—If you could have (more) children in coming years how many children would you want to have altogether (counting those you have now)?

India: How many children make an ideal-sized family?

Korea: What could be an ideal number of children, if you could control the number as you wish?

Puerto Rico: Supposing you were about to get married again for the first time. How many children would you want to have?

Jamaica: If you could live your life over, how many children would you like to have?

Lebanon: Suppose you have a very close friend, in the same circumstances as yourself, and she asked you for advice on the convenient number of children for her. What is the number of children you would advise her to have, if she could?

The importance of a careful selection of survey questions in studies of reproductive desires is illustrated by two surveys carried out in the United States in 1955 and 1960. Four slightly different questions generated different responses (Whelpton, Campbell, and Patterson* 1966):

The number of children ideal for the average American family	3.4–3.5
The number individually desired if life could be relived under ideal circumstances	3.6–3.7
The number wanted under actual and anticipated circumstances	3.1–3.4
The number actually expected	2.8–3.5

It might be expected that the same questions would produce even more varied responses in countries where infant mortality is high and birth-control methods uncertain.

A summary of desired family size surveys is shown in Figure 2-67. The numbers shown may be biased slightly downward because respondents with no expressed numerical preference (''as many as God sends'') were not counted in most surveys. All the average desired family sizes in Figure 2-67 are moderate: none are below 2 or above 6. The only obvious trend is that the desired family size is generally lower in industrialized countries than in nonindustrialized areas.

Figure 2-68 illustrates the relationship between industrialization and family size goals more quantitatively. The percentage of respondents in each country indicating that they would like 4 or more children (from Figure 2-67) is plotted against the GNP per capita in that country. Again, an inverse relationship between industrialization and family-size goals is seen, especially below a GNP value of 500 dollars per capita. Illustrations of the inverse relationship between income and *actual* fertility are given in Figures 2-8, 2-11, and 2-69.

Because it is not certain whether the stated family size goals listed in Figure 2-67 represent individual or societal goals, with or without mortality compensation, the conclusions to be drawn from the data are qualitative at best; families in all areas seem to want only a moderate number of children, and that number seems to be lower in industrialized populations than in nonindustrialized populations. That is a rather

*A more recent U.S. national fertility survey shows less variation in answers to questions on ideal, actual, and intended family size (Ryder and Westoff 1971).

tenuous empirical base upon which to rest a hypothesis about changing social family-size norms, especially since other contributing factors, such as fertility control effectiveness and infant mortality, also change with industrialization. However, it is possible to add to the direct empirical evidence considerable indirect evidence, social theory, and common experience, all of which underscore the observation that industrial development leads to profound changes in the pressures, rewards, values, and sanctions that each family responds to in its reproductive decisions. This entire spectrum of social pressures and inducements regarding childbearing is represented by the variable we call social family size norm SFSN. It includes such varied factors as taxes based on family size, representations of families in school textbooks, statements by community or religious leaders, and the nature of the subtle everyday comments directed at couples with no children, three children, or ten children.

> The assumption is that family size norms will tend to correspond to a number which maximizes the net utility to be derived from having children in that society. Obviously, different aspects of the society may exert opposing pressures on the norms, as a balance must be struck. Therefore, we must look for important aspects of the social organization which support the norms of family size by providing explicit or implicit social rewards or penalties depending on the number of children. [Freedman 1963]

The first causal theory of the change in social family size norm that accompanies industrialization was put forward by Leibenstein (1957) and later developed by Spengler (1966) and Lorimer (1967). This theory, in its most general form, states that the potential benefits awarded by society for having children tend to decrease in the process of industrialization, while the costs imposed by the system for having and raising children increase.

In this theory both the benefits and the costs of childbearing are interpreted very broadly. For example, in a nonindustrialized society, children represent not only the economic benefits of a labor force for the family enterprise and a security for old age but also an important source of prestige and pleasure for which no substitutes are available. Children may be necessary for the fulfillment of religious duties and for the full acceptance of the parents as mature participating members of the community. As a society develops economically, however, many (but by no means all) of the social benefits of children are replaced by institutions independent of the family. Insurance or social security arrangements provide for old age, prestige is gained by material as well as reproductive means, a supply of labor outside the immediate family can be obtained, and child labor is discouraged. The necessity for division of labor, mobility, and urban living breaks up the kinship-extended-family ties and results in nuclear families that depend on organizations outside the family for both economic and social interchange.

At the same time that relative benefits decline, childbearing costs increase in an industrialized society. For example, children must be educated; thus they remain economically dependent longer, even if education is free. Social approval is gained not so much by raising many children but by raising some children ''well.'' Medical care, clothing, food, and housing standards are much higher in an industrialized