

Web App Security

Basic Auth

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Practical Study :
Using No Code / Low Code

Java SpringBoot Security

StringInitializr [1/4]

Setup project: <https://start.spring.io/>

The screenshot shows the Spring Initializr web application at <https://start.spring.io/>. The interface is divided into several sections:

- Project**: Options for **Gradle - Groovy** (selected), **Gradle - Kotlin**, and **Maven**.
- Language**: Options for **Java** (selected), **Kotlin**, and **Groovy**.
- Spring Boot**: Options for **3.3.0 (SNAPSHOT)**, **3.3.0 (M1)**, **3.2.4 (SNAPSHOT)**, **3.2.3** (selected), **3.1.10 (SNAPSHOT)**, and **3.1.9**.
- Dependencies**: A section with a button labeled **ADD DEPENDENCIES... CTRL + B**. It displays the message *No dependency selected*.
- Project Metadata**: Fields for **Group** (com.example), **Artifact** (demo), **Name** (demo), **Description** (Demo project for Spring Boot), and **Package name** (com.example.demo).
- Buttons at the bottom**: **GENERATE CTRL + ↵**, **EXPLORE CTRL + SPACE**, and **SHARE...**.

SpringInitializr [2/4]

Change to Maven

Enter Dependencies: Web, Security

Click "Generate" (Download zip)

Dependencies

[ADD DEPENDENCIES... CTRL + B](#)

Spring Web WEB

Build web, including RESTful, applications using Spring MVC. Uses Apache Tomcat as the default embedded container.

Spring Security SECURITY

Highly customizable authentication and access-control framework for Spring applications.

SpringInitializr [3/4]

Compile & Launch Web Server

The screenshot shows the IntelliJ IDEA interface with the following details:

- Project Structure:** The project is named "demo-springboot-security". The "src" directory contains "main" and "test" packages. "main" has a "java" folder containing "com.example.demo" which holds the "DemoApplication.java" file.
- Code Editor:** The "DemoApplication.java" file is open, showing the main class definition:

```
package com.example.demo;  
import ...  
@SpringBootApplication  
public class DemoApplication {  
    public static void main(String[] args) { SpringApplication.run(DemoApplication.class, args); }  
}
```

- Java Output Console:** Shows the application's startup logs:

```
2024-02-25T12:58:26.801+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [           main] o.apache.catalina.core.StandardService : Starting service [Tomcat]  
2024-02-25T12:58:26.801+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [           main] o.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngine : Starting Servlet engine: [Apache Tomcat/10.1.19]  
2024-02-25T12:58:26.847+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [          main] o.a.c.c.C.[Tomcat].[localhost].[/] : Initializing Spring embedded WebApplicationContext  
2024-02-25T12:58:26.848+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [          main] w.s.c.ServletWebServerApplicationContext : Root WebApplicationContext: initialization completed in 977 ms  
2024-02-25T12:58:27.208+01:00 WARN 13924 --- [           main] .s.s.UserDetailsServiceAutoConfiguration :  
  
Using generated security password: 29e69305-0899-4677-95fe-36fef4972403  
  
This generated password is for development use only. Your security configuration must be updated before running your application in production.  
  
2024-02-25T12:58:27.303+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [           main] o.s.s.web.DefaultSecurityFilterChain : Will secure any request with [org.springframework.security.web...  
2024-02-25T12:58:27.356+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [           main] o.s.b.w.embedded.tomcat.TomcatWebServer : Tomcat started on port 8080 (http) with context path ''  
2024-02-25T12:58:27.370+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [           main] com.example.demo.DemoApplication : Started DemoApplication in 1.929 seconds (process running for :  
2024-02-25T12:58:48.382+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [nio-8080-exec-1] o.a.c.c.C.[Tomcat].[localhost].[/] : Initializing Spring DispatcherServlet 'dispatcherServlet'  
2024-02-25T12:58:48.382+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [nio-8080-exec-1] o.s.web.servlet.DispatcherServlet : Initializing Servlet 'dispatcherServlet'  
2024-02-25T12:58:48.382+01:00 INFO 13924 --- [nio-8080-exec-1] o.s.web.servlet.DispatcherServlet : Completed initialization in 0 ms
```

- Bottom Status Bar:** Shows "Build completed successfully in 4 sec, 342 ms (4 minutes ago)"

SpringInitializr [3/4]

