administratively, it was a unit for the payment of stipends, the collection of taxes, and the maintenance of law and order.[212] With the quarters and fifths the Arabs had got their tens, hundreds and thousands. The leaders of these units, however, were not tribal vassals, but tribal chiefs, the *ru'ūs al-qabā'il* or *ru'ūs al-qawm* who formed the tribal aristocracy or *ashrāf* of the Umayyad period.

The *ashrāf* constituted the link between governor and governed in the Sufyānid system of indirect rule;[213] they commanded their units in times of war and were responsible for them in times of peace.[214] *Ashrāf* and governor came together in the latter's *majlis*, a session which did not differ greatly from a tribal meeting. Absence was a sign that something was wrong, while attendance provided an occasion for the exchange of information, orders, requests, and for a display of traditional generosity on the part of the governor.[215] The *ra's al-qabīla* in turn passed on information and gifts in his own *majlis*, and the process was repeated in the sessions of the lesser chiefs to reach the tribal group which had formed the primary unit of the conquerors.[216] Occasionally, it was repeated also at a higher level, as when the *wufūd* took deputations of *ashrāf* to the *majlis* of the caliph.[217] There were admittedly also elements of more direct rule in the system. Government by reliance on the *ashrāf* was supplemented morally by direct confrontation between governor and tribesmen in the weekly Friday service, and materially by the coercive power vested in the *shurṭa*, the local police force. But the exchange of bloodcurdling speeches and showers of gravel which marked the Friday service was hardly a major contribution to the smooth functioning of government;[218] and the *shurṭa* was drawn from the tribesmen themselves so that the governor had no independent force against the citizen militia.[219] Primarily, then, it was on the *ashrāf* that the Sufyānid set-up rested.

The position of the *ra's al-qabīla*, like that of any tribal chief under conditions of indirect rule, rested on the dual basis of influence within the tribe and acceptability to the authorities, and it was accordingly marked by the tense balance of loyalties that this implies on both parts. He was usually chosen from among the larger groups accommodated in the unit, and usually from within existing chiefly houses where the position tended to be hereditary.[220] To this extent the *ashrāf* demonstrate the continuing

efficacy of the pre-conquest stratification. But he was appointed by the authorities and occasionally even by the caliph himself:²²¹ rivalry for nomination is thus a recurrent theme.²²² And moreover, he was bound to the governor by a certain amount of intermarriage,²²³ by the prospects of promotion to a minor subgovernorship,²²⁴ and not least by the highest available stipends, the *sharaf al-ʿaṭāʾ*.²²⁵ The *ashrāf* were not the creatures of the state, and there is no lack of men among them who sided with their fellow-tribesmen against the governor: in 684 [64] few of the Basran *ashrāf* had any compunction about the expulsion of ʿUbaydallāh.²²⁶ But they certainly were indebted to the state, and there is equally no lack of men who took the opposite side: already in 680 [60] ʿUbaydallāh had been able to send Kufan *ashrāf* against their fellow-tribesmen during the affair of Muslim b. ʿAqīl.²²⁷ And the way the balance was tipping is clear from the standard accusation against the *ashrāf*, built into virtually every one of their biographies, that they support the powers that be.²²⁸

Between the metropolis and the provinces were the provincial governors; on them fell the duty of ensuring that the Arab tribes and the non-Arab bureaucracy were kept apart in the provinces, while at the same time both were linked to the metropolis. This problem was solved by two simple measures. Firstly, the number of governors at the highest level was reduced to an absolute minimum. The conquered lands were divided into four huge provinces: Syria with Mesopotamia where the caliph himself was supreme governor, Egypt with the west, and Kufa and Basra with their eastern dependencies.²²⁹ Some of these provinces were later subdivided and others were assigned together, but whatever the variations the number of top-governors was always very small; and it was in line with the same policy that fiscal and military power was all but invariably concentrated in the hands of one man. Secondly, the offices were entrusted to a kinsman of the caliph, be he agnatic, cognatic or affinal,²³⁰ or to members of a small tribe closely related to his, such as Quraysh,²³¹ Thaqīf²³² or the Anṣār.²³³ These men in turn relied on their own kinsmen and, to a less extent, the local *ashrāf* for the many sub-governorships they controlled,²³⁴ so that the vast majority of tribesmen were debarred from office or at the most admitted to interim governorships and insignificant posts.²³⁵

The solution worked, but at a price. Where government is monopolized by a small circle of relatives and friends, personal relations will necessarily take precedence over the impersonal demands of bureaucratic rules. There was of course no lack of such rules; the governor's revenues were acknowledged to be public money which had to be sent on to Damascus after the deduction of local expenses, and had the Sufyānids been able, they

would doubtless have ensured that the rule was enforced. But where officials need to be controlled, friends by contrast have to be cultivated, and it was accordingly by an elaborate system of indulgence that the Sufyānid system was upheld.[236] The governor spent enormous amounts of public money on opening moral accounts with *ashrāf*, honourable visitors, potential rebels, family, friends, poets, and other hangers-on,[237] and enormous amounts were likewise invested by the caliph in the governor.[238] The distinction between public and private money was tenuous in practice, and governorship soon came to be regarded as a source of private enrich-ment for the incumbent, so that what was actually sent on to Damascus depended largely on the good-will of the governor, and what the caliph expected to receive was determined largely by what he had received from the predecessor. The only remedy the caliph allowed himself was to call the governor to account on dismissal in an effort to retrieve what was deemed to have been illegitimate gains, the usual agent chosen for this procedure being the successor.[239] Very early on, governorship thus assumed the nature of *qabāla*, the governor sending on a fixed sum and pocketing an unlimited one which could be regained only through post-dismissal extortion; and the relatively gentle treatment which the governors received in this period was evidently due to the limitation of the rivals for the spoils to a small number of personal acquaintances to the exclusion of the tribal leaders. But it was precisely on this insulation of political and fiscal power from the tribal structures of conquest that the viability of the Sufyānid system turned.

The system was, however, vulnerable in both structural and temporal terms. Unlike a colonial empire, the Sufyānid state was tribally based even in its metropolis: it was thus a basic feature of the system that the mutual insulation of tribes and state could not obtain everywhere. And unlike colonial subjects, the Sufyānid tribes were conquerors: it was thus also a basic feature that the insulation could not obtain for long. As long as the precarious balance of tribal alliances in the metropolis and the tense balance of sharifian loyalties in the provinces were maintained, the state could not become the object of tribal or factional fighting. But in 684 [64] a momentary fluctuation in high politics upset the system in Syria; and already before 684 the long-term erosion of the tribal roots had begun to undermine its foundations.

4

SYRIA OF 684 [64]

The background to the events in Syria in the second civil war was two-fold. Firstly, in terms of religious developments the transfer of the capital to Syria had placed the Umayyad high priest in exile from his temple; the Umayyads may have done something to make the temple come to Syria, but for the politically redundant Quraysh of Arabia it was a more appealing idea to have the capital come back to the Ḥijāz.[240] Accordingly, on the death of Muʿāwiya in 680 [60], Ibn al-Zubayr refused to pay allegiance to Yazīd I, sought refuge in the temple, and awaited an opportunity to make his bid for the caliphate.

Secondly, in terms of tribal politics the rise of Quḍāʿa had led to the emergence of three rival confederacies in Syria. The Quḍāʿa, who were then considered descendants of Maʿadd,[241] were represented in the three districts of Jordan, Damascus and Ḥimṣ[242] where they had the support of neighbouring tribes such as Ghassān and Kinda.[243] In the north, however, the immigration of members of the confederacy of Qays in the reign of Muʿāwiya[244] led to the detachment from Ḥimṣ of the new district of Qinnasrīn by Yazīd I,[245] and here the Quḍāʿa had no foothold. They similarly lacked representatives in the southernmost district of Palestine, and their efforts to win over the Palestinian Judhām by intervening in a quarrel over the tribal leadership proved unsuccessful. The rivals were Nātil b. Qays al-Judhāmī who held the leadership, and Rawḥ b. Zanbāʿ al-Judhāmī, a younger man who hoped to get it. Ḥassān b. Baḥdal al-Kalbī, the Quḍāʿī chief, intervened on behalf of Rawḥ, who in return proselytized for the affiliation of Judhām to Asad of Maʿadd, but Nātil retorted by opting for Qaḥṭān,[246] a confederacy which had recently been formed for the benefit of Ḥimyar and Hamdān in Ḥimṣ.[247] The once un-disputed predominance of the Quḍāʿa was thus threatened in the north by Qays and in the south by Qaḥṭān, and both confederacies moreover were busy winning allies against the Quḍāʿa in the central districts. The tribal balance on which the Sufyānid system rested had become unstable, and for this reason there was an opening for Ibn al-Zubayr in Syria.

The death of Yazīd I followed by that of his son Muʿāwiya in 683

[64] provided the occasion. For the Quḍāʿa and their allies it was evidently imperative to close the interregnum with a Sufyānid or at least an Umayyad caliph. Accordingly, on the news of Yazīd's death, Ḥassān b. Baḥdal, who was governor of Palestine at the time, left Rawḥ b. Zanbāʿ as his deputy, gathered his tribal following in Jordan and joined the other pro-Umayyad *ashrāf* at Jābiya,[248] where the chiefs of the Quḍāʿa, Kinda, Ghassān, ʿAkk, Ashʿar and others elected Marwān b. al-Ḥakam in a last grand tribal *majlis*.[249] For the Qays and Qaḥṭān, however, it was clearly no less imperative that the Umayyad house be excluded, and both confederacies thus gave their allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr and/or Daḥḥāk b. Qays, a Damascene Qurashī who stepped forth as Ibn al-Zubayr's representative in Syria;[250] in Palestine Nātil b. Qays expelled Rawḥ in the name of the Zubayrid cause;[251] in Ḥims Nuʿmān b. Bashīr, the Anṣārī governor, declared for him on behalf of Qaḥṭan;[252] and the Qaysīs followed suit in Qinnasrīn.[253] The antagonists met at Marj Rāhiṭ, where the Quḍāʿī supporters of Marwān won a signal victory.[254]

Inasmuch as the Syrian tribes constituted the Umayyad power base, it was in the nature of Syrian politics that what they were about was not merely a confrontation of *ashrāf* and state apparatus, but sharifian control of this apparatus. The interregnum had brought tribal rivalry to a head in both Syria and Basra; but whereas the Basrans could only try to evade or reject the state,[255] the Syrians by contrast fought for its possession under the leadership of their respective caliphal candidates. It is easy to see that in this respect Syria of A.D. 684 is a taste of the future. Equally, it is worth noting that the events had one effect of some importance for the future; that is, they generated the alignments which were to dominate the Marwānid period. Shortly after Marj Rāhiṭ a local feud broke out between the Qays and the Kalb in the region around Palmyra,[256] and it was in the course of this feud that the Quḍāʿa under the leadership of the Kalb and with the encouragement of Khālid b. Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya changed their genealogy from Quḍāʿa b. Maʿadd to Quḍāʿa b. Ḥimyar.[257] The tribal instability thus issued in a genealogical realignment: the confederacy of Maʿadd was dissolved and its members absorbed by the Qaḥṭān. In future it was the Qaḥṭān, or in other words Yemen, who were to be poised against the Qays.

But in itself there was nothing futuristic about this civil war. A tribal conflict for the possession of the state apparatus was a hazard built into the Sufyānid system, not the result of its collapse, and whatever the undesirability of such a conflict, there was no reason why the system should not in due course be restored. On the one hand, the mixture of religious and political issues was purely adventitious. The Zubayrid utopia

was extrinsic, and indeed contrary to the ambitions of the Syrian *ashrāf* who had not the slightest interest in handing over the state apparatus to the Ḥijāzī Quraysh, and the rumour which had it that Ḍaḥḥāk was seeking the caliphate on his own behalf is likely to have been right.[258] The interregnum might change the dynasty, but once the dynasty was there nobody in Syria displayed the slightest interest in the Zubayrid issue.[259] On the other hand, the agents of the war were still authentically tribal. Ḥassān b. Baḥdal and his rivals were tribal chiefs who put their confederacies together with time-honoured genealogical glue, and though the civil war might change the alignments, the new alignments could serve as well as the old. The civil war changed many names, but substantially it left things as they were.

5

THE MARWĀNID EVOLUTION,
684–744 [64–126]

Yet if the Sufyānid system could still be made to work in 684, its founda-
tions had of course long been subject to steady erosion, and by the
Marwānid period the effects began to tell: out of the unitary tribe of the
Sufyānids came the soldiers and civilians of the Marwānids.

The new armies can be seen emerging from the time of ʿAbd al-Malik
(685–705 [65–86]). They were not all of the same type. On the one
hand, there was the Syrian field army which was based on the five districts
of Palestine, Jordan, Damascus, Ḥimṣ and Qinnasrīn, and which
provided garrisons for the entire empire and emergency troops wherever
they might be required.²⁶⁰ And on the other hand, there were the local
armies of which only those along the frontiers retained their import-
ance.²⁶¹ But field and frontier armies alike reveal a number of common
features in terms of both composition and organization which suffice to
establish the dislocation of military power from the tribal structures of
conquest.

In terms of composition the dislocation is evident in two ways. In the
first place, the manner of recruitment was now entirely voluntary en-
listment.²⁶² The unwieldiness of the old militia, difficult to mobilize and
hard to keep in the field, appears to have been a problem already in the
Sufyānid period;²⁶³ and by the time of Ḥajjāj the institution was defunct.²⁶⁴
Ḥajjāj accordingly recruited soldiers at the price of a horse, arms and
three hundred dirhams for his new muqātila.²⁶⁵ Similarly, after the battle
of the Pass in 731 [112f], Hishām ordered the governor of Khurāsān
to recruit at least fifteen thousand men while promising him reinforce-
ments raised in Iraq.²⁶⁶ And in the course of the third civil war three new
armies were raised: the thirty thousand volunteers recruited by Ḥafṣ b.
al-Walīd in Egypt at the order of Yazīd III,²⁶⁷ the twenty odd thousand
Jazīrans enrolled by Marwān II at Ḥarrān,²⁶⁸ and the armies of Abū
Muslim in Khurāsān.²⁶⁹

In the second place, the domain of recruitment now embraced both
Arabs and non-Arabs. There had of course always been non-Arabs in the

Arab armies; but for one thing, the rarity of volunteers meant that in effect
only prisoners-of-war were involved; and for another, the tribal organiza-
tion of the early armies offered no facilities for the large-scale accom-
modation of non-tribal groups. The Persian Asāwira had had to turn
themselves into a subtribe of Tamīm,[270] while the prisoners-of-war were
either placed in a regiment loosely attached to the person of their captor[271]
or else, as was more commonly the case, distributed among the soldiers
as servants and batmen.[272] But by the time of 'Abd al-Malik volunteers
were sufficiently numerous and the tribe sufficiently eroded for non-Arabs
to form a quarter or fifth of their own.[273] Such units of *mawālī*, that is to
say ethnic, social or religious renegades to the Arabs, appear in Syria
under 'Abd al-Malik,[274] in Iraq under Ḥajjāj,[275] in Khurāsān under
Qutayba,[276], and in Egypt under 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Marwān.[277] There were
also separate regiments of non-Arabs such as the *Waḍḍāḥiyya*, named after
its commander, a Berber freedman of 'Abd al-Malik,[278] and the *Qīqāniyya*,
a regiment of archers from Qīqān.[279] Finally, there were the *mutaṭawwi'a*,
irregular volunteers for the duration of a single campaign in whom volun-
tary enlistment and non-Arab origin converge. Rarely paid and usually
finding their reward in plunder, such volunteers are mentioned as early
as the reign of Mu'āwiya,[280] but again they reach significant proportions
only under the Marwānids.[281]

In terms of organization, the dislocation of military power from the
tribal structures of conquest is evident in the disappearance of the smaller
tribal groups accommodated in the quarters and fifths, and their replace-
ment by regular regiments known as *ajnād*. Every such *jund* was placed
under a commander, a *qā'id*,[282] whose men or *aṣḥāb*[283] were certainly
registered under him in the 'Abbāsid period and perhaps before.[284] Hence-
forth, the *ra's al-qabīla* was chosen from among the *qā'ids*. As before,
he commanded his *qabīla* in war and was responsible for its good behav-
iour in peacetime, but the archaic terminology notwithstanding, the *qabīla*
was henceforth composed of regiments, not of tribal groups, and its
leader was a general, not a tribal chief. The tribal pretensions of the
Arab and non-Arab *qabīla*s were equally false, and eventually of course
they disappeared. The Khurāsānī fifths are last heard of in 741 [123],[285]
and a few years later Abū Muslim's men are described as coming from four
new quarters in Marw which appear to bear topographical names.[286]
By 775 [159] the fifths had also disappeared from Basra.[287] Parallel
evidence for the remaining provinces is absent,[288] but it is scarcely hazard-
ous to guess that by the end of the Umayyad and the beginning of the
'Abbāsid periods the last vestiges of the tribe had disappeared from the
entire army organization.

It is, however, of some importance that the tribal nomenclature persisted as long as it did. Syria of 684 had changed only names: the substance was left as before. But the Marwānid evolution changed only substance: the names were left as before. In other words, where the Sufyānid system might have continued to work under the new labels, the Marwānid erosion displayed its effects under the obsolete labels of the Sufyānids.

With the dissociation of military and tribal structures the army became the instrument of control of the Arab and non-Arab population alike, the distinction between the two becoming increasingly effaced. Henceforth governors thus had to be chosen from among men who had the obedience of the army, that is generals rather than kinsmen, and the large number of subgovernorships would accordingly be distributed among men on whom the generals could rely, that is other generals rather than kinsmen and tribal chiefs. The net effect of the erosion of the tribal roots was thus to crack open the Sufyānid kinship state. In the metropolis the Quḍāʿī confederacy of the Sufyānids was replaced by the standing army of the Marwānids, while in the provinces the tribes under indirect rule were replaced by a civilian population under direct military control. And between metropolis and provinces the kinsmen to whom the state had owed its impermeability gave way to generals. Just as the Arabs had been their own colonial rulers, so also they inherited their own peculiar version of a post-colonial dilemma: colonial rulers usually go home, leaving the tribes with alien political roles; but in the Arab case the tribal roles disappeared, leaving the Arabs with alien rulers.

This transition is well illustrated by the governors of ʿAbd al-Malik. This ruler, after the successful termination of the second civil war, began by appointing his kinsmen entirely in the Sufyānid style;[289] his departure from the old pattern is first discernible in the appointment of Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra to Khurāsān. Muhallab is said to have been now a *sharīf* and now a *mawlā*,[290] and the ambiguity is instructive. On the one hand, he never held the *riyāsa*, the leadership, of Azd in Basra, and he doubtless owed his appointment to the military ability he had demonstrated in his campaigns against the Azāriqa as well as to his long acquaintance with Khurāsān.[291] It is thus difficult not to see in his appointment, as in that of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr to North Africa under Walīd I,[292] a recognition of the fact that the empire could no longer be governed by manipulation of kinship ties, and it is not of course surprising that this recognition should have come first in a frontier province. But on the other hand, the reaction of Muhallab is typical in his attempt to assimilate to the old model. First, he encouraged the immigration of Azd so as to set himself up as a tribal

chief.[293] Secondly, he tried to make himself out as a kinsman by forging affinal and symbolic kinship ties with the caliphal house: he married his daughter to Ḥajjāj[294] and, like Mūsā b. Nuṣayr a few years later, he proclaimed a characteristically intimate loyalty to the ruling house in the naming of his sons.[295] There is a similarly ambivalent pattern in the career of Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhili.[296] But when Jarrāḥ b. 'Abdallāh al-Ḥakami opened a long sequence of Syrian governors in Khurāsān, the generals ceased to disguise themselves.[297]

We thus have a situation in which the tribal character of the Sufyānid army and the affinal character of the Sufyānid state have both given way to military politics. At this point one might have expected one of two things to happen: the dissolution of the conquest society might have issued in the effective disintegration of the unitary state on the pattern of Merovingian history; or it might have led to the attempt at an orderly reorganization of the state on the pattern of Visigothic history. But the actual character of Marwānid politics arises from the fact that neither happened. The unitary state continued, but as one in which access to office and its spoils was normatively and substantively disorderly.

The unitary state continued because two crucial variables held constant in the transition from Sufyānid to Marwānid rule: metropolitan government remained affinal in character, and provincial power remained monolithic in shape. In contrast to most barbarian rulers, the Marwānid caliph was no soldier. Syria therefore continued to be ruled very much as before by men chosen from among the kinsmen of the caliph and the *ashrāf*;[298] and the Syrian troops who ruled a civilian population abroad found themselves subject to what had now become civilian rule at home. It was thus a basic feature of the Marwānid system that the head of state and the military were not competitors: the civilian caliph did not control the generals and the generals did not control the metropolis. Equally, in contrast with most barbarian rulers, the Marwānids vested immense provincial power in the hands of a tiny number of men. The top-governors continued to fill masses of subordinate offices and to handle huge fiscal resources. All competitors for office thus focused their attention on these men from whom all power flowed, and these men in turn fixed their attention on the caliph to whom they owed their appointment. Hence, it was also basic to the system that the struggle for power was centripetal. As long as both conditions held good, the unitary state would survive: the power structure invited provincial bids for the metropolis, not provincial bids for independence.

Had the caliphs become military men, or conversely had the generals

taken control of Syria at this point instead of in the third civil war, the metropolitan problem of keeping control of rebellious provinces would doubtless have resulted in both attempts at reorganization of the state and the danger of disintegration; in fact these were postponed until the advent of the ʿAbbāsids. And in the mid-Umayyad period, as not in the ʿAbbāsid period, such a development might well have precluded the survival of Islamic civilization: had the pre-conquest polities resurfaced, the Arabs might still have Arabized the Middle East,[299] but like the Germanic conquerors of the west, they would have left behind only barbarian kingdoms within the imperial civilizations.[300]

It is, however, not altogether surprising that the dissolution of the Arab conquest society had a different sequel. Unlike Germanic or Central Asiatic kingship, the caliphal office was a priestly one closely associated morally, if no longer physically, with a sanctuary in the tribal homeland.[301] And unlike Germanic and Central Asiatic conquerors, the Arabs had no compelling imperial tradition to confront in Syria. Indeed, the archaic character of the Marwānid metropolis in which a high priest without a sanctuary presided over a tribal society which no longer existed is one of the most striking testimonies to the strength of the Hagarene aegis on the one hand, and the extraordinary etiolation of imperial culture in Syria on the other.[302] The Umayyad princes might be soldiers, and the caliph Hishām took a certain interest in imperial statecraft,[303] but basically it took fifty years before an Umayyad prince and the Syrian troops decided to break the illusion.[304]

The unitary state thus survived, but the reasons why it survived are also the reasons why access to office was disorderly. It was in the nature of provincial power that competition for office was highly centripetal: all the competitors were, so to speak, trying to crash the same gate. And it was in the nature of metropolitan rule that the caliphs could not regulate the competition. There are of course always many more competitors than there are spoils, but usually the authorities see to it that hurdles of one kind or another eliminate a sufficient number of candidates on the way. The unwritten rules of kinship and *sharaf* had had precisely this function under the Sufyānids, but these were now obsolete. Had the Marwānids been military men, they might have acknowledged unwritten rules of military valour; and had they been reformers, they might have devised a formal *cursus honorum*. But as civilians orientated towards a tribal past, they could not tell their generals how to select their men. And in the absence of both traditional and formal rules of allocation, competition for office necessarily took the form of factionalism.

6

THE MARWĀNID FACTION

The Marwānid faction is identified as such by the fact that the interests involved were not susceptible of rationalization. The parties were drawn from the same army and fought for the same spoils; they merely happened to be too many for the spoils available.[305] Accordingly, they offered no programmes, demanded no reforms and laid no claim to the possession of truth until the faction came home to the metropolis as civil war: it is this failure to *argue*, as opposed to merely pour abuse, which is such a tell-tale indication of the nature of Marwānid *'aṣabiyya*.[306]

The faction was articulated in a tribal language because the soldiers aligned themselves by the nearest criteria to hand, that is to say along the lines of their regimental units. These, as will be remembered, bore tribal names, and it was thus the archaic labels of the Sufyānid period which were bandied about as factional slogans. Since a soldier was assigned to his particular regiment on the strength of his tribal background, it is not surprising that tribal and factional membership virtually always co-incide: a Kindī by tribe is a Kindī by regiment and a Kindī, that is to·say a Yemeni, by factional affiliation.[307] This does not of course mean that the loyalties were tribal, for the labels meant nothing to an Arab civilian,[308] while conversely they meant much to a non-Arab soldier.[309] But nor does it mean that the tribal language was wholly inert. The factional issues and the tribal language interacted in three major ways.

Firstly, in contrast to most factions that of the Marwānids was a response to a moral vacuum. Unlike, for example, the factions of Chinese gentry trying to manipulate the examination system, Qays and Yemen attempted to invent rather than to circumvent the rules, and to this extent they can scarcely be classified as corrupt. Intrinsically, the rules they invented were neither better nor worse than so many others tried out through the ages: Qaysī descent is presumably as good a ground on which to give a man a job as knowledge of the classics. But because they had been invented by the competitors as opposed to the authorities, they did not constitute an acceptable title to rule.[310] Here the tribal vocabulary came alive, for it could supply not only the rules, but also the honour. In

a world in which the metropolis persisted in defining nobility as tribal, the soldiers scarcely had much choice but to see their generals as chiefs: their poetry may not be very pre-Islamic in style, but it leaves no doubt that they took their tribal pretensions seriously.

Secondly, in contrast to most factions that of the Marwānids was polar. This was clearly the result of the monolithic character of provincial power: just as there could not be a number of generals breaking away from Marwānid control, so there could not be a number of factions sharing the enjoyment of Marwānid power. But it meant that the tribal language was very convenient. The lines of polarization could of course have been invented, but since the Sufyānid confederacies had divided all the major tribes into two or at the most three groups,[311] dividing lines with ancestral sanction already existed: Qays, Muḍar or Nizār and Yemen have no pre-Islamic history, but the generals certainly saw their antagonism as the legacy of a venerable past.

Finally, it is the combination of regimental composition and tribal nomenclature which explains the extraordinary rigidity of the Marwānid factional lines. Just as confederacies are usually made up of changing tribal groups, so factions usually consist of changing coalitions; but the Marwānid factional groups were fixed as if *ab aeterno* precisely because the language was dead: being soldiers, the participants could no longer reshuffle their alignments in accordance with the tribal rules,[312] but having adopted a tribal vocabulary they could not reshuffle in defiance of them either.

The role of the faction in Marwānid politics can be analysed at three levels. Firstly, it played a local role in cementing the teams competing for provincial power and fiscal resources. The faction pushed its leaders at the caliph for nomination, and rewarded its supporters with office and commands.[313] It thus provided a simultaneous solution to the problems of the civilian caliph who was faced with a profusion of eligible generals, and those of the Syrian general who had to select his men from among masses of eligible soldiers.

In the governors of Iraq generals and faction can be seen to emerge together. The Marwānid period opens with Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf, a Syrian of Qays and affinal kinsman of the caliph who relied a great deal on his own family of Abū 'Aqīl. To that extent he harks back to the Sufyānid kinship state, and it would certainly be absurd to claim that he favoured Qays or Muḍar over Yemen.[314] But as a pointer to the future he was also the man who introduced Syrian troops into Iraq.[315] He was followed by Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, an Iraqi of Azd/Yemen and the son of a general in disguise

who already showed a more marked inclination for men of his own regimental background when he could not rely on members of his own family;[316] and as a pointer to the future he was also the man who introduced Syrian troops into Khurāsān.[317] With ʿUmar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī, a Mesopotamian general of Qays, *all* the subgovernors whose tribal affiliation is known are of Qays and Muḍar; Khālid al-Qasrī, a Damascene of Bajīla/Yemen, reversed the factional background, but kept it equally uniform; and Yūsuf b. ʿUmar, a relative of Ḥajjāj, dismissed all Khālid's men to replace them with Qays and Muḍar in an elegant illustration of the demise of the kinship state.[318] All Yūsuf's men were dismissed in their turn by the *Yamaniyya*, the Yemeni following of Yazīd III on the outbreak of the third civil war.

High stakes kept the faction going. As before, governorship was a source of private enrichment, but now of course the competitors were no longer confined to a small circle of friends. As the governor increasingly relied on men of his own regimental background, the appointment of a top-governor came to mean the appointment of a faction whose members from the lowest subordinate at the bottom to the figure-head at the top all diverted part of the revenues into their own pockets. Dismissal of a subgovernor accordingly came to mean the dismissal of a faction whose successors had few inhibitions in the application of the post-dismissal treatment. This was clearly a vicious circle. The greater the threat of extortion on dismissal, the larger the amount of money embezzled and the harsher the treatment accorded on the inevitable fall. Failure to pay up was met by imprisonment and torture, often resulting in the death of the victim, while willingness to pay was also dangerous since it encouraged the belief that there was more to be had with the application of pressure.[319] Hence Marwānid governors were rarely dismissed as much as seized and thrown into jail;[320] hence also a change of governors was planned with the greatest secrecy and fears of revolt in the event of a leak;[321] and when the secret did leak the men in office would usually consider either revolt or a contribution to the top figure so that he could buy himself a renewal of tenure or at least immunity from torture.[322] The faction in power was thus cemented both by its profits and its fears, just as the men outside were united by their aspiration to replace it.[323]

Secondly, the faction played a medial role in linking up the metropolitan and the provincial armies. It was the ubiquitous Syrian troops who had generated the faction in their scramble for provincial spoils, but to the extent that local men continued to be eligible for office they were inevitably split by factions of their own. In Iraq, where the local army was of negligible importance, the local faction is likely to have been a simple

product of the Syrian presence, but in Khurāsān or Spain where the armies were power structures of their own they were doubtless of autonomous origin. Here, however, the local and the Syrian faction had to relate, and the tribal vocabulary provided a universally intelligible guide to the alignments. Throughout the Marwānid empire the soldiers were thus united by their participation in a faction which had everybody turn his attention to the centre, and though by origin the faction was the price that had to be paid for the continuance of the unitary state, it certainly paid off by contributing to that continuance. It is a striking fact that whereas the 'Abbāsids were peripatetic, it took civil war to make the Umayyads budge from Syria.

Thirdly, the faction played a central role by providing the categories for the conduct of metropolitan civil war. The faction was not, of course, a metropolitan phenomenon as such. Just as Syria escaped the direct rule of the Syrian troops, so also it escaped the factional competition for its resources; and for all that Qays and Yemen loathed each others' sight abroad, they lived peacefully enough at home. But the faction was clearly capable of *becoming* a metropolitan phenomenon. If the instability of high politics could generate a conflict between confederacies in the days when Umayyad power was based on tribes, it could similarly generate a conflict between factions when the tribes had been replaced by troops; and it is precisely this point which is illustrated in Yazīd b. al-Muhallab's flight from Ḥajjāj's instruments of torture in Iraq to Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Malik's succession quarrel in Syria.[324] Back in the metropolis, however, the faction could not remain a faction. High politics meant civil war; and it was then that the factional slogans assumed the nature of political programmes: the *Yamaniyya* of Yazīd III and the *Qaysiyya* of Marwān II consisted of the same soldiers who had fought each other for provincial office and spoils in Iraq; but back in Syria they fought for the possession of the state apparatus.

7
SYRIA OF 744 [126]

In Syria of A.D. 744 the Marwānid evolution came full circle. Once again the Syrians were lined up under their respective caliphal candidates in a conflict for the possession of the state. But whereas the second civil war had been fought for the maintenance of the Sufyānid order, the third civil war by contrast was enacted for its final destruction.

In the first place, the agents had drastically changed. The leaders of the third civil war were generals. Yazīd III's *Yamaniyya* had served in North Africa, Iraq, Armenia, Khurāsān, and Sind at various times before the revolt, while Marwān II's *Qaysiyya* were frontier troops,[325] and it was only such soldiers who responded to the factional slogans.[326] But the victims of the civil war were *ashrāf*. With a few exceptions the Sufyānid aristocracy supplied no sons to the generals of 744, and the few that one does find among them are indistinguishable from their fellow soldiers in terms of careers and interests.[327]. The sons of the *ashrāf* of Jābiya appeared as the opponents of Yazīd.[328] In contrast to the *Yamaniyya* they were purely local figures.[329] They had no careers in the far-flung provinces of the empire, but they were greatly respected at home where they commanded the loyalty of the city or district populace, coming forth as its leaders in a legitimist revolt on behalf of the sons of Walīd. But militarily they were no match for the generals, and it was no longer they who elected the caliph. Inside the army the difference between *sharīf* and general had been effaced; outside the army even the Syrian *ashrāf* had now lost out to the generals.

In the second place, the political centre of gravity had changed. Many of Yazīd's supporters shared a connection with Iraq, either their fathers and/or they themselves having been stationed there in the past;[330] their first act after the murder of Walīd was to send Syrians to Iraq, where they counted on and with few exceptions received the allegiance of the local Syrians;[331] and it was in Iraq that the last battles between the *Yamaniyya* and the *Qaysiyya* were fought.[332] This Iraqi orientation is of interest in two ways. Looking forward, it heralds the end of the Syrian metropolis. Since Syria owed its metropolitan status exclusively to its

peculiar tribal composition, the decay of the tribal roots which had swept
away the *ashrāf* at the same time eliminated the one ground for keeping
the capital where it was. The *Yamaniyya* did not of course abolish their
own metropolitan standing and even Marwān went no further than
Ḥarrān. But it was with Iraqi resources that the Yemenis reduced Syria
to military rule, and so it was largely a question of time until Iraq would
reduce it to a province.

Looking back, the Iraqi connection provides the clue to the transition
from faction fighting to civil war. The Syrians stationed in Iraq since the
time of Ḥajjāj had been drawn wholly or largely from the southern
districts of Syria which, unlike the northern ones, had no frontier to
defend;[333] and as it happened, the southern districts were overwhelmingly
Yemeni in composition while the northern ones were overwhelmingly
of Qays.[334] This coincidence meant that the faction was open to contamina-
tion by political issues, for if initially Qays and Yemen were simply so many
rival generals, their relationship to the key province of Iraq increasingly
differentiated them into two discrete military units, the Syrian field
army and the Syro-Mesopotamian frontier troops.[335] The question thus
arose which of the two was to inherit the status of imperial troops. For the
Yemenis who had acquired families and struck roots in Iraq[336] there was
no doubt that they possessed the title-deeds to provincial control; and yet
in practice they tended to be excluded by the Qaysīs, not only in the eastern
provinces, but also in Iraq itself, where the insecurity of their hold on the
province was demonstrated on two humiliating occasions: in 720 [101]
the revolt of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab brought Maslama to Iraq with an army
of Syro-Jazīrans who stayed on to take the governorships under Ibn
Hubayra;[337] and, more bitterly, in 738 [120] the dismissal of Khālid
al-Qasrī meant the end of fifteen celebrated years of Yemeni control.[338]
It was against the background of this second loss that the Yemenis pre-
pared their take-over of the metropolis in 744.[339]

That the factional slogans could serve to conceptualize the interests of
two rival armies was thus accidental; certainly far more so than the use
of tribal labels in the faction itself. But that this was indeed how they
served is suggested by two exceptional cases. The first is that of the odd
men out. Inevitably, the coincidence of tribal and military membership
was imperfect: there were Qaysīs in the south just as there were Yemenis
in the north. In the faction fighting such men would side with the party
to which their genealogy assigned them, but in the civil war significant
exceptions begin to appear. Not all of these are amenable to explanation,[340]
but with some it is clear that we have to do with men siding with the party
to which they belong by career: in the civil war, as not before, a Jordanian

Qaysī would fight with the *Yamaniyya*.[341] The second case is that of Khurāsān. It was in the nature of the faction that the Yemenis of Khurāsān would identify with the Yemenis of Syria, and the 'Abbāsid missionaries did their best to play on their Yemeni discontent;[342] yet the 'Abbāsid revolution was no Yemeni revolution: in Khurāsān the factional differences failed to coincide with any material ones, so here the recruitment for the take-over of the metropolis had to be cross-factional.[343]

Finally, the relationship between religion and politics had changed. In 744 as in 684 the agents of the civil war were up against a dissociation of sanctity and power, but whereas in the second civil war the mixture of religious and political issues had been adventitious, in the third civil war it was intrinsic: the *Yamaniyya* based their action on a Ghaylānī doctrine of the imamate.[344] In 684 the dissociation had not yet been strongly felt; for all that Mu'āwiya did not return to the Prophet's seat, he still presided over a tribal society which made sufficient sense of his rule to deprive Ibn al-Zubayr's utopia of its persuasiveness in the Syrian metropolis, or even in Iraq.[345] But by 744 it was the tribal character of Umayyad society that failed to carry conviction, so that even for the Syrians the Umayyad caliphate was now in need of redefinition. It is well worth noting, however, that the Syrian generals could very easily have avoided the task of providing such a redefinition. A discreet coup behind the scenes would have enabled them to dispense with religious issues; it would almost certainly have spared them the confrontation with Marwān; their material interests would have been equally well served; and there was even a precedent for a *majordomus* in Daḥḥāk b. Qays. But the Yemenis still saw the murder of the impious Walīd as the first item on their religio-political agenda: they did not merely want power, they wanted to put power right.[346] Had the Muslims been content simply to legitimate power after the fashion of the Franks,[347] the archaic caliphate might well have continued as cosmetics for a Yemeni sultanate. But power in Islam had to be intrinsically sacred: it was only when power and sanctity no longer *could* be kept together that the Muslims had to make do with an illusion. Yazīd's *Yamaniyya* and Marwān's *Qaysiyya* were the same sort of generals; but because Marwān was *both* a legitimist on behalf of the civilian Walīd *and* a general who assumed caliphal power, he could make no sense of his rule, and few names are so suggestive of ugly power-politics as his. By contrast, the *Yamaniyya* who killed a caliph so that military power might be sanctified have come down to posterity with an unmistakable aura of righteousness.[348]

8

UMAYYAD CLIENTAGE

We may now reverse the perspective and look at the evolution of the conquest society from the point of view of the non-Arab convert. The non-Arab converts were the representatives of the two empires which the Arabs had respectively truncated and destroyed, and in the Marwānid period such converts were becoming increasingly numerous. Yet they signally failed to direct the political evolution of their conquerors: just as the Arab conquerors contrived to keep up their fixation on the tribal past, so the non-Arab converts remained in the position of mere clients to the Arab tribes.

Clientage among the Arabs was known as *walā'*, a term which also designated the patronate. It always bound two individuals, both known as *mawālī*,[349] but never groups.[350] And it arose on either manumission or voluntary commendation, the latter being known as *tibā'a*,[351] *luzūm*,[352] *inqitā'*,[353] *khidma*,[354] or generically as *muwālāt*,[355] The clientage which arose on conversion can readily be seen as a special form of voluntary clientage. *Walā'* was in all likelihood a *Fortleben* of Roman clientage, the Arabs having borrowed it from their subjects with their usual lack of acknowledgement,[356] and to that extent it is comparable with Frankish ties of dependence. But whereas in Gaul Roman clientage fused with a Germanic political tradition and operated in a context of disintegrating state structures, in the Middle East it fused with a Judaic tradition and operated in the context of a fully bureaucratic state.

Throughout the Umayyad period *walā'* was the only mechanism for the attachment of newcomers to the conquest society. Being adherents of an ethnic faith the Arabs were not always willing to share their God with gentile converts,[357] and being conquerors they were usually unwilling to share their glory with defeated enemies – both problems to which clientage provided an apt solution. Clients were freely accepted without conversion,[358] but no converts were allowed to escape the humiliation of *walā'*, the newcomers to the faith being attached to the person 'at whose hands' they had converted.[359] This use of the tie is at the same time a striking example of the imperviousness to native values which the fusion of tribalism and monotheism had created and one of the most important

mechanisms whereby the imperviousness was maintained. The newcomer automatically renounced his position in the pre-conquest polity,[360] and an Iranian noble would find himself rubbing shoulders in the clients' rank with the peasants whom his ancestors had ruled.[361] The institution thus operated to distance the conquerors from the pre-conquest polity and its cultural values, not to merge them in it as it did among the Franks.

Even so, the clients might well have got a better grip on the development of Arab society if they had been recruited predominantly from among the free members of the pre-conquest elite, in particular the Persian aristocracy. There were of course members of the elite who defected to the Arabs,[362] and even some who defected to the Arab God, notably in Syria[363] though the converts also included a scatter of *dihqāns*;[364] and as was to be expected they placed their legacy at the disposal of the conquerors: the resurfacing of clientage is in itself an example. But it would require considerable imagination to see these converts as being at all near determining the actual direction of the Marwānid evolution. In part their feebleness reflects the fact that the position of client is a disadvantageous one from which to negotiate syncretic deals, but it also reflects the fact that the Syrians had little direction to offer: had the *Iranian* aristocracy converted in large numbers, the Marwānid evolution would certainly have taken a very different course. But the nature of the Arab conquest was such that aristocratic renegades by choice were few and far between.[365]

The overwhelming majority of converts in the Sufyānid and very likely also the Marwānid periods were prisoners-of-war who had been enslaved and were subsequently manumitted. The number of prisoners-of-war which the Arabs took in the course of their conquest was staggering,[366] and enslavement hit all social, ethnic and religious groups in the Middle East. For their future role, however, the provenance of the slaves scarcely mattered: dispersed among the conquerors and employed for the most part as domestic servants, they all rapidly adopted the norms and values of their masters,[367] while at the same time they and their descendants continued to be despised by the freeborn members of their masters' society. To the extent that they supplied a disproportionate number of scholars, scribes, tutors and poets active in the late Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid periods, their role in Arab society is comparable to that of the Oriental slaves in republican Rome.[368] But their contribution was shaped overwhelmingly by Arab values, not by their native ones. Whereas the Romans, being no monotheists, had happily let their slaves and freedmen teach them Hellenistic culture and Oriental cults, the Arabs by contrast made theirs operate wholly within the political and cultural directives furnished by their own religious aegis.[369] Without doubt the freedmen of the Arabs contri-

buted far more to the civilization of their masters than had their ancestors
to that of Rome; but they were in far less of a position to change its overall
character.

In the Marwānid period the converts began to enter willingly, but if
before they had been slaves, now they were overwhelmingly fugitive
peasants. The predominance of this type of convert in the Marwānid
period has to be seen against the background of the fact that the Arabs,
particularly those in Iraq, continued to be concentrated in the garrison
cities after the collapse of the tribal order had led to their demilitariza-
tion.[370] The continuing urban character of Arab settlement in Iraq may to
some extent reflect the fact that the ex-tribesmen still saw themselves as
settlers in an alien land, but more particularly it resulted from the circum-
stance that the countryside was beyond their control in the crucial period
of transition: whatever their wishes, they were in no position to make the
alien land their own. Under the Sufyānids the *dihqāns*, protected by a
state for which they acted as tax-collectors, enjoyed an autonomy which
effectively made the countryside theirs,[371] and which enabled them to
resist inundation by prospective Arab landowners as effectively as they
did conversion. Ḥajjāj put an end to their autonomy, placing the country-
side under the direct control of *mawlā* tax-collectors about the same time
as he made over the Iraqi cities to the Syrian troops: it was not for nothing
that he suspected the *dihqāns* of having sympathized with the revolt of
Ibn al-Ashʿath and the *ashrāf*.[372] But it was the state, not the Iraqis, that
benefited from this change; and insofar as land passed into Arab hands in
the course of it, it was the caliph, his family and governors who acquired
it,[373] only a fraction passing into the ownership of the ex-tribesmen.[374]
On the one hand, then, the Marwānid period saw the formation of the so-
called Muslim bourgeoisie.[375] The ex-tribesmen became shopkeepers,
craftsmen and merchants, and the *Sharīʿa* which they wrote is accordingly
marked by a high regard for mercantile activities[376] which landed nobili-
ties usually despise: that of Sāsānid Persia was no exception.[377] On the
other hand, the Marwānid governors could subject the countryside to
bureaucratic rule with merciless efficiency. Being wholly out of sympathy
with the lifestyle of a landed aristocracy both by origin and by evolution,
they everywhere eliminated privileged estates, fiscal exemptions and
other intervening structures as relentlessly as they did in Iraq.[378] Because
the countryside was thus denuded of its protective network, flight from
the land replaced the traditional search for a rural patron as the primary
mode of tax-evasion.[379] And since power, protection and fiscal exemp-
tion were now concentrated in the cities, rural communities found it in-
creasingly hard to withstand their attractions.

The peasant flights which bedevilled the Umayyad governors did not always go in the direction of the cities; a great many went to monasteries and districts in which the peasants were not registered; and wherever they went, it was the departure from the land which caused the relief to the peasants and the loss to the authorities who invariably reacted with ruthless determination to make up for their losses.[380] To that extent there was no difference between the escape routes. But unlike the rural refugee, the peasant who went to the city went straight into the lion's den, and here conversion was a *sine qua non* for survival. It was, however, not enough for survival. The typical fate of those who chose this course is described in a stereotype episode which recurs at various times and places in the chronicles, in which a tax-collector writes to a governor that the *dhimmī*s have flocked to Islam and that the taxes are in arrears; somebody thereupon points out that they have only converted to escape their taxes, and the governor accordingly takes action by rounding up the fugitives in the city concerned, sending them back to their land and reimposing their taxes.[381] The chronicles scarcely envisage any other type of convert.[382] Whatever the truth of each particular episode, posterity clearly remembered the Marwānid converts as fugitive peasants for whom conversion was a standard but unsuccessful means of tax-evasion.[383]

How then did they survive? The answer is by finding a patron: it was the acquisition of an Arab protector that made the conversion socially effective. There were clearly some who managed to find such a patron among civilians. By way of example we have the success story of Māhān, the father of Ibrāhīm al-Mawṣilī. He is described as a *dihqān* from Arrajān in Fars who fled from the fiscal tyranny of the Umayyad tax-collectors to settle in Kufa. Here he became the client of the B. Naḍla b. Nuʿaym, presumably by conversion 'at their hands', took a wife from the family of another fugitive *dihqān* and, when he had a son, reinforced the tie between himself and his patrons by fosterage.[384] Māhān being the client of a Tamīmī *sharīf*, the sources either did not recollect or else did not see fit to provide him with a history of continued fiscal martyrdom.

By far the majority of the runaways, however, concentrated their efforts on entering the army. In a variant on the stereotype *mawlā* episode it is the good caliph rather than the bad governor who takes action, and he does so, not by sending the fugitives back, but by granting them tax-relief and enrolling them in the army.[385] It is clearly not the case that non-Arabs as such were excluded from the army;[386] equally, when we are told that 'twenty thousand *mawālī* fought in the army without pay or rations'[387] we are not to take it that the Arabs enrolled the non-Arabs, but in a niggardly fashion refused them pay. What these stories say is that *peasants*

were excluded. Admission to the army transformed a tax-payer into a tax-recipient, a fact vividly illustrated in the papyri of Qurra b. Sharīk with their monotonous demands for money and produce from the *ahl al-arḍ* for distribution among the *ahl al-arzāq*, and it is not surprising that the authorities should have been bent on keeping the *ahl al-arḍ* quite literally in their place. Provided that they paid their taxes, however, the peasants were perfectly free to work out their fascination with the army as *mutaṭawwiʿa*, unpaid and/or irregular volunteers, and it is clearly as such that the twenty thousand *mawālī* have to be identified. No less than thirty thousand *mutaṭawwiʿa* are said to have participated in Maslama's expedition to Constantinople, and they appear in unspecified numbers in the armies of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab in the extreme east as well as in those of Mūsa b. Nuṣayr in the extreme west.[388]

Needless to say, not all of these volunteers were necessarily peasants on the look-out for a military haven, but a great many are likely to have been, and whatever ʿUmar II's action in the matter, it was not usually a caliph who would let them in. About the time that peasants begin to congregate in the ranks of the volunteers, private retainers also begin to cluster around the generals. These retainers are not to be confused with the personal servants of the soldiers; such servants, of course, continued to be found in the Marwānid armies,[389] but they are quite distinct from the armed retinues which now appear.[390] Most of them are mentioned in the third civil war, by which time they were clearly an institution of some standing;[391] and though as a rule they appear to have been quite modest in size,[392] some, like the famous *Dhakwāniyya* of Sulaymān b. Hishām, consisted of several thousand men.[393] Some of these retainers were freedmen;[394] and some were even slaves;[395] but it is hard not to see in the majority of them the peasants from the ranks of the volunteers. And how such a peasant might be picked up from there is precisely what we are told in Naṣr b. Sayyār's harangue to his client Yūnus:[396] 'You, Yūnus b. ʿAbd Rabbih, are one of those who wished to escape the burden of supplying provisions to Marw, and you and your family were among those whose necks Asad b. ʿAbdallāh wished to seal in order to put you in the infantry; but I gave you appointments and I favoured you . . . ' Yūnus and his family, in other words, were runaway peasants whom one governor would treat as such by sealing their necks and relegating them to the ignominious and presumably unpaid peasants' infantry; and here another would pick them out for positions of trust.[397] It was without doubt this latter kind of patron most of the converts hoped to acquire,[398] and Naṣr's action was certainly not the only one of its kind. Already in 696f [77] Bukayr b. Wishāḥ had been told that he only needed to promise converts

remission of their taxes to collect a superbly obedient army,[399] and according to Christian sources it was precisely in this way that Ḥafṣ b. al-Walīd, the governor of Egypt, obtained his semi-private army consisting of some twenty or twenty thousand renegades and other troops.[400]

The appearance of such retinues is not in itself a phenomenon of major interest. Soldiers are generally inclined to collect them, and the Marwānid caliphs were particularly badly placed to object: there are no measures against *mawālī tibāʿa* to compare with the Byzantine legislation against *Bucellarii*.[401] The governor-general was virtually at liberty to choose between taxes and retainers, and in civil war he evidently opted for retainers.

But both the predominance and the fate of the peasant converts provide a striking illustration of the manner in which the Arab possession of both truth and power kept the pre-conquest polities at bay. Possessing both, the Arabs were sufficient unto themselves, and their relations with their subjects were almost exclusively fiscal. The non-Arabs were rarely asked or forced to convert;[402] on the whole they were dissuaded. They simply had to pay for the upkeep of those who had defeated them, preferably in a manner which emphasized their twin humiliation of non-Arab ethnicity and unbelief.[403] Now the landed aristocracy of Iraq and the Iranian plateau on the whole could afford the price and bear the humiliation, shielding themselves on their estates.[404] But their peasants, for all that they might have borne the humiliation, could not afford the price, and in the Arab, unlike the Hellenistic, Middle East it was thus the peasants who went to live in the cities. Where the Greeks had siphoned off the local elites but left the rural masses virtually untouched, the Arabs by contrast siphoned off the masses from underneath the elite and mopped up the elite when in due course its position had collapsed.

It was thus those least qualified to represent the Persian polity that the Arabs had to deal with in the crucial period in which their tribal ties dissolved. Moreover, these sorry representatives arrived as fugitives, illegal immigrants dependent on the elusive patronage of Arab generals and other individuals with access to power for their precarious foothold in a society which looked with mixed feelings at the prospect of *dhimmī*s wishing to save their souls. The crowds of peasants hammering at the doors of an Arab Heaven were hardly in a better position to retain or pass on what legacy they might possess than were those who had been dragged to Paradise in chains. When the rural masses of the Hellenistic Middle East had acquired Christian voices, there was no lack of chauvinism in what they spoke: their heritage had been deeply eroded, but at least they were no Greeks. But the masses who flocked to Islam in the century of Umayyad rule simply became Arab Muslims.

The Arabs, in other words, uprooted their subjects by enslavement in the course of their conquest, and by taxation in the course of their administration, subjecting those whom they had thus uprooted to the indignity of clientage. The role of shaping the political and cultural evolution of the conquerors thus fell almost exclusively on the members of the bureaucracy who for all their clientage were the only non-Arabs to combine native learning with a position of power in the Arab state.[405] And since it was not until the capital was moved to Iraq that the Arabs were exposed to bureaucrats with a strong commitment to the order of the past, the imagination of the Umayyad rulers continued to be exercised more strongly by the tribal rather than the native after-image.

There is another way of demonstrating the same point. In the Marwānid period ties of dependence began to develop even among the Arabs them-selves. Thus next to the *mawlā* retinue we find the *qawm*, a term which had once denoted a man's tribal following, but which now came to be used of a general's personal recruits, usually from within his own tribal group.[406] For all that the recruits were private dependents, the institu-tion was tolerated or even encouraged,[407] and some of these retinues appear to have been comparable with the *Dhakwāniyya* in size.[408] If Ḥafṣ b. al-Walīd's recruits in Egypt were a giant *mawlā* retinue, Marwān II's recruits in the Jazīra can be seen as a giant *qawm*.

Within the *qawm* there were plain retainers and more distinguished ones, *aṣḥāb* or companions, who were the general's most trusted men.[409] How such a companion might be acquired is graphically told in the story of Ziyād b. 'Ubaydallāh al-Ḥārithī and Khālid al-Qasrī.[410] Ziyād, who has just enrolled in the Damascene army,[411] meets Khālid, who has just received his appointment to Iraq. After having assured himself that Ziyād is a Yemeni, Khālid invites him to Iraq. He also asks him to inform his companions, who are waiting for news at the camp, of his appoint-ment, instructing him to ask for remuneration. On hearing the news Khālid's companions go mad with joy and shower Ziyād with gifts, a taste of what he might get in Iraq. Ziyād is then in a quandary until his *'arīf*, the army official in charge of payment, undertakes to draw his pay in his absence on the understanding that he may keep it for himself if Ziyād's venture should turn out to be a success. It did. By the time he was back from his first meeting with Khālid in Iraq he had received six hundred dīnars worth of gold, silver and other commodities, and he was sub-sequently appointed to the *shurṭa*.[412] As Naṣr picked Yūnus from the infantry, so Khālid picked Ziyād from the rank and file. There is yet an-other story to illustrate the ideal relationship between the governor and his companions. The scene is once more Yemeni and it is now 'Abdallāh b.

'Umar who takes the role of governor.[413] He has just sat down to eat in
the company of his generals, scribes and other servants in Ḥīra when he
receives the message that the rebel Ibn Muʿāwiya is approaching. Having
paused for a moment, he unperturbedly gives the sign for the cook to
serve, and though everybody is in tremors of fear, he does not bat an
eyelid. Having finished his meal, he has gold, silver and other valuables
brought out for distribution among his companions. Only then does he set
out for battle, and though the place is now swarming with Ibn Muʿāwiya's
men he wins.

It is not, of course, particularly remarkable that Ibn 'Umar should
be depicted here as a paradigm of military valour. These were clearly
stories told of soldiers for soldiers, and apart from the name of the faction
to which the heroes belong, there is not the slightest trace of tribal notions,
nor, despite Ibn 'Umar's pious ancestry, of religious ones. But there is
an undeniable whiff here of the private lord in the Anglo-Saxon or Scan-
dinavian style, the warlord and gold-giver whose followers would faith-
fully repay him in battle and avenge his death.[414] Considering that
Khālid and Ibn 'Umar were generals of a public army whose gold had
been raised by an orderly bureaucracy, the virtues they exemplify would
seem peculiarly out of place. They reappear, nonetheless, in the accounts
of Abū Muslim and his men, among whom companionship and clientage
almost converged. Himself a *mawlā*, Abū Muslim was the lord of Arab
and non-Arab companions who held him dearer than the world and the
hereafter;[415] they were a constant menace to Manṣūr when he planned
the elimination of their master; and they honoured the obligation to
avenge his death, at least in Khurāsān. And the men who had accompan-
ied him to Iraq and allowed themselves to be dispersed by a combination
of threats and bribes were well aware of their infamous conduct, as is clear
from their penitential *biʿnā mawlānā biʾl-darāhim*, 'we have sold our lord
for silver'.[416]

Despite the tendency towards convergence attested in Khurāsān,
companionship and clientage never did fuse, nor was that really to be
expected. Clientage was about affiliation of the weak and the despised.
Clients were non-Arabs, and non-Arabs were *ʿabīd* and *ʿulūj*, slaves and
peasants. The tie was far too thoroughly associated with them ever to lose
its social stigma,[417] and though emotive loyalties towards the patron are
very much in evidence among the clients,[418] reciprocal attitudes among the
patrons are thinly exemplified.[419] The occasional client who rose to
honour did so not as a client, but as a kinsman, the kinship having been
created by fosterage[420] or by the widespread custom of naming one's
children after the patron.[421] There was no such thing as an Arab *mawlā*,[422]

but with a bit of good-will a *mawlā* might be seen as *almost* an Arab.[423]

Companionship, by contrast, was about providing honour for a post-tribal military, and it is this phenomenon which is interesting. Transitions from tribal to private ties are of course commonplace, but not usually in the presence of a fully-fledged state: vassals appeared among the Franks in the context of crumbling state structures, *nököt* among the Mongols in the context of nascent ones, but the post-tribal Mongols in China simply became a Chinese-style gentry.[424] The post-tribal Arabs, however, did not become an Iranian-style aristocracy. The peculiarity of the Arab case lies in the fact that unlike the post-tribal conquerors of China they did not inherit any political roles from their subjects, and unlike the post-colonial subjects of the Europeans they could not inherit any from the conquerors. As the tribal illusion wore off, the soldiers thus found themselves in an undisguised moral vacuum. Because the metropolis remained committed to the *ashrāf* of the past, the soldiers were given public power without the corresponding public honour: the Marwānid generals never became an aristocracy at all. It was this vacuum that the ideals of private lordship filled; in a world in which tribal honour belonged to the past and military honour to the future, the soldiers had no choice but to see the generals as their private lords and masters.[425] The Arabs and the Franks are thus obverse cases. The Franks had all the will to set themselves up as a Gallo-Roman aristocracy, but the material collapse of Gaul was such that they could not. The Arabs by contrast had all the material capacity to set themselves up as an Iranian or for that matter a Greek nobility, but their moral distance from the conquered polities was such that they would not. To the extent that clientage was one of the chief mechanisms whereby this distance was maintained, clientage and companionship are in a curious way two sides of the same coin.

THE FAILURE OF THE ISLAMIC EMPIRE

9
THE ABORTIVE SERVICE ARISTOCRACY

With the closure of the third civil war the reorganization of the conquest society could no longer be postponed. On the one hand, the common past had receded beyond the point where it could offset the drastic changes accompanying the rise of the new dynasty. In particular, the new dynasty drew its soldiers from Khurāsān, a highly distinctive frontier province in which Iranian civilization enjoyed a unique *Fortleben* in Islam, so that the revolution could not fail to be ominously reminiscent of a Persian re-conquest. For all their illegitimacy the Syrian soldiers had at least been Arabs who never stooped to speaking Syriac, but it was no secret that the Khurāsānīs did speak Persian.[426] Hence it was only too easy to believe that the 'Abbāsids had ordered the extermination of the Arabs in Khurāsān,[427] and there was widespread fear that the conquerors would now have to endure the humiliation of being ruled by their own clients.[428] With the loss of the common past the idea of secession was likely to suggest itself. Not that it came easily: despite the massacre of his relatives, the Umayyad refugee in Spain acknowledged 'Abbāsid overlordship until as late as 757 [139].[429] But when Spain eventually did secede, the precedent had been set.

On the other hand, the factional ties had snapped. The civil war had turned the caliphs into military men in command of their own generals; and what is more, the transfer of the capital to Iraq eliminated the vital provincial spoils: henceforth there were governors of Basra and Kufa, but not of Iraq, let alone of the entire east.[430] The faction thus disappeared all but overnight from the metropolitan army,[431] and insofar as it survived, it did so as a purely local phenomenon which the governors would hence-forth try to suppress, not one to which they would relate.[432] In view of the distinctive character of Khurāsān this was no mean loss. There was of course no question of moving the capital there: Khurāsān was the *dār al-hijra*[433] not the *umm al-qurā* of the revolution, and the western provinces would scarcely have accepted it as anything else. But conversely, having staged the revolution, Khurāsān was unlikely to submit willingly to the hegemony of a culturally alien Iraq. It was thus vital for the

'Abbāsids to find a way of integrating Khurāsān into the Islamic empire: were they to fail, the eastern frontier would go the way of Spain.

The main features of the 'Abbāsid reorganization are well known. The bureaucracy was hugely expanded,[434] fiscal and military governorships began to be separated,[435] and an elaborate espionage system was set up to facilitate central control.[436] The basic problem of the 'Abbāsids, however, was not the fairly simple one of creating the machinery required for imperial rule, but rather that of giving meaning to such rule. They urgently needed a political rationale.

The difficulties involved in the creation of such a rationale were determined by the fact that the Marwānids had contrived to do without one for so long. In the 690s Islamic civilization hardly existed, and had the Marwānids undertaken a reorganization of the conquest society then, they would of necessity have had to seek their rationale for it in the political traditions of their non-Muslim subjects. But by the 750s Islamic civilization did exist, and whatever political rationale the 'Abbāsids might attempt to create, it was clear that it was within Islam that they would have to find it. There was of course nothing to prevent them from seeking inspiration in the imperial tradition of the Middle East, that of the Sāsānids, and given the prominence of this tradition in Iraq it is not surprising that they did: the increasingly inaccessible monarch, the complex court etiquette,[437] and the appearance of the chief *qāḍī*[438] are well-known examples of the 'Abbāsid attempt to reshape Islamic government according to the Persian model. But since the moral identity of the empire was to be Islamic, a direct revival of the Sāsānid tradition was ruled out.[439] What the 'Abbāsids had to do was thus to fuse the Sāsānid tradition with Islam.

By the 750s, however, Islam had already acquired its classical shape as an all-embracing holy law characterized by a profound hostility to settled states. The *Sharīʿa* was created by men who had exchanged a tribal past for a commercial present in the demilitarized cities of Iraq, *outside* imperial Iran and in *opposition* to caliphal Syria. Its political ideal can be seen as the intellectual counterpart to the military faction, that is as the price which the Muslims paid for the continuance of the Umayyad state beyond the point where the tribal ties had disappeared. The *ʿulamāʾ*, as also the generals, found that power had lost its Sufyānid meaning, and both in their different ways tried to rediscover it in the Arabian past. But the generals, for all that they operated in a moral vacuum, were the representatives of power, whereas the *ʿulamāʾ* were merely the subjects of it, so that unlike the Syrians, whom they saw as their oppressors, they were deeply alienated from the existing regime; and their alienation went into the *Sharīʿa* they

elaborated. Where the generals merely exploited the tribal language of their faction, the *'ulamā'* defined God's law as *ḥaqq al-'arab*,[440] the law of the Arabs, just as they identified his language as the *lisān al-'arab*, the normative language of the bedouin, the consensus being that where God had not explicitly modified tribal law, he had endorsed it.[441] The result was a tribal vision of sacred politics. The simple state of the Prophet and the *shaykhayn*, the first two caliphs in Medina, was held up as the ideal from which the Umayyads had deviated,[442] the accumulation of secular and religious power alike being condemned as a presumptuous encroachment upon the omnipotence of God. Kings were rejected as Pharaohs and priests as golden calfs, while God's community was envisaged as an egalitarian one unencumbered by profane or religious structures of power below the caliph, who was himself assigned the duty of minimal government.

The *Sharī'a* caught the 'Abbāsids in an insoluble dilemma. To the extent that it was the core of Islam, an Islamic empire must of necessity represent the norms embodied in it; yet were the 'Abbāsids to abide by its norms, an Islamic empire could not be created: it was as if Charlemagne had been asked not to revive the Roman imperial tradition, but to fuse it with a divinely sanctioned Salian law. Had the *'ulamā'* been content to desanctify power, they could have rendered unto Caesar what was Caesar's, but the very fact that politics are covered by the law testifies to its continuing sanctity. Where the Christians had left power alone, the *'ulamā'* gave it minimal definition, and they did so with a wealth of casuistic detail which bound the caliph hand and foot; so that where the Christians might see imperial power as vain, the Muslims saw it as illegitimate in the most literal sense of the word.

Effectively, the *'ulamā'* had thus made up their minds against settled states for good, a point which can also be made in another way. Political alienation was a feature of Iraqi society at large in the late Umayyad period: Sunnīs,[443] Khārijites and Shī'ites, not excluding the lunatic fringe of Gnostic *ghulāt*, were at one in their rejection of the Syrian state. But it was only the Zaydīs and the *ghulāt* who engaged in ill-planned revolts against the Syrian troops[444] or terrorism,[445] and only the Khārijites and the 'Abbāsids who sent out missionaries to raise troops outside Iraq for a future revolution:[446] the Sunnīs refused to act. Outside Iraq we have revolts by soldiers who, for all that they had power, wanted a different type of state, witness the *Yamaniyya* in Syria and Ḥārith b. Surayj in Khurāsān. The religious persuasions of these men were neither Shī'ite nor Khārijite, but nor were they Sunnī in the strict sense of the word, inasmuch as the creeds came from the theologians, not from the traditionists.[447] The Sunnī traditionists neither rebelled nor inspired others to rebel:

being a Sunnī meant being a quietist. The 'Abbāsids staged their revolution
because they wished to make a difference, and yet it was already a basic
feature of the Sunnī outlook before the revolution that it would not
make much difference whoever won the state; where the 'Abbāsids wished
to be redeemers, the Sunnīs had come to terms with their exilic situation.

The intractable Sunnī *'ulamā'* were of course not all there was to Islam
in the 750s. Outside Iraq the fixation on the political paradigm of the
tribal past was probably less pronounced, certainly so in Khurāsān,
where the soldiers found it easy enough to adopt Iranian political roles.[448]
And even in Iraq the *'ulamā'* were not the only exponents of Islamic norms.
They shared their literacy with both *mutakallim*s and *kuttāb*, the
theologians and secretaries who perpetuated the traditional division of
learning in pre-Islamic Iraq, that between Christian priests and bureaucrats;
and though not all the *mutakallim*s and none of the *kuttāb* disputed the
validity of the traditionists' law, the former certainly did not see it as the
core of Islam, while the latter would have none of its infatuation with the
desert.[449] Similarly, the Sunnī traditionists faced the rivalry of the Shī'ite
imam in whom the high-priestly authority of the early caliphs lived on:[450]
the *'ulamā'* went so far, after the revolution, as to accept the caliph as a
layman endowed with *ijtihād* in matters of the law,[451] but for the Shī'ites
the imam was the very fount and the origin of this law. The 'Abbāsids rose
to power by staging a revolution of Shī'ite colouring in Khurāsān, from the
start employing *mutakallim*s who as religious disputants and propagandists
played an integral part in the 'Abbāsid establishment;[452] and they soon
inherited the bureaucracy of Iraq. They thus possessed what resources
were available for a syncretic handling of Islam. Certainly, a caliph
whose soldiers would have obeyed had he ordered them to pray with their
backs to the *qibla*,[453] ought to have had no problems when it came to a
reshaping of Islamic law. But the most striking feature of these resources
was their marginality. Just as Khurāsān was a frontier province, so Shī'ism
was a heresy, while the theological and bureaucratic traditions were both
tainted with the double stigma of secular status and foreign origins, Greek
reason in the one case, Persian statecraft in the other. Despite the arch-
heretics among their followers, the 'Abbāsids were certainly less marginal
than the Ismā'īlīs who were in due course to attempt a repeat performance
of the 'Abbāsid revolution: it is not for nothing that the fears of a Persian
religious and/or political restoration in the 750s were minimal compared
to the paranoia which the Ismā'īlīs were to induce.[454] But the fact remains
that it was in traditions marginal to mainstream Islam that the 'Abbāsids
found their intellectual resources, while at the same time it was to the
Muslims at large that they had to make themselves acceptable. And in this
dilemma lies the explanation of their failure.

The rationale with which the 'Abbāsids set out to restore the meaning of politics rested on a conflation of the priestly and the messianic roles familiar to Shī'ism. The conflation was in all likelihood a product of the circumstances attending the last phases of the revolution. The mission in Khurāsān had revolved around the themes of revenge for the Prophet's family and the restoration of power to a member of this family, but precisely who was intended to take power in precisely what political role is not clear because Ibrāhīm al-Imām, the crucial figure of the revolution, died in Marwān II's prison before the arrival of the troops in Iraq. The point is, however, that the leaders of the revolution would appear to have known no better: there is nothing in Abū Salama's bewildered convocation of 'Alids and 'Abbāsids for a prosaic *shūrā* to suggest that a priestly line had already been fixed among the latter, and the choice of Abū'l-'Abbās by impatient generals was certainly unforeseen.[455] Whatever the original programme, the result of the confusion was that the 'Abbāsids who had promised the climactic redemption were also the men who took the ongoing power; and if the meaning of their venture was to be preserved at all, they had of necessity to recast themselves as priests. What appears to have begun as a simple mess thus ended up as a formal ideology.[456]

The formal ideology combined an abstract title to power with rights arising from a concrete event in the past. As Hāshimites, that is as members of the Prophet's lineage, the 'Abbāsids claimed an ascribed right to the caliphate to the exclusion of all other Qurashīs, let alone non-Qurashīs:[457] all previous caliphs with the exception of 'Alī were thus rejected as usurpers.[458] And as leaders of the *dawla*, that is the revolution, they claimed to have encashed these rights to the exclusion of all other Hāshimites: 'Alī's descendants were thus also excluded.[459] The 'Abbāsid stress on their Hāshimite descent was a claim to membership of a priestly lineage, but the *dawla* was an apocalyptic event, a millenarian turn of fortune which had eliminated the Umayyad usurpers, avenged the Prophet's family, restored the rightful dynasty and filled the earth with justice:[460] the black banners of the avenging armies, the violence with which they treated the members of the offending dynasty,[461] the messianic names of the early caliphs,[462] and the analogies between the revolution and the rise of Islam[463] were all so many proclamations that political redemption had come.

Participation in the past event was the hallmark of the three crucial ranks of the 'Abbāsid aristocracy. Here too there is an analogy with the rise of Islam: the principle was that of *sābiqa*, priority in service.[464] The lowest of these ranks was that of the *ahl al-dawla*, *ansār al-dawla*, *ahl al-da'wa*, *ahl al-shī'a* and so forth, that is the members of the Khurāsānī troops who had brought about the revolution in the past and who were

now spread all over the empire as garrisons in replacement of the Syrian troops.[465] Their title to nobility was a corporate one acquired on enrolment, for just as 'Abbāsid rule was known as the 'blessed *dawla*' long after the revolution, so the Khurāsānī soldiers knew themselves as 'people of the *dawla*' long after the original members of the revolutionary armies had died out.[466] The concept thus attempted to bridge the moral gap between the caliph and his soldiers on the one hand, and the soldiers and the caliph's subjects on the other.

Within the *ahl al-dawla* there was the more select group of the Abnā', that is *abnā' al-dawla, abnā' al-shī'a* or *abnā' al-da'wa*. Generally, the Abnā' were the bodily, as opposed to institutional, descendants of the participants in the revolution,[467] and they are found as far afield as North Africa and Khurāsān.[468] Specifically, they were the descendants of those participants who had settled in Baghdad to become the new imperial troops,[469] and it is here that the sons of the greatest leaders of the revolution are found.[470] Either way, their status rested not only on membership of the Khurāsānī army, but also on descent, a combination which distinguished all the major families of the early 'Abbāsid period.[471] It was these men who were assigned the crucial role of forging moral bonds between the metropolis and Khurāsān. Thus on the one hand, they were flattered for their Khurāsānī origin, their mixed descent, and their Iranian nobility,[472] while Baghdad was described as the Khurāsān of Iraq.[473] And on the other hand, they held a virtual monopoly on the offices most intimately associated with the fortunes of the dynasty. In Baghdad they commanded the caliph's personal troops, his *shurṭa*,[474] held the leadership of his personal guard, the *ḥaras*,[475] and commonly enjoyed the privilege of guarding his private seal.[476] In the provinces they held a large number of military commands and governorships;[477] and above all, they supplied the governors of Khurāsān.[478]

Finally, within the Abnā' there was the most select group of *ahl al-bayt*, the honorary kinsmen of the caliph. Primarily, of course, the *ahl al-bayt* were the real kinsmen of the caliph, the 'Abbāsid princes who ranked above the Abnā' and held an enormous number of governorships in all provinces except Khurāsān.[479] But in addition a number of Abnā' were bound to the 'Abbāsid house by nomination as members of the family[480] or fosterage,[481] and Jāḥiẓ credits all Abnā' with the habit of naming their children after the caliphs.[482] Officially, these men were not known as *mawālī*,[483] but just as the Prophetic precedent for the nomination of kinsmen involved a Persian *mawlā*,[484] so it was with *walā'* that fosterage and symbolic naming had typically been associated in the Marwānid period;[485] we doubtless have here the fictitious kinship tie with which the Marwānid generals

had raised their clients to honour. The honorary kinsmen would usually possess not one, but three titles to merit in the Islamic state. Khālid b. Barmak, for example, was one of the leading *ahl al-dawla*, his descendants were among the most illustrious Abnā', and they were also members of the *ahl al-bayt* by fosterage. It was thus as Islamic nobles, not as alien Khurāsānīs, that they and their like enjoyed their enormous power in the Islamic state.[486]

In addition to the Khurāsānī aristocracy there were two non-Khurāsānī groups, both associated with the caliph by private ties. The first of these was the *ṣaḥāba*, the companions, an institution which is attested only under Manṣūr and Mahdī, and which doubtless perpetuated the military companionship of the Marwānid period, now Islamized on analogy with the companionship of the Prophet. The companions were men who could claim no services to the *dawla*. Some were Umayyad princes,[487] and others were scholars,[488] but many and perhaps the majority were Syrian generals who had stayed on in the metropolitan army after the dynastic change.[489] They were now settled in Baghdad,[490] where indeed they would have to live to conform to the description of companions, and they held a number of military commands and governorships outside Baghdad.[491] Though some of the better known Syrian governors and generals are not identified as companions,[492] it is tempting to see in the *ṣaḥāba* the outcome of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's advice to Manṣūr that he single out a special group from among the Syrians to win them over to the dynasty.[493] If conciliation of the defeated Syrians was the main point of the institution, its ephemeral nature would certainly be less puzzling.[494]

The second group was the *mawālī*, the clients of the caliph.[495] Like the honorary kinsmen they might be bound to the caliph's family by fosterage and symbolic naming,[496] but unlike them they were officially known as *mawālī*, and some of them were distinguished by the title *mawlā amīr al-muʾminīn*. This title is clearly honorific and semantically equivalent to the Frankish *vasso domini*, and it is conceivable that these *vassi* were intended as a non-Khurāsānī counterpart to the *ahl al-bayt*: one of the first men to bear the title was suggestively a governor of Syrian origin.[497] In practice, however, the difference between the clients and the kinsmen, or for that matter the rest of the service aristocracy, was a far more fundamental one. It is not merely that most of the clients were of non-Arab origin,[498] for so were many of the Khurāsānīs; it is not even that most of them were of servile origin,[499] for there must similarly have been slaves among the ancestors of the Khurāsānīs. It is rather that the clients had been chosen not despite but *because* of these origins: the *mawālī* of the caliph, like those of the Koran, were defined by the obscurity of their parentage.[500]

Some, it is true, were relatives of the caliph, but always on the female side and not always very reputable;[101] and the vast majority were freedmen of the 'Abbāsids themselves.[102] The honorary kinsmen were public servants who had been incorporated in the private household of the caliph as a final legitimation of their status; but the clients were private servants who had been pushed onto the public scene with perfunctory legitimation as caliphal vassals. The honorary kinsmen perpetuated the free clientage of the Marwānids; the clients by contrast represented a novel reliance on the servile tie.[103]

In itself this reliance on freedmen is not particularly remarkable. The *mawālī* were employed overwhelmingly where one would expect to find them, in private and semi-private functions associated with the household, the court,[104] the postal service, courier and espionage system,[105] the prisons and the like;[106] and though quite a number of them were already found in the less traditional roles of bureaucrats, governors and generals under Manṣūr,[107] this was not so ominous in view of the fact that they rose in what was manifestly an uneasy period of political transition:[108] for all that there had been freedmen in Augustus' fisc, the Romans never handed over to their slaves. What was remarkable, then, was not that freedmen were used, but that within a century of the revolution they had taken control. The explanation is not far to seek: if they rose in a period of political transition, they stayed because the transition failed.

This failure is apparent in a number of ways. Doctrinally, the 'Abbāsids fell between two stools. The Shī'ites narrowed down the priestly lineage to the descendants of 'Alī, more particularly those of Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, so that other Hāshimites were excluded, while the Sunnīs conversely admitted all Quraysh to the caliphate, so that the Hāshimite lineage was devalued. In the face of this opposition the 'Abbāsids fidgeted. At one extreme they claimed to have inherited the imamate by bequest from an 'Alid,[109] and at the other extreme Mahdī claimed that it vested in the descendants of 'Abbās to the exclusion of 'Alī.[110] But neither argument of course satisfied the Shī'ites and both stood to offend the Sunnīs by their *rafḍ*, rejection of the first two caliphs.[111] The 'Abbāsids did better when they shifted the argument from genealogy to deeds. The 'Alids were said to have been inactive and inefficient,[112] while the Umayyads were branded as iniquitous:[113] only the 'Abbāsids had brought about the *dawla* in the past and continued to uphold Islamic norms in the present. The Shī'ites of course rejected the *dawla* as having installed the wrong dynasty, but the Sunnīs could at least accept that it had eliminated the Umayyad 'kings'.[114] It is thus not surprising that the 'Abbāsids should have gravitated

towards the Sunnīs. But in so doing, they were stripped of their priestly pretensions; and past events of course recede. They were thus coming back to where the Umayyads had ended.

The problems which the 'Abbāsids experienced with their ideology simply restate the problem of their marginality: the Shī'ites from whom they borrowed their ideas, and the Sunnīs whom they wished to accept these ideas, were too far apart. It is certainly possible that the very accession of the 'Abbāsids catalysed the polarization between Sunnīs and Shī'ites by forcing them to take up position *vis-à-vis* the new state; but if that is so, it merely illustrates the fact that whatever hopes the 'Abbāsids may have had of being a happy compromise, they could not be redeemers to Sunnīs and Shī'ites alike. In fact, being no 'Alids, the 'Abbāsids could not be redeemers to the Shī'ites without handing over to an 'Alid.[115] It is true that just as sectarian lines may well have been less clear-cut before the revolution, so the Hāshimite family may well have enjoyed greater unity; but Sharīk al-Mahrī, for one, had no doubts that it was for an 'Alid, not an 'Abbāsid, ruler that he had taken up arms,[116] and when the accession of the 'Abbāsids forced the 'Alids into open revolt, the 'Abbāsid pretensions to having accomplished Shī'ite ambitions had to be given up. For practical purposes this was the moment when the long 'Abbāsid trek towards acceptance of the Sunnī role as guardians of the Muslim community began. For it was now from the Sunnīs alone that the 'Abbāsids could hope to have their *dawla* accepted, and the Sunnīs had neither hoped nor worked for the 'Abbāsid redemption. The 'Abbāsid claim to having begun a new and better era thus shrivelled and withered on exposure to the sheer indifference of their Sunnī subjects. The Sunnīs were not, on the whole, hostile to the 'Abbāsids; they dutifully learnt their lesson: the 'Abbāsids, so they knew, were of the house of the Prophet, though it did not really matter; they had defeated the impious Umayyads, though it did not make much difference. The Sunnīs gathered that they had been redeemed, but they had never felt it.[117]

The marginality of the 'Abbāsids reappears in the fact that they made this trek towards the Sunnī camp, which they seem to have reached in the days of Hārūn,[118] without ever attempting a showdown with the *'ulamā'*.[119] They began with every available asset: troops, secretaries, theologians, religious prestige. and Ibn al-Muqaffa' provided the blueprint for precisely such a showdown when he submitted his *Risāla fī 'l-ṣaḥāba*.[120] For Ibn al-Muqaffa' the caliph was the sole source of religious and political authority,[121] and the caliph is advised to use this authority to impose religious and legal uniformity,[122] to maintain a corps of religious representatives to whom people can turn for instruction,[123] to preserve the aristocratic

status of his public servants,[124] taking particular care to maintain the dignity of the military,[125] and to exclude menials from positions of authority at court.[126] It was a truly imperial vision of Islam presented without a single reference to Kisrā, Buzurjmihr or anything Persian,[147] and it was certainly one to which the caliph must have given serious thought. But Manṣūr did not try it out;[128] and it was *zindīq*s. Manichaeans, not *'ulamā'*, who were the victims of Mahdī's inquisition.[129] In part, of course, Manṣūr was simply too preoccupied with the post-revolutionary task of consolidation: the suppression of 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī's revolt, the liquidation of Abū Muslim and its aftermath.[130] But it was clearly the outbreak of the 'Alid revolts which effectively deprived the 'Abbāsids of what leverage they had on their traditionist rivals. Mahdī's outrageous rejection of every non-'Abbāsid caliph, be he a companion or the cousin of the Prophet, was a declaration of intent that could not very well become a programme of action: even a foolhardy caliph would hesitate to pick a fight with the *entire* Muslim world. The 'Abbāsids were thus forced into attempts at conciliation of the very men who had usurped their religious authority. And meanwhile the 'Abbāsid assets wasted.