Alternative .. Compile & Launch Web Server using maven

\$ mvn package


\$ mvn spring-boot:run

A screenshot of a terminal window titled "Cmder". The terminal shows the command \$ mvn spring-boot:run being run. The output is a series of Maven [INFO] logs. It starts with scanning for projects, then building the demo module from its pom.xml. It then moves to the jar phase. Finally, it runs the spring-boot:3.2.3:run goal, which corresponds to the default-cli profile, and ends with a test-compile phase for the demo module.

```
arnaud@DesktopArnaud /cygdrive/c/arn/perso/cours/esilv/2024/security/demo-springboot-security
$ mvn spring-boot:run
[INFO] Scanning for projects...
[INFO]
[INFO] -----< com.example:demo >-----
[INFO] Building demo 0.0.1-SNAPSHOT
[INFO]   from pom.xml
[INFO] -----[ jar ]-----
[INFO]
[INFO] >>> spring-boot:3.2.3:run (default-cli) > test-compile @ demo >>>
[INFO]
[INFO] --- resources:3.3.1:resources (default-resources) @ demo ---
```

SpringInitializr [4/4]

Test: open <http://localhost:8080>



username = "user"
password = randomly generated at startup


```
2024-02-25T13:35:55.221+01:00  WARN 13900 --- [           main] .s.s.UserDetailsServiceAutoConfiguration :
```

```
Using generated security password: 32b43163-eb64-428b-b616-094903ae17e6
```


This generated password is for development use only. Your security configuration must be updated before running your application in production.

```
2024-02-25T13:35:55.543+01:00  INFO 13900 --- [           main] o.s.s.web.DefaultSecurityFilterChain      : Will secure any request with [org.springframework.security.web
```

```
2024-02-25T13:35:55.716+01:00  INFO 13900 --- [           main] o.s.b.w.embedded.tomcat.TomcatWebServer  : Tomcat started on port 8080 (http) with context path ''
```



**"OK" but 404
(no more 401)**



Whitelabel Error Page

This application has no explicit mapping for /error, so you are seeing this as a fallback.


Sun Feb 25 13:56:12 CET 2024

There was an unexpected error (type=Not Found, status=404).

Add Resource static/page1.html

http GET /page1.html => Http 200

add file
**src/main/resource/
static/page1.html**



The screenshot shows the IntelliJ IDEA interface with the project 'demo-springboot-security' open. The left panel displays the project structure:


- demo-springboot-security [demo] C:\arn\perso\cours\es
- .idea
- .mvn
- src
 - main
 - java
 - com.example.demo
 - resources
 - static
 - templates

The right panel shows the code editor for 'page1.html'. The code is as follows:

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
    <title>Hello World</title>
</head>
<body>
    <h1>Hello World Page</h1>
</body>
</html>
```

relaunch

http GET /**page1.html**



Install Demo & Hands-on

then pause

Detailed Analysis of 4 http scenarios

Scenario 1/4 : No authentication

Scenario 2/4 : BAD user/password

Scenario 3/4 : user/password OK => auth success, redirect, set Cookie

Scenario 4/4 : clear cookie

Detailed Analysis of 4 http scenarios



Scenario 1/4 : No authentication

Scenario 2/4 : BAD user/password


Scenario 3/4 : user/password OK => auth success, redirect, set Cookie

Scenario 4/4 : clear cookie

Scenario 1: NO authentication using curl

```
$ curl -vv http://localhost:8080
*   Trying [::1]:8080...
* Connected to localhost (::1) port 8080
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:8080
> User-Agent: curl/8.4.0
> Accept: */*
>
< HTTP/1.1 401
< Vary: Origin
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Method
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Headers
< Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=F4AC86090C48019BB14C4315942710AA; Path=/; HttpOnly
< WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="Realm"
< X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
< X-XSS-Protection: 0
< Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
< Pragma: no-cache
< Expires: 0
< X-Frame-Options: DENY
< Content-Length: 0
< Date: Sun, 25 Feb 2024 12:36:32 GMT
<
* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact
```

Http Request/Response Sequence



401 : Unauthorized



MDN Web Docs

<https://developer.mozilla.org> › Web › HTTP › Status ::

401 Unauthorized - HTTP - MDN Web Docs

Apr 10, 2023 — The HyperText Transfer Protocol (**HTTP**) **401** Unauthorized response status code indicates that the client request has not been completed ...

[403 Forbidden](#) · [WWW-Authenticate](#) · [402 Payment Required](#)

curl, no authentication data
=> NO result, only 401 response code

retry almost "Same" request in Web Browser
=> get different response !


http 301 ... redirect to login html page

exactly "same" as Web Browser:
using curl to accept html content format... cf next

curl -H Accept:application/xhtml