As the creed of the 'Abbāsids wilted, the institutions which it was meant to support began to fall apart. Whereas the bureaucrats, overwhelmingly recruited from among converts in Iraq, kept up their professional commitment to the Persian political tradition and its attendant culture, the new generation of Abnā' who grew up in Baghdad forgot their Persian and their heretical views and settled down instead as the leaders of the *hashwiyya*.[131] There is no more striking illustration of the extent to which the secretaries and the soldiers of the 'Abbāsid caliphs went their different ways than the divergent careers of the grandsons of Khālid b. Barmak and Ḥanbal b. Hilāl. Both men were Khurāsānīs, the former a native of Balkh, the latter of Marw, and both joined the revolution; the descendants of both ended up in Baghdad where they counted among the Abnā'.[132] The sons of Khālid, however, went into the bureaucracy, where the third generation became the very embodiment of secretarial culture: the Barmakids were readers of Persian literature, patrons of the Shu'ūbīs, sponsors of Greek philosophy and *kalām* who took a soft line on the 'Alids and an aristocratic line on trade.[133] But the son of Ḥanbal b. Hilāl stayed in the army, first in Khurāsān and next in Baghdad, and here his grandson became the archetypal Sunnī *'ālim*, Ibn Ḥanbal, who was in due course to lead the traditionist opposition to the Barmakid type of religion and culture as the hero of the obscurantist masses of Baghdad.[134] The distance between the pillars of the 'Abbāsid state thus widened into a gulf. And inasmuch as the caliphs could not afford a confrontation with the

'*ulamā*', it was the secretaries that they kept trying to bring into line: the
execution of Ibn al-Muqaffa', the Manichaean purges which hit the court
and the bureaucracy, and finally the crash and splinter as the Barmakids
themselves came down, can all be seen as violent adjustments to the outlook
of the '*ulamā*'.[155] That the cultural policy of the early caliphs was
always consistent is unlikely; but it was the chief *qāḍī*, not the chief
secretary, who drew up a treatise on taxation for Hārūn.[156]

At a provincial level the failure of the 'Abbāsid ideology is reflected
in the high incidence of political disturbance. Some of the provincial
troubles, of course, were of the type liable to accompany any major transfer
of power: for instance, the secession of Spain, the revolt on behalf of the
Umayyads in Syria and the Jazīra in 75 of [1 3 2 f],[157] or the Syrian attempt
at a come-back by support of 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī's bid for the throne in
754 [1 3 7].[158] Others clearly reflect the shift from a loose conquest society
to an integrated state, witness the frequency with which fiscal or admin-
istrative oppression acted as a trigger. The Coptic *jacqueries* in Egypt,[159]
very likely also Bundār's rising in Christian Lebanon,[140] the Khārijite
rebellions in Sīstān,[141] possibly also those in the Jazīra,[142] the massive
peasant revolts under the leadership of syncretic prophets in Transoxania,
Khurāsān, the Jibāl and Azerbayjan,[143] and the Transoxanian revolt of
Rāfi' b. Layth;[144] all these were in their very different ways attempts
to shake off the heavy hands of the 'Abbāsid governors. But it would
certainly be wrong to see no more than that in these revolts. On the one
hand, it is clear that, for all their governmental machinery, the 'Abbāsids
could not cope. Spain was written off from the start, though Manṣūr and
probably also Mahdī went through the motions of an attempt at re-
conquest.[145] In 789 [1 7 2] when Morocco passed into the hands of Idrīs,
an 'Alid refugee from Fakhkh, Hārūn is said to have arranged for his
poisoning; but as for attempts at reconquest, he did not even go through the
motions.[146] And in 800 [1 8 4] he practically sold Tunisian North Africa to
Ibrāhīm b. al-Aghlab, the son of a Khurāsānī soldier.[147] On the disap-
pearance of tribal and factional ties the Muslim state had become too big:
the 'Abbāsids had found no alternative ways of keeping it together.

On the other hand, the revolts were all too often directed not merely
against the agents of the state, but also against the state itself. That was
certainly so in Syria which never came round to acceptance of 'Abbāsid
rule. When Amīn tried to enrol ex-Umayyad soldiers for a defence of the
dawla in the fourth civil war, the outcome was Syrians and Khurāsānīs
at each others' throats in a minor reenactment of the revolution;[148] and
Umayyad legitimism provided the aegis both for the urban take-over of
local power in Damascus at the time of the civil war,[149] and for the rural

insurrection in Palestine towards the end of the reign of Muʿtaṣim.[550] Similarly, the Khārijites who kept the ʿAbbāsid governors out of the Sīstānī countryside were under no illusion that the caliph would be on their side if only he knew what was going on, as were Robin Hood or Oleksa Dovbuš in respect of their kings.[551] The Sīstānī Khārijites were rural bandits, but they were also Muslim heretics and thus politicized: unlike their many counterparts throughout the world, they forced the head of state to *argue*. And it is indicative of the threadbareness of the ʿAbbāsid title to power that in this argument Hārūn did none too well.[552]

The revolts in Transoxania are of particular importance in that they illustrate the continuing gulf between the syncretic frontier province from which the ʿAbbāsid armies came and the straightlaced Iraq in which they settled. The followers of the Iranian prophets belonged to the same population from which the ʿAbbāsids had recruited their *Rāwandiyya*, the most extreme heretics among their soldiers, a number of whom had to be liquidated in Iraq in 758 [141].[553] Whatever the repercussions of this incident in the east, the eastern heretics had already concluded from the murder of Abū Muslim that the ʿAbbāsid state was an Arab state,[554] and they rose in revolt inspired by hopes of the imminent collapse of foreign domination, in precisely the same manner as the Bantu or Bakongo prophets, the Amerindian Ghost Dancers, the Judaizing Maori, and a host of other syncretic rebels, who were in due course to act upon apocalyptic visions of the end of the white man's rule.[555] Unlike the peasants who had gone to the Arab garrisons, the semi-Islamized populations of rural Transoxania and, as the westward spread of the revolts was to show, also those of the Jibāl and Azerbayjan, still saw the Muslim state as one of alien colonists.[556] Given both the extreme syncretism and the rural locus of these rebels, they clearly could not be fatal to the political status of the ʿAbbāsids as long as the wielders of power in the east were not infected by them; and on the whole they were not.[557] But something of the same contrast between a colourful local society and a state perceived as alien recurs in the revolt of Rāfiʿ b. Layth, and here it was very damaging. Rāfiʿ was an Arab Muslim of a family settled in Khurāsān for generations,[558] he was a member of the Khurāsānī army,[559] and he became a rebel, according to some, to avenge his private honour.[560] But no sooner had he begun than the recently pacified Transoxania once more went up in flames.[561] What was so particularly undermining about this revolt was that for Rāfiʿ the soldier, as also for Muqannaʿ the prophet, the Turks of the area were more acceptable members of the local scene than the representatives of the Baghdadi state: the Turks were called in[562] and the ʿAbbāsids were rejected, according to Ibn Ḥazm for an Umayyad restoration.[563]

And worse still, a number of the local Abnā' joined the insurrection.[164] Just as the Abnā' went their different ways in the army and the bureaucracy, so they went their different ways in Iraq and eastern Iran.

Only in Iraq, and above all in Baghdad, did the new dynasty succeed in winning acceptance. In the fourth civil war the Baghdadi populace fought for the Abnā' with precisely the same passion with which the Ḥimṣī populace had defended their *ashrāf* against the *Yamaniyya* in Marwānid Syria;[165] and the fury with which the mob, the semi-naked criminals, vagabonds and riff-raff threw themselves into the battle against Ṭāhir's troops[166] was at the same time a superb illustration of the loyalties which the 'Abbāsids had hoped to inspire and a pathetic attestation of their failure. For the Abnā' had been designed as an imperial aristocracy, and they had ended up instead, like the *ashrāf*, as nothing but the heroes of a local mob.

Yet there was a crucial difference between the Marwānid and the 'Abbāsid predicaments. The Marwānid problem had been that outside Syria the *ashrāf* could have no power, but there had at least been hopes that the generals who took the power could also inherit the legitimacy when the *ashrāf* were swept away. But the 'Abbāsid problem was that outside Baghdad the Abnā' could have no legitimacy, and it was obvious that the *'ulamā'* who took the legitimacy could not also take the power if the Abnā' were to disappear. Given that the Abnā' had failed as a pillar of the state, who then were to inherit their power? In Khurāsān an Iranian aristocracy was still in existence, but the Muslim world at large had been denuded of heirs: here the caliphs had only their dependents.[167]

10
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SLAVE SOLDIERS

The large-scale encroachment of the dependents on the territory of the service aristocracy began under Mahdī and Hārūn. Mahdī turned the clients of the 'Abbāsid house into a servile army fighting under its own commanders[168] and filled a substantial number of governorships with men of this kind;[169] much resented by the Khurāsānīs,[170] this policy was continued by his successors.[171] Hārūn in addition recruited free clients among the non-Arabs of Khurāsān. The enrolment of foreigners was not without precedent. Already in 766[149] a Christian churchman had been scandalized by the 'locust swarm' of Alans, Khazars, Kufans, Ethiopians, Medians, Persians and Turks who went on summer campaign in that year, worshipping the sun and carrying with them the false gods of their nations.[172] But the scale of Hārūn's enterprise was doubtless new. Altogether half a million Iranians are said to have been recruited, presumably on making a formal renunciation of their false gods, and like the locust swarm they became *mawālī* of the caliph.[173] Graced with the name of *'Abbāsiyya*, some twenty thousand were transferred to Baghdad where, if the figures are at all correct, they were numerically on a par with the Abnā'.[174] Though the freedmen and the Iranians were different types of clients, they were inspired by the same concern. The point of the former was their utter dependence,[175] that of the latter their utter alienness; and the contrast with the Abnā' is obvious: with the *dawla* the 'Abbāsids had tried to identify their servants with the norms of Islam, but with *walā'* they bound them to a ruler who could not exercise his power without transgressing these norms.

The creation of the *mamlūk* institution consisted in a simple fusion of the two components which had hitherto remained discrete, servile status and alien origin. Freedmen reared in an Islamic environment and free mercenaries recruited abroad, for all that they became extremely common in the Muslim armies, were so to speak approximations to the ideal type: the classical *mamlūk* is characterized by *both* personal dependence and cultural dissociation.

Given that within fifty years of the revolution it had already become

74

clear that politics and religion were to go their separate ways, one might have expected the *mamlūk* institution to have already emerged by then. It is in fact between 800 and 820 [184–204] that slave armies begin to make their appearance, first in Ibrāhīm b. al-Aghlab's North Africa[576] and next in Hakam I's Spain;[577] and a similar army was under formation in the secessionist Egypt of 'Ubaydallāh b. al-Sarī.[578] But it was not until thirty years later that Mu'taṣim made slave armies a standard Muslim institution by creating one in the metropolis itself. Why did it take so long?

The problem was Khurāsān. If Khurāsān could not accept the hegemony of Baghdad in the shape of the Abnā', *a fortiori* it would reject it when the Abnā' were replaced by private dependents. The failure of the Islamic aristocracy thus meant that the Islamic heartlands and the eastern frontier had to separate: if the *mamlūks* were to inherit the former, the local nobility were the obvious heirs to the latter. But though it came easy enough to Hārūn to sell North Africa, granting Khurāsān autonomy was a different matter; and the caliphal road to the *mamlūk* institution was accordingly a tortuous one which passed through civil war.

Hārūn can be seen groping for a solution in the governors he appointed to the troublesome province. The first were Abnā',[579] and two were relatives on the female side – private dependents in disguise;[580] but in 806f [191] he appointed Harthama b. A'yan, a native Khurāsānī, with the title of *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn*.[581] Harthama's *walā'* was double-faced, its meaning depending on the side from which it was read: neither a Banawī nor a freedman of the caliph, he was more of a local representative than the Abnā' to the Khurāsānīs and more of a dependent *vis-à-vis* Hārūn. And precisely the same ambiguity was to recur in the *walā'* which bound Ṭāhir and his successors to the caliphal house. Unlike Ṭāhir, however, Harthama is not known to have had noble blood, and he certainly had no independence.

Both noble blood and independence arrived with Ma'mūn, who replaced Harthama on Hārūn's death in 809 in accordance with the dispositions Hārūn had made as far back as 802 [186] for the division of the empire between his sons.[582] In this solution kinship replaced *walā'*, and once again the tie was double-faced: an Iranian by maternal descent[583] to the Khurāsānīs, Ma'mūn was an 'Abbāsid *vis-à-vis* Baghdad, and his interest in the continuance of the unitary state was further guaranteed by the fact that he was also an heir-apparent. To that extent the solution was an ideal one. But as Hārūn himself was painfully aware, the dynastic arrangement positively invited civil war;[584] and civil war was not slow in coming.

The fourth civil war dealt the *coup de grâce* to the 'Abbāsid rationale in that it set Khurāsānīs against the Abnā'. Had the Abnā' won, the *dawla* would of course have been vindicated, and the Abnā' could have prided themselves on having saved it as well as having brought it about in the first place.[185] But they could not have saved its Khurāsānī identification: just as the Syrians had been discredited as *Zawāqīl* by the civil war,[186] so the Khurāsānīs would have stood condemned as *'ajamī* traitors to the 'Abbāsid revolution.[187] A Banawī victory might have been followed by a straightforward Iraqi domination of Khurāsān, but in all likelihood Iraq and Khurāsān would soon have parted ways.

Instead the Khurāsānīs defeated the Abnā': in 813 as in 750 a caliph and his Sunnī notables were swept away by Persian-speaking troops. Admittedly, the Abnā' did not immediately disappear from the political scene,[188] and as late as 870 [256] Muhtadī could try to play them against the Turks.[189] But the *dawla* had been discredited,[190] and it was thus a Khurāsānī domination of Iraq which preceded the parting of the ways.

There were three components to the Khurāsānī interlude. Firstly, in 813, as not in 750, the capital was transferred to eastern Iran: not even during the civil war did Ma'mūn leave Marw. Secondly, where Hārūn had gravitated towards the Sunnīs, Ma'mūn by contrast made a bid for the Shī'ites. In common with his predecessors he based his title to power on membership of the Hāshimite lineage, but the *dawla* having lost its legitimatory force, he gave up the 'Abbāsid claim to have excluded the 'Alids by their deeds: he was thus free to invert the testament of Abū Hāshim and designate an 'Alid as his heir on the ground of personal merit.[191] Finally, where Hārūn had resorted to dependents, Ma'mūn by contrast relied on princes. The tie, now as then, was *walā'* – what other ties were left? But the change of capital made for a crucial difference. In the first place, *walā'* had locally assumed the character of royal vassalage. Pre-Islamic Iran had been familiar with a tradition for local kinglets to surrender their crown and their throne to the King of Kings, receiving them back as his vassals.[192] Sāsānid measures of centralization on the one hand, and the nature of the Arab conquest on the other, had combined to eradicate this tradition from the central Iranian provinces; but it survived along the frontier, where it fused with *walā' al-islām*. Thus when Qutayba restored Bukhārā to the Bukhārkhudā, the latter converted to become the *mawlā islām* of the man to whom he owed his crown and his throne,[193] in the same way the Sāmānkhudā became a *mawlā islām* of Asad al-Qasrī when the latter restored him to Sāmān;[194] and a similar behavioural pattern is exemplified in the story that Barmak had gone to the caliph's court to convert.[195] Mahdī may well have been the first to make extensive use of this

tie in Khurāsān,[596] but it was Ma'mūn who took it up for a systematic legitimation of the eastern Iranian principalities: invited to submit to God and the caliph, the local rulers were confirmed in their positions as caliphal clients.[597] In the second place, the *mawālī* who ruled the empire at large were now public rather than private servants. It is not that they were all of different origin from those of Hārūn; some in fact had served under Hārūn,[598] though obviously most of them were new.[599] But with the change of capital they ceased to rule as aliens: Hārūn had valued them for their distance from the metropolitan tradition of Iraq; under Ma'mūn by contrast it was their affinity to the tradition of Khurāsān which was rewarded.

The cultural flexibility characteristic of the Shī'ite heresy and the eastern frontier thus came together for a brief moment under Ma'mūn, generating a remarkable openness to secular learning and secular elites alike.[600] Had Ma'mūn been content with a Khurāsānī successor state, he might have stayed on as an 'Abbāsid Ṭāhirid: the graceful surrender of Rāfi' b. Layth,[601] the delight in Ma'mūn's Iranian mother,[602] and the general pacification of his eastern domains all go to demonstrate that in Khurāsān at least he was at home. But to the Islamic world at large his policy was an affront, merely a partial admission of their rights in the eyes of the Shī'ites,[603] and a straightforward Zoroastrian plot against Islam in the eyes of the Sunnīs.[604] And when the Baghdadis rebelled under the leadership of the Abnā', rejecting Ma'mūn as a traitor to his house and raising up a son of Mahdī,[605] Ma'mūn was forced to return. Ruefully liquidating his Iranian minister and 'Alid heir on the journey back,[606] he entered Baghdad in 819, [204], where the Baghdadis, in a supreme effort to conciliate the caliph, awaited him dressed in the obnoxious green which was to have symbolized his new and better era.

But although he returned, Ma'mūn did not thereby regain the capacity to glorify the *dawla* and the Abnā' with which his predecessors had tried to persuade the Sunnīs to accept an imperial state, and he might well have given in completely to the Sunnīs at this point. But give in he would not; and because there was no longer any point in trying to conciliate the '*ulamā*', whom the return to Baghdad had brought back into prominence, the caliphal showdown with the traditionist rivals finally came. Claiming for himself the prerogatives of the Shī'ite imam,[607] Ma'mūn unpacked his priestly insight as Mu'tazilite theology and proceeded to make what was to be the first and the last attempt in Islam to bring the traditionists under inquisitorial control.[608] But for all the inventiveness and nerve with which he persisted in his manipulation of the symbols of religious authority, his efforts were not only inefficient, but also to some extent

superfluous: even granted a fair measure of success, his abstract imamate could not easily have served to sanctify concrete and intimate bonds. It was thus Ma'mūn's return to Baghdad, not the Sunnī restoration under Mutawakkil, that marked the final parting of the ways.

In both Khurāsān and the Islamic heartlands the heirs of the Abnā' were *mawālī*. But in Khurāsān the *mawālī* were caliphal vassals. The province received its autonomy in 821 [205] on the appointment of Ṭāhir, a member of the local nobility,[609] with the title of *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn*,[610] while at the same time the leadership of the Baghdadi *shurṭa*, traditionally associated with Khurāsān, was granted to the Iraqi branch of his family by way of reinforcement of the tie.[611] Less controllable than Harthama, Ṭāhir was also less dangerous than Ma'mūn, and though he is said to have declared himself independent shortly after his appointment,[612] the arrangement was kept up with his descendants. In due course, as the caliphs lost their power to the Turks, it was to work out as an alliance for the protection of Iraq.[613]

In the Islamic heartlands, by contrast, the *mawālī* were unfree clients. Already Ma'mūn himself was credited with large-scale purchases of Turkish slaves;[614] it was certainly in his lifetime and with his blessing that Mu'taṣim, his brother and successor, began to accumulate his servile army;[615] and on his accession Mu'taṣim systematized the practice.

As a legacy of the past Mu'taṣim's armies were a peculiar mixture of princes and slaves. The princes came as *mawālī islām* from Transoxania precisely as they had done under Ma'mūn;[616] but they came no longer as representatives of the metropolitan tradition, but as foreigners to it: witness the Afshīn, whose renunciation of the false gods of his nation had not extended to a renunciation of its ancestral culture.[617] The combination was thus not quite so odd as it might look. As the princes eventually disappeared they were replaced by Daylamites, Kurds, Africans, bedouin and other peoples marginal to the settled Islamic world: all were mercenaries and nobility simply did not matter.

The slaves were largely Turks captured among the tribes beyond the Muslim border in Transoxania, though some were still purchased in Iraq.[618] Usually they were manumitted, and they were virtually always converted,[619] but both were somewhat perfunctory concessions to traditional values. It is not for nothing that unlike ordinary freedmen they continued to be known as *mamlūks*,[620] and unlike ordinary converts to be called by their ancestral names, for all that these names were as barbarous on the tongues of the believers as those of the crassest Shu'ūbīs.[621]

Manumission was dispensable and in time increasingly dispensed with,[622] and conversion, though far more *de rigueur*, was rarely more than a formality:[623] Bughā, who, wondering what the trial of Ibn Ḥanbal was about, revealed that he knew only two things about Islam, had lost no more of his ancestral ignorance than had the Afshīn of his ancestral culture.[624] And the whole point of Mu'taṣim's Samarra was to keep both the slaves, their specially imported wives and their descendants in this state.[625]

The combination of cultural dissociation and personal dependence was a very forceful one in that it obliterated the soldier's public personality. Legally and psychologically aliens do not belong, and mercenaries do not usually have strong views on public issues in the polity which recruits them. Similarly, dependents do not count, and slaves are usually as indifferent to public issues as are women,[626] children and private servants. Samarra may be viewed as both a ghetto and as a harem: the ruler would bring up his foreign slaves as his *children*,[627] and they existed in the Muslim polity only through him. It was this extinction of the soldier's autonomy which made the *mamlūk* such a superb instrument of his master's will when it was coupled with personal obedience; by the same token, of course, it made the loss of personal obedience the more disastrous. And it was a feature which sharply differentiated a servile army from a feudal one. The barons were no aliens, but members of their own polity who subscribed, with whatever cynicism, to its political values, whereas the *mamlūks* had to be born in Islam to acquire a comparable commitment to the political norms of Islam;[628] and precisely for this reason home-born *mamlūks* were eventually excluded from the army: where the sons of barons hoped to honour their ancestors as soldiers, those of *mamlūks* had to forget theirs as scholars.[629] Equally, the barons were free men participating in a public culture: their code of private fidelity and chivalry became itself a public one. The *mamlūks* by contrast had only a superficial Islamic veneer unless they acquired sovereign power of their own,[630] and when they did so, it was not a servile code that went public: their court culture might be Arabic, Persian or Turkish, but it was invariably *imported.*[631] *Mamlūks* were not supposed to think, but to ride horses;[632] they were designed to be not a military elite, but military automata.[633]

Once endorsed by the caliphs, the *mamlūk* institution soon spread throughout the settled Middle East; and as eastern Iran brought itself into line with mainstream Islam under its successor dynasties, even this last bastion of princes fell: 'slaves upon horses', far from a topsy-turvy vision, became in Islam the most everyday of sights.[634] Free, native soldiers did not of

course vanish altogether from the Muslim armies;[635] but from the eastern
to the western borders of the caliphate and from the mid ninth century
into modern times, the crack troops at least of the settled rulers were
composed of slaves.[636]

The incidence of the *mamlūk* institution elegantly confirms the
diagnosis of the disease of which it was a symptom. Among the Muslims
of the Middle East it became both general and chronic. Yet it was not as
if the outcome of the 'Abbāsid experiment had been apt to encourage
prospective imitators;[637] nor were slaves always easy to obtain: Africans,
Slavs, Indians, Greeks, Abyssinians and Circassians might replace the
Turks,· but the greatest of all *mamlūk* institutions had to fall back on its own
Balkan peasantry, enslaved in flagrant contravention of the law.[638] Against
the ubiquity of the institution in the Muslim Middle East we have its total
absence in the pre-Islamic and the non-Islamic Middle East. If the Muslims
braved both offputting experiences and daunting obstacles to procure their
mamlūks, their non-Muslim neighbours by contrast signally failed to
borrow the idea. It was not that slaves were always difficult to get in the
Christian world,[639] still less was the *mamlūk* institution always inefficient;
there were no religious objections, and there were certainly men who
entertained the idea of imitating their Muslim neighbours.[640] Yet there were
no *mamlūks* in Spain after the expulsion of the Muslims, and none on
Byzantine soil before the Muslim conquest; and there were only mercen-
aries in northern Europe.[641]

The *mamlūk* institution is thus a specifically Muslim institution.[642]
There are, however, two illuminating exceptions to this rule. Within the
Muslim world the ubiquity of the *mamlūks* in the Middle East is balanced
by their total absence beyond the frontiers of the culturally destructive
conquests, where the rulers could continue to seek their legitimating
resources in the pre-Islamic traditions.[643] And conversely, within the non-
Islamic world the general failure to borrow the institution is matched by
the independent invention of comparable institutions precisely where
political meaning had for one reason or another been destroyed.[644] The
convergences thus point unambiguously to the Islamic deprivation of
legitimating resources as the root from which the institution grew.[645]
Evidently, the meaning of power has always been a problem wherever
power has existed, and there have been few states in which its wielders
have not made at least occasional use of their private dependents, even at
the best of times: witness the eunuchs of Confucian China, Sāsānid
Persia and Byzantium. Conversely, wherever slaves have existed,
there have always been those who would enrol them for the exercise of
power, if only at the worst of times: witness the gladiators in the Roman

civil wars[646] or the enrolment of prisoners-of-war by Mukhtār.[647] But the systematic handing over of power to slaves (or for that matter to women) to the more or less complete exclusion of the free males of the community bespeaks a moral gap of such dimensions that within the great civilizations it has been found only in one.

II
THE EMERGENCE OF THE
MEDIEVAL POLITY

The adoption of the *mamlūk* institution by the ʿAbbāsids was followed almost immediately by *fainéance* of the caliphal office and disintegration of the caliphal state. It is clearly not the case that slave armies necessarily entail either one or the other: the caliphs might have stayed in power, if only in Iraq,[648] just as the unitary state might have survived, if only as a sultanate.[649] But it is not very likely that the adoption of the new armies and the onset of general disorder simply happened to coincide. How then is the disorder to be explained? The key to the explanation must clearly lie in the manner in which the peculiar nature of the *mamlūk* institution interacted with the peculiar legacy of the ʿAbbāsids.

It is in the nature of slave armies that they can easily get out of hand: because they are private in character, their discipline turns to a greater extent than is usually the case on the personal forcefulness of the ruler. There were various ways in which the institution could be rendered more sensitive to such forcefulness, and the ʿAbbāsids might have been better off if they had not been beginners. Both the isolation and the homogeneity of the Samarran slaves probably exceeded the safety limit;[650] when the ruler and his troops came out of their joint quarantine, generational recruitment of new slaves replaced Muʿtaṣim's grandiose attempt to breed them,[651] and free mercenaries and other elements were brought in to balance the Turks;[652] the institution thus certainly became more amenable to control.[653] But it was far more important that the presence of the forcefulness itself could not be guaranteed. No dynasty can be relied on to produce an unbroken succession of able rulers; and even if it could, no state can ensure the constant availability of a military scene in which the rulers can display what ability they have. Of the two most long-lived *mamlūk* institutions one was non-dynastic while the other combined dynastic succession with the brutal selective pressure of fratricidal war. Either way the principle was the survival of the fittest; and in both cases the principle depended for its proper function on continuing external war: when warfare petered out, the Mamluk power struggles degenerated into mere anarchy, while the Ottomans withdrew from the command, stopped their fratricidal struggles and followed the ʿAbbāsids into *fainéance.*[654]

Mu'taṣim's successors may well have been men of some ability, but it was in the nature of their office that they lacked a military scene. The meaning of the caliphate had never lain in warfare. Internally, the caliphs were too exalted to go into the field against mere rebels in the manner of simple *amīr*s. Externally, not even the 'Abbāsids had ever been committed to the personal conduct of frontier campaigns; and, given the sheer physical extent of the caliphate, they could not easily adopt the role of *ghāzī*s. The incessant campaigns of Mu'taṣim himself do indeed recall those of the early Ottoman sultans; but for all the brilliance of his capture of Amorium, the summer expeditions on the Byzantine frontier had long been a ritual display, while conversely the real expansion of the Muslim frontier in Transoxania and North Africa necessarily had to be the work of local governors. There was no warfare for the 'Abbāsids to conduct; and for this reason they did not even get the proverbial run of three generations before being relegated to the harem, but lost control of their slaves within some thirty years.

It was, however, not in the nature of the *mamlūk* institution that the vacuum at the top should have continued for so long. In themselves slave armies can be restored as easily as they can get out of hand, and to some extent, of course, the caliphs regained their power under Muwaffaq and his immediate successors.[655] But the caliphal restoration was ephemeral, and no stable sultanate emerged until the arrival of the Būyids in 945 [334], so that for the better part of a century no one person was in firm control. The explanation for this prolonged vacuum doubtless has to be sought primarily in the nature of the 'Abbāsid heritage. It was crucial for the 'Abbāsids that they adopted the *mamlūk* institution against a background of failure: there never had been an Islamic empire. The imperial past was located outside Islam altogether, so that where the Ottoman officials were restorationists for ever looking back to the days of Sulaymān the Magnificent, the 'Abbāsid secretaries were merely alienated: there was no hankering for the magnificent days of Manṣūr. The caliphs accordingly had little support to derive from the one pillar of the administration on which they ought to have been able to rely. Increasingly Shī'ite in recruitment,[656] the secretaries had become a species of administrative *mamlūk*s who were scarcely more committed to the wider interests of the caliphate than were the slaves; and since their own interests lay in keeping military power fragmented, they could be relied on to put spokes in the wheels of whoever threatened to alter the status quo: in 908 [295] they flagrantly called a halt to the 'Abbāsid restoration by elevating a minor to the throne;[657] and throughout the period it took the threat of external conquest to make them search for Badr al-Jamālīs and Köprülü viziers.[658]

It was thus up to the soldiers to take over. But the ecology of Iraq was such that the power struggle there could not easily issue in a definitive victory for any one of the parties involved. A flat rural plain, it had no local niches of the kind which enabled Maḥmūd of Ghazna to conquer the Sāmānid metropolis;[659] even after the creation of the chief emirate in 936 [324] none of the competitors managed to retain it: Ibn Rā'iq, Bajkam and Mu'nis all rose on the flimsy basis of Iraq or its immediate environs and fell within a few years.[660] At the same time, the combination of secretarial intrigues, rival generals and public insolvency which con- fronted the potential conquerors of Iraq was unlikely to attract them, and morally the caliphate did not signify enough to make them come. Even after the chief emirate was there for the taking, the only interested candidates outside lower Iraq were the Ḥamdānids of Mosul: the Ikhshīd, for all that he was willing to have a caliph for his sultanate, refused to play the sultan to the caliphate.[661] Iraq thus had to await the anti-'Abbāsid animus of the Būyids, who set out with the idea of removing the caliph, and the pro-'Abbāsid sentiments of the Seljuqs, who entertained the idea of saving him, for the conquerors finally to arrive.[662]

The loss of *both* political meaning *and* personal control by the 'Abbāsids thus combined to make over the Islamic world to foreign slaves for almost a hundred years. Because *mamlūk* armies are essentially bodyguards writ large, they have all the virtues of elite troops at their best, but all the vices of private servants and foreign mercenaries at their worst: the facility with which palace officials can manipulate the state apparatus without ever considering the wider interests of politics, and that with which a hired soldiery can mutiny, ravage, loot and enter rebel service without ever going home, came together in the persons of the military slaves. A well-controlled *mamlūk* army might have kept the unitary state intact, but an uncontrolled one could not fail to bring about its total disintegra- tion.

Between foreign slaves and alienated secretaries, politics degenerated into mere intrigues and bickerings for the proceeds of a state apparatus which either party could permanently control, both parties squandering resources on an impressive scale while few indeed were reinvested in the state. At the same time the political horizon tended to narrow down to Iraq and its immediate environs. One by one the provinces were thus left to fall to obstreperous, dexterous or undisturbed governors,[663] rebels, heretics or robbers,[664] while Iraq itself was slowly laid waste as dykes broke, peasants fled, and bedouin advanced in the tracks of *mamlūk* desolation.[665] Meanwhile, in the provinces the combination of foreign governors and a passive populace meant that there were few local buffers

against the chaos spreading from Baghdad.[666] Had the chaos broken out before the 'Abbāsids adopted the *mamlūk* institution, such buffers might have appeared in the form of provincial warlords: the descendants of local *ashrāf* and Umayyad governors who took over Syria during the fourth civil war and its sequel and promised to be exactly that.[667] Equally, had the chaos been brought under sufficient control for the 'Abbāsids to obstruct the formation of local states, *ashrāf* and *mamlūks* might have merged as *a'yān* and *derebeys*.[668] But because the adoption of the *mamluk* institution was immediately followed by loss of control, the men who took over were all *mamlūks*, foreign mercenaries or mercenary bedouin, whose states faithfully replicated the metropolis from which they had broken away. In terms of origin, they were all Muḥammad 'Alīs.

The disintegration of the 'Abbāsid state was an intensely painful process in which it seemed at times as if the very venture of Islam was coming to an end, like that of Alexander the Great before it.[669] While Byzantine armies marched into Syria to the accompaniment of euphoric Byzantine prophecies of a Jerusalem regained,[670] the astrologers in a depopulated Baghdad stricken by military infighting, popular disorder, brigandage and famines, serenely predicted both a Persian restoration and the supercession of Islam by a new faith.[671] Indeed, that Islam was soon to disappear was the very premise upon which the Ismā'īlī revolutionaries held out their promise of a moral and material recovery: nothing less than a restoration of Adam's faith in a post-physical world could now save the marriage between religion and power to which the Islamic polity owed its existence.[672] And whether this polity could survive the divorce proceedings was still an open question.

Yet for all its agony the divorce was also a source of great relief to the Sunnī world. The state had ceased to lay claim to religious authority, so that for the *'ulamā'* it was no longer a competitor, and its very presence soon became sporadic. Hence where the *'ulamā'* in the 'Abbāsid cities had devoted enormous energy to defining their stand *vis-à-vis* the state, their successors in the Būyid cities were free to devote their attention to sorting out their position in whatever local society they found themselves. This was the development which permitted the emergence of the local notable, the distinctive figure of the medieval polity. The local notables were the obverse of the imported *mamlūks*: an urban elite, they were distinguished in negative terms by their lack of military and, except on a very minor scale, governmental functions,[673] and in positive terms by their combination of both landed and commercial wealth and religious learning. They represented a fusion of the urban *'ulamā'*, who had so far

made a living by trade and craftmanship, and the landed *ex-ashrāf*, ex-governors and generals who had begun to take an interest in scholarship,[674] a fusion which took place throughout the provincial cities of the Islamic world,[675] and which is epitomized by the appearance of the *sharīf* in the medieval sense of *sayyid*, descendant of the Prophet. The medieval *sharīf* is an 'Alid who is *not* a political pretender, usually not even a Shī'ite,[676] and who instead encashes his Prophetic genealogy as a title to local status. Such 'Alids can be seen to have made their appearance in Hamadhān by the 870s,[677] in Qazvīn by the 940s,[678] in Nīshāpūr by the 960s,[679] and in Bayhaq by the end of the tenth century A.D.[680] Wherever they appear,[681] they are a sure sign that morally states have ceased to matter. And whenever they appear, the old fear of judicial office gives way to endless quarrels between such men and other local notables for precisely this office and the city headmanship.[682] It was a development whereby the '*ulamā*' took on a role quite unlike that of any rabbi. Where the '*ulamā*' in caliphal Iraq had seen themselves as the leaders of a Muslim diaspora subjected to a Pharaonic yoke,[683] their successors in the days when the yoke had collapsed took advantage of the fact that the Pharaohs had in fact been their own. The '*ulamā*' inherited the land; they made themselves at home, founded dynasties of learned men, wrote local chronicles and engrossed themselves in the intricacies of family politics. And in that diversion of interests there was a great release of tension.

The peculiarity of the polity that ensued can be set out against the contrast of both Sāsānid Persia and medieval Europe. In Sāsānid Persia and the medieval West, landownership was vested in a military aristocracy, while religious learning was the monopoly of a church closely associated with this aristocracy in terms of both revenues and recruitment. The cities stood outside this framework. In Persia they were non-Iranian assets, and in Europe they were a late growth. Being centres of non-landed wealth and non-clerical learning, they were also rivals to the traditional holders of power: they supplied professional skills to the royal bureaucracy on the one hand, and bred religious dissidents on the other – Christians and Manichaeans in Persia, Waldensians in Europe. In one respect, of course, there is complete continuity between Sāsānid Persia and medieval Islam. The cities continued to produce professional men for the ruler's administration and court; witness the doctors, astrologers and above all secretaries who upheld the tradition of secular learning in Islam, and who maintained the continuity of administrative practice which lay behind the endless political vicissitudes of the time.[684] As in the days of the Sāsānids they were frequently recruited from among members of the minority religions, especially Christianity;[685] even when they were not, they tended to stand

out against society at large.[686] But what they stood out against had drastically changed. In Sāsānid Persia their distinctiveness had arisen from the fact that they were an urban elite and what is more an Aramaean one, in a society which located its power in the Iranian countryside. But in medieval Islam the ethnic difference had disappeared and power had moved to the cities; and had this transfer represented a bourgeois revolution such as was eventually to take place in Europe, the professional men would have been its leading exponents. But it did not. *Dhimmī*s and converts, the professional men stood out against the rest of society because they collaborated with a state from which the rest of society had withdrawn. It was not the bourgeoisie that had taken over, but the Muslims at large that had walked out. The commercial wealth of the cities, the landed property of the aristocracy and the religious learning of the church had *all* come together in a non-political elite; and the bourgeois appearance of medieval Muslim society arises precisely from its non-political character. The characteristic contrast in European history may be between city and countryside, but in medieval Islam it is between society and state.

There is another way of putting the same point. Just as Islam is unique among the great civilizations in the extent to which the state has ceased to embody public norms, so it is unique among pre-industrial societies in the extent to which government service has ceased to be associated with the ownership of land. The slave soldiers were no barons. Where the point of the European fief was to invest a native soldiery with land, that of the Muslim *iqṭāʿ* was precisely to dissociate a foreign soldiery from it, so that unlike the baron who was the apex of local society, the *muqṭaʿ*, whatever his usurpation of governmental functions, was merely the local tax-collector:[687] slaves *vis-à-vis* their lord, the *mamlūk*s were mercenaries *vis-à-vis* the land. Equally, the notables were no patricians. They did indeed combine landed and commercial wealth, urban residence and cultural leadership in a manner reminiscent of the elites of the medieval Italian and other cities.[688] But the patricians of the European cities and city states, not to mention those of ancient Rome, were the wielders of public power, whereas the distinctive feature of the notables was precisely that the many assets they combined did not suffice to give them a share in such power.[689] To that extent the medieval polity was comparable to a conquest society.

It is precisely the fact that the medieval polity was in the nature of a conquest society that explains some of its more striking features. Politically, the lack of integration between an alien state and a local society meant that there was far less to obstruct the workings of the central government, when a central government was present, than there was in medieval or

early modern Europe, and that conversely governors and notables alike
were badly placed to take over the maintenance of local order if the central
government collapsed.[690] And the same disjunction explains why govern-
ment so often took the form of manipulation. As the governor could play
notables against each other by dangling official rewards such as the city
headmanship, the *qaḍā'*, local tax-farms, perquisites, reliefs and benefits
of all kinds, so the notables could bring their influence to bear on the
governor by a judicious handling of the information and advice on which
he depended to rule what to him was a foreign land. Hence the political
pattern that accompanied this disjunction was one of oscillation between
the extremes of despotism and anarchy on the part of the state,[691] and
ritual avoidance and factionalism on the part of the notables.[692] It
was a pattern on which the local variations are considerable, interesting
and to a large extent still unexplained.[693] But it only disappeared with the
medieval polity itself.

Intellectually, it is the very totality of the disjunction between the
exponents of state and religion that explains why the relationship between
the two could come to be seen even by the medieval Muslims as a sym-
biosis: once the divorce was finalized, there was nothing to obstruct an
improvement in the relationship between the divorcees. Having won the
battle for religious authority, and lacking Shīʿite hopes of future glory, the
Sunnī *ʿulamāʾ* certainly showed themselves at their most generous, and
in two ways an organic link between religion and politics remained. In-
ternally, the ruler kept his providential role: he protected the *Sharīʿa*,
enabled the community to prosper, kept the roads safe;[694] and for practical
purposes that was enough. To be sure, Suyūṭī could still adduce a vast
array of proof-texts in defence of his refusal to pay the customary visit
to the sultan,[695] and avoidance of the state remained the norm. But
Suyūṭī's intransigence reflects his own considerable self-esteem rather
than a genuinely widespread fear of the polluting touch of power.[696] The
truth of the matter was that where the Umayyad loss of sanctity had been
outrageous, the openly profane nature of a stage such as that of Mamluk
Egypt was really very comforting; so that where the early traditionists
had lost no time in rejecting the Umayyads as Pharaohs, their medieval
successors accepted even Pharaoh as a representative of divine provid-
ence.[697] In theory the ruler was a shepherd; and in practice the *mamlūks*,
for all that they might fleece their sheep, directed their predatory instincts
mainly against their own kind.

Externally, the ruler retained the obligation of *jihād*. The doubts which
the jurists of Aghlabid North Africa had evinced as to the status of holy
war conducted by an illegitimate ruler[698] never resulted in an unambiguous

internalization of *jihād* among the Sunnīs as it did among the Shīʿites:[699] holy war remained an exoteric activity in the performance of which even a ruler by usurpation could gain for himself a certain instrumental sanctity. Certainly, for all his services to Islam even so great a warrior as Saladin held only profane power; but for all their unashamed profanity even so alien a set of rulers as the slaves of Mamluk Egypt could legitimate their rule by brilliant defence of Islam.[700] It is thus not surprising that when a Muslim empire rose again, it did so as a *ghāzī* state.

At the same time the occlusion of sacred politics opened up a new dimension of *jihād* in holy war against corrupt believers. In itself of course the phenomenon was not new. Long before medieval times Muslims had raised armies in the backlands for a conquest of the settled states; witness the Ibāḍīs, Zaydīs, Carmathians and Fāṭimids. But there was a significant doctrinal shift. Just as the imamate ceased to generate new heresies, so the desert ceased to be the breeding-ground of heretics: it was now *Sunnīs* who enrolled the tribes. The ease with which the orthodox learning of the urban ʿ*ulamāʾ*, be it reformist or Ṣūfī, passed into programmes of militant activism at the hands of Almoravids and Almohads, or for that matter Wahhābīs and Sanūsīs, is quite without precedent in classical Islam.

We thus have the elements for the alternation between tribal and servile rule which became so characteristic a feature of medieval Islamic history. At one extreme we have the religious conquerors from the desert such as the Arabs themselves or their Berber imitators, at the other extreme the Central Asiatic slaves imported by the ʿAbbāsids and the successor dynasties; and in between we have their permutations. Central Asian conquerors followed in the wake of the imported slaves,[701] Central Asian slaves took over from their importers,[702] while mercenary tribesmen set up their local dynasties and once more imported slaves.[703] But it was a coming and going of states over a society which, for all the chaos and factionalism which it experienced, remained extremely stable.

By way of epilogue we may return to the subject with which this study began, the contrasting relationship between tribes and civilization in the Chinese and the Middle Eastern worlds. We left the Turkish and Mongol barbarians to their fate of Sinification in China, and we have now been through the formation of one aspect of the civilization which the Arabs created for the Middle East. How then do the Chinese and the Muslim views of tribal conquerors compare? There is one irresistible contrast here, that between the Confucian theorists and Ibn Khaldūn, both celebrated propounders of cyclical theories of history. For the Confucians as for Ibn Khaldūn, history consisted of dynastic cycles punctuated, *inter alia*, by

tribal conquest; but the moral evaluations of this scheme are radically dis-
similar, and it is the dissimilarity that we must proceed to consider.

The attention of the Chinese was riveted on the inevitable decline of
settled dynasties. Such dynasties were seen as running out of a quality
defined now as virtue and now as a Spenglerian life-force, through the
gradual loss of which they would sooner or later reach the nadir where a
fresh dynasty must take over.[704] Tribal conquest belonged at the rock
bottom of the cycle,[705] and of tribal decay the Chinese had no real notion:
being barbarians, the tribesmen possessed no virtue that could be cor-
rupted. That barbarians could not govern China as such was taken as
axiomatic.[706] But were the tribesmen to lose their ancestral rudeness, the
Chinese would construe the loss, which the barbarians themselves usually
lamented, as acquisition of the very virtues which Chinese government
represented:[707] the transition from tribal to settled rule could not fail
to be a transition to better, stronger and more enduring government.[708]
Ibn Khaldūn, by contrast, was fascinated by the inevitable decline of
tribal dynasties, and where the Chinese tried to define the properties of
virtue, Ibn Khaldūn laboured to identify the nature of tribal solidarity.
In his scheme tribal conquest marks the high point of the cycle, and the
loss of tribal ties is seen as a proof not that settled government will win
out, but that tribal conquest must of necessity recur. The idea that the
transition to settled rule could be a transition to better, stronger and
more enduring government never suggested itself to him, and he would
certainly have been puzzled by Manchu or Frankish history, had he known
of them: as far as he was concerned, civilization equalled effeminate cor-
ruption.[709] Ibn Khaldūn, in short, saw the cycles from the barbarian's
point of view: we have here the Muslim fixation on the tribal past restated
in the secular terms of macro-history.

Ibn Khaldūn's theory, however, has to be seen in the light of his evalua-
tion of the *mamlūk* institution. In a celebrated passage he praises this
institution as a gift from God for the salvation of Islam.[710] Its benefit
consists in the fact that it enables the Turkish tribes which are imported
from the land of heathendom to embrace Islam with the determination of
true believers, all while retaining their nomadic virtues undefiled by lust-
ful pleasure, untouched by the excess of luxury, unmarred by the habits
of civilization. The passage brilliantly describes the *mamlūks* as institution-
alized tribal conquerors. What this means is that Ibn Khaldūn saw the
medieval polity as consisting of a settled non-political society and a tribal
state, be it imported or imposed by conquest. He saw, in other words,
that the medieval polity was in the nature of a conquest society, and if
the idea of applauding the transition to settled rule did not suggest itself

to him, it was for the simple reason that Islam, in such contrast to China, lacked a form of settled government to which the transition could have been made. Politics in Islam had remained the domain of the barbarians: it was precisely the non-political nature of settled society that gave Ibn Khaldūn so strong a feeling that civilization was effeminate.

The reason why Ibn Khaldūn had so clear a view of the nature of Islamic politics is partly that he was a very clever man, and more particularly that he was a highly cultured man of urban origin whose lifelong ambition was to be a great politician.[71] In his failure the political evolution of Islam has come full circle. It was because the Arab fixation on the tribal past had been religiously fixed that the Muslims handed over power to slaves and tribes; and it was because power had thus been handed over to slaves and tribes that a medieval Muslim became a statesman *manqué* who could do no better than to sublimate his disappointment into a theory of the circulation of tribal elites.

APPENDIX 1

THE *ASHRĀF* OF SYRIA AND IRAQ

Virtually all the families included in this list are said to have been sharifian in the technical sense of the word (*sharīf lahu bayt qadīm* or statements to similar effect), but ambiguities do of course occur: the pretensions may be spurious or the nobility may lie in the character. Where such doubts arise, this is stated. Since the number of sharifian families in an Arab settlement was necessarily considerable, the list is by no means exhaustive. With a few exceptions only families that can be followed for a minimum of three generations have been included.

A. SYRIA (WITHOUT QINNASRĪN)

(1) *Bahdal b. Unayf al-Kalbī.* Bahdal belonged to the chiefly house of the B. Ḥāritha b. Janāb/Kalb and made his fortune by marrying off a daughter to Mu'āwiya (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2], *s.v.*; cf. also Lammens, *Études sur le règne du Calife Omaiyade Mo'āwiya*, pp. 286f). Three of his descendants dominated the political scene of Sufyānid Syria. Ḥassān b. Mālik b. Bahdal commanded the Quḍā'a of Damascus at Ṣiffīn for Mu'āwiya (Naṣr b. Muzāhim, *Waq'at Ṣiffīn*, p. 233; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 184), governed Jordan and Palestine for Mu'āwiya and Yazīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 468; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 65, vol. v, p. 128), and led the movement in favour of an Umayyad candidate after the death of Yazīd I (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 63ff); though at first he supported Khālid b. Yazīd, he was brought to accept Marwān at Jābiya (*ibid.*, vol. v, pp. 128, 130), fought for him at Marj Rāhiṭ (*ibid.*, vol. v, p. 138) and agreed to change the succession in favour of his sons (*ibid.*, vol. v, p. 150). Later he supported 'Abd al-Malik against 'Amr b. Sa'īd al-Ashdaq (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 785; cf. also *Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2], *s.v.* 'Ḥassān b. Mālik'). A Ḥassān b. Mālik appears as the issuer of a bilingual *entagion* dated 70 A.H. and a Ḥassūn who is perhaps identical with him is mentioned in two slightly earlier Greek documents (P. Colt 67, 92f in Kraemer,

93

Non-literary Papyri, pp. 196f 290ff). The reading of the names is uncertain and the chronicles do not remember Ḥassān as having resumed his governorship of Palestine after the civil war, but this is clearly not impossible. Saʿīd b. Mālik b. Baḥdal, his brother, was governor of Qinnasrīn for Yazīd I (*Aghānī*, vol. xix, p. 195). Ḥumayd b. Ḥurayth b. Baḥdal, his cousin, was head of Yazīd's *shurṭa* (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 6, 60) and leader of the tribal feuds between Kalb and Qays after Marj Rāhiṭ (*ibid.*, vol. v, pp. 308ff); under ʿAbd al-Malik he supported Ashdaq (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 784ff).

The family disappeared almost completely in the Marwānid period. It made a brief reappearance in the third civil war when Khālid b. ʿUthmān b. Saʿīd b. Baḥdal fought against the *Yamaniyya* as the head of Walīd II's *shurṭa* (*ibid.*, p. 1803; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, s.v. 'Ḥālid b. ʿUtmān'), while an unnamed member of the family fought on the other side as a Yemeni commander who was sent to reinforce the Syrians in Iraq in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 19). It reappeared again in the reign of Hārūn when ʿĀṣim b. Muḥammad b. Baḥdal al-Kalbī emerged as the leader of the Yemenis in the factionalism between Qays and Yemen in Damascus (Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. vii, pp. 129f).

(2) *Dhū Aṣbaḥ* and *Dhū'l-Kalāʿ* were the two major Ḥimyarī families in Ḥimṣ. Abraha b. al-Ṣabbāḥ and Abū Shamir, his son, were among the conquerors of Egypt where most of the Aṣbaḥīs settled (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2586f, cf. ser. ii, p. 211; Kindī, *Governors*, p. 12, cf. p. 19). Kurayb b. Abraha Abū Rishdīn was head of Ḥimyar in Syria under Muʿāwiya and fought for the latter in the civil war (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, s.v.). He later went to Egypt, supported Ibn al-Zubayr in the second civil war, negotiated the treaty with Marwān after the Egyptian defeat, and was sent by ʿAbd al-Malik to Byzantium together with Ḥumayd b. Ḥurayth b. Baḥdal to negotiate yet another treaty for the caliph (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 41f, 44; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 300; cf. also Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 786). A cousin of his, Ayyūb b. Shuraḥbīl b. al-Ṣabbāḥ, was governor of Egypt for ʿUmar II (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 67ff). Naḍr b. Yarīm b. Maʿdikarib b. Abraha b. al-Ṣabbāḥ stayed in Syria where he was head of Ḥimyar and governor of Palestine for ʿUmar II (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 465; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, table 278 and s.v. 'al-Naḍr b. Yarīm'). Thereafter the family disappears. One hears only of the South Arabian branch of Aṣbaḥīs in the third civil war, in which they appear as followers of Abū

Ḥamza al-Khārijī (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 592, 596, 619; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, pp. 168, 172f, 174, 176; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1982). But the Naḍr b. Yarīm who conducted a *ṣā'ifa* under Abū'l-'Abbās was perhaps a member of this family (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 633).

Samayfa' b. Nākūr Dhū'l-Kalā', the founder of the other family, was among the conquerors of Syria (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.v.*; Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2082, 2085, 2094, 2151ff, 2389). He also settled in Ḥimṣ and fought for Mu'āwiya at Ṣiffīn, where he fell (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 220, 222; Naṣr b. Muzāhim, *Waq'at Ṣiffīn*, pp. 233f, 239, 269; Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3314). Another two members of his family are supposed to have participated in the battle, but their names are clearly Aṣbaḥī (Naṣr b. Muzāhim, *Waq'at Ṣiffīn*, pp. 234, 358; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 219; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 184). Shuraḥbīl b. Dhī'l-Kalā' was sent by Nu'mān b. Bashīr, the Zubayrist governor of Ḥimṣ, to reinforce Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays against the Umayyads in the second civil war (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 474; but the Zubayrist sympathies of the family were perhaps limited, for it was also Kalā'īs who hunted down Nu'mān after the defeat, *ibid.*). He later joined the army of 'Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād, fought against the Tawwābūn and fell against Ibn al-Ashtar at Khāzir (*ibid.*, pp. 553, 557ff, 711, 715). Several other Kalā'īs are known, though their precise relationship cannot be reconstructed. Thus Khālid b. Ma'dān b. Abī Karib al-Kalā'ī was head of the *shurṭa* of Yazīd I, a participant in Maslama's expedition against Constantinople, and a traditionist (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v. p. 86; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1315). 'Imrān b. al-Nu'mān al-Kalā'ī was governor of Sind for 'Umar II (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 430). Ṣaqr b. Ṣafwān al-Kalā'ī is supposed to have participated in the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ, though on what side is not stated; in the third civil war he was among the Ḥimṣī *ashrāf* whom Yazīd III took great care to conciliate after he had suppressed their revolt and received their allegiance (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. vi, p. 444; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1830f).

(3) *Ḥaywīl b. Yasār Abū Kabsha al-Sakṣakī/Kinda*. Abū Kabsha, whose *ism* is also given as Jabawīl or 'Ulāqa, was one of the few Syrian *ashrāf* to found a family of generals. He is said to have been *'arīf* of Sakāsik (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 22), but that is probably a misreading of his tribal group, 'Arīq of Sakāsik (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 243), for he was scarcely less than a *ra's al-qabīla*. Like so many other Syrian

ashrāf he is said to have been sent by Yazīd I to Ibn al-Zubayr to demand allegiance from the latter (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 20), and he was one of the men who met at Jābiya to elect Marwān (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 128). Ibn al-Kalbī lists him as the father of Yazīd and Ziyād (*Ğamhara*, table 243). Yazīd b. Abī Kabsha was head of ʿAbd al-Malik's *shurṭa* for a while (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 349). In 79 he was in Iraq where Ḥajjāj sent him on a campaign against a Khārijite (*ibid.*, p. 358) and appointed him head of his *shurṭa* in Wāsiṭ (*ibid.*, p. 411, where Abu ʿUlāfa should be emended to Abū ʿUlāqa; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 270). In 94 he conducted a campaign against the Byzantines (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1256), and in 95 he became governor of Iraq for a short while on the death of Ḥajjāj (*ibid.*, pp. 1268f). Sulaymān appointed him governor of Sind where he seized Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Thaqafī, the governor and relative of Ḥajjāj, and where he died soon after his arrival (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 429f; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, vol. iv, p. 465). Nothing is known of Ziyād b. Abī Kabsha, but Sarī b. Ziyād, his son, was among the conspirators against Walīd II and he is doubtless identical with the Abū ʿUlāqa al-Saksakī who appears among the leaders of the *Yamaniyya* in Syria in 127 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1800, 1878, 1894).

(4) *Ḥubaysh b. Dalja al-Qaynī*. Dalja b. al-Mushammit, a Quḍāʿī *sharīf* who settled in Jordan, is said to have visited the Prophet and to have wintered at Balda in 36 (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, *s.v.* ʿDalğa b. al-Musammit'). Ḥubaysh b. Dalja Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, his son, commanded the Jordanian Quḍāʿa at Ṣiffīn for Muʿāwiya (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 222; Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, *Waqʿat Ṣiffīn*, p. 234). In 47 and 48 he wintered at Antioch (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 244, 245; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 84, 85); in 63 he commanded the Jordanian troops with Muslim b. ʿUqba in the Ḥijāz (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 299; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 41, 47); and in 65 he was put in command of an army which was sent by Marwān against Ibn al-Zubayr and which was defeated at Rabadha where he fell (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 150ff; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 578ff). The family then disappears completely until 126 when Jordan rebelled against Yazīd III. The formal leader of the revolt was Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Malik (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1831), but when Yazīd III sent Sulaymān b. Hishām to Jordan it was Ḥakam b. Jurw and Rāshid b. Jurw al-

Qaynī that he was concerned to mollify (*ibid.*, p. 1832); they may therefore be taken to have been the real leaders of what feeble resistance there was in the district. Their full *nasab* is never given, but there can scarcely be any doubt as to their identity; Ibn al-Kalbī, whose list of Qayn is extraordinarily detailed, only has four Qaynīs by the name of Jurw, and of these three are related to Dalja b. al-Mushammit (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, tables 313 and 324): in all likelihood it was two grandsons of Ḥubaysh who led the movement against Yazīd III in Jordan just as it was descendants of Sufyānid *ashrāf*, who led it in the other districts.

(5) *Ḥusayn b. Numayr al-Sakūnī.* Ḥusayn was one of the most famous members of the Sufyānid nobility. Sayf has his career start already in 11 (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2004, cf. p. 2220) which seems unduly early for a man who was killed fifty-six years later, and we are on firmer ground when we are told that he conducted summer campaigns in 58 and 62 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 271, 288). He was governor of Ḥimṣ for Yazīd I and commanded the *jund* of Ḥimṣ in Muslim b. 'Uqba's expedition to the Ḥijāz, where he succeeded to the general command on Muslim's death (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v. 'Ḥusayn b. Numayr'). On the news of the death of Yazīd he offered Ibn al-Zubayr his allegiance on condition that the latter come to Syria, but Ibn al-Zubayr refused (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 430ff) and Ḥusayn returned to Syria to participate in the election of another caliph at Jābiya, where he came out in support of Marwān (*ibid.*, pp. 474, 487; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 134). He was then sent against Iraq, fought the Tawwābūn and fell at Khāzir against Ibn al-Ashtar (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 557ff, 714). Yazīd b. Ḥusayn, his son, also participated in the battle against the Tawwābūn (*ibid.*, p. 560). He was later governor of Ḥimṣ for 'Umar II (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 465). Mu'āwiya b. Yazīd b. Ḥusayn is not heard of until 126 when the populace of Ḥimṣ mutinied on hearing of Walīd's murder, destroyed the house of 'Abbās b. Walīd, elected Mu'āwiya their leader and refused to pay homage to Yazīd III (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1826). Yazīd easily put down the revolt, showered honours on the disgruntled *ashrāf*, and appointed Mu'āwiya governor of Ḥimṣ (*ibid.*, pp. 1826ff, 1830f, 1834), but Mu'āwiya and other *ru'ūs* nonetheless could not wait to pay allegiance to Marwān II when the latter came to Syria (*ibid.*, p. 1892), and Numayr b. Yazīd, the brother of Mu'āwiya b. Yazīd, went with Marwān's governor to Egypt (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 88).

(6) *Khuraym/Ḥuraym b. 'Amr al-Murrī.* The sharifian status of this family is doubtful in the extreme. Khuraym does appear at Mu'āwiya's court, but only in connection with a spurious story (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 137), and he certainly receives none of the attention accorded to 'Abdallāh b. Mas'ada al-Fazārī (cf. no. 7) or Hammām b. Qabīṣa al-Numayrī, the head of the Damascene Qays who commanded a *rub'* for Mu'āwiya at Ṣiffīn and fell at Marj Rāhiṭ in support of Ibn al-Zubayr (Naṣr b. Muzāhim, *Waq'at Ṣiffīn,* p. 233; Balādhurī, *Ansāb,* vol. v, p. 137). It is thus not surprising that whereas Hammām's family disappears in the Marwānid period, that of Khuraym becomes increasingly prominent. Khuraym himself figures at the court of Sulaymān and he would seem to have been implicated in the revolt of Qutayba (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1300, 1312). Junayd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, his nephew, was governor of Sind under Yazīd II and Hishām (*ibid.,* p. 1467; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh,* p. 538, cf. p. 484 where he has become 'Abd al-Ḥamīd; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ,* p. 442), and in 112 he was appointed to Khurāsān where he died in 115 or 116 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1527ff, 1564; cf. also Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara,* table 127). He is said only to have appointed Muḍarīs (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1529). 'Umāra b. Khuraym was in the service of Junayd in Khurāsān and was briefly deputy governor there (*ibid.,* pp. 1529, 1532, 1565). 'Uthmān b. 'Umāra. b. Khuraym was a member of Manṣūr's *ṣaḥāba* and probably identical with the Abū Yaḥyā b. Khuraym who fought against Ibrāhīm b. 'Abdallāh in Basra in 145 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 281, 305); according to Ibn al-Kalbī he was also governor of Armenia and Khurāsān for Mahdī, which is certainly wrong (*Ǧamhara, s.v.*); but under Hārūn he was governor of Sīstān (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh,* p. 745; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān,* pp. 152f where he has become Khuzayma al-Muzanī). Khuraym b. Abī Yaḥyā was an authority on the Syrian Qays (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1300, cf. p. 1302). 'Āmir b. 'Umāra b. Khuraym Abū 'l-Haydhām was the leader of Qays in the factionalism which broke out in Damascus in 176 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1565, ser. iii, pp. 624f; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb,* vol. vii, pp. 176ff).

(7) *Mas'ada b. Ḥakama al-Fazārī.* Mas'ada is said to have been killed in Zayd b. Ḥāritha's raid on Fazāra, as a result of which 'Abdallāh b. Mas'ada was brought to the Prophet (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 1557). 'Abdallāh and 'Abd al-Raḥman, his brother, both settled in Damascus where they were among the *ashrāf* of Qays. 'Abd al-Raḥmān conducted summer campaigns under Mu'āwiya and is said to have gone with other *ashrāf* and his brother to extract an oath of alleg-

iance from Ibn al-Zubayr under Yazīd (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*; *Aghānī*, vol. i, p. 33; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 20). 'Abdallāh fought for Mu'āwiya in the civil war, conducted summer campaigns, and commanded the Damascene troops in Muslim b. 'Uqba's expedition to the Ḥijāz (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3446; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 47, 50, 57f; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 299). After Yazīd's death he was one of the men who elected Marwān at Jābiya, and he was still around under 'Abd al-Malik (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 147, vol. v, p. 128). Thereafter the family disappears completely until Mughīra b. 'Abdallāh b. Mughīra b. 'Abdallāh b. Mas'ada, who turns up in 131 as Marwān II's governor of Egypt, whether as a Qaysī or a disaffected *sharīf*, or both (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 92f).

(8) *Qays b. Thawr al-Sakūnī.* Qays was a minor *sharīf* from Ḥimṣ who is found in the entourage of Mu'āwiya (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 49). 'Amr b. Qays, his son, was sent to reinforce Maslama in Azerbayjan in 98 and/or he conducted a summer campaign in that year (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1317); in 100 he conducted another summer campaign with Walīd b. Hishām al-Mu'aytī (*ibid.*, p. 1349); and in 126 he was able to assist Walīd II with 500 men, though there is no indication that he was governor of Ḥimṣ (*ibid.*, p. 1802). Insofar as his career is known, it is thus a distinctively military one, and one would have expected him to have joined the *Yamaniyya*; if nonetheless he not only assisted Walīd, but also supported the revolt of the *ashrāf* against Yazīd III (*ibid.*, pp. 1826f), it was perhaps because his career had been enacted on the Syro-Byzantine frontier rather than in Iraq, with the result that behaviourally he was a Qaysī. He is not, it is true, mentioned among the generals who joined Marwān on the latter's arrival, but that was scarcely to be expected of a very old man: he died in 140 at the age of a hundred (Ibn Ḥibbān, '*Ulamā*', p. 117). His son 'Īsā Abū Jamal, however, must have been one of them, for he commanded the *jund* of Qinnasrīn in the army of Marwān's governor in Egypt (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 88). It is worth noting that 'Īsā's career continued under the 'Abbāsids: he was governor of Basra for Manṣūr in 143 and 152 (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.* "'Īsā b. 'Amr'; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 646, 660, 674f, where he has become a Saksakī). Abū Thawr b. 'Īsā was reduced to the local role of governor of Ḥimṣ under Hārūn before the family disappeared (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*).

(9) *Rawḥ b. Zanbā' al-Judhāmī.* Zanbā', the founder of the family, is

credited with *ṣuḥba* (Lammens, *Califat de Yazīd*, ch. 20, with other details on the family). Salāma b. Zanbāʿ appears in a *majlis* with ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ at the latter's estate in Beersheba in 36 (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3250; for the location of ʿAmr's estate see *ibid.*, p. 2967). Rawḥ b. Zanbāʿ was the most successful member of the family. Yazīd I sent him along with other *ashrāf* to demand an oath of allegiance from Ibn al-Zubayr (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 20) and he commanded the Palestinian troops in Muslim b. ʿUqba's expedition to the Ḥijāz (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 299; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 424). His rivalry with Nātil b. Qays over the *riyāsa* has already been described (above, p. 34). At Jābiya he supported the candidature of Marwān (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 134f), and he became one of the most influential advisers of ʿAbd al-Malik, who is said to have made him his secretary (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1164; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, p. 35). He was deputy governor of Palestine for ʿAbd al-Malik in the reign of Marwān, and he also assisted Bishr b. Marwān in Iraq (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 149; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, pp. 36f; Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, vol. v, pp. 254ff). His sons certainly inherited a good deal of prestige, and it is not surprising that Saʿīd b. Rawḥ could be described as *raʾs ahl Filasṭīn* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1831). But they inherited little of their father's power, and they are never heard of during the Marwānid period until they rebelled in 126 under the nominal leadership of Yazīd b. Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik (*ibid.*, pp. 1831f). The revolt was not a source of much danger to Yazīd III, who offered Ḍabʿān b. Rawḥ the governorship of Palestine in the expectation that he would find the offer irresistible, as indeed he did (*ibid.*, p. 1832). Ḥakam b. Ḍabʿān, however, continued the family's attempt to recover its former prominence. According to one version he took control of Palestine on the death of Yazīd III with the help of Lakhm and Judhām, giving his allegiance to Sulaymān b. Hishām (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 152); another version has him take over at the time of Marwān's defeat at the Zāb (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 47); while finally a third version states that he rebelled with ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī in 136, on which occasion several members of his family got killed (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 103ff; cf. Omar, *ʿAbbāsid Caliphate*, p. 185). ʿAbdallāh b. Yazīd b. Rawḥ, by contrast, remained loyal to Marwān (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 47; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 136). However this may be, the family scarcely mattered politically thereafter. Rawḥ [b.?] b. Rawḥ b. Zanbāʿ did indeed rise to the position

of deputy governor of Egypt for Ibrāhīm b. Ṣāliḥ in 176 (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 135). But 'Abdallāh b. Yazīd b. Rawḥ and Rajā' b. Salāma b. Rawḥ are known only as transmitters (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 374, 1831). The contrast between the sharifian descendants of Rawḥ b. Zanbā' with their popular and semi-tribal support on the one hand, and the upstart soldier Thābit b. Nu'aym with his Palestinian troops on the other, is perhaps the single most illuminating illustration of the Marwānid evolution (cf. Appendix IV, no. 34).

(10) *Simṭ b. al-Aswad al-Kindī.* Simṭ and his son Shuraḥbīl figure as staunch Muslims in the wars of the *ridda* (Ṭabarī, ser, i, pp. 2004f), and both distinguished themselves in the wars of conquest, the one in Syria and the other in Iraq (*ibid.*, pp. 2225, 2265 etc.; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 131, 137f, 145, 245). Simṭ settled in Ḥimṣ and Shuraḥbīl in Kufa, but when the latter came up against the rivalry of Ash'ath b. Qays al-Kindī, he left to join his father in Ḥimṣ (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 133f; cf. below, no. 21). Shuraḥbīl was a firm supporter of Mu'āwiya in the first civil war, and he is described as one of the most important men in Syria at the time (Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, *Waq'at Ṣiffīn*, pp. 49ff). Nonetheless he and his descendants seem to have lost out completely to Ḥusayn b. Numayr. There is virtually no information about them until the third civil war, though an Ibn al-Simṭ b. Shuraḥbīl is mentioned as having been in Iraq at the time of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab's revolt during which he was taken prisoner and apparently executed by the rebels (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 58; the reversal of the two names is commonplace). In 126, however, Simṭ b. Thābit b. Yazīd b. Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ came forward as the second leader of the revolt against Yazīd III side by side with Mu'āwiya b. Yazīd b. Ḥusayn b. Numayr with whom he is said to have been on bad terms (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1827f). Like his rival he received a great deal of honorific attention from Yazīd III after the revolt had been put down (*ibid.*, p. 1830), but unlike him he would appear to have found Marwān II no more to his liking, for he is said to have been crucified by him after participation in the Ḥimṣī revolt against him (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 485; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 404; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*); according to another version, however, he and his son were both crucified in the reign of Hārūn (*sic*), presumably for 'aṣabiyya (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, pp. 487f; cf. Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, p. 495; perhaps a later generation

of the family is intended). The B. al-Simṭ who took control of Ḥimṣ during the fourth civil war and its aftermath, were doubt-less descendants of this family (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, p. 541).

(11) *Yazīd b. Asad b. Kurẓ al-Qasrī.* Asad b. Kurz is said to have been now a runaway slave and now the chief of Bajīla, and his sharifian status is correspondingly uncertain (Gabrieli, *Il Califatto di Hishām*, pp. 6f). However this may be, Yazīd b. Asad, his son, settled in Syria, where he is said to have been a fervent 'Uthmānī throughout the first civil war (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2985, 3265; Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, *Waq'at Ṣiffīn*, pp. 49, 190, 271f etc). He commanded the Damascene troops in 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ' reconquest òf Egypt and conducted a summer campaign for Yazīd in 64 (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 226; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 319). 'Abdallāh b. Asad, his brother, conducted a similar campaign in 62 (*ibid.*, p. 288). 'Abdallāh b. Yazīd, his son, fought for Ibn al-Zubayr at Marj Rāhiṭ (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 794; differently Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 262); he also supported the revolt of 'Amr b. Sa'īd al-Ashdaq, fled to Muṣ'ab and eventually got *amān* from 'Abd al-Malik (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 794; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 138f, vol. v, pp. 299, 354). His two sons were among the most prominent men of the Marwānid period. Khālid b. 'Abdallāh was perhaps governor of Rayy in 83 (Gaube, *Numismatik*, p. 79); he was certainly governor of Mecca for Walīd from 89 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1199, 1231, 1305; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 400, 415, 428); and in 105 Hishām appointed him to Iraq, where he stayed for fifteen years, making vast profits, enthusing the Yemenis and indulging the Christians until he was dismissed and imprisoned in 120, harassed for a number of years, and finally sold to Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafī, his successor in office, who had him killed under torture in 126 (Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 328ff, 358f). Asad b. 'Abdallāh, his brother, was governor of Khurāsān in 116—9 and 117—20 (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v.). Several of his relatives were among the *Yamaniyya* of the third civil war. Yazīd b. Khālid fought on the side of Yazīd III, apparently as the head of his *shurṭa*, and led the Damascene revolt against Marwān II who had him executed (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 152; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1841f, 1878, 1893f). Muḥammad b. Khālid rebelled in Kufa in favour of the approaching Khurāsānī armies (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 18ff). Ismā'īl b. 'Abdallāh fled from Marwān to Iraq where he participated in the faction fighting between Qays and Yemen and became governor of Kufa for 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar

(*ibid.*, ser. ii, pp. 1881ff, 1902, ser. iii, p. 66; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 616). And Abū'l-Asad, a client of Khālid or more probably of Asad al-Qasrī under whom he had served in Khurāsān, was likewise among the soldiers of Yazīd III (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1630f, 1806f, 1841f, 1878f). After the revolution Muḥammad b. Khālid was governor of Mecca, Medina and Ṭā'if for Manṣūr (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 137, 141, 143, 161ff), while Ismā'īl b. 'Abdallāh became governor of Mosul and a member of Manṣūr's *ṣaḥāba* (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 178, 214f, 217; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 402). Yazīd b. Jarīr b. Yazīd b. Khālid b. 'Abdallāh al-Qasrī was governor of the Yemen for Ma'mūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 857, 863f).

(12) *Ziml al-'Udhrī* and *Ziml al-Saksakī*. These two Yemeni *ashrāf* have become somewhat mixed up in the sources. Ziml (Zāmil, Zumayl) b. 'Amr al-'Udhrī is said to have visited the Prophet with a delegation of 'Udhra (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 383). He settled in Gerasa (cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 478), fought for Mu'āwiya in the first civil war, and appears as one of the witnesses to the arbitration agreement of Ṣiffīn (*ibid.*, ser. i, p. 3338). Either he or his Saksakī namesake was head of Mu'āwiya's *shurṭa* (*ibid.*, ser. ii, p. 205; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 383). Yazīd I made him his secretary and also sent him to Ibn al-Zubayr along with the other *ashrāf* (Mas'ūdi, *Tanbīh*, p. 306 = 397; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 20). After Yazīd's death he was one of the men who gathered around Ḥassān b. Baḥdal at Jābiya and he fell at Marj Rāhiṭ (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 128; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 478). An Ibn Ziml al-'Udhrī is mentioned under 'Abd al-Malik, but the family would appear to have played no further role in politics (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 164). Mudlij b. Miqdād b. Ziml and Ḥārith b. Hāni' b. Mudlij b. Miqdād al-Zimlī were transmitters (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.v.* 'Mudliǧ b. Miqdād'; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. iii, p. 460; the Ibn Mudlij al-'Udhrī who is mentioned as having received property in Damascus at the time of the conquests by Ibn 'Asākir, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. ii, p. 126, was doubtless a member of this family).

Ziml b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saksakī was a *sharīf* from Bayt Lihya in the district of Damascus and the father of Ḍaḥḥak and 'Abbās (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. vii, p. 2; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 243 and *s.v.*). As mentioned already, he himself may have been head of Mu'āwiya's *shurṭa*. A son of his is found in the entourage of Mu'āwiya (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 49).

Daḥḥāk b. Ziml (commonly Ramal) was governor of the Yemen for Yazīd or Walīd II and an authority on Syrian affairs (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 552; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. vii, p. 3; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 15, 136). Ḥajjāj b. Ziml accompanied Marwān II on his flight from Syria, refusing to leave a man who had honoured him (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 136f).

Ibn 'Asākir notwithstanding, Zāmil b. 'Amr al-Ḥubrānī who was governor of Damascus for Marwān II, was not a member of either family (*Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 346; cf. Appendix IV, no. 82).

B. QINNASRĪN AND THE JAZĪRA

(13) *'Adī b. 'Amīra al-Kindī.* 'Adī was the head of Banū Arqam, a small branch of the Mu'āwiya al-Akramūn/Kinda who had gone to Kufa after the conquests, but who migrated to the Jazīra on the outbreak of the first civil war; here they settled in Edessa as adherents of Mu'āwiya, and 'Adī fought in the battle of Ṣiffīn on his side (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 295; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 205; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, s.v. "'Adī b. 'Amīra', cf. also table 237). Some remained in Kufa, where Arqam b. 'Abdallāh was among the followers of Ḥujr b. 'Adī al-Kindī (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, pp. 220, 228; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 136, 139, 144); but in the Jazīra 'Adī b. 'Adī b. 'Amīra appears in the rather different role of commander for Muḥammad b. Marwān, who sent him against the local Khārijite (Ṭabarī, ser. ii. pp. 887ff); he was also among the Jazīran soldiers who were called in to deal with Shabīb for Ḥajjāj in Iraq (*ibid.*, pp. 897, 899, 921); and finally he was governor of Armenia, Azerbayjan and the Jazīra at various times for Sulaymān and 'Umar II (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 205; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 426, 464; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, s.v. "'Adī b. 'Adī'). 'Urs b. Qays, who was the last of the family to leave Kufa, became governor of the Jazīra for Yazīd II (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 485; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, s.v.). Fā'id b. Muḥammad al-Kindī, who was likewise governor of the Jazīra for Yazīd II, was perhaps also a member of this family (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 485). There appears to be no further information on the family, but it is scarcely to be doubted that they could easily have joined the *Qaysiyya* despite their Yemeni genealogy.

(14) *Ḥātim b. al-Nu'mān al-Bāhilī.* Ḥātim was yet another Jazīran of Iraqi provenance. Having settled in Basra, he was exiled by 'Alī

and participated in the battle of Ṣiffīn on Muʿāwiya's side, where he appears under a variety of garbled names (Jāḥiẓ, 'Risāla fī'l-ḥakamayn', p. 428; Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. iii, p. 429; Naṣr b. Muzāhim, *Waqʿat Ṣiffīn*, pp. 207, 233; Hinds, 'Banners and Battle Cries', p. 26, cf. p. 24 where a Basran relative of his appears on ʿAlī's side). In the second civil war he was governor of Ḥarrān and Edessa for Ibn al-Ashtar (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 251; cf. also Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 137 and *s.v.*). ʿAbdallāh, his son, was governor of Armenia and Azerbayjan for Muḥammad b. Marwān in 85 (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 393; cf. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 205 where the chronology is wrong). ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, another son, participated in the feuds of Qays against Taghlib together with ʿUmayr b. al-Ḥubāb in the second civil war; later he was governor of the Jazīra, Armenia and Azerbayjan (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 323; *id.*, *Futūḥ*, p. 205; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 393, 426, 431, 464, 476; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1346; Ghevond, *Histoire*, p. 34; Movsēs Dasxuranċi, *History*, pp. 280f). ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Ḥātim joined the *Qaysiyya*; he was one of Marwān's commanders in the service of Ibn Hubayra (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 162).

(15) *Qaʿqāʿ b. Khulayd al-ʿAbsī.* This family would seem to have no Sufyānid history; they are first mentioned under ʿAbd al-Malik, who married Wallāda, the cousin of Qaʿqāʿ and mother of Walīd and Sulaymān (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 146). ʿAbd al-Malik (or Walīd) granted them the land near Qinnasrīn on which they were settled (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 146; Yāqūt, *Wörterbuch*, vol. ii, p. 373), and Qaʿqāʿ became the secretary of Walīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 837). Walīd b. al-Qaʿqāʿ, who was no doubt named after his caliphal kinsman, served in Armenia under Maslama and in Khurāsān under Junayd (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 206; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1529, 1550); in 119 he was back in Syria where he conducted a summer campaign and was appointed governor of Qinnasrīn by Hishām (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1593, 1783). ʿAbd al-Malik b. al-Qaʿqāʿ, who was similarly named after a caliphal kinsman, became governor of Ḥims (*ibid.*). The family got involved in several succession disputes. Qaʿqāʿ would appear to have supported Walīd's efforts to deprive Sulaymān of the succession, and his sons similarly supported Hishām's efforts to deprive Walīd II of the succession (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1312; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, vol. v, p. 198), but unlike their father they did not get away with it: on his accession Walīd sent Yazīd b. ʿUmar b. Hubayra as governor

of Qinnasrīn to seize the two brothers and torture them to death together with other members of the family (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1783). Thumāma b. al-Walīd b. al-Qaʿqāʿ survived to conduct summer campaigns for the ʿAbbāsids (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 447, 485, cf. p. 493; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 670, 685; Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 486; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 189). ʿUthmān b. Thumāma emerged as one of the local rulers of Syria in the Qinnasrīn area in the chaotic years after the fourth civil war (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 541; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 363; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, pp. 494, 507, 510 = vol. iii, pp. 27, 49, 53).

(16) *Rabīʿa b. ʿĀṣim al-ʿUqaylī.* Rabīʿa was a Basran *sharīf* who fell in the battle of the Camel in support of ʿĀʾisha (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3208); the family then emigrated to the Jazīra in the tracks of the Banū Arqam and Banū Ḥātim (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, s.v. 'Muslim b. Rabīʿa'; cf. also table 102). Muslim b. Rabīʿa fought with Zufar b. al-Ḥārith at Qarqīsiyāʾ (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 303), ʿAbd al-Malik b. Muslim was one of Maslama's commanders in Armenia and Azerbayjan (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 206), and perhaps also governor of Armenia for Marwān II (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, s.v.). Isḥāq b. Muslim similarly served in Armenia and Azerbayjan (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 206; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1635), and in 126 Marwān put him in charge of the Qays who were stationed at Bāb and/or appointed him governor of Armenia (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1871; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 209; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 564; Ghevond, *Histoire*, p. 113). In 128 he was in Mesopotamia with Marwān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1941; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 574f). In 132 he was back in his post as governor of Armenia, and it was from here that he set out to join the Mesopotamian revolt against the ʿAbbāsids (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 56ff; Walker, *Umaiyad Coins*, pp. 229f). The ʿAbbāsids pardoned him and he became one of the most influential members of Manṣūr's *ṣaḥāba* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 57f, 281). Bakkār b. Muslim, his brother, likewise joined the revolt and was presumably pardoned; he rebelled again with ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī and must have received a second pardon, for in 150 he was in Khurāsān campaigning against Ustādhsīs, and in 153 Manṣūr appointed him to Armenia (*ibid.*, pp. 57, 96, 356, 371). ʿĪsā b. Muslim, the third brother, appears among Marwān II's generals, but he does not seem to have survived into the ʿAbbāsid period (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1877, 1909). Muslim b. Bakkār b. Muslim is credited by sons with a campaign against a Khārijite in the Jazīra in 180 which others ascribe to

Saʿīd b. Salm b. Qutayba; in 177 he was head of the *shurṭa* of
Isḥāq b. Sulaymān in Egypt (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 645 (contrast
Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 728 and Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 291); Kindī,
Governors, p. 136).

(17) *'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī.* ʿUmar's title to sharifian status rests
on the claim that his maternal grandfather was chief of the B.ʿAdī
(Ibn Qutayba, *Maʿārif*, p. 179), but nothing is heard of his family
until he appears as a general under the Marwānids. He served
under Sufyān b. al-Abrad al-Kalbī in Iraq in 77, and participated
in Maslama's expedition to Constantinople in 97–8 (Ṭabarī, ser.
ii, pp. 973, 996, 1306, 1315; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 423, 425;
Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 453 = vol. ii, p. 484).
ʿUmar II or Yazīd II appointed him to the Jazīra in 100 or 102
(Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1349; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 16), and Yazīd II
appointed him to Iraq and Khurāsān in 102 or 103; he was dis-
missed in 105, put to torture, but freed on paying up (Ṭabarī, ser.
ii, pp. 1433f, 1467f; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 85). Yazīd b.
ʿUmar, his son, was governor of Qinnasrīn for Walīd II (Ṭabarī,
ser. ii, p. 1783), and he was one of the *wujūh* of Qays who joined
Marwān II when the latter came to Syria (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p.
564; Azdi, *Mawṣil*, p. 61). Marwān appointed him to Iraq where
he was killed by the ʿAbbāsids in 132 after the famous siege of
Wāsiṭ (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1913ff, ser. iii, pp. 61ff; Miles, *The
Numismatic History of Rayy*, pp. 18f; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp.
550f). Dāwūd b. Yazīd, who was with his father at Wāsiṭ, and
Muthannā b. Yazīd, who was governor of the Yamāma for his
father, were likewise killed (Ibn Qutayba, *Maʿārif*, p. 179;
Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 69). Mukhallad b. Yazīd, however, survived in
Syria where he is said to have had much influence and many sons
(Ibn Qutayba, *Maʿārif*, p. 179). One of them, Yazīd b. al-
Mukhallad, was governor of Tarsus for ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ,
but the Khurāsānī soldiers could not bear his *Hubayriyya* and drove
him out (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 170); later he commanded summer
campaigns against the Byzantines, and he fell on such a campaign
in 191 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 709, 712; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 738).

(18) *'Umayr b. al-Ḥubāb al-Sulamī.* ʿUmayr was a Qaysī from the
Balīkh area in Mesopotamia who participated in the conquest of
an Armenian fortress in 59 (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 314;
id., Futūḥ, p. 184). He is better known for his role in the second
civil war. Having paid homage to ʿAbd al-Malik after the battle
of Marj Rāhiṭ, he fought under ʿUbaydallāh b. Ziyād against the

Tawwābūn and Ibn al-Ashtar, considered deserting to the Iraqis, but opted for joining Zufar b. al-Ḥārith at Qarqīsiyā', where he organized raids on Kalb, started the wars with the Taghlib and acquired a reputation as one of the mightiest men of the day (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 707ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 248f, 268, 308, 313ff, 345). Despite this display of tribal valour, his brother and his sons all appear as generals. Tamīm b. al-Ḥubāb was sent to Kufa under Yazīd II to assist in the campaigns against the Khārijites (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1376; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 7). Dhufāfa and Khālid b. 'Umayr both served under Maslama in Armenia, and Khālid also participated in Maslama's campaign against Constantinople (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 206; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 84). No members of the third generation appear to be known (though a rebel in Aghlabid North Africa counted 'Umayr among his ancestors (Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, p. 148)). They ought to have been among the *Qaysiyya*.