```
$ curl -vv http://localhost:8080/page1.html -H Accept:text/html,application/xhtml
*   Trying [::1]:8080...
* Connected to localhost (::1) port 8080
> GET /page1.html HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:8080
> User-Agent: curl/8.4.0
> Accept:text/html,application/xhtml
>
< HTTP/1.1 302
< Vary: Origin
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Method
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Headers
< Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=3AF9670D9ACFF604C58140D4BA8159FB; Path=/; HttpOnly
< X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
< X-XSS-Protection: 0
< Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
< Pragma: no-cache
< Expires: 0
< X-Frame-Options: DENY
< Location: http://localhost:8080/login
< Content-Length: 0
< Date: Sun, 25 Feb 2024 17:22:50 GMT
<
* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact
```

Scenario 1 .. redo using Web browser Chrome



open (F12) : Developer Tools > Network "preserve log"=true

request
"/page1.html"

redirect "/login"



The screenshot shows the Chrome DevTools Network tab with the "Preserve log" checkbox selected. The timeline at the top shows a single request from 10 ms to 60 ms. The table below lists four requests:

Name	Headers	Preview	Response	Initiator	Timing	Cookies
page1.html	General					
login	Request URL: http://localhost:8080/page1.html Request Method: GET Status Code: 302 Found					
bootstrap.min.css	Remote Address: [:1]:8080					
signin.css	Referrer Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin					

Detailed Response Headers for the "login" request:

- Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
- Connection: keep-alive
- Content-Length: 0
- Date: Sun, 25 Feb 2024 14:28:26 GMT
- Expires: 0
- Keep-Alive: timeout=60
- Location: http://localhost:8080/login
- Pragma: no-cache
- Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=6BA1F0AB3F8ADCAA5D78A3B8D376B904; Path=/; HttpOnly
- Vary: Origin
- Vary: Access-Control-Request-Method
- Vary: Access-Control-Request-Headers
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- X-Frame-Options: DENY

At the bottom of the Network tab, it says "4 requests | 2.5 kB transferred | 127 kB resources".

Detailed Request Headers

Headers	Preview	Response	Initiator	Timing	Cookies				
X-Frame-Options:		DENY							
X-Xss-Protection:		0							
▼ Request Headers		<input type="checkbox"/> Raw							
Accept:	text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7								
Accept-Encoding:	gzip, deflate, br, zstd								
Accept-Language:	en,fr-FR;q=0.9,fr;q=0.8,en-FR;q=0.7,en-US;q=0.6								
Cache-Control:	max-age=0								
Connection:	keep-alive								
Cookie:	metabase.DEVICE=7856a6fd-dd9c-495d-880e-0b2ed106aab5; _ga=GA1.1.576560884.1694723966; JSESSIONID=41795E3A8958BD0E3F603879725681A0								
Host:	localhost:8080								
Sec-Ch-Ua:	"Not A(Brand";v="99", "Google Chrome";v="121", "Chromium";v="121"								
Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile:	?0								
Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform:	"Windows"								
Sec-Fetch-Dest:	document								
Sec-Fetch-Mode:	navigate								
Sec-Fetch-Site:	none								
Sec-Fetch-User:	?1								
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests:	1								
User-Agent:	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/121.0.0.0 Safari/537.36								

Detailed Response Headers

The screenshot shows the Headers tab of a browser developer tools Network panel. The tab bar includes Headers, Preview, Response, Initiator, Timing, and Cookies. The Headers section is expanded, showing various response headers and their values. A red box highlights the Location header, which has a value of `http://localhost:8080/login`. Other visible headers include Cache-Control, Connection, Content-Length, Date, Expires, Keep-Alive, Pragma, Set-Cookie, Vary, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, and X-Xss-Protection.

Header	Value
Cache-Control	no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
Connection	keep-alive
Content-Length	0
Date	Sun, 25 Feb 2024 14:28:26 GMT
Expires	0
Keep-Alive	timeout=60
Location	http://localhost:8080/login
Pragma	no-cache
Set-Cookie	JSESSIONID=6BA1F0AB3F8ADCAA5D78A3B8D376B904; Path=/; HttpOnly
Vary	Origin
Vary	Access-Control-Request-Method
Vary	Access-Control-Request-Headers
X-Content-Type-Options	nosniff
X-Frame-Options	DENY
X-Xss-Protection	0

Http response code 302 + Http Response Header "location:" => redirect

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References > 302 Found English (US)

Filter


In this article

- Status
- Specifications
- Browser compatibility
- See also

302 Found

The HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) `302 Found` redirect status response code indicates that the resource requested has been temporarily moved to the URL given by the `Location` header. A browser redirects to this page but search engines don't update their links to the resource (in 'SEO-speak', it is said that the 'link-juice' is not sent to the new URL).

Http Redirect Sequence



Next request (after redirected)

GET /login => http 200 <html>..</html>

Name	X	Headers	Preview	Response	Initiator	Timing	Cookies
page1.html							
login		▼ General					
bootstrap.min.css							
signin.css							
		Request URL:		http://localhost:8080/login			
		Request Method:		GET			
		Status Code:		200 OK			
		Remote Address:		[:]8080			
		Referrer Policy:		strict-origin-when-cross-origin			
		▼ Response Headers	<input type="checkbox"/> Raw				
		Cache-Control:		no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate			
		Connection:		keep-alive			
		Content-Length:		1550			
		Content-Type:		text/html;charset=UTF-8			
		Date:		Sun, 25 Feb 2024 14:28:26 GMT			
		Expires:		0			
		Keep-Alive:		timeout=60			
		Pragma:		no-cache			
		Vary:		Origin			
		Vary:		Access-Control-Request-Method			
		Vary:		Access-Control-Request-Headers			
		X-Content-Type-Options:		nosniff			
		X-Frame-Options:		DENY			
		X-Xss-Protection:		0			
4 requests		2.5 kB transferred		127 kB resources			

Detailed Analysis of 4 http scenarios

Scenario 1/4 : No authentication



Scenario 2/4 : BAD user/password

Scenario 3/4 : user/password OK => auth success, redirect, set Cookie

Scenario 4/4 : clear cookie

Wrong Password

401 : Unauthorized

```
$ curl -vv http://localhost:8080/page1.html -u user:WRONGPASS
*   Trying [::1]:8080...
*   Connected to localhost (::1) port 8080
*   Server auth using Basic with user 'user'
> GET /page1.html HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:8080
> Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpXUk9OR1BBU1M=
> User-Agent: curl/8.4.0
> Accept: */*
>
< HTTP/1.1 401
< Vary: Origin
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Method
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Headers
* Authentication problem. Ignoring this.
< WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="Realm"
< X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
```

Wrong User

401 : Unauthorized

```
Cmder
$ curl -vv http://localhost:8080/page1.html -u WRONGUSER:${PASSWORD}
* Trying [::1]:8080...
* Connected to localhost (::1) port 8080
* Server auth using Basic with user 'WRONGUSER'
> GET /page1.html HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:8080
> Authorization: Basic V1JPTkdVU0VSOjMyYjQzMjYzLWViNjQtNDI4Yi1iNjE2LTA5
> User-Agent: curl/8.4.0
> Accept: */*
>
< HTTP/1.1 401
< Vary: Origin
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Method
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Headers
* Authentication problem. Ignoring this.
< WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="Realm"
< Content-Type: Options; nosniff
```

All 401 !
NO Difference between

No Auth / Wrong User / Wrong Password

Rule of Thumb : never give any information (to attackers)

Detailed Analysis of 4 http scenarios

Scenario 1/4 : No authentication

Scenario 2/4 : BAD user/password



Scenario 3/4 : user/password OK => auth success, set Cookie

Scenario 4/4 : clear cookie

http GET using login/password
=> OK + get body

`curl -vv http://localhost:8080/page1.html -u user:${PASSWORD}`

```
Cmder
arnaud@DesktopArnaud /cygdrive/c/arn/devPerso
$ curl -vv http://localhost:8080/page1.html -u user:${PASSWORD}
*   Trying [::1]:8080...
*   Connected to localhost (::1) port 8080
* Server auth using Basic with user 'user'
> GET /page1.html HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:8080
> Authorization: Basic dXNlcjozMmI0MzE2My1lYjY0LTQyOGItYjYxNi0wOTQ5MDNhZTE3ZTY=
> User-Agent: curl/8.4.0
> Accept: */*
>
< HTTP/1.1 200
< Vary: Origin
```

empty line
(end of http headers)

61 bytes of data
then close TCP socket