(19) *Zufar b. al-Ḥārith al-Kilābī.* Zufar was yet another Iraqi *sharīf* who migrated to the Jazīra in the first civil war. He had settled in Basra (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 376) and commanded the B. Āmir (b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa) in the battle of the Camel for 'Ā'isha (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3179, 3208f, 3216; the Ḥarīth b. Yazīd al-'Āmirī who appears on p. 2479 as a participant in the conquest of Hīt and Qarqīsiyā' is doubtless meant to be his father). His is credited with the usual combination of participation in the battle of Ṣiffīn (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 222), a journey to Ibn al-Zubayr under Yazīd I (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 20), and a command in Muslim b. 'Uqba's expedition to the Ḥijāz (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 299). On the death of Yazīd I he gave allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr, and may or may not have fought the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv, b, p. 59; vol. v, pp. 132, 140). After the battle, however, he fled to Qarqīsiyā' where he fortified himself against 'Abd al-Malik until eventually a *ṣulḥ* was brought about between them (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 69, 145, 157f; vol. v, pp. 140f, 301; vol. xi, pp. 24f). Back in Qinnasrīn Zufar was the neighbour of Maslama who owned a castle at Naʿūra (Yāqūt, *Wörterbuch*, vol. iv, p. 732), and Maslama married one of Zufar's daughters while Hudhayl b. Zufar became a general in Maslama's service (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 307; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1402). Zufar's family were considered to be the very incarnation of *Qaysiyya* (cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1300, 1455), and they were certainly among the followers of Marwān II; Kawthar

b. Zufar was his governor of Marʿash (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 189), while Majzaʾa b. al-Kawthar Abūʾl-Ward and Wathīq b. Hudhayl b. Zufar were among the *wujūh* of Qays who joined him on his arrival in Syria (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 564; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 61). Majzaʾa is described as one of Marwān's *aṣḥāb, quwwād* and *fursān* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 52); he served Marwān in Syria (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1894), submitted to the ʿAbbāsids after Marwān's defeat, but was later brought to revolt when an ʿAbbāsid general was settled among the descendants of Maslama at Naʿūra (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 52ff; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubda*, vol. i, pp. 53ff).

C. IRAQ

(20) *ʿAbbād b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ḥabaṭī.* ʿAbbād appears to have no pre-Islamic history. He is first mentioned in Basra at the time of Muʿāwiya, when he accompanied ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Samura to Sīstān as the head of the latter's *shurṭa* (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 396). In 64 he participated in the tribal feuds in Basra as the leader of the B. ʿAmr b. Tamīm for Aḥnaf (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 112, where Ḥanẓalī is doubtless to be emended to Ḥabaṭī; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 108; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 453f). In the Zubayrid period he was twice head of the *shurṭa*, participated in the campaign against Mukhtār, fought against the pro-Umayyad *Jufriyya*, and became deputy governor of Basra for Muṣʿab on the latter's departure for Maskin (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 681, 720ff, 725, 733ff, 738f, 748f, 807; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 155f, 159f). At Rustaqābādh he was loyal to Ḥajjāj, but in decrepit old age he sided with Ibn al-Ashʿath and fled to Kābul where he was killed (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 289, 343; Ibn Qutayba, *Maʿārif*, p. 182). Jahdam, his son, who similarly joined Ibn al-Ashʿath, was executed by Ḥajjāj (Ibn Qutayba, *Maʿārif*, p. 182). Miswar b. ʿAbbād (or b. ʿUmar b. ʿAbbād) participated in the suppression of the revolt of the Muhallabids in 101 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1383). In 126 he was head of the *shurṭa* and/or *aḥdāth* in Basra for Ibn ʿUmar, but he was dismissed by ʿAmr b. Suhayl, Ibn ʿUmar's deputy, whereupon a *fitna* broke out which lasted till the arrival of Ibn Hubayra (*ibid.*, p. 1875; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 185). Ibn Hubayra at first chose Miswar as his civilian deputy in Basra, but he later had to cancel the appointment in favour of a *qāḍī*, with whose appointment the tumults seem to have come to an end (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 615). A son of Miswar

by the name of 'Abbād is listed by Ibn al-Kalbī, but nobody seems
to have anything to say about him (*Ğamhara*, table 81).

(21) *Ash'ath b. Qays al-Kindī.* Ash'ath, who founded one of the best
known sharifian houses in Iraq, was chief of the B. Mu'āwiya al-
Akramūn in South Arabia, where he is said to have been among
the most influential men of the B. Ḥārith/Kinda (Ibn al-Kalbī,
Ğamhara, s.v. 'Ma'dikarib b. Qais'). After a number of pre-Islamic
exploits, conversion and a celebrated apostasy, he joined the wars
of conquest and settled in Kufa where he soon acquired the leader-
ship of Kinda: Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ, his rival, withdrew from the
contest and went to Syria (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 135f; cf. above,
no. 10). Under 'Alī he was governor of Armenia and Azerbayjan,
and he fought on his side at Ṣiffīn, where his performance earned
him the everlasting hatred of the Shī'ites (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2],
s.v. 'al-Ash'ath b. Ḳays'). He married in accordance with his status:
one of his wives was a sister of Abū Bakr (*ibid.*), and he gave two
daughters as wives to the family of 'Uthmān (Ibn al-Kalbī,
Ğamhara, s.vv. 'Ḥabbāna' and 'Qarība bint Ma'dikarib').

The next generation is represented by Qays and Muḥammad,
both of whom held the leadership of Kinda after their father's death
(*ibid., s.v.* 'Muḥammad b. Ma'dikarib'; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 386).
Qays b. al-Ash'ath commanded the *rub'* of Kinda and Rabī'a
at Karbalā' (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 326), and Muḥammad b. al-
Ash'ath was one of the witnesses against Ḥujr b. 'Adī (Balādhurī,
Ansāb, vol. iv a, p. 221); he was also governor of Ṭabaristān for
'Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād and of Mosul for Ibn al-Zubayr (Balādhurī,
Futūḥ, p. 325; *id., Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 229). He fled to Muṣ'ab
after Mukhtār's take-over of Kufa and fell in battle against the
latter at Ḥarūrā' (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 241, 259f). His
daughter was married to 'Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād (*ibid.*, vol. iv b,
p. 83).

With the third generation we reach the period in which the
tribal chiefs begin to give way to generals. Muḥammad's sons all
appear as commanders in the old *muqātila*; Isḥaq fought against
the *Azāriqa* in western Persia and Ṭabaristān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp.
857, 1018); Qāsim and Ṣabbāḥ similarly fought in Ṭabaristān
(Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 324); and 'Abd al-Raḥmān was
sent against Shabīb in Iraq and against the local ruler in Sīstān
(Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 930, 1042ff). But the campaigns were all to
the discredit of their commanders; Isḥāq deserted from the wars
against the *Azāriqa*; it was Syrians who finally dealt with

Shabīb; it was similarly Syrians who provided the backbone of the army in Ṭabaristān; and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's expedition to Sīstān culminated in the spectacular revolt which meant the definitive reduction of the old *muqātila* to a local police force (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 857ff, 1018ff; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*², s.v. ʿIbn al-Ashʿath'). Thereafter the *Ashāʿitha* never played any major role in politics. Two became rebels: Muḥammad b. Isḥāq and ʿUthmān b. Isḥāq both joined the revolt of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1397, 1411). Four were satisfied with a modest role in the local politics of Kufa: Mundhir b. Muḥammad commanded the division of Kinda and Rabīʿa in the old *muqātila* against Zayd b. ʿAlī in Kufa in 126; Ṭalḥa b. Isḥāq b. Muḥammad was deputy governor of Kufa in 137; Isḥāq b. al-Ṣabbāḥ b. ʿImrān b. Ismāʿīl b. Muḥammad was likewise governor of Kufa between 156 and 159 and for three months under Hārūn; and Faḍl b. Muḥammad b. al-Ṣabbāḥ was briefly appointed to the same office by the supporters of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī in 202 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1702; ser. iii, pp. 92, 465f, 1019, 1022; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 695, 744; Miles, *Rare Islamic Coins*, p. 117). One seems to have become a Shīʿite: Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath, the tenth-century Kufan who transmitted *Ashʿathiyyāt* in Egypt, was presumably a member of the *Ashāʿitha* (Madelung, 'Sources' pp. 33f). And one consoled himself with the pursuit of abstract truth: Yaʿqūb b. Isḥāq b. al-Ṣabbāḥ b. ʿImrān b. Ismāʿīl b. Muḥammad is better known as al-Kindī, the philosopher of the Arabs (Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 255 = 615; for other members of the family, see Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 816; Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. iii, p. 82).

(22) *Dhūʾ l-Ghuṣṣa al-Ḥārithī.* Ḥusayn b. Yazīd Dhūʾ l-Ghuṣṣa was a chief of Baʾl-Ḥārith in the Yemen, where he fell in a tribal war with the Murād (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara, s.v.*). Shihāb b. al-Ḥusayn avenged his father (*ibid., s.v.*), ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn inherited his chieftainship (*ibid., s.v.*), and Qays b. al-Ḥusayn is credited with a visit to the Prophet who gave him the chieftainship (Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol. v, p. 528). Having settled in Kufa, the family supplied *ashrāf* for the Sufyānid set-up. Kathīr b. Shihāb b. al-Ḥusayn appears as the head of Madhḥij and one of the *ruʾūs al-Yamaniyya* who bore witness against Ḥujr in 51 (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara, s.v.*; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, pp. 218, 221), and in 60 he was one of the men who were sent with their following to dissuade the adherents of Muslim b. ʿAqīl from rebellion (Ṭabarī,

ser. ii, pp. 256ff). He was also governor of Rayy for Ziyād b. Abīhi (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 136). Qaṭan b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn, his cousin who likewise appears among the witnesses against Ḥujr, was governor of Azerbayjan for Ziyād (*ibid.*, pp. 136, 221); he commanded the division of Asad and Madhḥij at Maskin as a lukewarm supporter of Musʿab, and briefly held the office of governor in Kufa after ʿAbd al-Malik's victory (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 341, 344, 351, 354).

With the fourth generation we reach the Marwānid period and the family begins to recede. ʿUthmān b. Qaṭan was one of the men who remained loyal to Ḥajjāj when the army mutinied at Rustaqābādh in 75 (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 284f); he fell in 76 against Shabīb (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 911, 919, 929ff). Khālid b. Qaṭan, his brother, joined the revolt of ʿAbdallāh b. Muʿāwiya in 127 (*ibid.*, p. 1880). Muḥammad b. Zuhra b. al-Ḥārith b. Qays b. Kathīr b. Shihāb was greatly esteemed in the time of Rashīd, under whom he held a minor administrative office (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*)

(23) *Ḥārith b. ʿAmr al-Riyāḥī.* Qaʿnab b. ʿAttāb b. al-Ḥārith seems to be the earliest member of this family to have been equipped with a history: the *fāris* of the B. Yarbūʿ, he died in the early sixth century A.D. (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 986; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*). Other members appear in the armies of conquest: ʿAttāb b. Nuʿaym and Nuʿaym b. ʿAmr fought at Qādisiyya, while Warqāʾ b. al-Ḥārith and Ḥabīb b. Qurra were among the conquerors of Tustar (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2307, 2554f; compare Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 68). The family settled in Kufa where little is heard about them in the Sufyānid period. Ḥurr b. Yazīd, however, commanded the division of Tamīm and Hamdān at Karbalāʾ, where he is said to have deserted the Ḥusayn (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 326). In the Zubayrid period ʿAttāb b. Warqāʾ was governor of Isfahan (*ibid.*, pp. 762ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 118). He fought half-heartedly for Musʿab at Maskin and was later one of the many Kufans who campaigned unsuccessfully against the *Azāriqa* and Shabīb (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 341, 344; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 878, 940ff). Khālid b. ʿAttāb who also fought against Shabīb was governor of Madāʾin and Rayy for Ḥajjāj; he had been one of the drinking companions of Bishr (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 961, 965f, 1002, 1069; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 172).

The subsequent history of the family is one of discontent and disappearance. Abrad b. Qurra, who had known better days under

Muṣ'ab, joined the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath, while Ḥanẓala b. 'Attāb supported that of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 773f, 1076, 1397). There was, however, a branch of the family in Khurāsān. Ḥabīb b. Qurra had been governor of Balkh for 'Uthmān in 29 (*ibid.*, ser. i, p. 2831), Abrad b. Qurra had married off a daughter to a Khurāsānī soldier (*ibid.*, ser. ii, 1691), and Samharī b. Qa'nab who was with Junayd in Khurāsān was presumably a member of the same family (*ibid.*, p. 1530). Perhaps it was also in Khurāsān that 'Attāb b. Warqā' had acquired his *Shākiriyya* (*ibid.*, p. 965). Here, at all events, 'Abbād b. al-Abrad and Abrad b. Dāwūd appear among the generals of Naṣr b. Sayyār in the struggle against Ḥārith b. Surayj and in the faction fighting towards the end of the Marwānid period (*ibid.*, pp. 1917f, 1921).

(24) *Ḥudayn b. al-Mundhir al-Shaybānī.* Ḥudayn b. al-Mundhir was a minor *sharīf* in Basra who is said to have fought for 'Alī in the first civil war as a young man endowed with *ḥasab*, and even to have commanded the Basran Bakr b. Wā'il in the battle of Ṣiffīn (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3312; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 221; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 182). His brother would appear to have settled in Kufa (cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 223). Though a number of stories play up his standing in Basra, Ḥudayn was clearly a less impressive figure than Shaqīq b. Thawr or Mālik b. Misma', the major Bakrī chiefs (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3414, ser. ii, pp. 434f; cf. below, nos. 28 and 32), and it was perhaps for this reason that he chose to go to Khurāsān where he is found under Yazīd b. al-Muhallab and Qutayba and where he was the head of the Bakr b. Wā'il in 96 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1141f, 1289f, 1291). His son accordingly had a very different career from that of the *ashrāf* who stayed in Iraq. While the descendants of Shaqīq and Mālik were reduced to mere subjects of Ḥajjāj and his Syrian troops, Yaḥyā b. Ḥudayn became a general who commanded the Bakrī division in the Khurāsānī army, participated in the wars of conquest, fought against Ḥārith b. Surayj, came up for nomination to the governorship of Khurāsān, and joined the faction fighting of the late Umayyad period (*ibid.*, pp. 1445, 1571f, 1577, 1581, 1609, 1660, 1662, 1692, 1865, 1921). On the outbreak of the revolution he joined Ibn Hubayra and the Syrian troops in Iraq, where he was among those who claimed to have killed Qaḥṭaba and where he is met for the last time, besieged by the 'Abbāsid troops in Wāsiṭ (*ibid.*, ser. iii, pp. 15, 62f). Mujāhid b. Yaḥyā

b. Ḥudayn, a close companion of Naṣr b. Sayyār, was caught and killed by Abū Muslim (*ibid.*, ser. ii, p. 1995). 'Ubaydallāh b. Yaḥyā b. Ḥudayn joined the revolt of Ibrāhīm b. 'Abdallāh, the 'Alid in Basra in 145 (*ibid.*, ser. iii, pp. 290, 299).

(25) *'Imrān b. al-Faḍīl al-Burjumī.* What little is known of this family illustrates the same contrast between Iraq and Khurāsān as seen above, no. 24. 'Imrān b. al-Faḍīl (or Faṣīl) al-Burjumī participated in the conquest of eastern Iran in 29, settled in Basra, and set out for Khurāsān with Salm b. Ziyād in 61 (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2830f, ser. ii, pp. 392f). One of his sons, Hudhayl b. 'Imrān, stayed in Basra where he was the drinking companion of Bishr, and where he came up against Ḥajjāj; he mutinied against him at Rustaqābādh and was executed in 75 (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 178, vol. xi, pp. 279ff, 286, 291f). Another son, however, must have gone to Khurāsān, for Bishr b. Bisṭām b. 'Imrān appears as a soldier there under Naṣr b. Sayyār in 128; a Marwānid loyalist, he joined the Syrian troops of Ibn Ḍubāra at Isfahan to fight against Qaḥṭaba in 131 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1918, 1991, ser. iii, p. 5). The Rabī' b. 'Imrān al-Tamīmī, who converted Transoxania with Abū'l-Ṣaydā' in 110 (*ibid.*, ser. ii, pp. 1507f), was probably yet another son of this *sharīf*.

(26) *Jarīr b. 'Abdallāh al-Bajalī.* Jarīr is presented as the head of the B. Ḥazīma of Qasr and the rival of Asad b. Kurz in the *Jāhiliyya*, and he is celebrated as an early convert, a participant in the wars of conquest and the unifier of his scattered tribe in the time of Islam (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, *s.v.* 'Ğarīr b. 'Abdallāh'; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*', *s.v.* 'Badjīla'). He settled in Kufa, where he would seem to have been the leader of one of the sevenths at the time of the Ḥujr affair, and where his son Bashīr b. Jarīr led Bajīla in the sharifian revolt against Mukhtār (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 215; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 652, 656). Even in its reconstituted form, however, Bajīla was not a very important tribe and the family scarcely found it hard to exchange their sharifian role for one of loyal assistants to the Syrian governors in Iraq. Bishr b. Jarīr fought the Azāriqa among the *ahl al-Madīna* in 74 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 857); Ziyād b. Jarīr was head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* and deputy governor of Kufa for several years, and he retained this office under Ḥajjāj's successor (*ibid.*, pp. 1182, 1191, 1208, 1266; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 410, 414, 427); Khālid b. Jarīr fought against Ibn al-Ash'ath with Kufan recruits originally destined for Khurāsān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1099); and Muḥammad b. Jarīr was sent against Khārijites

in 100f (*ibid.*, pp. 1348, 1375). There is little change in this pat-
tern in the next generation except for an involvement with the
Syrian *Yamaniyya*. Muḥammad b. Ziyād b. Jarīr was governor of
Baḥrayn for Khālid al-Qasrī (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 538); Ibrāhīm
b. 'Abdallāh b. Jarīr commanded the *ahl al-Madīna* in the old army
against Zayd in 126 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1702); Jarīr b. Yazīd b.
Jarīr was deputy governor of Basra for Manṣūr ·b. Jumhūr and he
also appears briefly in the service of Manṣūr (*ibid.*, ser. ii, p. 1837,
ser. iii, p. 104; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 559). 'Abbās b. Jarīr b. Yazīd
b. Jarīr b. 'Abdallāh al-Bajalī was briefly governor of Armenia for
Hārūn (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 516). And yet another Jarīr b.
Yazīd was governor of Basra for Hārūn and of the Yemen for Amīn
(Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 740; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 528), but it
is not clear whether he is a descendant of Jarīr or of Khālid al-
Qasrī (compare above, no. 11).

(27) *Jārūd b. 'Amr al-'Abdī.* Jārūd appears as one of the leaders of 'Abd
al-Qays at the time of the death of the Prophet; he is credited with
a visit to the latter, a refusal to join the *ridda*, and participation in
the wars of conquest in the course of which he fell in Fars in about
20 (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara, s.v.* 'Bišr b. 'Amr al-Ğārūd'; Ṭabarī, ser. i,
pp. 1958ff, 2699). His family settled in Basra. Here Mundhir b.
al-Jārūd became one of the more distinguished *ashrāf* of the
Sufyānid period; he had already been governor of Istakhr for 'Alī
(Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 240), and he now became head of a
khums (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 240), governor of Qandābīl or Hind
(Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 287; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 434), and father-in-
law of the Umayyads: one of his daughters married 'Ubaydallāh
b. Ziyād, another 'Abd al-'Azīz b. 'Abdallāh b. Khālid b. Asīd
(Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 78, 164). It is thus not surprising
that Ḥakam b. al-Mundhir b. al-Jārūd joined the pro-Umayyad
Jufriyya in Basra in the second civil war (*ibid.*, p. 162).

Under the Marwānids, however, the family displayed many
signs of disaffection. 'Abdallāh b. al-Jārūd instigated the mutiny
against Ḥajjāj at Rustaqābādh (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp.
280ff); Bishr b. al-Mundhir and 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. al-Mundhir
both joined the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1106,
1109, 1125; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 343, where the names
are slightly different). And Jayfar (or Jafīr) b. al-Ḥakam (or Ḥakīm)
al-'Abdī and his son Mundhir, the Shī'ite traditionists, were
perhaps also members of this family (Najāshī, *Kitāb al-rijāl*,
pp. 95, 297; Sprenger, *Túsy's List of Shy'ah Books*, pp. 79, 338f.

I owe both references to Professor W. Madelung). Ziyād b. al-Mundhir, who participated in Zayd's revolt and founded the Zaydī *Jārūdiyya*, was clearly taken to be a member of this family by some, for he sometimes appears with the *nisba* al-ʿAbdī (thus Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 178 = 443; Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, vol. v, p. 474); but the consensus is that he was a Hamdānī (Van Arendonk, *Débuts*, p. 282; drawn to my attention by Professor Madelung); Mālik b. al-Mundhir, however, kept a clean record. He fought against Mukhtār as the leader of the ʿAbd al-Qays under Musʿab, similarly commanded the ʿAbd al-Qays against Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, and later became the head of Khālid al-Qasrī's *shurṭa* (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 253, 259; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1831, 1837, 1487). Ashʿath b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Jārūd was governor of Baḥrayn for Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, but apparently stayed out of the revolt (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 430). Under the ʿAbbāsids another two members of the family appear in similarly modest roles. ʿAbdallāh b. Sulaymān b. al-Mundhir was governor of Baḥrayn for Abūʾl-ʿAbbās (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 632), and Mundhir b. Muḥammad al-Jārūdī commanded a thousand Basran volunteers in ʿAbd al-Malik b. Shihāb al-Mismaʿī's expedition to Hind in 159 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 461; cf. below, no. 28). There was also one who took to scholarship: ʿAbdallāh b. Sulaymān b. Yūsuf b. Yaʿqūb b. al-Mundhir was known as a traditionist (Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. vii, p. 443).

(28) *Mismaʿ b. Shihāb al-Shaybānī.* Jaḥdar b. Ḍubayʿa, the legendary ancestor of the *Masāmiʿa*, is one of the heroes in the story of the war of Basūs (*Aghānī*, vol. v, pp. 37, 41, 43, 46). Mismaʿ himself appears in the *ridda* in which apparently he fell (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 84; Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 1971). Three of his sons are found in Basra. Mālik b. Mismaʿ is said to have commanded the Bakr b. Wāʾil in the battle of the Camel for ʿĀʾisha (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3179), to have protected Marwān after the battle (*ibid.*, pp. 3220f), and to have joined Muʿāwiya in Syria (*ibid.*, ser. ii, pp. 765f), all of which is proffered in explanation of the later Marwānid sympathies of the family. Whatever his activities in the first civil war, he emerged as one of the most prominent men in Basra in the second, when he negotiated the *ḥilf* with the recently arrived Azd, took a leading role in the tribal debacle of 64, and definitively usurped the *riyāsa* from the family of Shaqīq b. Thawr (*ibid.*, pp. 448ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 105ff; cf. below no. 32). Under Musʿab he commanded the *khums* of Bakr against Mukhtār, sided

with the pro-Marwānid *Jufriyya* in 71, and fled to Yamāma after its failure; he returned to Basra after Muṣʿab's death and died shortly afterwards, amply rewarded by ʿAbd al-Malik (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 720, 726, 799ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 156ff, 160ff, 165). His two brothers are much less heard of. Muqātil b. Mismaʿ is said to have encouraged Mālik to protect Marwān after the battle of Camel, but he is nonetheless listed among ʿAlī's commanders at Ṣiffīn (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3220f; Hinds, 'Banners and Battle Cries', p. 24). Under Muṣʿab he commanded the infantry against Mukhtār at Harūrā', and after ʿAbd al-Malik's victory he was appointed to Ardashīr Khurrah by Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh. He fell in battle against the Khārijites in 72 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 725, 822f, 825; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 168; cf. Gaube, *Numismatik*, p. 70). ʿĀmir or ʿAmr b. Mismaʿ was appointed to Sābūr by Khālid (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 822, cf. p. 460). According to Khalīfa he was also head of the *shurṭa* in Basra for Ḥajjāj, which is doubtless a confusion with ʿAbdallāh b. ʿĀmir (*Taʾrīkh*, p. 410; cf. below).

The next generation is represented by three cousins. Mismaʿ b. Mālik b. Mismaʿ was governor of Fasā and Dārābjird for Khālid in 72 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 822); he was loyal to Ḥajjāj at Rustaqābādh (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 286, 288) and died as governor of Sīstān in 86 (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 387; Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 283 = 93; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 118). ʿAbdallāh b. ʿĀmir b. Mismaʿ was head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* in Basra, but nonetheless joined the revolt of Ibn al-Ashʿath much to Ḥajjāj's disappointment (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1062, 1065; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 343, 346). Ziyād b. Muqātil b. Mismaʿ was killed either at Rustaqābādh or in the revolt of Ibn al-Ashʿath, probably the latter, but either way on the side of the rebels (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 302, 345, 351; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1066f). Thereafter the family remained loyal. Nūḥ b. Shaybān b. Mālik b. Mismaʿ commanded the *rubʿ* of Bakr b. Wā'il against the Muhallabids in Basra; Mālik b. Mismaʿ and ʿAbd al-Malik b. Mismaʿ were both executed by the Muhallabids; ʿImrān b. ʿĀmir b. Mismaʿ is said to have joined the rebels, but the passage is garbled (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1381f (where the Yazīd in question would seem originally to have been the caliph), 1396; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 471). But they also lost greatly in importance. Under ʿUmar II ʿAbd al-Malik b. Mismaʿ was admittedly governor of Sind for a short while, and Sarī b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿĀṣim b. Mismaʿ governor of

Sīstān (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 463; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 284 = 94).
But their activities scarcely mattered in the power politics of the
Syrians and the Khurāsānīs: Misma' b. Muḥammad b. Shaybān
b. Mālik b. Misma' is noted in passing to have been an adherent
of Marwān in the third civil war; that is all (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 224).
And when 'Abd al-Malik b. Shihāb al-Misma'ī emerged on the
public scene in 159 it was precisely as a commander of the losers:
he was sent to India with a motley army of Asāwira, Sayābija, local
Syrians and Basran volunteers; they conquered Bārbad with much
recitation of the Koran and returned in 160, decimated by gales
and disease (*ibid.*, pp. 460f, 476f). 'Abd al-Malik went to India
again in 161 as the deputy of the new governor, but the governor-
ship was cancelled and he had to go home (*ibid.*, p. 491). 'Āmir
b. 'Abd al-Malik was an authority on Jaḥdar's exploits in the wars
of Basūs (*Aghānī*, vol. v, pp. 37, 42ff; cf. Sezgin, *Geschichte*, vol. i,
p. 265, where he is wrongly placed in the Umayyad period).

(29) *Rib'ī b. 'Āmir al-Riyāḥī.* According to Sayf, Rib'ī was made head
of his Ḥanẓalī following by 'Umar on the eve of the conquests
(Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2188); he participated in the conquest of Syria,
crossed over to Iraq after the fall of Damascus (*ibid.*, p. 2154;
differently p. 2188f), distinguished himself in the conquest of Iraq
and Persia and settled in Kufa together with his son Shabath (*ibid.*,
pp. 2269f, 2294, 2479, 2554, 2569, 2619, 2683). Shabath was
a man of much religious enthusiasm; he began as a follower of Sajāḥ,
the prophetess, continued as an adherent of 'Alī, went on to become
a Khārijite, and is soon after found as a fervent ex-Khārijite
(*ibid.*, pp. 1919, 3270ff, 3349, 3380, 3388; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*,
p. 100). None of this, however, prevented him from inheriting the
chieftainship from his father (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2188f), and in Kufa
he dutifully bore witness against Ḥujr (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a,
p. 221), commanded the infantry at Karbalā' despite an earlier
involvement with Ḥusayn (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 325f), combated the
Khārijites (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 140), and joined the
opponents of Mukhtār (*ibid.*, vol. v, pp. 218, 224, 226f, 232,
234f). After the death of Mukhtār he was head of the *shurṭa* in
Kufa (*ibid.*, pp. 274f). 'Abd al-Mu'min b. Shabath would appear to
have fought on the side of Mukhtār (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 654), and
later he was certainly one of the rebels with Ibn al-Ash'ath (*ibid.*,
p. 1054). Ḥātim b. al-Sharqī b. 'Abd al-Mu'min b. Shabath was
apparently a local notable; 'Abdallāh b. Mu'āwiya married one of his
daughters (*ibid.*, p. 1880). Azhar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Shabath lived

as a poet in Sīstān in the early 'Abbāsid period (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*).

(30) *Ruwaym b. 'Abdallāh al-Shaybānī.* Ruwaym seems to be remembered primarily for the circumstance that a daughter of his was the mother of Jārūd b. 'Amr (Khalīfa, *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 61; cf. above, no. 27). Yazīd b. Ruwaym is said to have seen the rise of Islam (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*). His descendants settled in Kufa. Ruwaym b. al-Ḥārith (b. Ruwaym) appears as the commander of the Kufans at Ṣiffīn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 221). 'Adī b. al-Ḥārith b. Ruwaym was governor of Bahurasīr for 'Alī (Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 163). Yazīd b. al-Ḥārith b. Ruwaym was among the *ashrāf* who bore witness against Ḥujr (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 221), invited Ḥusayn to Kufa (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 235), and fought against Mukhtār (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 207, 218, 224, 226, 232); he was governor of Madā'in and Rayy for Muṣ'ab (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 775f, 817; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 118); according to some he was also appointed to Rayy by 'Abd al-Malik, but according to others 'Abd al-Malik appointed Ḥawshab, his son (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 354). Ḥawshab, who had also fought against Mukhtār, was head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* in Kufa and his deputy governor there for some years (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 735, 918, 1127, cf. pp. 966, 1121). Khirāsh b. Ḥawshab was similarly head of Yūsuf b. 'Umar's *shurṭa* in Kufa in 122 (*ibid.*, p. 1715, cf. p. 1774), and finally Thumāma b. Ḥawshab was head of Manṣūr b. Jumhūr's *shurṭa*, apparently in Wāsiṭ (*ibid.*, p. 1850). A *qā'id* of the Ruwaym family also appears in the entourage of Khālid al-Qasrī (*ibid.*, p. 1625). 'Awāmm b. Ḥawshab and Shihāb b. Khirāsh b. Ḥawshab were traditionists in Wāsiṭ (Ibn Ḥibbān, *'Ulamā'*, p. 176; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. vi, p. 342).

(31) *Sa'īd b. Qays al-Hamdānī.* Sa'īd was supposedly a descendant of one of the kings of Ḥimyar (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*), and he was certainly one of the major *ashrāf* in Kufa (cf. Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3371). He participated in the wars of conquest (*ibid.*, p. 2619), became governor of Hamadhān and Rayy under 'Uthmān (*ibid.*, pp. 2927f, 3058), commanded the Kufan seventh of Ḥimyar and Hamdān for 'Alī in the battle of the Camel and at Ṣiffīn, and led another campaign for 'Alī in 39 (Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 155; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 221; Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3446). Under the Sufyānids he appears as one of the *ru'ūs al-Yamaniyya* (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 218). 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Sa'īd was appointed to Mosul by Mukhtār at the time of the uneasy alliance between the

rebel and the nobles, but he later rebelled against Mukhtār together
with the other *ashrāf* and fell in the attempt to recover control of
Kufa (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 620, 631, 635, 643f, 650f, 656, 659).
The majority of Mukhtār's adherents, however, were drawn from
'Abd al-Raḥmān's own tribe of Hamdān (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 614,
665f). There was thus scarcely any *riyāsa* for Muḥammad b.
'Abd al-Raḥmān to inherit, and he and his friend Ibn al-Ash'ath
are said to have been merciless in their treatment of the prisoners
they took when eventually Kufa was reconquered (*ibid.*, p. 740).
Muḥammad's subsequent career followed the usual pattern. He
fought halfheartedly for Mus'ab at Maskin (*ibid.*, pp. 807, cf. p.
804), commanded the *rub'* of Tamīm and Hamdān in the wars
against the Azāriqa and deserted on the news of the death of Bishr
(*ibid.*, pp. 857, 859). In 77 he commanded the right wing in
'Attāb b. Warqā's army against Shabīb; he showed much valour,
but was defeated, and as he and Ibn al-Ash'ath walked home on
foot with their faces covered in dirt, even a Khārijite could feel
sorry for them (*ibid.*, pp. 949, 952, 955). Jarīr b. Hāshim b.
Sa'īd b. Qays joined Ibn al-Ash'ath's rebellion (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*,
vol. xi, p. 340).

(32) *Shaqīq b. Thawr al-Sadūsī.* This family does not appear to have
remembered or acquired a pre-Islamic history; Shaqīq b. Thawr
is first met with as the leader of Sadūs in the wars of conquest (Ibn
al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*), and Majza'a b. Thawr appears at Tustar
where he fell (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2548, 2552, 2556; Balādhurī,
Futūḥ, pp. 308f). The family settled in Basra. Shaqīq commanded
the Basran Bakr b. Wā'il for 'Alī in the battle of the Camel, and he
also fought for him at Ṣiffīn (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3174f, 3203, 3311,
3316); under Ziyād he participated in a fray with Khārijites
(Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, pp. 151f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 264).
Shaqīq's position was threatened by the presence of Mālik b.
Misma' (above, no. 28), and it was scarcely helped by rampant
intrigues in the family (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 92); Ashyam
b. Shaqīq did inherit the *riyāsa* on the death of his father, but he had
to go to Yazīd I to get it back from Mālik, and part of the Bakr
b. Wā'il refused to accept him (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 448); his role
in the tribal feuds in Basra in 64 was accordingly a minor one
(*ibid.*, pp. 455, 464). In 75 he was among the mutineers at
Rustaqābādh together, apparently, with his brother Abū Ruhm,
who is also said to have joined the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath
(Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 292, 302). La'y b. Shaqīq, who

was in Kerman at the time of Ibn al-Ash'ath, stayed loyal to
Ḥajjāj (*ibid.*, p. 333; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 362). Shaybān b.
Zuhayr b. Shaqīq b. Thawr was an expert on genealogy (Ibn 'Abd
al-Barr, *Inbāh*, p. 56).

(33) *Ziyād b. 'Amr al-'Atakī/Azd.* 'Amr b. al-Ashraf al-'Atakī is
supposed to have fallen in the battle of the Camel in defence of
'Ā'isha (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3201, 3204), but the 'Atīk were Azd
'Umān who only migrated to Basra in the Sufyānid period, and
there is no mention of the family until the second civil war
(*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'Azd'; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*,
s.v. "Amr b. al-Asraf"). In 64, however, Ziyād b. 'Amr was the
leader of Azd in the tribal feuds which broke out on the death of
Yazīd I (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 461f; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp.
98f, 112, 121), in 67 he commanded the *khums* of Azd in
Muṣ'ab's army against Mukhtār (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 720, 726;
Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 259), and in 69 he was a member of
the *Jufriyya* who prepared for an Umayyad take-over of the city
(Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 156, cf. p. 163). After the second
civil war he became head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* in Basra and his deputy
governor there (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 284, 304, 305;
differently p. 285), and his sons settled down for a career as
assistants to the governor. Ḥafṣ b. Ziyād fought the Zanj with the
Basran *muqātila* as his father's deputy (*ibid.*, p. 305); Hawārī b.
Ziyād fled from Basra on the outbreak of the revolt of Yazīd
b. al-Muhallab, and Mughīra b. Ziyād commanded the *khums*
of Azd in the suppression of the revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1387f,
1381; cf. also Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 121, 156 on the
rivalry between the families of Muhallab and Ziyād). Mukbir b.
al-Hawārī was killed in the revolt of 'Abdallāh b. Mu'āwiya
(Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1885; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 567). Musabbih b. al-
Hawārī was governor of Nīshāpūr towards the end of the Umay-
yad period (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 105, where his name is
Masīh); after the revolution he was sent by Abū'l-'Abbās to
combat a Khārijite as governor of Baḥrayn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p.
632; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 163). Tasnīm b. al-Hawārī would
appear to have been governor of Oman for Manṣūr in 158 (Ṭabarī,
ser. iii, p. 385), and his son, Ḥasan b. Tasnīm, was certainly
governor for Hādī there in 169 (*ibid.*, p. 568). Both Tasnīm and
Sa'īd b. Tasnīm appear as transmitters on the revolt of Muḥammad
al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (*ibid.*, pp. 206, 293).

(34) *Zurāra b. 'Udus al-Dārimī.* The B. Zurāra were chiefs of the B.

Dārim of Tamīm, and occasionally of all the B. Ḥanẓala, heroes
of a large number of pre-Islamic *ayyām*, men of renowned genero-
sity, and perhaps the most celebrated noble family among the
northern Arabs (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, pp. 154, 458; *Ency clo-
paedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'Ḥādjib b. Zurāra'; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*,
table 60). They busied themselves with their *ayyām* into the cali-
phate of 'Alī (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.v.* 'Nu'aym b. al-Qa'qā'),
and not much is heard about them before the first civil war: Ḥiṣn/
Ḥuṣayn b. Ma'bad b. Zurāra is said to have participated in the wars
of conquest (Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 119; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 354);
a descendant of 'Alqama b. Zurāra is listed among the first settlers
in Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 141); and 'Umayr or Muḥammad
(b. 'Umayr) b. 'Uṭārid figures as a commander of the Tamīm for
'Alī at Ṣiffīn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 221; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p.
183). After the civil war, however, most of the family had come
together in Kufa where they continued to flaunt their tribal pride.
Labīd b. 'Uṭārid having endured the humiliation of having his face
slapped in a crowded *majlis*, Nu'aym b. al-Qa'qā' promptly
assembled his Tamīmīs to slap the offender threefold; but Ziyād
the governor, was not impressed, and the heroes were either lashed
or had their hands cut off (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 84f).
Nu'aym accordingly became a Zubayrist in the second civil war
and was executed as such by Bishr (*ibid.*, vol. v, p. 180). Muḥam-
mad b. 'Umayr has been endowed with the traditional sharifian
biography: he bore witness against Ḥujr together with Labīd
(Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 133), invited Ḥusayn to Kufa together with other
ashrāf (*ibid.*, p. 345), and fought against Mukhtār, unless he was
in Azerbayjan where Mukhtār had appointed him governor
(*ibid.*, pp. 635, 655, 685); next he betrayed Muṣ'ab at Maskin as a
member of the *Marwāniyya*, and was appointed to Hamadhān
after the victory of 'Abd al-Malik (*ibid.*, pp. 804, 817). A daughter
of his was married to a son of Ziyād b. Abīhi, who had himself
married a daughter of Qa'qā' b. Ma'bad (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol.
iv b, pp. 74, 83). Unlike other *ashrāf*, however, Muḥammad is
not said to have held the leadership of the *rub'* a governorship or
a major command under the Sufyānids, with the single exception
of a campaign against Rayy whose population had rebelled on the
death of Yazīd (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 328). The family would
appear to have been just a little too much for the Sufyānids.

In return, however, Ḥajjāj was much too much for the B.
Zurāra. Muḥammad b. 'Umayr disliked Ḥajjāj's introductory

speech and automatically reached for a pebble, but he never managed to throw it (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 865; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 267, 269); at Rustaqābādh he insolently refused to come to Ḥajjāj's assistance, though unlike other *ashrāf* he appears to have escaped execution (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 286, 292f). 'Uṭārid b. 'Umayr was given a major command in the Peacock Army and presumably rebelled with Ibn al-Ash'ath: Halqām b. Nu'aym b. al-Qa'qā' certainly did; he was executed, confessing that he had fancied becoming caliph (*ibid.*, p. 319; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1044, 1109, 1111). Thereafter there is silence around the family in Kufa. But a branch of them reappear under the early 'Abbāsids and that as generals, doubtless made in Khurāsān: 'Umar b. al-'Abbās b. 'Umayr b. 'Uṭārid was appointed to Sīstān by Abū Muslim, who esteemed him highly, and his brother Ibrāhīm was appointed to Sind. The outcome was an unhappy one. 'Umar made the departure of his brother for Sind an occasion of public festivity, the populace of the city of Sīstān being assembled to see him off. An incident involving a Tamīmī, however, sparked off a mutiny by the Tamīm and next a revolt by the entire city, and both 'Umar and his brother lost their lives (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 136f; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 285 = 96; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 617, 632). A certain Qa'qā' of Āl Zurāra was head of 'Īsā b. Mūsā's *shurṭa* in 147 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 347).

APPENDIX II

THE SUBGOVERNORS OF SYRIA, 685–744 [65–126]

Since the governors of Syria receive scant attention in the sources, this list is necessarily fragmentary. The pattern, however, should be clear.

'ABD AL-MALIK (65–86)

(1) *Abān b. Marwān.* A brother of 'Abd al-Malik who was governor of Palestine; Ḥajjāj began his career as the head of this man's *shurṭa* (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 166).

(2) *Abān b. al-Walīd b. 'Uqba.* An Umayyad who was governor of Ḥimṣ, Qinnasrīn (which then included the Jazīra) and Armenia for both Marwān and 'Abd al-Malik (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 307; *id., Futūḥ*, p. 188; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara, s.v.*). 'Uthmān b. al-Walīd, his brother, was also governor of Armenia, whether as the deputy of his brother or in his own right (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 205; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 853). One of Abān's subgovernors was Dīnār b. Dīnār, a *mawlā* of 'Abd al-Malik, who defeated a Byzantine army in 75 and who was later secretary to his patron (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 188; Jahshiyārī, *Wuẓarā'*, p. 54; Guidi, *Chronica Minora*, p. 232 = 175f). It is characteristic that it is on the frontier that the first *mawlā* general appears in Syria.

(3) *'Abdallah b. 'Abd al-Malik.* The son of the caliph who was governor of Ḥimṣ for his father according to Khalīfa (*Ta'rīkh*, p. 394). According to Balādhurī, he was in charge of a summer campaign in 84, but only appointed to Ḥimṣ by Walīd I (*Futūḥ*, p. 165; *id., Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 156; cf. Guidi, *Chronica Minora*, p. 232 = 176). He was later governor of Egypt (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 156; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1165, 1200).

(4) *'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Umm al-Ḥakam al-Thaqafī.* The nephew of Mu'āwiya who had been governor of Kufa for his uncle (cf. below, note 230), and who was appointed to Damascus by 'Abd al-Malik (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 181, 784; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 269,

337). According to Balādhurī, he had also been governor of the Jazīra, Mosul and Egypt (*Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 5; cf. Khalīfa, *Ta'-rīkh*, p. 260; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 157; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 42, 44).

(5) *Abū 'Uthmān b. Marwān*. A brother of the caliph who was governor of Jordan (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 394).

(6) *Khālid b. Yazīd b. Mu'āwiya*. The son of Yazīd I who was governor of Ḥimṣ (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 69).

(7) *Maslama b. 'Abd al-Malik*. Maslama, who became one of the most celebrated generals of the Umayyad house, was governor of Qinnasrīn for his father according to Michael the Syrian (*Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 449 = vol. ii, p. 474). Muslim sources only seem to remember his later governorship of the Jazīra, Armenia and Azerbayjan.

(8) *Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-Thaqafī*. The brother of Yūsuf b. 'Umar and a relative of Ḥajjāj, who was himself an affinal kinsman of the caliph (cf. below, note 289). Muḥammad administered the Balqā' (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 394).

(9) *Qurra b. Sharīk al-'Absī*. A *sharīf* from Qinnasrīn who was governor of his home province (Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 449 = vol. ii, p. 474). He later became secretary to Walīd and governor of Egypt (cf. Abbott, *The Kurrah Papyri from Aphrodito in the Oriental Institute*, pp. 57ff; for his sharifian status see Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, *s.v.* 'Qurra b. Šarīk').

(10) *Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Malik*. The future caliph who was governor of Palestine (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 394). 'Abd al-Malik had similarly been governor of Palestine as heir apparent (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 149).

(11) *'Ubayda b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī*. A Jordanian *Sharīf* of Qays who was governor of Jordan (*Aghānī*, vol. ix, p. 313). He was the nephew of Abū'l-A'war al-Sulamī, the famous conquerer of Syria, general at Ṣiffīn and governor of Jordan under Mu'āwiya (Yāqūt, *Wörterbuch*, vol. i, p. 326; *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'Abū'l-A'war al-Sulamī'), and he was later appointed to North Africa by Hishām where, *sharīf* or no *sharīf*, he was drawn into the faction (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 142).

(12) *Walīd b. 'Umar* and *Ḥārith b. Ka'b*. Two unidentifiable governors of Qinnasrīn mentioned by Michael the Syrian (*Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 449 = vol. ii, p. 474).

(13) *Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥakam b. Abī'l-'Āṣ*. Uncle of 'Abd al-Malik and governor of Palestine (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 163; cf. Sharon, 'An Arabic Inscription from the Time of 'Abd al-Malik', p. 371).

WALĪD I (86–96)

(14) '*Abbās b. al-Walīd.* A son of the caliph who was appointed to Ḥimṣ (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 417). Like Maslama he became a celebrated soldier (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*², *s.v.*).

(15) '*Abdallāh b. ʿAbd al-Malik.* An earlier governor of Ḥimṣ according to Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 156 (cf. above, no. 3).

(16) '*Abd al-ʿAzīz b. Walīd.* Another son of the caliph who was appointed to Damascus (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 417).

(17) *Farwa, Naḍr, Muḥammad* and *Layth.* Four unidentifiable governors (or subgovernors?) of the Qinnasrīn area mentioned by Michael the Syrian (*Chronique*, vol. iv, pp. 456f = vol. ii, p. 489).

(18) *Marthad b. Sharīk al-ʿAbsī.* The brother of Qurra who was governor of Qinnasrīn after Qurra's appointment to Egypt (Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 451 = vol. ii, p. 478).

(19) *Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik.'* The future caliph who continued in office as governor of Palestine (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 417; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 143).

(20) '*Umar b. al-Walīd.* A son of the caliph who governed Jordan (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 417).

SULAYMĀN (96–99)

(21) *Muḥammad b. Suwayd b. Kulthūm al-Fihrī.* A relative of Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays who was governor of Damascus (Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, p. 78; cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, table 34). Kulthūm b. Qays was Ḍaḥḥāk's brother; but Suwayd (or Saʿīd) b. Kulthūm is nonetheless supposed to have been governor of Damascus in the days of Abū ʿUbayda! (Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, p. 40; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, *s.v.* ʿSaʿīd b. Kulthūm'). There were perhaps, as Ṣafadī implies, two men of this name. However this may be, Muḥammad b. Suwayd was known as a traditionist (Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, vol. ix, p. 210).

ʿUMAR II (99–101)

(22) *Ḍaḥḥāk b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿArzab (or ʿArzam) al-Ashʿarī.* A Jordanian traditionist who was governor of Damascus on two occasions, at least one of them for ʿUmar II (Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. iv, p. 446; Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, p. 44).

(23) *Ḥārith b. ʿAmr al-Ṭāʾī.* One of the few generals to receive office
in Syria: he administered the Balqāʾ (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 465;
Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. iii, p. 453). His antecedents are not
known, but he was later governor of Armenia for Yazīd II (Balā-
dhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 206; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1526, 1532; Ghevond,
Histoire, p. 99; Movsēs Dasxurançi, *History*, p. 209), and he may
conceivably have been in North Africa (cf. Van Ess, 'Untersuchun-
gen zu einigen ibāḍitischen Handschriften', p. 29).

(24) *Hilāl b. ʿAbd al-Aʿlā.* Governor of Qinnasrīn and possibly
the brother of ʿUthmān (Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubda*, vol. i, p. 46; cf.
below no. 43).

(25) *Muḥammad b. Suwayd al-Fihrī.* The relative of Ḍaḥḥāk b.
Qays who had been governor of Damascus under Sulaymān
and who apparently continued in office under ʿUmar (Ibn Ḥajar,
Tahdhīb, vol. ix, p. 210; cf. Ibn ʿAsākir, *Taʾrīkh*, vol. ii, p. 41;
cf. above, no. 21).

(26) *Naḍr b. Yarīm b. Maʿdikarib b. Abraha b. al-Ṣabbāḥ.* A Ḥim-
yarī *sharīf* who was governor of Palestine (cf. Appendix I,
no. 2).

(27) *ʿUbāda b. Nusayy al-Kindī.* A traditionist of unknown tribal
status who governed Jordan (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 465; Ibn al-
Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*).

(28) *ʿUmayr b. Hāniʾ al-ʿAnsī.* A general who was appointed to the
Thaniyya and Ḥawrān and whose sons were among the *Yaman-
iyya* (cf. Appendix III, no. 43).

(29) *ʿUthmān b. Saʿīd al-ʿUdhrī.* A general who appears as commander
of a *rubʿ* in the Syrian army which was sent against Shabīb in Iraq
in 77 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 970) and who was governor of Damascus
according to Ṣafadī (*Umarāʾ*, p. 55). According to Khalīfa, how-
ever, the name of the governor was ʿUbayd b. al-Ḥashās al-
ʿUdhrī (*Taʾrīkh*, p. 465). ʿUbayd is presumably identical with the
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Ḥashās al-ʿUdhrī who was *qāḍī* of Damascus
for ʿUmar II (Wakīʿ, *Akhbār al-quḍāh*, vol. iii, pp. 203f, cf. p.
201); he is also said to have been *qāḍī* for Yazīd II (De Goeje,
Fragmenta, p. 81).

(30) *Walīd b. Hishām b. Walīd b. ʿUqba.* An Umayyad who governed
Qinnasrīn (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 465; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubda*, vol.
i, p. 46f).

(31) *Yazīd b. Ḥusayn b. Numayr al-Sakūnī.* A Ḥimṣī *sharīf* who was
governor of Ḥimṣ (cf. Appendix 1, no. 5).

YAZID II (101–105)

(32) *ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUtba al-Fihrī.* A Qurashī who was governor of Damascus (Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, p. 48). His father was governor of Egypt for Ibn al-Zubayr and fell in battle against Marwān I's troops (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 41ff). He himself had been in charge of the *ṣadaqāt* in Syria under ʿUmar II (Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, p. 48).

(33) *Masrūr (or Bishr) b. al-Walīd.* A brother of the caliph who was governor of Qinnasrīn (Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubda*, vol. i, p. 49).

(34) *Walīd b. Talīd al-Murrī.* Walīd was head of the *shurṭa* of Muḥammad b. Marwān while the latter was governor of Mosul, the Jazīra, Armenia and Azerbayjan (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 332), governor of Damascus for Yazīd II (Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, p. 95), and governor of Mosul for Hishām from 114 to 120 (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 33, 35f, 38, 40; cf. Walker, *Umaiyad Coins*, pp. 283f). A nephew of his was apparently governor of Mosul in 126 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1821). According to Azdī, Walīd was not of Murra, but of ʿAbs.

HISHĀM (105–25)

(35) *Ishāq b. Qabīṣa b. Dhuʾayb al-Khuzāʿī.* Ishāq's father was a Medinese brother-in-law and secretary of ʿAbd al-Malik (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 155, 160; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 787, 837; Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol. v, p. 176). He himself was governor of Jordan (Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. ii, p. 499).

(36) *Kulthūm b. ʿIyāḍ al-Qushayrī.* Governor of Damascus for Hishām (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1814; Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, p. 71). In 123 he was sent to suppress the revolt of the Khārijites in North Africa, but was defeated and killed (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 232; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 528f; cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*², s.v. 'Baldj b. Bishr'). He is sometimes described as a Qasrī, and Dīnawarī even has it that he was a cousin (or fellow-tribesman, *ibn ʿamm*) of Khālid al-Qasrī (*Akhbār*, p. 345; similarly Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 344n). The genealogists, however, are agreed that he was of Qushayr (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 105; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamhara*, p. 290; cf. also Ibn al-Qūṭiyya, *Iftitāḥ*, pp. 40f).

(37) *Walīd b. al-Qaʿqā b. Khulayd al-ʿAbsī.* A *sharīf* from Qinnasrīn who was governor of Qinnasrīn (cf. Appendix I, no. 15).

(38) *Walīd b. Talīd al-Murrī.* Yazīd II's governor of Damascus, who

continued in office under Hishām (Ṣafadī, *Umarā'*, p. 95; cf. above, no. 34).

<div align="center">WALĪD II (125–6)</div>

(39) *'Abd al-Malik* (or *'Abd al-Ṣamad*) *b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥajjāj.* A grandson of Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf who was governor of Damascus as the deputy of Ḥakam b. al-Walīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1789; Ṣafadī, *Umarā'*, pp. 52f).

(40) *Ḥakam b. al-Walīd.* Walīd's son and heir apparent who was appointed to Damascus (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 51).

(41) *Marwān b. 'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-Malik.* Governor of Ḥimṣ (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1826ff).

(42) *Sa'īd b. 'Abd al-Malik.* Walīd's uncle who was governor of Palestine (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1831). He had previously been governor of Mosul and commanded summer campaigns (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 332; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1462, 1472).

(43) *'Uthmān b. 'Abd al-A'lā b. Surāqa al-Azdī.* Governor of Damascus according to Ṣafadī (*Umarā'*, p. 55), but Ṣafadī is unlikely to be right (cf. above, no. 39). 'Uthmān, who was perhaps a brother of Hilāl (above, no. 24), was later a general in the service of Marwān II who appointed him to Mosul (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 162). He never forgave Marwān his ignominious flight from the Zāb (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 98) and repeatedly sought honourable death in battle himself. In 132 he rebelled against 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī (*ibid.*, p. 53; differently Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 144), and when 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī himself rebelled in 137, 'Uthmān joined in, was appointed to Damascus, killed Muqātil b. Ḥakīm for 'Abdallāh, and held forth on the virtues of fighting to the bitter end (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 94, 98; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 164; Ṣafadī, *Umarā'*, p. 55; Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 185); and having failed to be killed with 'Abdallāh, he possibly rebelled once more on his own behalf against Manṣūr (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.v.* "Utmān b. Surāqa'). Thereafter he is no more heard of. According to Ṣafadī, he was a Damascene and also a *qāḍī* (*Umarā'*, p. 55).

(44) *'Uthmān b. al-Walīd.* Another son and heir apparent of Walīd II who was appointed to Ḥimṣ (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 51).

(45) *Yazīd b. 'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī.* A general, reputedly of sharifian descent, who was governor of Qinnasrīn (cf. Appendix I, no. 17).

APPENDIX III

THE SUBGOVERNORS OF IRAQ AND ITS DEPENDENCIES, 694–744 [75–126]

This list excludes most governors said to have been appointed by the caliph, all governors of Mecca and Medina (which were dependencies of Iraq under Ḥajjāj and Yūsuf b. 'Umar), and all governors between 99 and 102. The last omission is due to the fact that between 99 and 102 Iraq was first shared between two men, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qurashī and 'Adī b. Artāh al-Fazārī who were appointed to Kufa and Basra respectively, and next given over to Maslama who was in office for less than a year, so that the number of subgovernors appointed by each of the three is very small. Within these limits the list should be reasonably complete.

ḤAJJĀJ B. YŪSUF AL-THAQAFĪ/QAYS (75–95)

(1) *'Abdallāh b. Abī 'Uṣayfir al-Thaqafī/Qays*. Governor of Madā' in 76 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 899). He had apparently been governor there already in the Zubayrid period and possibly stayed on till he was dismissed by Ḥajjāj in the course of the Shabīb affair in 76 (*ibid.*, p. 929; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 192).

(2) *'Abdallāh b. 'Āmir al-Shaybānī/Rabī'a*. A local *sharīf* who was head of the *shurṭa* in Basra (cf. Appendix I, no. 28).

(3) *'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath al-Kindī/Yemen*. A Kufan *sharīf* who was governor of Sīstān (cf. Appendix I, no. 21).

(4) *'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Sulaym al-Kalbī/Yemen*. A Syrian of 'Āmir/Kalb and thus probably from either Mizza near Damascus or Palmyra (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 289). He fought for 'Abd al-Malik against 'Amr b. Sa'īd al-Ashdaq and for Ḥajjāj against Ibn al-Ash'ath (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 785, 1075), and was appointed to Sīstān, Oman and/or Fars (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 387, 415; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 283 = 93, where he has become a Kinānī). He was governor of Basra for Maslama (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1417; cf. Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 474, 483). In 104 he was back in Syria where he conducted a summer cam-

paign (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 478, cf. p. 487). His son Ya'qūb was among the conspirators who planned the revolt against Walīd II (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1794, 1799).

(5) *'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Ubayd b. Ṭāriq al-'Abshamī/Muḍar*. A Kufan who was head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* in both Kufa and Basra (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 410; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1034), and who is said to have been deputy governor of Kufa already under Ziyād in 50 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 101). He figures in many of Abū Mikhnaf's *isnād*s.

(6) *'Adī b. Wattād al-Iyādī/Niẓār*. One of the rare members of the ancient tribe of Iyād to appear in the sources, 'Adī was governor of Rayy in 77 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 996ff). He was doubtless from Kufa where most of the remaining Iyād had settled (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.v.* 'Iyād b. Nizār').

(7) *'Amr b. Sa'īd al-'Awdhī/Yemen(?)*. A Damascene subgovernor of Basra, who is otherwise unknown (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 414). 'Awdh b. Sūd was a tribe of Azd, 'Awdh b. Ghālib a branch of 'Abs, and 'Awdh b. al-Ḥārith counted as Bajīla (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.vv.*), so 'Amr may well have been a Qaysī, but Bajīla seems the most likely tribe for a Damascene.

(8) *Ashhab b. Bishr al-Kalbī (?)/Yemen (?)*. A Khurāsānī appointed to Sīstān (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 400; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 119f, where he is a Yarbū'ī/Muḍar; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 283 = 93).

(9) *Barā' b. Qabīṣa al-Thaqafī/Qays*. A member of Ḥajjāj's family who was governor of Isfahan in 77 and who was later appointed to Kufa (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 118; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 385; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 994, 996f, 1004).

(10) *Ḥakam b. Ayyūb al-Thaqafī/Qays*. A relative and son-in-law of Ḥajjāj who was governor of Basra from 75 to 86 except for the period of Ibn al-Ash'ath's revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 872, 973, 1061f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 348, 384f, 414).

(11) *Ḥakam b. Nahīk al-Hujaymī/Muḍar*. Governor first of Fars and next of Kerman for Ḥajjāj (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 392; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.v.*).

(12) *Ḥasan b. Abī l-'Amaraṭṭa al-Kindī/Yemen*. Ḥasan's father had been executed as a fervent adherent of Ḥujr b. 'Adī al-Kindī in Kufa (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 120f, 125; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, pp. 216f, 233). Ḥasan himself claimed descent from Ākil al-Murār, the king of Kinda (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1485). According to Ibn al-Kalbī he was head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* before he went with Jarrāḥ b. 'Abdallāh to Khurāsān, where Asad al-Qasrī appointed him to Samarqand (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.v.* 'Ḥasan b. 'Umair';

Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1446, 1485); he was still governor there when Abū'l-Ṣaydā' set out to convert the Sogdians in 110 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1507f).

(13) *Hawshab b. Yazīd al-Shaybānī/Rabīʿa.* A Kufan *sharīf* who was head of the *shurṭa* in his native city (cf. Appendix I, no. 30).

(14) *Ibn al-Ḥaḍramī.* A *ḥalīf* of Quraysh. ʿĀmir b. al-Ḥaḍramī, Ibn al-Ḥaḍramī's grandfather, figures in the *Sīra* where his desire to avenge his brother contributes to the decision of Quraysh to fight the disastrous battle of Badr (Ibn Isḥāq, *Leben Muhammed's*, vol. i, pp. 424ff, 441f = 287ff, 298). ʿAbdallāh b. ʿĀmir b. al-Ḥaḍramī is said to have been governor of Mecca for ʿUthmān and a keen ʿUthmānī (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3057, 3097ff); he was also an agent for Muʿāwiya in Basra (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v. 'Ibn al-Ḥaḍramī'). ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿĀmir was *ʿāmil* of Kufa for Ḥajjāj (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 353).

(15) *'Ikrima b. al-Awṣāfī or Waṣṣāfī al-Ḥimyarī/Yemen.* An unknown Syrian who was head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* in Wāsiṭ (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 411).

(16) *Jarrāḥ b. ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥakamī/Yemen.* Jarrāḥ is the paradigmatic general. He was a Syrian, doubtless from Jordan (*pace* Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 206), and must have come to Iraq with the troops of Sufyān b. al-Abrad al-Kalbī and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥabīb al-Ḥakamī in 77 (cf. Yāʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 328); he was certainly there in 82 when he fought against Ibn al-Ashʿath (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1077, 1091). In 87 or a few years later he became governor of Basra for Ḥajjāj, and he stayed in this office until Yazīd b. al-Muhallab was appointed to Iraq and Khurāsān in 96 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1191, 1208, 1266; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 414). Yazīd made him his deputy governor in Iraq before going to Khurāsān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1310; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 427f), and ʿUmar II appointed him to Khurāsān as the successor to Yazīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1346; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 463; Kračkovskaya and Kračkovsky, 'Dokument', p. 55). He was dismissed in 100 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1352ff), seems to have fought with Maslama against Yazīd b. al-Muhallab (*ibid.*, pp. 1413f), was appointed to Armenia by Yazīd II in 104 (*ibid.*, p. 1453; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 477; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 102), dismissed by Hishām in 107 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 492) and reappointed by him in 111 (*ibid.*, p. 500; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1526). He fell in battle against the Khazars in 112 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1530f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 502ff; Theophanes, *Chronographia*, A.M. 6220;

Movsēs Dasxurançi, *History*, pp. 209f; *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'Djarrāḥ b. 'Abd Allāh').

(17) *Khālid b. 'Attāb al-Riyāḥī/ Mudar.* A Kufan *sharīf* who was governor of Rayy and Madā'in (cf. Appendix I, no. 23).

(18) *Khiyār b. Abī Sabra al-Mujāshi'ī/ Mudar.* One of Muhallab's former generals who was appointed by Ḥajjāj to Oman and later killed there by Ziyād b. al-Muhallab, apparently because he had had a hand in the dismissal of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab from Khurāsān in 85 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1140; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*). According to Khalīfa, it was 'Abd al-Jabbār b. [Abī] Sabra who was appointed (*Ta'rīkh*, p. 415).

(19) *Mawdūd (al-Thaqafī/ Qays).* A nephew of Ḥajjāj who was head of his *shurṭa* in Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 410).

(20) *Misma' b. Mālik al-Shaybānī/ Rabī'a.* A Basran *sharīf* who was governor of Sīstān in 86 (cf. Appendix I, no. 28).

(21) *Mughīra b. 'Abdallāh b. Abī 'Aqīl al-Thaqafī/ Qays.* A member of Ḥajjāj's family who served as his deputy governor in Kufa (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1032, 1182; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 385).

(22) *B. al-Mughīra b. Shu'ba al-Thaqafī/ Qays.* Three sons of Mu'āwiya's famous governor were employed by Ḥajjāj. 'Urwa was deputy governor of Kufa in the seventies and again in 95 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 873, 916, 960; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 385, 414); Ḥamza was governor of Hamadhān; and Muṭarrif, who became a Khārijite rebel, was governor of Madā'in (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 979ff). They are said to have counted as *ashrāf* despite the ignoble birth of their father (*ibid.*, p. 979).

(23) *Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra* and *Yazīd b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/ Yemen.* Governors of Khurāsān (cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 427ff). Yazīd later rose in revolt against Yazīd II and was killed with a large number of his relatives (cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 312ff), but his family was by no means wiped out. Sulaymān b. Ḥabīb b. al-Muhallab was one of the *ru'ūs al-Yamaniyya* who interceded for Thābit b. Nu'aym in the reign of Hishām, governed Ahwāz for 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar after the Yemeni take-over, and joined 'Abdallāh b. Mu'āwiya in Fars after his defeat at the hands of Marwān's troops (cf. Appendix IV, no. 46). He was later crucified by Abū' l-'Abbās (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 486). 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Yazīd b. al-Muhallab also joined Ibn Mu'āwiya in Fars, fled to Oman after the latter's defeat, and was killed (in Oman?) despite a grant of *amān* in 133 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1978f, ser. iii, p. 74). Accord-

ing to others Abū Salama sent him to 'Ayn al-Tamar on the arrival
of the Khurāsānīs in Iraq (*Akhbār al-dawlat al-'abbāsiyya*, p. 378).
Sufyān b. Mu'āwiya b. Yazīd rebelled in Basra in 132 on behalf
of Qaḥṭaba, joined the *Yamaniyya* and Rabī'a, but was defeated.
After the revolution, however, he was governor of Basra for
Manṣūr. But when al-Nafs al-Zakiyya rebelled in 145, Sufyān's
son and deputy surrendered Basra without resistance, apparently
because of his and his father's 'Alid sympathies (Ṭabarī, ser. iii,
pp. 21f, 126f, 138, 142, 189, 291, 297, 300; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*,
pp. 610, 674). Abū Sa'īd b. Mu'āwiya b. Yazīd appears as a
general in Ṣāliḥ b. 'Alī's army in Egypt shortly after the revolution
(Kindī, *Governors*, p. 103). And Khālid b. Yazīd b. al-Muhallab is
supposed to have lived long enough to have been head of the
shurṭa of an equally long-lived Rawḥ b. Rawḥ b. Zanbā' in Egypt
in 176 (*ibid.*, p. 135; presumably the less illustrious links in their
genealogies have been omitted).

The most successful Muhallabids of the early 'Abbāsid period,
however, were descendants of Qabīṣa b. al-Muhallab. 'Umar
b. Ḥafṣ b. 'Uthmān b. Qabīṣa, nicknamed Hazārmard, was
governor of Basra and Baḥrayn for Abū'l-'Abbās, and of Basra
and Sind for Manṣūr. According to one version he fought under
'Īsā b. Mūsā against al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, but another has it that
he stayed in Sind where, having 'Alid sympathies, he protected
al-Nafs al-Zakiyya's son until he was dismissed in 151. However
that may be, he was appointed to North Africa in 151 and fell
there two years later in the revolt of Abū Ḥātim al-Ibāḍī (Ṭabarī,
ser. iii, pp. 138f, 236, 359ff, 370f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 630,
632, 639, 674, 677, 680; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 232f, 445; for
the dynasty of governors which the Muhallabids established in
North Africa, see Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, p. 76). Rawḥ b.
Ḥātim b. Qabīṣa participated in the siege of Wāsiṭ on the
'Abbāsid side in 132, campaigned in Ṭabaristān in 142, governed
Kufa (or Sind) in 159 and Sind in 160–1, received appointment
for a campaign against Byzantium planned by Hādī, governed
Basra in 166, and was appointed to North Africa in 170; he died
there in 174 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 64f, 69, 139f, 461, 482, 484,
487, 491, 517, 569, 606, 609; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 191, 338).
Dāwūd b. Rawḥ b. Ḥātim was charged with *zandaqa* in 166, but he
was soon released (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 517). Faḍl (or Mufaḍḍal)
b. Rawḥ was killed in North Africa in 178 when the Muhallabids
were expelled (*ibid.*, p. 630; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 233). Yazīd

b. Ḥātim b. Qabīṣa is found in the entourage of Abū Jaʿfar after the surrender of Wāsiṭ. He campaigned against a Khārijite in 137, governed Egypt from 143 or 144 to 152, and North Africa from 154 to 170 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 67, 120, 142, 189, 313, 353, 370f, 373, 379, 470, 503, 518, 569; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 233; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 111ff; Miles, *Glass Weights*, pp. 113ff; Grohmann, *Arabic Papyri in the Egyptian Library*, pp. 177f. Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. Ḥātim was governor of Ahwāz for Amīn and fell in the civil war (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 851ff; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 756). Khālid b. Yazīd b. Ḥātim was governor of Mosul in 190 (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 310). Dāwūd b. Bishr b. Ḥātim was governor of Egypt and Sind for Hārūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 649; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 133f). Bishr b. Dāwūd stayed on in Sind as a rebel governor until he was finally dislodged by Maʾmūn in 216 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1098, 1100, 1105).

A branch of the Muhallabid family settled in Nīshāpūr in the mid tenth century; by the early eleventh century they had become frequent holders of the *riyāsa* at Bayhaq where they intermarried with the local *sayyids* (Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, p. 198).

(24) *Muḥammad b. Hārūn b. Dhirāʿ al-Numayrī/ Qays.* One of Ḥajjāj's governors of Sind (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 435f; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 358, 435f). He was presumably a Basran.

(25) *Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Thaqafī/ Qays.* A member of Ḥajjāj's family who was governor of Sind for many years (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 435ff; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1200, 1257, 1271). On the accession of Sulaymān he was seized and brought to Iraq where he was tortured together with the rest of Āl Abī ʿAqīl (Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, vol. iv, p. 465; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1282f).

(26) *Muḥammad b. al-Saʿṣaʿa al-Kilābī/ Qays.* One of Ḥajjāj's governors of Baḥrayn and Oman (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 358, 391f).

(27) *Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī/ Qays.* Ḥajjāj's brother and Hishām's father in law (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 533). He was governor of Fārs for Ḥajjāj (Le Strange and Nicholson, *Fārsnāma*, pp. 132, 169f = Le Strange, 'Description of the Province of Fars in Persia', pp. 26, 83f), and later of the Yemen (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 384, 417). He is hardly identical with the Muḥammad b. Yūsuf who fell in North Africa in 124 (*ibid.*, p. 530).

(28) *Mubāṣir b. Suḥaym al-Ṭāʾī/ Yemen.* A Syrian from Ḥims who was head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* in Wāsiṭ and later one of his deputy governors in Basra (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 411, 414). It is tempting to

identify him with the Suḥaym b. al-Muhājir who was governor of Aṭrābulus for 'Abd al-Malik and who assisted in the suppression of the Jarājima (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. vi, pp. 65f; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 300).

(29) *Mujjā'a b. Si'r al-Tamīmī/ Muḍar.* One of Ḥajjāj's governors of Sind. He had held a command in Oman and is said to have been a candidate for the governorship of Khurāsān which went to Qutayba (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 435; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 390ff; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1140f).

(30) *Mūsā b. al-Wajīh al-Ḥimyarī/Yemen.* A Syrian who became head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* in Wāsiṭ (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 411). He was still in Iraq in 99 when 'Umar II's governor of Basra sent him to seize Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, the ex-governor (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1346, 1350); he fell in battle against the Muhallabids in 101 or was executed by them along with other prisoners (*ibid.*, p. 1384; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 58). A Kalā'ī, he was probably from Ḥimṣ.

(31) *Qaṭan b. Mudrik al-Kilābī/ Qays.* Governor of Basra, and probably a Basran himself (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 406f, 414).

(32) *Qaṭan b. Qabīṣa b. al-Mukhāriq al-Hilālī/ Qays.* A Basran who was governor of Kerman and Fars (Khalīfa, *Ṭabaqāt*, pp. 56, 184; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 392). According to Ibn al-Kalbī, he was also governor of Sīstān (*Gamhara, s.v.*). It was, however, not he but his son Ḥarb b. Qaṭan who was governor there; he was appointed by Yūsuf b. 'Umar in the reign of Hishām or Walīd II, dismissed by Manṣūr b. Jumhūr, and reappointed for a short while by 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 538, 553, 560; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 128ff). He then joined the armies of Marwān II, where he is found together with Ibn Nubāta in 129 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1981; compare Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, vol. v, p. 284, who has got his *nisba* right). Muḥammad b. Qaṭan, doubtless another son of this Basran, was one of the trusted men of Naṣr b. Sayyār in Khurāsān where he was killed by Abū Muslim (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1995, cf. pp. 1917, 1921). Muḥammad b. Ḥarb b. Qaṭan was head of the *shurṭa* of Ja'far b. Sulaymān and 'Abd al-Ṣamad b. 'Alī in Medina and Basra under Manṣūr and Hārūn (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara, s.v.*).

(33) *Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhilī/ Qays.* Qutayba's father, Muslim b. 'Amr, was a Syrian who was greatly esteemed and favoured by the Umayyads, in particular by Yazīd I (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 11, vol. v, p. 341; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 252). He is said to have been

in Basra already under Ziyād and at all events went there under
'Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād, staying on as a supporter of Muṣ'ab in
the second civil war; he fell at Maskin (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 83f,
239ff, 252, 773, 806; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, pp. 148f,
vol. v, pp. 342, 345). Whatever his status in Syria, Qutayba was
thus no *sharīf* in his adoptive home, and he is said to have obtained
his first command as a protegé of 'Anbasa b. Sa'īd, Ashdaq's
brother (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 962f); later Ḥajjāj appointed him to
Rayy (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 342), and in 85 he became
governor of Khurāsān, where he was killed in his attempt to
raise a revolt on the accession of Sulaymān (Wellhausen, *Kingdom*,
pp. 429ff).

His family, however, by no means disappeared. Muslim b. 'Abd
al-Raḥmān b. Muslim, his nephew, was governor of Balkh and its
provinces for Junayd and Naṣr b. Sayyār and a supporter of Naṣr in
the faction (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1529f, 1664, 1723, 1920, 1927,
1929); Qaṭan b. Qutayba, his son, was governor of Bukhārā
and its provinces for Junayd and Naṣr (*ibid.*, pp. 1529, 1548,
1664); and Salm b. Qutayba, another son, was governor of Basra
for Yazīd b. 'Umar b. Hubayra in the third civil war (*ibid.*, ser. iii,
pp. 21ff; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 610, 621). All three are said to have
been candidates for the governorship of Khurāsān which eventually
went to Naṣr b. Sayyār (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1559f, 1663, 1721).
Under the 'Abbāsids they rose to even greater prominence. Salm
became governor of Basra and Rayy for Manṣūr (*ibid.*, ser. iii,
pp. 206, 305, 319, 327; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 625, 675; Miles,
Numismatic History of Rayy, pp. 27f). Miswar b. 'Abdallāh b.
Muslim, presumably one of Qutayba's nephews, was in charge of
the *aḥdāth* of Basra in 159 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 466). And Qutayba's
grandsons held an enormous number of offices until the fourth civil
war. 'Amr b. Muslim b. Qutayba and 'Amr b. Salm b. Qutayba
both fought against Ustādhsīs in 150 (*ibid.*, pp. 357f). Muthannā
b. al-Ḥajjāj b. Qutayba was governor of Ṭabaristān in 176
(*ibid.*, p. 613; Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 189 = 132).
Muḥammad b. al-Muthannā appears in the entourage of Ṭalḥa b.
Ṭāhir (Ṭayfūr, *Kitāb Baghdād*, pp. 170f). Kathīr b. Salm b.
Qutayba was governor of Sīstān for Hādī and later deputy gover-
nor of Sind for his brother Sa'īd (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 745, 746;
Tārīkh-i Sīstān, p. 151). Sa'īd b. Salm campaigned against
Yūsuf al-Barm in 160 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 670), governed Mosul,
Ṭabaristān, the Jazīra and Sind at various times under Hārūn, and

participated in the latter's campaign against the Byzantines in 191 (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 269, cf. p. 291; Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 189 = 132; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 645, 647, 746; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 746). Ibrāhīm b. Salm was governor of the Yemen under Hādī (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 568, cf. pp. 576, 587). Muthannā b. Salm appears in the army of the governor of Sīstān in 199, and the Aḥmad b. 'Amr b. Muslim al-Bāhilī who fell against Khārijites in Sīstān in 216 was presumably also a member of this family (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 173, 183). Aḥmad b. Saʿīd b. Salm b. Qutayba conducted an unsuccessful campaign against the rebellious Zuṭṭ in the reign of Muʿtaṣim and was later appointed to the *thughūr* by Wāthiq and was responsible for the ransom of Muslim prisoners-of-war from the Byzantines in 231 (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 576, 588; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1352ff; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 797). Abū'l-Aḥwaṣ b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd b. Salm b. Qutayba participated in the repression of the Zanj against whom he fell together with his son in 256 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1786, 1837; cf. also p. 1809). But Saʿīd b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd b. Salm al-Bāhilī, who can scarcely fail to have been his brother, took his cue from the Zanj and set himself up as a highway robber in the marshes with his Bāhilī companions; he was executed in 258 (*ibid.*, pp. 1858f).

(34) *Saʿīd b. Aslam b. Zurʿa al-Kilābī/Qays.* Saʿīd's ancestor has something of a pre-Islamic history and may have been a *sharīf* (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.v.* 'Zurʿa b. 'Amr'). Aslam b. Zurʿa was a Basran who went to Khurāsān several times, and who became governor there for 'Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād in 55 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 65, 81, 168, 172); on his dismissal in 59 he had to pay up 300 000 dirhams (*ibid.*, p. 189). Saʿīd b. Aslam was among the men who stayed loyal to Ḥajjāj at Rustaqābādh (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 287, 289), and was rewarded with the governorship of Makrān; when he was killed there, Ḥajjāj brought up Muslim b. Saʿīd together with his own children (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 435; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1457). Muslim was later appointed to Khurāsān by 'Umar b. Hubayra (*ibid.*; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 484; cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 415, 454f).

(35) *Saʿīd b. Ḥassān al-Usaydī/Muḍar.* A governor of Basra and Oman who appears to be unidentifiable. He was presumably a Basran (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 391f).

(36) *Sinān b. Salama b. al-Muḥabbiq al-Hudhalī/Qays.* A Basran *muḥaddith* who was governor of Sind for Ziyād and 'Ubaydallāh

b. Ziyād, and who was appointed to Baḥrayn by Ḥajjāj. He died there, leaving his son Mūsā as his successor (Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol. vii, p. 124; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 433ff; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 245, 249f, 391). Mūsā b. Sinān was also governor of Oman for Ḥajjāj (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 391).

(37) *Sufyān b. Sulaym al-Azdī(?)/Yemen.* A Syrian who was head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* in Wāsiṭ (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 411). Since the reading of his *nisba* is conjectural, there are two possibilities of identification. Either he is the Sufyān b. Sulaymān al-Azdī with whom Yazīd b. al-Muhallab deposited his baggage in Palestine on his escape from prison (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1211), or else he was the brother or possibly the nephew of the Sulaymān b. Sulaym al-Kalbī who was among the Syrian troops in Iraq under Yūsuf b. ʿUmar. Sulaymān commanded the Bukhāriyya and Qīqāniyya in Kufa at the time of Zayd's revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1708); he was among the few men who protected Yūsuf on the outbreak of the civil war just as Sufyān b. Salāma b. Sulaym, his nephew, was one of the few men who left with Yūsuf (*ibid.*, pp. 1838ff), and he was eventually crucified by Abū'l-ʿAbbās (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 486). Back in Syria the B. Sulaym b. Kaysān similarly assisted the beleaguered Walīd II against the *Yamaniyya* of Yazīd III (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1802). No explanation of their unusual allegiances is offered.

(38) *Suwayd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Minqarī/Muḍar.* A Kufan who was appointed to Ḥulwān and Māsabadhān, where he assisted in the suppression of Muṭarrif b. Mughīra's revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 989ff). He had previously fought against Mukhtār in Kufa under Ibn Muṭīʿ who appointed him to his *shurṭa* (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 225f), and he similarly fought against Shabīb and Ibn al-Ashʿath under Ḥajjaj (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 911, 990). Qaʿqāʿ b. Suwayd assisted his father against Muṭarrif, fought under Maslama against the Muhallabids (*ibid.*, pp. 990, 1402), and was appointed by Ibn Hubayra to Sīstān (Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 284 = 95; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 125; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 484, where he is appointed by Yazīd II and dismissed by Ibn Hubayra). According to Ibn al-Kalbī, he was a *sharīf* (*Ǧamhara, s.v.*).

(39) *Ṭalḥa b. Saʿīd al-Juhanī/Yemen.* A Damascene who was deputy governor of Basra (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 414). He later reappears as the commander of Juhayna in Yazīd III's revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1792). The longevity seems excessive, and it is possible that two generations have been run together.

(40) *Ṭufayl b. Ḥusayn al-Baḥrānī/Yemen.* A general who was briefly

governor of Oman (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 391; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Gamhara*, *s.v.* 'Ṭufayl b. Ḥiṣn'). Judging from his *nisba*, he was a Syrian from Ḥimṣ.

(41) *'Ubaydallāh b. Abī Bakra al-Thaqafī/Qays.* A son of a famous *mawlā* and companion of the Prophet (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'Abū Bakra'). 'Ubaydallāh was governor of Sīstān, first under Ziyād and next under Ḥajjāj (cf. Bosworth, "Ubaidallāh b. Abī Bakra and the "Army of Destruction" in Zābulistān').

(42) *'Umāra b. Tamīm al-Lakhmī/Yemen.* One of Ḥajjāj's Syrian commanders at Dayr al-Jamājim who was later sent to Sīstān to hunt down Ibn al-Ash'ath (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1076, 1101, 1104, 1123, 1133; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 375, where it is suggested that he was of Qayn/Yemen; Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, pp. 67f). He celebrated his victory over the rebels in 85 by issuing the last Arab–Sasanian coin so far known (Gaube, *Numismatik*, pp. 76f).

(43) *'Umayr b. Hāni' al-'Ansī/Yemen.* A Damascene who was employed by Ḥajjāj to repress the Kurds, and who was later appointed deputy governor of Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 385; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 323f, where he has become an 'Absī). Under 'Umar II he became governor of the Thaniyya and Ḥawrān, and he is said to have survived until 132, when he was killed by one of Marwān's men (Ibn Ḥibbān, *'Ulamā'*, p. 112). Qays b. Hāni', his brother, and Ya'qūb b. 'Umayr b. Hāni', his son, were both among the supporters of Yazīd III; Ya'qūb commanded the troops of Dārayyā in the revolt against Walīd and was later sent to deal with the disgruntled *ashrāf* in Ḥimṣ (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1792, 1826f); Qays was killed by Marwān II (*ibid.*, pp. 1835f). Like so many other followers of Yazīd III they were Ghaylānīs (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Gailāniya', pp. 273ff).

(44) *Yazīd b. Abī Kabsha Abū 'Ulāqa al-Saksakī/Yemen.* A Syrian general of sharifian descent who was head of Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa* in Wāsiṭ and later his successor (cf. Appendix I, no. 3).

(45) *Ziyād b. 'Amr al-'Atakī/Yemen.* A Basran *sharīf* who was head of the *shurṭa* and deputy governor in Basra (cf. Appendix I, no. 33).

(46) *Ziyād b. Jarīr al-Bajalī/Yemen.* A Kufan *sharīf* who was head of the *shurṭa* and deputy governor in Kufa (cf. Appendix I, no. 26).

(47) *Ziyād b. al-Rabī'* and *Qaṭan b. Ziyād al-Ḥārithī/Yemen.* Governors of Baḥrayn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 360, 391, 415). Their ancestor, Dayyān, was also the ancestor of the 'Abd al-Madān family with whom the 'Abbāsids intermarried, and he is said to have been

chief of Madhhij before Dhū' l-Ghuṣṣa in pre-Islamic times (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 259 and *s.v.* 'Yazīd b. Qaṭan al-Daiyān'). They were thus accredited *ashrāf.* Rabīʿ b. Ziyād, however, had settled in Basra where Madhhij were very few, and he had spent most of his time in eastern Iran, where he participated in the wars of conquest together with his brother Muhājir and became governor first of Sīstān and next of Khurāsān (Balādhurī, *Futūh*, pp. 377, 382, 391, 393, 397, 410; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 455ff; Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, pp. 21ff). After having served Ḥajjāj, Ziyād b. al-Rabīʿ b. Ziyād (or a son of his named Rabīʿ) was taken prisoner by the Muhallabids during their revolt in 102, but spared execution because of his *sharaf* and *bayt qadīm* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1409; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 58). Thereafter they seem to disappear, though the Yaḥyā b. Ziyād b. al-Ḥārith al-Ḥārithī who was governor of Baḥrayn for Khālid al-Qasrī was doubtless a member of this family (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 539).

YAZĪD B. AL-MUHALLAB AL-AZDĪ/YEMEN (96–9)

(48) ʿ*Abdallāh b. Hilāl al-Kilābī/Qays.* One of Yazīd's governors of Basra and the sole Qaysī in an almost wholly Yemeni staff (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1310; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 428, where Hilāl has become Bilāl). Kilābī might be a mistake for Kalbī, in which case he would be a Yemeni, but there seems to be no variant in support of this conjecture.

(49) *Ashʿath b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Jārūd al-ʿAbdī/Rabīʿa.* A Basran *sharīf* who was governor of Baḥrayn (cf. Appendix I, no. 27).

(50) *Bashīr b. Ḥassān al-Nahdī (or Mahrī)/Yemen.* One of Yazīd's governors of Kufa and, judging by his *nisba*s, a Syrian (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1314; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 429).

(51) *Ḥabīb b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/Yemen.* Yazīd's brother and governor of Sind; he is said to have been appointed by Sulaymān or Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, presumably at Yazīd's request (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 429; Balādhurī, *Futūh*, p. 441).

(52) *Ḥarb b. ʿAbdallāh.* Head of Yazīd's *shurṭa* in Wāsiṭ (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 427). He seems unidentifiable. Ibn al-Kalbī does know a Ḥarb b. ʿAbdallāh of Tamīm whose son and nephew joined the ʿAbbāsid troops in Khurāsān (*Ǧamhara, s.vv.* "Uqba b. Ḥarb' and 'Ri'āb b. Shaddād'); but since the head of the Wāsiṭī *shurṭa* was invariably a Syrian, they are unlikely to be identical.

(53) *Ḥarmala b. ʿUmayr al-Lakhmī/Yemen.* Yazīd's first governor of

Kufa; he had apparently been appointed by Yazīd b. Abī Kabsha, Ḥajjāj's successor in office, and was probably a Syrian (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 429).

(54) *'Imrān b. al-Nu'mān al-Kalā'ī/Yemen.* One of Yazīd's governors of Sind (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 430). Dhū'l-Kalā' having settled in Ḥimṣ, he was presumably a Syrian (cf. Appendix I, no. 2).

(55) *Jarrāḥ b. 'Abdallāh al-Ḥakamī/Yemen.* A Syrian general who had been deputy governor of Basra for Ḥajjāj, and who was appointed deputy governor of Iraq by Yazīd (cf. above, no. 16).

(56) *Marwān b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/Yemen.* Yazīd's brother and last deputy governor of Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1310; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 429).

(57) *Mu'āwiya b. Yazīd b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/Yemen.* Yazīd's son who was appointed to Sīstān after Mudrik (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 429; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, pp. 283f = 94; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 121).

(58) *Mudrik b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/Yemen.* Yazīd's brother and first governor of Sīstān (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 429; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, pp. 283f = 94; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 121).

(59) *Mukhallad b. Yazīd al-Azdī/Yemen.* Yazīd's son who was governor of Khurāsān before his father's arrival (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 429).

(60) *Sufyān b. 'Abdallāh (or 'Umayr) al-Kindī/Yemen.* A governor of Basra from 96 to 98 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1305, 1335; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 428, where the date is obviously wrong). He is not otherwise known, and the possibilities of identification are endless. If Khalīfa's version of his name is right, he might be a brother of Ḥasan b. 'Umayr Abī'l-'Amaraṭṭa al-Kindī who went to Khurāsān with Jarrāḥ (cf. above, no. 12) and intermarried with Azd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1485). But he might as well be somebody else.

(61) *'Uthmān b. al-Ḥakam b. Tha'laba al-Hunā'ī/Yemen.* The head of Yazīd's *shurṭa* in Basra (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 427). Another version has Yazīd appoint him to his *shurṭa* at the time of his revolt (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 59). He appears to be otherwise unknown.

(62) *Yazīd b. Abī Kabsha al-Saksakī/Yemen.* A Syrian general of sharifian descent who had been Ḥajjāj's successor in office and who was appointed to Sind by Sulaymān or Ṣāliḥ b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, presumably in concert with Yazīd (cf. Appendix I, no. 3).

(63) *Ziyād b. Jarīr b. 'Abdallāh al-Bajalī/Yemen.* A Kufan *sharīf* who was head of the *shurṭa* in Kufa (cf. Appendix I, no. 26).

(64) *Ziyād b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/Yemen.* Yazīd's brother and governor
of Oman (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 430).

<div style="text-align:center">'UMAR B. HUBAYRA AL-FAZĀRĪ/QAYS (102–5)</div>

(65) *Firās b. Sumayy al-Fazārī/Qays.* An affinal relative of Ibn Hubayra,
who appointed him to Basra (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 483).

(66) *Hassān b. 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Mas'ūd al-Fazārī/Qays.* A
Damascene who was governor of Basra (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 483).
His father had commanded a summer campaign under Mu'āwiya in
56 and conducted the enquiry into the Iraqi complaints against
Hajjāj under 'Abd al-Malik (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 173; Balādhurī,
Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 295f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 268, where the
name is somewhat different).

(67) *Hawthara b. Suhayl al-Bāhilī/Qays.* Hawthara is said to have been
head of Ibn Hubayra's *shurta* in Wāsit (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 488),
but that is presumably a doublet of his role under the later Ibn
Hubayra in Wāsit. He was governor of Egypt for Marwān II from
128 to 131 ('Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 88ff), sent to Iraq to reinforce
Yazīd b. 'Umar b. Hubayra in 131 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 601;
Tabarī, ser. iii, pp. 10, 13), and killed by the 'Abbāsids after the
surrender of Wāsit in 132 (Tabarī, ser. iii, p. 69). According to
Severus, however, he was killed in Egypt by Marwān himself
(Severus, *Patriarchs*, p. 186, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 117, 160ff, 168, 171,
173, 183).

(68) *Ibn Rayyāt.* The head of Ibn Hubayra's *shurta* in Basra. He is
completely unidentifiable and his name probably corrupt (Khalīfa,
Ta'rīkh, p. 488).

(69) *Ibrāhīm b. al-'Arabī al-Kinānī/Mudar.* A Syrian who is known
only from Muslim *aggada*. His maternal grandfather had the
honour of occasioning a piece of Koranic revelation: the verses
on *li'ān* were revealed because of his adultery. His mother was
the nurse of Marwān b. al-Hakam, so she saved him at the time
of the murder of 'Uthmān by sheltering him in the *bayt al-qarātīs*
in Medina (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. i, pp. 21f, vol. v, p. 79). And
in precisely the same manner Ibrāhīm saved Walīd b. 'Abd al-
Malik at the time of Ashdaq's revolt by sheltering him in the *bayt
al-qarātīs* in Damascus (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 790, cf. p. 792; Brav-
mann contrives not to see a doublet here, whence the notorious state
archives in Medina, the existence of which has been accepted even
by Van Ess (Bravmann, 'The State Archives in the Early Islamic

Era'; Van Ess, *Anfänge*, p. 27; *id.*, 'The Beginnings of Islamic Theology', p. 99)). 'Abd al-Malik appointed Ibrāhīm to the Yamāma, where he stayed until the death of Walīd (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. i, pp. 21f, vol. v, p. 79; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 393, 416, where 'Adī should be emended to 'Arabī). He was re-appointed by Ibn Hubayra (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 485).

(70) *Junayd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Murrī/Qays.* A Damascene general who was appointed to Sind (cf. Appendix I, no. 6).

(71) *Muḥammad b. Manẓūr al-Asadī/Muḍar.* The head of the *shurṭa* in Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 488; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*). His son later held the same position in Kufa under 'Abbās b. Mūsā b. 'Īsā (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.* 'al-'Alā' b. Muḥammad').

(72) *Muslim b. Sa'īd al-Kilābī/Qays.* Ḥajjāj's Basran foster-son who was appointed to Khurāsān (cf. above. no. 34).

(73) *Qa'qā' b. Suwayd al-Minqarī/Muḍar.* A. Kufan who was governor of Sīstān (cf. above, no. 38).

(74) *Sa'īd b. 'Amr al-Ḥarashī/Qays.* A general from Qinnasrīn whose descendants remained prominent far into the 'Abbāsid period. Sa'īd probably came to Iraq with Maslama in 101 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1378, but cf. p. 1092), and here 'Umar b. Hubayra appointed him governor first of Basra and next of Khurāsān in 103–4 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 483, where 'Amr has become 'Umar; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1436f, 1453ff). Having returned to Syria, he was sent to Armenia by Maslama or Hishām (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 206; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1531), fell into disgrace by making an ill-fated attack on the Khazars, but was restored to favour and later appointed governor of Armenia by Hishām (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 206f; Ghevond, *Histoire*, pp. 100f). One of his sons, Yazīd b. Sa'īd, was killed on service in North Africa under Kulthūm b. 'Iyāḍ (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 529). Another, Naḍr b. Sa'īd, was among the leaders of the *Qaysiyya* in Iraq in 127, where Marwān had appointed him governor; 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar, the governor appointed by the *Yamaniyya*, refused to relinquish his position and Naḍr eventually returned to Syria (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1885ff, 1900, 1905, 1913, 1917). A third, 'Anbasa b. Sa'īd, commanded the troops from Qinnasrīn in the Syrian army which Faḍl b. Ṣāliḥ brought with him to Egypt in 169 (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 129, where Jurashī should be emended to Ḥarashī). Yazīd b. 'Anbasa conducted a summer campaign in 171 (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 522). Sa'īd [b. ? b. Sa'īd] al-Ḥarashī is never explicitly identified as a grandson of the Umayyad general, but that he was

one is very likely (similarly von Zambaur, *Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam*, vol. i, p. 13). Mahdī employed him in Khurāsān where he defeated Muqannaʿ in 163 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 484, 494) and in Ṭabaristān (*ibid.*, pp. 521, 705). ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿīd was appointed to Ṭabaristān in 185 by Hārūn (*ibid.*, p. 650; Ibn Isfandiyār, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 196ff, cf. p. 207 = 141ff, cf. p. 147), and to Ḥimṣ in 194 by Amīn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 795). He and his brother Aḥmad both fought for Amīn in the civil war (*ibid.*, pp. 831f, 859). After the civil war he became governor of Wāsiṭ where he was defeated by Abūʾl-Sarāya in 199 (*ibid.*, p. 979). Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd al-Ḥarashī was governor of Egypt in 162 (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 122f, where his name is garbled; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 493), of Isfahan in 163 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 500; differently Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 122f), of Ṭabaristān, Ruyyān and Jurjān from 164 to 167 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 503, 518, 520; cf. Miles, *Numismatic History of Rayy*, p. 77), of Mosul from 180 to 181 (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 286ff, 290, 293), and of Jabal in 184 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 649). Sindī b. Yaḥyā al-Ḥarashī accompanied Hārūn to Ṭūs, was sent on to Maʾmūn, but returned to Iraq where he fought for Amīn in the civil war (*ibid.*, pp. 680, 734, 856). A family in Seljuq Nīshāpūr claimed descent from a certain Saʿīd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥarashī, supposedly the deputy governor of Ibn ʿĀmir in Khurāsān, whose grandson, Aḥmad b. ʿAmr b. Saʿīd al-Ḥarashī, died in Nīshāpūr in 226 – some 180 years after his grandfather's dismissal! (Bulliet, *Patricians of Nishapur*, p. 90). That it was the above family that the Nīshāpūrī Ḥarashīs claimed descent from is not in doubt, but the genealogical charter had clearly got into disorder.

(75) *Sayyāl b. al-Mundhir b. ʿAuf b. al-Nuʿmān al-Shaybānī/ Rabīʿa.* A second governor of Sīstān (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 484; Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 284 = 94; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 123, where he is named Sabbāk and appointed by Jarrāḥ b. ʿAbdallāh; cf. also Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, pp. 69, 72). Despite his lavish *nasab* he resists identification.

(76) *Ṣiʿr b. ʿAbdallāh al-Murrī/Qays.* Ibn Hubayra's deputy governor in Kufa (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 483). His name is perhaps more likely to have been Ṣaqr, but he remains unknown.

(77) *Suwayd al-Murrī/ Qays.* The head of Ibn Hubayra's *shurṭa* in Wāsiṭ (Kalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 488). Ziyād b. Suwayd, his son, was later head of the *shurṭa* of Yazīd b. ʿUmar b. Hubayra, so Khalīfa may be guilty of yet another doublet. However this may be, Ziyād was

among the *wujūh* of the Qaysiyya in Wāsiṭ where he fell or was executed by the 'Abbāsids in 132 (*ibid.*, pp. 607, 623; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 68; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 371, where he is Ziyād b. al-Ḥārith al-Muzanī).

(78) *'Ubaydallāh b. 'Alī al-Sulamī/Qays.* A governor of Sind appointed in 103 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 484). He might be identical with the Kufan of the same name who is found in Khurāsān in 96 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1291).

KHĀLID AL-QASRĪ/YEMEN (105–20)

(79) *Abān b. Dubāra al-Yazanī/Yemen.* A Syrian from Ḥimṣ and member of the famous Ḥimyarī family of Dhū Yazan, who was governor of Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1506; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 535; cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara, s.v.* 'Ďū Yazan').

(80) *'Abdallāh b. Abī Burda al-Ash'arī/Yemen.* A grandson of Abū Mūsā, the celebrated companion, conqueror and arbiter who had settled in Kufa (cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'al-Ash'arī, Abū Mūsā'). 'Abdallāh was Khālid's last governor of Sīstān. On the appointment of Yūsuf b. 'Umar to Iraq he was seized and sent to Iraq where he was killed under torture (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 384; *id., Buldān*, p. 284; Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, pp. 73f).

(81) *'Abdallāh and 'Āṣim b. 'Amr al-Bajalī/Yemen.* Two brothers who were governors of Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 536). They are not otherwise known.

(82) *'Abd al-Malik b. Jaz' b. Ḥidrijān al-Azdī/Yemen.* A Palestinian who was governor of Kufa for a while (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 535). According to Ibn al-Kalbī, he was a *sharīf* from Damascus who had held office at the time of Ḥajjāj (*Ğamhara, s.v.*; cf. also Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 571).

(83) *Asad b. 'Abdallah al-Qasrī/Yemen.* Khālid's brother and governor of Khurāsān (*Encyclopaedia of Islam,² s.v.*).

(84) *Aṣfaḥ b. 'Abdallāh Abū Khālid al-Kindī (?)/Yemen.* Governor of Sīstān (Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, p. 73). He is now a Kindī (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 537), now a Kalbī (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 284 = 95; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, table 285) and now a Shaybānī (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 126). Since the Basran Kinda counted as Rabī'a, Khalīfa and the *Tārīkh-i Sīstān* are perhaps both right (cf. Caskel in Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, vol. i, p. 33n). Aṣfaḥ's son was governor of Wāsiṭ under Manṣūr b. Jumhūr, and he must

have participated in the siege, presumably on the Syrian side, for he is an authority on the death of Qaḥṭaba (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.* 'Ḥālid b. al-Aṣfaḥ'; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 15). He also transmitted poetry dealing with the faction (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1251).

(85) *Bilāl b. Abī Burda al-Ashʿarī/ Yemen.* Another grandson of Abū Mūsa. Bilāl was head of the *shurṭa*, civil governor and *qāḍī* in Basra; on the appointment of Yūsuf b. ʿUmar to Iraq he fled to Syria, but was sent back and killed under torture (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 535; Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 388; Pellat, *Le Milieu baṣrien et la formation de Ǧāḥiẓ*, pp. 288f).

(86) *Ḍabīs b. ʿAbdallāh al-Bajalī/ Yemen.* One of Khālid's governors of Kufa (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 536). He is not otherwise known.

(87) *Ḥakam b. ʿAwāna al-Kalbī/ Yemen.* A Syrian who was deputy governor of Khurāsān for Asad al-Qasrī in 109 and governor of Sind for Khālid al-Qasrī some years later (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 428, 444; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 538). His son stayed in Kufa where he wrote Umayyad history and died about 150 (*Encyclopaedia of Islām,*[2] *s.v.* ''Awāna b. al-Ḥakam').

(88) *Haẓẓān b. Saʿīd al-Ruhāwī/ Yemen.* Governor of Baḥrayn (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 538). He was among the prisoners taken by the ʿAbbāsids after the surrender of Wāsiṭ in 132, but must have escaped execution, for he later appears as a member of Manṣūr's *ṣaḥāba* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 68f; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 178, 233, where his name is Hazzār and Marār). According to Ibn al-Kalbī, he was a Syrian *sharīf* (*Ǧamhara, s.v.* 'Zahrān b. Saʿīd').

(89) *Ismāʿīl b. Awsaṭ al-Bajalī/ Yemen.* Head of the *shurṭa* in Kufa and/or deputy governor there (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 536; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*). His father was a Damascene traditionist who had been governor of Ḥims for Yazīd I (Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. iii, p. 153). He is also said to have been from Ḥims himself (Khalīfa, *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 308).

(90) *Junayd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Murrī/ Qays.* A lone Qaysī among Khālid's men, Junayd retained his office as governor of Sind for two years after the dismissal of Ibn Hubayra (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 538; cf. Appendix I, no. 6).

(91) *Mālik b. al-Mundhir al-ʿAbdī/ Rabīʿa.* A Basran *sharīf* who was head of the *shurṭa* in his native city (cf. Appendix I, no. 27). Since the Rabīʿa were *ḥulafāʾ* of Yemen, he is not really an exception.

(92) *Muḥammad b. Ḥujr b. Qays al-Kindī(?)/ Yemen.* A governor of

Sīstān (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 127). According to Khalīfa, he was appointed by Yūsuf b. 'Umar (*Ta'rīkh*, p. 538). Khalīfa also thinks he was an 'Abdī/Rabī'a, but he has the name Ḥujr and the authority of Ibn al-Kalbī against him (*Ǧamhara*, *s.v.* 'Muḥammad b. Ḥuǧr'). Presumably, then, he was a Basran Kindī (cf. above, no. 84).

(93) *Muḥammad b. Ziyād al-Bajalī/Yemen.* A Kufan *sharīf* who was governor of Baḥrayn (cf. Appendix I, no. 26).

(94) *Naḍr b. 'Amr b. al-Muqri' al-Ḥimyarī/Yemen.* A Damascene who was civil governor of Basra (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 535, cf. p. 498). He was later a prominent member of the *Yamaniyya* : he commanded the troops of Jurash, Ḥadītha and Dayr Zakkā in Yazīd's revolt and was appointed to Yazīd's *shurṭa, ḥaras, dīwān al-kharāj* and lesser seal (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 839, 1792; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 562, who has '*jund*' for '*shurṭa*'; Ibn 'Asākir, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. x, p. 257; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 69). Sulaymān b. 'Amr al-Muqri' commanded the troops of Jordan in Khurāsān under Asad al-Qasrī in 119 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1609, where 'Azd' is an obvious mistake for 'Urdunn'). That one brother should appear as a Jordanian and the other as a Damascene is not particularly problematic as Jurash was part sometimes of the Jordanian and sometimes of the Damascene *jund*.

(95) *Nawf al-Ash'arī/Yemen.* A governor of Kufa or head of the *shurṭa* there (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 536). He is otherwise unidentifiable.

(96) *Tamīm b. Zayd al-Qaynī/Yemen.* A Syrian, presumably a Jordanian, who replaced Junayd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān as governor of Sind (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 538; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 443, where Qaynī has become 'Utbī; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 308). He reappears in 126 when he tried to smuggle a pomegranate drink to Khālid, who was being carted back to Iraq as the prisoner of Yūsuf b. 'Umar (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1822, where he is Zayd b. Tamīm al-Qaynī).

(97) *Yaḥyā b. Ismā'īl.* A governor of Baḥrayn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 539). Perhaps he was a son of Ismā'īl b. 'Abdallāh al-Qasrī, Khālid's brother, but no son of that name appears to be recorded.

(98) *Yaḥyā b. Ziyād b. al-Ḥārith al-Ḥārithī/Yemen.* Yet another governor of Baḥrayn and probably a member of the Dayyān family (cf. above, no. 47).

(99) *Yazīd b. al-Gharīf al-Hamdānī/Yemen.* A Jordanian who was governor of Sīstān (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 537; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 284 = 95; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 126, where his father is 'Arīf).

(100) *Ziyād b. 'Ubaydallāh al-Hārithī/Yemen.* Ziyād was a member of the 'Abd al-Madān family, the second and more famous branch of the B. al-Dayyān (cf. above, no. 47). They were natives of South Arabia where their memorable deeds are said to have included wars against the B. Zubayd, a delegation to the Prophet, administration of Najrān under 'Alī, and an unsuccessful battle against Mu'āwiya's envoy in the first civil war (Tabarī, ser. i, p. 3452, ser. ii, p. 384; *Aghānī,* vol. xvi, p. 266; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara, s.v.* "Abdalhiğr b. 'Amr ('Abdalmadān)'"). There is no record of when they left for the Fertile Crescent. Rayṭa bint 'Ubaydallāh must have married Muhammad b. 'Alī about the turn of the century: she was the mother of Abū'l-'Abbās (Tabarī, ser. iii, p. 88). And in 105 Ziyād b. 'Ubaydallāh appears as a recent recruit in the Syrian army where Khālid picked him up (cf. above, p. 55). He is said to have taught himself to read and write so as to qualify for a full governorship in Rayy, but having been rejected by the fiscal governor, he ended up with the more familiar job of running Khālid's *shurṭa* in Kufa (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1470f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh,* p. 536). Presumably he stayed in Iraq after Khālid's fall; he is at all events found among the beleaguered Syrian troops in Wāsiṭ in 132 when he deserted to the 'Abbāsids (Tabarī, ser. iii, p. 66). In 133 he was appointed to Mecca, Medina, Ṭā'if and Yamāma, where he stayed until the accession of Mansūr (*ibid.,* pp. 73, 81, 91; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh,* pp. 630f, 672). Muhammad b. Yazīd b. 'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-Madān was appointed to the Yemen, where he was succeeded by 'Alī b. al-Rabī' b. 'Ubaydallāh b. 'Abd al-Madān in 134, and he in turn was replaced by 'Abdallāh b. al-Rabī' b. 'Ubaydallāh b. 'Abd al-Madān under Mansūr (Tabarī, ser. iii, pp. 73, 80, 81, 265, 318; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh,* p. 673; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae,* vol. ii, p. 489, where Mansūr's governor is Rabī' b. 'Abdallāh). Yazīd b. Ziyād Abū Ghassān became chamberlain to Abū l-'Abbās (Tabarī, ser. iii, pp. 91f). The family appears to have settled in Basra and environs, where a Hārith Abū Ghassān of theirs impressed his contemporaries as a soothsayer, and where a number of them were outrageously massacred by a bad-tempered general in 134, a scandal which provided much fuel for residual Yemeni feelings (*ibid.,* pp. 21, 76f).

YŪSUF B. 'UMAR AL-THAQAFĪ/QAYS (120–6)

(101) *'Abbās b. Sa'īd al-Murrī/Qays.* The head of Yūsuf's *shurṭa*

(Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1702, 1707, 1711, where Murrī has consistently become Muzanī; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 99; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 556, who specifies Murra/Ghaṭafān; similarly Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara, s.v.* "'Abbās b. Sa'd').

(102) *'Abdallah b. Sharīk al-Numayrī/Qays.* Governor of Baḥrayn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 539). He is not otherwise known.

(103) *Abū Umayya b. al-Mughīra al-Thaqafī/Qays.* A member of Āl Abī 'Aqīl, Yūsuf's own family; he was Yūsuf's last governor of Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 536, 553).

(104) *'Amr b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qārī/Muḍar.* The head of the *shurṭa* in Kufa at the time of Zayd b. 'Alī's revolt; he had probably been appointed by Ḥakam b. al-Ṣalt al-Thaqafī, Yūsuf's governor of Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 556, cf. below, no. 107). The choice is explained by the fact that the B. Qāra were *akhwāl* of Qays (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1699).

(105) *Bishr b. Sallām al-'Abdī/Rabī'a.* Bishr is mentioned as governor of Baḥrayn at the time of Walīd's death and had presumably been appointed by Yūsuf b. 'Umar; he managed to hang on, apparently without official sanction, until he was confirmed in office by Yazīd b. 'Umar b. Hubayra. He died soon after and was succeeded by his sons, Sayyār and Salm (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 617).

(106) *Fayḍ b. Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Thaqafī/Qays.* Governor of Oman (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1780; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 553, where his name has been run together with that of Kardam b. Bayhas, cf. below, no. 111). He was another member of Yūsuf's family.

(107) *Ḥakam b. al-Ṣalt al-Thaqafī/Qays.* Governor of Kufa in 122 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1699, 1701, 1712; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 536). He was yet another member of Yūsuf's family and had previously served in Khurāsān under Junayd; apparently it was Yūsuf's wish to substitute him for Naṣr b. Sayyār as governor of Khurāsān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1718f).

(108) *Ḥarb b. Qaṭan al-Hilālī/Qays.* One of Yūsuf's governors of Sīstān (cf. above, no. 32).

(109) *Ibrāhīm b. 'Āṣim al-'Uqaylī/Qays.* A general from the Jazīra who is found in Khurāsān under 'Āṣim b. 'Abdallāh al-Hilālī and Asad al-Qasrī, and who became governor of Sīstān under Yūsuf, on whose behalf he killed and confiscated the property of his predecessor, or, according to others, had him seized and sent on to Iraq where he was killed under torture by Yūsuf. He himself died in Sīstān in 126 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1579, 1594ff;

Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 538; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 127ff; cf. above, no. 80).

(110) *Juday‘ b. ʿAlī al-Azdī/Yemen.* On his appointment to Iraq Yūsuf is said to have dismissed Jaʿfar b. Ḥanẓala al-Bahrānī/Yemen from Khurāsān with the intention of appointing Salm b. Qutayba/Qays. Hishām, however, refused to ratify the choice and Yusuf appointed Juday‘ b. ʿAlī instead, evidently as a stop-gap, for he was soon replaced by Naṣr b. Sayyār al-Laythī/Muḍar, Hishām's candidate (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1659ff).

(111) *Kardam b. Bayhas* [*al-Kilābī/Qays (?)*]. Governor of Oman (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 553, where his name has been run together with that of Fayḍ b. Muḥammad, cf. above, no. 106). He was doubtless a son of Bayhas b. Zumayl al-Kilābī, a Damascene who held Walīd II's seal and who is found in Walīd's entourage at the time of Yazīd's attack (Ibn ʿAsākir, *Taʾrīkh*, vol. x, p. 396; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1795f; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, p. 68). There was admittedly another Damascene *sharīf* by the name of Bayhas b. Ṣuhayb al-Jarmī/Yemen, a man of Basran origin whose son Saʿīd is said to have been imprisoned by Walīd for his failure to support the change of succession (Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. iii, p. 323; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 54, 1776); but he is evidently a less likely candidate. Both families survived into the ʿAbbāsid period. Ṣāliḥ b. Bayhas al-Kilābī was sent to Constantinople in 184 to redeem Muslim prisoners-of-war (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 731). Yaḥyā b. Ṣāliḥ and Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ took control of Damascus in the chaotic years after the fourth civil war as supporters of an Umayyad pretender (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 363; Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, pp. 78, 97). And a Yemeni Ibn Bayhas was among the *ahl al-buyūtāt* who supported the Sufyānī in his rebellion against Muʿtaṣim and Wāthiq in 227 according to Ṭabarī (ser. iii, pp. 1320, 1322); according to Yaʿqūbī, however, he was yet another Ibn Bayhas al-Kilābī (*Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 586). Michael the Syrian supplies no *nisba* (*Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 542 = vol. iii, p. 103).

(112) *Kathīr b. ʿAbdallāh al-Sulamī/Qays.* Governor of Basra from 120 to 122 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1667; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 535). In 126 he was head of the *shurṭa* for ʿAbd al-Malik b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥajjāj, the governor of Damascus (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1789f). He was probably a Damascene like his employers.

(113) *Khirāsh b. Ḥawshab al-Shaybānī/Rabīʿa.* A Kufan *sharīf* who was head of the local *shurṭa* (cf. Appendix I, no. 30).

(114) *Muḥammad b. Ḥassān b. Sa'd al-Usaydī/Muḍar.* A Basran who
was governor of Baḥrayn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 539; cf. Ibn al-
Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.* 'Ḥassān b. Sa'd').

(115) *Muḥammad b. Ḥujr b. Qays al-Kindī (?)/Yemen.* A governor of
Sīstān who was appointed by Yūsuf according to Khalīfa, but by
his predecessor according to the local tradition (cf. above, no. 92).

(116) *Muḥammad b. Nubāta al-Kilābī/Qays.* Governor of Wāsiṭ, where
he was taken prisoner by the *Yamaniyya* on the arrival of Man-
ṣūr b. Jumhūr in 126 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1837). Muḥammad's
father, Nubāta b. Ḥanẓala, was a Syrian who is said to have
participated in the bombardment of the Ka'ba in the second civil
war (Ibn Qutayba, *Ma'ārif*, p. 184); he came to Iraq in the course
of the third civil war, and he and his sons were among the *wujūh
al-Qaysiyya* there in 127 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1885, 1905);
Yazīd b. 'Umar b. Hubayra sent Nubāta to Jurjān where he fell
against Qaḥṭaba in 130 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 2003ff; Khalīfa,
Ta'rīkh, pp. 591f). Muḥammad stayed in Iraq, endured the
siege of Wāsiṭ, and was among the *wujūh al-Qaysiyya* who were
executed by the 'Abbāsids in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 15ff, 65,
68f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 607, 610; the names of the various
members of the family are hopelessly confused, cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii,
p. 1885 as compared with Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 94).

(117) *Qāsim b. Muḥammad al-Thaqafī/Qays.* Yūsuf's relative and
governor of Basra (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 535, 552; Balādhurī,
Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 153).

(118) *Qāsim b. 'Umar al-Thaqafī/Qays.* Yūsuf's brother and governor
of Yemen (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 534). He was still in the Yemen in
129 when he was defeated by the Ibāḍīs; apparently Marwān II
had appointed him to either Ṣan'ā' or the entire province (*ibid.*,
pp. 582f; Caetani, *Chronografia Islamica*, p. 1621).

(119) *'Ubaydallāh b. al-'Abbās al-Kindī/Yemen.* A Kufan who is said
to have been governor of Fars for Khālid al-Qasrī, of Kufa for
Yūsuf b. 'Umar, of Qinnasrīn for Abū 'l-'Abbās and of Armenia for
Manṣūr, a wildly improbable career for a Kufan *shurṭī* (Ibn al-
Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*). He may have been governor of Kufa for
Yūsuf or the head of his *shurṭa* there (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 536,
552). But according to Ṭabarī, he was merely a fairly prominent
member of the local *shurṭa* under Yūsuf, and governor of Kufa only
under Manṣūr b. Jumhūr, the representative of Yazīd's *Yamaniyya*,
and that is doubtless the correct version (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1699,
1855). Ibn al-Kalbī also advances great claims on behalf of the

founders of the family: Yazīd b. al-Aswad was blessed as a child by the Prophet, Jabala b. Saʿd b. al-Aswad also visited the Prophet, and Masrūq b. Yazīd parcelled out the land of the B. Yazīd in Kufa (*Ǧamhara, s.vv.*, cf. also table 237). But the family was clearly a product of the local police force. Aktal b. al-ʿAbbās commanded the archers in Maslama's army against the Muhallabids (thus at least Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*); ʿUbaydallah similarly fought together with Syrian troops in 126 when he assisted in the suppression of Zayd's revolt, and in 127 when he fought against the Khārijites (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1699, 1705; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 569). Jaʿfar b. ʿUbaydallāh also fought against Zayd, apparently as a commander of Syrian troops; he was head of the *shurṭa* of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar in 127, when he fell in battle against the Khārijites (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1701f, 1901; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 570); Silsila b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-ʿAbbās is credited with the defeat of the Khārijite ʿUbayda, Ḍaḥḥāk's successor who fell in 129 (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1945); and Nuʿmān b. al-Masrūq b. Yazīd fell in Khurāsān at an unspecified time (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*).

(120) *ʿUmar (or ʿAmr) b. Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Thaqafī/Qays.* Yūsuf's governor of Sind and yet another member of the Āl Abī ʿAqīl (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 526, 538, 553). His father had been governor of Sind for Ḥajjāj (cf. above, no. 25). He himself committed suicide on the outbreak of the civil war to avoid torture at the hands of his Yemeni successor (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1839; cf. Appendix IV, no. 24).

(121) *Yūsuf b. Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Thaqafī/Qays.* A brother of the above and one of the governors of Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 536).

(122) *Ziyād b. Ṣakhr al-Lakhmī/Yemen.* A Syrian, presumably from Palestine, who was one of Yūsuf's governors of Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 536). He is the only significant exception to Yūsuf's preference for Qays and Muḍar, and his involvement with the *Qaysiyya* was permanent: he later held an administrative post in Palestine under Rumāḥis b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Kinānī, Marwān II's governor there (Grohmann, *Arabic Papyri from Ḥirbet el-Mird*, nos. 26f, 43, 60f, 87). He is also known as a traditionist (Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 403).

APPENDIX IV

THE *YAMANIYYA* AND THE *QAYSIYYA*

This appendix is a list of the Syrian soldiers who conducted the civil war in Syria and Iraq between 126 and 132. It omits all Qurashīs (largely Umayyads), all Syrians who fought elsewhere, and, with the exception of no. 46, all earlier representatives who fail to reappear in the civil war itself. Iraqis have been included when they received appointment from the Syrians. The list should have the vast majority of the named protagonists and certainly all who were in the least important.

A. THE YAMANIYYA

(1) *'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Thābit al-'Ansī/Yemen*. An adherent of Yazīd III who had served in Khurāsān and who later became a fiscal officer under Manṣūr and Mahdī; he was a Qadarī (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Ġailāniya', p. 273).

(2) *'Abd al-Raḥmān* and *'Abdallāh b. Yazīd al-Sulamī/Qays*. Another two Qadarīs who participated in Yazīd's revolt (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Ġailāniya', pp. 273, 275). They were doubtless Jordanians.

(3) *'Abd al-Sallām b. Bukayr b. Shammākh al-Lakhmī/Yemen*. One of the murderers of Walīd II (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1800, 1806; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 549). There is much disagreement on his father's position. He is said to have been head of Yazīd III's *shurṭa* (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 562; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. x, p. 257), but others think that it was Yazīd b. Shammākh who enjoyed this position (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 402); he is also said to have been secretary to Yazīd III (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. x, p. 257), but others think that he enjoyed this position under Walīd II, which seems rather unlikely (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 838). However this may be, the family was Damascene (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. x, p. 257).

(4) *'Abd al-Ṣamad b. Abān al-Anṣārī/Yemen*. One of 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar's governors of Kufa (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 616). 'Abd al-Ṣamad's great-grandfather, Bashīr b. Sa'd, was a Medinese com-

panion of the Prophet credited with various expeditions in the Prophet's lifetime, a major role in the day of the *saqīfa* and a minor role in the conquest of 'Ayn al-Tamr, where he fell (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 1592f, 1597, 1843f; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 244, 248). Nu'mān b. Bashīr, his better known grandfather, was an 'Uthmānī who refused to give allegiance to 'Alī and who fought for Mu'āwiya in the first civil war; the sources characteristically send him to 'Ayn al-Tamr (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3070, 3255, 3444f). Mu'āwiya appointed him to Ḥimṣ, where he had settled, perhaps also to the Ḥaḍramawt, and certainly to Kufa in 59 (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 137; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 188, 195). Yazīd confirmed him in office on his accession, but replaced him soon after in the course of the Muslim b. 'Aqīl affair in 60 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 216, 228, 238f). He is also mentioned among the men who were sent by Yazīd to extract an oath of allegiance from Ibn al-Zubayr (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 316). On the death of Yazīd, however, he gave his allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr, who appointed him to Ḥimṣ, from where he supplied Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays with reinforcements for the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 468, 474; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 59; vol. v, p. 127). He fled from Ḥimṣ after Ḍaḥḥāk's defeat, but was caught and killed by a local Kalā'ī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 480). At least three of his descendants were known as *muḥaddithūn* (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. iii, pp. 260f, 270f), but nothing is heard of them outside the world of scholarship until 126, when the B. Nu'mān b. Bashīr came to assist Walīd II against Yazīd III (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1802). How 'Abd al-Ṣamad ended up on the other side is hard to tell in the absence of further information, but one would guess that he had become a soldier.

(5) *'Amr b. Ḥuwayy al-Saksakī/Yemen.* The descendant of a Damascene *sharīf* who commanded the *rub'* of Kinda for Mu'āwiya at Ṣiffīn, and who claimed to have felled 'Ammār b. Yāsir (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 222; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, s.v. 'Ḥuwaiy b. Māti''; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 296). His appearance on Yazīd's side is a little odd in that an Ibn Ḥuwayy is also listed among the disgruntled *ashrāf* on whom Yazīd showered honours after having put down their revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1831); but whatever the relationship between the two, 'Amr commanded Yazīd's right wing in the attack on Walīd, and Nūḥ b. 'Amr figures as an authority on the death of Walīd (*ibid.*, pp. 1797f, 1801). His previous career is unknown.

(6) *'Amr b. Yazīd al-Ḥakamī/Yemen.* A somewhat shadowy figure who appears in the quintessentially Yemeni, but not very illuminating, roles of bringing *amān* to Yazīd b. al-Muhallab and advising Yazīd III at the time of their respective revolts (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1387f, 1784). If he is identical with the 'Amr/'Umar b. Yazīd/Zayd al-Ḥakamī who supported Ibn al-Zubayr in Damascus in the second civil war, he must have been extraordinarily long-lived (*ibid.*, pp. 471, 817; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 133, 354). He was probably a brother of 'Abdallāh b. Yazīd al-Ḥakamī, the head of 'Abd al-Malik and Walīd I's *shurṭa* (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 335; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 373; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 395, where his father's name is Zayd). 'Abdallāh must also have enjoyed unusual longevity, for he is later found in the *ṣaḥāba* of Manṣūr (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 178). Perhaps two generations have been run together.

(7) *'Anbasa b. Sa'īd al-Sakṣakī/Yemen.* A participant in Yazīd's revolt in 126 and apparently a *sharīf* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1784, 1799). He is unidentifiable.

(8) *Aṣbagh b. Dhu'āla al-Kalbī/Yemen.* A Palmyrene who had served in Khurāsān under Asad al-Qasrī in 119 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1595, 1892f), and who may have been in Kufa in 122 (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*). In 126 he was one of the conspirators against Walīd II and a supporter of Sulaymān b. Hishām (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1878); in 127 he commanded the Yemeni troops in Iraq together with his sons and rebelled against Marwān II back in Syria (*ibid.*, pp. 1892ff, 1900, 1902); and after the 'Abbāsid revolution he joined forces with Qays and participated in the revolt of Abū'l-Ward b. Zufar in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 55; cf. Appendix I, no. 19). According to another version he was executed by Marwān (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 484).

(9) *Bishr b. Shaybān, mawlā of the Kināna b. 'Umayr of Kalb/Yemen.* One of the murderers of Walīd II (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1806, 1809). He is not otherwise known.

(10) *B. Diḥya b. Khalīfa al-Kalbī/Yemen.* Diḥya b. Khalīfa was a companion of the Prophet credited with outstanding beauty and a mission to Heraclius; he settled in Mizza near Damascus (*Encyclopaedia of Islām²*, *s.v.*). Three of his descendants figure in the third civil war. Harim b. 'Abdallāh b. Diḥya commanded a minor detachment in Yazīd's battle against Walīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1794); Sulaymān b. 'Abdallāh b. Diḥya also participated, *as is indicated*

by the presence of a client of his (*ibid.*, p. 1805); and 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Hārūn b. 'Abdallāh b. Dihya was offered the governorship of Iraq, but declined because he had no *jund* (*ibid.*, p. 1836).

(11) *Ḥajjāj b. Arṭāh al-Nakha'ī/Yemen*. A Kufan *faqīh* who was head of the *shurṭa* for Manṣūr b. Jumhūr and 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 559, 578). He later entered the service of Abū'l-'Abbās for whom he was briefly *qāḍī* of Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 61; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 634). Manṣūr made him his *kātib* and employed him in the construction of Baghdad (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 276, 322; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 269; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, pp. 241f, 249 = 17f, 31). He accompanied Mahdī to Rayy, where he died in 150 (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, *s.v.*; Khalīfa, *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 167; differently Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 648).

(12) *Ḥakam b. Utayba al-Asadī/Muḍar*. A Syrian who was appointed to the *shurṭa* in Kufa by 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Qurashī, the subgovernor of 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar in 126 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1902).

(13) *Ḥumayd b. Ḥabīb al-Lakhmī/Yemen*. A rebel against Walīd who commanded the troops from Dayr Murrān, Arza and Saṭrā (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1792, 1794f).

(14) *Ḥumayd b. Naṣr al-Lakhmī/Yemen*. One of the soldiers who planned the conspiracy against Walīd and who participated in the battle against him (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1800).

(15) *Ḥurayth b. Abī'l-Jahm al-Kalbī/Yemen*. Ḥurayth's father was among the Syrians who were sent with Sufyān b. al-Abrad al-Kalbī to Ṭabaristān in 77 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1020), and from there he must have gone first to Iraq, where he appears as executioner for Ḥajjāj in 83 (*ibid.*, p. 1098), and next to Khurāsān, where he served Yazīd b. al-Muhallab (*ibid.*, p. 1328). Ḥurayth himself was in Iraq at the time of Yazīd's revolt and became governor of Wāsiṭ for Manṣūr b. Jumhūr (*ibid.*, pp. 1836f, 1839). He was a member of the Kalbī subtribe of 'Āmir and thus presumably from either Mizza near Damascus or Palmyra (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, table 288).

(16) *Janāḥ b. Nu'aym al-Kalbī/Yemen*. A rebel against Walīd (Ṭabarī, ser, ii, p. 1798). He was presumably the brother of Ḥamala b. Nu'aym al-Kalbī, a commander of the Damascene troops in Khurāsān under Asad al-Qasrī in 119 (*ibid.*, p. 1609. cf. p. 1721).

(17) *Jarīr b. Yazīd al-Bajalī/Yemen*. A Kufan *sharīf* who was governor of Basra for Manṣūr b. Jumhūr (cf. Appendix I, no. 26).

(18) *Khālid b. al-Asfaḥ al-Kindī (?)/Yemen (?)*. A governor of Wāsiṭ

for Manṣūr b. Jumhūr who was probably a Basran Kindī (cf. Appendix III, no. 84).

(19) *B. Khālid al-Qasrī/Yemen.* The members of Khālid's family were among the leaders of the *Yamaniyya* in the third civil war (cf. Appendix I, no. 11).

(20) *Manṣūr b. Jumhūr al-Kalbī/Yemen.* One of the most important generals of the *Yamaniyya.* A coarse soldier equally devoid of nobility and piety, Manṣūr was shunned by devout contemporaries as an *a'rābī* possessed of only one genuine feeling, *viz.* anger at the murder of Khālid; religious creeds, by contrast, he regarded merely as tickets of entry to whatever party he found of use at a given time (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1837). He presumably began his career in Iraq together with his fellow-tribesmen of the B. 'Āmir (cf. *ibid.*, p. 1098), but he first appears in Syria with a Ghaylānī ticket to plan and carry out the murder of Walīd (*ibid.*, pp. 1778, 1797f, 1800, 1803f, 1809, 1837). Thereafter he was sent to take control of Iraq, perhaps as the deputy of Ḥārith b. al-'Abbās b. al-Walīd (*ibid.*, pp. 1835ff), but his tenure was of short duration, and he was replaced by 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz in the same year (*ibid.*, pp. 1854f). Apparently he returned to Syria, but he was back in Iraq in 127, when he participated in the faction fighting and combated the Khārijites under Ibn 'Umar; and since the Khārijites had the upper hand, he pronounced himself a sinner wishing to obey God's word and became a proselyte (*ibid.*, pp. 1902, 1906f). Allied with the Khārijites he set himself up in western Persia and fought Ibn Hubayra until he and his allies were decisively beaten, whereupon he hastily deposited his money with a *ṣayrafī* in Madā'in and fled to Fars, where a motley crowd of enemies of Marwān had congregated around 'Abdallāh b. Mu'āwiya (*ibid.*, pp. 1915f, 1946f, 1977, cf. p. 1883; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 165). Meanwhile he forgot *taḥkīm* and adopted love of the *qurbā* instead (Miles, *Numismatic History of Rayy*, pp. 15ff). Even in Fars, however, the Yemenis were being rounded up. Defeated by Ibn Hubayra's generals, the motley crowd dispersed and Manṣūr fled to India where he succeeded in setting himself up as governor, apparently with a hurriedly acquired mandate from the 'Abbāsids (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1979, ser. iii, pp. 72, 75; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 407). But his luck was out. In 134 Mūsā b. Ka'b was sent to deal with him, and having been defeated once again he fled into the desert where he died of thirst (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 80; cf. Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp. 161f).

Several members of Mansūr's family similarly participated in the civil war. Hibāl b. 'Amr, his cousin, was among the conspirators (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1880). Jahshana, a nephew of his, fell in battle against the Khārijites at Wāsit (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 571). Manzūr, his brother, was sent to take control of Khurāsān, but met with no success (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1846f). He was later murdered in India by Rifā'a b. Thābit al-Judhāmī who had fled to Mansūr and who was the worst of Thābit's brood. Mansūr got hold of the murderer and immured him alive in a pillar (*ibid.*, p. 1895; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 407, where the story is somewhat different).

(21) *B. Masād al-Kalbī/Yemen.* There were two Kalbī families by the name of Masād in Syria if Ibn al-Kalbī is right. B. Masād b. Ka'b of 'Ulaym were sharifian; Zubayr b. al-'Awāmm had intermarried with them and Yazīd III likewise took a wife from among them (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ġamhara, s. vv.* 'Ribāb bint Unaif' and 'Hadramī b. al-Asbaġ'; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 67); there is no evidence that they participated in the third civil war. B. Masād b. Qays of 'Āmir, on the other hand, were scarcely sharifian, though Ibn al-Kalbī describes them as the leading clan of 'Amīra/'Āmir (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ġamhara, s.v.* 'Masād b. Qays'); but they provided several members of the *Yamaniyya*. Yazīd III took great pains to win over Mu'āwiya b. Masād, the *sayyid* of the people of Mizza (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1789), and presumably he succeeded, for 'Abd al-Rahmān and Hishām b. Masād appear among his followers on several occasions (*ibid.*, pp. 1791, 1793, 1795, 1828). Walīd b. Masād is said to have been head of his *haras* or *shurta* (*ibid.*, p. 1878, cf. p. 1893), and Yazīd b. Masād was among Sulaymān b. Hishām's men (*ibid.*, p. 1828).

(22) *Miswar b. 'Abbād al-Habatī/Mudar.* Miswar can be adduced as a minor exception to the general rule that the *Yamaniyya* appointed only Yemenis: he was appointed to the *shurta* and *ahdāth* in Basra by 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar (cf. Appendix I, no. 20).

(23) *Mu'āwiya b. 'Abdallāh al-Saksakī/Yemen.* A Syrian who fought on the side of Sulaymān b. Hishām against Marwān II in Hims, where he was taken prisoner and executed (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1893, 1909, 1911; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 404; cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ġamhara*, table 243, where his father is 'Abd al-A'lā).

(24) *Muhammad (or Yazīd) b. 'Azzār (or 'Arār, 'Adhār, 'Izzān, Ghazzān etc.) al-Kalbī/Yemen.* Mansūr b. Jumhūr's governor of

Sind and Sīstān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1839; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 560; Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, p. 75). Muḥammad had served in Sind under Ḥakam b. 'Awāna al-Kalbī, who designated him his successor; the new governor of Iraq, Yūsuf b. 'Umar, however, appointed 'Umar b. Muḥammad al-Thaqafī who sent Muḥammad to Iraq where he was asked to pay a large sum of money and subjected to torture which cost him the use of one hand and some fingers (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 538; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1839; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 389). When Muḥammad returned to Sind as Manṣūr's governor, 'Umar b. Muḥammad committed suicide in his prison to avoid the torture in store for him (cf. Appendix III, no. 120). Muḥammad installed himself comfortably in Sind until Manṣūr b. Jumhūr himself arrived and proved deaf to the appeal to the *qarāba* between them; in the ensuing battle Muḥammad was defeated, and according to Ya'qūbī it was this man who was immured in a pillar (cf. above, no. 20; *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 407; Ya'qūbī also thinks that Muḥammad had been appointed already under Walīd, *ibid.*, pp. 399f).

(25) *Muḥammad b. Rāshid al-Khuzā'ī/Yemen*. A Ghaylānī adherent of Yazīd III who later developed a soft spot for 'Alī and 'Amr b. 'Ubayd (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Gailāniya', pp. 273f). He figures as a visitor of Yūsuf b. 'Umar and/or the sons of Walīd in their prison and is also Madā'inī's *rāwī* on the revolt of Palestine which he himself was sent to suppress (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1832, 1843; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 146).

(26) *Muḥammad b. Sa'īd b. Muṭarrif al-Kalbī/Yemen*. A general of Yazīd III who was sent to catch Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafī at his home in the Balqā' (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1841f).

(27) *Naḍr b. 'Amr al-Ḥimyarī/Yemen*. A Damascene rebel who had served in Iraq under Khālid al-Qasrī (cf. Appendix III, no. 94).

(28) *Qays b. Hāni'* and *Ya'qūb b. 'Umayr b. Hāni' al-'Ansī/Yemen*. Two Damascenes whose brother/father had served in Iraq (cf. Appendix III, no. 43).

(29) *Rawḥ b. Muqbil*. A participant in Yazīd's attack on Walīd who appears unidentifiable (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1800, 1809).

(30) *Rib'ī b. Hāshim al-Ḥārithī/Yemen*. A leader of a group of 'Udhra and Salāmān in Yazīd's revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1792).

(31) *Sarī b. Ziyād b. Abī Kabsha al-Saksakī/Yemen*. A general of sharifian descent (cf. Appendix I, no. 3).

(32) *Shabīb b. Abī Mālik al-Ghassānī/Yemen*. One of the conspirators

against Walīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1778). Shabīb's father, Ḥārith b. Muʿāwiya, had served in Khurāsān under Salm b. Ziyād (*ibid.*, p. 392). He himself had been interim governor of Basra in 102 (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 483). His son, ʿĪsā b. Shabīb, participated in Yazīd's revolt as the commander of the troops from Dūma and Ḥarastā (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1792). They appear with the *nisbas* of Ḥārithī, Māzinī and Taghlabī in addition to that of Ghassānī; Taghlabī should be emended to Thaʿlabī, but they all refer to the same tribe at different levels of segmentation (cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, tables 176, 194).

(33) *Ṭalḥa b. Saʿīd al-Juhanī/Yemen.* A Damascene who had been governor of Basra for Ḥajjāj (cf. Appendix III, no. 39).

(34) *Thābit b. Nuʿaym al-Judhāmī/Yemen.* One of the chief opponents of Marwān after the outbreak of the civil war. He was a Palestinian of unknown ancestry who had served under Kulthūm b. ʿIyāḍ in North Africa; here his career came to an end when Ḥanẓala b. Ṣafwān had him sent back to Syria on the ground that he was corrupting the army, and he was imprisoned by Hishām. The leading Yemenis in Syria, however, interceded with Marwān, who got him out of Hishām's prison and took him to Armenia, where he was stationed at Bāb. On the death of Walīd, Marwān left Thābit in charge of the Yemenis at Bāb; Thābit, however, persuaded them to desert, whereupon they were all intercepted by Marwān, who detained Thābit and let the rest of the Syrians go home (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1871ff). By 127 he was free again, and when the Syrian *ajnād* were told by Marwān to elect their own governor, the Palestinians chose Thābit (*ibid.*, p. 1892). But no sooner had Marwān left than he rebelled again, assuming the name of *al-Aṣfar* or *al-Aṣqar al-Qaḥtānī* (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 66; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 566). Marwān returned, put down the revolt, and sent an army against its leader, who was defeated first by Jordan and next in Palestine; apparently, however, he managed to escape to Egypt, where he had been trying to mobilize support for some time (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1892ff; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 85ff). But in the end he was caught by Marwān's governor and had his hands and legs cut off (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 90; cf. Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 567, where it takes place in Syria).

(35) *Thawr b. Yazīd al-Kalāʿī/Yemen.* A Ghaylānī adherent of Yazīd III from Ḥimṣ who had to flee from his native city at the time of the sharifian revolt against the *Yamaniyya* (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Ǧailāniya', p. 273). Like other supporters of Yazīd

III he had been in Iraq, though in what capacity is not stated
(Ibn Ḥibbān, 'Ulamā', p. 181, where he is a Kindī).

(36) *Ṭufayl b. Ḥāritha al-Kalbī/Yemen.* One of the conspirators
against Walīd II and a leading Yemeni in the subsequent events
(Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1829f, 1893, 1896). A brother of his
served in Armenia shortly before the outbreak of the civil war
(*ibid.*, p. 1852).

(37) *Ṭufayl b. Zurāra al-Ḥabashī(?).* A commander of Sulaymān b.
Hishām's left wing at Ḥimṣ in 126 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1829, cf.
p. 1912). Ibn al-Kalbī thinks him a Ḥarashī/Qays and moreover
has his full genealogy (*Ǧamhara*, table 101); but it looks as if his
erudition has got the better of him, for he also knows that Ṭufayl
had been a member of Hishām's *ḥaras* (*ibid.*, *s.v.* 'Ṭufail b. Zurāra'),
and the *ḥaras* was wholly or largely staffed by non-Arabs in the
Umayyad period.

(38) *'Ubaydallāh b. al-'Abbās al-Kindī/Yemen.* A Kufan *shurṭī* who was
deputy governor of Kufa for Manṣūr b. Jumhūr (cf. Appendix III,
no. 119).

(39) *'Umar b. al-Ghaḍbān al-Shaybānī/Rabī'a.* A Kufan *sharīf* who
became head of the *shurṭa* in Kufa under 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar b.
'Abd al-'Azīz (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1855, 1902). His father,
Ghaḍbān b. al-Qaba'tharā, had been an arbitrator between the
feuding tribes in Basra in 64 (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 114,
121), a traitor to Muṣ'ab at Maskin (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v,
pp. 341, 344), and a rebel against Ḥajjāj at Rustaqābādh, after
which he had either escaped to Syria or been imprisoned, but
at all events was pardoned in the end (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi,
pp. 284, 291f, cf. p. 197; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 347f). 'Umar
similarly appears in the role of go-between. In 126 'Abdallāh b.
'Umar's decision to pay stipends to the Kufans occasioned a brawl
between the Syrian and Kufan soldiers in the course of which
'Ubaydallāh b. al-'Abbās occupied the castle; Ibn Ghaḍbān, how-
ever, managed to get him out and to restore order, whereupon he
was richly rewarded and appointed to the *shurṭa* as well as other
offices (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1855, 1882). In 127 he paid homage
to 'Abdallāh b. Mu'āwiya (*ibid.*, p. 1883) and/or once more
performed the service of getting a rebel out of the castle in
Kufa when he obtained a general *amān* for 'Abdallāh, himself
and his people, and the Zaydīs (*ibid.*, p. 1887). Whatever his exact
involvement with Ibn Mu'āwiya, he was dismissed from the *shurṭa*
for it (*ibid.*, p. 1902).

(40) *'Umāra b. Abī Kulthūm al-Azdī/Yemen.* One of Khālid al-Qasrī's *thiqāt*, and a commander in Yazīd's army against Walīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1797, 1819). He was executed by Marwān II (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*).

(41) *Walīd b. Ḥassān al-Ghassānī/Yemen.* A head of the *shurṭa* in Kufa under 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar in 127 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1902). He was doubtless a Syrian.

(42) *Ya'qūb b. 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Sulaym al-Kalbī/Yemen.* A conspirator against Walīd whose father had served in Iraq (cf. Appendix III, no. 4).

(43) *Yazīd b. al-'Aqqār al-Kalbī/Yemen.* A participant in the revolt against Walīd. He was head of Yazīd's *haras* or *shurṭa* and died in Marwān's prison (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1878).

(44) *Yazīd b. Hajara al-Ghassānī/Yemen.* A participant in the revolt against Walīd who is praised for his religious merit. He is said to have advised Yazīd against the appointment of Mansūr b. Jumhūr to Iraq on the ground that Mansūr was an irreligious bedouin (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1837).

(45) *Ziyād b. Ḥuṣayn al-Kalbī/Yemen.* A rebel against Walīd II who fell in the battle against him (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1797).

(46) Three *ru'ūs al-Yamaniyya* are mentioned as having interceded for Thābit b. Nu'aym al-Judhāmī, the prisoner of Hishām: 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Dakhm, Ka'b b. Ḥāmid al-'Absī, and Sulaymān b. Ḥabīb, his *qāḍī* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1871; for Thābit see above, no. 34). Apparently then we have a case of Qaysīs described as members of the *Yamaniyya*. In fact, however, all three men were of Yemeni descent. The first was of 'Ans. Dakhm b. Qurra is listed by Ibn al-Kalbī as a *sharīf* of 'Ans in Damascus (*Ǧamhara*, table 272 and *s.v.*) and 'Abd al-Rahman was doubtless his son; a grandson, Yazīd b. Ya'lā b. Dakhm is also found at Hishām's court: he was head of the *shurṭa* (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 544, where he has become an 'Absī; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 374, where he is correctly given as an 'Ansī). The second was likewise of 'Ans. Ka'b b. Ḥāmid was head of the *shurṭa* of 'Abd al-Malik, Walīd, Sulaymān, Yazīd, and Hishām at various times (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1342; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, pp. 373f; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 377, 393, 349, 359). He is all but invariably given as an 'Absī, but Ibn Ḥabīb has him as an 'Ansī and there is no doubt that he is right; the change of 'Ans into the better known 'Abs is commonplace, and moreover the Syrian 'Ans are known to have been concentrated in Damascus (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*

"'Ans b. Mālik'). That leaves Sulaymān b. Ḥabīb. Now the *qāḍī* of that name was certainly of Muḥārib/Qays, and since he died in 126 he could just be the man envisaged (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 557; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1226, 1338). But there was another Sulaymān b. Ḥabīb who was governor of Ahwāz for Ibn 'Umar in the civil war and later fled to Ibn Mu'āwiya in Fars, and this Sulaymān was of course a Muhallabid, a well-known *ra's al-Yamaniyya* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1946f, 1977f; cf. also Van Vloten, 'Zur Abbasidengeschichte', p. 226, and Appendix III, no. 23). 'His *qāḍī*' is evidently a gloss, and that a wrong one.

B. THE QAYSIYYA

(47) *Abān b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Bisṭām al-Numayrī/Qays.* A little known collaborator of Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafī who was executed by the 'Abbāsids after the fall of Wāsiṭ (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1779f; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.*).

(48) *'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Ḥātim al-Bāhilī/Qays.* A Mesopotamian general of sharifian descent who served under Ibn Hubatra (cf. Appendix I, no. 14).

(49) *'Abd al-Malik b. Muḥammad b. 'Aṭiyya al-Sa'dī/Muḍar.* A general, doubtless from the Jazīra, who campaigned against the Ibāḍīs in Arabia for Marwān in 130 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 2012ff; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 595ff). He was accompanied by his nephew, Walīd b. 'Urwa b. Muḥammad, who became governor of Medina in 130f (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 2014, ser. iii, p. 11; cf. Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 603).

(50) *'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Bashīr al-'Ijlī/Rabī'a.* A governor of Kufa for Ibn Hubayra in 127 who was also head of the Kufan *shurṭa* in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1916, ser. iii, pp. 18, 20); after Muḥammad b. Khālid al-Qasrī's revolt in favour of the 'Abbāsids he fled to Ibn Hubayra in Wāsiṭ and endured the siege with him (*ibid.*, ser. iii, p. 64), and he is presumably to be identified with the 'Abdallāh b. Bishr who was executed by the 'Abbāsids (Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 371). Judging by his *nisba*, he was a Kufan.

(51) *Abū Bakr b. Ka'b al-'Uqaylī/Qays.* A governor of Khuwār for Marwān II who ended up among the *wujūh al-Qaysiyya* in Wāsiṭ and was executed after the siege (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1, 68; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 371).

(52) *'Āmir b. Ḍubāra al-Murrī/Qays.* A general who is first met on a summer campaign against Byzantium in A.D. 726 (Theophanes,

Chronographia, A.M. 6218); he was later one of the major assistants
of Ibn Hubayra who appointed him to Hamadhān and apparently
also Sīstān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1885, 1945, 1947ff, 1978ff, ser.
iii, pp. 2, 21ff; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 586, 600, 617; De Goeje,
Fragmenta, pp. 160ff; Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, pp. 77f).

(53) *Asīd b. Ẓāfir al-Sulamī/Qays*. A Mesopotamian general who served
both Muḥammad b. Marwān and Marwān b. Muḥammad in
Armenia (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 205, 207). Nothing is known of
his ancestors, but his descendants were around in the area until the
end of the third century. Yazīd b. Asīd became governor of
Armenia under Abū'l-'Abbās and of Mosul, apparently together
with the Jazīra, for Manṣūr (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 81, 84; Azdī,
Mawṣil, p. 217; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 265); in 155 he was
appointed to Armenia and Azerbayjan where he campaigned
against the Khazars (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 209f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*,
p. 664); and in 157 he conducted a summer campaign (Khalīfa,
Ta'rīkh, p. 666). He disliked Yemenis and was full of *'aṣabiyya*
against them (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 259). Khālid b. Asīd was appointed
deputy governor of Armenia by Faḍl b. Yaḥyā al-Barmakī
(Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 516), while Aḥmad b. Yazīd became
governor of Mosul and later also of Armenia thanks to the
patronage of Yaḥyā b. Khālid al-Barmakī; but Aḥmad had to be
recalled because the Khurāsānīs could not bear him; he also had to
be protected when he ventured to Baghdad and got pelted with
stones for his prejudice against them (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 295). Like
his father he thought there were too many Yemenis in the world,
but his plans to reduce their number fell through when their
wujūh absconded from his camp and returned to Mosul where
they refused to let him in; whereupon Aḥmad went burning and
killing in the environs, refusing to believe that the government
could disapprove of this reaction to such manifest insubordination.
Apparently he was right, for the caliph sent a cousin of his to
reinforce him, though not to much avail (Azdī, *Mawsil*, pp. 296f).
After this inglorious affair there is silence for a generation. Under
Ma'mūn, however, Yaqẓān b. 'Abd al-A'lā b. Aḥmad b. Yazīd
became governor of Armenia; he fell on Byzantine territory in 210
(Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 565; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 192).
And yet another descendant of Aḥmad appears in 281 in the form
of Abū'l-Agharr Khalīfa b. al-Mubārak, the lord of Sumaysāṭ and
apparently a rebel against the government at the time (Ṭabarī,
ser. iii, p. 2410; cf. Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 295). Abū'l-Agharr later

became a great supporter of the caliphs, assisting them against their own insubordinate servants and protecting the pilgrims from bedouin attack on their behalf (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 2191f, 2199, 2216); Muktafī counted him among the *wujūh al-quwwād* (*ibid.*, p. 2248) and sent him against the Carmathians in Syria in 290, when he had the satisfaction of commanding the *Farāghina* and other caliphal troops; but he was nonetheless defeated and is last met on a *ṣā'ifa* in 297 (*ibid.*, pp. 2222, 2231f, 2275).

(54) '*Āṣim b. 'Abdallāh b. Yazīd (or Burayd) al-Hilālī/Qays.* A Mesopotamian who makes his first appearance as governor of Khurāsān in 116–17 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1482, 1564ff, 1573ff; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 461f, 466f). Having returned to the Jazīra, he became governor of Armenia for Marwān II in 126, and he was one of the leaders of Qays who joined the latter when he set out for Syria; according to others, he stayed in Armenia where he was killed in 127 (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 56, 61; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 404f). His son Zufar supported the revolt of 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī who appointed him to Aleppo or Qinnasrīn and entrusted him with the murder of Ḥumayd b. Qaḥṭaba, which he failed to accomplish (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 94; Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubda*, vol. i, p. 57; Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 185, where Zufar has become a Muhallabī). Despite the revolt Zufar's career was unimpaired. He conducted summer campaigns in 154, 156 and possibly also in 157, became governor of Medina in 160 and was appointed to the Jazīra in 163 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 373, 378, 380, 482, 498ff). Mu'āwiya b. Zufar conducted summer campaigns in 178 and 180 (*ibid.*, pp. 637, 645) and may have been governor of Rayy (Miles, *Numismatic History of Rayy*, pp. 56, 65f). 'Abbās b. Zufar was one of Hārūn's governors of Armenia (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 519) and also served in Ṭabaristān (Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 197 = 141). After Hārūn's death he was one of the *Zawāqīl* whom Amīn tried to enrol for his war against Ma'mūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 845) and one of the local rulers who emerged in Syria in the chaotic period after the civil war (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 363; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, pp. 495, 497, 499f = vol. iii, pp. 27, 31, 36, 38); it was doubtless in this capacity that he protected the Hāshimites of the Aleppo area against marauding bedouins (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 145f).

(55) '*Atīf b. Bishr al-Sulamī/Qays.* One of the generals with whom Marwān II reinforced 'Āmir b. Dubāra in Mosul (Ṭabarī, ser. ii,

p. 1945; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 162, where he is mentioned together with a certain Shaqīq al-Sulamī). He was later sent to Rayy to reinforce Naṣr b. Sayyār, which he did not do (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 32), and finally he is said to have reinforced Ibn Ḍubāra once more in 131, this time in Fars (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 600).

(56) *Bishr b. Sallām al-'Abdī/Rabī'a.* Governor of Baḥrayn for Yazīd b. 'Umar b. Hubayra (cf. Appendix III, no. 105).

(57) *Ḥabīb b. Budayl al-Nahshalī/Muḍar.* Ibn Hubayra's governor of Rayy (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 2f; Miles, *Numismatic History of Rayy*, p. 19). He left with the Syrian troops on the approach of the Khurāsānīs and is no more heard (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 3). But his son, Waḍḍāḥ b. Ḥabīb Abū Budayl, who had been in Khurāsān under Naṣr, reappears in the service of Mahdī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1888, ser. iii, p. 496).

(58) *Ḥabīb b. Murra al-Murrī/Qays.* One of Marwān's *fursān* and *quwwād* who rebelled against the 'Abbāsids in the Balqā' and Ḥawrān area in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 52f). He is probably identical with the Ḥabīb b. Murra who was head of the *shurṭa* of Junayd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Murrī in Khurāsān (*ibid.*, ser. ii, p. 1529). It is true that Ṭabarī calls this second Ḥabīb an 'Absī, but he lists him just after another 'Absī, so this *nisba* can probably be put down to dittography.

(59) *Ḥakam b. Yazīd al-Usaydī/Muḍar.* A Basran who was one of Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafī's candidates for the governorship of Khurāsān in 120, and who was appointed to Kerman by Yazīd b. 'Umar b. Hubayra under Marwān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1663, where Asadī should be emended to Usaydī, cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 83). 'Umar b. Yazīd al-Usaydi, his brother, had been head of the *shurṭa* and *aḥdāth* in Basra for Maslama and a fervent anti-Yemeni who paid for it with his life under Khālid al-Qasrī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1417, 1468, 1495f; cf. the garbled passage in Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 410; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, pp. 87f).

(60) *Ḥarb b. Qaṭan al-Hilālī/Qays.* Yūsuf b. 'Umar's governor of Sīstān who joined Marwān's troops (cf. Appendix III, no. 32).

(61) *Ḥawthara b. Suhayl al-Bāhilī/Qays.* Marwān's governor of Egypt who was executed after the siege of Wāsiṭ or in Egypt (cf. Appendix III, no. 67).

(62) *Hishām b. 'Amr al-Taghlabī/Rabī'a.* A Mesopotamian general who was governor of Mosul for Marwān together with Bishr b. Khuzayma al-Asadī/Muḍar; after the battle of the Zāb they refused to open the gates for the defeated caliph and deserted to 'Abdallāh

b. 'Alī (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 47; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 133 where Hishām
is a Zuhayrī; cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 165). Hishām did
well under the 'Abbāsids. Manṣūr employed him during the con-
struction of Baghdad and appointed him to Sind in 151 (Yaʿqūbī,
Buldān, p. 242 = 18; *id., Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 448f, 462;
Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 359; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 444f). His brother
Bisṭām b. 'Amr was deputy governor of Sind under Manṣūr
(Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 678); yet another brother, Sufayh b. 'Amr,
was governor of Sind for Mahdī (*ibid.*, p. 697); and finally a
nephew of his, Muḥammad b. 'Adī, was governor of Sind for
Hārūn (*ibid.*, p. 746).

(63) *Isḥaq* and *'Īsā b. Muslim al-'Uqaylī/ Qays.* Two descendants of a
Mesopotamian *sharīf* (cf. Appendix I, no. 16).

(64) *Jaʿwana b. al-Ḥārith al-'Āmirī/ Qays.* A general from Edessa
(Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. iii, p. 392). Muḥammad b. Marwān
employed him in a campaign against a local Khārijite (Khalīfa,
Taʾrīkh, p. 351); 'Umar II appointed him to the *durūb* (Ibn 'Asākir,
Tahdhīb, vol. iii, p. 391; cf. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 196); and
Maslama sent him to Armenia with Saʿīd al-Ḥarashī (Balādhurī,
Futūḥ, p. 206). He was known as an eager adherent of Marwān II
(Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.* 'Ǧaʿwana b. al-Ḥārit'), and his
son Manṣūr b. Jaʿwana was both the leader of the Edessene revolt
against the 'Abbāsids in 132 and a supporter of 'Abdallāh b.
'Alī in 137 (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 192; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*,
vol. iii, p. 392; cf. Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 185, where he has
become a Kalbī).

(65) *Kawthar b. al-Aswad al-Ghanawī/ Qays.* The head of Marwān's
shurṭa in 127 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1910; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*,
p. 374). His son 'Abd al-Malik was governor of Qinnasrīn (Ibn
al-'Adīm, *Zubda*, vol. i, p. 50). Kawthar was among the few men
who stayed by Marwān after his defeat on the Zāb, accompanying
him on his flight to Syria and beyond (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 136).

(66) *Majẓaʿa b. al-Kawthar Abū 'l-Ward al-Kilābī/ Qays.* A descendant
of Zufar b. al-Ḥārith, the *sharīf* from Qinnasrīn (cf. Appendix
I, no. 19).

(67) *Mālik b. Adham b. Muḥriz al-Bāhilī/ Qays.* The son of a Ḥimṣī
who had fought for Muʿāwiya in the first civil war and for Marwān
in the second, and who had been one of Ḥajjāj's *quwwād* (Ibn
'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. ii, p. 364; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 553). Mālik
served in Armenia under Maslama in 105 (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*,
p. 480). In the third civil war he sided with Marwān and un-

successfully defended Hamadhān against Qaḥṭaba; having entrenched himself at Nihāwand together with his Syrian troops and the refugees from Khurāsān, he finally surrendered with *amān* for himself and the Syrians, leaving the Khurāsānīs to be executed (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 2, 6f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 600f). In 142 he commanded the Syrian troops at Adhana (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 168), and he frequented the court of Manṣūr (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 439).

(68) *Ma'n b. Zā'ida al-Shaybānī/ Rabī'a*. A general, doubtless from Mesopotamia, who was sent against 'Abdallāh b. Mu'āwiya and the residue of the *Yamaniyya* in Fārs in 129 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1978f); he returned to Iraq and fought against the 'Abbāsids at Wāsiṭ, where he was one of the men who claimed to have killed Qaḥṭaba (*ibid.*, ser. iii, pp. 15, 63). After the 'Abbāsid victory he kept a low profile until 141, when he came out of hiding to deal with the *Rāwandiyya*, doing so well that Manṣūr gave him *amān*, incorporated him in his *ṣaḥāba*, and appointed him first to the Yemen and next to Sīstān, where he fell in battle against the Khārijites in 152 (*Ibid.*, pp. 131ff, 394, 368f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 659, 677; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 143ff; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 401f). Zā'ida b. Ma'n, his son, succeeded him as governor of the Yemen (Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, pp. 462f), while another son, Sharaḥīl b. Ma'n, is found on Hārūn's campaign against the Byzantines in 190 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 709). Ma'n's maternal uncle was Ibn Abī'l-'Awjā', the notorious *zindīq* who was crucified in the 150s (Vajda, 'Les Zindīqs', pp. 193ff), but no heresy is attested for the branch of the family that stayed in the army.

It was Ma'n's paternal nephews rather than his sons who rose to great prominence under the early 'Abbāsids. Yazīd b. Mazyad had been with his uncle in Sīstān (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 143ff); under Mahdī he campaigned against Yūsuf al-Barm in Khurāsān, participated in a summer campaign in 165, and was sent with Hadī to Jurjān in 167 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 470, 503, 519; Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, pp. 478f); Hādī enlisted his support for the annulment of Hārūn's succession and appointed him to Armenia where he stayed until 172 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 572, 607); Hārūn employed him against a Khārijite in the Jazīra in 179 and appointed him to Armenia and Azerbayjan in 183; he died there in 183, leaving Asad b. Yazīd as his successor (*ibid.*, pp. 648, 650; Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, pp. 515ff). Asad b. Yazīd was among the generals who were sent to Ma'mūn in Marw in 193, but he returned

to fight for Amīn in the civil war, fell into disgrace with the latter, and was replaced by his uncle Aḥmad b. Mazyad (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 734, 833ff); he may have been governor of Rayy in 181 (Miles, *Numismatic History of Rayy*, p. 70). Muḥammad b. Yazīd suppressed a Khārijite revolt in 190 and participated in Hārūn's Byzantine campaign in 191 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 711, 712). ʿUbaydallāh b. Yazīd came to Egypt with the Afshīn in 216 (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 191), and Muḥammad b. ʿUbaydallāh b. Yazīd b. Mazyad, his son, was governor of Alexandria in 252 under Muʿtazz (*ibid.*, p. 205). Khālid b. Yazīd was governor of Kufa at the time of Abūʾl-Sarāya's revolt for Ḥasan b. Sahl, campaigned against Egyptian rebels for Maʾmūn and governed Armenia for both Maʾmūn and Wāthiq (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 543, 555f, 565, 588; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1075; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 174ff). Aḥmad b. Khālid was governor of Damascus for Muʿtazz (Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, p. 5). Muḥammad b. Khālid took over the governorship of Armenia on his father's death, was re-appointed by Mutawakkil, and stayed on under Mustaʿīn for whom he fought in Baghdad in 251 (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 588, 599; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1577, 1615). Muḥammad and his brothers Haytham and Yazīd founded the dynasty of the Yazīdīs in Shirwān who lasted down to the Seljuq invasions and were among the rare Arabs to exchange their native genealogy for a Persian one (Madelung, 'The Minor Dynasties of Northern Iran', pp. 243ff).

(69) *Miswar b. ʿAbbād al-Ḥabaṭī/Muḍar.* A Basran *sharīf* who was employed by both Yemenis and Qaysis (cf. Appendix I, no. 20).

(70) *Naḍr b. Saʿīd al-Ḥarashī/Qays.* A Mesopotamian general who was Marwān's first governor of Iraq (cf. Appendix III, no. 74).

(71) *Nubāta b. Ḥanẓala and Muḥammad b. Nubāta al-Kilābī/ Qays.* Two Syrian *wujūh al-Qaysiyya* in Iraq (cf. Appendix III, no. 116).

(72) *Qaṭrān b. Akama al-Shaybānī/Rabīʿa.* A Jazīran who was appointed to Mosul by Marwān II in 127 and killed by Ḍaḥḥāk al-Khārijī in the same year (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1938; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 68f).

(73) *Rumāḥis b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Kinānī/Muḍar.* One of the leaders of Marwān's *shurṭa* and later his governor of Palestine (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğambara, s.v.*; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1895; Grohmann, *Arabic Papyri from Ḥirbet el-Mird*, nos. 43, 87). He fled with Marwān to Egypt and escaped from there to Spain where he became gover-

nor of Algeciras and later rebelled (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 46; Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. ii, p. 56; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 328). Ibn al-Kalbī attributes the same career to his son 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Rumāḥis (*Ǧamhara*, *s.v.*).

(74) *Salm b. Qutayba al-Bāhilī/Qays.* Ibn Hubayra's governor of Basra (cf. Appendix III, no. 33).

(75) *Ṣaqr or Ṣafar b. Ḥabīb al-Murrī/Qays.* One of Marwān's men who killed 'Umar b. Hāni' al-'Ansī (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Ġailāniya', p. 277; Ibn Ḥibbān, 'Ulamā', p. 112). He was perhaps a son of Ḥabīb b. Murra (above, no. 58).

(76) *Sulaymān b. 'Abdallāh b. 'Ulātha al-'Uqaylī/Qays.* A governor of the Jazīra appointed by the son of Marwān in 126 on the news of the murder of Walīd II (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1870f). The *nisba* is provided by Ibn al-Kalbī, who also knows that Sulaymān had been *qāḍī* for Hishām (*Ǧamhara*, table 102 and *s.v.*). Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh, his brother, similarly appears in the service of Marwān, who sent him to convey his oath of allegiance to Yazīd III in Syria (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1873). Under the 'Abbāsids Muḥammad became *qāḍī* in Baghdad under Manṣūr and Mahdī (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 462, 472, 529; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, *s.v.*).

(77) *Ṭāriq b. Qudāma.* A general in the service of Ibn Hubayra at Wāsiṭ, where he was executed by the 'Abbāsids (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 68; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 370f). According to Dīnawarī he was of Qasr/Yemen; Ṭabarī, however, enumerates him among the *wujūh al-Qaysiyya* and *Muḍariyya*; in all likelihood, therefore, he was not a Qasrī, but a Qushayrī.

(78) *Tha'laba b. Salāma al-'Āmilī/Yemen.* A general who had commanded the Jordanian troops in Kulthūm b. 'Iyāḍ's North African expedition, and who was governor of Jordan for Marwān II; he fled with Marwān from Syria (Lafuente, *Ajbar*, p. 30, cf. pp. 44, 46; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 46; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 136f). His Yemeni genealogy is not in doubt (cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 244), and why he should have thrown in his lot so thoroughly with the *Qaysiyya* is not clear; it would seem also to have surprised his contemporaries (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 136f).

(79) *'Uthmān b. 'Abd al-A'lā b. Surāqa al-Azdī/Yemen.* One of Marwān's governors of Mosul (cf. Appendix II, no. 43).

(80) *Wathīq b. Hudhayl al-Kilābī/Qays.* A descendant of Zufar, the *sharīf* from Qinnasrīn (cf. Appendix I, no. 19).

(81) *Yazīd b. 'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī/Qays.* Marwān's governor of Iraq (cf. Appendix I, no. 17).

(82) *Zāmil b. 'Amr al-Ḥubrānī/Yemen*. A somewhat enigmatic figure who became governor of Damascus by local choice after Marwān's arrival there in 127, but who was wholly on Marwān's side in the revolt which broke out after Marwān's departure (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1892, 1894; cf. Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 485). He is also said to have been governor of Ḥimṣ, where he was wholly on the side of rebels such as Thābit b. Nu'aym al-Judhāmī (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 86; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 346). It is thus hard to decide on which side he belonged. His *nisba* also varies a good deal, but most of them are clearly variations on Ḥubrānī (of Ḥimyar), the reading suggested by Ibn al-Kalbī (*Ğamhara*, *s.v.* 'Zāmil b. 'Amr').

(83) *Ziyād b. Ṣakhr al-Lakhmī/Yemen*. A Syrian who had been deputy governor of Kufa under Yūsuf b. 'Umar and who held some administrative office in Palestine under Marwān (cf. Appendix III, no. 122).

(84) *Ziyād b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥārithī/Yemen*. Ziyād's grandfather is supposed to have fought at Qādisiyya (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, *s.v.* 'al-Aswad b. Ziyād'), so Ziyād was presumably an Iraqi. He was governor of Kufa for Ibn Hubayra in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 18; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 607, 616; he is not to be confused with the 'Abbāsid *naqīb* of the same name who was of Khuzā'a). When Muḥammad b. Khālid al-Qasrī rebelled in favour of the approaching Khurāsānīs, Ziyād went to Wāsiṭ, where he is said to have been among Ibn Hubayra's closest companions and to have been entrusted by him with the *ḥarāsa* of the city; nonetheless, he was among the generals who responded to the Yemeni propaganda of the future Manṣūr and defected to the 'Abbāsids (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 18, 65f; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 368f). The sources offer no explanation for this unusual companionship.

(85) *Ziyād b. Suwayd al-Murrī/Qays*. The head of Ibn Hubayra's *shurṭa* in Wāsiṭ (cf. Appendix III, no. 77).

APPENDIX V

THE 'ABBĀSID SERVANTS, 750–813
[132–98]

This appendix is a list of Khurāsānīs and clients who held office under the early 'Abbāsids. The list is selective, but should include the best known representatives of the two groups. The information is largely restricted to offices and commands. Where possible, the fortunes of the families have been traced beyond 198, but none of the men who make their appearance under Ma'mūn have been included.

A. KHURĀSĀNIYYA (AHL AL-DAWLA AND ABNĀ')

(1) *'Abd al-Jabbār b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Azdī*. A *dā'ī* and general of the revolution who was appointed head of Abū'l-'Abbās' *shurṭa* on his arrival in Iraq (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 2003f, ser. iii, pp. 76, 100f, cf. p. 67). He kept this position under Manṣūr until he was appointed governor of Khurāsān in 140; here he began a purge of the army and ended up by rebelling in favour of the 'Alids (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 469; Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp. 205ff; *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v.. "'Abd al-Djabbār b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān'). His brother 'Abd al-'Azīz was governor of Basra for Manṣūr (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 674); he is also mentioned as having combated a Khārijite in the Jazīra in 128 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 122). 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, another brother, is said to have been in charge of the *shurṭa* of Baghdad at the time of Manṣūr's death, or, alternatively, to have replaced his brother as head of Manṣūr's *shurṭa* on the latter's appointment to Khurāsān (*ibid.*, pp. 458f; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 469). On 'Abd al-Jabbār's revolt 'Umar was replaced by Mūsā b. Ka'b (cf. below, no. 16). 'Abd al-Sallām b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān was appointed to the *ṣawāfī, qaṭā'ī* and *khazā' in* by Abū Salama on the arrival of the Khurāsānīs in Iraq (*Akhbār al-'dawlat al-'abbāsiyya*, p. 377). 'Abd al-'Azīz b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Abd al-Jabbār appears as an officer in Ḥātim b. Harthama's army in Egypt under Amīn (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 147); he was still there at the time of Ma'mūn's designation

of al-Riḍā, when he headed the local revolt (*ibid.*, p. 168).