```
Cmder
< HTTP/1.1 200
< Vary: Origin
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Method
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Headers
< Last-Modified: Sun, 25 Feb 2024 11:57:53 GMT
< Accept-Ranges: bytes
< X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
< X-XSS-Protection: 0
< Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
< Pragma: no-cache
< Expires: 0
< X-Frame-Options: DENY
< Content-Type: text/html
< Content-Length: 61
< Date: Sun, 25 Feb 2024 14:19:45 GMT
<
<html>
<body>
<H1>Hello World Page</H1>
</body>
</html>* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact
```

```
Notice: curl -u user:${password}
> Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZA==
```

user:password is sent as Http Header "Authorization: Basic <<base64>>"
in **CLEAR TEXT** (encoded in base 64)

to decode, use "base64 -d"



```
$ echo dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZA== | base64 -d
user:password
```

Remark 2 : when using explicit user:password
=> NO set-cookie

By default, Web Browsers do not send "user:password"

Server detect non interactive (batch) usage / Rest Api call

NO need to create interactive "session", so no set-cookie needed

user/password Using applicative Login Html page + Form + Button


The image displays two side-by-side screenshots of a web browser window, both titled "Please sign in" and showing the URL "localhost:8080/login".

Screenshot 1 (Left): This shows the initial state of the login form. It contains two input fields: "Username" and "Password", and a blue "Sign in" button below them.


Screenshot 2 (Right): This shows the form after input. The "Username" field contains the text "user", the "Password" field contains a series of dots (...), and the "Sign in" button is highlighted with a red border.

```
graph LR; S1["Screenshot 1: Initial Form"]; S2["Screenshot 2: Form Filled"];
```

Authenticated OK => http 200
/page1.html?continue



F12 - Elements : Button Html Source



The screenshot illustrates the use of browser developer tools to inspect and edit HTML elements. The top part shows a browser window titled "Please sign in" at "localhost:8080/login". A tooltip over the "Sign in" button displays its CSS class as "button.btn.btn-lg.btn-primary.btn-block lock" and its dimensions as "300 x 48". The bottom part shows the browser's developer tools with the "Elements" tab selected. The HTML source code is displayed, highlighting the "button" element with the class "btn btn-lg btn-primary btn-block" and the attribute "type='submit'".

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head> ...
  </head>
  <body>
    <div class="container">
      <form class="form-signin" method="post" action="/login">
        <h2 class="form-signin-heading">Please sign in</h2>
        <p> ...
        <p> ...
        <input name="_csrf" type="hidden" value="6_JEyDwB-mnln7e8DNJhOAYEPPC-v_ckwt8zuC9ILxAS09ey0pcn-1k5ngjI_oXfLJjc8Jo-ZXiRt5HnMmsLOA">
      ...
      <button class="btn btn-lg btn-primary btn-block" type="submit">Sign in</button> == $0
    </form>
  </div>
</body>
</html>
```

Details on <form>

```
<form class="form-signin" method="post" action="/login"> == $0
  <h2 class="form-signin-heading">Please sign in</h2>
  <p>
    <label for="username" class="sr-only">Username</label>
    <input type="text" id="username" name="username" class="form-control" placeholder="Username" required autofocus>
  </p>
  <p>
    <label for="password" class="sr-only">Password</label>
    <input type="password" id="password" name="password" class="form-control" placeholder="Password" required>
  </p>
  <input name="_csrf" type="hidden" value="6_JEyDwB-mnln7e8DNJhOAYEPPC-v_ckwt8zuC9ILxAS09ey0pcn-1k5ngjI_oXfNf9VCmc8E
-ZXiRt5HnMmsLOA">
  <button class="btn btn-lg btn-primary btn-block" type="submit">Sign in</button>
</form>
```

<form> ... behavior explanation

on click button "Signin"

=> submit Form

=> call http POST "/login"

with payload = FormData { username, password, _csrf }

Notice: _csrf ?