(2) *Abū'l-'Abbās Faḍl b. Sulaymān al-Ṭā'ī al-Ṭūsī.* A member of a family long established in Khurāsān (cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1422, 1521). He was *dā'ī* in Abīward and a prominent general in the revolution (*ibid.*, pp. 1950, 1963, 2001, ser. iii, p. 20). In 141 he was appointed head of the *ḥaras* of Manṣūr who also entrusted him with his seal (*ibid.*, p. 131, cf. p. 455; Khalīfa, *Ta'-rīkh*, p. 684; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 124), and in 142 he became governor of Ṭabaristān (Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 189). He retained his leadership of the *ḥaras* under Mahdī until 165 or 166 when he was appointed to Khurāsān, where he stayed until the early years of Hārūn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 689, 696, 700, 706, 745; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 483; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 517, 521, 740). On his return to Baghdad in 171 he was put in charge of Hārūn's seal, but he died soon after (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 751; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 605f). 'Abdallāh Abī'l-'Abbas was head of Mahdī's *ḥaras* after his father's appointment to Khurāsān (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 700). Muḥammad b. Abī'l-'Abbās was a member of Ma'mūn's army and a brother-in-law of Ṭāhir (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1040f; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 569; Ṭayfūr, *Kitāb Baghdād*, pp. 28f).

(3) *Abū 'Awn 'Abd al-Malik b. Yazīd, mawlā* of Hunā'a/Azd. A native of Jurjān whose names reveal a pro-Umayyad background. He joined the revolution in 129, followed Qaḥṭaba to Iraq and 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī to Syria and Egypt, where he was twice governor between 133 and 141 (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*², *s.v.*; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 101ff; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 72, 75, 81, 84; Grohmann, *Corpus Papyrorum Raineri*, vol. i, part two, nos. 12of; Margoliouth, *Catalogue*, pp. 28ff; Miles, *Glass Weights*, pp. 103ff; id., *Supplement*, pp. 19ff). By 150 he was back in Khurāsān where he participated in the suppression of Ustādhsīs and became governor in 159, only to be dismissed in disgrace in the following year (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 358, 459, 477; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 676, 696, where he has unaccountably become a Ḥimṣī). Though rarely seen there, he had settled in Baghdad together with his *aṣḥāb*, similarly natives of Jurjān (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 249 = 32).

(4) *Abū Ghānim 'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Rib'ī al-Ṭā'ī.* A *dā'ī* in Marw and cousin of Qaḥṭaba who fought under the latter in the revolution; he was head of Qaḥṭaba's *shurṭa* (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 257; Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 352; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 2001, ser. iii, p. 15). On his arrival in Iraq he was among the

generals who elected Abū' l-'Abbās when Abū Salama prevaricated
(Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 28, 36). He participated in the battle of the
Zāb, followed 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī to Syria, became governor of
Damascus, and was among the Khurāsānīs who supported
'Abdallāh's claim to the caliphate on Abū'l-'Abbās' death (*ibid.*,
pp. 38, 53f, 93; Ṣafadī, *Umarāʾ*, p. 50). His subsequent fate
appears unknown to the published sources.

His sons seem initially to have stayed in Khurāsān. Aṣram b.
'Abd al-Ḥamīd was sent from there to Sīstān where he died as
governor under Hārūn (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 745f; *Tārīkh-i
Sīstān*, pp. 152, 155). Ḥumayd b. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd was similarly
governor of Sīstān, first as his brother's deputy and next in his own
right (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 152, 155). It was in his house in Ṭūs
that Hārūn died in 193 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 737f). Ḥumayd, how-
ever, came to Iraq as a member of Maʾmūn's army, and he fought
against the rebel Baghdadis under Ḥasan b. Sahl in 201−3 (*ibid.*,
pp. 1005f, 1012, 1018f, 1030, 1032ff). He died in 210 (*ibid.*,
p. 1085). Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd doubtless came west the same
way. He fought against Bābak together with his cousin, Mahdī
b. Aṣram, and fell in battle in 214 (*ibid.*, pp. 1099, 1101; Yaʿqūbī,
Historiæ, vol. ii, pp. 564f). Ghānim b. Abī Muslim b. Ḥumayd
al-Ṭūsī was military governor of Mosul for Wāthiq in 231 when he
suppressed a Khārijite revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1351). 'Abdallāh
[b. Abī Muslim?] b. Ḥumayd al-Ṭūsī fell together with his son in
battle against the Zanj in 256 (*ibid.*, p. 1837).

(5) *Abū Ḥumayd al-Marwarrūdhī*. A general who fought under
Qaḥṭaba in the revolution. He later served under 'Abdallāh
b. 'Alī in Syria where he was appointed to Manbij, but quit on
'Abdallāh's declaration of revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 2001, ser. iii,
pp. 47, 94). Ibrāhīm b. Ḥumayd al-Marwarrūdhī, presumably a
relative of his, was governor of Sīstān for Manṣūr and an agent
of Hārūn in the fall of the Barmakids (Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 677;
Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 285 = 97; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 679f).

(6) *Asīd. b. 'Abdallāh al-Khuzāʿī*. A *dāʿī* from Nasā who commanded
the troops of Nasā and Abīward for Abū Muslim and Qaḥṭaba
during the revolution (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1950, 1963f, 1972,
1987, 2002ff; Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 73). On his arrival in
Iraq he was briefly appointed governor of Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. iii,
p. 23; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 616, where Asīd has become Asad).
Next he was put in charge of the *ḥaras* and seal of Abū'l-'Abbās
(Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 635; cf. Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 433,

where it is his son Abū Bakr b. Asad (*sic*) who held this office). Finally, he was appointed to Khurāsān by Manṣūr; he died in office (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 676; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 303 = 130).

(7) *The Barmakids.* Only a simple enumeration of the offices held by this famous family need be given here; for further details, see Sourdel, *Vizirat*, pp. 127ff.

Khālid b. Barmak was the son of a leader of a Buddhist monastery in Balkh and a *mawlā islām* of Khuzā'a; he fought in the revolution under Qaḥṭaba who entrusted him with the distribution of booty (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1964); Abū 'l-'Abbās appointed him to the *diwan al-kharāj* and later to the entire administration; Manṣūr appointed him to Fars, Ṭabaristān and Mosul; and Mahdī appointed him to Fars once more (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v. 'Barāmika'). He was the foster-father of Rayṭa, the daughter of Abū'l-'Abbās (Ṭabarī, ser ii, p. 840). Abū 'Ubayd Mu'āwiya b. Barmak al-Balkhī, who is mentioned as a settler in Baghdad, was presumably his brother (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 252 = 38).

Muḥammad b. Khālid b. Barmak was governor of the Yemen and the Jazīra for Hārūn for whom he was also chamberlain (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 742, 747, 752; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 638). Yaḥyā b. Khālid b. Barmak was the foster-father of Hārūn, his wife and Khayzurān having exchanged sons, and Hārūn addressed him as his father (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 599, cf. p. 545; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 177). Having become secretary to Hārūn under Mahdī, he was put in charge of the entire administration and the seal on Hārūn's accession (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 491f, 497, 500, 631; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 751).

Faḍl b. Yaḥyā b. Khālid, Hārūn's foster-brother, similarly held the seal and the vizierate under Hārūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 603f, 606). In 176 he was appointed to Armenia, Azerbayjan, Ṭabaristān, Jibāl and other Persian provinces and fought against the 'Alid rebel Yaḥyā b. 'Abdallāh; in 177 he also received Khurāsān, where he campaigned against Ushrūsana, organized Hārūn's Iranian army, and had allegiance taken to Amīn, the heir apparent (*ibid.*, pp. 611, 612ff, 629, 631). He was also tutor to Amīn (Sourdel, *Vizirat*, p. 147). Ja'far b. Yaḥyā b. Khālid likewise held the seal at various times under Hārūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 609, 644). He was governor of Egypt and Khurāsān which he administered by deputy (*ibid.*, pp. 626, 629, 644; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 745, 747) and also head of Hārūn's *ḥaras* to which he appointed Harthama b. A'yan deputy (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 644f;

Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 751). In addition he was head of the postal service, the Mint and the textile manufacture, and tutor to Ma'mūn (Sourdel, *Vizirat*, pp. 150f). Finally, he was commander of the army which was sent to suppress the *'aṣabiyya* in Syria in 180 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 639ff). Mūsā b. Yaḥyā b. Khālid was appointed to Syria in 176 on the first outbreak of *'aṣabiyya* (*ibid.*, p. 625). Having been released from prison by Amīn, he made a minor political come-back under Ma'mūn who appointed him to India; here he was succeeded by his son, 'Imrān b. Mūsā, who was killed in office during an outbreak of *'aṣabiyya* under Wāthiq (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 297; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 445; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 557).

(8) *Harthama b. A'yan, mawlā* of B. Ḍabba. A Khurasānī who makes his first appearance in 153 when he was brought to Baghdad in chains as a result of his support of 'Īsā b. Mūsā, the heir apparent who had been forced to resign (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 371). He stayed in Baghdad, played a major role in the enthronement of Hārūn (*ibid.*, pp. 599f), and rose to great prominence under this caliph. He was governor of Palestine, Egypt, North Africa and Mosul at various times (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 630, 645; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 233; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 747, 748; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 294f, 303), conducted two summer campaigns (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 712; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 169), became head of Hārūn's *ḥaras*, first as the deputy of Ja'far al-Barmakī and next in his own right (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 645, 667, 704; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 751), assisted Hārūn in the destruction of the Barmakids (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 679f), and finally, in 191 he was appointed to Khurāsān with the title of *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn* which he kept under Ma'mūn (*ibid.*, pp. 716, 927, cf. also p. 913). He was in Khurāsān at the time of Hārūn's death, and in contrast with the Abnā' he sided with Ma'mūn in the civil war. Having been appointed to Ma'mūn's *ḥaras*, he went with Ṭāhir to Iraq, where he stayed on after Amīn's death to fight Abū'l-Sarāya (*ibid.*, pp. 734, 775, 777, 802, 840 etc., 971ff). He then returned to Khurāsān with the intention of denouncing Faḍl b. Sahl to Ma'mūn, but Ma'mūn refused to listen and had him thrown in jail where he was killed (*ibid.*, pp. 996ff; cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'Harthama b. A'yan').

Ḥātim b. Harthama was governor of Egypt for Amīn, and later of Armenia and Azerbayjan where he tried to raise a revolt on the news of his father's death (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 147;

De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 350; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 339). A'yan b. Harthama, who was governor of Sīstān in 205, was doubtless also a son of the famous general (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 176; Miles, *Rare Islamic Coins*, p. 73). Muḥammad b. Ḥātim b. Hartama was governor of Armenia under Mutawakkil (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1380). Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥātim b. Harthama was governor of the right bank of Baghdad under Mustaʿīn in 249 (*ibid.*, p. 1511; the text has Khālid for Ḥātim). Yet another relative of Harthama's is known in 'Abd al-Wāhid b. Sallāma al-Ṭaḥlāzī, who was one of the leaders of Ma'mūn's *ḥaras* (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 574). But Yaʿqūbī notwithstanding, the Muḥammad b. Harthama who appears in Barqa and Fusṭāt under Ibn Ṭūlūn cannot have been a grandson of this general (*ibid.*, p. 623, cf. Kindī, *Governors*, p. 216. His grandfather was doubtless Naḍr, cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1603).

(9) *'Īsā b. Māhān.* 'Īsā was *dāʿī* in Marw, deputy *naqīb* and probably the brother of Bukayr b. Māhān, the chief *dāʿī* in Kufa; if so, he was a *mawlā* of the B. Musliya (Omar, *'Abbasid Caliphate*, pp. 74, 349). A fifteenth-century source, however, calls him a *mawlā* of Khuzāʿa (Kaabi, 'Les Origines ṭāhirides', p. 161). Whatever his antecedents, he mutinied after the revolution and was put to death at the order of Abū Muslim (*ibid.*, pp. 160f). Nonetheless he was the founder of a celebrated Banawī family. 'Alī b. 'Īsā b. Māhān was head of the *ḥaras* of Mahdī in 163, for Hādī both before and after his accession, and for Hārūn for a while (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 456, 494, 519, 548; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 709, 751). Under Hādī he was also chamberlain, director of the treasuries and head of the *dīwān al-jund* (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 167; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 548; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 709). Hārūn appointed him to Khurāsān where he misgoverned the province for eight years, accumulating vast wealth and fighting a spate of rebels until he was finally replaced by Harthama (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 648f, 702ff, 713ff and *passim*; Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, pp. 304f = 133; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 737, 738, 745). His disgrace notwithstanding, Amīn honoured him as *shaykh hādhihi'l-dawla* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 810), put him in charge of the affairs of his heir apparent (*ibid.*, p. 794), and appointed him to the eastern provinces. He set out with 50 000 Baghdadi troops and reached Rayy where he was defeated and killed by Ṭāhir (*ibid.*, pp. 796ff). Approximately, he fell with a cry for the Abnā' (*ibid.*, p. 824).

'Īsā b. 'Alī b. 'Īsā was deputy governor of Sīstān for his father

(*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 155ff); he also assisted him in Khurāsān, where he was killed by supporters of Rāfiʿ b. Layth in 191 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 650, 708, 712). Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā was similarly deputy governor of Sīstān for his father (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 155; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 745). Amīn sent him to Syria in 195 to suppress the revolt of the Sufyānī, and he was back in Syria in the following year during the attempt to recruit the Syrians for Amīn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 830, 844; Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 532). On his return to Iraq he switched allegiances, attempted a coup in favour of Maʾmūn, and managed to throw Amīn into jail; the Baghdadi troops, however, freed Amīn and killed Ḥusayn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 846ff). ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī, Yaḥyā b. ʿAlī and Muḥammad b. ʿAlī all appear to have surrendered to Ṭāhir towards the end of the siege of Baghdad (*ibid.*, pp. 882, 904). ʿAbdallāh, who had participated in the battle at Rayy, was later subjected to *ḥadd* punishment by Ḥasan b. Sahl, a humiliation which greatly enraged the Abnāʾ and contributed to their proclamation of Manṣūr b. al-Mahdī as caliph in 201 (*ibid.*, pp. 824f, 1001). And Yaḥyā, who had also been in the field against Ṭāhir, is duly found among Manṣūr b. al-Mahdī's supporters (*ibid.*, pp. 821, 827f, 1006; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 394). Ḥamdawayh b. ʿAlī first appears in 200 when he was sent to Mecca and Medina to deal with the Ṭālibids; having been appointed to the Yemen, he proceeded to make himself independent and had to be dislodged by force (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 986, 995, 1002; Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 544, 553f; cf. Van Arendonk, *Débuts*, pp. 94f, 100f).

(10) *Jibrīl b. Yaḥyā al-Bajalī.* A Khurāsānī who had probably participated in the revolution; at least he is found in Syria under Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī already in 140 or 141 (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 166; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 135). Under Manṣūr he was sent with troops from Syria, Mesopotamia and Mosul to reinforce Yazīd b. Asīd al-Sulamī in Armenia (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 446f; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 328). in 150 he was back in Khurāsān where he campaigned against Ustādhsīs (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 354), in 159 he was appointed to Samarqand, and in 161 he was in action against Muqannaʿ (*ibid.*, pp. 459, 484). He had settled in Baghdad (Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 252 = 37). Maslama b. Yaḥyā, his brother, commanded the Khurāsānīs on an expedition with the Syrians under Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī and governed Egypt under Hārūn (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 168; Kindī, *Governors*, p. 133). Ibrāhīm b. Jibrīl, his

son, was governor of Sīstān in 178 for Faḍl b. Yaḥyā al-Barmakī
and also head of the latter's *shurṭa* and *ḥaras* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 634;
Tārīkh-i Sīstān, p. 154; Jahshiyārī, *Wuẓarā'*, p. 192). Sulaymān
b. Ghālib b. Jibrīl was head of the *shurṭa* in Egypt on several
occasions and also governor of Egypt himself under Ma'mūn
(Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 146, 148, 165ff). Muḥammad b. Sulaymān
b. Ghālib b. Jibrīl was head of the *shurṭa* in Egypt in 236f (*ibid.*,
p. 199). 'Abbās b. Muḥammad b. Jibrīl administered the right bank
of Baghdad in 231 under Wāthiq (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1346).

(11) *Khāzim b. Khuzayma al-Tamīmī*. A deputy *naqīb*, apparently
from Marw al-Rudh, who was one of the most important generals
of the revolution (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1959, 1964, 2001, ser. iii,
pp. 2f, 9, 12f, 20, 62, 68f; Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 354).
After the revolution he was endlessly in the field, campaigning
against 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī in Syria in 137 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 96),
a Khārijite in the Jazīra in 138 (*ibid.*, pp. 123f), 'Abd al-Jabbār
in Khurāsān in 141 (*ibid.*, pp. 134f), the Ispahbādh of Ṭabaristān
in 141f (*ibid.*, pp. 136, 139; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 338), Ibrāhīm b.
'Abdallāh in Basra in 145 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 305f), and
Ustādhsīs in Transoxania in 150 (*ibid.*, pp. 354ff). Unlike his
son he does not appear to have held any governorships. Khuzayma
b. Khāzim participated in the revolution with his father (*ibid.*, ser.
ii, pp. 1959f, 1997). He is said to have been appointed to Ṭabaris-
tān by Manṣūr in 143 (Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 381), but his main
career fell under Hārūn whom he had helped to the throne (Ṭabarī,
ser. iii, pp. 602f). Under Hārūn he campaigned in Armenia, where
he became governor (*ibid.*, pp. 648, 705; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*,
vol. ii, p. 515). He was also governor of Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. iii,
p. 740; cf. Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 743), and of northern Syria
and the Jazīra on behalf of Qāsim b. Hārūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 730;
Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 747; Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubda*, vol. i, p. 64).
In addition he was head of Hārūn's *shurṭa* (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p.
750; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii,
p. 520). Under Amīn he remained governor of northern Syria and
Mesopotamia, first as the deputy of Qāsim b. Hārūn and next in
his own right (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 775f; Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubda*, vol. i,
p. 64). He was against Amīn's decision to depose Ma'mūn, but
fought for the caliph until 198 when he sought *amān* from Ṭāhir
(Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 809f, 856, 903ff). In 201 he was among the
leaders of the Baghdadi revolt under Manṣūr b. al-Mahdī (*ibid.*,
pp. 1002, 1004, 1006, 1011). Ibrāhīm b. Khāzim was governor

of Nisibis for Hārūn; he was killed by a Khārijite in 178 (*ibid.*, p. 631). 'Abdallāh b. Khāzim was head of the *shurṭa* for Mahdī on the latter's summer campaign in 163, for the future Hādī during his campaign in Jurjān, and for Amīn at the end of his reign (*ibid.*, pp. 495, 519; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 537; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375). Under Hārūn he was governor of Ṭabaristān (Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 189 = 132). In the civil war he fought for Amīn until 197 when he fled to Madā'in with his family (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 826, 899). Shu'ayb b. Khāzim b. Khuzayma was governor of Damascus for Hārūn (Ṣafadī, *Umarā'*, p. 41; the text has Ḥāzim for Khāzim, a mistake which recurs elsewhere). Hubayra b. Khāzim appears as a Banawī general shortly after the civil war in which he had clearly fought for Amīn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 935). Nahshal b. Ṣakhr b. Khuzayma b. Khāzim was still a member of the 'Abbāsid army in 251 when he deserted from Musta'īn to Mu'tazz (*ibid.*, p. 1631).

(12) *Mālik b. al-Haytham al-Khuzā'ī.* One of the twelve *naqībs* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1358, 1988). Mālik became head of the *shurṭa* of Abū Muslim on the outbreak of the revolution, fought under him in Khurāsān and elsewhere and almost shared his death (*ibid.*, pp. 1968, 1987, 1989, 1993, 2001, ser. iii, pp. 64, 71, 116ff). In 142 Manṣūr appointed him to Mosul where he stayed until 145 (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 177ff, 194). 'Awf b. al-Haytham, his brother, similarly fought in the revolution (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara, s.v.*). Ḥamza b. Mālik, his son, was head of the caliph's *shurṭa* (as opposed to the *shurṭa* of Baghdad) under Manṣūr and Mahdī (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 683, 699; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, pp. 374f; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 483). He was appointed to Sīstān by Mahdī in 159 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 459; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 696 (garbled); *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 149; Miles, *Numismatic History of Rayy*, pp. 40f), to an expedition against the Byzantines by Hādī in 169 (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 191), and to Khurāsān by Hārūn in 176; he stayed for a year (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 626, 629, 740). He was also among the men who held Hārūn's seal (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 751). He died in 181 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 646).

'Abdallāh b. Mālik was head of the *shurṭa* under Mahdī, Hādī and Hārūn (*ibid.*, pp. 548, 583, 602, 692; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 699, 709, 750; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 483, 491, 520), and according to Khalīfa he was also governor of Khurāsān under Manṣūr (*Ta'rīkh*, p. 676). Hārūn appointed him to Mosul in 173, dismissing him in 175 (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 271,

273, 275), and to Ṭabaristān, Qūmis, Hamadhān and other Persian provinces in 189 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 705; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 307). In 190–1 he participated in Hārūn's campaign against Byzantium (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 709, 712); in 192 he campaigned against the *Khurramiyya* of Azerbayjan (*ibid.*, p. 732); and in 193 he accompanied Hārūn to Khurāsān, travelling on to Ma'mūn in Marw (*ibid.*, pp. 734, 772f). His prominence under Hārūn is all the more remarkable in that he had supported Hādī's attempt to exclude Hārūn from the succession (*ibid.*, pp. 571f, 603). He stayed in Marw during the civil war, but was one of the *ru'asā'* who excused themselves when offered the position which ultimately went to Faḍl b. Sahl, and his relations with Ma'mūn were not particularly happy (*ibid.*, pp. 713f; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, pp. 278, 313, 315f).

'Abbās b. 'Abdallāh b. Mālik was governor of Rayy for Ma'-mūn in 194, but was dismissed for his sympathies with Amīn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 777f; Miles, *Numismatic History of Rayy*, pp. 93f). Muṭṭalib b. 'Abdallāh b. Mālik administered the oath of allegiance to Ma'mūn in Mosul in 196 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 857) and governed Egypt for this caliph in 198 and again in 199f (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 152f, 154ff; Grohmann, *Corpus Papyrorum Raineri*, vol. i, part two, pp. 142f). But in 202 he administered the oath of allegiance to Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī in Baghdad, horrified by the news of Ma'mūn's designation of an 'Alid heir (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1016; compare his previous attitude, p. 1011; cf. also Lapidus, 'Separation of State and Religion', p. 373).

Qāsim b. Naṣr b. Mālik was head of the *shurṭa* of the future Hādī at the time of Manṣūr's death and later for Hārūn (*ibid.*, p. 455; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375). Thābit b. Naṣr b. Mālik was in charge of the Syrian frontier provinces between 192 and 197; here he ransomed Muslim prisoners-of-war in 192, conducted a number of summer campaigns, and made himself independent during the civil war; he died or was killed soon after Ma'mūn's accession (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 730, 732; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 537, 541, 553). Aḥmad b. Naṣr b. Mālik was a Baghdadi who frequented the *aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth* and was violently opposed to the tenet of the created Koran; his traditionist friends incited him to revolt, stressing the role of his father and grandfather in the 'Abbāsid *dawla*, and his own role in Baghdad in 201 when he had been the leader of the populace of the eastern bank during Ma'mūn's absence. The revolt came to nothing, but

Aḥmad was brought before Wāthiq's inquisition and executed (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1343ff; cf. Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, pp. xxxivf; Lapidus, 'Separation of State and Religion', pp. 381f). A namesake of his who appears as *'āmil* of Kufa in 251 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1617) was presumably a member of the same family.

Muḥammad b. Ḥamza b. Mālik was head of the *shurṭa* for Amīn (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 537). Naṣr b. Ḥamza b. Mālik was appointed to the eastern bank of Baghdad by Ḥasan b. Sahl in 201 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1002); he was sent to deal with the revolt of his kinsman Thābit b. Naṣr, whom he is said to have poisoned, and he became governor of Damascus for 'Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 553; Ṣafadī, *Umarā*, p. 91). He was still in the army under Wāthiq (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1357).

Muḥammad b. Naṣr b. Ḥamza b. Mālik was taken prisoner during the war between Musta'īn and Mu'tazz in 251; as a Baghdadi he had supported the former (*ibid.*, p. 1595, cf. p. 1732). Manṣūr b. Naṣr b. Ḥamza was governor of Wāsiṭ and a custodian of Musta'īn in 252 (*ibid.*, p. 1670, cf. p. 1657). 'Abdallāh b. Naṣr b. Ḥamza, though never explicitly identified as such, was doubtless his brother; he was a general in the service of Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir whom he assisted in the suppression of a Zaydi revolt in 250 and he fought for Musta'īn in 251 (*ibid.*, pp. 1518, 1573, 1588, 1602f). Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Naṣr b. Ḥamza was sent from Baghdad to conciliate mutinous troops in Fars under Musta'īn (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 609).

Ja'far b. Mālik and Dāwūd b. Mālik are both said to have been appointed to the *shurṭa* of early 'Abbāsid caliphs (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Gamhara*, *s.vv.*). Naṣr b. Mālik was head of the *shurṭa* under Mahdī (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 699; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 483). He died in 161 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 491).

(13) *Mu'ādh b. Muslim, mawlā* of the B. Dhuhl. A native of Khuttal or Rayy who settled in Baghdad (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 253 = 39; *id.*, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 455; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. ii, p. 455). He is first mentioned in 149–50 when he was among the troops from Marw al-Rūdh who were defeated by Muqanna' (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 354; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 656). In 160 he was appointed to Khurāsān, in 161 he was once more in the field against Muqanna', and in 163 he was dismissed (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 477, 484, 500;

Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 687, 696; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 303 = 131).
In 169 he fought against the 'Alids at Fakhkh (Ṭabarī, ser. iii,
p. 558); he probably died soon after. Ḥusayn b. Mu'ādh b.
Muslim, his son, was a foster-brother of Hādī (*ibid.*, p. 586).
Yaḥyā b. Mu'ādh b. Muslim, another son, was governor of Syria
in 191–2 and campaigned against a local rebel (*ibid.*, pp. 711,
732; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 143f). He accompanied Hārūn to
Khurāsān, was sent on to Ma'mūn in Marw and stayed there
during the civil war, but excused himself when offered the position
which was taken by Faḍl b. Sahl (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 734, 770,
772, 773f, 1026; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 278). He became gover-
nor of the Jazīra and Armenia for Ma'mūn, campaigned against
Bābak, and died in 206 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1033, 1039, 1045;
Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 554, 563). Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b.
Mu'ādh appears in the service of Ma'mūn as one of the prison
guards of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1075). Isḥāq b.
Yaḥyā b. Mu'ādh was governor of Damascus for Mu'taṣim in the
reign of Ma'mūn and later for Wāthiq (*ibid.*, p. 1134; Ibn 'Asākir,
Tahdhīb, vol. ii, p. 455), head of the *ḥaras* for Mu'taṣim, Wāthiq
and Mutawakkil (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1303, 1331; Ya'qūbī,
Historiae, vol. ii, p. 602), and governor of Egypt for Muntaṣir
in the reign of Mutawakkil (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 198f). He had
transferred from Baghdad to Samarra (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p.
260 = 32). Sulaymān b. Yaḥyā b. Mu'ādh was head of the *ḥaras* of
Mutawakkil after his brother (Ya'qūbī *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 602),
and in 251 he was one of the few generals not to follow Musta'īn
to Baghdad (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1543). 'Alī b. Isḥāq b. Yaḥyā was
in charge of the *ma'ūna* of Damascus for Ṣūl Artakīn in 226
(Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1313). It was Isḥāq b. Yaḥyā b. Sulaymān b.
Yaḥyā who was head of Wāthiq's *ḥaras* according to Ya'qūbī,
not Isḥāq b. Yaḥyā b. Mu'ādh (*Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 590). Yaḥyā b.
al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī b. Mu'ādh b. Muslim is found in the entourage of
the Ṭāhirids at Raqqa (Ṭayfūr, *Kitāb Baghdād*, p. 157).

(14) *Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath al-Khuzā'ī*. A deputy *naqīb* (Omar,
'Abbāsid Caliphate, p. 354). He was appointed to Ṭabasayn,
Fars and Kerman by Abū Muslim in 130 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1978,
2001, ser. iii, pp. 71, 75; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, pp. 373f; differently
Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 632, where he is appointed to Sīstān, doubt-
less a mistake), fought against Sunbādh at Rayy in 137 and/or
against Jahwar b. Marār at Rayy in 138 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p.
637; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 122), governed Egypt from 141 to 143

(Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 108f; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 138, 141; Miles, *Glass Weights*, pp. 111f; *id.*, *Supplement*, pp. 21f), and campaigned against the Ibāḍīs of North Africa (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 109; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 654, 680; differently Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 230, 232, where his tenure of North Africa is in the reign of Abū'l-'Abbās). He is said also to have been governor of Damascus for Manṣūr (Ṣafadī, *Umarā'*, p. 76). He died on his way to a summer campaign in 149 (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 184; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 353).

Ja'far b. Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath was head of Hārūn's *shurṭa* (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 520; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 751); he also held Hārūn's seal until it was made over to Abū'l-'Abbās al-Ṭūsī in 171 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 605f); in 173 he was appointed to Khurāsān (*ibid.*, pp. 609, 740; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 745). Naṣr b. Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath was governor of Palestine for Mahdī in 161 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 46, 485); he was appointed to Sind in the same year and died there in 164 (*ibid.*, pp. 491, 501, 502; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 697). 'Abbās b. Ja'far b. Muḥammad was governor of Khurāsān after his father (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 609, 740; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 745); he participated in a summer campaign in 187 and was among the generals who accompanied Hārūn to Ṭūs, from where he was sent on to Ma'mūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 694, 734). He probably did not stay there. 'Uqba b. Ja'far b. Muḥammad, at least, was an opponent of Ma'mūn (Khaṭīb, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 81 = Lassner, *Topography*, p. 62). If the Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath whom Ma'mūn appointed to Sīstān in 197 was a grandson of his Khuzā'ī namesake, he was of a branch of the family that had stayed in the east, for he is described as a Ṭārābī, *sc.* a native of one of the villages of Bukhārā; he ended up by fighting on the side of one of the many rebels in Sīstān and was executed by Layth b. al-Faḍl (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 171ff; cf. Yāqūt, *Wörterbuch*, vol. iii, p. 487). The Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath al-Khuzā'ī who was *ṣāḥib al-barīd* in Diyār Bakr under Mu'tazz was perhaps also a member or a client of this family (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 612).

(15) *Muqātil b. Ḥakīm al-'Akkī. Dā'ī* in Nasā (Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 73). He fought under Qaḥṭaba in the revolution (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1972, 2001ff, ser. iii, pp. 4, 20), was appointed to the Jazīra by Manṣūr in the reign of Abū'l-'Abbās, assisted in the suppression of the revolt of the Sufyānī, and was killed by 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī in 137 for his refusal to join the latter's rebellion

(*ibid.*, pp. 93f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 627, 633, 678; Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubda*, vol. i, p. 56).

Muḥammad b. Muqātil was not only a son of one of the *kibār* of the *ahl al-dawla*, but also a foster-brother of Hārūn who appointed him to North Africa (Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, p. 89). 'Īsā b. [Muqātil] al-'Akkī was appointed deputy governor of Syria by Ja'far al-Barmakī in 180 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 641; his brother is similarly known as Ibn al-'Akkī, cf. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 234).

(16) *Mūsā b. Ka'b al-Tamīmī*. A *naqīb* and general of the revolution (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1358, 1586f, 1952, 1964, etc.). He participated in the battle of the Zāb, went on to Syria with 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī, became deputy governor of the Jazīra in 132, and fought against Abū'l-Ward and the pro-Umayyad rebels (*ibid.*, pp. 39, 56; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 611; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 186). Abū'l-'Abbās appointed him to his *shurṭa* and then sent him to India to subdue Manṣūr b. Jumhūr (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 80, 81; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 632; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 429). He returned on the death of Abū'l-'Abbās, resumed his position as head of the *shurṭa* and then gave it up again to become governor of Egypt for a short while; he died in 141 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 138; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 106ff; Miles, *Glass Weights*, p. 108). The Mūsā b. Ka'b who is said to have been governor of the Jazīra under Manṣūr is in fact Mūsā b. Muṣ'ab (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 378, 381, 383; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 222; cf. below, no. 37).

'Uyayna b. Mūsā, who had also been a *dā'ī*, was deputy governor of Sind for his father, but rebelled and was killed by local Yemenis (Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp. 208f; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 448).

(17) *Musayyab b. Zuhayr al-Ḍabbī*. A deputy *naqīb* who fought under Qaḥṭaba in the revolution (Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 354; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 2003f, ser. iii, pp. 3, 21). In 134 he was appointed to the *shurṭa*, first as the deputy of Mūsā b. Ka'b and next in his own right; most of the time he held only the *'adwa* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 80, 138, 195, 384; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 682f (garbled); Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 374). In 145 he is described as the head of Manṣūr's *ḥaras* which is doubtless wrong (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 293). He was head of the *shurṭa* of Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm on the latter's expedition to Malaṭya in 141 (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 188), governor of Khurāsān for Mahdī in 163–6 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 500, 503, 517; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 687,

692, 696), governor of the Jazīra for the same caliph (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 697), commander of an expedition to Ḥadath under Hādī (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 191), and once more head of the *shurṭa* under Hārūn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 750; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 520). He was a friend of Khālid b. Barmak (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 382). Muḥammad b. al-Musayyab was head of the *shurṭa* (*'adwa*) of Hārūn according to Khalīfa (*Ta'rīkh*, p. 750). Amīn transferred him to the *ḥirba* and later appointed him to Armenia (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 537; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375). Zuhayr b. al-Musayyab sided with Ma'mūn in the civil war. He was governor of Sīstān for him (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 170), participated in the siege of Baghdad under Ṭāhir (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 868, 890; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 756, 757), campaigned against Abū'l-Sarāya, administered the eastern bank of Baghdad and Jūkhā for Ḥasan b. Sahl, participated in the suppression of the revolt of the *Ḥarbiyya*, and was killed in prison by the leader of the rebels in 201 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 977f, 999, 1001f, 1004). Hārūn b. al-Musayyab was sent with Ḥamdawayh b. 'Alī b. 'Īsā to Mecca, Medina and the Yemen to deal with the Ṭālibids after Abū'l-Sarāya's revolt (*ibid.*, pp. 986, 993). Azhar b. Zuhayr b. al-Musayyab fought with his father in Iraq (*ibid.*, pp. 976, 1002). 'Amr b. Zuhayr, his brother, was governor of Kufa from 155 to 158 (*ibid.*, pp. 375, 377, 384, 458; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 676). Azhar b. Zuhayr, a brother of Musayyab's, is mentioned as a settler in Baghdad, but is not otherwise known unless he is in fact the grandson (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 243 = 20).

'Abdallāh b. al-Musayyab b. Zuhayr was head of the *shurṭa* (*ḥirba*) for Manṣūr at the time of the latter's death, presumably as his father's deputy (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 455; cf. Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, ser. iii, p. 455; cf. Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 683); he was also governor of Egypt under Hārūn as the deputy of Ja'far al-Barmakī and others between 176 and 179 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 747; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 135, 137, 388). 'Abbās b. al-Musayyab is said to have been head of the *ḥaras*, doubtless a mistake for *shurṭa*, of Mahdī in 163 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 495); he was later head of the *shurṭa* of Ja'far al-Barmakī on his expedition to Syria, and of that of Ma'mūn at the time of Hārūn's death (*ibid.*, pp. 639, 772). He appears to have retained his office until Ma'mūn's return to Baghdad when the family's traditional association with the *ḥirba* came to an end: 'Abbās was dismissed and replaced, not, as he had hoped, by his

son Muḥammad, but by Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn (Ṭayfūr, *Kitāb Baghdād*, pp. 9, 11, 23).

(18) *Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb al-Ṭā'ī.* A *naqīb* of Kufan origin and next to Abū Muslim the most important general of the revolution (cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v. 'Ḳaḥṭaba b. Shabīb'). He himself fell in Iraq, but his sons like Abū Muslim counted as members of the *ahl al-bayt* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 64).

Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba had been deputy *naqīb* in Khurāsān (Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 354). After the revolution he became deputy governor of Armenia for the future Manṣūr (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 95, 99, 101), fought against 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī in Syria (*ibid.*, pp. 93, 95ff), and conducted summer campaigns in 149, 162 and 163 (*ibid.*, pp. 353, 493, 495). He died in 181 (*ibid.*, p. 646). Ḥumayd b. Qaḥṭaba had similarly been deputy *naqīb* (Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 354). He followed 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī to Syria, where he briefly supported the latter's claim to the caliphate on Abū'l-'Abbās' death, changed his mind and escaped (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 53, 93ff). In 137 he was governor of the Jazīra where he was hard pressed by a Khārijite (*ibid.*, pp. 120f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 679); in 142–3 he was governor of Egypt (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 141f; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 110f); in 145 he assisted in the campaign against Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 225, 238, 246, 310, 313); in 148 he campaigned in Armenia (*ibid.*, p. 353); and in 152 he was appointed to Khurāsān where he died in 159 (*ibid.*, pp. 369, 458, 459; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 676; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 303 = 130).

Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan participated in his father's summer campaign in 162 and became deputy governor of Khurāsān for Ja'far al-Barmakī in 180 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 686; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 644). 'Alī b. al-Ḥasan was similarly deputy governor of Khurāsān for Ja'far (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 740); he was also governor of Sīstān for 'Alī b. 'Īsā and of Damascus for Hārūn (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 155; Ṣafadī, *Umarā'*, p. 57). Sa'īd b. al-Ḥasan was appointed to the western bank of Baghdad by the *Ḥarbiyya* in 201 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1002). All Ḥasan's descendants had fought for Amīn and surrendered to Ṭāhir in 197 (*ibid.*, p. 882).

'Abdallāh b. Ḥumayd b. Qaḥṭaba was interim governor of Khurāsān after his father's death in 159 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 677, 696). Under Hārūn he was governor of Sīstān (thus at least Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 745) and of Ṭabaristān (Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 189 = 132, where his name has been shortened).

In the civil war he was one of the chief supporters of Amīn who described him to the Abnā' as *ibn kabīr da'watikum wa-man 'alā yaday abīhi fakhrukum* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 931). He had been sent to Ma'mūn in Marw in 193, but returned together with other generals, was appointed to Hamadhān by 'Alī b. 'Īsā and commanded 20 000 Abnā' against Ṭāhir in 196; he surrendered in 197 (*ibid.*, pp. 790, 798, 840, 882). Shabīb b. Ḥumayd b. Qaḥṭaba was head of the *ḥaras* of Ja'far al-Barmakī during the latter's campaign in Syria (*ibid.*, p. 639). He was sent to Marw together with his brother in 193 and presumably returned with him (*ibid.*, p. 772). Nonetheless, he is said to have been head of Ma'mūn's *ḥaras* for a while, and to have been appointed by him to Qūmis (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 574).

(19) *'Uthmān b. Nahīk al-'Akkī.* A deputy *naqīb* and *dā'ī* in Abīward (Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp. 73f; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1963). Having served under Qaḥṭaba, he was appointed to the *ḥaras* of the future Manṣūr in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 2001, ser. iii, pp. 20f, 65); after Manṣūr's accession he held both the *ḥaras* and the seal until his death in the *Rāwandiyya* incident in 141 (*ibid.*, p. 131; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 684; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 377). 'Īsā b. Nahīk, who had also been *dā'ī* in Abīward, succeeded his brother as head of Manṣūr's *ḥaras* (Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp. 73f; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 131; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p, 684).

Ibrāhīm b. 'Uthmān b. Nahīk is said to have been head of Hārūn's *shurṭa* followed by his son Wahb (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375). He conducted summer campaigns in 183, 185, 186 and 187 (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 522f), and was killed by Hārūn after the fall of the Barmakids in 187 (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 523, but cf. p. 512; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 699ff). All the members of the family fought for Amīn in the civil war. 'Uthmān b. 'Īsā b. Nahīk was placed in charge of the *ḥaras* of Amīn's son and heir apparent (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 794); he had previously been governor of Ṭabaristān for Hārūn (Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 189 = 132, where his name has been shortened). Muḥammad b. 'Īsā b. Nahīk was placed over the *shurṭa* of Amīn's son (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 794; on p. 881 he appears as the head of Amīn's own *shurṭa*), and he was one of Amīn's most influential advisers (*ibid.*, pp. 778, 797, 813, 881f, 912). He deserted to Ma'mūn in 198 (*ibid.*, pp. 914, 916). 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. 'Īsā b. Nahīk was a commander in Amīn's service (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 534f).

B. MAWĀLĪ

(20) *'Abbās b. Sa'īd.* A *mawlā* of Hārūn's who was governor of the Yemen (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 742; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 498).

(21) *Abū'l-Khaṣīb Marzūq.* A Sindī client of Muthannā b. al-Ḥajjāj [b. Qutayba b. Muslim] according to Ibn Isfandiyār (*Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 176 = 120; his name is garbled in the translation); other sources, however, identify him as a *mawlā* of Manṣūr so that if Ibn Isfandiyār is right, Manṣūr had presumably purchased the *walā'*. He makes his appearance in 137 when he was sent to count the booty taken from 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī's camp, an act of interference which greatly annoyed Abū Muslim (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 98, 102f). In 140 or 141 he was sent to Tabaristān together with a number of generals, tricked the Ispahbadh into defeat, and became the first governor of the province (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 136, 139; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 338; Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 176, 178 = 120, 122). He was one of Manṣūr's chamberlains (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 684; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 112).

(22) *Abū Sulaym Faraj al-khādim, mawlā* of Hārūn. A Turkish eunuch who rebuilt Ṭarsūs for Hārūn in 170 and Adhana for Hārūn or Amīn in 193–4; he was civil governor of the *thughūr* for both caliphs (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 604; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 495, where he is Abū Sulaymān; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 168f; Yāqūt, *Wörterbuch*, vol. i, p. 179). After the civil war he is mentioned in a context which suggests that he had been a supporter of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1076).

(23) *Faraj al-Rukhkhajī.* A prisoner-of-war from Sīstān who became a slave of Hārūn's daughter and eventually a client of Hārūn, who appointed him to Ahwāz (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, pp. 270f). Under Ma'mūn he administered the caliph's private estates, accompanied Khālid b. Yazīd b. Mazyad on his expedition to Egypt, and became one of the *a'yān al-kuttāb* together with his son 'Umar (Sourdel, *Vizirat*, p. 732; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 555f; Yāqūt, *Wörterbuch*, vol. ii, p. 770). 'Umar remained prominent in the administration until he was disgraced by Mutawakkil in 233 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1350, 1362, 1370, 1377; Khaṭīb, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 94 = Lassner, *Topography*, p. 79).

(24) *Farāsha.* A *mawlā* of Mahdī's who was governor of Dunbāwand and Qūmis for Mahdī from 164 and of the same provinces plus Jurjān from 167; he bore the title *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn*

(Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 503, 518, 520, 521). Mahdī later sent him to Ṭabaristān with 10 000 men; he was defeated, taken prisoner and executed by the Ispahbadh (Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, pp. 185f = 128f). With that name he must have been a freedman. Isḥāq b Farāsha, presumably his son, was in the service of Amīn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 960).

(25) *Ghazwān*. A slave of the Qaʿqāʿ b. Ḍirār family who had been bought and freed by Manṣūr. In 145 he was given command of some troops to attack a number of merchant ships suspected of complicity in the revolt of Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbdallāh in Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 295f). He also appears to have been a civil servant (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 462). The Yazīd b. Ghazwān who conducted a summer campaign in 178 was probably his son (*ibid.*, p. 522).

(26) *Ḥajjāj*. A *mawlā* of Hādī and governor of Jurjān in 169 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 568). Fatḥ b. Ḥajjāj, a *mawlā* of Hārūn who was appointed to Sīstān by Ma'mūn, was presumably his son (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 170).

(27) *Hamawayh*. A eunuch and client of Mahdī who was postmaster in Khurāsān under Hārūn; his deputy in Baghdad was his own client Sallām Abū Sulaym (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 712, 718, 764; cf. Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 252 = 38).

(28) *Ḥammād al-Barbarī*. A freedman of Hārūn's who was appointed to Mecca and the Yemen in 184; he stayed in office for thirteen years, subduing local rebels and ruling with such harshness that the Yemenis sent a deputation to Hārūn imploring him to dismiss him (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 498; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 649, 712; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 742, 743). Muḥammad b. Ḥammād al-Barbarī was one of Amīn's generals in the civil war (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 857f). The Ibn Ḥammād al-Barbarī who appears as an authority on the events of 255 was presumably a grandson rather than a son of Ḥammād (*ibid.*, p. 1700).

(29) *Ḥasan or Ḥusayn b. Jamīl*. A *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn* who was governor of Basra and Egypt for Hārūn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 744, 747; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 740; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 142ff). Muḥammad b. Jamīl was director of the *dīwān al-kharāj* in Iraq for Hādī (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 548; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā*, p. 167).

(30) *Ibrāhīm b. Dhakwān al-Ḥarrānī*, *mawlā* of Manṣūr. The son of a freedman of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī who was vizier and finance director under Hādī (Sourdel, *Vizirat*, pp. 121ff).

(31) *'Īsā, mawlā of Ja'far.* Mahdī's governor of Rayy in 165 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 505).

(32) *Layth, mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn.* A general who makes his first appearance under Manṣūr who sent him to Kashgar to subdue the king of Farghāna (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 465). Mahdī employed him against Muqanna' (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 304 = 131; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 484) and later appointed him to Sind; he was recalled by Hādī, but reappointed by Hārūn (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 480; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 697, 707, 746; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 505; *Aghānī*, vol. vi, p. 240). Barthold suggested that he was a son of Naṣr b. Sayyār *(Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion,* pp. 205f); in fact, however, he was the son of a certain Ṭarīf, possibly Manṣūr's client of that name, who was also the father of Mu'allā (Khaṭīb, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 96 = Lassner, *Topography*, p. 81; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 480; *Aghānī*, vol. vi, pp. 239f; cf. below, nos. 36 and 44). According to the *Aghānī* (vol. vi, pp. 239f), he and his brother had been acquired as slaves by Manṣūr and given to Mahdī who freed them. He is not to be confused with Layth b. al-Faḍl who was governor of Egypt and Sīstān for Hārūn and Ma'mūn respectively (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 139ff, 148, 402; Margoliouth, *Catalogue*, p. 105; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 747; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 174ff, cf. p. 153). One of the two would seem to have been governor of Dīnawar in 180 (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 725).

'Abbās b. al-Layth, *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn* was among the generals who returned to Amīn on the death of Hārūn in Ṭūs to fight against Ma'mūn in the civil war; like his father he was known as a *mawlā* of Mahdī (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 790, 801).

(33) *Manāra.* A client of Manṣūr who was sent to Baghdad with the news of Manṣūr's death in 158, and who is also said to have been one of his *'ummāl.* He is described as a *waṣīf* and was evidently a freedman (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 462, 472; cf. *id.*, *Buldān*, p. 241 = 16; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 456).

(34) *Masrūr al-khādim al-kabīr Abū Hāshim.* A eunuch who is mentioned already at the time of Mahdī's death, but who makes his first appearance in public life as one of Hārūn's agents in the downfall of the Barmakids; Hārūn also appointed him to the *barīd* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 524, 678, 680, 685; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, pp. 234ff, 265). In 191 he accompanied Harthama b. A'yan on a summer campaign as general manager (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 295) and in 199 he campaigned against the 'Alids in Mecca (*ibid.*,

p. 532). He was arrested by Ma'mūn after the civil war, presumably for having sided with Amīn, but was apparently released, for he is said to have guarded Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim in 219 (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 317; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1166).

(35) *Maṭar.* A slave bought by Abū Ayyūb and presented to Manṣūr who freed him and appointed him postmaster of Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia at an unknown date, and fiscal governor of Egypt in 157; he was dismissed in 159 (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 101; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 380, 467; Miles, *Glass Weights*, pp. 120, 124).

(36) *Mu'allā, mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn.* The brother of Layth b. Ṭarīf (above, no. 32). A freedman, general and drinking companion of Mahdī's, he directed the post and the *ṭirāz* of Khurāsān for the latter, fought against Yūsuf al-Barm and administered the districts of the Tigris, Kaskar, Ahwāz, Fars, Kerman, Baḥrayn, Yamāma and Ghawṣ from 165 to 167 (Khaṭīb, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 96 = Lassner, *Topography*, p. 81; *Aghānī*, vol. vi, pp. 239f; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 505, 514, 518, 521; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 160).

(37) *Mūsā b. Muṣ'ab.* A *mawlā* of the Khath'am whose *nisba* he often bears. Rabī', his grandfather, was apparently a Palestinian freedman and/or convert; Muṣ'ab, his father, was a secretary of Marwān II's who had sought *amān* from 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī in 132; he himself was the foster-brother of Mahdī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 839, ser. iii, p. 46; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 227). He was governor of Mosul and the Jazīra with the title of *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn* on several occasions under Manṣūr and possibly also under Mahdī (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 679; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 225ff, 247ff, where he has become a Khawlānī; Poole, *A Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum*, p. 197; Chabot, *Chronique de Denys de Tell-Mahré*, pp. 108f, 131f, 146ff, 195ff and *passim* = 91f, 110f, 122ff, 161ff and *passim*; cf. above, no. 16; cf. also Cahen, 'Fiscalité, propriété, antagonismes sociaux'). In 167 he was appointed to Egypt, where he was killed in the following year (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 124ff, cf. p. 108).

(38) *Rabī' b. Yūnus b. Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Abī Farwa.* A client of Manṣūr who evidently affected descent from a secretary of Muṣ'ab (cf. Ibn Qutayba, *Ma'ārif*, p. 87), but who was either a foundling or a freedman or both (*Encyclopaedia of Islam¹*, *s.v.*). He began his career as a servant of Abū 'l-Khaṣīb, rose to the position of chamberlain under Manṣūr and Mahdī, and became a commander of the caliph's *mawālī* under Hārūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii,

pp. 112, 495f, 503; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 469, 483; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 684, 700).

Ḥasan b. al-Rabī' was similarly chamberlain to Mahdī while Faḍl b. al-Rabī' held the same office under Hādī with whom he is said to have been extremely influential (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 700, 709; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 491). Faḍl received the title of *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn* under Hārūn, inherited the position of the Barmakids, and became a foster-brother (?) of Ma'mūn (Sourdel, *Vizirat*, pp. 183ff; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1068, where the *riḍā'a* may not be meant literally). On Hārūn's death he became counsellor to Amīn while his son 'Abbās assumed the office of chamberlain, and he was the prime agent behind Amīn in the fourth civil war. After his defeat he was also among the supporters of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī. Ma'mūn did not find it easy to forgive him, and though eventually he was pardoned, he and his family disappeared from the public scene (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v. 'al-Faḍl b. al-Rabī'; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā*, p. 289; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1068).

(39) *Sa'd, mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn*. Mahdī's governor of Rayy from 166 to at least 168 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 518; Miles, *Numismatic History of Rayy*, pp. 47f).

(40) *Ṣāliḥ b. al-Haytham*. A client of Abū'l-'Abbās and/or Rayṭa bint Abī'l-'Abbās who was a foster-brother of Manṣūr. He was doubtless a freedman or the son of one: women rarely if ever had free male clients. Abū' l-'Abbās employed him as chamberlain, and Manṣūr appointed him head of the *dīwān al-rasā'il* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 840, ser. iii, p. 101; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 215).

(41) *Sālim al-Barallusī/Burnusī/Yūnusī*. A client of Ismā'īl b. 'Alī who was a commander on the Syrian frontier in the reign of Mahdī (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 685; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 166); he was also governor of Sind for Hārūn (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 746; Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 493). Presumably Barallusī is the correct *nisba* (cf. Yāqūt, *Wörterbuch*, vol. i, p. 593).

(42) *Sallām*. A client of Mahdī who was in charge of the *maẓālim* court for this caliph (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 700; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 253 = 39).

(43) *Sindī b. Shāhak*. A servant and client of Manṣūr who bore the title of *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 98, 145, 146, 306). He would seem to have been sent to Syria to deal with the outbreak of factionalism in 176 (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 495; the Sindī could of course be Sindī b. al-Ḥarashī), and he is

mentioned as governor of Damascus for Mūsā b. 'Īsā (Ṣafadī, *Umarā*', p. 39). Later he was appointed to the *shurṭa* of Baghdad and assisted in the destruction of the Barmakids (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 375; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 297, cf. p. 713). In the civil war he supported Amīn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 912, 915); after the civil war he was an eager adherent of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī (*ibid.*, p. 1016). Ibrāhīm b. al-Sindī b. Shāhak was employed in Ma'mūn's intelligence service (Ṭayfūr, *Kitāb Baghdād*, pp. 66ff; the *khayr* on p. 66 is to be emended to *khabar* as on p. 70).

(44) *Ṭarīf*. A client of Manṣūr's who was appointed to the *barīd of Egypt, Syria* and Mesopotamia (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā*', pp. 100f). It is presumably this Ṭarīf who was the father of Layth and Mu'allā (above, nos. 32 and 36).

(45) *Ṭayfūr, mawlā* of Mahdī. A son of Manṣūr's Ḥimyarite wife by her previous marriage to a North African tailor (Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamhara*, p. 21). He was Mahdī's half-brother and is possibly identical with the Ṭayfūr whom Manṣūr is said to have 'given to' Mahdī, though the phrase would imply that the latter was a freedman (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 310); and he is probably identical with the Ṭayfūr, *mawlā* of Hādī, who was governor of Isfahan in 169 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 568). Muḥammad b. Ṭayfūr al-Ḥimyarī, *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn*, was governor of Sind for Hārūn according to Khalīfa, but according to Ya'qūbī the governor was Ṭayfūr b. 'Abdallāh b. Manṣūr al-Ḥimyarī, that is a descendant of Manṣūr's brother-in-law (*Ta'rīkh*, p. 746; *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 493).

(46) *'Umāra b. Ḥamza b. Maymūn*. A client of Manṣūr and Mahdī whose grandfather had apparently been a freedman of 'Abdallāh b. 'Abbās; he claimed descent from a client of the Prophet (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā*' pp. 90, 147; Khaṭīb, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, pp. 87, 96 = Lassner, *Topography*, pp. 70, 82). He was governor of the districts of the Tigris, Ahwāz, Fars, Yamāma, Baḥrayn and Ghawṣ in 156–7, director of the *dīwān al-kharāj* in Basra in 158, and in charge of the *aḥdāth* of Basra in 159 (Khaṭīb, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, p. 96; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 379, 380, 459, 466, 469; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā*', pp. 134, 149). He had also assisted in the construction of Baghdad where he received a plot (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, pp. 242, 252 = 18, 38). A collection of his correspondence was known to Ibn al-Nadīm (*Fihrist*, p. 118 = 258).

(47) *Waḍḍāḥ, mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn*. A director of the arsenal under one of the early caliphs, probably Manṣūr (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 245 = 24). He is doubtless identical with Waḍḍāḥ b. Shabā

al-Sharawī, a member of Muḥammad b. 'Alī's *Sharawiyya* and client of Manṣūr (Khaṭīb, *Ta'rīkh*, vol. i, pp. 80, 89; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 517).

(48) *Wāḍiḥ, mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn.* A *mawlā* of Manṣūr, Mahdī and Ṣāliḥ b. Manṣūr and the ancestor of Ya'qūbī. Manṣūr employed him during the construction of Baghdad and later appointed him to Armenia (Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 242, cf. p. 247 = 18, 28; *id.*, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 447, 462); Mahdī appointed him governor of Egypt (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 493; Kindī, *Governors*, p. 121; Miles, *Glass Weights*, pp. 128f; Grohmann, *Corpus Papyrorum Raineri*, vol. ii, no. 133); and under Hārūn he was postmaster in Egypt where he helped Idrīs escape to North Africa, a deed for which he was executed (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 561; cf. also Wiet in his introduction to his translation of Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. vii).

(49) *Yaḥyā b. Muslim b. 'Urwa.* A black *mawlā* and foster-brother of the 'Abbāsids who was appointed to Armenia by Manṣūr in 137 according to some (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 99). Apparently, he sided with 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī in the latter's revolt and was subsequently put to death (Goitein, *Studies*, p. 180n).

APPENDIX VI

MAWLĀ IN THE SENSE OF 'KINSMAN'

A number of passages relating to the Sufyānid period and second civil war at first sight suggest that client retinues were quite common already in the sixties. On closer inspection, however, it is clear that this impression is misleading. Most of the passages employ the term *mawlā* in its old sense of 'kinsman' and/or 'supporter', while the two passages in which the word certainly does mean 'client' are of dubious historicity.

(1) The sources are agreed that the Umayyads were expelled from Medina in 63 together with their *mawālī*. These *mawālī* were later understood to have been clients; thus Abū Mikhnaf has an Umayyad freedman relate the events as an eye-witness (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 405ff); and the *mawālī* of Muʿāwiya, who according to one source played a crucial role in the events leading up to the expulsion, were doubtless freedmen (Kister, 'The Battle of the Ḥarra', pp. 45f). But those who left with the Umayyads were not. Thus according to ʿAwāna the Umayyads were expelled *bi-ʿiyālātihim wa-nisāʾihim* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 469), and according to the Hispano-Muslim chronicle *cum omnibus liberis vel suis propinquis* ('Continuatio Byzantia Arabica', p. 346). Abū Mikhnaf himself enumerates the Umayyads *wa-mawālīhim wa-man raʾā rayʾahum min Quraysh* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 405), which reappears as *mawālīhim wa-man ʿurifa biʾl-mayl ilayhim min Quraysh* in Balādhurī (*Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 32). What the variants enumerate are thus Umayyad relatives on the one hand and Qurashī supporters on the other, and the *mawālī* clearly overlap with both (cf. also Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 406, 407, where they are concatenated with *anṣār*).

(2) After the expulsion Ibn Ziyād advised Marwān to expel Ḍaḥḥāk with the help of the people of Palmyra 'and those who were with him of the Umayyads, their *mawālī* and their following' whereupon Marwān received the homage of 'the Umayyads, their *mawālī*, their following and the people of Palmyra' (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 141). It is scarcely credible that these *mawālī*, placed second

only to the Umayyads themselves, should have been clients, and in fact they were not, for in Wahb b. Jarīr's version Marwān is advised to marry the widow of Yazīd so as to win over 'the *mawālī* of Muʿāwiya and their following' (*ibid.*, p. 156). Here it is clear that the *mawālī* in question were Qurashīs and *ashrāf* and that it was their following which it would be so advantageous to win over.

(3) Slightly later Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays decided to switch allegiance from Ibn al-Zubayr to the Umayyads, and he therefore apologized to the Umayyads, displaying his gratitude for the favours they had shown 'to his *mawālī* and himself' (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 472). Balā-dhurī apparently found these *mawālī* incomprehensible, for he omitted them (*Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 133), and the context certainly militates against taking them as clients. But kinsmen and supporters make perfect sense.

(4) On a few occasions we find Umayyad *mawālī* as a fighting force. Thus Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik is said to have fought against Ashdaq's brother with the *mawālī* of ʿAbd al-Malik (Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, vol. v, p. 239); similarly Khālid b. Yazīd is said to have fought against Zufar b. al-Ḥārith with *mawālī* of Muʿāwiya and others, or with Kalb (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 301f); and finally, in the wars against the *Jarājima* we find a *jaysh* of *mawālī* of ʿAbd al-Malik and the Umayyads and a *jund* of *thiqāt jundihi*, both under the command of Suhaym b. al-Muhājir (*ibid.*, p. 310). There can be little doubt that the first two passages refer to kinsmen (Kalb certainly were the kinsmen of Muʿāwiya). The third passage, however, is less clear-cut. If the commander was a client, as his name suggests, so presumably were the troops; but he may have been a Ṭāʾī (cf. Appendix III, no. 28).

(5) Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī is said to have assembled his *ahl bayt* and *mawālī* when asked to pay homage to Yazīd I (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 218); the variant version has *ahl baytihi wa-man kāna ʿalā raʾyihi* (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 13), and these *mawālī* were thus also relatives and other adherents. Later versions predictably interpreted them as freedmen and slaves (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 14; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 231).

(6) ʿAmr. b. Saʿīd al-Ashdaq is said to have performed the pilgrimage surrounded by a *jamāʿa* of his *mawālī* for fear of Ibn al-Zubayr (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 21). That these *mawālī* were in fact clients is supported by the story that some 300 of his *mawālī* and *ghilmān* were arrested on his dismissal by his successor in

office or the Medinese (Kister, 'The Battle of the Ḥarra', p. 46). Nonetheless, the *mawālī* who appear in connection with his death are of dubious historicity. Abū Mikhnaf's version does not have them; according to him, 'Amr surrendered, was put in chains, tried to speak with his followers outside the castle, but was handed over to Abu Zu'ayzi'a for execution (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 139). All other versions, however, have some time elapse between the surrender and the execution with the result that the followers, whose presence is required by the story, are no longer assembled outside the castle. A substitute thus had to be found. Some equip 'Amr with a hundred *aṣḥāb*, others give him a hundred *mawālī*, still others have his brother arrive with *aṣḥāb*, with *aṣḥāb* and *mawālī*, with *mawālī* from Ḥimṣ or with slaves (*ibid.*, pp. 141, 143, 145; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 787, 789). These stories neatly array the types of retinues which were available to a soldier in the late Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid periods, but they scarcely furnish evidence for the existence of retinues maintained on a permanent basis at the time of the transition from Sufyānid to Marwānid rule.

(7) The *mawālī* of 'Abbād b. Ziyād are similarly of dubious historicity. There are three relevant episodes. First, we are told that when 'Abbād was dismissed from Sīstān he distributed the contents of the treasury among his slaves, a thousand of whom joined him on his departure (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 392). Secondly, it is said that at the time of Marj Rāhiṭ 'Abbād went with 2000 of his *mawālī* and others apparently to join the battle (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 136). Finally, after the battle we find him on his way to Dūma in search of neutrality; Mukhtār, however, sent an army against him on the ground that he was *ra's al-fitna*, and in the ensuing battle 'Abbād's army consisted of 700 *mawālī* and slaves in addition to the rest of his following (*ibid.*, pp. 267f). The third episode can be discounted. For one thing, it makes not the slightest sense: 'Abbād could scarcely be characterized as a *ra's al-fitna*, and if he had gone to Dūma in search of neutrality it is hard to see why Mukhtār should have gone out of his way to fight him. For another, it is manifestly a doublet of a previous battle between Mukhtār and Ibn al-Zubayr in the region: Mukhtār sent precisely the same man on the two occasions, Mukhtār's man quoted precisely the same poetry, and moreover he had gone with an army which was a precise mirror image of 'Abbād's troops, *viz. mawālī* and 700 Arabs as against 'Abbād's Arabs and 700 *mawālī* (*ibid.*,

p. 246f). That leaves the first two episodes. It is not of course in the least implausible that 'Abbād should have made use of slaves in the emergency situation in Sīstān, and it is tempting to assume that he formed them into a permanent bodyguard; but whether there actually is a connection between the two episodes is anybody's guess.

NOTES

Where page references are given in the form 'p. 5 = 67', the first figure refers to the original text and the second to the translation.

1. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

¹ P. Crone and M. Cook, *Hagarism, the Making of the Islamic World*, Cambridge 1977, p. 125.

² One can of course play up the fact that something was written, but Sezgin's argument that the tradition was basically written from the time of the Prophet, if not the *jāhiliyya*, is very unconvincing (F. Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*, vol. i, Leiden 1967, pp. 53ff, 237ff; cf. M. A. Cook, 'Monotheist Sages. A Study in Muslim and Jewish Attitudes towards Oral Tradition in the Early Islamic Period', unpublished typescript, note 17).

³ Cf. Cook, 'Monotheist Sages'. Traditionist objections to history do not, in fact, hold that it should not be written down, but that it should not be cultivated at all (I. Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, ed. S. M. Stern, London 1967–71, vol. ii, p. 206; *id.*, 'Historiography in Arabic Literature' in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. J. Desomogyi, Hildesheim 1967–70, vol. iii, pp. 371ff; the story adduced by G. Rotter, 'Abū Zurʿa ad-Dimašqī (st. 281/894) und das Problem der frühen arabischen Geschichtsschreibung in Syrien', *Die Welt des Orients* 1970–1, p. 103 is not, however, about history, but about companion *ḥadīth*).

⁴ For the titles of Umayyad books see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, under the relevant headings. Most of it was concerned with Arabian antiquities. For the transition to a basically written transmission see N. Abbott, *Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri*, vol. i, Chicago 1957, p. 24; vol. ii, Chicago 1967, pp. 184, 196 and *passim*. Whether the late Umayyad fragment on the battle of Badr comes from a book or private notes, one cannot tell (A. Grohmann, *Arabic Papyri from Ḥirbet el-Mird*, Louvain 1963, no. 71).

⁵ Cf. A. A. Duri, 'The Iraq School of History to the Ninth Century – A Sketch' in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East*, London 1962.

⁶ Compare the fact that three generations complete the transition from slave to freeborn, non-Arab to Arab, tribal conqueror to effeminate dynast, immigrant to American in search of his origins.

[7] As Mani chose to do. That Muḥammad did the same has recently been argued by J. Burton, *The Collection of the Qur'ān*, Cambridge 1977.

[8] E. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, Rome 1956, especially pp. 135, 153ff, 163f.

[9] Compare also the transition from Jesus the Jew to Jesus the God within *two* generations. That Christian scholars have some hope of being able to trace this transition is due entirely to the good luck that Christian doctrine was reduced to writing fairly rapidly.

[10] Ibn Isḥāq died *ca* 150 — about 130 years after the Prophet; and his work survives only in the recension of Ibn Hishām who died in 213 or 218 — about 200 years after the Prophet. Consider the prospect of reconstructing the origins of Christianity on the basis of the writings of Clement or Justin Martyr in a recension by Origen.

[11] The refusal of the Koran to yield its secrets comes across very strongly in J. Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies*, Oxford 1977. Less original scholars have been content to conclude that it has no secrets.

[12] What the rabbis remembered, or rather managed to forget, about Jesus and his time is a typical example (cf. R. Travers Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, Edinburgh 1903). Cf. also the contrast between the focused account of Paul given in the Judeo-Christian source of 'Abd al-Jabbār, and the woolly version of the same story which the rabbis preserved in the *Toledoth* (P. Crone, 'Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm', forthcoming in *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*).

[13] Thus B. Gerhardsson, *Memory and Manuscript*, Uppsala 1961, pp. 194ff.

[14] R. Sellheim, 'Prophet, Chalif und Geschichte. Die Muhammed-Biographie des Ibn Isḥāq', *Oriens* 1967, p. 43.

[15] The Constitution of Medina unambiguously depicts a society of Muhājirūn, Arab tribes and Jewish allies preparing for war in the name of a creed to which there is only the most cursory reference. The *Sīra* nonetheless has Muḥammad arrive as a peacemaker in Medina, where he spends a substantial part of his time expounding Islam to the Arab tribes and disputing with Jewish rabbis. A number of traditions even have him set up a major educational industry (for these see Abbott, *Studies*, vol. i, p. 28; for the Prophet as a teacher see also M. M. Azmi, *Studies in Early Ḥadīth Literature*, Beirut 1968, pp. 183f).

[16] J. Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford 1950.

[17] As has been done by Schacht (*Origins*), by J. Van Ess, *Zwischen Ḥadit und Theologie*, Berlin and New York 1975, and by Cook, 'Monotheist Sages'.

[18] Ibn Ishaq, *Das Leben Muhammed's nach Muhammed Ibn Ishâk, bearbeitet von 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Hischâm*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen 1858–60, vol. i, p. 4 = *The Life of Muhammad*, tr. A. Guillaume, Oxford 1955, p. 691.

[19] I owe both this point and the following example to M. A. Cook.

[20] Nu'aym b. Ḥammād, *Kitāb al-fitan*, British Museum Or. no. 9449, f. 97bff.

[21] Ibn Isḥāq, *Leben Muhammed's*, vol. i, pp. 341ff = 231ff.

[22] Abū 'Ubayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, ed. M. K. Harās, Cairo 1968, pp. 290ff.

[23] Thus the *min* between *al-muslimīn* and *Quraysh* in the opening line has fallen out, *min dūni* has become *dūna* (both p. 291), *umma ma'a al-mu'minīn* has become *umma min al-mu'minīn* (p. 293), and *dahama Yathrib* has become *rahama Yathrib* (p. 294).

[24] In Ibn Isḥāq the document is issued by *Muḥammad al-nabī*, in Abū 'Ubayd by *Muḥammad al-nabī rasūl Allāh*; *kullu ṭā'ifa* is glossed by *minhum*; *Banū'l-Ḥārith* is glossed by *b. al-Khazraj*, (p. 291); a blessing follows the mention of God, and that following Muḥammad's name is more elaborate (p. 294). Ibn Isḥāq has 'believers and Muslims' once, but Abū 'Ubayd twice.

[25] Most strikingly a large number of clauses on p. 343 in Ibn Isḥāq are missing from the corresponding p. 294 in Abū 'Ubayd; but two famous clauses are also missing from p. 292, and one from p. 293. There are also several minor differences.

[26] From Zuhrī. Ibn Abī Khaythama (d. 279) similarly provided the document with an *isnād*, but brought it all the way back to Kathīr b. 'Abdallāh al-Muzanī from his father from his grandfather (Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, *'Uyūn al-athar fī funūn al-maghāzī wa'l-shamā'il wa'l-siyar*, Cairo 1356, vol. i, p. 198; cf. M. Gil, 'The Constitution of Medina: a Reconsideration', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1974, p. 47). Ibn Hishām knew of another recension which may well have been Abū 'Ubayd's: he tells us that some have *al-birr al-muḥsin* for *al-birr al-maḥḍ*, which is precisely what Abū 'Ubayd has (Ibn Isḥāq, *Leben Muḥammed's*, p. 343; Abū 'Ubayd, *Amwāl*, p. 294). And in some respects Abū 'Ubayd's version is the more archaic. It lacks the invocation (p. 291); where Ibn Isḥāq later qualifies Muḥammad as *rasūl Allāh*, Abū 'Ubayd by contrast calls him *nabī* (p. 294); and it was presumably Ibn Isḥāq who omitted the Jews from the clause on *ṣulḥ* rather than Abū 'Ubayd who put them in (*ibid.*).

[27] A. J. Wensinck, *Muhammad and the Jews of Medina*, Freiburg 1975, pp. 64ff; cf. Gil, 'The Constitution of Medina', p. 48. The Shī'ite references to the Constitution are even vaguer, if indeed they are references to it at all (cf. R. B. Serjeant, 'The "Constitution of Medina"', *Islamic Quarterly* 1964, pp. 5f).

[28] Cf. R. Brunschvig, 'Ibn 'Abdalḥakam et la conquête de l'Afrique du Nord par les Arabes', *Annales de l'Institut des Études Orientales de l'Université d'Alger* 1942–7.

[29] Cf. below, p. 52.

[30] The Islamic tradition on this battle describes in profuse detail how the last legitimate caliph defeated Mu'āwiya, the governor of Syria, only to be bitterly cheated of the fruits of his victory. It does not emerge from this tradition that the Syrian side regarded itself as having won: a Syriac source casually refers to Ṣiffīn as the battle in which Mu'āwiya defeated Abū Turāb (S. Brock, 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor', *Analecta Bollandiana* 1973, p. 313 = 319; cf. p. 329), and the Syriac tradition used by Theophanes was similarly innocent of the knowledge that Mu'āwiya had been defeated (Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. C. De Boor, Leipzig 1883–5, A.M. 6148). In fact the Syrians may very well have won, for the story of the Korans on their lances is certainly apocryphal (for a possible

Vorlage see A. Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien zu Themen, Formen und Tenden-zen frühislamischer Geschichtsüberlieferung*, Bonn 1973, p. 154). Nor does it emerge that the Syrians never recognized 'Alī as caliph and that it was only in mid-third-century Iraq that the *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jamā'a* accepted him as the fourth of the *Rāshidūn* (cf. W. Madelung, *Der Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen*, Berlin 1965, pp. 223ff). 'Alī is, however, omit-ted from the mid-Umayyad Syriac 'king-lists' and the Hispano-Muslim chron-icle (P. N. Land (ed.), *Anecdota Syriaca*, vol. ii, Leiden 1868, p. 11 of the 'Addenda'; I. Guidi *et al.* (eds. and trs.), *Chronica Minora* (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, third series, vol. iv), Louvain 1903–7, p. 155 = 119; 'Continuatio Byzantia Arabica' in T. Mommsen (ed.), *Chronica Minora*, vol. ii (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctores Antiquissimi, vol. xi), Berlin 1894, p. 343; cf. p. 368). On the Muslim side the refusal to count him among the caliphs is attested only in the ninth-century work of the Damascene Abū Zur'a (Rotter, 'Abū Zur'a', pp. 94f).

[31] Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 177, note 60.

[32] Mukhtār's *mahdī* hardly knew that he was the messiah, let alone how to behave when he was told, and Mukhtār's *kursī* was just an old chair of 'Alī's he had got out of Umm Ja'da's attic. Both points can still arouse the merri-ment of students. (See the account in Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, vol. v, ed. S. D. F. Goitein, Jerusalem 1936, pp. 214ff.)

[33] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa'l-mulūk*, ed. M. J. De Goeje *et al.*, Leiden 1879–1901, ser. ii, pp. 881, 979ff. The Shabīb affair and its antecedents take up the better part of the years 76 and 77.

[34] For the references see below, part II; C. Van Arendonk, *Les Débuts de l'imāmat zaidite au Yemen*, Leiden 1960, pp. 25ff; *The Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, Leiden and London 1960–, *s.vv.* "'Abd Allāh b. Mu'āwiya', 'Ḍaḥḥāk b. Kays al-Shaybānī'. The accounts of these rebellions are of course both biased and confused, but that is a different and far more familiar problem.

[35] Notably Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya and Ḥusayn, the rebel at Fakhkh (Van Arendonk, *Débuts*, pp. 45ff, 57f).

[36] The longest is that relating to Mulabbad, who was clearly made of the same stuff as Shabīb, but who nonetheless gets only three pages in Ṭabarī (ser. iii, pp. 120, 122ff). For others see *ibid.*, pp. 631, 645, 649, 688, 711.

[37] Needless to say, modern historians have adopted a determinedly materialist approach to the migration of the Icelanders: even the prospect of trade (with the Eskimos?) has been held out as a more plausible motive than mere dislike of state structures (G. Jones, *A History of the Vikings*, Oxford 1973, pp. 280f). Contrast the complete break-down of materialism in the account by an Icelandic Marxist, for whom the withering away of the state is clearly a restoration of the Icelandic past (E. Olgeirsson, *Fra Ættesamfunn til Klassestat*, Oslo 1968, pp. 49ff). The Marxist account is in this case by far the more persuasive. Had overpopulation or the like been all there was behind the exodus, it is odd that Iceland did not become a Norwegian colony or an independent monarchy. Monarchy was by now as indispensable an ingredient

of civilization as was Christianity, and the oddity of the Icelanders was noticed (cf. Adam of Bremen's surprise that 'with them there is no king except the law', cited with approval by Olgeirsson, *Ættesamfunn*, p. 43, or the thirteenth-century cardinal who 'thought it unreasonable that this country would not serve a king even as all other countries in the world', cited with scathing comment by E. O. Sveinsson, *The Age of the Sturlungs*, Ithaca 1953, p. 14). The Icelanders themselves felt the attraction of the Norwegian kings, whose hirdmen they became, whose institutions they imitated, and whose sagas they wrote. But though they did not long resist the coming of Christianity, it was only in A.D. 1264 that the collapse of their archaic society brought them to surrender to kings.

38 The contrast between the evolution of the conquerors of Normandy and the settlers in Iceland is well brought out by Olgeirsson, *Ættesamfunn*, pp. 42f. Note also the role of physical isolation in the preservation of the Irish *jāhiliyya*.

39 The Icelanders collected the *Edda* and wrote the *Heimskringla* and *fornaldasögur* about the Scandinavian past. The Arabs collected the *Mu'allaqāt* and wrote *akhbār* about Arabia (*ayyām, asnām, ansāb* and *amthāl al-'arab*).

40 The *Landnámabók* of the Icelanders, the *kutub al-futūh* of the Arabs.

41 The *Íslendingabók* and *Íslendingasögur* of the Icelanders, the *ansāb* and *akhbār*-literature of the Arabs.

42 It might have been different if the Icelanders had decided to remain pagan: Snorri's *Heimskringla*, a universal chronicle beginning with Odin, has all the aspirations of a *Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa'l-mulūk*.

43 To that extent the sagas are comparable with the *Shāhnāmeh*. Whereas the *Iliad* or the *Mahābhārata* were literary remains from the heroic age handed down by oral tradition, the sagas and the *Shāhnāmeh* were literary creations *about* the heroic age composed on the basis of literary records. And the forcefulness with which these dirges for the past conjure up the lost society testifies to the bitter loss which the authors felt.

44 Sayf's long account of the conquest of Damascus, for example, is told under a single *isnād* (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2147f, 2150ff). But his much longer account of the battle of Qādisiyya consists of a mass of smaller pieces (*ibid.*, pp. 2212ff).

45 Contrast the way in which a saga written almost 250 years after the Christianization of Iceland turns on the working of inexorable fate (A. M. A. Madelung, *The Laxdœla Saga: its Structural Patterns*, Chapel Hill 1972, pp. 17f, 158ff).

46 It is not for nothing that anthropologists have completely failed to use the *Sīra* for information on tribal Arabia, though they have had no inhibitions about combing the *Secret History* for information on Mongolia.

47 A. Noth, 'Iṣfahān-Nihāwand. Eine quellenkritische Studie zur frühislamischen Historiographie', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 1968; id., *Quellenkritische Studien*, pp. 24ff, 182ff and *passim*. To some extent the narrative technique analysed by Noth is that characteristic of epics (or fairy tales) rather than of rabbinic literature, that is to say stock themes have been

put together in a variety of ways to form coherent narratives, and the historical contents of the tradition have been worn away and replaced by a wealth of details providing general verisimilitude, but little fact. To that extent the *futūḥ* belong to the tradition of *ayyām* rather than *ḥadīth*. But the 'rabbinic' influence is manifest in the insistence on 'Umar's guiding hands, the exposition of the Islamic creed in the *da'wa*s to Islam, the searches for martyrdom and so forth. It is also evident in the restraints placed on the narrative imagination: the *futūḥ*, despite their roots in the *ayyām*, do not often make exciting reading.

[48] Who participated in the battle of Ṣiffīn is as loaded a question as who participated in that of Badr.

[49] The typical Syrian *sharīf* fights against 'Alī at Siffīn, goes to the Ḥijāz to persuade Ibn al-Zubayr to pay allegiance to Yazīd I, and reappears at Jābiya and/or Marj Rāhiṭ. The typical Iraqi *sharīf* fights against Mu'āwiya at Ṣiffīn, deserts Ḥusayn at Karbalā', fights against Mukhtār under Muṣ'ab and deserts Muṣ'ab for 'Abd al-Malik at Maskin (cf. Appendix I). A man to whom a career of this pattern is attributed is a *sharīf*.

[50] W. Caskel, 'Aijām al-'arab', *Islamica* 1930 (Supplement).

[51] Thus for example Sayf's accounts of the *'irāfa*s or the land exchange under 'Uthmān, which are so strangely free of halakhic interests (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2496, 2854ff). It is thanks to the survival of this kind of material, and above all thanks to Sayf, that Hinds' reconstruction of the situation in the provinces at the time of the civil war carries conviction (for the references see the bibliography).

[52] Thus the accounts of the shifting genealogies of Quḍā'a, the tribal feuds in Basra, the participants at Jābiya or the wars between the Syrian tribes after Marj Rāhiṭ (below, ch. 4). What the tribesmen remembered of the *politics* of Mukhtār was likewise genuine.

[53] Ibn Ḥabīb, *Kitāb al-Muḥabbar*, ed. I. Lichtenstädter, Hyderabad 1942. In it the interested reader will find the answer to questions such as who wore turbans in Mecca to hide their beauty from women (pp. 232f), who was the father-in-law of four caliphs (p. 243), what women could count ten caliphs within their forbidden degrees (pp. 404f), who had Christian or Ethiopian mothers (pp. 305ff), and what *ashrāf* lost an eye in battle, were crucified or had their heads put on a stake (pp. 261f, 478ff, 490ff). Noth was also struck by the absurdity of this book (*Quellenkritische Studien*, p. 90).

[54] The phrase was coined by E. L. Petersen, *'Alī and Mu'āwiya in Early Arabic Tradition*, Copenhagen 1964, p. 24.

[55] That the Muslims sensed this themselves comes across in the reason which 'Abīda b. Qays, a Kufan *tābi'*, is said to have given for his refusal to engage in *tafsīr*: 'those who knew what the Koran was revealed about have died' (Ibn Sa'd, *al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, Beirut 1958–60, vol. vi, pp. 94f; for the doctrinal point at issue see H. Birkeland, *Old Muslim Opposition against Interpretation of the Koran*, Oslo 1955).

[56] A. Noth, 'Der Charakter der ersten grossen Sammlungen von Nachrichten zur frühen Kalifenzeit', *Der Islam* 1971; *id.*, *Quellenkritische Studien*, pp. 13ff.

[57] For his Syrian origins see Appendix III, no. 87. That he was biased in favour of the Umayyads was first maintained by Yāqūt (*Irshād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, London 1923–31, vol. vi, p. 94); it was endorsed by the latter's editor (D. S. Margoliouth, *Lectures on Arabic Historians*, Calcutta 1930, pp. 52f), and again by Duri, though with the qualification that he also has anti-Umayyad material (Duri, 'The Iraq School of History', pp. 48f). S. A. El-Ali saw no evidence of bias in favour of either the Umayyads, Kalb or Kufa (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* ''Awāna b. al-Ḥakam'), and Petersen claimed that on the whole he is anti-Umayyad (*'Alī and Muʿāwiya*, p. 53n). In short, 'Awāna had material in favour of contradictory views, precisely as had the other compilers.

[58] Noth, 'Der Charakter'; *id.*, *Quellenkritische Studien*, pp. 13ff; Naṣr b. Muzāḥim's *Waqʿat Ṣiffīn* is not really an exception. It is indeed thoroughly Shīʿite, but then it does not belong among the first compilations: most of it is based on Abū Mikhnaf (cf. U. Sezgin, *Abū Miḥnaf*, Leiden 1971, pp. 128ff). It thus belongs in the same category as Yaʿqūbī (cf. note 60).

[59] For the forms of Islamic historiography see F. Rosenthal, *A History of Muslim Historiography*, Leiden 1952.