C.S.R.F. stands for "Cross Site Request Forgery"

For preventing "http://a-malicious-site/click-me-page" to automatically call your http POST "/login" on your site and filling sensitive data from your browser

cf Appendix

Http POST /login

X	Headers	Payload	Preview	Response	Initiator	Timing	Cookies
General							
Request URL:	http://localhost:8080/login						
Request Method:	POST						
Status Code:	302 Found						
Remote Address:	[::1]:8080						
Referrer Policy:	strict-origin-when-cross-origin						
Response Headers							
<input type="checkbox"/> Raw							
Cache-Control:	no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate						
Connection:	keep-alive						
Content-Length:	0						
Date:	Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:00:43 GMT						
Expires:	0						
Keep-Alive:	timeout=60						
Location:	http://localhost:8080/page1.html?continue						
Pragma:	no-cache						
Set-Cookie:	JSESSIONID=E4F23994BBF20E40D20C63CC76C98EA5; Path=/; HttpOnly						
Vary:	Origin						
Vary:	Access-Control-Request-Method						
Vary:	Access-Control-Request-Headers						
X-Content-Type-Options:	nosniff						
X-Frame-Options:	DENY						

POST ... payload user,password in CLEAR text FormData

The screenshot shows the Network tab of a browser developer tools interface. The 'Payload' tab is selected. Below it, under 'Form Data', there are three entries: 'username' with value 'user', 'password' with value '32b43163-eb64-428b-b616-094903ae17e6', and '_csrf' with a long, complex value.

Header	Value
username	user
password	32b43163-eb64-428b-b616-094903ae17e6
_csrf	tJ1Tc6yZKHN83PhLjfaz3dwEhXeYz9hEjP-ve7vxdsT4ZYCM0fliQc6hHBdR5M177NuH6u1gqE77_7ppvM6YTd7GRqHIBLHp

POST ... payload view parsed or view source

X Headers Payload Preview Response Initiator Timing Cookies

▼Form Data view source view URL-encoded

username: user

password: 32b43163-eb64-428b-b616-094903ae17e6

_csrf: tJ1Tc6yZKHN83PhLjfaz3dwEhXeYz9hEjP-ve7vxdsT4ZYCM0fliQc6hHBdR5M177NuH6u1gqE77_7ppvM6YTd7GRqHIBLHp

X Headers Payload Preview Response Initiator Timing Cookies

▼Form Data view parsed

username=user&**password**=32b43163-eb64-428b-b616-094903ae17e6&**_csrf**=tJ1Tc6yZKHN83PhLjfaz3dwEhXeYz9hEjP-ve7'c6hHBdR5M177NuH6u1gqE77_7ppvM6YTd7GRqHIBLHp


curl equivalent to http POST /login

```
Cmder
$ curl -vv 'http://localhost:8080/login'    -H 'Origin: http://localhost:8080'    -H 'Referer: ht
tp://localhost:8080/login'  --data-raw 'username=user&password=32b43163-eb64-428b-b616-094903ae
17e6&_csrf=I3iPb2oPGITQyNKh6jnEro3WnMTYE_eNInLiCRDyjoj34kQRq7Vgw6erb9q7CWiRTwn-nvI0p1VizzDLmv
6Rd0-AlG7rEk' -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' -H 'Cookie: metabase.DEVICE=
7856a6fd-dd9c-495d-880e-0b2ed106aab5; _ga=GA1.1.576560884.1694723966; JSESSIONID=7A481C4907DBC1
DA5EBA75E4A53F5C40'
*   Trying [::1]:8080...
* Connected to localhost (::1) port 8080
> POST /login HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:8080
> User-Agent: curl/8.4.0
> Accept: /*
> Origin: http://localhost:8080
> Referer: http://localhost:8080/login
> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> Cookie: metabase.DEVICE=7856a6fd-dd9c-495d-880e-0b2ed106aab5; _ga=GA1.1.576560884.1694723966;
JSESSIONID=7A481C4907DBC1DA5EBA75E4A53F5C40
> Content-Length: 162
>
< HTTP/1.1 302
< Vary: Origin
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Method
```