[60] Cf. G. Richter, *Das Geschichtsbild der arabischen Historiker des Mittelalters* (Philosophie und Geschichte, vol. xliii), Tübingen 1933, pp. 19f. Yaʿqūbī is largely a digest of Abū Mikhnaf (Petersen, *'Alī and Muʿāwiya*, p. 169), and to the extent that Abū Mikhnaf and most of the other first compilers were Shīʿite sympathizers, one can claim with equal validity that the Sunnī sources do not give us the Sunnī experience of Islamic history. But whereas the *ahl al-sunna* eventually made the tradition their own, the Shīʿites acquired theirs only by repeating the process whereby the mainstream tradition had been created, that is to say blurring the old contours and creating new ones. Where Yaʿqūbī merely intersperses his selections from Abū Mikhnaf with curses, Naṣr b. Muzāḥim embroiders his with exaltations of 'Alī, Shīʿite piety and sentiments (*Waqʿat Ṣiffīn*, ed. 'A. M. Hārūn, Cairo 1946), and in Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī secondary material of this kind tends to swamp the Sunnī history behind it (for his authorities see *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.*, where his *Kitāb al-futūḥ* is dated 819; for an estimate placing it almost a century later see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, vol. i, p. 329). Ibn Aʿtham's work is stuffed with letters to and from the caliph expounding the principles of Islam, deliberations in which 'Alī invariably distinguishes himself, elaborate invitations to the enemy to convert, and lengthy descriptions of battles yielding a minimum of information; and in his account of the conquest of Jerusalem virtually everything that the mainstream tradition remembered has given way to Shīʿite reconstruction: Abū 'Ubayda begins by appointing a Kufan Companion governor of Damascus (Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī, *Kitāb al-futūḥ*, Hyderabad 1968–, vol. i, p. 289; cf. Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, *Kitāb al-ṭabaqāt*, ed. A. D. al-'Umarī, Baghdad 1967, p. 127 (Saʿīd b. Zayd)); 'Umar complies with the request that he come to Syria thanks to 'Alī's advice (Ibn Aʿtham, *Futūḥ*, p. 292); the treaty, which they have preserved to this day, but the text of which

is not given, was negotiated by a supposed '*musta'rib* whose *kunya* was Abū'l-Ju'ayd' (*ibid.*, p. 296); 'Umar goes, not to the temple rock, but to the cathedral: it is here that Ka'b al-Ahbār converts from Judaism and makes his speech which has now lost its messianic content and Biblical flavour to become Arab *saj'* (*ibid.*, pp. 296f; contrast Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2408f). The account of the conquest of Jerusalem is by no means an isolated example: Sunnī history is once and Shī'ite history twice removed from reality (cf. also the Shī'ite 'memory' of the Constitution of Medina referred to above).

61 Kindī's recollection of an iconoclast edict clearly derived from a local tradition (cf. Crone, 'Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm', note 45), and Abū Zur'a's refusal to count 'Alī among the caliphs presumably also represents local tradition, not just doctrinal choice (cf. above, note 30). But such examples are rare.

62 Cf. Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien*, p. 15; Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies*, p. 90.

63 Just how much information can be brought together by combing sources early and late, printed and manuscript is superbly demonstrated by Kister's work (for a recent example see M. J. Kister, 'The Battle of the Harra' in *Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet*, ed. M. Rosen-Ayalon, Jerusalem 1977).

64 For a striking exception see the description of the Roman nobles who cover their heads with their cloaks and await death refusing to survive the ignominy of defeat (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2099; cf. M. De Goeje, *Mémoire sur la conquête de la Syrie*², Leiden 1900, p. 62). But such exceptions are very few indeed.

65 Compare J. H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, *Antioch: City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire*, Oxford 1972, or P. Brown, 'The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity', *Journal of Roman Studies* 1971, two vivid portraits of the Syria which the Arabs conquered, and H. Lammens, *Études sur le règne du Calife Omaiyade Mo'āwiya Ier*, Paris 1908, or P. K. Hitti, *History of Syria*, London 1951, two portraits of the Syria which the Arabs saw. In part, of course, the contrast arises from the different dates and very different historical and literary talents of the authors, but basically it arises from the sources: it is no accident that one of the most successful sketches of the encounter between the Arabs and late antiquity comes from a scholar to whom these sources are not accessible (P. Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity*, London 1971, pp. 189ff).

66 Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien*, pp. 128f.

67 Th. Nöldeke (ed. and tr.), 'Zur Geschichte der Araber im 1. Jahr. d. H. aus syrischen Quellen', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 1875, p. 92 = 97.

68 The examples of *takbīrs* adduced by Noth certainly are *topoi* and legends. In the same way the invitations to conversion issued to the enemy clearly are schematic and over-elaborate, and the promises of complete equality often do bear all the signs of being arguments for a gentile Islam (Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien*, pp. 131ff). But precisely such an invitation was issued with precisely such a promise to the garrison at Gaza (H. Delahaye (ed.), 'Passio sanctorum sexaginta martyrum', *Analecta Bollandiana* 1904, p. 302:

'et estis sicut nos, et habetis honorem sicuti unus e nobis'). And Noth's dismissal of Sebeos' account of Mu'āwiya's letter to the Byzantine emperor is certainly wrong: the fact that it does not sound like a classical Islamic *da'wa ilā'l-islām* hardly proves that it was a Christian *topos* (Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien*, pp. 146f). What the Muslim sources do not tell us is that those who refused the *da'wa* in the days of the early conquests were liable not just to be defeated and subjected to the *jizya*, but also to be martyred.

[69] Cf. Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 173, note 276.

[70] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 5, 28 and 178, note 69; 'Alī appears as Muḥammad's brother in R. G. Khoury (ed.), *Wahb b. Munabbih: der Heidelberger Papyrus PSR Heid. Arab. 23*, Wiesbaden 1972, p. 166 (for the Shī'ite character of this work see M. J. Kister, 'On the Papyrus of Wahb b. Munabbih', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1974, pp. 556ff); compare the reference to Abū Ṭālib as Muḥammad's father in U. Rubin, 'Pre-existence and Light', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1975, p. 75n.

[71] Thus W. M. Watt, *Muhammad at Mecca*, Oxford 1953; *id.*, *Muhammad at Medina*, Oxford 1956. Watt's desire to find social malaise in the desert would have been more convincing if the Meccans had been members of OPEC rather than the *ḥilf al-fuḍūl*. Similarly M. A. Shaban, *The 'Abbāsid Revolution*, Cambridge 1970; *id.*, *Islamic History, a New Interpretation*, Cambridge 1971–6, through whose work runs the conviction that the Arabs were eminently modern-minded people who did not allow religious or tribal side-issues to cloud their grasp of the realities of politics in general and trade in particular; even the East African slaves in the salt marshes of Basra have here become pioneers of a trade as all-explaining as that which supposedly led the Norwegians to flock to Iceland (*Islamic History*, vol. ii, pp. 101f).

[72] One of the rare exceptions is R. B. Serjeant, 'Haram and Hawtah, the Sacred Enclave in Arabia' in A. Badawī (ed.), *Mélanges Taha Husain*, Cairo 1962. The disappearance of the unreality which is so striking in this sketch arises from the fact that it is based on tribal studies in modern South Arabia, plus the Constitution of Medina, to the exclusion of the rest of the *Sīra*. (The South Arabian model does not, of course, fit very well in the north, still less does it explain why the holy man should preach a new religion; but then Serjeant, like Arsūzī, sees only what was pre-Islamic in Islam.)

[73] Watt's *Muhammad at Mecca*, and *Medina*, Serjeant's 'Haram' and M. Rodinson, *Mohammed*, London 1971, merely happen to be about the same subject; Watt's book has found favour among historians, Serjeant's article among anthropologists, and Rodinson's book is good for students to read, but nobody *works* on them: in fact modern scholars tend not to work on the Prophet at all (contrast the situation before the First World War). Similarly, it was not the cumulation of previous research which led Shaban to write his new interpretation of Islamic history.

[74] J. Wellhausen, 'Prolegomena zür ältesten Geschichte des Islams' in his *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten*, vol. vi, Berlin 1899; *id.*, *Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte Israels*, Berlin 1883.

[75] Given the immense period covered by the Pentateuch, even the most credulous scholar will probably never know as much about the origins of Judaism as even the most sceptical scholar knows about those of Islam; but what the Biblical scholar knows makes infinitely better sense.

[76] For a fair critique of the Scandinavian *jacquerie* against Wellhausen see the chapter by C. R. North in H. H. Rowley (ed.), *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, Oxford 1951. The application of the rabbinic model in Islamic guise to the Pentateuch is not a little anachronistic, and the basic trouble of the Graf–Wellhausen hypothesis was clearly that it threatened to create work shortage in an overpopulated field.

[77] Noth, 'Der Charakter'; *id.*, *Quellenkritische Studien*, pp. 9ff. For the Syrian school see Rotter, 'Abū Zurʿa'. For an attack on Wellhausen from a somewhat different point of view see Sezgin, *Abū Miḫnaf*, pp. 1off.

[78] Sellheim, 'Prophet, Chalif und Geschichte'. Sellheim identified two strata consisting of miracle stories and ʿAbbāsid propaganda respectively: all the rest is labelled *Grundschicht* and characterized as *Felsbrocken* (p. 48). It is, however, this layer which is in need of analysis, and the assurance that it reflects the events of history more or less directly is hardly borne out by the soundings on pp. 73ff.

[79] Noth, 'Iṣfahān-Nihāwand'.

[80] Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien*; for the warning see p. 29. Noth does not deny that Islamic history can be written: his work is meant as a practical guide (*ibid.*, p. 28). But he himself writes none.

[81] I. Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, Halle 1889–90, vol. ii.

[82] H. Lammens, *Fāṭima et les filles de Mahomet*, Rome 1912; C. H. Becker, 'Prinzipielles zu Lammens' Sīrastudien', *Der Islam* 1913 (also published as 'Grundsätzliches zur Leben-Muhammed-Forschung' in his *Islamstudien*, Leipzig 1924–32, vol. i). Lammens saw the *Sīra* as nothing but a Midrash to the Koran, but nonetheless proceeded to a hazardous interpretation rather than a rejection of the Islamic tradition; Becker formally reinstated the historical recollection behind the *tafsīr* and *ḥadīth* of which he saw the *Sīra* as composed, but knew of no method other than subjective intuition for deciding which was which; Levi Della Vida was accordingly free to reinstate the historicity of the Medinan period of Muḥammad's life (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*[1], Leiden 1913–38, *s.v.* 'Sīra'); and Watt proceeded to reinstate that of the Meccan one as well, so that by 1953 Islamic studies were back to square one. Schacht himself seems to have regarded Lammens' theories as responsible for the blacklash (for the reference see the following note), but Islamic scholarship in general seems to have stalled about 1914–20 at the very moment when it was about to take off, and however many sins Lammens may have had on his conscience, he certainly was not responsible for that (cf. the fate of Wellhausen's theories and the separation of Syriac and Islamic studies about the same time; cf. also Cook, 'Monotheist Sages', note 264).

[83] J. Schacht, 'A Revaluation of Islamic Traditions', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1949. Schacht's misgivings as regards the effects of Lammens on

Islamic scholarship are found on p. 143n. Despite the general reluctance to accept the implications of his theories, his success in structuring an amorphous mass of traditions makes it unlikely that a reaction of quite the same magnitude could ever recur.

[84] Schacht, *Origins*; *id.*, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, Oxford 1964, part one, a somewhat easier survey of this evolution.

[85] H.-P. Raddatz has applied Schacht's theories in his own field (*Die Stellung und Bedeutung des Sufyān at-Taurī*, Bonn 1967; 'Frühislamisches Erbrecht nach dem Kitāb al-farā'iḍ des Sufyān at-Taurī', *Die Welt des Islams* 1971); in the neighbouring fields Van Ess (*Zwischen Ḥadīt und Theologie*), Wansbrough (*Quranic Studies*), Burton (*The Collection of the Qur'ān*), and Cook ('Monotheist Sages') are similarly indebted to Schacht (and Goldziher). Considering the deference with which Schacht is usually cited, it is surprising that no more work has been carried out under his aegis.

[86] Schacht, 'Revaluation'; *id.*, 'On Mūsā b. 'Uqba's Kitāb al-Maghāzī', *Acta Orientalia* (Copenhagen) 1949.

[87] J. Schacht, 'The Kitāb al-Tārīḫ of Ḫalīfa b. Ḫayyāṭ', *Arabica* 1969; cf. 'Mūsā b. 'Uqba', p. 293. Schacht's conclusions were confirmed not only by the late Umayyad fragment on the battle of Badr (Grohmann, *Arabic Papyri from Ḥirbet el-Mird*, no. 71), but also by the archaic third-century chronicle of Abū Zur'a (Rotter, 'Abū Zur'a').

[88] Watt disposes of Schacht by casuistry (W. M. Watt, 'The Materials used by Ibn Isḥāq' in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East*, London 1962, p. 24). Gibb defends the authenticity of a narrative relating to the mid-Umayyad period with reference to its superior *isnād* (H. A. R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, London 1962, p. 53). Shaban pretends never to have heard of Schacht, or for that matter any other critic of the sources (see in particular his *Islamic History*, vol. i, p. 1). The reactions of the Arabists are very similar. R. Paret, 'Die Lücke in der Überlieferung über den Islam', *Westöstliche Abhandlungen Rudolf Tschudi*, ed. F. Meier, Wiesbaden 1954, takes Schacht seriously, but nonetheless ends by endorsing the soundness of the *Sīra*. A. Guillaume seems to be under the impression that the only attack ever made on the historicity of the *Sīra* is that by his own research students in respect of the *Sīra*'s poetry (see his introduction to his translation of the *Sīra*; similarly his 'The Biography of the Prophet in Recent Research', *Islamic Quarterly Review* 1954). Sellheim's innocence of Schacht has already been noted. Abbott and F. and U. Sezgin are of course anything but deaf, but their method consists in believing what the Muslims said about the formation of their own tradition while abstaining from too close an analysis of the character of this tradition which so flagrantly contradicts it: the conclusions of Schacht (and now also Noth) are denied, but not disproved. The only serious attempts to refute Schacht are those of N. J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, Edinburgh 1964, pp. 64ff (who accepts the essentials of Schacht's conclusions), and Azmi, *Studies* (who disagrees fundamentally with both Goldziher and Schacht).

[89] Nor for that matter by anyone else.

⁹⁰ That, of course, was precisely the inference which Lammens and Becker drew from Goldziher's theories.

⁹¹ For example, we are told that Muḥammad's grandfather vowed to sacrifice his son and had to ransom him (Ibn Isḥāq, *Leben Muhammed's*, vol. i, pp. 97ff = 66ff). The story is modelled on Abraham and Isaac and presumably once had a point, but as it stands it is remarkably pointless, and except for a general Pentateuchal obsession, the doctrinal structure to which it belonged has utterly gone. It is, so to speak, a case of *naskh al-ḥukm dūna al-tilāwa*.

⁹² J. M. B. Jones, 'The Chronology of the *maghāzī* – a Textual Survey', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1957 (the chronology of Muḥammad's campaigns becomes gradually improved); Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies*, pp. 38ff (the chronology of the revelation is arbitrary); Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 157, note 39 (there is disagreement on the number of years Muḥammad spent in Medina).

⁹³ Sellheim, 'Prophet, Chalif und Geschichte', pp. 75, 77f (every year has one major event, Muḥammad was born, performed the *hijra* and died on Monday 12th Rabīʿ I).

⁹⁴ E. Mittwoch, 'Muhammeds Geburt- und Todestag', *Islamica* 1926 (Moses also was born and died on the same day). The doctrinal inspiration is, however, particularly clear in the tight synchronization of Muḥammad's relations with the Jews and Koranic revelation in the first years after the *hijra*, and in the date of the Prophet's death (cf. the following note).

⁹⁵ Viz. the year of the death of the Prophet (Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, pp. 4, 24).

⁹⁶ Sellheim's view that falsifications are as good as unthinkable in the prosopographical lists is flatly contradicted by his own research: if the lists could be manipulated to include and exclude ʿAbbās and Abū Sufyān in accordance with political demands *after* A.D. 750, it is somewhat gratuitous to assume that they were stable until then (Sellheim, 'Prophet, Chalif und Geschichte', pp. 73f). In fact, lists of first converts (Abū Bakr, ʿAlī, ʿUmar) clearly reflect discussions of the imamate; similarly lists of commanders: in Sunnī tradition it was ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ whom the Prophet charged with the expedition to Syria, but in Shīʿite tradition it was ʿAlī (Kister, 'On the Papyrus of Wahb b. Munabbih', pp. 557ff). Lists of those who became brothers in Medina not only pair Muḥammad and ʿAlī as one might expect (cf. above, note 70), but also include Salmān al-Fārisī, a figure whose genesis can to some extent be followed (J. Horovitz, 'Salmān al-Fārisi', *Der Islam* 1922; cf. also Crone, 'Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm', especially note 179). In general, who participated in the events of the Prophet's life was so loaded a question that it would be more interesting to know how and why the relevant men came to be included in the lists than whether they actually did participate: even if we knew the historical names, we would still not have the historical information required to identify the men behind them.

⁹⁷ And that despite the fact that in 1954 Cahen used a Syriac source to draw a vivid picture of the Mesopotamian countryside quite unlike anything one

can get out of Muslim fiscal manuals (C. Cahen, 'Fiscalité, propriété, anta-
gonismes sociaux en Haute-Mésopotamie au temps des premiers 'Abbāsides',
Arabica 1954): his first worthy follower in this field is M. G. Morony (cf.
the bibliography). Cahen was also the first to turn to these sources for religious
information (C. Cahen, 'Note sur l'accueil des Chrétiens d'Orient à l'Islam',
Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 1964); but there seems to have been a general
consensus that non-Muslim sources could teach us nothing about Islam as a
religion, and even Cahen used them only for the Christian reaction to Islam.
(Cahen's question whether the Christians really saw Islam as an opponent or
rival to Christianity has to be answered with an emphatic yes: quite apart from
the fact that they suffered martyrdom at the hands of the Muslims, the
Christians never described Islam as a Christian heresy (cf. Crone and Cook,
Hagarism, chh. 1f and p. 120). That John of Damascus saw it as such hardly
follows from his inclusion of it in his book of heresies, cf. his inclusion of
pagan, Jewish and Samaritan sects.)

98 M. Allard, 'Un Philosophe théologien, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-'Āmirī', *Revue
de l'Histoire des Religions* 1975, p. 62. The view that all Jews and Christians
throughout the Middle East invariably interpreted all political and religious
disturbances as Jewish messianic movements is inherently unlikely and
factually untrue.

99 The chronology and prosopography of the Rāshidūn was analysed by Noth,
Quellenkritische Studien, pp. 40ff, 90ff, and on the whole rejected. The
discussion is, however, somewhat unsatisfactory because Noth (who mys-
teriously does not know Schacht's work on this topic) treats the two separately
and dismisses the *ta'rīkh* as secondary (that the *combination* of *ta'rīkh* and
akhbār is secondary is obviously true, but that is another matter). Equally,
he makes no distinction between lists of different types: those of governors
and other magistrates clearly belong to a different tradition from those of
'*ulamā*' or those of participants and fallen in battles. It is certainly true that
the chronology of the conquests is confused (Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien*,
p. 41), that the Rāshidūn are given Umayyad magistrates (*ibid.*, p. 43; one
might add Ibn Qunfudh, 'Uthmān's supposed *ṣāḥib shurṭa*), and that the
lists of participants in battles testify to *Namenmanie* (*ibid.*, p. 96). And
perhaps the *Grundschicht* of this period is as unsatisfactory as it is for the
Prophet. But the case of 'Umayr b. Sa'd (cf. below), and the order which
has emerged from Hinds' prosopographical studies of the rebels against
'Uthmān, suggest that there is more to be said about this subject.

100 Cf. Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien*, p. 96.

101 Anyone who has gone through the papyrological, numismatic or epigraphical
publications must have been struck by this agreement, but it is scarcely less
striking that 'Umayr b. Sa'd, the obscure governor of Ḥimṣ and Damascus
in the 640s A.D., 'Abdallāh b. Darrāj, the fiscal agent and *mawlā* of Mu'āwiya,
and Dīnār b. Dīnār, a subgovernor in northern Syria under 'Abd al-Malik,
should have been confirmed by Syriac sources (Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*,
pp. 160, note 57, 162, note 11; see also Appendix II, no. 2). Not all the gover-

nors of the Umayyad period can, of course, be checked in this way, and not everything fits when they can (cf. the aberrant chronology of certain Arab–Sasanian coins in A. D. Mordtmann, 'Zur Pehlevi-Münzkunde', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 1879, especially p. 97; the problem is not discussed by H. Gaube, *Arabosasanidische Numismatik*, Braunschweig 1973). But enough has been confirmed to make rejection of the unconfirmed extremely difficult.

[102] Lists of caliphs are attested from the mid-Umayyad period onwards in the form of Syriac 'king-lists', which probably reflect Arabic models, and next in Zuhrī's book of *asnān al-mulūk* (Rotter, 'Abū Zur'a', p. 91; for the first 'king-list' see Land, *Anecdota*, vol. ii, p. 11 of the 'Addenda'). Lists of governors and *qāḍīs* must have been composed about the same time (cf. the unique and presumably archaic title of Kindī's work in which the earliest material on *qāḍīs* dates from the early part of the second century (Schacht, *Origins*, p. 100), and note that Abū Zur'a got his lists of caliphs and most of his lists of *qāḍīs* from the same informant (Rotter, 'Abū Zur'a', pp. 99f)). Lists of commanders of the summer campaigns are not attested until early 'Abbāsid Syria (*ibid.*, p. 101), but it is hard to believe that they had not been compiled before: the evidence would indicate that *ta'rīkh* originated in Syria (cf. *ibid.*, p. 92), and that the contents of the Syrian lists were caliphs and magistrates. Lists of *muḥaddithūn*, on the other hand, attesting to the rabbinicization of Islam, are of later origin (*pace ibid.*, p. 92) and first appear in Iraq: we are told that Shu'ba, who died in Basra in 160, was the first to occupy himself with the study of traditionists (Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb*, Hyderabad 1325–7, vol. iv, p. 345), and in the archaic work of Abū Zur'a these lists are still only vaguely chronological, not annalistic (*ibid.*). That leaves the lists of participants and fallen in battle and other lists relating to the *ashrāf*, which clearly belong to the tribal tradition and which are the most difficult to check for authenticity. As an ingredient in the *maghāzī* they are attested in the Khirbet el-Mird fragment (above, note 4), but there is nothing to indicate that they were part of a specifically Syrian tradition, and they are unlikely always to have been dated.

[103] Sebeos, for example, confirms the complicity of Egyptians in the murder of 'Uthmān and the subsequent proclamation of a new 'king'; though his designation of what was clearly 'Alī as a king would indicate that his informants were not Syrians, he also has Mu'āwiya not only defeat but also kill 'Alī 'in the desert', presumably by compression of the events (Sebeos, *Histoire d'Héraclius*, tr. F. Macler, Paris 1904, p. 149; he also states that the Egyptians were allied with those in Arabia, and that Mu'āwiya later sent a victorious expedition to Arabia, both statements which could be taken at their face value; it is, however, possible that Arabia is a mistake for Iraq (mistranslation of Bēth 'Arbāyē?)).

[104] Cf. below, note 647.

[105] Below, note 572.

[106] J.-B. Chabot (ed. and tr.), *Chronique de Denys de Tell-Maḥré*, Paris 1895, pp. 117f = 99.

[107] D. Dennett, *Conversion and Poll-tax in Early Islam*, Cambridge Mass. 1950; E. Sachau (ed. and tr.), *Syrische Rechtsbücher*, Berlin 1907–14, vol. iii, p. 18 = 19 (letters of Ḥenānīshō', Nestorian patriarch A.D. 686–93). For an even earlier reference to the poll-tax see J.-B. Chabot (ed. and tr.), *Synodicon Orientale ou reçueil de Synodes nestoriens* (Notices et extraits des manuscripts de la Bibliothèque Nationale, vol. xxxvii), Paris 1902, p. 225 = 490 (synod of 676); but this was perhaps a somewhat less accessible work.

[108] Most of the information in Appendix I is to be taken in this sense.

2. THE NATURE OF THE ARAB CONQUEST

[109] K. A. Wittfogel and C.-S. Fêng, *History of Chinese Society, Liao (907–1125)*, Philadelphia 1949, p. 267.

[110] al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Taqyīd al-'ilm*, ed. Y. al-'Ishsh, Damascus 1949, pp. 50f; cf. M. J. Kister, 'Ḥaddithū 'an banī isrā'īla wa-lā ḥaraja', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1972, pp. 253ff.

[111] The advice of the Celestial Turks had of course been to stay there physically (cf. V. Thomsen, *Inscriptions de l'Orkhon déchiffrées*, Helsingfors 1896, p. 117).

[112] Wittfogel and Fêng, *Liao*, p. 236n.

[113] *Ibid.*, pp. 672f; cf. also pp. 220f for other evidence of cultural assimilation.

[114] It is of course also a land of desert and mountain, but no conqueror ever came forth from the Takla Makan or the Tien Shan, and it is no accident that the Tibetan Tanguts owed both their ruling house and their political tradition to the Turkish To-pa (W. Eberhard, *A History of China*, London 1950, pp. 230f; cf. *id.*, *Conquerors and Rulers, Social Forces in Medieval China*, Leiden 1952, pp. 69ff).

[115] It *can* be cultivated as the desert cannot (L. Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, The Hague 1966, pp. 10ff), and tribal agriculture is attested already for the Hsiung-nu in Mongolia and the Sarmatians in southern Russia (S. I. Rudenko, *Die Kultur der Hsiung-Nu und die Hügelgräber von Noin Ula*, Bonn 1969, p. 28; J. O. Maenchen-Helfen, *The World of the Huns*, ed. M. Knight, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1973, pp. 174ff). It took only a slight relaxation of Manchu control for peasants to swamp Inner Mongolia, whereas it takes the immense determination, capital and skill of Zionism for peasants to gain a foothold in the Negev.

[116] Largely restricted to the desert, the Central Asian camel is used only as a beast of burden on the steppe (R. Patai, 'Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 1951, p. 406).

[117] See for example Rudenko, *Kultur der Hsiung-Nu*, pp. 22f for early attestation and L. Krader, 'Ecology of Central Asian Pastoralism', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 1955, pp. 309f for modern conditions.

[118] Cf. Krader, *Ecology*, p. 320. Whereas the high density of humans and flocks per square kilometre in certain areas of Central Asia is clearly a fact about the steppe (*ibid.*, pp. 315ff), the ratio of flocks to humans must be a fact about the animals: presumably horses are not very labour intensive because they have

a natural herding instinct, thus requiring few herdsmen (cf. note 158; I owe this point to Elizabeth O'Beirne-Ranelagh).

[119] Sheep have a market, but not much of a price, and camels have a price, but much less of a market, whereas horses had both until quite recent times. It is true that pastoralism is likely to have been less market-orientated in the past, and in modern Arabia there seems to be no appreciable difference of herd size between the Murra who do not sell their camels and the Rwala who do (cf. below, note 159). But the Chinese did purchase horses from the barbarians (cf. J. R. Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des cinq dynasties*, Paris 1955, pp. 106ff; Jing-shen Tao, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China*, Seattle and London 1976, pp. 15f; D. Sinor, 'Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History', *Oriens Extremus* 1972, p. 175), and Iṣṭakhrī's claim that the wealth of Chorasmia was based on trade with the nomads also suggests that the Central Asian pastoralists were not entirely orientated towards subsistence: in modern Arabia it is only the wealth of a few families which is based on such trade (W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*³, London 1968, p. 247; A. Musil, *The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins*, New York 1928, pp. 278f).

[120] F. Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, Oslo 1964, pp. 103ff; cf. W. Irons, 'Variation in Economic Organization: A Comparison of the Pastoral Yomut and the Basseri' in W. Irons and N. Dyson-Hudson (eds.), *Perspectives on Nomadism*, Leiden 1972, pp. 96ff. Unlike the Yomut, the Basseri are reluctant to use hired shepherds and do not call upon kinsmen in other camps for assistance, clearly reflections of the extent to which the cessation of tribal warfare has turned the Basseri camps into isolated worlds of their own (cf. Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, pp. 46f; contrast Irons, 'Variation', pp. 93, 103). But the fact that the Basseri also lack the Yomut mechanisms for concentrating labour resources in the household suggests that there may be ecological reasons why large flocks do not pay here. Barth's point, however, remains unaffected, for even among the Yomut the very wealthy and the very poor feel the pull towards sedentarization (Irons, 'Variation', pp. 99, 101). The process is delayed, and its effects are counteracted by the fact that the proximity of settled and nomad on the one hand, and the need for military strength on the other, enable those who settle to remain members of the tribe. But it cannot be suspended, and the Yomut may thus be taken to represent the limit of the social differentiation that sheep-nomadism will permit. There are no comparable analyses for horse- or camel-rearers (D. Cole, *Nomads of the Nomads*, Illinois 1975, p. 102 asserts the existence of a point of diminishing returns among the Murra bedouin beyond which the bedouin themselves choose not to go; but no evidence is offered).

[121] Among the sheep-nomads who are, so to speak, dealing in cheap currency, the Yomut will accumulate up to 1000 head per household (Irons, 'Variation', p. 99), the Basseris up to somewhere between 200 and 800 (Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, p. 103), while the Brahui will keep theirs below 500 (W. W. Swidler, 'Some Demographic Factors Regulating the Formation of Flocks

and Camps among the Brahui of Baluchistan' in W. Irons and N. Dyson-Hudson (eds.), *Perspectives on Nomadism*, Leiden 1972, p. 72. But the Brahui case clearly turns on the availability of wage-labour as an alternative source of income: the Brahui do not herd their own flocks, but place them with a hired shepherd, and their flocks, though pooled in units of about the 500 which a single shepherd can control, are commonly below the minimal size required for subsistence). Among the horse-nomads of Mongolia, however, it is worth accumulating up to several thousand head per household (Wittfogel and Fêng, *Liao*, p. 119). In other words, although the denomination is higher, the maximum figures are also higher. It is worth noting that the Mongols use or used the same methods for concentrating labour resources in the household as do the Turkish Yomut, that is ultimogeniture whereby the youngest son is kept at home, adoption, and slavery, but not, apparently, deferred independence for the elder sons. (For the far lower figures among camel-rearers see below, note 159.)

[122] Cf. B. Ya. Vladimirtsov, *The Life of Chingiz Khan*, London 1930, pp. 3f; A. E. Hudson, *Kazak Social Structure*, New Haven 1938, pp. 27f, 57. Note the comparable effect among the Yomut, where the sedentarized rich keep a large portion of their wealth in the form of livestock (Irons, 'Variation', pp. 99f).

[123] O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, New York 1940, pp. 452f. The migration of Siberian pastoralists into the steppe is elegantly illustrated in the Pazyryk burials of horses disguised as reindeer.

[124] R. Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes*, New Brunswick 1970, pp. 18, 25. The extent to which Central Asia was criss-crossed by such traffic is highlighted by the facts that the Uighurs imported their Manichaeism from *China*, while the Chinese conversely got their Buddhism, *inter alia*, from a *Parthian* (*ibid.*, pp. 49, 121).

[125] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 29ff on the havoc wrought by the first known turmoil of this kind.

[126] For the varieties of fortification in the area see R. N. Frye, 'The Sassanian System of Walls for Defence' in M. Rosen-Ayalon (ed.), *Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet*, Jerusalem 1977, pp. 13ff.

[127] Both the Hsiung-nu and the Mongols seem to have begun as hunters in the north (W. M. Macgovern, *The Early Empires of Central Asia*, New York 1939, p. 100; B. Vladimirtsov, *Le Régime social des Mongols*, Paris 1948, p. 39; cf. also the downward movement of the Oirots in G. Hambley *et al.*, *Central Asia*, London 1969, p. 245). The Kirghiz who overran the Uighur empire certainly came from the Yenisei.

[128] The two major exceptions, Timur Lenk and the Manchus, were both synthetic imitations of the Mongols.

[129] L. Krader, 'Principles and Structure in the Organization of the Asiatic Steppe-Pastoralists', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 1955, pp. 84f.

[130] L. Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads*, The Hague 1963, p. 202; compare the *buiruk* and the *kara bodun* of the Orkhon Turks (R. Giraud, *L'Empire des Turcs célestes*, Paris 1960, pp. 82, 86ff).

[131] Krader, *Social Organization*, pp. 20ff, 128ff, 183f; *id.*, 'Principles', pp. 79ff.

Krader's evidence is of course largely post-Chingizid and modern, but it fits very neatly with the analysis of pre-Chingizid Turkish tribes given by a Sinologist (Eberhard, *Conquerors and Rulers*, pp. 69ff). Compare also the early attestation of social differentiation and thus presumably political organization at Pazyryk (S. I. Rudenko, *Frozen Tombs of Siberia*, London 1970, p. 215), and contrast the far more rudimentary organization of the Turks and Kirghiz of the mountains and the Mongols of the forests (Krader, 'Principles', p. 85; Vladimirtsov, *Life of Chingiz Khan*, p. 4).

[132] A. Waley (tr.), *The Secret History of the Mongols*, London 1963, p. 125 = P. Pelliot (ed. and tr.), *Histoire secrète des Mongols*, Paris 1949, section 33. The wisdom finds concrete illustration in the fate of the acephalous tribe at the hands of Bodonchar and his brothers: 'those people have no chief to rule them; they make no difference between great and small; such a people would be easy to take. Let us go and make prisoners of them' (Waley, *Secret History*, p. 220 = Pelliot, *Histoire secrète*, section 35).

[133] O. Lattimore, 'Feudalism in History' (review article), *Past and Present* 1957, pp. 51f.

[134] Vladimirtsov, *Régime social*, pp. 80ff.

[135] The effect of warfare on the 'difference between great and small' can be followed in Sarmatian graves (T. Sulimirski, *The Sarmatians*, London 1970, p. 33), and social stratification in Mongolia is strikingly illustrated both in the graves of the Hsiung-nu and in the Orkhon inscriptions (Rudenko, *Kultur der Hsiung-Nu*, pp. 21, 63; Thomsen, *Inscriptions de l'Orkhon, passim*). The Manchus certainly had a point when they contrasted the noble origin of the Mongol and Manchu dynasties with the common origin of those of the Chinese (F. Michael, *The Origins of Manchu Rule in China*, Baltimore 1932, p. 119).

[136] The *nököt* of the Mongols (Vladimirtsov, *Régime social*, pp. 110ff); cf. also Wittfogel and Fêng, *Liao*, p. 509; Krader, *Social Organization*, p. 184; Hudson, *Karzak Social Structure*, pp. 59f.

[137] Rudenko, *Kultur der Hsiung-Nu*, p. 59; W. Eberhard, *Das Toba-Reich Nordchinas*, Leiden 1949, p. 301; Vladimirtsov, *Régime Social*, pp. 131ff.

[138] The precedent for Chingiz's *Yāsa* goes back at least to the Celestial Turks (Thomsen, *Inscriptions de l'Orkhon*, pp. 97f).

[139] Spectacularly illustrated by the Goths who are said still to have spoken Gothic there in the thirteenth century A.D. (A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea*, Cambridge Mass. 1936, p. 166).

[140] M. Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*, Oxford 1922, pp. 43, 211ff.

[141] G. Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia*, New Haven 1943, pp. 113ff, 281ff.

[142] Maenchen-Helfen, *The World of the Huns*, pp. 190ff; D. M. Dunlop, *The History of the Jewish Khazars*, New York 1967, pp. 91ff; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*², s.v. 'Bulghār'; B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, Leipzig 1943, pp. 300ff.

[143] Krader, *Social Organization*, pp. 122ff, 201ff (on the Kazak and Kalmuk states). Note also how the Oirots reversed the traditional direction of tribal

movements in Central Asia when they made their exodus from Russia in A.D. 1770f not to Hungary, but to the Ili: like the Israelites the Oirots were fleeing from an oppressive *civilization* (M. Courant, *L'Asie Centrale au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, Paris 1912, pp. 134ff).

[144] Thus the Cimmerians who occupied Urartu, the Scythians who took the Dobrudja, and the Bulgars who crossed the Danube to become Slavs.

[145] It is important for their survival there that in southern Russia, as not in Mongolia and still less Arabia, there was an agricultural region *outside* the imperial borders, partly in the steppe itself and more particularly to the north: for all that they stayed in the steppe, the Mongols of the Golden Horde could thus feed off the agricultural revenues of Russia (cf. P. Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, London 1974, p. 227).

[146] Aptly illustrated by the Ch'i-tan who, though refugees from the Jurchen, were nonetheless able to found the irredentist state of the Kara-Khitai in western Turkestan, whereas the Huns, Avars, Cumans and others who reached Europe appear to have lost most of their state structures on the way.

[147] E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, Oxford 1965. Contrast the backwardness of the Slavs, who enjoyed no such confrontation.

[148] Thus the *Belagines* of the Goths, if Jordanes is to be believed (Jordanes, *Getica*, in Th. Mommsen (ed.), *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, auctores antiquissimi*, vol. v, Berlin 1882, p. 74). But in practice the Germanic codes all appear *after* the barbarians have settled down in their Roman homes.

[149] This is of course even more true of the Slavs, whose invasion of the Balkans turned on the arrival of the Avars.

[150] What these horsemen would have thought of the Franks is clear from the dictum of a fifth-century To-pa king: 'the Chinese are footsoldiers and we are horsemen. What can a herd of colts and heifers do against tigers or a pack of wolves?' (Grousset, *Empire*, p. 62).

[151] Less so, of course, on the eastern frontier which was more exposed. But thanks to the ecological potential the Slavs were peasants who periodically lost their state structures to Central Asian invaders, not pastoralists who periodically created them (cf. Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, pp. 217ff).

[152] The Hsiung-nu fell to the Hsien-pi, the Celestial Turks to the Uighurs, the Uighurs to the Kirghiz, the Tanguts to the Mongols, and so forth; Roman Gaul today is France, but it is only in the archaic usage of foreigners that northern China is Tabghatch or Cathay. Contrast the viability of Korea and Vietnam.

[153] Cf. J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, *The Long-Haired Kings and Other Studies in Frankish History*, London 1962, p. 25.

[154] Already the Hsiung-nu ruler boasted of having united 'all the nations of the archers' (W. Samolin, *East Turkestan to the Twelfth Century*, The Hague 1964, pp. 20f), the Orkhon Turks very nearly did so (they lacked southern Russia), and the desire to control the entire steppe has been plausibly adduced in explanation of Chingiz's strategy (O. Lattimore, 'The Geography of Chingiz Khan', *Geographical Journal* 1963; I am indebted to Dr D. O.

Morgan for drawing my attention to this article). Conversely, note that as far west as Transoxania the Karakhanids insisted on styling themselves kings of China even after their conversion to Islam (V. V. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, vol. i, Leiden 1956, p. 99).

[155] For the Ch'i-tan in north China conquest of south China equalled unification of the whole world (Wittfogel and Fêng, *Liao*, p. 537), but already Attila had seen himself as destined to conquer a world which was primarily Roman (Jordanes, *Getica*, pp. 105f), and the political horizons of the Turkish kaghans included China, Byzantium and Iran. (The passage in Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, ed. and tr. J.-B. Chabot, Paris 1899–1910, vol. iv, p. 568 = vol. iii, p. 150 is not, however, a prophecy that the Turkish kaghans will conquer the world as maintained by O. Turan, 'The Idea of World Domination among the Medieval Turks', *Studia Islamica* 1955, pp. 78f: the ancestral spirits have foretold that the world will be *devastated*, and the kaghan is accordingly in tears, not rejoicing (cf. the fuller version in Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 350 = vol. ii, p. 315, and the original in John of Ephesos, *Historiae Ecclesiasticae pars tertia*, ed. and tr. E. W. Brooks (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vols. livf), Louvain 1935f, pp. 322f = 244f.))

[156] Precisely what Chingiz had in mind when he began his conquest is of course hard to tell: as against Gregory of Akner's conviction that he had been supernaturally bidden to rule many countries, we have the failure of the *Secret History* to betray any awareness of non-Chinese civilizations (Grigor of Akanc', *History of the Nation of the Archers (Mongols)*, ed. and tr. R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, Cambridge Mass. 1954, p. 291). But the crucial point remains that right from the start he struck out in *two* directions: insofar as the awareness was not there, it soon arrived.

[157] Horses in the desert are as great a luxury as tomatoes in the Negev.

[158] She-camels require differential herding, so that where one shepherd can look after a flock of 4–500 sheep (Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, pp. 6, 22; Swidler, 'Demographic Factors', p. 74), it takes two full-time and one part-time herders at least to look after an average herd of fifty camels (Cole, *Nomads of the Nomads*, pp. 36ff); and watering them is even more labour-consuming (Musil, *Rwala*, p. 345). The Rwala thus hire shepherds as a matter of course (*ibid.*, p. 336), while the Murra dispense with them only by recourse to the extended family (cf. Cole, *Nomads of the Nomads*, pp. 65f).

[159] Murrī herds consist of forty to seventy-five female camels with an average around fifty and twenty to thirty-five males per household, each household consisting of about seven persons (Cole, *Nomads of the Nomads*, pp. 24, 36f). For the Rwala and other great tribes further north Raswan estimates forty to fifty camels per household, each household consisting of about five persons, but only twenty to thirty among the lesser tribes (C. Raswan, *The Black Tents of Arabia*, London 1935, p. 248). In 1959 the Dosiri tribesmen of Kuwait regarded as well-off families owning eighteen female camels, two baggage camels and a few riding camels (L. E. Sweet, 'Camel Pastoralism in North Arabia and the Minimal Camping Unit' in A. P. Vayda (ed.), *Environment and*

Cultural Behaviour, Austin and London 1969, p. 161). It may be added that for grazing purposes the Rwala distinguish between herds of different sizes up to eighty, but not beyond (Musil, *Rwala*, p. 336).

160 Similarly in modern times: where in Central Asia only Outer Mongolia has preserved a precarious independence, in Arabia only the coast has a colonial history.

161 G. Monnot, 'Sabéens et idolatres selon 'Abd al-Jabbar', *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales du Caire* 1974, p. 16; J. O. Maenchen-Helfen, 'Manichaeans in Siberia' in W. J. Fischel (ed.), *Semitic and Oriental Studies, a Volume Presented to W. Popper*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951.

162 A. von Gabain, *Das uigurische Königsreich von Chotscho 850–1250* (Sitzungs-berichte der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin), Berlin 1961, p. 13.

163 Which is why one can write a history of Central Asia, but only about events in pre-Islamic Arabia (cf. S. Smith, 'Events in Arabia in the 6th Century A.D.', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1954).

164 Thus in the famous formulation of Abū'l-Faraj al-Isbahānī, *Kitāb al-aghānī*, Cairo 1927–, vol. xix, pp. 128f.

165 E. Bräunlich, 'Beiträge zur Gesellschaftsordnung der arabischen Beduinen-stämme', *Islamica* 1934, pp. 82ff. The sins of the pre-Islamic 'tyrants' consisted in their arrogation of the rights to distribute pasture lands and determine tribal moves – commonplace privileges among Central Asian chiefs (G. E. von Grunebaum, 'The Nature of Arab Unity before Islam', *Arabica* 1963, p. 11).

166 Compare the illuminating account of decision-making in a Basseri camp by Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, pp. 43ff and A. Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, Paris 1948, p. 140. The chief of an Arab *'ashīra* and the leader of a Basseri camp are evidently in very much the same position, but there is no Arab equivalent to the autocratic Basseri chief (Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, pp. 71ff; cf. Jaussen, *Coutumes*, p. 127).

167 As it does today (Jaussen, *Coutumes*, p. 144).

168 Note the contrast between the orphanages of Muḥammad and Chingiz. Whereas Muḥammad is traditionally described as having been brought up within the tribal framework by his uncle and grandfather, Chingiz barely survived outside it and could only return to it as an adventurer in the service of foreign chiefs; the same pattern recurs in the career of Muḥammad Shaybānī, the founder of the Uzbek state.

169 Compare also the lighthearted vein in which pre-Islamic wars are described in the *Aghānī* and elsewhere as against the dead seriousness of the *Secret History*: a comparable gravity appears in the Arab tradition only when the tribal past is of religious significance.

170 The Turks, by contrast, went out of their way to annihilate their former suzerains, the Yüan-yüan; three thousand of them were executed on extradition from China at the demand of the Turks (Samolin, *East Turkestan*, p. 55), and their alliance with the Byzantines had Tardu vow that he would send them

fleeing into the bowels of the earth: 'not with our swords shall we exterminate that race of slaves; we shall crush them like the meanest of ants beneath our horses' hoofs' (Grousset, *Empire*, p. 173).

[171] Similarly, the Hsiung-nu and the Mongols practised collective hunting, a training for battles, whereas the Arabs hunted individually, a training for raids (Rudenko, *Kultur der Hsiung-Nu*, p. 56; Vladimirtsov, *Régime social*, pp. 48f, 102; G. Jacob, *Altarabisches Beduinenleben²*, Berlin 1897, pp. 113ff).

[172] Grousset, *Empire*, p. 546, note 13.

[173] Giraud, *L'Empire des Turcs célestes*, pp. 67ff; cf. also P. Poucha, 'Rang und Titel bei den Völkern des mongolischen Raumes im Laufe der Jahrhunderte', *Proceedings of the IXth Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference*, Naples 1970 (where six of the nine papers are characteristically on titles).

[174] The *ṣanāʾiʿ* of the Kindī kings are the nearest equivalent (G. Olinder, *The Kings of Kinda*, Lund 1927, p. 73).

[175] Cf. above, p. 31.

[176] In Zenobia's case, moreover, the alternative to dependence on Rome was dependence on the Persians.

[177] Not much of course, but the longevity of the Yemeni mukarribates, the Zaydī and the Ibāḍī imamates, and for that matter also the Ethiopian monarchy, testify to the fact that only extreme ecological poverty prevented the Arabs from forming similar types of states elsewhere.

[178] Cf. Olinder, *The Kings of Kinda*.

[179] M. Höfner, 'Beduinen in den vorislamischen arabischen Inschriften' in F. Gabrieli (ed.), *L'Antica società beduina*, Rome 1959.

[180] Cf. J. J. Saunders, 'The Nomad as Empire Builder: a Comparison of the Arab and Mongol Conquests', *Diogenes* 1965, p. 81. It had of course been possible for desert tribes to conquer civilization in the remote past when civilization was an extremely vulnerable structure: no extravagant show of strength was required to overrun the petty states of the ancient Near East. Sheep- and goat-nomads such as the Hebrews and the Amorites could thus cross the Jordan and the Euphrates, while mountain tribes such as the Guti and Lullubi could conquer the valley of Babylonia. It was still possible for the Hyksos to conquer Egypt and the Kassites to conquer Babylon thanks to their possession of horses. But long before the seventh century A.D. desert tribes had ceased to be a match for civilization, and mountain tribes conquered valleys only in the Yemen.

[181] When the conquests began, the Persians are said to have been convinced that the Arabs would never get beyond the Euphrates or Tigris (A. Scher (ed. and tr.), *Histoire nestorienne*, part two, in *Patrologia Orientalis*, vol. xiii, p. 580).

[182] Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 410. The same applies to the various peoples now known as Turks (*id.*, *12 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*, Berlin 1935, pp. 35f).

[183] So at least by the time of the Nemara inscription, but doubtless before. It is thus no accident that where Central Asia has social stratification, Arabia has pariah tribes (Patai, 'Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian', pp. 410f).

[184] For the Arabs as a *Kulturnation* rather than a *Staatsnation* see von Grunebaum, 'The Nature of Arab Unity'.

[185] Though not of course from the point of view of the cultural history of the Middle East.

[186] Given the regularity with which Christians persecuted Jews on the one hand, and the prominence of the desert fantasy among the Jews on the other, it could of course be argued that had it not happened then, it would have happened later.

[187] The claim that if Muḥammad had not had the idea, somebody else would is rather large. Few peoples can have stood in greater need of a programme of state formation and conquest than the Amerindians after the European conquest; Judaism was certainly around, and so even was Islam: there were Crypto-Muslim refugees from the Spanish inquisition just as there were Crypto-Jews, and Muslim slaves were later imported to Brazil. But no Amerindian ever did have the idea.

[188] As the Manchus and the Mongols restaged the conquest of China in the name of their common barbarian way of life, despite their different languages, so the Jews and the Arabs restaged the conquest of Palestine in the name of their common monotheist descent, despite their different cults (D. M. Farquhar in J. K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order*, Cambridge Mass. 1968, p. 199; Sebeos, *Histoire d'Héraclius*, p. 95).

[189] Note how the Prophet's career is *not* reenacted in Central Asia: the Seljuqs, for all that they were Muslims, were no Almoravids, and it was Chingiz, not Muḥammad, that Timur chose to imitate.

[190] Cf. Eberhard, *History of China*, p. 230.

[191] E. Voegelin, 'The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245−1255', *Byzantion* 1940f.

[192] John of Plano Carpini in A. Van den Wyngaert (ed.), *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. i, Karachi 1929, p. 38. Compare the prostrations of the Khazars in the presence of their kings (Dunlop, *History of the Jewish Khazars*, p. 97).

[193] When Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism came to be seen as three versions of the same message in China, it was the Mongols who were Confucianized; but when Christianity, Judaism and Islam were regarded as basically the same truth in the Middle East, it was the Christians who were Islamized (I. de Rachewiltz, 'Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189−1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman' in A. F. Wright and D. Twitchett (eds.), *Confucian Personalities*, Stanford 1962, pp. 209ff; Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, pp. 84ff).

[194] Cf. Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, pp. 121f.

[195] This is of course only half of the explanation. For the other half, the character of the conquered civilizations, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 79ff.

[196] Contrast the translation of the Chinese classics into Tangut (E. I. Kychanov, *Ocherk istorii tangutskogo gosudartsva*, Moscow 1968, pp. 237ff; I owe this reference to M. A. Cook). Eventually, of course the translation of the Sāsānid records had a similar effect (witness the works of Ibn al-Muqaffaʻ), but not until the capital had been moved to Iraq.

[197] For these dodges (ranging from the suggestion that China be turned into grazing grounds to the cumbrous system of double administration) see Eberhard, *Conquerors and Rulers*, pp. 76ff.

[198] That of the Chʾi-tan lasted from A.D. 922 to 1125, that of the Mongols from 1127 to 1368 without major internal upheavals.

[199] Rachewiltz, 'Yeh-lü Chʾu-tsʾai', pp. 204f.

[200] B. Lewis, *The Arabs in History*³, London 1956, p. 55.

[201] Cf. M. Hinds, 'The Murder of the Caliph ʻUthmān', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1972.

[202] Cf. M. Hinds, 'Kufan Political Alignments and their Background in the Mid-Seventh Century A.D.', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1971.

[203] *Ibid.*, pp. 361f.

[204] Cf. below, note 210. The tribal basis of the kingdom of Ḥīra had been far less solid: the tribes there were *afnāʾ al-ʻarab* (AbūʻUbayd, *Amwāl*, p. 39).

[205] He married a daughter of the Quḍāʻī chief, whose sons rose to great prominence under the Sufyānids (cf. Appendix I, no. 1).

[206] Subtribe is used here for *ʻashīra*, a unit which though seen as a descent group is in fact defined by its possession of a common chief (for a parallel in modern usage see Jaussen, *Coutumes*, p. 127; though commonly translated as such, it is certainly not a clan in the anthropological sense of the word). The small size of the *ʻashīra* is indicated among other things by the many mosques which even minor tribes in Kufa possessed (see for example Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamharat an-nasab, das genealogische Werk des Hišām b. Muḥammad al-Kalbī*, translated and rearranged with a commentary by W. Caskel and G. Strenziok, Leiden 1966, vol. ii, *s.vv.* "Āmir, Ḥārith, Ğadīma Ṣuhbān and Wahbīl b. Saʻd' for the five mosques of the small Nakhaʻ in Kufa; cf. also Caskel's comments, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 23f).

[207] Cf. the analysis of the modern ʻAnaza by M. Freiherr von Oppenheim, *Die Beduinen*, vol. i, Leipzig 1939, pp. 62f.

[208] Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2495, where one seventh is missing. For the complete list see H. Djaït, 'Les Yamanites à Kufa au Ier siècle de l'hégire', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 1976, p. 154. Compare also Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, *Waqʻat Ṣiffīn*, pp. 131f. Abū Mikhnaf's assertion that the Kufans were once divided into fifths must represent a confusion with Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1382).

[209] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1382; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, vol. iv a, ed. M. Schloessinger and M. J. Kister, Jerusalem 1971, p. 190.

[210] L. Massignon, 'Explication du plan de Kufa', *Mélanges Maspero*, Cairo 1934–40; *id.*, 'Explication du plan de Basra', *Wesöstliche Abhandlungen R. Tschudi*, ed. F. Meier, Wiesbaden 1954; Ṣ. A. al-ʿAlī, *al-Tanẓīmāt al-ijtimāʿ-iyya wa'l-iqtiṣādiyya fī'l-Baṣra²*, Beirut 1969, pp. 53ff. The Syrian quarters have to be pieced together from a variety of sources which yield the following result. (1) Damascus: Quḍāʿa, Qays, Quraysh, Kinda. (2) Ḥimṣ: Quḍāʿa, Kinda, Ḥimyar and Ḥaḍramawt, Qays and Iyād (and Azd?). (3) Jordan: Quḍāʿa, Ghassān, Hamdān and Madhḥij. (4) Palestine: Kināna, Khathʿam, Lakhm and Judhām, Azd and Khuzāʿa (Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, *Taʾrīkh*, ed. S. Zakkār, Damascus 1967f, p. 222; Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, *Waqʿat Ṣiffīn*, pp. 233f; Dīnawarī, *al-Akhbār al-ṭiwāl*, ed. V. Guirgass, Leiden 1888, pp. 183f; Ibn ʿAsākir, *Taʾrīkh madīnat Dimashq*, ed. Ṣ. al-Munajjid, Damascus 1954–, vol. i, p. 262; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1609; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, vol. iv b, ed. M. Schloessinger, Jerusalem 1938, p. 48; M. Hinds, 'The Banners and Battle Cries of the Arabs at Ṣiffīn', *al-Abḥāth* 1971, pp. 25ff).

[211] *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'khiṭṭa'.

[212] Cf. the elaborate military and administrative hierarchy described by Sayf in Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2225, 2496 (both of which must refer to a somewhat later date than Sayf indicates). Cf. also *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* "arīf".

[213] Compare Hinds, 'Kufan Political Alignments', pp. 346f.

[214] Cf. Appendix I.

[215] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 229f, 285.

[216] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 442, 684; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 242, 245; Jahshiyārī, *Kitāb al-wuzarā' wa'l-kuttāb*, ed. M. al-Saqqā' *et al.*, Cairo 1938, p. 28.

[217] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 68, 190, 196; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 93.

[218] Cf. J. Wellhausen, *The Arab Kingdom and its Fall*, Calcutta 1927, p. 125.

[219] This was very clear in 64, when the death of Yazīd I deprived ʿUbaydallāh of caliphal backing at a time when the tribal disturbances caused by the immigration of Azd were coming to a head: ʿUbaydallāh had no option but to flee (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 433 ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 97ff).

[220] Cf. Appendix I, nos. 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 31, 33.

[221] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 448.

[222] Cf. Appendix I, nos. 9, 10, 32.

[223] Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath, Mundhir b. al-Jārūd, and the Zurāra family all provided daughters fom Ziyād and his sons (Appendix I, nos. 21, 27, 34); similarly Asmāʾ b. Khārija al-Fazārī (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 82).

[224] Cf. Appendix I, nos. 21, 22, 27; for early Marwānid examples see nos. 23, 26, 28, 30.

[225] Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 32 (cf. also the introductory section, p. 11).

[226] Cf. above, note 219. For another episode, see Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 129ff, 148ff.

[227] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 254, 256.

[228] The *ashrāf* of Iraq bear witness against Ḥujr, betray Ḥusayn, and desert Muṣʿab at Maskin (cf. Appendix I, nos. 21ff).

[229] In addition there were the Arabian provinces which were usually dependencies of Syria. But they scarcely mattered politically.

²³⁰ Thus 'Abdallāh b. 'Āmir, the governor of Basra and Khurāsān who, quite apart from being a Qurashī and a maternal cousin of 'Uthmān, married a daughter off to Yazīd I and married a daughter of Mu'āwiya himself (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*², *s.v.*; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, table 13; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 62; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 69); 'Abdallāh b. Khālid b. Asīd, an Umayyad who was governor of Kufa (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ğamhara*, table 8; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 162, 166, 170); 'Utba b. Abī Sufyān, Mu'āwiya's brother who was governor of Egypt (Kindī, *The Governors and Judges of Egypt*, ed. R. Guest, Leiden and London 1912, pp. 34ff); 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Umm al-Ḥakam, a son of Mu'āwiya's sister by a Thaqafī, who was governor of Kufa and other provinces (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 5; cf. Appendix II, no. 4); Sa'īd b. 'Uthmān b. Affān, an Umayyad who was governor of Khurāsān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 177f); Ziyād b. Abīhi, a Thaqafī adopted by Mu'āwiya as his brother who became governor of the entire east (Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 119ff); 'Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād, his son who was governor of Khurāsān, Basra and later the entire east (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*¹, *s.v.* "Ubaid Allāh b. Ziyād'); 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ziyād, another son who was appointed to Khurāsān; he was married to a daughter of 'Utba b. Abī Sufyān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 188ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 75); Salm b. Ziyād, a third son who was governor of Khurāsān and Sīstān for Yazīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 391ff).

²³¹ Thus 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ, Mu'āwiya's first governor of Egypt (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*², *s.v.*) and Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays al-Fihrī, one of his governors of Kufa (*ibid*, *s.v.*). But Ibn al-Zubayr's reliance on Quraysh was of course far more systematic.

²³² In addition to Ibn Umm al-Ḥakam, Ziyād, and the sons of Ziyād, who were both Thaqafīs and Umayyads, there is the famous Mughīra b. Shu'ba, Mu'āwiya's first governor of Kufa (Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 113ff).

²³³ Thus Nu'mān b. Bashīr, an Anṣārī from Ḥimṣ who was appointed to Kufa (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 188, 216, 228; cf. Appendix IV, no. 4) and Maslama b. Mukhallad who was governor of Egypt and North Africa (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 38ff; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 94). In the same bracket one may put 'Uqba b. 'Āmir al-Juhanī, a member of the small Ḥijāzī tribe of Juhayna who was governor of Egypt (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 36ff), and Sa'īd b. Yazīd, a Palestinian of Azd (viz. Azd Sarāt, a small tribe before they merged with Azd 'Umān) who was similarly governor of Egypt (*ibid.*, pp. 40f).

²³⁴ As governor of Syria the caliph led the way in this respect. Thus the Baḥdal family, his affinal relatives, governed Jordan, Palestine and Qinnasrīn (see Appendix I, no. 1); 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Khālid b. al-Walīd, a Qurashī, was governor of Ḥimṣ and its dependencies in the thirties (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2913f, 2921, 3057); he was succeeded by Nu'mān b. Bashīr, an Anṣārī (see Appendix IV, no.4); Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays al-Fihrī, a Qurashī, was governor of Damascus (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*², *s.v.*). In the same fashion Ibn 'Āmir employed two consanguine relatives of his as subgovernors of Khurāsān,

that is the cousins Qays b. al-Haytham and 'Abdallāh b. Khāzim (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara, s.v.* 'Daǧāǧa bint Asmā' b. al-Ṣalt'; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 414); in Sīstān he relied on 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Samura of 'Abd Shams (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden 1866, pp. 394f, 396f). Ziyād employed one Umayyad, 'Abdallāh b. Khālid b. Asīd, who was governor of Fars or Ardashīr Khurrah (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 151f); two *ashrāf* of tribes sparsely represented in Basra, that is Ḥakam b. 'Amr al-Ghifārī who was governor of Khurāsān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 79ff) and Rabī' b. Ziyād al-Ḥārithī who was governor first of Sīstān and next of Khurāsān (see Appendix III, no. 47); and one Thaqafī, 'Ubaydallāh b. Abī Bakra, in Sīstān (C. E. Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, Rome 1968, p. 21). Thereafter the eastern dependencies were all but monopolized by the sons of Ziyād (cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 415).

[235] Thus two of the interim governors of Basra, Samura b. Jundub al-Fazārī and 'Abdallāh b. 'Amr al-Thaqafī, were both local men who had previously been in charge of the *shurṭa* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 71, 158, 162, 166; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 100). But Ḥārith b. 'Amr/'Abd 'Amr/'Abdallāh, who was also interim governor there was a Palestinian Azdī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 68, 71; cf. Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 222, 241). He is doubtless identical with the Ḥārith b. 'Abd who appears as governor of Palestine under Mu'āwiya in seven bilingual *entagia* dated 54–7 A.H. (P. Colt 60–6 in C. J. Kraemer, *Non-literary Papyri* (*Excavations at Nessana*, vol. iii), Princeton 1958, pp. 181ff).

[236] *Ṣilat al-raḥim* in the contemporary phrase.

[237] 'Ubaydallāh b. Abī Bakra gave the contents of the treasury in Sīstān to a Qurashī who was his guest or deputy governor (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, vol. i, ed. M. Ḥamīdallāh, Cairo 1959, p. 498). He was later outdone by Tamīm b. Zayd, the most generous Arab, who found eighteen million dirhams in the treasury in Sind and hastened to dispose of them (*id.*, *Futūḥ*, p. 443). Yazīd I honoured a deputation of Medinese whose faltering loyalties were in need of buttressing, with gifts in the range of 100 000 dirhams (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 402ff), and the same method was later adopted by Ibn 'Umar in Iraq (*ibid.*, p. 1881). Early Marwānid poetry sold at the rate of 100 000 dirhams (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 175, 177); Sufyānid poetry was scarcely less expensive.

[238] Cf. the size and the fate of the sums involved in the following note.

[239] Mu'āwiya gave Ibn 'Āmir the choice between dismissal with permission to keep what he had taken and renewal of office at the cost of paying up (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 69; he opted for dismissal); 'Abdallāh b. Khālid b. Asīd protested at the *muḥāsaba* of his son Umayya at the hands of Ziyād, whereupon Ziyād let Umayya keep half of the 50 000 dirhams he had embezzled as governor of Sūs (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, pp. 174f); 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ziyād admitted having made a profit of twenty million dirhams as governor of Khurāsān, but Yazīd let him keep it (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 29); Ibn Zubayr, however, got five million dirhams out of Salm b. Ziyād on the latter's arrival from Khurāsān (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 76).

4 SYRIA OF 684 [64]

240 Cf. Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 32.

241 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, *al-Inbāh ʿalā qabāʾil al-ruwāh*, Najaf 1966, pp. 59ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. i, pp. 15ff; M. J. Kister and M. Plessner, 'Notes on Caskel's Ǧamharat an-nasab', *Oriens* 1977, p. 56; W. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia²*, London 1903, pp. 8f.

242 Cf. above, note 210.

243 Kinda even has a Maʿaddī genealogy (cf. Kister and Plessner, 'Notes', pp. 58f). Ibn al-Kalbī may of course be right that this genealogy is merely the outcome of scholarly confusion arising from the fact that Kinda had lived in Maʿaddī territory (Olinder, *The Kings of Kinda*, p. 32); but in fact the Yemeni origin of Kinda was so firmly imprinted on scholarly minds that this genealogical articulation of Kinda's part is more likely to reflect Ḥassān's attempt to consolidate the Quḍāʿī confederacy.

244 Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. i, pp. 82f, Cf. also Appendix I, nos. 13f, 16, 19. The immigrants were not of course all of Qays, but the predominance of this confederacy in Qinnasrīn and the Jazīra is manifest.

245 Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 132.

246 *Aghānī*, vol. ix, p. 314; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. i, pp. 36f.

247 Caskel in Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, vol. i, pp. 34f.

248 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 468ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 132.

249 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 474ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 134f.

250 Cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'Ḍaḥḥāk b. Ḳays'.

251 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 469; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 132.

252 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 468; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 132; note also the attitudes of Kurayb b. Abraha, Shuraḥbīl b. Dhīʾl-Kalāʿ al-Ḥimyarī, and ʿAbdallāh b. Yazīd al-Bajalī to Ibn al-Zubayr (Appendix I, nos. 2 and 11).

253 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 468; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 132; cf. also Appendix I, no. 19.

254 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 477ff. Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 136ff.

255 For a detailed account see J. C. Wilkinson, 'Arab Settlement in Oman: the Origins and Development of the Tribal Pattern and its Relationship to the Imamate', Oxford D. Phil. thesis 1969, vol. i, pp. 57ff.

256 Cf. ʿA.-A. ʿA. Dixon, *The Umayyad Caliphate, 65–86/684–705*. London 1971, ch. 3.

257 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, *Inbāh*, pp. 60f; cf. Caskel in Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, vol. ii, pp. 73ff; Kister and Plessner, 'Notes', p. 57; Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, p. 9.

258 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 473f.

259 Note that there is no Zubayrite sect in Islam.

5 THE MARWĀNID EVOLUTION, 684–744 [64–126]

260 The first Syrians abroad are the troops sent against the *Aẓāriqa* in Ṭabaristān

in 77 under Sufyān b. al-Abrad al-Kalbī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1018; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, vol. xi (*Anonyme arabische Chronik*), ed. W. Ahlwardt, Greifswald 1883, pp. 338f), against Shabīb in Iraq under the same commander and under Ḥabīb b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥakamī in the same year (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 943f), and against Ibn al-Ash'ath in Iraq under the same two commanders and others in 82 (*ibid.*, pp. 1060, 1064, 1069f, 1072, 1076; the three events are hopelessly confused, and the muddle culminates in the Muṭarrif affair where all the participants are brought together in unlikely constellations). In Khurāsān they are first met under Yazīd b. al-Muhallab when they are said to have numbered 60 000 (*ibid.*, pp. 1318, 1327; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 335f). They likewise appear in Sind from the time of Ḥajjāj onwards (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 436; *id.*, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 313). Emergency troops were sent to North Africa under Kulthūm b. 'Iyāḍ by Hishām, but Syrians had presumably been stationed there before; there were still Syrians in North Africa in 183 (E. Lafuente y Alcántara (ed. and tr.), *Ajbar machmuá*, Madrid 1867, pp. 3of; Ibn al-Qūṭiyya, *Ta'rīkh iftitāḥ al-Andalus*, ed. 'A. A. al-Ṭabbā' [Beirut 1958], pp. 4of; Ibn 'Idhārī, *Kitāb al-bayān al-mughrib*, ed. G. S. Colin and E. Lévi-Provençal, Leiden 1948–51, vol. i, pp. 89f).

[261] That is to say the troops of Khurāsān, Sīstān, Sind, Spain, North Africa and Syro-Mesopotamia. The Syro-Mesopotamians had three frontiers to defend, viz. Armenia and Azerbayjan, the Mesopotamo-Byzantine frontier (the so-called right ṣā'ifa) and the Syro-Byzantine frontier (the so-called left ṣā'ifa). Qinnasrīn and to a lesser extent Ḥimṣ were thus in the unusual position of being both field and frontier troops.

[262] There were two exceptions. In Armenia and Khurāsān the non-Muslim rulers continued to be subject to forced levies; and the Medinese may have been subject to conscription until the end of the period (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1192, 1983). Neither affects the argument.

[263] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 40, 857ff.

[264] First it mutinied at Rustaqābādh, the centre of mobilization (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 266ff), and next it rebelled under Ibn al-Ash'ath, whose troops only wanted to go home (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1054, 1059; cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 870f and Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 271). Henceforth the old *muqātila* was only a local police force (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1381, 1702).

[265] Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 273; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 890. For recruits in Egypt about the same time, see Kindī, *Governors*, p. 49. Voluntary enlistment had previously been limited to bedouin (cf. the stories in Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 29, vol. v, pp. 130, 194; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1633; Yāqūt, *Jacut's geographisches Wörterbuch*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Leipzig 1866–73, vol. vi, p. 133).

[266] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 429; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1545. Balādhurī's version makes it quite clear that *ghāya* means limit here, not purpose; the instruction is thus that Junayd may recruit fifteen thousand or more (*pace* Shaban, '*Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 116).

[267] Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 84ff; cf. above, p. 54.

[268] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1873; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 564.

[269] Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, ch. 9; Shaban, '*Abbāsid Revolution*, pp. 155ff. Note that on the arrival of the Khurāsānīs in Iraq they enrolled five thousand men at Shahrazūr (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 10).

[270] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 373f.

[271] Thus the *Bukhāriyya* of 'Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 170; Narshakhī, *Description de Boukhara*, ed. C. Schefer, Paris 1892, p. 36 = *id.*, *The History of Bukhara*, tr. R. N. Frye, Cambridge Mass. 1954, p. 37.

[272] This is the kind of servant intended when we are told that the Basrans under 'Alī numbered 60 000 men, not counting the children, slaves and *mawālī*, that the Kufans numbered 57 000 Arabs and 8 000 slaves and *mawālī*, or that Ibn al-Ash'ath disposed of 10 000 regular sodiers 'and a like number of *mawālī*', while Yazīd b. al-Muhallab had 100 000 men, 'not counting the *mawālī*, slaves and volunteers' (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3370ff, ser. ii, pp. 1072, 1318). The slaves rarely participated in battle. They accompanied their masters as ordinary servants (cf. *ibid.*, ser. ii, p. 45) and were unarmed: a Kufan mortally wounded in battle against Shabīb handed over his weapons and horse to his slave, who continued in his place (*ibid.*, p. 937). They were in charge of the camp, but had only tent-poles to defend it with, and being non-combatants, they were spared execution in defeat (*ibid.*, pp. 368, 1547, 1910, 1941, ser. iii, p. 39). This is the situation Wāqidī projects back to the Prophet's Arabia when he has an informant say that because in those days he was a slave, he was left behind in the camp, only two slaves participating in the battle itself (Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, ed. M. Jones, Oxford 1966, vol. i, p. 230). The freedmen, on the other hand, commonly fought side by side with their masters (thus, among countless examples, Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3190, 3293, 3302, ser. ii, pp. 335, 596, 757), particularly as standard-bearers, a role in which slaves occasionally also appear (*ibid.*, ser. i, pp. 3203, 3427, ser. ii, pp. 326, 990, 998ff, 1582, 1705; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 267). The use of slaves and freedmen as standard-bearers were clearly new (cf. Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3175), but is again projected back to the Prophet's Arabia (*ibid.*, pp. 1940, 1945).

[273] Both the *mawlā* quarters and the alternative procedure are ascribed to 'Umar I (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 458). The fact that the *mawālī* were put in a *qabīla* of their own obviously does not mean that they were segregated: one might as well accuse the Umayyads of having segregated the Azd from the Tamīm.

[274] 'Abd al-Malik set up a *rub'* consisting of runaway slaves (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 300). No other *mawlā* quarters are heard of in Syria, and it is possible that here the non-Arabs were integrated in the Arab divisions, presumably from the time when the Syrian quarters themselves disappeared (cf. below, note 288 and Appendix IV, no. 9).

[275] Two *mawlā* commanders in charge of two thousand and a thousand men (at least in the one case similarly *mawālī*) appear in 76 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 919). These commanders are quite distinct from Ḥajjāj's own *mawālī* and slaves whom he armed for the occasion (*ibid.*, p. 958).

[276] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1290f; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 423; Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī is their *raʾs al-qabīla*. Compare also the poem in which the *mawālī* are enumerated as a sixth *qabīla* along with the *akhmās* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1303; Madhḥij is poetic licence for *ahl al-ʿāliya*).

[277] Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 51, 70, 96; cf. H. I. Bell (ed.), *Greek Papyri in the British Museum*, vol. iv, London 1910, index, *s.v.* ʿmauleusʾ.

[278] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1268, 1306, 1893; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, pp. 423, 567, 597; Yāqūt, *Wörterbuch*, vol. iv, p. 932. The *Waḍḍāḥiyya* was unusual in having its own hereditary commander.

[279] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1702, 1708; cf. Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol. vii, p. 325.

[280] Guidi, *Chronica Minora*, p. 72 = 56.

[281] Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 453 = vol. ii, p. 484; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1037, 1318; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 313; Lafuente, *Ajbar*, pp. 3f, 31.

[282] The hierarchy was *fāris*, *qāʾid*, *raʾs al-qawm* (cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1074). On mobilizing the Syrians Marwān II put a *qāʾid* over every *jund* (*ibid.*, p. 1895; cf. Kindī, *Governors*, p. 84). Thābit b. Nuʿaym gathered his *jund* and his *qawm* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1894; for the *qawm*, see above, p. 55). A Syrian refused the governorship of Iraq on the ground that he had no *jund* (*ibid.*, p. 1836). A general took hostages *min kulli jund min quwwādihim* (Lafuente, *Ajbar*, p. 38). And so forth.

[283] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1839, 1899, 1904, ser. iii, p. 21; ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Yaḥyā, ʿRisāla fī naṣīhat walīʾl-ʿahdʾ in M. K. ʿAlī (ed.), *Rasāʾil al-bulaghāʾ*, Cairo 1954, p. 204.

[284] When Asad b. Yazīd b. Mazyad was imprisoned in 192, the *dafātir aṣḥāb Asad* were passed over to the new commander (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 838f). In 123, however, Maghrāʾ b. Aḥmar seems to have been transferred from Khurāsān to Iraq only with his *ahl* (*ibid.*, ser. ii, p. 1722).

[285] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1723 (*ahl al-ʿāliya*).

[286] *Ibid.*, pp. 1954, 1957. The quarter of Kharraqān was clearly geographically defined: we are told that a certain village was located in it (*ibid.*, pp. 1953, 1957). So presumably the same was the case with the quarter of Saqādum (differently Shaban, ʿ*Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 158).

[287] In 159 the Basrans were mobilized *min jamīʿiʾl-ajnād*, not *min jamīʿiʾl-akhmās*; similarly the Khurāsānīs in 163 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 460, 494).

[288] The Syrian *arbāʿ* are last mentioned in 77 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 969f) and must have become somewhat *de trop* when the Syrians began to be stationed abroad: the division into five *ajnād* would have sufficed. Instead, however, the grouping of these *arbāʿ* into Qays and Yemen appears to have been given official sanction: thus a Qinnasrīnī in Khurāsān in 120 is described as *raʾs Qays* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1637), and on his departure from Armenia Marwān II appointed a *raʾs* to both Qays and Yemen (*ibid.*, p. 1871; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, p. 564; cf. Appendix I, no. 16. Compare also the disappearance of the *mawlā* quarter(s) (above, note 274) and Marwān II's interest in reviving Judhām's Asadī genealogy (below, note 312)).

[289] He appointed one brother to Egypt (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2], *s.v.* '*Abd al-'Azīz Marwān*'), another to Kufa and later the whole of Iraq (*ibid.*, *s.v.* '*Bishr b. Marwān*'), and a third, Muḥammad b. Marwān, to the Jazīra, Armenia and Azerbayjan (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 393). Khālid b. 'Abdallāh, an Umayyad, was appointed to Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 818). Umayya b. 'Abdallāh, his brother, was appointed to Khurāsān and Sīstān, and he in turn appointed his son 'Abdallāh b. Umayya to Sīstān (Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, pp. 49ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 153). On Bishr's death Iraq was made over to Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf, a Syrian whose daughter married a son of Walīd I while his niece married Yazīd II and became the mother of Walīd II (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1810; M. J. De Goeje (ed.), *Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum*, Leiden 1871, p. 13; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2], *s.v.* 'Ḥadjdjādj b. Yūsuf').

[290] Yāqūt, *Wörterbuch*, vol. ii, p. 387; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 396; M. J. Kister, '"Call Yourselves by Graceful Names . . . "', *Lectures in Memory of Professor M. Plessner*, Jerusalem A.M. 5355 [1974f], p. 14.

[291] Wilkinson, 'Arab Settlement', vol. ii, ch. 3, note 7. The assertion that Qabīṣa b. Abī Ṣufra had held the *riyāsa* of Azd in Basra carries little conviction (*Aghānī*, vol. vi, p. 417).

[292] Mūsā b. Nuṣayr is said to have been an Arab, an Arab prisoner-of-war, a non-Arab prisoner-of-war, or a slave; but at all events a client (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2064; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 230; Lafuente, *Ajbar*, p. 3).

[293] Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 427; Shaban, '*Abbāsid Revolution*, pp. 54f.

[294] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1209.

[295] Muhallab's sons were Mu'āwiya, Yazīd, 'Abd al-Malik, 'Abd al-'Azīz, Marwān, Muḥammad and Ḥajjāj (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ǧamhara*, table 204). Mūsā's were 'Abd al-'Azīz and Marwān after his patron 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Marwān (Kindī, *Governors*, index).

[296] Cf. Appendix III, no. 33; note that Qutayba also named a son Ḥajjāj.

[297] Cf. Appendix I, nos. 6 and 11 (Junayd al-Murrī and Khālid al-Qasrī), Appendix III, nos. 16 and 74 (Jarrāḥ al-Ḥakamī and Sa'īd al-Ḥarashī), Appendix IV, no. 54 ('Āṣim b. 'Abdallāh al-Hilālī).

[298] Cf. Appendix II. The Jazīra was of course similarly goverened by kinsmen, viz. Muḥammad b. Marwān, Maslama, and Marwān b. Muḥammad, but since the Jazīra was a frontier province, all three were generals (note the comparable tendency for the Umayyad princes to become generals in Qinnasrīn and, to a lesser extent, Ḥims).

[299] Especially in the event of disintegration. The crucial role of chaotic fighting in the spread of the conquest ethnicity is neatly demonstrated by the contrasting case of Frankish Gaul against Visigothic Spain, or Turkish Anatolia against barbarian China.

[300] There is of course no telling how this might have happened. It is easy to imagine 'Abd al-Malik as a Reccared or Manṣūr as a Charlemagne; but the Persians might well have expelled the Arabs as the Chinese expelled the Mongols, just as the Byzantines might have reconquered Syria as they reconquered Ostrogothic Italy and Bulgaria.

[301] It is striking that whereas the Arabs had the Judaic and the Mongols the barbarian tradition, the Goths could make neither a Mecca nor a Karakorum of their 'hallowed grave' and 'ancient seat' (cf. Maenchen-Helfen, *The World of the Huns*, pp. 152f).

[302] Cf. Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, pp. 92ff.

[303] Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, p. 63.

[304] The peculiarity of this situation can also be brought out by contrasting the evolution of the later Roman empire, where the militarization of power did not stop short of the metropolis. The generals having risen to the imperial office, the senatorial aristocracy was displaced, the special status of Italy abolished, the provinces reorganized, subdivided and subjected to close control: in short, the military revolution meant the transition from Principate to Dominate. But just as 'Abd al-Malik was no Reccared, so not even Hisham was a Diocletian.

6 THE MARWĀNID FACTION

[305] This comes out very clearly in the case where a governor, contrary to the normal pattern, is succeeded by a man of his own factional background: 'Āṣim b. 'Abdallāh al-Hilālī did not hesitate to imprison and torture the appointees of Junayd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Murrī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1564f). Clearly, had one faction succeeded in eliminating the other, it would have split into two itself.

[306] It is thus hard to accept the suggestion that Qays and Yemen were political parties (cf. Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. i, pp. 120ff).

[307] See Appendix IV. Out of eighty-five cases there are eight certain exceptions and two uncertain ones (nos. 2, 12, 22, 37, 77–9, 82–4; cf. also Appendix I, no. 8 and Appendix III, no. 37).

[308] This is clear in the civil war (see below, note 326); but one certainly never hears about factional *merchants*.

[309] One of the instigators of the Yemenī brawl in Marw in 126 was a *mawlā* of Azd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1856). Similarly, one of the Muḍarīs who remained faithful to Kirmānī was a *mawlā* of Sulaym (*ibid.*, p. 1934). And a *mawlā* of Layth was included in Naṣr's Muḍarī *wafd* to Abū Muslim (*ibid.*, p. 1895). Since the *mawlā* units were subdivided into regiments by the tribes in which the *mawālī* had their *walā'*, the *mawālī* had no troubles in aligning (cf. Kindī, *Governors*, p. 51).

[310] It would have been very different if the competitors had *been* the authorities. In republican Rome where the old aristocracy fought in the metropolis with provincial resources, *factio* and *amicitia* were as legitimate titles to power as *sharaf* and *qarāba*, however deplorable their excesses.

[311] Outside Syria there were the three groups of Muḍar, Rabī'a and Yemen, but though in theory the Rabī'a could swing both ways, in practice their alignment was fixed: in Basra they fought with Yemen, in the Jazīra with Qays.

[312] In contrast to the *ashrāf* of the Sufyānid period, the generals took not the slightest interest in genealogy except for the purpose of abuse. It was Marwān II, not a *ra's al-qabīla*, who tried to revive Judhām's old Asadī genealogy (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. i, p. 36; cf. above, p. 34. As Asadīs the Judhām would now have belonged to Muḍar, a genealogy that would have aligned them with Marwān's Qaysī army instead of setting them against it). And it was because the generals had no knowledge of genealogy that one general could maintain that Naṣr b. Sayyār had the *bayt* of Kināna while another maintained that on the contrary he was a mere *mulṣaq* (Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 356; Ibn al-Kalbī, the professional genealogist, has nothing to say about Naṣr's father and grandfather, cf. his *Ǧamhara*, *s.vv.* 'Saiyār b. Rāfi'' and 'Rāfi' b. Judayi').

[313] 'Never did I see such '*aṣabiyya*', as a Syrian Yemeni said on hearing of Naṣr b. Sayyār's uniformly Muḍarī appointments (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1664).

[314] Cf. Appendix III, nos. 1–47.

[315] Cf. above, note 260.

[316] Cf. Appendix III, nos. 48–64.

[317] Cf. above, note 260.

[318] Cf. Appendix III, nos. 65–122.

[319] Cf. Yūsuf's visions of getting a hundred million dirhams from Khālid's governors after Khālid had readily paid nine (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1654).

[320] See for example Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1419f, 1564f; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 334; Appendix III, nos. 80, 85; Appendix IV, no. 24.

[321] Cf. the graphic account of the preparations for Khālid's removal (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1649ff).

[322] When Naṣr b. Sayyār was threatened with dismissal his subgovernors raised about a million each (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1920). When Khālid was in the same situation his fiscal agent suggested the same solution, but Khālid refused on the ground that he could not ask back what he had allowed his subgovernors to take (*ibid.*, p. 1651).

[323] It is not that there were no cases of desertion: Ṣāliḥ b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, Ḥajjāj's fiscal agent, is an obvious example. When the accession of Sulaymān made the fall of Ḥajjāj's family a certainty, Ṣāliḥ avoided falling with them, doubtless by guaranteeing to pay what they were deemed to have embezzled while in office: that would explain why he was appointed to the *kharāj* and was given a free hand with the family whom he subjected to torture (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1282f; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rīkh*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Leiden 1851–76, vol. v, p. 465). But he paid for his treachery in the end: when Ibn Hubayra was appointed, he was killed under torture for a debt of 600 000 dirhams (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 58). Ṣāliḥ's behaviour can be reconstructed by a comparison with Ṭāriq, the fiscal agent of Khālid al-Qasrī, who was accused of having schemed to take Iraq in *qabāla* on Khālid's fall (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1651); in fact he didn't: he died on the rack (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 63).

[324] Ḥajjāj had demanded six million dirhams from Yazīd and got three before Yazīd and his family managed to escape to Palestine, where he sought refuge

with local Azdīs and got in touch with Sulaymān, the governor of Palestine at the time. Sulaymān, who was threatened with exclusion from the succession, assumed liability for the remaining three, secured *amān* for Yazīd and, when in fact he did succeed, appointed Yazīd to Iraq and Khurāsān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1208ff). Compare the flight of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr to ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz as reported by Ibn ʿIdhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, pp. 39f.

7 SYRIA OF 744 [126]

[325] Cf. Appendix IV.

[326] The Syrian *ashrāf* who rebelled against Yazīd were all Yemenis by descent, but all opponents of the *Yamaniyya*. Note also how the sharifian descendant of Baḥdal was head of Walīd II's *shurṭa* while a descendant of Ḥusayn b. Numayr joined Marwān II (Appendix I, nos. 1 and 5).

[327] Appendix I, no. 3; Appendix IV, nos. 5 and 7.

[328] Appendix I, nos. 2, 4, 5, 9f (cf. also Appendix IV, no. 5).

[329] For a particularly striking contrast compare the descendants of Rawḥ b. Zanbāʿ and Thābit b. Nuʿaym (Appendix I, no. 9 and Appendix IV, no. 34).

[330] Cf. Appendix IV, nos. 8, 15, 27f, 31–3, 35, 40–2.

[331] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, 1836ff. The few Syrians who left with Yūsuf b. ʿUmar are enumerated on p. 1841.

[332] Cf. the account of the war in Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, ch. 7.

[333] The very first troops to arrive in Iraq had probably been drawn from Damascus and Jordan: they were commanded by a Kalbī and a Ḥakamī (cf. above, note 260). And the subsequent predominance of the Yemenis in Iraq is clear from Appendix IV: of the *Qaysiyya* only nos. 67 and 71 have served in Iraq. The Jazīra was certainly exempt from the duty of garrisoning Iraq, and Qinnasrīn almost certainly was: it appears to have supplied fewer troops than the other *ajnād* even for emergencies (Lafuente, *Ajbar*, p. 31). Ḥimṣ was in an intermediate position in that it provided troops for both the frontier and Iraq.

[334] Note the interchangeability of Qays and Qinnasrīn in Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1637.

[335] Cf. Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. i, p. 155.

[336] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1883. Here as elsewhere the Syrians appear to have stayed on after the revolution (cf. *ibid.*, ser. iii, p. 460).

[337] Cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 317ff; Appendix III, nos. 65ff.

[338] The extent to which Khālid's governorship protected Yemeni interests is neatly illustrated in Khurāsān: when Khurāsān was attached to Iraq Khālid appointed his brother Asad, a protector of Yemenis like himself; when it was detached from Iraq the caliph appointed two Qaysīs from the Jazīra, Ashras al-Sulamī and ʿĀṣim al-Hilālī (for the latter see Appendix IV, no. 54). For his other governors see Appendix III, nos. 79ff.

[339] Cf. the use of Khālid's name as a slogan in the rebellion, which is presented as a grand act of revenge (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1809, 1823f).

[340] Appendix III, no. 37; Appendix IV, nos. 78, 82–4. Two are uninteresting:

Appendix IV, nos. 12 and 22 were both appointed by a Qurashī and one was moreover a local *sharīf.*

[341] Compare 'Ubayda b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī, a Jordanian *sharīf* who joined the Qaysī faction as governor of North Africa, and the sons of Yazīd al-Sulamī, doubtless also Jordanians, who joined Yazīd III's *Yamaniyya* (Appendix II, no. 11 and Appendix IV, no. 2). 'Uthmān b. 'Abd al-A'lā al-Azdī may have been a Damascene, but his (and his brother's) career had clearly been enacted in the north, whence his appearance among the *Qaysiyya* (Appendix II, nos. 24 and 43). Similarly the case of Qays b. Thawr al-Sakūnī (Appendix I, no. 8).

[342] See for example F. Omar, *The 'Abbāsid Caliphate,* Baghdad 1969, pp. 81f, 94.

[343] For a convenient list of the leaders of the revolution see *ibid.,* pp. 352ff.

[344] Cf. J. Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Ġailāniya de Yazīd III', *Studia Islamica* 1970.

[345] Note that the list of persons whom the Muslim convert to Christianity has to abjure includes Mu'āwiya and even Yazīd I as well as Zubayr and Ibn al-Zubayr (E. Montet, 'Un Rituel d'abjuration des Musulmans dans l'église grecque', *Revuè de l'Histoire des Religions* 1906, p. 149; 'Abdallāh' clearly is Ibn al-Zubayr, not Muḥammad's father as suggested by Montet, *ibid.,* p. 156). Wellhausen also has it that the 'Abbāsid avengers spared Mu'āwiya's grave (*Kingdom,* p. 552), but he gives no source and those used by Omar do not confirm it (*'Abbāsid Caliphate,* p. 263). But even 'Abd al-Malik could be invoked to authorize a legal doctrine on a par with the Prophet and the *a'immat al-hudā* by *qāḍīs* as late as the 750s A.D. (C. Pellat (ed. and tr.), *Ibn al-Muqaffa',* '*Conseilleur' du Calife,* Paris 1976, § 35 (translation of *al-risāla fī'l-ṣaḥāba*)).

[346] *Qum yā amīr al-mu'minīn rāshidan mahdiyyan,* as one of the Yemeni generals said to Yazīd III (De Goeje, *Fragmenta,* p. 136; cf. Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Ġailāniya', p. 279).

[347] Or, for a more spectacular example, the Japanese.

[348] Cf. the Mu'tazilite recognition of Yazīd III as a rightful imam (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²,* s.v. '*imāma*'). The righteousness of the Yemenis also comes across very strongly in Shaban, *Islamic History,* vol. i, in which their Qaysī opponents are described in the vocabulary of modern political abuse.

8 UMAYYAD CLIENTAGE

[349] The two were distinguished as 'upper' and 'lower' *mawlā*'. I hope to deal with the legal aspects of *walā'* in an article entitled 'The Roman Origin of Islamic Clientage'.

[350] Nor individuals and groups. When a man is described as a *mawlā* of Tamīm it means that he is a *mawlā* of a Tamīmī.

[351] Thus Marwān II distinguished between the *mawlā tibā'a* and *mawlā 'itāqa* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1852f). Compare Sulaymān b. Hishām's *mawālīya wa-man ittaba'anī* (*ibid.,* p. 1913) and Nuṣayb's *muttakhidh mawlāka mawlāya*

wa-tābiʿuhu (*Aghānī.* vol. i, pp. 327f; cf. Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 57f).

[352] Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol. v, pp. 295, 304; Ibn Ḥibbān al-Bustī, *Kitāb mashāhir ʿulamāʾ al-amṣār*, ed. M. Fleichhammer, Wiesbaden 1959, p. 23).

[353] Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol. v, pp. 295, 307; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1204.

[354] *Aghānī*, vol. xii, p. 44. The *mawlā khidma* is all but identical with the eastern *shākirī* (cf. for example Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1695).

[355] *Walāʾ al-muwālāt* is the technical term for voluntary clientage in legal literature, but it is also quite common in non-legal texts (see for example *Aghānī*, vol. v, p. 278).

[356] Crone, 'The Roman Origin of Islamic Clientage'.

[357] Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, pp. 120ff.

[358] Even in law conversion was no condition for the validity of *walāʾ*, be it of manumission or commendation, and in practice many non-Muslim *mawālī* are known. Yuḥannas, the *mawlā* of Zubayr, was presumably a Christian freedman (Khalīfa, *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 242); Sarjūn b. Manṣūr was a Christian *mawlā muwālāt* of Muʿāwiya (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, pp. 2, 60, 81f; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 228, 239; D. J. Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam*, Leiden 1972, pp. 17ff, 26ff); Ṭarkhūn, the *mawlā* of Qutayba, and Dīwastī, the *mawlā* of Jarrāḥ, were non-Muslim rulers of eastern Iran (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1249; V. A. Krackovskaya and I. Y. Kračkovsky, 'Drevneyshiy arabskiy dokument iz Sredney Azii', *Sogdiysky Shornik* (Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Institut Vostokovedeniya), Leningrad, 1934, p. 55 (I owe this reference to M. A. Cook); compare also Īrak, a Sogdian prince who was *munqatiʿan ilā Sulaymān* and who appears in the latter's *Dhakwāniyya* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1204). Karbeas, the leader of the Paulicians, was a *mawlā* of the Ṭāhirids (Masʿūdī, *Kitāb al-tanbīh waʾl-ishrāf*, ed. M. J. De Goeje (Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, vol. viii), Leiden 1894, p. 183 = *id.*, *Le Livre de l'avertissement et de la revision*, tr. B. Carra de Vaux, Paris 1896, p. 248); but Photius has it that Karbeas pretended to follow the religion of the Arabs, so this spectacular example may in fact be none (Ch. Astruc *et al.* (eds. and trs.), 'Les Sources grecques pour l'histoire des Pauliciens d'Asie Mineure', *Travaux et Mémoires* 1970, p. 171 = 170).

[359] Whence, of course, *mawlā* in the sense of non-Arab Muslim.

[360] With the notable exception of eastern Iran where the laboriousness of the conquests forced the Arabs to come to terms with the existing power structure (cf. Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, pp. 130f).

[361] Thus, for example, Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. Note also how a descendant of the Iranian gentry becomes a musician training slave girls for an Arab caliph (above, p. 52 and *Encyclopaedia of Islam*², *s.v.* 'Ibrāhīm al-Mawṣilī').

[362] Thus Sarjūn b. Manṣūr (above, note 358) and the Asāwira. The sources are unanimous that the latter converted on joining the Arabs in 17 (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2563; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 373), but when they reappear in the second civil war almost fifty years later, their leader is called Māh Afrīdhūn (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 452, 454), while another member of their ranks, Yazīd b. Siyāh al-Uswārī, clearly represents the first generation of Muslims (*ibid.*, p. 579). The

Asāwira who were transferred from Basra to Antioch by Muʿāwiya appear likewise to have been non-Muslims at the time: Ḥassān b. Māhawayh al-Anṭākī represents the first generation of converts here at the time of Hishām (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 166, cf. p. 117).

363 Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 90.

364 M. G. Morony, 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest on the Persian Population of Iraq', *Iran* 1976, pp. 54f.

365 The commonly reiterated view that the Persian aristocracy converted in order to maintain its position and escape the poll-tax after the conquest is very misleading. There is a case for it in eastern Iran (cf. B. Spuler, 'Der Verlauf der Islamisierung Persiens. Eine Skizze', *Der Islam* 1948, where the evidence comes overwhelmingly from the east; most of it, however, is late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid). But as far as western Iran and Iraq are concerned, the evidence consists of legal proof-texts on poll-tax (cf. Dennett, *Conversion and Poll-tax*, pp. 32f); the fact that *dihqāns* are the protagonists in these *ḥadīths* does indeed show that some *dihqāns* converted at some stage in the Umayyad period, but it shows no more than that. The evidence which Morony ('The Effects of the Muslim Conquest') adduces from Christian sources provides an important corrective to the accepted view, and his conclusion that it needs to be 'qualified in several ways' is certainly correct.

366 Just how many is presumably beyond calculation, but the huge numbers which were taken in Armenia give a good idea of the scale involved (Sebeos, *Histoire d'Héraclius*, p. 101; cf. pp. 100, 110, 146). Note also the extent to which Kufa was flooded with such prisoners-of-war at the time of Mukhtār's revolt (Bar Penkaya in A. Mingana (ed. and tr.), *Sources syriaques*, Leipzig n.d. [1907] pp. *156–68 = *183–95).

367 Ibn Isḥāq was the grandson of a Christian prisoner-of-war from ʿAyn al-Tamr, Abū Ḥanīfa the grandson of a pagan prisoner-of-war from Kabul, but for all one can tell it might as well have been the other way round.

368 Cf. S. Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic*, Oxford 1969.

369 The equivalent of Oriental cults in Rome is Shīʿite *ghuluww* in Islam.

370 Not so, of course, in Syria and Mesopotamia where there were no garrison cities and where the Arabs had been settled on the land from the start. Pseudo-Dionysius testifies to the existence of an Arab peasantry in Mesopotamia in the early ʿAbbāsid period (cf. Cahen, 'Fiscalité, propriété, antagonismes sociaux', pp. 140ff), and the Arabs who took to cultivating their own land on losing their stipends in the 760s doubtless illustrate precisely how this peasantry had come into being (*ibid.*, pp. 145f; the date given should of course be A.D. 767f, not 667f).

371 Cf. Morony, 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', pp. 55f.

372 Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 67, 293; cf. Morony, 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', p. 56. Note that the *dihqān* who appears under Khālid al-Qasrī in 120 is no longer a tax-collector, but a private agent of Khālid's (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1647).

373 Thus it was Maslama who benefited from the reclamation of swamps under

Ḥajjāj, just as it had been Muʿāwiya who benefited from it after the first civil war (Morony, 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', p. 56; Dennett, *Conversion and Poll-tax*, pp. 29f). It was Khālid al-Qasrī, a Syrian governor and general, who acquired vast estates in Iraq, just as it had been Ziyād and his sons, the governors and kinsmen of the caliph, who acquired them under the Sufyānids (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1647; M. G. Morony, 'Landholding in Seventh Century ʿIrāq', unpublished paper prepared for the Conference on the Economic History of the Near East, Princeton 1974, p. 32).

[374] For a list of Iraqi landowners see Morony, 'Landholding', pp. 33f. Morony's views on this subject are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, he explicitly states that the tribal aristocracy of Iraq did *not* become a landed one, most of the land passing into the ownership of the state (*ibid.*, p. 33). On the other hand, he concludes that 'the second half of the seventh century saw the emergence of a class of Muslim Arab landed aristocrats assimilated to the local dahāqīn' (*ibid.*; similarly 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', p. 56), and in both articles *taljiʾa* is presented as an important mechanism in the formation of this class ('Landholding', p. 23; 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', p. 56). Morony's second view represents what we would have expected to happen, but the evidence is on the side of the first. (Neither of the two examples cited in fact concerns *taljiʾa*. The *dihqān* who sells his land to Ibn Masʿūd, but continues to pay *kharāj*, clearly illustrates the point that *kharāj* land cannot be transformed into ʿ*ushr* land: it is hard to see how this *dihqān* can epitomize a search for *protection*. And no local landholders put their land under Maslama's protection: Maslama is the subject and the verb is in the fourth form.)

[375] S. D. Goitein, 'The Rise of the Near-Eastern Bourgeoisie in Early Islamic Times', *Journal of World History* 1956.

[376] *Ibid.*, pp. 586–96.

[377] 'Degenerate heirs appear, who adopt boorish ways and forsake noble manners and lose their dignity in the sight of people. They busy themselves like tradesmen with the earning of money, and neglect to garner fair fame', as Tōsar has it in his account of aristocratic decay (M. Minovi (ed.), *Tansar's Letter to Goshnasp*, Tehran 1932, p. 19 = M. Boyce (tr.), *The Letter of Tansar*, Rome 1968, p. 44). For the priestly reasons why 'the lowest activity is commerce' see the passage from the Dēnkart cited by M. Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie dans l'Iran ancien*, Paris 1963, pp. 424f. For the reappearance of such sentiments among the Muslim *kuttāb* see Goitein, 'Bourgeoisie', p. 597.

[378] E. R. Hardy, *The Large Estates of Byzantine Egypt*, New York 1931, pp. 60ff; Dennett, *Conversion and Poll-tax*, p. 69.

[379] There were fugitives in the later Roman empire just as there was *taljiʾa* even under the Umayyads, but the shift of primacy is undeniable (cf. F. de Zulueta, 'De Patrociniis Vicorum' in P. Vinogradoff (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History*, vol. i, Oxford 1909; C. Cahen, 'Note pour l'histoire de la *ḥimāya*', *Mélanges Louis Massignon*, vol. i, Damascus 1956).

[380] Dennett, *Conversion and Poll-tax*, pp. 79, 110ff; cf. also C. Cahen, 'Histoire économico-sociale et islamologie. Le problème préjudiciel de l'adapta-

tion entre les autochtones et l'Islam', *Colloque sur la sociologie musulmane, actes,* Brussels 1962, pp. 205ff.

[381] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1122f, 1354, 1435, 1507ff; Balādhurī, *Ansāb,* vol. xi, pp. 336f; Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil,* ed. W. Wright, Leipzig 1864–92, p. 286; Jahshiyārī, *Wuẓarā',* p. 57; Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt,* vol. v, p. 386; Narshakhī, *Description,* p. 58 = 59f.

[382] Note how the Persian who killed Mas'ūd b. 'Amr in 64 was either an Uswārī or an *'ilj* who had converted and migrated to Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 461, 465). Companion *ḥadīth*s on clientage of conversion also assume that the convert is a *rajul min ahl al-arḍ* (Shāfi'ī, *Kitāb al-umm,* Būlāq 1321–5, vol. vii, p. 121; Sarakhsī, *Kitāb al-mabsūṭ,* Cairo 1324–31, vol. viii, p. 91). That people converted in order to escape the *jizya* was perfectly well known to the lawyers (cf. Abū 'Ubayd, *Amwāl,* pp. 66f).

[383] As the Muslims remember the converts as peasants who flee from their taxes, so the *dhimmī*s remember the Arabs as Hagarenes who impose them (see for example Īshō'yahb III, *Liber Epistolarum,* ed. and tr. R. Duval (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, second series, vol. lxiv), Paris 1904f, p. 251 = 182; Bar Penkaya in Mingana, *Sources syriaques,* p. *147 = *175; E. Beck (ed. and tr.), *Des heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Sermones III* (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vols. cxxxviiif), Louvain 1972, p. 61 = 81; B. Lewis, 'An Apocalyptic Vision of Islamic History', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1950, p. 321, cf. p. 323; H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth-Century Books²,* Oxford 1971, p. 195).

[384] *Aghānī,* vol. v, p. 154; cf. Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-fihrist,* ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig 1871f, p. 140 = *id., The Fihrist of al-Nadīm,* tr. B. Dodge, New York 1970, p. 307.

[385] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ,* p. 426; Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr,* ed. C. C. Torrey, New Haven 1922, p. 155; Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt,* vol. v, p. 384.

[386] Cf. above, pp. 37f.

[387] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1354.

[388] Cf. above, note 281.

[389] Cf. above, note 272.

[390] Despite the abundance of prisoners-of-war, such retinues do not appear to have been very common in the Sufyānid period. Apart from the *Bukhāriyya* of 'Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād, there is some rather weak evidence for slaves and freedmen in the retinues of 'Abbād b. Ziyād and 'Amr b. Sa'īd al-Ashdaq in the second civil war (cf. Appendix VI, nos. 6f), and there are many examples of people arming both their own and other people's slaves and freedmen in the same civil war (cf. below notes 646f;) but most of the passages suggesting the existence of standing retinues have to be discounted (cf. Appendix VI, nos. 1–5).

[391] Already Yazīd b. al-Muhallab fought with *mawālī* in his revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1381, 1403); he is reputed to have wondered why Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, who also had a great many, did not similarly rebel (Ibn al-Qūṭiyya, *Iftitāḥ,* pp. 161f). Khālid al-Qasrī also had a fair number, though whether they were

armed is not clear (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1813ff, 1819f). In the civil war a
Yemeni in Iraq gathered his *aṣḥāb* and *mawālī* (*ibid.*, p. 1839), while ʿAbbās b. al-
Walīd in Syria and Zabbān b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz in Egypt fought with their kinsmen
and *mawālī* (*ibid.*, p. 1803; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 87, 90). Muḥammad b.
Khālid al-Qasrī rebelled in favour of the ʿAbbāsids with Yemeni *fursān* and
mawālī (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 19), and shortly after the revolution Khāzim b.
Khuzayma recruited men from among his family, kinsmen and *mawālī* in Marw
(*ibid.*, p. 78), while Maʿn b. Zāʾida left a large number of *mawālī* and fellow-
tribesmen for his nephew on his death in Sīstān (Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae*, ed. M. Th.
Houtsma, Leiden 1883, vol. ii, p. 463). The ʿAbbāsids themselves had a retinue
known as the *Sharawiyya*, presumably after the Sharāh in which they were
settled (Yaʿqūbī, *Kitāb al-buldān*, ed. A. W. T. Juynboll (Bibliotheca
Geographorum Arabicorum, vol. vii), Leiden 1892, p. 243, cf. pp. 245, 247
= *id.*, *Les Pays*, tr. G. Wiet, Cairo 1937, pp. 20, 23, 29).

[392] The Yemeni in Iraq gathered thirty companions and clients, but he may of
course have had more (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1839); ʿAbbās b. al-Walīd had about
150 sons and clients (*ibid.*, 1803).

[393] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1941; cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 1830, 1892, 1897, 1908f, 1913;
Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 464 = vol. ii, p. 505). The *Rāshid-
iyya*, *Ṣaḥṣaḥiyya*, and *Dāliqiyya* were presumably client retinues of the same
order (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 2, 40; Jāḥiẓ, ʿRisāla ilāʾl-Fatḥ b. Khāqān fī manāqib
al-turk wa-ʿāmmat jund al-khilāfaʾ in *Tria Opuscula*, ed. G. Van Vloten, Leiden
1903, p. 10 = *id.*, ʿJahiz of Basra to al-Fath Ibn Khaqan on the "Exploits of
the Turks and the Army of the Khalifate in General"ʾ, tr. C. T. H. Walker,
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1915, p. 644; they were obviously not
tribal units as suggested by Omar, *ʿAbbāsid Caliphate*, p. 122). After the
revolution Khāzim b. Khāzim had an armed retinue of 5000 *mawālī*
(Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 602).

[394] Thus doubtless the *mawālī* who appear in the seventies and who do not yet
form permanent retinues (as for example those of ʿUthmān b. Qaṭan, Ṭabarī,
ser. ii, p. 919); similarly Muslim b. Dhakwān, the commander of the
Dhakwāniyya who was a freedman of Yazīd III (*ibid.*, pp. 1852f), and
Yazīd al-Aslamī, the *mawlā* who was sent against Abū Muslim and who
was a freedman of Naṣr b. Sayyār (*ibid.*, pp. 1057ff). The sources certainly
tend to take it for granted that a client is a freedman unless otherwise
specified.

[395] Thus the four hundred slaves of ʿAbdallāh al-Iṣbahānī in the second civil war
(Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 366), and the retinue of *ghilmān* belonging to Ṭāriq, the
fiscal agent of Khālid al-Qasrī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1653). When Naṣr b. Sayyār
faced dismissal, he bought a thousand slaves whom he armed and mounted
(*ibid.*, p. 1765); cf. Appendix VI, no. 7). Note also the *ḥadīth* ʿman iʿtazza biʾl-
ʿabīd adhallahu Allāhʾ (Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī, *Ḥilyat al-awliyāʾ*, Cairo
1932–8, vol. ii, p. 174. I owe this reference to Professor M. J. Kister).

[396] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1920.

[397] The ʿAbd Rabbih b. Sīsan who appears as the agent of Naṣr's *ṣāḥib shurṭa* was

presumably Yūnus' father (*ibid.*, pp. 1923f). Yūnus himself is described as one of Naṣr's trusted companions (*ibid.*, p. 1995). He was later killed by Abū Muslim (*ibid.*, pp. 1989, 1995).

[398] Compare the Persian *mawlā* of Quraysh who changed his *walā'* on taking military service with the B. Fahm (R. Guest, 'Relations between Persia and Egypt under Islam' in *A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to E. Browne*, Cambridge 1922, p. 165).

[399] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1024.

[400] Severus b. al-Muqaffa', *History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria*, ed. and tr. B. Evetts in *Patrologia Orientalis*, vol. v, p. 116; cf. R. Basset (ed. and tr.), *Le Synaxaire arabe-jacobite (rédaction copte)* in *Patrologia Orientalis* vol. xvi, p. 233. It is not clear in Kindī (*Governors*, pp. 84ff) that the recruits were converts, though presumably the mysterious *maqāmiṣa* were some non-Arab group (for a somewhat implausible suggestion as to their identity see Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. i, p. 158). On his flight to Egypt Marwān II similarly promised to enrich all converts, and many converted (Severus, *Patriarchs*, pp. 158f). A few years after the revolution the 'Abbāsids themselves promised tax-remission to converts, but by now the purpose was scarcely military (*ibid.*, p. 189).

[401] Cf. Hardy, *Large Estates*, pp. 60ff.

[402] *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, ed. M. Sh. Bahār, Tehran 1314, p. 91 is commonly adduced as an example of forced conversion under Mu'āwiya. But the people whom Rabī' b. Ziyād forces to learn *'ilm, Qur'ān* and *tafsīr* are evidently Arabs, and the 'many Zoroastrians' who converted are said to have done so voluntarily, impressed by his good conduct. Governors were supposed to teach the people of the *amṣār* their religion and the *sunna* of their Prophet (Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, Cairo 1352, p. 14 = A. Ben Shemesh (tr.), *Taxation in Islam*, vol. iii, Leiden and London 1969, p. 47).

[403] Note also how the Arabs could afford to discriminate against their subjects with *dhimmī* regulations where the Jurchen and the Manchus desperately tried to impose barbarian hair-styles and clothes on the Chinese.

[404] In Iraq, where the presence of the highest echelons of the Persian nobility was politically intolerable, it was the lower ranks that survived longest (cf. Morony, 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', p. 54), but on the plateau, where the nobility could stay out of sight, it appears to have been members of the lower echelons such as Māhān and his in-laws that went first.

[405] Morony, 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', pp. 57ff has scraped the barrel for the contribution of the *dihqāns*. Though the case is overstated (the Arabs evidently did not acquire the 'attitudes and lifestyle appropriate to a landed aristocracy' (p. 59)), it is clear from it that there would not have been much of a Persian heritage in Islam without the *kuttāb*.

[406] When 'Umar II allowed Jarrāḥ b. 'Abdallāh to keep the 10 000 or 20 000 dirhams he had taken from the treasury while in office, Jarrāḥ spent them on stipends to his *qawm* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1355); two Kufans spent the 100 000 dirhams they had received from Ibn 'Umar in the same way (*ibid.*, pp. 1855, 1883); Naṣr b. Sayyār recruited men from among his *qawm* of B. Salama and

others (*ibid.*, p. 1919); and Syrian generals appear with their *qawm* in the civil war (*ibid.*, pp. 1894, 1899).

407 This is clear not only in the examples in note 406 above, but also in the case of Nuṣayb, who was allowed to give *fard* to his *qawm* by way of reward (*Aghānī*, vol. i, p. 373), and Hārūn b. Sha'sh who in the early 'Abbāsid period was told to recruit 200 men of his *qawm* on his receipt of *amān* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 304).

408 If the recruits were paid 60 or 70 dirhams, one could get a sizeable retinue for 100 000 (cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1855, 1883).

409 Cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1628; ser. iii, pp. 52, 126.

410 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1468f; Azdī, *Ta'rīkh al-Mawṣil*, ed. 'A. Ḥabība, Cairo 1967, pp. 22f.

411 Both Ṭabarī and Azdī have '*iqtaraḍtu*' which makes no sense and is clearly to be emended to '*iftaraḍtu*'.

412 Cf. Appendix III, no. 100.

413 Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1885ff.

414 As they were to avenge Khālid (cf. above, note 339).

415 Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 85.

416 *Ibid.*, p. 117.

417 Cf. below, note 610.

418 For clients (free or freed) avenging their patrons see Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1049, 1849, 1890; Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 338.

419 And note that the clients in point are either Transoxanian princes (thus Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1249) or poets (*Aghānī*, vol. ii, pp. 217, 419, vol. v, p. 82).

420 For Māhān see above, p. 52 Muslim b. Yasār, evidently a non-Arab, was a foster-brother of 'Abd al-Malik (Ibn Ḥibbān, '*Ulamā*', p. 121). Yazīd b. Abī Muslim, the governor of North Africa under Yazīd II, was likewise a *mawlā* and foster-brother of Ḥajjāj (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā*', p. 42; cf. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 231).

421 Thus the Bukhārkhudā named a son Qutayba and the Sāmānkhudā named one Asad after their patrons (Narshakhī, *Description*, pp. 8, 57 = 10, 59); Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī, a freedman of Maṣqala b. Hubayra who had become a client of Muqātil b. Ḥayyān al-Qurashī, named one Muqātil (*ibid.*, pp. 56f, cf. p. 61 = 58, cf. 63; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1204, 1330, 1504 etc.); a client of Manṣūr named a son Ja'far (*Aghānī*, vol. xii, p. 44). Compare Mūsā b. Nuṣayr and Muhallab, above, notes 295f.

422 Though there had of course been Arab freedman in the past.

423 In due course the lawyers were to turn all the *mawālī* into naturalized Arabs by their interpretation of *walā'* as a kinship tie, and the idea was taken up by the *mawālī* themselves. But for Jāḥiẓ *mawālī* claiming as much were still a recent sprout ('Risāla fī banī Umayya' in H. al-Sandūbī (ed.), *Rasā'il al-Jāḥiẓ*, Cairo 1933, p. 299).

424 There is of course also such a thing as private ties which are parasitical upon the state apparatus, but the emotional character of such ties is a far cry from what we have to do with here.

425 Note that these ties developed no further under the 'Abbāsids with whom the

moral vacuum disappeared: 'Abbāsid companionship and clientage were
public ranks (cf. below, part III).

9 THE ABORTIVE SERVICE ARISTOCRACY

[426] See for example *Akhbār al-dawlat al-'abbāsiyya wa-fīhi akhbār al-'Abbās*,
ed. 'A.-'A. Dūrī and 'A.-J. al-Muṭṭalibī, Beirut 1971, p. 376; Ṭabarī, ser. iii,
pp. 51, 64f.

[427] Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1974; cf. the poem by Naṣr b. Sayyār in Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*,
p. 360. In Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1937 and ser. iii, p. 25 the instruction is only to
kill every *speaker* of Arabic in Khurāsān, presumably the Syrians and their local
sympathizers, and this is of course more likely to have been the original
instruction, if such an instruction was given at all. But the point is unaffected:
the Khurāsānīs were foreigners who saw Arabic as the language, not of
the common past, but of the common oppressor.

[428] Cf. the outburst of the people of Mosul on the appointment of Muḥammad b.
Ṣūl: 'are we to be ruled by a *mawlā* of Khath'am?'. In this case the Arabs
did indeed end up by being exterminated (Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp.
312ff). The view that Abū Muslim had instigated the slaves of Khurāsān
against their masters reflects the same paranoia, though it was not of course
entirely untrue (Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb ta'rīkh Ibn 'Asākir*, ed. 'A.-Q. Badrān
and A. 'Ubayd, Damascus 1911–32, vol. ii, p. 291; Theophanes, *Chrono-
graphia*, A.M. 6240; cf. Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 96).

[429] E. Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane*, Paris and Leiden 1950–3,
vol. i, p. 132.

[430] See for example Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 630, 673ff, 695, 706, 743f.

[431] For a stray accusation of *'aṣabiyya* in Khurāsān in 135 see Ṭabarī, ser. iii,
p. 83. The charge is unlikely to have been true.

[432] Local factionalism is attested in Syria under Hārūn and Mu'tamid (Ṭabarī,
ser. iii, pp. 625, 639; Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, pp. 495, 623; cf. Appendix I,
nos. 1, 6), in Mesopotamia under Hārūn (Appendix IV, no. 53), in Egypt
under Ma'mūn (Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 567) and in Sind under Manṣūr,
Hārūn and Mu'taṣim (*ibid.*, pp. 448, 494; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 446). That
it also continued in Sīstān is clear from the *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 191.

[433] E. Tyan, *Institutions du droit public musulman*, vol. i (*Le Califat*), Paris 1954,
p. 451.

[434] D. Sourdel, *Le Vizirat 'abbáside de 749 à 936*, Damascus 1959f, pp. 589ff.

[435] R. Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, Cambridge 1969, pp. 362. As Levy
points out, it was by no means a consistent policy (see for example Kindī,
Governors, pp. 110, 111, 120, 121 as against *ibid.*, pp. 117, 118, 119,
121 etc.), though there was a distinct tendency for the Iraqi governor-
ships to be even further subdivided (Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 675; Ṭabarī, ser.
iii, pp. 465f).

[436] *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'barīd'.

[437] D. Sourdel, 'Questions de cérémonial 'abbaside', *Revue des Études Islamiques* 1960.

[438] E. Tyan, *Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en pays d'Islam*, Paris and Beirut 1938–43, vol. i, pp. 182f (overstated). Compare the Christian use of such titles as 'father of fathers' and 'shepherd of shepherds' for the catholicos (M. G. Morony, 'Religious Communities in Late Sasanian and Early Muslim Iraq', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 1974, p. 118). Pellat's suggestion that the title of the *qāḍī'l-quḍāt* is modelled on *dātvarān dātvar* rather than *mōbedhān mōbedh* is unlikely to be correct (C. Pellat (tr.), *Le Livre de la couronne attribué à Ǧāḥiẓ*, Paris 1954, p. 44n). It was the *mobedhs* who worked as judges, their judicial functions were comparable to those of the *qāḍī*s, and *qāḍī* is a standard translation for *mōbedh* in Muslim sources (cf. M.-L. Chaumont, 'Recherches sur le clergé zoroastrien: le hērbad', *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 1960, pp. 166, 169).

[439] And note that they were also debarred from perpetuating the image of the polity that had collapsed in the civil war: where Augustus could pose as a *princeps*, the Marwānids had gone on too long for Manṣūr to masquerade as a *protosymboulos*.

[440] It is with reference to this concept that Sarakhsī justifies rulings on *walā'* (*Mabsūṭ*, vol. viii, pp. 89, 96).

[441] Coulson, *Islamic Law*, pp. 117f. The Imāmīs, as Coulson points out, took the opposite view.

[442] As indeed it often is in modern works. Consider the idea of blaming the decay of the Merovingians on their failure to retain the simple ways of their tribal past.

[443] Or more correctly proto-Sunnīs. I use 'Sunnī' here to mean adherents of the traditionists who were eventually to emerge as the *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jamā'a*, as opposed to adherents of heresy and theology.

[444] Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 337ff; W. Tucker, 'Rebels and Gnostics: al-Muġīra ibn Sa'īd and the Muġīriyya', *Arabica* 1975.

[445] W. Tucker, 'Abū Manṣūr al-'Ijlī and the Manṣūriyya: a Study in Medieval Terrorism', *Der Islam* 1977.

[446] Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 506ff; T. Lewicki, 'The Ibādites in Arabia and Africa', *Journal of World History* 1971, pp. 74ff.

[447] The Yamaniyya were Ghaylānīs and Ḥārith b. Surayj perhaps a Murji'ite; his secretary was certainly a *mutakallim* (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Gailāniya'; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*², *s.v.* 'al-Ḥārith b. Suraydj'.)

[448] Thus Qutayba could flatter his soldiers as '*dihqāns* of the Arabs', while Asad could let himself be flattered as a paradigm of *katkhudāniyya* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1247, 1636f).

[449] As they were to say in no uncertain terms when they became Shu'ūbīs.

[450] For the syncretic potential which this implies see Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, pp. 131ff. Cf. also above, note 441 for the Shī'ite attitude to the *Sharī'a*. Note also that there were Shī'ites who could accept the Būyid use of the title King of Kings, whereas the Sunnīs pelted the *khaṭībs* with pieces of brick

when it was read in the Friday sermon (W. Madelung, 'The Assumption of the Title Shāhānshāh by the Būyids and the "Reign of Daylam (*Dawlat al-Daylam*)"', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 1969*bis*, pp. 175n, 181).

[451] Schacht, *Introduction*, pp. 52f.

[452] S. Pines, 'A Note on an Early Meaning of the Term *Mutakallim*', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1971. (The two supposedly further passages adduced by J. Van Ess, *Anfänge muslimischer Theologie*, Beirut 1977, p. 20n, are in fact both to be found in Pines' article (pp. 239n and 240n).)

[453] Pellat, *Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ*, § 12. This passage suggests that the *mutakallims* played the role not only of disputants and propagandists *vis-à-vis* outsiders, but also of official religious instructors inside the army itself (cf. Pines, 'Note', p. 239n): were the caliph to make the outrageous demand, it would clearly be transmitted through them. (Pellat's translation is unusable here in that it omits the crucial word.)

[454] For a typical Sunnī view of the Ismāʿīlīs see S. M. Stern, 'Abuʾl-Qāsim al-Bustī and his Refutation of Ismāʿīlism', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1961, p. 25. It was only Naṣr b. Ṣayyār who saw the ʿAbbāsids as a threat to Islam (Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 360).

[455] Cf. C. Cahen, 'Points de vue sur la "revolution ʿabbāside"', *Revue Historique* 1963, pp. 330f.

[456] The 'Testament of Abū Hāshim', of course, leaves no doubt that the ʿAbbāsids had staged the revolution in the name of the imamic rights which they had inherited from a son of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya (*Akhbār al-dawlat al-ʿabbāsiyya*, p. 165; Nawbakhtī, *Kitāb firaq al-shīʿa*, ed. H. Ritter. Istanbul 1931, p. 42; J. Van Ess, *Frühe muʿtazilitische Häresiographie*, Beirut 1971, pp. 31ff), but this is certainly an imamic revision of a story that originally had a different point; for inasmuch as Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya was the *mahdī*, there was nothing for his son to inherit, let alone bequeath. The story establishes a doctrinal connection between Mukhtār and the ʿAbbāsids, and virtually the only thing they can have shared is a belief in the coming of the *mahdī*. Now just as Mukhtār's *mahdī* was known as Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, so we find Abuʾl-ʿAbbās predicted as Ibn al-Hārithiyya (*Akhbār al-dawlat al-ʿabbāsiyya*, pp. 167f, 169); and just as Mukhtār assumed the title of *wazīr* of the *mahdī*, so Abū Salama was known as *wazīr* of the family of Muḥammad from among whose ranks he presumably expected the *mahdī*; it was similarly as *wazīr* to the *mahdī* that Sunbādh, an ex-ʿAbbāsid soldier, expected Mazdak to return (G. H. Sadighi, *Les Mouvements religieux iraniens au IIe et au IIIe siècles de l'hégire*, Paris 1938, p. 139; contrast the completely non-messianic use of the title in the writings of a contemporary Iraqi secretary (Pellat, *Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ*, §§ 32f, 44). It looks, in other words, as if the ʿAbbāsids began by expecting the *return* of a redeemer, whoever he might be. All this does not, of course, do much to solve the enigma of the role which Ibrāhīm al-Imām was expected to play. He bore neither the names nor the title of the *mahdī*, and yet his death clearly meant that the redemption failed; or to put it the other way round, he bore the title of *imām*, and yet his death left the succession question completely

open, not only to Abū Salama, but also to other supporters of the 'Abbāsids (cf. *Akhbār al-dawlat al-'abbāsiyya*, p. 403).

[457] Abū'l-'Abbās and Dāwūd b. 'Alī both claim the caliphate as their birthright in the accession speeches of 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 29ff; there is no reference to the Testament of Abū Hāshim). Similarly Manṣūr in his correspondence with Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (*ibid.*, pp. 211ff).

[458] 'There has not been a caliph between you and the Prophet except 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and the man behind me', as Dāwūd b. 'Alī put it to the Kufans on the accession of Abū'l-'Abbās (*ibid.*, p. 37 ; contrast the more diplomatic avoidance of *rafḍ* in Abū'l-'Abbās' own reference to the first three caliphs on p. 30).

[459] *Ibid.*, pp. 29f.

[460] *Ibid.*, pp. 30ff; cf. Jāḥiẓ, *Manāqib al-turk*, pp. 8, 15 = 642, 651.

[461] Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 551ff; S. Moscati, 'Le Massacre des Umayyades dans l'histoire et dans les fragments poétiques', *Archiv Orientální* 1950.

[462] B. Lewis, 'The Regnal Titles of the First Abbasid Caliphs' in *Dr Zakir Husain Presentation Volume*, New Delhi 1968.

[463] Jāḥiẓ, *Manāqib al-turk*, p. 8 = 642f (where they are explicit); for Khurāsān as a *dār al-hijra* see above, p. 61.

[464] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 531, 931, 1068.

[465] Cf. Manṣūr's eulogy of the Khurāsānīs, *ibid.*, pp. 430ff, and the boasts of the Khurāsānīs in Jāḥiẓ, *Manāqib al-turk*, p. 8 = 641f.

[466] As they do in Jāḥiẓ, *Manāqib al-turk*.

[467] D. Ayalon, 'The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Mu'taṣim, their Background and Consequences', unpublished paper read at the Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi 1964, pp. 4ff (I am indebted to Prof. Ayalon for letting me have a copy of this paper). Note in particular *abnā' al-shī'a al-khurāsāniyya* and *abnā' al-jund al-khurāsāniyya* (*Aghānī*, vol. xx, pp. 14, 188) and *ibn dawlatika wa' l-mutaqaddim fī da'watika wa'bn man sabaqa ilā bay'atika* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 531). The 'Abbāsids themselves are never known as *abnā'al-dawla*.

[468] M. Talbi, *L'Emirat Aghlabide 184-296/800-909: Histoire politique*, Paris 1966, pp. 144f, 166; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 732, 1274. Cf. also W. Madelung, 'The Minor Dynasties of Northern Iran' in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. iv, Cambridge 1975, p. 200 for Abnā' in Ṭabaristān, Kindī, *Governors*, p. 147 for Abnā' in Egypt under Amīn, and Van Arendonk, *Débuts*, pp. 101n, 107, 122n for Abnā' in third-century Yemen.

[469] Ayalon, 'The Military Reforms', pp. 7f. In the fourth civil war they numbered 20 000 men or more (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 826).

[470] Notably the Barmakids and the sons of Qaḥṭaba and 'Īsā b. Māhān (Appendix V, nos. 7, 9, 18).

[471] Appendix V, nos. 1–19.

[472] The Abnā' are *muwalladūn* and sons of *dihqāns* (Ayalon, 'The Military Reforms' p. 6 = Ṭayfūr, *Kitāb Baghdād*, ed. H. Keller, Leipzig 1908, p. 143 ; Khwārizmī, *Kitāb mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, ed. G. Van Vloten, Leiden 1895, p. 119). They are sons of kings (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 414).

[473] The phrase is Jāḥiẓ's (*Manāqib al-turk*, p. 15 = 651); cf. the Banawī's boast

that his root is Khurāsān and his branch Baghdad (*ibid.*). For the identification of the *ahl Baghdād* and the *Abnā'* see also Ayalon, 'The Military Reforms', pp. 6ff.

[474] Appendix V, nos. 1, 11f, 14, 16f. Primarily, the *shurṭa* in question was clearly not the urban police force, but rather the military division which fought in the vicinity of the caliph, prince or general in battle under the leadership of a commander who was responsible for discipline, the hearing of complaints, the meting out of punishments and the *amr al-'askar* in general (cf. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yaḥyā, 'Risāla fī naṣīḥat walī'l-'ahd', pp. 181, 193f, 199, 200, 205); apparently he was also responsible for recruitment (cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 555). The leadership of this *shurṭa* was symbolized by the javelin (*ḥirba*), and 'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yaḥyā recommends that the post should be filled with men from among the *ahl buyutāt al-sharaf*, as in fact it was in both the Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid period ('Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yaḥyā, 'Naṣīḥa', p. 199). Baghdad of course also had a *shurṭa* in the sense of police force, doubtless drawn from the army settled there, and the leader of this *shurṭa* seems likewise to have been concerned with the administration of justice, for the office was known as the *'adwa*, 'redress' (cf. Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, pp. 374f; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 683, 750), and it was as leader of the *'adwa* that Sindī b. Shāhak was instructed to en-force the *dhimmī* regulations under Hārūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 713, cf. Appendix V, no. 43); but unlike the *ḥirba* this office was open to usurpation by clients such as Sindī himself.

[475] Appendix V, nos. 2, 6, 8f, 13, 19. Note that although the Umayyad *aṣḥāb al-ḥaras* had usually been *mawālī*, they were not usually *mawālī* of the caliph himself (as were the *ḥujjāb*), an indication that the office was not a menial one. It is in keeping with this that the 'Abbāsid *aṣḥāb al-ḥaras* were in charge not just of the caliph's bodyguard, but also of the general supervision of the army and at least sometimes also of the *khazā'in* (cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 654; 'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yaḥyā, 'Naṣīḥa', p. 208); thus it was in his capacity of *ṣāḥib al-ḥaras* that Muḥriz b. Ibrāhīm was responsible for fitting out the troops which were sent to India in 159 and proved acceptable as a guarantor of pay to the mutinous troops on Mahdī's death in 169 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 461, 547, cf. Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 700. Muḥriz was also one of the *ahl al-dawla*, cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1955ff, 2001, ser. iii, p. 1).

[476] Appendix V, nos. 2, 6f, 12, 14, 19.

[477] Appendix V, nos. 1, 3–8, 10–18.

[478] Appendix V, nos. 1–3, 6–9, 12–14, 18.

[479] See the lists of governors in, for example, Khalīfa's *Ta'rīkh* under the years of the caliphs' deaths.

[480] Both Abū Muslim and Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba were said by the 'Abbāsids to be *minnā ahl bayt* (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1949, 1952, ser. iii, p. 64). According to W. Ivanow, *The Alleged Founder of Ismailism*, Bombay 1946, pp. 165ff, the expression is simply a hackneyed compliment paid to worthies, and in the examples he cites there certainly is no question of spiritual adoption (cf. also below, note 484). In the case of Abū Muslim and Ḥasan, however, the point of

the expression was not to flatter the men thus designated, but to justify their position of power (it was said of them, not to them, in both cases to men who had asked for a member of the 'Abbāsid house); spiritual adoption may not be quite what the expression amounted to, but it clearly established a *rank*.

481 Thus the Barmakids, Muḥammad b. Muqātil and Ḥusayn b. Mu'ādh (Appendix V, nos. 7, 13, 15); cf. also Jāḥiẓ, *Manāqib al-turk*, p. 16 = 653.

482 Jāḥiẓ, *Manāqib al-turk*, p. 16 = 653.

483 Khālid b. Barmak identified himself to Abū'l-'Abbās as *mawlāka* (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 89), but the Barmakids never appear as *mawālī* of the caliph on their coins, so his terminology was hardly technical.

484 *Sc*. Salmān al-Fārisī (Ibn Isḥāq, *Leben Muhammed's*, vol. i, p. 677 = 764). Umayyad nominees were not necessarily *mawālī*, cf. Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol. vii, p. 271; Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Sīrat 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz*, ed. A. 'Ubayd, Cairo 1927, p. 28 (where 'Umar pronounces none other than Ḥajjāj *minnā ahl bayt*).

485 Cf. above, p. 56.

486 In the words of Mahdī to Yaḥyā b. Khālid b. Barmak: 'I have been looking through the lists of the sons of my *shī'a* and the people of my *dawla* and have chosen from among them a man whom I shall attach to my son Hārūn . . . and my choice fell on you. I thought you had the better right to it because you are his foster-father (*murabbī*) and intimate' (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 498).

487 Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 279.

488 Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 435f; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, Cairo 1931, vol. i, p. 89 = J. Lassner, *The Topography of Baghdad in the early Middle Ages, Texts and Studies*, Detroit 1970, p. 69 (misidentified as companions of the Prophet).

489 Thus 'Abdallāh b. Yazīd al-Ḥakamī (Appendix IV, no. 6); Abū Zurāra (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 178; unidentified, but by implication a Syrian Yemeni); Ja'far b. Ḥanẓala al-Bahrānī (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 178, cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 116, 125, 224, 291f, 318), a former commander of the *jund* of Ḥimṣ in Khurāsān, who had been interim governor of Khurāsān in 120 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1609, 1612, 1635, 1638, 1659, etc.), fought under Ibn Hubayra at Wāsiṭ (*ibid.*, ser. iii, pp. 68f), and conducted a summer campaign in 139 (*ibid.*, p. 125; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 171); the family of Khālid al-Qasrī (Appendix I, no. 11); Mālik b. Adham al-Bāhilī (?, Appendix IV, no. 67); Ma'n b. Zā'ida al-Shaybānī (Appendix IV, no. 68); Ibrāhīm b. Jabala b. Makhrama al-Kindī (Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 178), the son of an Umayyad general who had himself been governor of Ḥaḍramawt in 129 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1402; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 582); 'Uthmān b. 'Umāra al-Murrī (Appendix I, no. 6); Ishāq (and Bakkār?) b. Muslim al-'Uqaylī (Appendix I, no. 16); Hazzān b. Sa'īd al-Ruhāwī (Appendix III, no. 88).

490 S. A. El-Ali, 'The Foundation of Baghdad' in A. H. Hourani and S. M. Stern (eds.), *The Islamic City*, Oxford 1970, p. 96.

491 For the references see above, note 489.

492 Thus the descendants of Sa'īd al-Ḥarashī (Appendix III, no. 74; but then the

'Abbāsid Harashīs might not be descendants of the Umayyad ones), 'Īsā b. Qays al-Sakūnī (Appendix I, no. 8), and Hishām b. 'Amr al-Taghlabī and his relatives (Appendix IV, no. 62).

⁴⁹³ Pellat, *Ibn al-Muqaffa'*, § 41.

⁴⁹⁴ Though whether Mahdī's successors thought that the institution had accomplished his purpose or that it never would is anyone's guess.

⁴⁹⁵ If the order in which the various members of the 'Abbāsid court are enumerated in the sources is to be trusted, the *mawālī* ranked below the 'Abbāsids and the *ṣaḥāba*, but above the *quwwād* (cf. El-Ali, 'The Foundation of Baghdad', p. 96).

⁴⁹⁶ Appendix V, nos. 37f, 40, 49.

⁴⁹⁷ Appendix V, no. 37 (Mūsā b. Muṣ'ab). The bestowal of the title on Rabī' b. 'Abdallāh al-Hārithī points in the same direction (Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 489, cf. Appendix III, no. 100).

⁴⁹⁸ Rabī' b. 'Abdallāh was certainly an Arab (see the note above), but few other cases are so clear-cut: despite their *nisba*s, men such as Jawwās b. al-Musayyab al-Yamānī and Abū 'l-Sarī al-Shāmī may very well have been non-Arabs (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 323; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 244 = 21; differently Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. ii, p. 10).

⁴⁹⁹ Only by the most wilful reading of the sources could one get around this fact. Several *mawālī* are explicitly said to have been slaves (Appendix V, nos. 23, 25, 28, 30, 32f, 35f, 38, 46), and even when it is not stated, their fancy names and by-names (*ibid.*, nos. 21, 24, 33, 47f), their description as eunuchs (*ibid.*, nos. 22, 27, 34) and their lack of patronymics are incontrovertible evidence of their servile origin.

⁵⁰⁰ 'And if you do not know their fathers they are your brothers in religion and *mawālī*' (33:5), a verse which clearly provided the Islamic rationale for the 'Abbāsid clients. Compare Ya'qūb b. Dāwūd, the secretary and *mawlā* of Sulaym, who rose from prison to the status of Mahdī's 'brother in God' (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 461; Sourdel, *Vizirat*, p. 106).

⁵⁰¹ Rabī' b. 'Abdallāh al-Hārithī was a Yemeni noble (cf. Appendix III, no. 100), but Ṭayfūr was 'the son of the tailor' (Appendix V, no. 45). Compare Ghiṭrīf b. al-A'ṭā', Hārūn's maternal uncle who likewise held office on behalf of his kinsman (though apparently without the title of *mawlā*), and who was the brother of a Yemeni slave-girl (Khaṭīb, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 83 = Lassner, *Topography*, p. 66; Khalīfa, *Ta'rīkh*, pp. 742, 745; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 304 = 132).

⁵⁰² Cf. Appendix V, nos. 20ff. The domestic origin of the clients is well caught in expressions such as '*haram, biṭāna, mawālī* and *ghilmān*' or '*mawālī* and *hasham*' (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 744, 809).

⁵⁰³ For recommendations of the use of freedmen attributed to Manṣūr and Mahdī, see *ibid.*, pp. 414, 448, 531f; similar sentiments are attributed to Mu'āwiya in Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, pp. 23f. Marwān II's preference for freedmen rather than free clients (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1852f) may be more historical. It ought, however, to be clear that the Barmakids were not technically freedmen as suggested by S. D. Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions*, Leiden 1968, p. 180.

[504] They were grooms, attendants, chamberlains and the like (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 392, 429, 531; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, pp. 259f; Appendix V, nos. 21, 38).

[505] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 456, 679, 681, 720f, 726, 764, 771, 955; Appendix V, nos. 27, 34–6, 44, 48; Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. ii, p. 10. These positions were considered menial; cf. D. Ayalon, 'Preliminary Remarks on the *Mamlūk* Military Institution in Islam' in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, Oxford 1975, p. 49 (= Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 414).

[506] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 461, 766, 1166.

[507] Appendix V, nos. 21, 25, 32f, 40, 46–9.

[508] The same is of course true of Spain, where *mamlūks* appeared in the army shortly after the secession (Lévi-Provençal, *Espagne musulmane*, vol. i, pp. 129f).

[509] Cf. above, note 456.

[510] *Akhbār al-dawlat al-ʿabbāsiyya*, p. 165; Nawbakhtī, *Firaq*, p. 43; Van Ess, Häresiographie, pp. 31ff. Already Manṣūr claimed priority for the ʿAbbāsids on grounds of descent from the Prophet's uncle (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 211ff; cf. T. Nagel, 'Ein früher Bericht über den Aufstand des Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh im Jahre 145 h', *Der Islam* 1970, p. 251).

[511] The view that Mahdī's position enabled the ʿAbbāsids to seek the approval of the Sunnīs and Shīʿites without imams is rather odd (R. Mottahedeh, 'The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate in Iran' in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. iv, Cambridge 1975, p. 67). Note that unlike the ʿAbbāsid zealot who compiled the *Akhbār al-dawlat al-ʿabbāsiyya*, the Sunnī chroniclers maintain a polite silence on the question of the ʿAbbāsid imamate.

[512] Thus Manṣūr in Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 213ff; cf. Nagel, 'Ein früher Bericht', p. 250.

[513] Cf. C. Pellat, 'La "Nâbita" de Djâḥiz', *Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales de l'Université d'Alger* 1952, pp. 314ff.

[514] The Sunnī chroniclers give ample and sympathetic attention to the ʿAbbāsid *revolution*, though they leave the ʿAbbāsid imamate to the heresiographers.

[515] On the model of ʿAbdallāh b. Muʿāwiya who dies as a *mahdī* handing over to an ʿAlid in Nawbakhtī, *Firaq*, p. 31.

[516] 'The children of the Prophet must be the successors of the Prophet', as he said when he started his revolt in Bukhārā in the aftermath of the revolution (Omar, *ʿAbbāsid Caliphate*, p. 158).

[517] The Shīʿites can get just as worked up about the martyrdom of ʿAlī al-Riḍā as they can about that of Ḥusayn; but what is the grandeur of Manṣūr to that of ʿUmar among the Sunnīs?

[518] Cf. D. Sourdel, 'La Politique religieuse du calife ʿAbbāside al-Maʾmûn', *Revue des Études Islamiques* 1963, p. 32.

[519] I owe the point that 'Manṣūr and the miḥna' would have made as good or better sense than 'Maʾmūn and the miḥna' to the independent observations of Drs F. W. Zimmermann and G. M. Hinds.

520 Cf. Goitein, *Studies*, pp. 149ff.

521 Thus it is *only* the imam who is empowered to execute the *ḥudūd* and *aḥkām* according to the *kitāb* and *sunna*, to deal with matters of war, appointments and revenues, and to use his discretion where there is no *athar*; and whoever disobeys him in these matters loses his soul (Pellat, *Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ*, § 17; the translation of *athar* as 'disposition scriptuaire' is very odd: Shaybānī's *Kitāb al-āthār* is a book of traditions, not of Koranic legislation). Similarly, it is only the *wulāt al-amr* who have received *ra'y* from God, the people having no business to do other than give advice when asked (*ibid.* § 20). Hence both *ʿāmma* and *khāṣṣa* are in need of the imam for their *ṣalāḥ*, and it is for their good that God has placed among them *khawāṣṣ min ahl al-dīn wa'l-ʿuqūl* to whom they may turn (*ibid.* §§ 57f).

522 *Ibid.*, §§ 10 (catechism for the army), 36 (legal code), 55 (necessity of giving people religious instruction).

523 *Ibid.*, § 55.

524 *Ibid.*, §§ 44ff. The main criteria of aristocracy are given as kinship, religious learning and military prowess (*raḥim, fiqh fī'l-dīn, balā'*), the main aristocratic groups as Anṣār and Muhājirūn, kinsmen of the caliph and *ahl buyūtāt al-ʿarab* (§ 47).

525 Thus the caliph is advised not to appoint soldiers to the administration of taxes, partly because it corrupts the army and partly because it is a *degrading* occupation for a man of military dignity (*ibid.*, 23). Cf. also the attention military nobility in §§ 47f.

526 *Ibid.*, §§ 47ff. Reliance on such persons dishonours power (*kāna lī'l-sulṭan shāni'an,* § 48).

527 He even contrives to cite Arabic poetry in defence of aristocracies (§ 46).

528 Or if he did, it was only in very minor ways such as the separation of fiscal and military authority and the creation of a Syrian *ṣaḥāba*. And that despite the fact that both the lay-out of Baghdad and the idea behind the Abnā' testify to a similar vision.

529 Cf. G. Vajda, 'Les Zindîqs en pays d'Islam au debut de la période abbaside', *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 1938.

530 Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ seems to have written shortly after these events; he refers to people who had shared in the caliph's power *'alā ghayr ṭarīqatihi wa-ra'yihi,* but whom God has now eliminated for him (Pellat, *Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ*, § 8), and the good wishes for the future also give the impression that we are at the beginning of Manṣūr's reign (§ 9). Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ apparently saw the liquidation of Manṣūr's rivals as an appropriate moment for the execution of his plan, and it is of course possible that another caliph would have taken the opportunity. But given the youth of the regime and the magnitude of what Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ suggested, it is not altogether surprising that Manṣūr did not dare.

531 The transformation of the Abnā' into Ḥanbalites is eloquently documented in I. M. Lapidus, 'The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1975.

[532] Appendix V, no. 7; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*², s.v. 'Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal'; Ḥanbal b. Hilāl, who had been governor of Sarakhs under the Umayyads, was a missionary in the *da'wa*. For Muḥammad b. Ḥanbal as one of the *abnā' quwwād Khurāsān* see W. M. Patton, *Ahmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*, Leiden 1897, p. 10.

[533] Sourdel, 'Politique religieuse', pp. 28ff; id., *Vizirat*, pp. 176ff; Goitein, 'Bourgeoisie', p. 597.

[534] Cf. Lapidus, 'Separation of State and Religion', p. 380.

[535] For this interpretation of the fall of the Barmakids see Sourdel, 'Politique religieuse'.

[536] And note the complete assurance with which Abū Yūsuf preaches hell-fire to Hārūn, dwelling on the terrible responsibilities he has as a ruler, while at the same time serving him traditions playing down his political role: the imam is merely a shield, or he is a scourge of God (*Kitāb al-kharāj*, pp. 9f = 42f). It is a far cry from the gingerly manner in which Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ suggested to Manṣūr that he was the source of all religious authority.

[537] Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp. 268ff.

[538] *Ibid.*, pp. 183ff.

[539] Cf. I. M. Lapidus, 'The Conversion of Egypt to Islam', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1972, pp. 256f.

[540] Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp. 316f.

[541] Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs*, pp. 87ff.

[542] Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. ii, p. 33.

[543] Sadighi, *Mouvements religieux iraniens*.

[544] Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 205.

[545] Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp. 327ff.

[546] Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, pp. 369f.

[547] *Ibid.*, pp. 107ff.

[548] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 842ff; cf. Appendix IV, no. 54.

[549] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 830; Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 532; Ṣafadī, *Umarā' Dimashq fī'l-Islām*, ed. Ṣ. al-Munajjid, Damascus 1955, pp. 37, 57, 83 (nos. 122, 185, 251). Note also the fear under Hārūn that Syrian discontent might yet again provide fuel for the ambitions of 'Abbāsid princes (Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 513).

[550] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1319ff; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, pp. 541f = vol. iii, p. 103.

[551] Cf. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, Manchester 1959, p. 22.

[552] *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 162ff; G. Scarcia, 'Lo scambio di lettere fra Hārūn al-Rashīd e Ḥamza al-Khārigī secondo il "Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān"', *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli* 1964. Hārūn evades the question of the imamate, harps on the theme of obedience and holds out the prospect of material rewards: no wonder Ḥamza was disgusted.

[553] Omar, *'Abbāsid Caliphate*, pp. 192ff; cf. Goitein, *Studies*, p. 156.

[554] Note also how Ya'qūb the Coppersmith used to say that the *dawla* of the 'Abbāsids was founded on treachery, the 'Abbāsids having killed Abū Salama,

Abū Muslim, the Barmakids and Faḍl b. Sahl: it did not escape contemporary
notice that all the victims were Persians (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 267f).

555 Cf. V. Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed*, London 1963, a helpful
survey of nativist movements in which the syncretic prophets of both the
Iranians and the Berbers ought to have been included. Note in particular the
Congolese conviction that 'Christ is a French God', whence the trinity of
'the Father, Simon Kimbangu and André Matswa', which compares so well
with Sunbādh's trinity of Mazdak, Abū Muslim and the *mahdī* (Lanternari,
Religions of the Oppressed, p. 16; Sadighi, *Mouvements religieux iraniens*,
p. 139).

556 'At first we had the land and you had the Bible; now we have the Bible and
you have the land' is a statement which the Iranian rebels could with approp-
riate modifications have made their own (Lanternari, *Religions of the Oppressed*,
p. 5).

557 The very fact that the revolts took the form of nativist millenarism, as
opposed to national restorationism, testifies to the fact that the local
aristocracy had defected to the conquerors. But at least one member of
it, the prince of Bukhārā, decided to make common cause with the *'āmmī*
insurgents (Sadighi, *Mouvements religieux iraniens*, p. 169).

558 He was the grandson of Naṣr b. Sayyār, the last Umayyad governor of
Khurāsān.

559 Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 515.

560 So Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 707f. If this story is not true, it is certainly well told.
It is set in the remote frontier town of Samarqand, where a woman has been
left behind by a husband who has gone to Baghdad. The woman finds it hard
to be without a man and Rāfi' fancies both her and her wealth, so they use
the trick of letting her feign apostasy, which immediately dissolves her
marriage, whereupon she converts and marries Rāfi'. Outraged, the husband
in Baghdad makes use of his access to the caliph to have the marriage dis-
solved, and Rāfi', though he escapes the statutory lashing, is paraded around
in the streets on a donkey and thrown into jail. Having escaped, he eventually
kills the governor who had administered the humiliation and becomes a rebel.
It is the combination of the deep insult to Rāfi''s *omertà* and a state that
insists on imposing its own rules that makes this story so eminently plausible
(compare Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, pp. 15f; *id.*, *Bandits*, Harmondsworth
1972, esp. p. 43).

561 Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 528. According to Shaban, *Islamic History*,
vol. ii, p. 38, Rāfi' enjoyed the support of the 'chiefs and princes' of Sogdiana,
Transoxania and Ṭukhāristān, but apart from the Qarluq chief whose help
Rāfi' invoked, Ya'qūbī mentions only the people of these areas.

562 Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 528; for Muqanna' see Sadighi, *Mouvements
religieux iraniens*, p. 170. The Qarluq chief is described as a convert, but other
Turks such as the Toghuz-Oghuz were clearly not, and for Ya'qūbī the revolt
consisted in *qitāl al-sulṭān wa-qatl al-muslimīn*.

563 M. Kaabi, 'Les Origines ṭāhirides dans la *da'wa* 'abbāside', *Arabica* 1972,

p. 163; Ya'qūbī only mentions that Rāfi' 'called to others than B. Hāshim' (*Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 529).

[564] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 732.

[565] Cf. above, p. 46.

[566] F. Gabrieli, 'La successione di Hārūn al-Rashīd e la guerra fra al-Amīn e al-Ma'mūn', *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 1926–8, pp. 383ff.

[567] The 'Abbāsid Middle East and Salian Germany are thus inverse cases. The Salian use of *ministeriales* turned on the entrenched character of the German aristocracy, the 'Abbāsid use of *mawālī* on the insecurity of the Islamic equivalent; in Germany the aristocracy eventually absorbed the *ministeriales*, whereas in the Middle East the *infami* and *vilissimi homines* eventually ousted their noble competitors.

101 THE EMERGENCE OF THE SLAVE SOLDIERS

[568] Ṭabarī, ser, iii, p. 459, cf. p. 495.

[569] Appendix V, nos. 24, 31f, 36f, 39, 41, 46, 48.

[570] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 495, 531.

[571] Appendix V, nos. 20, 22f, 26, 28–30, 32, 38, 41, 45.

[572] Chabot, *Chronique de Denys de Tell-Maḥré*, pp. 84f = 72. Note also that Manṣūr had a *Khwārizmiyya* (Khaṭīb, *Ta'rīkh*, p. 85 = Lassner, *Topography.*, p. 68; cf. Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 246 = 27).

[573] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 631; cf. Chabot, *Chronique de Denys de Tell-Maḥré*, p. 85 = 72, where Chabot's translation of *mwly'* as 'plénitude' is clearly wrong; the context indicates that an Arabic term is being reproduced, and in Chabot's second edition of Pseudo-Dionysius the word is marked with plural signs: it is certainly to be read *mawlāyē* = *mawālī* (cf. J.-B. Chabot (ed.), *Incerti auctoris Chronicon pseudo-Dionysianum vulgo dictum* (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vol. liii), Louvain 1933, p. 229).

[574] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 631; cf. above, note 469.

[575] That comes across very strongly in Mahdī's explanation of his preference for *mawālī*: they can be made to do the meanest jobs (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 531f).

[576] Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, pp. 136, 150.

[577] Lévi-Provençal, *Espagne musulmane*, vol. iii, pp. 71ff; there had been slaves already in 'Abd al-Raḥmān I's armies (cf. *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 129f), but Ḥakam was the first to enrol them in the palace guard which formed the nucleus of all the classical slave armies.

[578] Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 513 = vol. iii, p. 59. 'Ubaydallāh was governor of Egypt between 822 and 826 when he was finally dislodged by 'Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir, but the black slaves may well have been recruited by his father who distrusted the leaders of the *jund* and had a number of them disposed of (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 171).

[579] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 740, cf. Appendix V, nos. 2, 7, 9, 12, 14, 18.

[580] Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 740; Ghiṭrīf b. al-'Aṭā' was the brother of Hārūn's mother, a Yemeni slave-girl (cf. above, note 501); Manṣūr b. Yazīd b. Manṣūr was a

descendant of Manṣūr's Ḥimyarī brother-in-law (cf. Appendix V, no. 45).

581 Appendix V, no. 8.

582 Cf. Gabrieli, 'La successione di Hārūn', pp. 346ff.

583 Though typically enough by a slave-girl: there were no dynastic marriages between the caliphs and Iranian princesses.

584 Cf. the elaborate clauses in the succession document designed to avert it (Gabrieli, 'La successione di Hārūn').

585 Cf. Amīn's solemn reference to their being *ahl al-sabq ilā'l-hudā* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 931).

586 The term applied to the Syrians whom Amīn had so unsuccessfully tried to enrol (cf. Ayalon, 'The Military Reforms', pp. 18ff).

587 A Banawī denigrated Ṭāhir's forces as just that (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 829).

588 Cf. Appendix V, nos. 2, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13.

589 Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 618; cf. also Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1510.

590 Cf. Ma'mūn's sentiments in Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1068; and note the inconsequentiality of the commander who vaunts the virtues of the Abnā' in Ṭayfūr, *Kitāb Baghdād*, p. 143: they defeated the Turks, led the revolution, rebelled against Ma'mūn and later submitted to him.

591 F. Gabrieli, *al-Ma'mūn e gli 'Alidi*, Leipzig 1929, pp. 35ff.

592 The practice is well described in Minovi, *Letter of Tansar*, p. 9 = 34f.

593 Narshakhī, *Description*, p. 8 = 10.

594 *Ibid.*, p. 57 = 59, where the city in question is wrongly given as Balkh, Asad's capital.

595 L. Bouvat, *Les Barmécides*, Paris 1912, p. 32.

596 Cf. Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 478; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 206f. It is not clear, however, that Mahdī asked these rulers to convert as much as to submit.

597 Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 430f; Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 550. The throne and the crown which the Kābulshāh sent to Ma'mūn on his conversion were put on display in Mecca (Sourdel, *Viȥirat*, pp. 204f). Note also Ma'mūn's attempt to make the Qārinwandid ruler of Ṭabaristān convert so that he could call him *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn* and make him governor of Ṭabaristān, as eventually happened after Māzyār b. Qārin had lost his kingdom to rival members of his family (Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh-i Ṭabaristān*, ed. 'A. Iqbāl, n.p., n.d. [Tehran 1941], vol. i, pp. 205ff = E. G. Browne, *An Abridged Translation of the History of Ṭabaristán*, Leiden and London 1905, pp. 145ff; Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 582; cf. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 339). It also appears to have been in the time of Ma'mūn that the Khwārizmshāh adopted Islam (E. Sachau, *Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwâriȥm*, part one (Sitzungsberichte der phil.-hist. Classe der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. lxxiii), Vienna 1873, p. 32n, cf. p. 33).

598 Thus Harthama, an intermediary figure between the Abnā' and the new Khurāsānīs, and, more to the point, Faḍl and Ḥassan b. Sahl (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, *s.v.* 'al-Faḍl b. Sahl b. Zādhānfarūkh'). Faḍl was a *mawlā islām* of Ma'mūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 709).

599 Thus for example Ḥasan b. ʿAlī al-Maʾmūnī, a native of Bādghīs who became governor of Armenia; he was clearly a *mawlā* of Maʾmūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 985; Yaʿqūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 566). Similarly Kaydar Naṣr b. ʿAbdallāh al-Ushrūsanī who was governor of Egypt at the time of Maʾmūn's death and responsible for the removal of the Arabs from the *dīwān* (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 193); he was a *mawlā amīr al-muʾminīn* (A. Grohmann (ed.), *Corpus Papyrorum Raineri Archiducis Austriæ*, III, vol. i, part two, Vienna 1924, p. 145). Note also the appearance of ʿAbbās b. Bukhārkhudā among Ṭāhir's men in Iraq (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 852). Ṭāhir himself, the descendant of a *mawlā islām* of Khuzāʿa, was likewise new to caliphal service.

600 Cf. Maʾmūn's views on class structure (Kister and Plessner, 'Notes', p. 50) and on the ignominy of trade (Goitein, 'Bourgeoisie', p. 600; Goitein's attempt to explain away these statements is somewhat unconvincing).

601 Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 777.

602 Gabrieli, 'La successione di Hārūn', p. 396. Maʾmūn was both *ibn ukhtinā* and *ibn ʿamm al-nabī* to the Persians, as were the Ḥusaynids (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 774; cf. G. Le Strange and R. A. Nicholson (eds.), *The Fársnáma of Ibnuʾl-Balkhí*, London 1921, p. 4).

603 For their overwhelmingly negative reaction see Madelung, *al-Qāsim*, pp. 78f. It is not in the least unlikely that some Shīʿites were 'jubilant, though by no means won over' (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v. "ʿAlī al-Riḍā'), but it is hard to see how one can tell, inasmuch as the Shīʿite sources are all wise after the event. Yaʿqūbī is brief and dispassionate (*Historiæ*, vol. ii, pp. 545, 550f). Abū 'l-Faraj and Ibn Babūyeh are agreed that al-Riḍā had the choice between compliance and death, and Ibn Babūyeh is particularly anxious to exonerate al-Riḍā from participation in what to him was a cunning plot to taint the imams with lust for worldly power (Abūʾl-Faraj al-Iṣbahānī, *Kitāb maqātil al-Ṭālibiyyīn*, Najaf 1353, pp. 368ff; Ibn Babūyeh, *ʿUyūn akhbār al-Riḍā*, ed. M. M. Kharsān, Najaf 1970, vol. ii, pp. 137ff). The explanations advanced in justification of al-Riḍā's behaviour clearly became more extravagant in time, but there is not much trace of a view that his succession might have been a good thing: the analogies drawn in Ibn Babūyeh with Joseph's rule in Pharaonic Egypt and with ʿAlī's participation in the *shūrā* are the closest one comes to it.

604 Faḍl b. Sahl, the evil spirit behind Maʾmūn, claimed descent from the Sāsānid kings, adopted Sāsānid practices, was a *majūsī*, and wanted an ʿAlid heir in order to restore the Sāsānid monarchy (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, pp. 313, 316f; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1006; Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, *al-Fakhrī*, ed. H. Derenbourg, Paris 1895, p. 304); Maʾmūn continued the power and religion of Kisrā while the Muslims were humbled (Mottahedeh, 'The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate in Iran', p. 72); hence Yaḥyā b. ʿĀmir b. Ismāʿīl, a quintessential Banawī, greeted Maʾmūn as *amīr al-majūs* or *amīr al-kāfirīn* (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1001; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, p. 488; cf. Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, p. 318). Yaḥyā's father was Marwān II's killer; on his death Manṣūr had prayed over him and accorded him burial in the cemetery of the Hāshimites (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 46, 49ff, 390f).

[605] Gabrieli, *Ma'mūn e gli 'Alidi*, pp. 48ff.

[606] *Ibid.*, pp. 55ff. It is of course just possible that al-Riḍā died a natural death, but if so his death was very opportune; Ma'mūn did not designate another 'Alid (though some Shī'ites say he planned to, cf. Madelung, *al-Qāsim*, p. 75), and his order that the *minbar*s on which al-Riḍā's succession had been proclaimed should be washed certainly suggests that the unfortunate 'Alid had been deliberately removed (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 170). There is of course not the slightest reason to doubt that Ma'mūn was genuinely grieved.

[607] Sourdel, 'Politique religieuse', pp. 38ff. It is not quite correct that Ibn al-Aktham dissuaded Ma'mūn from having Mu'āwiya publicly cursed by pointing out that it would cause discontent in Khurāsān. The text referred to has Ibn al-Aktham say *inna'l-'āmma lā taḥtamilu dhālika siyyamā ahl Khurāsān*, which clearly means that the populace in general and the Abnā' in particular would not put up with it (*ibid.*, p. 39; compare Madelung, *al-Qāsim*, pp. 223ff).

[608] Patton, *Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*. Why did Ma'mūn choose the dogma of the created Koran? There is of course no longer any question of seeing an attempt at a compromise between Shī'ites and Sunnīs here; neither Zaydīs nor Imāmīs had adopted Mu'tazilite theology at this stage (Madelung, *al-Qāsim*; *id.*, 'Imāmism and Mu'tazilite Theology' in *Le shī'isme imāmite*, Paris 1970, as against Sourdel, 'Politique religieuse'), and the whole point of the inquisition was clearly to undermine the position of the *'ulamā'* by showing up the stupidity of the vulgar *'āmma* who were too blind to see the reality of God's religion because of their weak minds (cf. Ma'mūn's letter in Patton, *Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*, pp. 57ff). Ma'mūn's interest, then, lay in finding a theological dogma that would demonstrate this weakness of the traditionist mind; and had he chosen free will, which was really the only alternative, the traditionists would have found it far too easy to harp on the theme of divine omnipotence (free will and divine omnipotence may be compatible to theologians, but the doctrines whereby this compatibility is achieved never make simple shibboleths).

[609] Cf. Kaabi, 'Les Origines ṭāhirides', from which it emerges that the ancestors of Ṭāhir may very well have been non-Khurāsānīs, that they rose to prominence by joining the 'Abbāsid *da'wa*, and that they took their reward in the form of a hereditary governorship of Būshang and Herat, as opposed to Banawī status in Baghdad. The fact that it was *not* as Abnā' that they received their appointment to Khurāsān neatly illustrates the extent to which the *dawla* had lost its legitimating force.

[610] Ṭāhir appears as *mawlā'l-Ma'mūn* on his coins (G. C. Miles, *The Numismatic History of Rayy*, New York 1938, pp. 96ff), 'Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir is addressed as 'my brother and *mawlā*' in a poem by Ma'mūn (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 181), and Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir appears as *mawlā amīr al-mu'minīn* in a letter of Muntaṣir (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1489). Ṭāhir's use of the caliph's name in the construction of his title was doubtless an indication of the particular intimacy of his bond. The more formal version of the title was later held by the Sāmānids, the Karakhānids and the Būyids (C. E. Bosworth, 'The Titulature

of the Early Ghaznavids', *Oriens* 1962, pp. 214, 222; Madelung, 'The Assumption of the Title Shāhānshāh', p. 105). But note how even when read as caliphal vassalage, the title had too strong connotations of dependence for Mazyār and Maḥmūd to accept it without modifications (Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 277 = 81; Bosworth, 'The Early Ghaznavids' p. 218).

[611] Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbar*, pp. 375ff. Ṭāhir himself had of course also held the *shurṭa* before his appointment to Khurāsān.

[612] Cf. D. Sourdel, 'Les Circonstances de la mort de Ṭāhir Ier au Ḫurāsān en 207/822', *Arabica* 1958.

[613] The idea of the arrangement was doubtless to prevent the Ṭāhirids from losing interest in the unitary state, not just by giving them a highly honoured position at the centre, but also by selecting the Khurāsānī governors from among members of the Baghdādī branch: a similar system had been adopted for Muhallabid North Africa (Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, p. 76). In fact, however, as the caliphs ran into troubles with their Turkish slaves, the Ṭāhirids preserved their interest in the caliphate largely by inheriting what was left of it. Only Ṭāhir and ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir, Maʾmūn's adopted brother (or son according to Shābushtī), went to Khurāsān from Iraq: another two were supposed to go, but did not. But from Iraq to the eastern border it was the Ṭāhirids who maintained order, and more revenues soon went to Khurāsān than came from there (C. E. Bosworth, 'The Ṭāhirids and the Ṣaffārids' in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. iv, Cambridge 1975, pp. 94ff; Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 308 = 138).

[614] Ayalon, 'The Military Reforms', p. 24, citing Maqrīzī, *Die Kämpfe und Streitigkeiten zwischen den Banū ʿUmajja und den Banū Hāšim*, ed. G. Vos, Leiden 1888, p. 63. No early source confirms Maqrīzī's contention. It is clear that Maʾmūn received large numbers of Turkish slaves as tribute and gifts, and that some of these slaves were put to military use (H. Töllner, *Die türkischen Garden am Kalifenhof van Samarra, ihre Entstehung und Machtergreifung bis zum Kalifat al-Muʿtaḍids*, Bonn 1971, pp. 18f), but the practice was still unsystematic, and no slaves appear to have been bought.

[615] Töllner, 'Die türkischen Garden', pp. 21ff.

[616] Thus, among others, the Afshīn who had converted in the days of Maʾmūn, but was known as a *mawlā* of Muʿtaṣim (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 430f; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 398); Barzand b. al-Marzubān, a *mawlā* of Muʿtaṣim who fought under the Afshīn (Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 398); ʿAmr al-Farghānī who commanded the *abnāʾ al-mulūk* at Amorium in 223 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1246); Muḥammad b. Khālid Bukhārkhudā who fought under the Afshīn against Bābāk (*ibid.*, p. 1203; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 398); the Qārinwandids of Ṭabaristān who had converted under Maʾmūn and who are found in ʿAbbāsid service long afterwards (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 134; Yaʿqūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, pp. 605, 607; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1276, 1288, 1534, 1622, 1663f; the Bundār b. Mūsā al-Ṭabarī, *mawlā amīr al-muʾminīn* who appears on p. 1573 and elsewhere, was perhaps also one of them); cf. also Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. ii, p. 64 (the presence of these and other *abnāʾ al-mulūk*

rightly impressed Shaban, but his attempt to wish away all slaves from the 'Abbāsid armies and the Muslim world in general is somewhat farfetched).

[617] Cf. the account of his trial (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1309ff).

[618] O. S. A. Ismail, 'Mu'taṣim and the Turks', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1966, p. 17.

[619] Whenever soldiers are described as *mawālī* one may take it that they have been manumitted, and there are also stories assuming that this was normal procedure (see for example Z. M. Hassan, *Les Tulunides*, Paris 1933, p. 27). Of the Aghlabid slaves we are explicitly told that they were manumitted (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 234). There is no example of unconverted slaves in the 'Abbāsid armies.

[620] Already Dionysius of Tell-Maḥrē, as preserved in Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, pp. 536ff = vol. iii, pp. 98ff, speaks of Mu'taṣim's black and Turkish slaves ('*abdē*) at Amorium without ever calling them *mawlāyē*.

[621] Muslim names appear only in the second generation (Aḥmad b. Ṭulūn, Mūsā b. Bughā etc.); similarly in Mamlūk Egypt (D. Ayalon, 'Names, Titles and "Nisbas" of the Mamlūks', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1975, pp. 193ff).

[622] Even in the 'Abbāsid armies manumission was no condition for service, for we are explicitly told that some of the *Maghāriba* were slaves at the time of Mutawakkil's accession, and *ghilmān* are frequently mentioned (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1370, 1385, 2185, 2204 etc). Sāmānid and Ghaznavid soldiers are consistently known as *ghilmān*, and that in fact they were unfree is clear from the story of the general who wished to be manumitted before his death (C. E. Bosworth, 'Ghaznevid Military Organization', *Der Islam* 1960, p. 42). All Janissaries were the sultan's slaves and the free men who eventually usurped their position *ipso facto* acquired the same status (R. C. Repp, 'A Further Note on the *Devshirme*', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1968; H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Oxford 1950–7, part one, p. 45). It was only in Mamluk Egypt, where there was no sultan above the *mamlūks* to own them, that the slaves were systematically freed before being allowed to fight (D. Ayalon, *L'Esclavage du mamelouk* (Oriental Notes and Studies published by the Israel Oriental Society, no. 1), Jerusalem 1951, pp. 17ff).

[623] But even conversion was sometimes omitted. The Franks, Slavs and Galicians who made up the guard of Ḥakam I in Spain doubtless remained Christians, for they were commanded by the (free) Christian *comes* Rabī' b. Teodulfo, who appropriately also collected the uncanonical taxes (Lévi-Provençal, *Espagne musulmane*, vol. iii, p. 73). Ibn Abī 'Āmir also used Christian soldiers (R. Dozy, *Historie des musulmans d'Espagne*², Leiden 1932, vol. ii, p. 232), and even the zealous Almoravids ended up by importing Christian troops complete with churches and chaplains to Morocco (H. Terasse, *Histoire du Maroc*, Casablanca 1949f, vol. i, p. 248). Further east the Zīrids also made use of Christian slaves (H. R. Idris, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Zirides, Xe– XIIe siècle*, Paris 1962, p. 530). And most of the Indians in the service of Maḥmūd of Ghazna were pagans (thus the *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 355; they may

have been mercenaries, but they are more likely to have been slaves, cf. Bosworth, 'Ghaznevid Military Organization').

[624] Patton, *Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*, p. 91. The two things were the *shahāda* and the caliph's kinship with the Prophet, so that for Bughā Islam was largely *Shinto*.

[625] Cf. Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, pp. 258f = 49f. The immediate cause of Mu'taṣim's withdrawal to Samarra may well of course have been the hostility of the Baghdadi populace in general and the Abnā' in particular to the new soldiers (cf. O. S. A. Ismail, 'The Founding of a New Capital: Sāmarrā", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1968, pp. 3ff).

[626] Female emancipation consists in giving women a public status as men.

[627] As was said of al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ (D. Ayalon, 'Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon (Part II)', *Der Islam* 1977, p. 26). The comparison of the relationship between slave and master to that between father and son is, of course, quite common (see for example G. Forand, 'The Relationship of the Slave and the Client to the Master or Patron in Medieval Islam', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1971, pp. 61f).

[628] Thus Ibn Ṭūlūn and Maḥmūd of Ghazna were great zealots on behalf of the caliph. The acquisition of sovereignty of course had a similar effect: the Mamluks of Egypt, for all that they were first-generation slaves, could not afford to be as ignorant of Islam as Bughā. But zealotism was largely restricted to their sons.

[629] The tenuous position of the *awlād al-nās* between their Turkish fathers and the Egyptian society they had to join has been well described by U. Haarmann, 'Mamluks and *awlād al-nās* in the Intellectual Life of 14th Century Egypt', unpublished paper read at the Colloquium on the Islamic World after the Mongol Conquest, Oxford 1977.

[630] The Bektashi affiliation of the Ottoman Janissaries was a subculture better designed to seal them off against Muslim society at large than to draw them into it. It can be seen as a substitute for the considerable tribal and ethnic homogeneity which the Egyptian Mamluks enjoyed.

[631] Ibn Ṭūlūn imported his from Baghdad (Hassan, *Les Tulunides*, pp. 249ff); Maḥmūd of Ghazna got both his genealogy and his culture from Iran (C. E. Bosworth, 'The Development of Persian Culture under the Early Ghaznavids', *Iran* 1968); the Mamluks continued the political and cultural traditions of the Ayyūbids until the late thirteenth century A.D. when they established their identity as Turks, first on Mongol and next on Ottoman models (R. Irwin, 'Real and Fictitious Authority under the Early Mamluk Sultans', unpublished paper read at the Colloquium on the Islamic World after the Mongol Conquest, Oxford 1977; D. Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khān. A Re-examination (C¹·²)', *Studia Islamica* 1972, pp. 130ff; 1973, pp. 134f; J. M. Rogers, 'Evidence for Mamlūk–Mongol Relations 1260–1360', *Colloque International sur l'Histoire du Caire*, Gräfenhainischen n.d.; U. Haarmann, 'Alṭun Hān und Čingiz Hān bei den ägyptischen Mamluken', *Der Islam* 1974; *id.*, 'Mamluks and *awlad al-nās*'.

[632] It was because the Janissaries were just soldiers that they could not assimil-ate European warfare when it ceased to be a mere craft (cf. V. J. Parry, 'La Manière de combattre' in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London 1975, pp. 255f).

[633] Whence the Muslim stereotype of the Turk as stupid and good for nothing except warfare (Haarmann, 'Mamluks and *awlād al-nās*').

[634] Though not necessarily a more cherished one. 'Whom do I meet when I look around? Apes riding on saddles', as Ibn Landak put it (Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, vol. i, p. 152).

[635] Though they certainly came very close to doing so at times, particularly in Mamluk Egypt, where ideally they were tolerated only for such tasks as handling the disreputable firearms (D. Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom*, London 1956, pp. 63ff).

[636] They were still employed by the Qu'aytī sultans in the 1940s (D. Ingrams, *A Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in the Aden Protectorate*, Eritrea 1949, p. 52).

[637] The popularity of *mamlūks* in the Middle East thus does not rest on any intrinsic superiority of the institution (*pace* D. Ayalon, 'Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon (Part I)', *Der Islam* 1976, p. 206).

[638] It is thus difficult to explain the spread of the institution with reference to the superior qualities of the Turks, for all that Turks were clearly preferred (*pace* Ayalon, 'Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon (Part I)', p. 206).

[639] When potential slave soldiers were available in the form of Saxons and Slavs, they failed to be used: the Slavs became *mamlūks* only among the Muslims. Conversely, when the Europeans went out of their way to get slaves, the purpose was economic, and despite the intense unpopularity of military service among the colonial aristocracy in Latin America, nobody thought of enrolling the slaves. Slaves did participate (on both sides) in the Portuguese wars against the Dutch and the French in Brazil, and in the American war of independence, but their enrolment turned on the outbreak of an emergency and was usually preceded or followed by manumission (C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, Oxford 1957, p. 140; *id.*, *The Golden Age of Brazil*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969, pp. 89, 96, 101f; J. H. Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom*², New York 1964, pp. 130ff). In precisely the same way slaves had been manumitted and enrolled in times of extreme crisis in antiquity (K.-W. Welwei, *Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst, erster Teil: Athen und Sparta*, Wiesbaden 1974; Y. Garlan, *War in the Ancient World*, London 1975, pp. 78ff; I owe my knowledge of Garlan's study to Dr Th. Wiedemann). There is also at least one example from the period of the Umayyads (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1543).

[640] Thus Benedikt Churipechitz, a sixteenth-century Austrian official (J. W. Bohnstedt, 'The Infidel Scourge of God', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 1968, pp. 38f). But note that for Churipechitz imitation of the Ottomans reduces to elimination of the aristocracy: it is the fact that neither the *sipahis* nor the Janissaries are privileged aristocrats that impresses

him, not that the Janissaries are slaves. And Ivan Peresvetov, his con-
temporary, took slaves to mean serfs, so that for him the creation of an
Ottoman-style army meant the emancipation of the Russian peasantry!
(W. Phillip, *Ivan Peresvetov und seine Schriften zur Erneuerung der Moskauer
Reiches*, Berlin 1935, pp. 17ff). The centralized state which both dreamed
about eventually emerged without recourse to servile ties.

⁶⁴¹ The German *ministeriales*, the Teutonic Knights and the French Foreign
Legion are comparable to the *mamlūk* institution in terms of recruitment or
organization, though they were responses to quite different problems (cf.
above, note 567; M. A. Cook in *id.* (ed.), *A History of the Ottoman Empire to
1730*, Cambridge 1976, p. 7n). The Russian *Oprichnina* was a response to
a similar problem, but lacked the slaves (Cook, *History of the Ottoman Empire*,
p. 8).

⁶⁴² Thus also Ayalon, 'Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon (Part I)', p. 196.

⁶⁴³ The kings of Muslim Java, unlike those of Muslim Persia, had aristocracies
instead of slaves.

⁶⁴⁴ Thus the employment of female *mamlūks* in Mauryan India in the form of
Greek women purchased for armed service in the palace guard (V. Smith,
The Early History of India, Oxford 1914, p. 123) is clearly related to the alien
character of imperial state structures in pre-Aśokan India: the Mauryan
empire (*ca* 320–183 B.C.) was a state more Achaemenid than Indian in
inspiration; it was founded by a man who lived in constant fear of assassina-
tion and maintained by an elaborate security system; and the political
tradition represented by the *Arthaśāstra* is marked by a striking divorce of state-
craft from religion and morality. A ruler of the Hunnish invaders of China
in the fourth century A.D. similarly created a palace guard of 10 000 women,
all expert archers who fought on foot and on horseback; the background was
no doubt uncertainty as to ethnic allegiance, these Huns being neither
barbarians nor Chinese (Macgovern, *Early Empires of Central Asia*, p. 341;
cf. the subsequent massacre of the Hunnish subjects on p. 350). The kings
of Dahomey likewise had a formidable army of Amazons who guarded the
palace and constituted the crack troops (J. Argyle, *The Fon of Dahomey*,
Oxford 1966, pp. 63ff); and here too the problem was one of ethnicity, the
Dahomeyans having none (that surely is why the Dahomeyan state almost
swallowed Dahomeyan society). The use of slaves for military purposes is
widely attested in West Africa (cf. J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder (eds.),
History of West Africa, vol. i, London 1971, pp. 146f, 216, 280f, 396, 399,
456ff); it is invariably associated with the slave trade, and though Islam was
present in the area, it clearly was not an Islamic institution: slaves here
replace private ties in the tribal synthesis of state structures. In at least
one case, however, it is directly comparable with the Islamic institution.
In Senegal the Wolof kings preyed upon their own subjects for purposes of slave
trade with the Europeans; when citizens have to pay protection money to
avert enslavement at the hands of their own kings, the destruction of political
meaning can hardly be more total; and here the kings relied almost exclusively

on their own slaves (D. B. Cruise O'Brien, *Saints and Politicians*, Oxford 1975, pp. 25f).

[645] There is in other words no need to look for the root in pre-Islamic Arabia. That slaves participated in warfare then just as they did in recent times need not, of course, be doubted: we are explicitly told that the bedouin who martyred the monks of St Saba in A.D. 797 were accompanied by armed Ethiopians (*Acta Sanctorum*, ed. J. Bollandus *et al.*, Paris 1863–, vol. iii, p. 172 (20 March); cf. Musil, *Rwala*, p. 227). But after the conquests attitudes predictably changed (cf. above, note 272). Arming slaves was now something which individuals might do, usually for illicit purposes, but not an activity in which the state engaged until the early 'Abbāsid period, and it is not for nothing that the 'Abbāsids at first systematically freed their slaves. But the *jāhiliyya* does of course do something to explain why the Muslims should have opted for slaves rather than Amazons, for if the settled Muslims found the idea of armed slaves a repugnant one, that of armed women would certainly have been even more alien to them. (With the Dahomeyans it was apparently the other way round; there was no lack of slaves and yet it was for female armies that they opted.).

[646] For a semi-popular account see M. Grant, *Gladiators*, London 1967, pp. 25f, 93. Compare Ibn Umm al-Ḥakam who distributed arms among the freedmen of the Umayyads on the eve of the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ, Miswar b. Makhrama who armed his own freedmen on behalf of Ibn al-Zubayr, and the Basran who hired out his slaves as soldiers in the same civil war (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b., pp. 48, 54, vol. v, p. 138; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 800). Private individuals maintaining bodyguards and armed gangs of slaves on a permanent basis were another risk that all slave-owning societies ran (cf. J. Vogt, *Sklaverei und Humanität, Studien zur antiken Sklaverei und ihrer Erforschung (Historia*, Einzelschriften, vol. viii), Wiesbaden 1965, p. 28; L. B. Rout, Jr, *The African Experience in Spanish America*, Cambridge 1976, p. 78; above, note 395).

[647] There is no need to belittle the role of foreign slaves and freedmen in Mukhtār's revolt, as does Shaban (*Islamic History*, vol. i, p. 95). For one thing, his involvement with the prisoners-of-war of Kufa is superbly attested not only in the Islamic tradition, but also in a contemporary Syriac source (Bar Penkaya in Mingana, *Sources syriaques*, pp. *156ff = *183ff). For another, he was hardly the only person in the civil war to get the idea of using other people's slaves: as Mukhtār took Kufa with the help of Kufan prisoners-of-war, so Ibn Abī'l-Nims is said to have taken Damascus with those of the Damascenes (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 477; the parallel version in Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 136, however, omits the slaves, and the late version in Mas'ūdī, *Kitāb murūj al-dhahab*, ed. and tr. A. C. Barbier de Meynard and A. J.-B. Pavet de Courteille, Paris 1861–77, vol. v, p. 224 omits Ibn Abī'l-Nims). Promising freedom to slaves who would join one's cause – *man jā'anā min 'abd fa-huwa ḥurr* – was an obvious way to undermine the position of one's opponent, and like everything else it is said to have been used by the Prophet himself (Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol. ii,

p. 160); it is attested for the 'Abbāsids (above, note 428) and for the 'Alid rebel at Fakhkh (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 556); and the technique was eventually put to startling use when 'Alī b. Muḥammad raised the Zanj (A. Popovic, *La Revolte des esclaves en Iraq au IIIe/IXe siècle*, Paris 1976). It was also used in the Americas. On the outbreak of the American war of independence in 1775 Lord Dunmore, the British governor of Virginia, promised freedom to all slaves who would join His Majesty's troops (Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom*, p. 132); and in 1793 Sonthonax, the French commissioner in Haiti, similarly promised freedom to those who would take up the cause of the *République* (T. O. Ott, *The Haitian Revolution*, Knoxville 1973, p. 71; Sonthonax was an 'Alī b. Muḥammad *manqué:* the slaves had begun their revolt before he arrived and had no need of him in the long run).

11 THE EMERGENCE OF THE MEDIEVAL POLITY

[648] Cf. the caliphate of Nāṣir (A.D. 1180–1225).

[649] Merovingian *fainéance* meant Carolingian consolidation, just as 'Abbāsid *fainéance* was in due course to mean Seljuq unification.

[650] Not all the Samarran soldiers were Turks, but neither the Iranians nor the *Maghāriba* were able seriously to rival the Turks, cf. the envious observation of the *Maghāriba* that the Turks made and unmade caliphs and viziers every day (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1680f).

[651] The systematic exclusion of sons of *mamlūks* from the army is likely to have been a Mamluk innovation, but the strong tendency to heredity in the Ayyūbid armies clearly turns on the fact that slaves did not predominate in them (cf. R. S. Humphreys, 'The Emergence of the Mamluk Army', *Studia Islamica* 1977, p. 92).

[652] The importance of ethnic diversity is stressed in the 'mirrors for princes' (Bosworth, 'Ghaznevid Military Organization', p. 51).

[653] It is, however, likely that the Aghlabids committed the same beginners' mistakes as the 'Abbāsids without suffering the same fate (cf. Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, pp. 136, 150n; *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v. 'al-'Abbāsiyya').

[654] V. J. Parry in Cook, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 133ff.

[655] The restoration began with Muwaffaq's assumption of the command against the Zanj who were threatening to conquer the metropolis itself. It was in other words warfare against rebellious slaves which enabled the caliphs to regain control of their mutinous slaves.

[656] L. Massignon, 'Recherches sur les shi'ites extrémistes à Baghdad à la fin du troisième siècle de l'hégire' in his *Opera Minora*, vol. i, Beirut 1963.

[657] Sourdel, *Vizirat*, pp. 365ff. Ibn al-Mu'tazz, the adult candidate for the throne, might not have made a very forceful ruler (cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v.), but then power might have revealed unexpected talents in this poet, as it did in Julian the Apostate.

[658] Compare H. A. R. Gibb, 'Government and Islam under the Early 'Abbāsids,

the Political Collapse of Islam' in C. Cahen *et al.*, *L'Élaboration de l'Islam, Colloque de Strasbourg,* Paris 1961, pp. 122f.

[659] In this respect Iraq is on a par with Egypt. The Ṭūlūnid, Ikhshīdid, Fāṭimid and Mamluk regimes were all created, restored and toppled by armies coming from outside, whereas Syro-Mesopotamia could produce its own Ḥamdānids and Ayyūbids.

[660] H. Bowen, *The Life and Times of ʿAlī ibn ʿĪsā,* Cambridge 1928; M. Canard, *Histoire de la dynastie des H'amdânides de Jaẓira et de Syrie,* vol. i, Algiers 1951, pp. 358ff, 386ff, 409ff.

[661] When Muttaqī offered him the position of Tūzūn, the chief emir in Baghdad, he offered Muttaqī a caliphate in Fusṭāṭ (Canard, *Histoire,* p. 500). For the brief emirate of the Ḥamdānid Nāṣir al-Dawla see *ibid.*, pp. 427ff.

[662] Note also that the only evidence that Yūsuf b. Abī'l-Sāj had designs on Iraq comes from his alleged confession to being an adherent of the Fāṭimids (M. Canard, 'L'Impérialisme des Fatimides et leur propagande', *Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales de l'Université d'Alger* 1942–7, p. 177).

[663] As for example the Ṭūlūnids, Ikhshīdids, Ḥamdānids or Sājids.

[664] Such as the Khārijites, Ṣaffārids, Carmathians and Fāṭimids.

[665] R. McC. Adams, *Land Behind Baghdad,* Chicago and London 1965, ch. 8. Adams' analysis leaves no doubt as to the crucial role of the ʿAbbāsid failure to create an imperial state in the agricultural decline of Iraq. It is scarcely surprising that the Arab conquest society had a detrimental effect on agricultural production here and, presumably, elsewhere: it was in the last resort the peasantry which had to pay for the squandering of resources by Sufyānid kinsmen and Marwānid factions. But the ʿAbbāsids could have been expected to reverse this trend, partly by creating a more stable administration, and more particularly by favouring the growth of a landed aristocracy which would have been both interested in long-term investment and capable of protecting its local possessions against such outbreaks of chaos as might still occur at the centre. It was the combination of extreme instability on the part of the state and total political and economic vulnerability on the part of the countryside which made for such steep and irreversible decline. The same of course applies to the provinces: insofar as they did at all better, it was thanks to less fragile economies and/or less exposed location.

[666] There were of course a few exceptions. A scatter of local rulers still survived in northern Iran, and the local populace could still band together in the isolated province of Sīstān, first against the Khārijites and next against the governor (Madelung, 'The Minor Dynasties of Northern Iran'; Bosworth, *Sīstān under the Arabs,* ch. 5). But the Islamic heartlands were as devoid of local power structures as the medieval west was full of them.

[667] ʿUthmān b. Thumāma who took control of Qinnasrīn, Antioch and Apamea was the descendant of a highly distinguished local *sharīf* (Appendix I, no. 15), as were the members of the Bayhas family who emerged as the rulers of Damascus (Appendix III, no. 111). Similarly, no doubt, the Banū'l-Simṭ who took over in Ḥimṣ (Appendix I, no. 10). ʿAbbās b. Zufar, the ruler of Qūrus,

was the descendant of a local Marwānid general (Appendix IV, no. 54); and the same is likely to be true of Ḥabīb b. al-Jahm, who entrenched himself in Kafartūthā and Ra's 'Ayn. (Ya'qūbī, *Historiæ*, vol. ii, p. 541; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 494 = vol. iii, p. 27; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 865). Note the friendliness of both 'Uthmān and Naṣr b. Shabath, another local warlord, towards the Christians (Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, pp. 507, 513 = vol. iii, pp. 49, 60f). In Egypt the descendants of Mu'āwiya b. Hudayj al-Sakūnī, a famous conqueror and *sharīf*, likewise survived into the reign of Ma'mūn, largely as heads of the local *shurṭa*, though they also counted a governor (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 98, 101, 102, 116–18, 121, 139, 148f), but here the bid for succession typically came from 'Ubaydallāh b. al-Sarī, an imported soldier whose father had arrived in Egypt under Hārūn (*ibid.*, pp. 148, 173ff).

668 Cf. B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*², London, Oxford and New York 1968, p. 447.

669 The parallel with the *mulūk al-ṭawā'if* who ruled between Alexander and Ardashīr is explicitly drawn by Mas'ūdī in one of his moving complaints of Islamic decline (*Murūj*, vol. ii, p. 73).

670 A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, Madison and Milwaukee 1964, vol. i, pp. 307ff.

671 Bīrūnī, *Chronologie orientalischer Völker*, ed. C. E. Sachau, Leipzig 1923, p. 213 = *id.*, *The Chronology of Ancient Nations*, tr. C. E. Sachau, London 1879, pp. 196f; cf. Madelung, 'The Assumption of the Title Shāhānshāh', p. 87. Bīrūnī's account leaves no doubt that such predictions, at least as far as political restoration was concerned, were the order of the day. Note also that the Zoroastrians took the Būyid claim to the title 'King of Kings' seriously. A passage in the *Dēnkart* implores a ruler addressed in the Sāsānid style as divine majesty and King of Kings to take upon himself the traditional royal task of protecting the Zoroastrian religion from heretics and all others who do not acknowledge the Avesta, the Muslims excepted: the writer clearly envisaged the ruler in question as a sort of 'Emperor of the Two Religions' in the style of Alfonso VI (J. C. Tavadia, *Die Mittelpersische Sprache und Literatur der Zarathustrier*, Leipzig 1956, p. 62).

672 Cf. W. Madelung 'Das Imamat in der frühen ismailitischen Lehre', *Der Islam* 1961, esp. pp. 49f.

673 The negative component in the make-up of the notable is not usually stressed; there seems to be a general feeling that since the notables did enjoy local power, the fact that this power was not formally acknowledged is of no importance. But formal and informal power engender very different kinds of behaviour, as any academic should know, and if we simply put the local notables in the category of local aristocracies, gentries and patriciates on the ground that power is power wherever it occurs, we can hardly expect to bring out what was so peculiar about the organization of power in Islam: the comparison is certainly worth making, but it is the contrasts that are particularly illuminating.

674 For descendants of *ashrāf* who became *muḥhaddithūn*, *nussāb* and *rāwī*s see

Appendix I, nos. 9, 12, 20, 22, 27f, 30, 32f; for the Muhallabids who survived as notables at Bayhaq see Appendix III, no. 23; for another family of governors and generals from whom a notable family in Nīshāpūr claimed descent see *ibid.*, no. 74.

[675] Cf. I. M. Lapidus, 'Muslim Cities and Islamic Societies' in *id.* (ed.), *Middle Eastern Cities*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969, pp. 52f.

[676] The extreme care which the Ḥasanid in Nīshāpūr took to weep over 'Uthmān and 'Ā'isha is typical (R. W. Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur*, Cambridge Mass. 1972, p. 234).

[677] Abū Dulaf, the lord of Karaj who became a virtually independent ruler of Hamadhān and its surroundings in the 830s A.D., was a Shī'ite, but 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Abī Dulaf (d. 873f) ostentatiously called two of his sons Abū Bakr and 'Umar; and sure enough, Ḥasanids turn out to have arrived, bringing a fortune with which they acquired land and financed the erection of various buildings in the city; later some of them went on to Iṣfahān (B. Fragner, *Geschichte der Stadt Hamadān und ihrer Umgebung in den ersten sechs Jahrhunderten nach der Hiğra*, Vienna 1972, pp. 40f, 52f, 55f).

[678] R. Mottahedeh, 'Administration in Būyid Qazwīn' in D. S. Richards (ed.), *Islamic Civilization 950–1150*, Oxford 1973, p. 34; the 'Ijlīs at whose expense the *sayyids* rose here were members of the same Dulafid family as in Hamadhān; in both cities the *sayyids* were favoured by the Būyids, especially the Ṣāhib b. 'Abbād, and in both they had acquired immense prestige and wealth by Seljuq times.

[679] Bulliet, *Patricians of Nishapur*, p. 234.

[680] J. Aubin, 'L'Aristocratie urbaine dans l'Iran seldjukide: l'exemple de Sabzavâr' in P. Gallais and Y. J. Rion (eds.), *Mélanges offerts à René Crozet*, Poitiers 1966, vol. i, p. 326 (I owe my knowledge of this article to Mr P. Awdi).

[681] They are more common in Iran than in Arab countries, clearly because whoever is an Arab in Iran might as well be the very best sort of Arab.

[682] Cf. Mottahedeh, 'Administration in Būyid Qazwīn'; Bulliet, *Patricians of Nishapur*; similar quarrels broke out in Bukhārā after the fall of the Sāmānids (R. N. Frye, *Bukhara, the Medieval Achievement*, Norman 1965, p. 130). For the strong hereditary tendency in the office of *qaḍā'* in Seljuq times and the role of the office-holder in the local administration and defence, cf. A. K. S. Lambton, 'Quis custodiet custodes? Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government', *Studia Islamica* 1956, pp. 133f, where Niẓām al-Mulk explains that the mantle of the caliphs has devolved onto the *qāḍīs*.

[683] Cf. Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, ch. 5.

[684] A point repeatedly made by Lambton for Persia and likely to be true elsewhere (see for example A. K. S. Lambton, 'The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire' in J. A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. v, Cambridge 1968, p. 203).

[685] Cf. Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 227, note 46. For the stock image of the astrologers and the Christian physicians with whom the bad man surrounds himself, see A. K. S. Lambton, 'Islamic Mirrors for Princes', *Atti del convegno*

internazionale sul tema: la Persia nel medioevo, Rome 1971, p. 432. Compare also the combination of Jewish origin, medical training and secretarial career in Rashīd al-Dīn (D. O. Morgan, 'Cassiodorus and Rashīd al-Dīn on Barbarian Rule in Italy and Persia', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1977, p. 304).

[686] Thus the Mīkālīs of tenth-century Nīshāpūr (who served at the court of the ruler and held the *riyāsa* of Nīshāpūr before it fell to the notables) did not intermarry with the notables and traced their genealogy to the Sāsānids (Bulliet, *Patricians of Nishapur*, p. 67; Bulliet's claim that they did not pursue religious sciences is not, however, correct, cf. C. E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, Edinburgh 1963, pp. 179ff).

[687] Pace C. Cahen, 'L'Évolution de l'iqta' du IXe au XIIIe siècle', *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 1953, p. 36.

[688] Cf. A. H. Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables' in W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, Chicago 1968, p. 45.

[689] One can certainly see them as 'politicians without a polity' from the point of view of the city (Bulliet, *Patricians of Nishapur*, p. 61), provided one remembers that they were non-politicians in the polity to which they actually belonged (in this case the Seljuq state). Unlike the Italian cities, those of the Muslim Middle East had no autonomy, and unlike the Italian patricians, the Muslim notables were ruled by their *condottieri*. Their lack of accredited political status comes out well in Hourani's account of notables' behaviour as between the city, from which they drew their social standing, and the state, whose ear they wished to gain: this anxiety to steer a middle course between appearing as the instruments of authority to the former and as the enemy of authority to the latter is characteristic of men under conditions of indirect rule, not of men possessing power in their own right (Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables', p. 46).

[690] Cook in *id., History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 7f.

[691] *Ibid.*, pp. 8f.

[692] The respect for 'old families' and 'local rights' which the Būyid government, in particular the Ṣāḥib b. 'Abbād, displayed *vis-à-vis* Qazvīn suggests a real attempt to integrate the notables into the Būyid state; but it does not represent a general Islamic pattern (Mottahedeh, 'Administration in Būyid Qazwīn').

[693] Thus the notables of Nīshāpūr certainly went beyond the limit when they destroyed themselves and their city in a suicidal conflict of factions (Bulliet, *Patricians of Nishapur*, pp. 76ff), while those of Tripoli fell short of it when they took over local power, founding a successful dynasty of *qāḍīs* (*Encyclopaedia of Islam²*, s.v. 'B. 'Ammār' (first article)). In general, local politics in Fāṭimid Syria seem to have been much less entropic than they were in Seljuq Iran. Note also the contrast between Ottoman Anatolia, which appears to have been relatively free of factionalism, and Ottoman Syria and Egypt, which were full of it; the fact that the local power structure in Anatolia was an Ottoman creation, whereas those in Syria and Egypt were not, is surely relevant here.

[694] For this type of statement see Lambton, 'Quis custodiet custodes?'; *id.*, 'Islamic Mirrors for Princes'.

[695] E. M. Sartain, *Jalāl al-dīn al-Suyūṭī*, vol. i, Cambridge 1975, pp. 86ff.

[696] Cf. his claim to be a *mujtahid* and his hopes of recognition as the *mujaddid* of the century (*ibid.*, pp. 61ff).

[697] Lambton, 'Islamic Mirrors for Princes', pp. 435, 437. Ibn Jamā'a, the formulator of the most extreme doctrine of quietism, served the Egyptian ruler as happily as did Joseph (K. S. Salibi, 'The Banū Jamā'a: a Dynasty of Shāfi'ite Jurists', *Studia Islamica* 1958; cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, Cambridge 1958, pp. 43ff).

[698] Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, p. 417.

[699] E. Kohlberg, 'The Development of the Imāmī Shī'ī Doctrine of *jihād*', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 1976, p. 66; and cf. pp. 78f on the parallel suspension of *jihād* in the literal sense until the coming of the *mahdī*. In the long run this doctrine proved too uncompromising even for the Shī'ites (*ibid.*, pp. 80ff).

[700] D. Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khan. A Re-examination (C¹)', pp. 118f. The 'Abbāsid *mamlūks* by contrast had been felt to be an outrage to Islam: they were *'ulūj* who killed and installed caliphs without regard for either the Muslims or Islamic norms (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1181, 1510).

[701] Karakhānids, Seljuqs and Mongols.

[702] For example Maḥmūd of Ghazna, the sultans of Delhi and those of Mamluk Egypt.

[703] Thus the Būyids, Ḥamdānids, Ayyūbids and the Berber dynasties of Spain.

[704] See for example B. Watson, *Ssu-Ma Ch'ien, Grand Historian of China*, New York 1958, pp. 5ff; W. Wan Lo, *The Life and Thought of Yeh Shih*, Florida and Hong Kong 1974, pp. 66, 124.

[705] For Yeh Shih, for example, Heaven had allowed the Jurchen to prosper as a chastisement of the Chinese (Lo, *Yeh Shih*, p. 56).

[706] 'There is a constant principle operating both in former and present times: the barbarians with their stinking filthiness cannot permanently feel at home in China' (Lo, *Yeh Shih*, p. 59).

[707] Cf. the hopeful memorandum submitted by a Neo-Confucian on the Mongols in the full style of an Oxford term report: 'the basic character of the Mongol is solid and simple and as yet undifferentiated. He is capable of giving individual attention and effort. If placed in a suitable company of peers and allowed to develop for himself for a few years, he will inevitably become an excellent servant of the state' (J. W. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, New York and London 1973, p. 34).

[708] The fifth Jurchen emperor suspected that Sinification lay at the root of the defeat and death of his predecessor, and Qubilai wished to know whether the employment of Chinese scholars had been responsible for the fall of the Jurchen state. But the scholars themselves had no doubt that the Jurchen had fallen because of their failure to achieve complete Sinification; they had adopted the words, but not the principles of the classics which provide guidance for

state and people. And Qubilai received the answer that foreign dynasties which adopted Chinese institutions enjoyed longer rule in China than those that did not (Tao, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China*, pp. 71, 92f).

[709] See for example E. Rosenthal, *Ibn Khalduns Gedanken über den Staat*, Munich and Berlin 1932.

[710] Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa', p. 119.

[711] Cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*², *s.v.* 'Ibn Khaldūn'.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbott, N., *The Kurrah Papyri from Aphrodito in the Oriental Institute*, Chicago 1938.

Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, vols. i and ii, Chicago 1957 and 1967.

'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yaḥyā, 'Risāla fī naṣīḥat walī'l-'ahd' in M. K. 'Alī (ed.), *Rasā'il al-bulaghā'*, Cairo 1954.

Abū'l-Faraj al-Iṣbahānī, 'Alī b. Ḥusayn, *Kitāb al-aghānī*, Cairo 1927–.

Kitāb maqātil al-Ṭālibiyyīn, Najaf 1353.

Abū Nu'aym al-Iṣfahānī, *Ḥilyat al-awliyā'*, Cairo 1932–8 A.H.

Abū 'Ubayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, ed. M. K. Harās, Cairo 1968.

Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, Cairo 1352 = A. Ben Shemesh (tr.), *Taxation in Islam*, vol. iii, Leiden and London 1969.

Acta Sanctorum, ed. J. Bollandus *et al.*, Paris 1863–.

Adams, R. McC., *Land Behind Baghdad*, Chicago and London 1965.

Aghānī, see Abū'l-Faraj al-Iṣbahānī.

Ajayi, J. F. A. and M. Crowder (eds.), *History of West Africa*, vol. i, London 1971.

Akhbār al-dawlat al-'abbāsiyya wa-fīhi akhbār al-'Abbās, ed. 'A.-'A. Dūrī and 'A.-J. al-Muṭṭalibī, Beirut 1971.

al-'Alī, Ṣ. A., ''Awāna b. al-Ḥakam', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

'The Foundation of Baghdad' in A. H. Hourani and S. M. Stern (eds.), *The Islamic City*, Oxford 1970.

al-Tanẓīmāt al-ijtimā'iyya wa'l-iqtiṣādiyya fī'l-Baṣra, Beirut 1969.

Allard, M., 'Un Philosophe théologien, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-'Āmirī', *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 1975.

Anderson, P., *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, London 1974.

Argyle, J., *The Fon of Dahomey*, Oxford 1966.

Astruc, Ch. *et al.* (eds. and trs.), 'Les Sources grecques pour l'histoire des Pauliciens d'Asie Mineure', *Travaux et Mémoires* 1970.

Aubin, J., 'L'Aristocratie urbaine dans l'Iran seldjukide: l'exemple de Sabzavâr' in P. Gallais and Y.-J. Rion (eds.), *Mélanges offerts à René Crozet*, Poitiers 1966.

Ayalon, D., 'Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon (Parts I and II)', *Der Islam* 1976f.

L'Esclavage du mamelouk (Oriental Notes and Studies published by the Israel Oriental Society, no. 1), Jerusalem 1951.

'The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khan. A Re-examination (C^{1-2}), *Studia Islamica* 1972f.

Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom, London 1956.

'The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Muʿtasim, their Background and Consequences', unpublished paper read at the Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi 1964.

'Names, Titles and "Nisbas" of the Mamlūks', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1975.

'Preliminary Remarks on the *Mamlūk* Military Institution in Islam' in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, Oxford 1975.

al-Azdī, Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yazīd b. Muḥammad, *Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil*, ed. ʿA. Ḥabība, Cairo 1967.

Azmi, M. M., *Studies in Early Ḥadīth Literature*, Beirut 1968.

Bailey, H. W., *Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth-Century Books²*, Oxford 1971.

al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, vol. i, ed. M. Ḥamīdallāh, Cairo 1959; vol. iv a, ed. M. Schloessinger and M. J. Kister, Jerusalem 1971; vol. iv b, ed. M. Schloessinger, Jerusalem 1938; vol. v, ed. S. D. F. Goitein, Jerusalem 1936; vol. xi (*Anonyme arabische Chronik*), ed. W. Ahlwardt, Greifswald 1883.

Futūḥ al-buldān, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden 1866.

Barth, F., *Nomads of South Persia*, Oslo 1964.

Barthold, W. [V. V.], *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, vol. i, Leiden 1956.

Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion³, London 1968 (references are to the pagination of the original edition given in the margin).

12 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens, Berlin 1935.

Basset, R. (ed. and tr.), *Le Synaxaire arabe-jacobite (rédaction copte)* in *Patrologia Orientalis*, vol. xvi.

Beck, E. (ed. and tr.), *Des heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Sermones III* (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vols. cxxxviiif), Louvain 1972.

Becker, C. H., 'Prinzipielles zu Lammens' Sīrastudien', *Der Islam* 1913 (also published as 'Grundsätzliches zur Leben-Muhammed-Forschung' in his *Islamstudien*, Leipzig 1924–32, vol. i).

Bell, H. I. (ed.), *Greek Papyri in the British Museum*, vol. iv, London 1910.

Birkeland, H., *Old Muslim Opposition against Interpretation of the Koran*, Oslo 1955.

al-Bīrūnī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, *Chronologie orientalischer Völker*, ed. C. E. Sachau, Leipzig 1923 = *id.*, *The Chronology of Ancient Nations*, tr. C. E. Sachau, London 1879.

Bohnstedt, J. W., 'The Infidel Scourge of God', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 1968.

Bosworth, C. E., 'The Development of Persian Culture under the Early Ghaznavids', *Iran* 1968.

'Ghaznevid Military Organization', *Der Islam* 1960.

The Ghaznavids, Edinburgh 1963.

Sīstān under the Arabs, Rome 1968.

'The Ṭāhirids and the Ṣaffārids' in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. iv, Cambridge 1975.

'The Titulature of the Early Ghaznavids', *Oriens* 1962.

''Ubaidallāh b. Abī Bakra and the "Army of Destruction" in Zābulistān', *Der Islam* 1973.

Bouvat, L., *Les Barmécides*, Paris 1912.

Bowen, H., *The Life and Times of 'Alī ibn 'Īsā*, Cambridge 1928.

Boxer, C. R., *The Dutch in Brazil*, Oxford 1957.

The Golden Age of Brazil, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969.

Bräunlich, E., 'Beiträge zur Gesellschaftsordnung der arabischen Beduinen-stämme', *Islamica* 1934.

Bravmann, M. M., 'The State Archives in the Early Islamic Era', *Arabica* 1968.

Brock, S., 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor', *Analecta Bollan-diana* 1973.

Brown, P., 'The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity', *Journal of Roman Studies* 1971.

The World of Late Antiquity, London 1971.

Brunschvig, R., 'Ibn 'Abdalḥakam et la conquête de l'Afrique du Nord par les Arabes', *Annales de l'Institut des Études Orientales de l'Université d'Alger* 1942-7.

Bulliet, R. W., *The Patricians of Nishapur*, Cambridge Mass. 1972.

Burton, J., *The Collection of the Qur'ān*, Cambridge 1977.

Caetani, L., *Chronografia Islamica*, Paris 1912.

Cahen, C., 'L'Évolution de l'iqṭā' du IXe au XIIIe siècle', *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 1953.

'Fiscalité, propriété, antagonismes sociaux en Haute-Mésopotamie au temps des premiers 'Abbāsides', *Arabica* 1954.

'Histoire économico-sociale et islamologie. Le problème préjudiciel de l'adaptation entre les autochtones et l'Islam', *Colloque sur la sociologie musulmane, actes*, Brussels 1962.

'Note pour l'histoire de la ḥimāya', *Mélanges Louis Massignon*, vol. i, Damascus 1956.

'Note sur l'accueil des Chrétiens d'Orient à l'Islam', *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 1964.

'Points de vue sur la "revolution 'abbāside"', *Revue Historique* 1963.

Canard, M., *Histoire de la dynastie des H'amdânides de Jazîra et de Syrie*, vol. i, Algiers 1951.

'L'Impérialisme des Fatimides et leur propagande', *Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales de l'Université d'Alger* 1942-7.

Caskel, W., 'Aijām al-'arab', *Islamica* 1930 (Supplement).

Chabot, J.-B. (ed. and tr.), *Chronique de Denys de Tell-Maḥré* Paris 1895.

(ed.), *Incerti auctoris Chronicon pseudo-Dionysianum vulgo dictum* (CSCO,

Scriptores Syri, vol. liii), Louvain 1933.

(ed. and tr.), *Synodicon Orientale ou recueil de Synodes nestoriens* (Notices et extraits des manuscripts de la Bibliothèque Nationale, vol. xxxvii), Paris 1902.

Chaumont, M.-L., 'Recherches sur le clergé zoroastrien: le hèrbad', *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 1960.

Cole, D., *Nomads of the Nomads*, Illinois 1975.

'Continuatio Byzantia Arabica' in T. Mommsen (ed.), *Chronica Minora*, vol. ii (= Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctores Antiquissimi, vol. xi), Berlin 1894.

Cook, M. A. (ed.), *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, Cambridge 1976.

'Monotheist Sages. A Study in Muslim and Jewish Attitudes towards Oral tradition in the Early Islamic Period', unpublished typescript.

Coulson, N. J., *A History of Islamic Law*, Edinburgh, 1964.

Courant, M., *L'Asie Centrale au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, Paris 1912.

Crone, P., 'Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm', forthcoming in *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*.

'The Roman Origin of Islamic Clientage' (in preparation).

Crone, P. and M. Cook, *Hagarism, the Making of the Islamic World*, Cambridge 1977.

Dardess, J. W., *Conquerors and Confucians*, New York and London 1973.

De Goeje, M. J. (ed.), *Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum*, Leiden 1871.

Mémoire sur la conquête de la Syrie², Leiden 1900.

Delahaye, H. (ed.), 'Passio sanctorum sexaginta martyrum', *Analecta Bollandiana* 1904.

Dennett, D., *Conversion and Poll-tax in Early Islam*, Cambridge Mass. 1950.

Dīnawarī, Abū Ḥanīfa Aḥmad b. Dāwūd, *al-Akhbār al-ṭiwāl*, ed. V. Guirgass, Leiden 1888.

Dixon, 'A.-A. 'A., *The Umayyad Caliphate, 65–86/684–705*, London 1971.

Djaït, H., 'Les Yamanites à Kufa au Ier siècle de l'hégire', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 1976.

Dozy, R., *Histoire des musulmans d'Espagne²*, Leiden 1932.

Dunlop, D. M., *The History of the Jewish Khazars*, New York 1967.

Duri, A. A., 'The Iraq School of History to the Ninth Century – A Sketch' in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East*, London 1962.

Eberhard, W., *Conquerors and Rulers, Social Forces in Medieval China*, Leiden 1952.

A History of China, London 1950.

Das Toba-Reich Nordchinas, Leiden 1949.

El-Ali, S., *see* al-'Ali, Ṣ. A..

The Encyclopaedia of Islam¹, Leiden 1913–38.

The Encyclopaedia of Islam², Leiden and London 1960–.

Fairbank, J. K. (ed.), *The Chinese World Order*, Cambridge Mass. 1968.

Forand, G., 'The Relationship of the Slave and the Client to the Master or Patron in Medieval Islam', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1971.

Fragner, B., *Geschichte der Stadt Hamadān und ihrer Umgebung in den ersten sechs Jahrhunderten nach der Hiğra*, Vienna 1972.

Franklin, J. H., *From Slavery to Freedom*[2], New York 1964.

Frauwallner, E., *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, Rome 1956.

Frye, R. N., *Bukhara, the Medieval Achievement*, Norman 1965.

'The Sassanian System of Walls for Defence' in *Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet*, ed. M. Rosen-Ayalon, Jerusalem 1977.

Gabain, A. von, *Das uigurische Königsreich von Chotscho 850–1250* (Sitzungs-berichte der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin), Berlin 1961.

Gabrieli, F., *Il Califatto di Hishâm. Studi di storia omayyade*, Alexandria 1935.

al-Ma'mūn e gli 'Alidi, Leipzig 1929.

'La successione di Hārūn al-Rashīd e la guerra fra al-Amīn e al-Ma'mūn, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 1926–8.

Garlan, Y., *War in the Ancient World*, London 1975.

Gaube, H., *Arabosasanidische Numismatik*, Braunschweig 1973.

Gerhardsson, B., *Memory and Manuscript*, Uppsala 1961.

Ghevond, *Histoire des guerres et des conquêtes des Arabes en Armenie*, tr. G. V. Chahnazarian, Paris 1856.

Gibb, H. A. R., 'Government and Islam under the early 'Abbāsids, the Political Collapse of Islam' in C. Cahen *et al.*, *L'Élaboration de l'Islam, Colloque de Strasbourg*, Paris 1961.

Studies on the Civilization of Islam, London 1962.

Gibb, H. A. R. and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Oxford 1950–7.

Gil, M., 'The Constitution of Medina: a Reconsideration', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1974.

Giraud, R., *L'Empire des Turcs célestes*, Paris 1960.

Goitein, S. D., 'The Rise of the Near-Eastern Bourgeoisie in Early Islamic Times', *Journal of World History* 1956.

Studies in Islamic History and Institutions, Leiden 1968.

Goldziher, I., *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. J. Desomogyi, Hildesheim 1967–70.

Muhammedanische Studien, Halle 1889–90.

Muslim Studies, ed. S. M. Stern, London 1967–71 (references are to the pagination of the original edition given in the margin).

Grant, M., *Gladiators*, London 1967.

Grigor of Akanc', *History of the Nation of the Archers (Mongols)*, ed. and tr. R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, Cambridge Mass. 1954.

Grohmann, A., *Arabic Papyri in the Egyptian Library*, vol. iii, Cairo 1938.

Arabic Papyri from Ḥirbet el-Mird, Louvain 1963.

Corpus Papyrorum Raineri Archiducis Austriae, III, vol. i, part two, Vienna 1924.

Grousset, R., *The Empire of the Steppes*, New Brunswick 1970.

von Grunebaum, G. E., 'The Nature of Arab Unity before Islam', *Arabica* 1963.

Guest, R., 'Relations between Persia and Egypt under Islam' in *A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to E. Browne*, Cambridge 1922.

Guidi, I. *et al.* (eds. and trs.), *Chronica Minora* (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, third series, vol. iv), Louvain 1903–7.

Guillaume, A., 'The Biography of the Prophet in Recent Research', *Islamic Quarterly Review* 1954.

(tr.), *The Life of Muhammad*, Oxford 1955.

Haarmann, U., 'Alṭun Ḥān und Čingiz Ḥān bei den ägyptischen Mamluken', *Der Islam* 1974.

'Mamluks and *awlād al-nās* in the Intellectual Life of 14th Century Egypt', unpublished paper read at the Colloquium on the Islamic World after the Mongol Conquest, Oxford 1977.

Hambley, G. *et al.*, *Central Asia*, London 1969.

Hamilton, J. R., *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des cinq dynasties*, Paris 1955.

Hardy, E. R., *The Large Estates of Byzantine Egypt*, New York 1931.

Hassan, Z. M., *Les Tulunides*, Paris 1933.

Hinds, M., 'The Banners and Battle Cries of the Arabs at Ṣiffīn', *al-Abḥāth* 1971.

'Kufan Political Alignments and their Background in the Mid-Seventh Century A.D.', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1971.

'The Murder of the Caliph 'Uthmān', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1972.

Hitti, P. K., *History of Syria*, London 1951.

Hobsbawm, E. J., *Bandits*, Harmondsworth 1972.

Primitive Rebels, Manchester 1959.

Höfner, M., 'Beduinen in den vorislamischen arabischen Inschriften' in F. Gabrieli (ed.), *L'Antica società beduina*, Rome 1959.

Horovitz, J., 'Salmān al-Fārisi', *Der Islam* 1922.

Hourani, A. H., 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables' in W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, Chicago 1968.

Hudson, A. E., *Kazak Social Structure*, New Haven 1938.

Humphreys, R. S., 'The Emergence of the Mamluk Army', *Studia Islamica* 1977.

Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Abū 'Umar Yūsuf b. 'Abdallāh, *al-Inbāh 'alā qabā'i il al-rawāb*, Najaf 1966.

Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, Abū Muḥammad 'Abdallāh, *Sīrat 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz* ed. A. 'Ubayd, Cairo 1927.

Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, Abū'l-Qāsim 'Abd al-Raḥmān, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, ed. C. C. Torrey, New Haven 1922.

Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad, *Kitāb al-'iqd al-farīd*, ed. A. Amīn, A. al-Zayn and I. al-Abyārī, Cairo 1940–65.

Ibn al-'Adīm, Kamāl al-Dīn 'Umar b. Aḥmad, *Zubdat al-ḥalab min ta'rīkh Ḥalab*, ed. S. Dahān, vol. i, Damascus 1951.

Ibn 'Asākir, Abū'l-Qāsim 'Alī b. Abī Muḥammad, *Tahdhīb ta'rīkh Ibn 'Asākir*, ed. 'A.-Q. Badrān and A. 'Ubayd, Damascus 1911–32 (some of the volumes are entitled *al-ta'rīkh al-kabīr*).

Ta'rīkh madīnat Dimashq, ed. Ṣ. al-Munajjid, Damascus 1954–.

Ibn A'tham al-Kūfī, Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad, *Kitāb al-futūḥ*, Hyderabad 1968–.

Ibn al-Athīr, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad, *al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rīkh*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Leiden 1851–76.

Ibn Babūyeh, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī, *ʿUyūn akhbār al-Riḍā*, ed. M. M. al-Kharsān, Najaf 1970.

Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥammad, *Kitāb al-Muḥabbar*, ed. I. Lichtenstädter, Hyderabad 1942.

Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Aḥmad b. Nūr al-Dīn, *Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb*, Hyderabad 1325–7.

Ibn Ḥazm, ʿAlī b. Aḥmad, *Jamharat ansāb al-arab*, ed. ʿA. M. Hārūn, Cairo 1962.

Ibn Ḥibbān al-Bustī, Muḥammad, *Kitāb mashāhir ʿulamā' al-amṣār*, ed. M. Fleichhammer, Wiesbaden 1959.

Ibn ʿIdhārī al-Marākushī, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad, *Kitāb al-bayān al-mughrib*, ed. G. S. Colin and E. Lévi-Provençal, Leiden 1948–51.

Ibn Isfandiyār, Muḥammad b. Ḥasan, *Ta'rīkh-i Ṭabaristān*, ed. ʿA. Iqbāl, n.p., n.d. [Tehran 1941] = E. G. Browne (tr.), *An Abridged Translation of the History of Ṭabaristán*, Leiden and London 1905.

Ibn Isḥāq, Muḥammad, *Das Leben Muhammed's nach Muhammed Ibn Ishâk, bearbeitet von ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn Hischâm*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen 1858–60 = A. Guillaume (tr.), *The Life of Muhammad*, Oxford 1955.

Ibn al-Kalbī, Hishām b. Muḥammad, *Ğamharat an-nasab, das genealogische Werk des Hišām b. Muḥammad al-Kalbī*, translated and rearranged with a commentary by W. Caskel and G. Strenziok, Leiden 1966.

Ibn al-Nadīm, Muḥammad b. Abī Yaʿqūb, *Kitāb al-fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig 1871f = B. Dodge (tr.), *The Fihrist of al-Nadîm*, New York 1970.

Ibn Qutayba, ʿAbdallāh b. Muslim al-Dīnawarī, *Kitāb al-maʿārif*, ed. M. I. ʿA. al-Ṣāwī, Cairo 1970.

Ibn al-Qūṭiyya al-Qurṭubī, Abū Bakr b. ʿUmar, *Ta'rīkh iftitāḥ al-Andalus*, ed. ʿA. A. al-Ṭabbāʿ, n.p., n.d. [Beirut 1958].

Ibn Saʿd, Muḥammad, *al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, Beirut 1958–60.

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad, *ʿUyūn al-athar fī funūn al-maghāzī wa'l-shamā'il wa'l-siyar*, Cairo 1356.

Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī, *al-Fakhrī*, ed. H. Derenbourg, Paris 1895.

Idris, H. R., *La Berbérie orientale sous les Zirides, Xe–XIIe siècle*, Paris 1962.

Ingrams, D., *A Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in the Aden Protectorate*, Eritrea 1949.

Irons, W., 'Variation in Economic Organization: A Comparison of the Pastoral Yomut and the Basseri' in W. Irons and N. Dyson-Hudson (eds.), *Perspectives on Nomadism*, Leiden 1972.

Irwin, R., 'Real and Fictitious Authority under the Early Mamluk Sultans', unpublished paper read at the Colloquium on the Islamic World after the Mongol Conquest, Oxford 1977.

Īshōʿyahb III, *Liber Epistolarum*, ed. and tr. R. Duval (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, second series, vol. lxiv), Paris 1904f.

Ismail, O. S. A.. 'The Founding of a New Capital: Sāmarrā'', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1968.

'Muʿtaṣim and the Turks', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1966.

Ivanow, W., *The Alleged Founder of Ismailism*, Bombay 1946.

Jacob, G., *Altarabisches Beduinenleben²*, Berlin 1897.

al-Jāḥiẓ, 'Amr b. Baḥr, 'Risāla fī banī Umayya' in H. al-Sandūbī (ed.), *Rasā'il al-Jāḥiẓ*, Cairo 1933.

'Risāla fī'l-ḥakamayn', ed. C. Pellat, *al-Mashriq* 1958.

'Risāla ilā'l-Fatḥ b. Khāqān fī manāqib al-turk wa-'āmmat jund al-khilāfa' in G. Van Vloten (ed.), *Tria Opuscula*, Leiden 1903 = *id.*, 'Jahiz of Basra to al-Fath Ibn Khaqan on the "Exploits of the Turks and the Army of the Khalifate in General"', tr. C. T. H. Walker, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1915.

al-Jahshiyārī, Muḥammad b. 'Abdūs, *Kitāb al-wuzarā' wa'l-kuttāb*, ed. M. al-Saqqā', I. al-Abyārī and A. Shiblī, Cairo 1938.

Jaussen, A., *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, Paris 1948.

John of Ephesos, *Historiae Ecclesiasticae pars tertia*, ed. and tr. E. W. Brooks (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vols. livf), Louvain 1935f.

Jones, G., *A History of the Vikings*, Oxford 1973.

Jones, J. M. B., 'The Chronology of the *maghāzī* – a Textual Survey', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1957.

Jordanes, *Getica*, in T. Mommsen (ed.), *Monumenta Germaniæ Historica, auctores antiquissimi*, vol. v, Berlin 1882.

Kaabi, M., 'Les Origines ṭāhirides dans la *da'wa* 'abbāside', *Arabica* 1972.

Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, *Kitāb al-ṭabaqāt*, ed. A. Ḍ. al-'Umarī, Baghdad 1967. *Ta'rīkh*, ed. S. Zakkār, Damascus 1967f.

al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Aḥmad b. 'Alī, *Taqyīd al-'ilm*, ed. Y. al-'Ishsh, Damascus 1949.

Ta'rīkh Baghdād, Cairo 1931; partially translated by J. Lassner, *The Topography of Baghdad in the Early Middle Ages, Text and Studies*, Detroit 1970.

Khoury, R. G. (ed.), *Wahb b. Munabbih: der Heidelberger Papyrus PSR Heid. Arab. 23*, Wiesbaden 1972.

al-Khwārizmī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, *Kitāb mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, ed. G. Van Vloten, Leiden 1895.

al-Kindī, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf, *The Governors and Judges of Egypt*, ed. R. Guest, Leiden and London 1912.

Kister, M. J., 'The Battle of the Ḥarra', *Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet*, ed. M. Rosen—Ayalon, Jerusalem 1977.

'"Call Yourselves by Graceful Names. . ."', *Lectures in Memory of Professor M. Plessner*, Jerusalem A.M. 5355 [1974f].

'Ḥaddithū 'an banī isrā'īla wa-lā ḥaraja', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1972.

'On the Papyrus of Wahb b. Munabbih', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1974.

Kister, M. J. and M. Plessner, 'Notes on Caskel's Ǧamharat an-nasab', *Oriens* 1977.

Kohlberg, E., 'The Development of the Imāmī Shī'ī Doctrine of *jihād*', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 1976.

Kračkovskaya, V. A. and I. Y. Kračkovsky, 'Drevneyshiy arabskiy dokument iz Sredney Azii', *Sogdiysky Sbornik* (Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Institut Vosto-kovedeniya), Leningrad, 1934.

Krader, L., 'Ecology of Central Asian Pastoralism', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 1955.

Peoples of Central Asia, The Hague 1966.

'Principles and Structure in the Organization of the Asiatic Steppe-Pastoralists', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 1955.

Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads, The Hague 1963.

Kraemer, C. J., *Non-literary Papyri* (*Excavations at Nessana*, vol. iii), Princeton 1958.

Kychanov, E. I., *Ocherk istorii tangutskogo gosudartsva*, Moscow 1968.

Lafuente y Alcántara, E. (ed. and tr.), *Ajbar machmuâ*, Madrid 1867.

Lambton, A. K. S., 'The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire' in J. A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. v, Cambridge 1968.

'Islamic Mirrors for Princes', *Atti del convegno internazionale sul tema: la Persia nel medioevo*, Rome 1971.

'Quis custodiet custodes? Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Govern-ment', *Studia Islamica* 1956.

Lammens, H., *Le Califat de Yazīd Ier*, Beirut 1910–21.

Études sur le règne du Calife Omaiyade Mo'āwiya Ier, Paris 1908.

Fātima et les filles de Mahomet, Rome 1912.

Land, P. N. (ed.), *Anecdota Syriaca*, vol. ii, Leiden 1868.

Lanternari, V., *The Religions of the Oppressed*, London 1963.

Laoust, H., *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Batta*, Damascus 1958.

Lapidus, I. M., 'The Conversion of Egypt to Islam', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1972.

'Muslim Cities and Islamic Societies' in I. M. Lapidus (ed.), *Middle Eastern Cities*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969.

'The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1975.

Lassner, J., *The Topography of Baghdad in the Early Middle Ages, Text and Studies*, Detroit 1970.

Lattimore, O., 'Feudalism in History' (review article), *Past and Present* 1957.

'The Geography of Chingiz Khan', *Geographical Journal* 1963.

Inner Asian Frontiers of China, New York 1940.

Le Strange, G. (tr.), 'Description of the Province of Fars in Persia', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1912.

Le Strange, G. and R. A. Nicholson (eds.), *The Fársnáma of Ibnu'l-Balkhí*, London 1921.

Levi Della Vida, G., '*Sīra*', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*[1].

Lévi-Provençal, E., *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane*, Paris and Leiden 1950–3.

Levy, R., *The Social Structure of Islam*, Cambridge 1969.

Lewicki, T., 'The Ibádites in Arabia and Africa', *Journal of World History* 1971.

Lewis, B., 'An Apocalyptic Vision of Islamic History', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1950.

*The Arabs in History*³, London 1956.

*The Emergence of Modern Turkey*², London, Oxford and New York 1968.

'The Regnal Titles of the First Abbasid Caliphs' in *Dr Zakir Husain Presentation Volume*, New Delhi 1968.

Liebeschuetz, J. H. W. G., *Antioch: City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire*, Oxford 1972.

Lo, W. Wan, *The Life and Thought of Yeh Shih*, Florida and Hong Kong 1974.

Macgovern, W. M., *The Early Empires of Central Asia*, New York 1939.

Madelung, A. M. A., *The Laxdœla Saga: its Structural Patterns*, Chapel Hill 1972.

Madelung, W., 'The Assumption of the Title Shāhānshāh by the Būyids and the "Reign of Daylam (*Dawlat al-Daylam*)"', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 1969 bis.

Der Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen, Berlin 1965.

'Das Imamat in der frühen ismailitischen Lehre', *Der Islam* 1961.

'Imāmism and Mu'tazilite Theology' in *Le Shî'isme imâmite*, Paris 1970.

'The Minor Dynasties of Northern Iran' in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. iv, Cambridge 1975.

'The Sources of Ismā'īlī Law', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 1976.

Maenchen-Helfen, J. O., 'Manichaeans in Siberia' in W. J. Fischel (ed.), *Semitic and Oriental Studies, a Volume Presented to W. Popper*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951.

The World of the Huns, ed. M. Knight, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1973.

al-Maqrīzī, Taqiyy al-Dīn, *Die Kämpfe und Streitigkeiten zwischen den Banū 'Umajja und den Banū Hāšim*, ed. G. Vos, Leiden 1888.

Margoliouth, D. S., *Catalogue of Arabic Papyri in the John Rylands Library*, Manchester 1933.

Lectures on Arabic Historians, Calcutta 1930.

Massignon, L., 'Explication du plan de Basra', *Westöstliche Abhandlungen R. Tschudi*, ed. F. Meier, Wiesbaden 1954.

'Explication du plan de Kufa', *Mélanges Maspero*, Cairo 1934–40.

'Recherches sur les shi'ites extrémistes à Baghdad à la fin du troisième siècle de l'hégire' in his *Opera Minora*, Beirut 1963.

al-Mas'ūdī, 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn, *Kitāb murūj al-dhahab*, ed. and tr. A. C. Barbier de Meynard and A. J.-B. Pavet de Courteille, Paris 1861–77.

Kitāb al-tanbīh wa'l-ishrāf, ed. M. J. De Goeje (Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, vol. viii), Leiden 1894 = *id., Le Livre de l'Avertissement et de la revision*, tr. B. Carra de Vaux, Paris 1896.

Michael, F., *The Origins of Manchu Rule in China*, Baltimore 1932.

Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, ed. and tr. J.-B. Chabot, Paris 1899–1910.

Miles, G. C., *Early Arabic Glass Weights and Stamps*, New York 1948.
  Early Arabic Glass Weights and Stamps. A Supplement, New York 1951.
  The Numismatic History of Rayy, New York 1938.
  Rare Islamic Coins, London 1950.

Mingana, A. (ed. and tr.), *Sources syriaques*, Leipzig n.d. [1907].

Minovi, M. (ed.), *Tansar's Letter to Goshnasp*, Tehran 1932 = M. Boyce (tr.),
  The Letter of Tansar, Rome 1968.

Mittwoch, E., 'Muhammeds Geburt- und Todestag', *Islamica* 1926.

Molé, M., *Culte, mythe et cosmologie dans l'Iran ancien*, Paris 1963.

Monnot, G., 'Sabéens et idolatres selon 'Abd al-Jabbar', *Mélanges de l'Institut
  Dominicain d'Études Orientales du Caire* 1974.

Montet, E., 'Un Rituel d'abjuration des Musulmans dans l'église grecque',
  Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 1906.

Mordtmann, A. D., 'Zur Pehlevi-Münzkunde', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlän-
  dischen Gesellschaft* 1879.

Morgan, D. O., 'Cassiodorus and Rashīd al-Dīn on Barbarian Rule in Italy
  and Persia', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1977.

Morony, M. G., 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest on the Persian Population
  of Iraq', *Iran* 1976.
  'Landholding in Seventh Century 'Iraq', unpublished paper prepared for the
  Conference on the Economic History of the Near East, Princeton 1974.
  'Religious Communities in Late Sasanian and Early Muslim Iraq', *Journal of
  the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 1974.

Moscati, S., 'Le Massacre des Umayyades dans l'histoire et dans les fragments
  poétiques', *Archiv Orientální* 1950.

Mottahedeh, R., 'The 'Abbāsid Caliphate in Iran' in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The
  Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. iv, Cambridge 1975.
  'Administration in Būyid Qazwīn' in D. S. Richards (ed.), *Islamic Civilization
  950–1150*, Oxford 1973.

Movsēs Dasxurançi, *The History of the Caucasian Albanians*, tr. C. J. F.
  Dowsett, London 1961.

al-Mubarrad, Muḥammad b. Yazīd, *al-Kāmil*, ed. W. Wright, Leipzig 1864–92.

Musil, A., *The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins*, New York 1928.

Nagel, T., 'Ein früher Bericht über den Aufstand des Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh
  im Jahre 145 h', *Der Islam* 1970.

al-Najāshī, Aḥmad b. 'Alī, *Kitāb al-rijāl*, Bombay 1317 (lithograph).

al-Narshakhī, Muḥammad b. Ja'far, *Description de Boukhara*, ed. C. Schefer,
  Paris 1892 = id., *The History of Bukhara*, tr. R. N. Frye, Cambridge Mass.
  1954.

Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, *Waq'at Ṣiffīn*, ed. 'A. M. Hārūn, Cairo 1946.

al-Nawbakhtī, Ḥasan b. Mūsā, *Kitāb firaq al-shī'a*, ed. H. Ritter, Istanbul 1931.

Nöldeke, Th. (ed. and tr.), 'Zur Geschichte der Araber im 1. Jahr. d. H. aus
  syrischen Quellen', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*
  1875.

Noth, A., 'Der Charakter der ersten grossen Sammlungen von Nachrichten zur frühen Kalifenzeit', *Der Islam* 1971.

'Iṣfahān-Nihāwand. Eine quellenkritische Studie zur frühislamischen Historiographie', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 1968.

Quellenkritische Studien ẓu Themen, Formen und Tendenẓen frühislamischer Geschichtsüberlieferung, Bonn 1973.

Nuʿaym b. Ḥammād, *Kitāb al-fitan*, British Museum Or. no. 9449.

O'Brien, D. B. Cruise, *Saints and Politicians*, Oxford 1975.

Olgeirsson, E., *Fra Æettesamfunn til Klassestat*, Oslo 1968.

Olinder, G., *The Kings of Kinda*, Lund 1927.

Omar, F., *The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate*, Baghdad 1969.

Oppenheim, M. Freiherr von, *Die Beduinen*, vol. i, Leipzig 1939.

Ott, T. O., *The Haitian Revolution*, Knoxville 1973.

Paret, R., 'Die Lücke in der Überlieferung über den Islam', *Westöstliche Abhandlungen Rudolf Tschudi*, ed. F. Meier, Wiesbaden 1954.

Parry, V. J., 'La Manière de combattre' in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London 1975.

Patai, R., 'Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 1951.

Patrologia Orientalis, ed. R. Graffin and F. Nau, Paris 1903-.

Patton, W. M., *Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*, Leiden 1897.

Pellat, C. (ed. and tr.), *Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, 'Conseilleur' du Calife*, Paris 1976.

(tr.), *Le Livre de la couronne attribué à Gāḥiẓ*, Paris 1954.

Le Milieu baṣrien et la formation de Gāḥiẓ, Paris 1953.

'La "Nâbita" de Djâḥiẓ', *Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales de l'Université d'Alger* 1952.

Pelliot, P. (ed. and tr.), *Histoire secrète des Mongols*, Paris 1949.

Petersen, E. L., *ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya in Early Arabic Tradition*, Copenhagen 1964.

Phillip, W., *Ivan Peresvetov und seine Schriften ẓur Erneuerung des Moskauer Reiches*, Berlin 1935.

Pines, S., 'A Note on an Early Meaning of the Term *Mutakallim*', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1971.

Poole, S. L., *A Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum*, ed. R. S. Poole, vol. i, London 1875.

Popovic, A., *La Revolte des esclaves en Iraq au IIIe/IXe siècle*, Paris 1976.

Poucha, P., 'Rang und Titel bei den Völkern des mongolischen Raumes im Laufe der Jahrhunderte', *Proceedings of the IXth Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference*, Naples 1970.

Rachewiltz, I. de, 'Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189–1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman' in A. F. Wright and D. Twitchett (eds.), *Confucian Personalities*, Stanford 1962.

Raddatz, H.-P., 'Frühislamisches Erbrecht nach dem Kitāb al-farāʾiḍ des Sufyān aṯ-Ṯaurī', *Die Welt des Islams* 1971.

Die Stellung und Bedeutung des Sufyān aṯ-Ṯaurī, Bonn 1967.

284   *Bibliography*

Raswan, C., *The Black Tents of Arabia*, London 1935.

Repp, R. C., 'A Further Note on the *Devshirme*', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1968.

Richter, G., *Das Geschichtsbild der arabischen Historiker des Mittelalters* (Philosophie und Geshichte, vol. xliii), Tübingen 1933.

Robertson Smith, W., *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia²*, London 1903.

Rodinson, M., *Mohammed*, London 1971.

Rogers, J. M., 'Evidence for Mamlūk–Mongol Relations 1260–1360', *Colloque International sur l'Histoire du Caire*, Gräfenhainischen n.d.

Rosenthal, E. I. J., *Ibn Khalduns Gedanken über den Staat*, Munich and Berlin 1932.

Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Cambridge 1958.

Rosenthal, F., *A History of Muslim Historiography*, Leiden 1952.

Rostovtzeff, M., *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*, Oxford 1922.

Rotter, G., 'Abū Zur'a ad-Dimašqī (st. 281/894) und das Problem der frühen arabischen Geschichtsschreibung in Syrien', *Die Welt des Orients* 1970–1.

Rout, L. B., Jr, *The African Experience in Spanish America*, Cambridge 1976.

Rowley, H. H. (ed.), *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, Oxford 1951.

Rubin, U., 'Pre-existence and Light', *Israel Oriental Studies* 1975.

Rudenko, S. I., *Frozen Tombs of Siberia*, London 1970.

Die Kultur der Hsiung-Nu und die Hügelgräber von Noin Ula, Bonn 1969.

Sachau, E. (ed. and tr.), *Syrische Rechtsbücher*, Berlin 1907–14.

Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwârizm, part one (Sitzungsberichte der phil.-hist. Classe der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. lxxiii), Vienna 1873.

Sadighi, G. H., *Les Mouvements religieux iraniens au IIe et au IIIe siècles de l'hégire*, Paris 1938.

al-Ṣafadī, Khalīl b. Aybak, *Umarā' Dimashq fi'l-Islām*, ed. Ṣ. al-Munajjid, Damascus 1955.

Sahas, D. J., *John of Damascus on Islam*, Leiden 1972.

Salibi, K. S., 'The Banū Jamā'a: a Dynasty of Shāfi'ite Jurists', *Studia Islamica* 1958.

Samolin, W., *East Turkestan to the Twelfth Century*, The Hague 1964.

al-Sarakhsī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, *Kitāb al-mabsūṭ*, Cairo 1324–31.

Sartain, E. M., *Jalāl al-dīn al-Suyūṭī*, vol. i, Cambridge 1975.

Saunders, J. J., 'The Nomad as Empire Builder: a Comparison of the Arab and Mongol Conquests', *Diogenes* 1965.

Scarcia, G., 'Lo scambio di lettere fra Hārūn al-Rashīd e Ḥamza al-Khārigī secondo il "Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān"', *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli* 1964.

Schacht, J., *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, Oxford 1964.

'The Kitāb al-Tārīḫ of Ḫalīfa b. Ḫayyāṭ, *Arabica* 1969.

'On Mūsā b. 'Uqba's Kitāb al-Maghāzī', *Acta Orientalia* (Copenhagen) 1949.

The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Oxford 1950.

'A Revaluation of Islamic Traditions', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1949.

Scher, A. (ed. and tr.), *Histoire nestorienne*, part two, in *Patrologia Orientalis*, vol. xiii.

Sebeos, *Histoire d'Héraclius*, tr. F. Macler, Paris 1904.

Sellheim, R., 'Prophet, Chalif und Geschichte. Die Muhammed-Biographie des Ibn Ishāq', *Oriens* 1967.

Serjeant, R. B., 'The "Constitution of Medina",' *Islamic Quarterly* 1964.

'Haram and Hawtah, the Sacred Enclave in Arabia', *Mélanges Taha Husain*, ed. A. Badawī, Cairo 1962.

Severus b. al-Muqaffa', *History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria*, ed. and tr. B. Evetts in *Patrologia Orientalis*, vols. i, v.

Sezgin, F., *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*, vol. i, Leiden 1967.

Sezgin, U., *Abū Miḥnaf*, Leiden 1971.

Shaban, M. A., *The 'Abbāsid Revolution*, Cambridge 1970.

Islamic History, a New Interpretation, Cambridge 1971–6.

Shāfiʿī, Muhammad b. Idrīs, *Kitāb al-umm*, Būlāq 1321–5 A.H.

Sharon, M., 'An Arabic Inscription from the Time of the Caliph 'Abd al-Malik', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1966.

Sinor, D., 'Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History', *Oriens Extremus* 1972.

Smith, S., 'Events in Arabia in the 6th Century A.D.', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1954.

Smith, V., *The Early History of India*, Oxford 1914.

Sourdel, D., 'Les Circonstances de la mort de Ṭāhir Ier au Ḥurāsān en 207/822', *Arabica* 1958.

'La Politique religieuse du calife 'Abbâside al-Ma'mûn', *Revue des Études Islamiques* 1963.

'Questions de cérémonial 'abbaside', *Revue des Études Islamiques* 1960.

Le Vizirat 'abbâside de 749 à 936, Damascus 1959f.

Sprenger, A. (ed.), *Túsy's List of Shy'ah Books*, Calcutta 1853.

Spuler, B., *Die Goldene Horde*, Leipzig 1943.

'Der Verlauf der Islamisierung Persiens. Eine Skizze', *Der Islam* 1948.

Stern, S. M., 'Abu'l-Qāsim al-Bustī and his Refutation of Ismāʿīlism', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1961.

Sulimirski, T., *The Sarmatians*, London 1970.

Sveinsson, E. O., *The Age of the Sturlungs*, Ithaca 1953.

Sweet, L. E., 'Camel Pastoralism in North Arabia and the Minimal Camping Unit' in A. P. Vayda (ed.), *Environment and Cultural Behaviour*, Austin and London 1969.

Swidler, W. W., 'Some Demographic Factors Regulating the Formation of Flocks and Camps among the Brahui of Baluchistan' in W. Irons and N. Dyson-Hudson (eds.), *Perspectives on Nomadism*, Leiden 1972.

Ṭabarī, Muhammad b. Jarīr, *Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa'l-mulūk*, ed. M. J. De Goeje et al., Leiden 1879–1901.

Talbi, M., *L'Emirat Aghlabide 184–296/800–909: Histoire politique*, Paris 1966.

Tao, Jing-shen, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China*, Seattle and London 1976.

Tārīkh-i Sīstān, ed. M. Sh. Bahār, Tehran 1314.

Tavadia, J. C., *Die Mittelpersische Sprache und Literatur der Zarathustrier*, Leipzig 1956.

Ṭayfūr, Aḥmad b. Abī Ṭāhir, *Kitāb Baghdād*, ed. H. Keller, Leipzig 1908.

Terasse, H., *Histoire du Maroc*, Casablanca 1949f.

Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. C. De Boor, Leipzig 1883–5.

Thompson, E. A., *The Early Germans*, Oxford 1965.

Thomsen, V., *Inscriptions de l'Orkhon déchiffrées*, Helsingfors 1896.

Töllner, H., *Die türkischen Garden am Kalifenhof von Samarra, ihre Entstehung und Machtergreifung bis zum Kalifat al-Muʿtaḍids*, Bonn 1971.

Travers Herford, R., *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, Edinburgh 1903.

Treggiari, S., *Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic*, Oxford 1969.

Tucker, W., 'Abū Manṣūr al-ʿIjlī and the Manṣūriyya: a Study in Medieval Terrorism', *Der Islam* 1977.

    'Rebels and Gnostics: al-Mugīra ibn Saʿīd and the Mugīriyya', *Arabica* 1975.

Turan, O., 'The Idea of World Domination among the Medieval Turks', *Studia Islamica* 1955.

Tyan, E., *Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en pays d'Islam*, Paris and Beirut 1938–43.

    Institutions du droit public musulman, vol. i (*Le Califat*), Paris 1954.

Vajda, G., 'Les Zindiqs en pays d'Islam au debut de la periode abbaside', *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 1938.

Van Arendonk, C., *Les Débuts de l'imāmat zaidite au Yemen*, Leiden 1960 (the references are to the pagination of the original edition given in the margin).

Van Ess, J., *Anfänge muslimischer Theologie*, Beirut 1977.

    'The Beginnings of Islamic Theology' in J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds.), *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, Dordrecht and Boston 1975.

    Frühe muʿtazilitische Häresiographie, Beirut 1971.

    'Les Qadarites et la Gailāniya de Yazīd III', *Studia Islamica* 1970.

    'Untersuchungen zu einigen ibāditischen Handschriften', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 1976.

    Zwischen Ḥadīt und Theologie, Berlin and New York 1975.

Van Vloten, G., 'Zur Abbasidengeschichte', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 1898.

Van den Wyngaert, A., *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. i, Karachi 1929.

Vasiliev, A. A., *The Goths in the Crimea*, Cambridge Mass. 1936.

    History of the Byzantine Empire, Madison and Milwaukee 1964.

Vernadsky, G., *Ancient Russia*, New Haven 1943.

Vladimirtsov, B. Ya., *The Life of Chingiz Khan*, London 1930.

    Le Régime social des Mongols, Paris 1948.

Voegelin, E., 'The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245 – 1255', *Byẓantion* 1940f.

Vogt, J., *Sklaverei und Humanität, Studien ẓur antiken Sklaverei und ihrer Erforschung* (*Historia*, Einzelschriften, vol. viii), Wiesbaden 1965.

Wakī', Muḥammad b. Khalaf, *Akhbār al-quḍāh*, ed. 'A. M. al-Marāghī, Cairo 1947–50.

Waley, A. (tr.), *The Secret History of the Mongols*, London 1963.

Walker, J., *A Catalogue of the Arab-Byẓantine and Post-Reform Umaiyad Coins*, London 1956.

Wallace-Hadrill, J. M., *The Long-Haired Kings and Other Studies in Frankish History*, London 1962.

Wansbrough, J., *Quranic Studies*, Oxford 1977.

Wāqidī, Muḥammad b. 'Umar, *Kitāb al-maghāẓī*, ed. M. Jones, Oxford 1966.

Watson, B., *Ssu-Ma Ch'ien, Grand Historian of China*, New York 1958.

Watt, W. M., 'The Materials used by Ibn Isḥāq' in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East*, London 1962.

Muhammad at Mecca, Oxford 1953.

Muhammad at Medina, Oxford 1956.

Wellhausen, J., *The Arab Kingdom and its Fall*, Calcutta 1927.

'Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams' in his *Skiẓẓen und Vorarbeiten*, vol. vi, Berlin 1899.

Prolegomena ẓur ältesten Geschichte Israels, Berlin 1883.

Welwei, K.-W., *Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst, erster Teil: Athen und Sparta*, Wiesbaden 1974.

Wensinck, A. J., *Muhammad and the Jews of Medina*, Freiburg 1975.

Wilkinson, J. C., 'Arab Settlement in Oman: the Origins and Development of the Tribal Pattern and its Relationship to the Imamate', Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1969.

Wittfogel, K. A. and C.-S. Fêng, *History of Chinese Society, Liao (907–1125)*, Philadelphia 1949.

al-Ya'qūbī, Aḥmad b. Abī Ya'qūb, *Historiae*, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, Leiden 1883.

Kitāb al-buldān, ed. A. W. T. Juynboll (Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, vol. vii), Leiden 1892 = *id., Les Pays*, tr. G. Wiet, Cairo 1937.

Yāqūt, Abū 'Abdallāh b. 'Abdallāh, *Irshād al-arīb ilā ma'rifat al-adīb*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, London 1923–31.

Jacut's geographisches Wörterbuch, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Leipzig 1866–73.

Zambaur, E. von, *Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam*, Hanover 1927.

Zulueta, F. de, 'De Patrociniis Vicorum' in P. Vinogradoff (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History*, vol. i, Oxford 1909.

GENERAL INDEX

PROSOPOGRAPHICAL INDEX

This index contains only Arabic personal names (and Arabicized ones such as Māhān); it includes all such names regardless of whether the person is of prosopographical or other interest (e.g. ʿAlī, Muʿtaṣim). Numbers in italics refer to the notes.

Rabi' b. 'Abdallāh al-Hārithī, 149, *497f*, 501

Rabi' b. 'Imrān al-Tamīmī, 114

Rabi' b. Yūnus, 193f

Rabi' b. Ziyād al-Hārithī, 141

Rabi'a b. 'Āṣim al-'Uqaylī, 106

Rāfi' b. Layth, 71, 72, 77

Rajā' b. Salāma b. Rawḥ, 101

Rāshid b. Jurw al-Qaynī, 96f

Rawḥ b. Hātim b. Qabīṣa, 134

Rawḥ b. Muqbil, 160

Rawḥ [b. ?] b. Rawḥ b. Zanbā', 100f, 134

Rawḥ b. Zanbā' al-Judhāmī, 34f, 99f

Rayṭa bint 'Ubaydallāh, 149, 176

Ribi'ī b. 'Āmir al-Riyāḥī, 118

Rib'ī b. Hāshim al-Hārithī, 160

Riḍā, 'Alī al-, [76f], *603f, 606*

Rifā'a b. Thābit al-Judhāmī, 159

Rumāḥis b. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Kinānī, 170f

Ruwaym b. 'Abdallāh al-Shaybānī, 119

Ruwaym b. al-Hārith al-Shaybānī, 119

Ṣabbāḥ b. Muḥammad al-Kindī, 110

Sa'd, 194

Sa'īd b. 'Abd al-Malik, 129

Sa'īd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Harashī, 145

Sa'īd b. Aḥmad al-Bāhilī, 138

Sa'īd b. 'Amr al-Harashī, 144

Sa'īd b. Aslam al-Kilābī, 138

Sa'īd al-Harashī, 144f

Sa'īd b. al-Hasan b. Qaḥṭaba, 188

Sa'īd b. Hassān al-Usaydī, 138

Sa'īd b. Mālik b. Baḥdal, 94

Sa'īd b. Qays al-Hamdānī, 119

Sa'īd b. Rawḥ al-Judhāmī, 100

Sa'īd b. Salm b. Qutayba, 107, 137

Sa'īd b. Tasnīm al-'Atakī, 121

Sa'īd b. 'Uthmān b. 'Affān, *230*

Sa'īd b. Yazīd al-Azdī, *233*

Salāma b. Zanbā' al-Judhāmī, 100

Ṣāliḥ b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, *323*

Ṣāliḥ b. Bayhas al-Kilābī, 151

Ṣāliḥ b. al-Haytham, 194

Sālim al-Barallusī, 194

Sallām, 194

Salm b. Qutayba al-Bāhilī, 137

Salm b. Ziyād [b. Abīhi], *230, 239*

Sāmānkhudā, 76, *421*

Samharī b. Qa'nab al-Riyāḥī, 113

Samura b. Jundub al-Fazārī, *235*

Ṣaqr/Ṣafar b. Habīb al-Murrī, 171

Ṣaqr b. Ṣafwān al-Kalā'ī, 95

Sarī b. 'Abdallāh b. 'Āṣim, 117f

Sarī b. Ziyād [b. Abī Kabsha], 96

Sarjūn b. Manṣūr, *358, 362*

Sayf b. 'Umar, 9, 10

Sayyāl b. al-Mundhir al-Shaybānī, 145

Shabath b. Rib'ī al-Riyāḥī, 118

Shabīb b. Abī Mālik al-Ghassānī, 160f

Shabīb b. Humayd b. Qaḥṭaba, 189

Shabīb the Khārijite, 8

Shaqīq b. Thawr al-Sadūsī, 113, 116, 120

Sharaḥīl b. Ma'n al-Shaybānī, 169

Sharīk al-Mahrī, 69

Shaybān b. Zuhayr al-Sadūsī, 121

Shihāb b. al-Husayn al-Hārithī, 111

Shihāb b. Khirāsh al-Shaybānī, 119

Shu'ayb b. Khāzim b. Khuzayma, 181

Shuraḥbīl b. Dhī'l-Kalā', 95

Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, 101

Silsila b. al-Husayn al-Kindī, 153

Simṭ b. al-Aswad al-Kindī, 101

Simṭ b. Thābit b. Yazīd, 101

Sinān b. Salama al-Hudhalī, 138f

Sindī b. Shāhak, 194f

Sindī b. Yaḥyā al-Harashī, 145

Si'r b. 'Abdallāh al-Murrī, 145

Sufayḥ b. 'Amr al-Taghlabī, 168

Sufyān b. 'Abdallāh/'Umayr al-Kindī, 142

Sufyān b. al-Abrad al-Kalbī, 132, *260*

Sufyān b. Mu'āwiya b. Yazīd, 134

Sufyān b. Salāma b. Sulaym, 139

Sufyān b. Sulaym al-Azdī(?), 139

Sufyān b. Sulaymān al-Azdī, 139

Suhaym b. al-Muhājir, 136, 198

Sulaym b. Kaysān, 139

Sulaymān b. 'Abdallāh b. Dihya, 156

Sulaymān b. 'Abdallāh al-'Uqaylī, 171

Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Malik (A.D. 715–17), 45, 125, 126

Sulaymān b. 'Amr al-Muqri', 148

Sulaymān b. Ghālib b. Jibrīl, 180

Sulaymān b. Habīb b. al-Muhallab, 133, 163f

Sulaymān b. Hishām, 53

Sulaymān the Magnificent, 83

Sulaymān b. Sulaym al-Kalbī, 139

Sulaymān b. Yaḥyā b. Mu'ādh, 184

Suwayd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Minqarī, 139

Suwayd al-Murrī, 145

Ṣuyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn, al-, 88

Tāhir [b. al-Husayn], 75, 78, *599, 610*

Ṭalḥa b. Isḥāq al-Kindī, 111

Ṭalḥa b. Sa'īd al-Juhanī, 139

Tamīm b. al-Hubāb al-Sulamī, 108

Tamīm b. Zayd al-Qaynī, 148, *237*

Ṭarīf, 195

Ṭāriq b. Qudāma al-Qasrī/Qushayrī, 171