replaying EXACT SAME curl command twice => http 401

```
$ curl -vv 'http://localhost:8080/login' -H 'Origin: http://localhost:8080' -H 'Referer: http://localhost:8080/login' --data-raw 'username=user&password=32b43163-eb64-428b-b616-094903ae17e6&_csrf=I3iPb2oPGITQyNKh6jnEro3WDnMTYE_eNInLiCRDyjoj34kQRRq7Vgw6erb9q7CWiRTwn-nvI0p1VizzDLmv6Rd0-A1G7rEk' -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' -H 'Cookie: metabase.DEVICE=7856a6fd-dd9c-495d-880e-0b2ed106aab5; _ga=GA1.1.576560884.1694723966; JSESSIONID=7A481C4907DBC1DA5EBA75E4A53F5C40'
* Trying [::1]:8080...
* Connected to localhost (::1) port 8080
> POST /login HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:8080
> User-Agent: curl/8.4.0
> Accept: */*
> Origin: http://localhost:8080
> Referer: http://localhost:8080/login
> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> Cookie: metabase.DEVICE=7856a6fd-dd9c-495d-880e-0b2ed106aab5; _ga=GA1.1.576560884.1694723966; JSESSIONID=7A481C4907DBC1DA5EBA75E4A53F5C40
> Content-Length: 162
>
< HTTP/1.1 401
< Vary: Origin
< Vary: Access-Control-Request-Method
```

Http POST Sequence



How did server remembered to redirect back from "/login" to "/page1.html" ?

Here, server is Statefull ...


JSESSIONID are returned as "set-cookie" header from server to client

then passed back as header from client to server


server lookup session in "database" (in memory) from JSESSIONID

Why is it "BAD" to use Cookie SESSIONID ?


Statefull Server / Database ... SPOF



Click "Sign in" ... redirected to "/page1.html"



Browser Previous Page then Redo "Signin"
=> no redirect
"/" Not Found .. 404



Detailed Analysis of 4 http scenarios

Scenario 1/4 : No authentication

Scenario 2/4 : BAD user/password

Scenario 3/4 : user/password OK => auth success, set Cookie



Scenario 4/4 : clear cookie

Cookies in Browser - Developer Tools

The screenshot shows the Google Chrome Developer Tools interface with the 'Application' tab selected. Red arrows highlight several key areas:

- A red arrow points from the 'Application' tab in the top navigation bar to the 'Storage' section on the left sidebar.
- A red arrow points from the 'Storage' section to the 'Cookies' subsection, which is expanded and highlighted with a red box.
- A red box highlights the 'Cookies' subsection under the 'Storage' category.
- A red box highlights the 'Application' tab in the top navigation bar.

The main content area displays a table of cookies for the domain `localhost:8080`. The table columns are: Name, Value, Dom..., Path, Expir..., Size, Http..., Secure, Same..., Partit..., Pri... . The data in the table is as follows:

Name	Value	Dom...	Path	Expir...	Size	Http...	Secure	Same...	Partit...	Pri...
JSESSIONID	11E8975AD018694576690C5FE23532B2	local...	/	Sessi...	42	✓				Medi...
_ga	GA1.1.576560884.1694723966	local...	/	2024...	29					Medi...
metabase.DEVICE	7856a6fd-dd9c-495d-880e-0b2ed106aa...	local...	/	2024...	51	✓		Lax		Medi...


At the bottom of the table area, a message reads: **Select a cookie to preview its value**.

Left sidebar categories and their sub-items:

- Manifest
- Service worker
- Storage
 - Local storage
 - Session storage
 - IndexedDB
 - Web SQL
 - Cookies
 - `http://localhost:8080`
 - Private state tokens
 - Interest groups
 - Shared storage
 - Cache storage
- Background services
 - Back/forward cache
 - Background fetch
 - Background sync
 - Bounce tracking mitigations
 - Notifications
 - Payment handler
 - Periodic background sync
 - Speculative loads
 - Push messaging
 - Reporting API
- Frames
 - top

Delete Cookies [1/3]


clear all Cookies of given URL site



Contextual Menu
(Right click Mouse)

Delete Cookies [2/3]


Delete explicitly a single Site-Cookie




Delete Cookies [3/3]

Clear Browsing Data ...

delete all Cookies (and History) of All sites



After clear "JSESSIONID" cookie
Refresh (F5) /page1.html
=> redirect again to /login



Is there a Better way (Stateless, without cookie) to redirect back from "/login" to "/page1.html" ?

yes, using **http URL query parameter**

http://localhost:8080/login?redirect=page1.html

... but NON replay & CSRF JSESSIONID are more secure for /login

A You

why do springboot web security use set-cookie JSESSIONID in the /login html page ?



ChatGPT

In Spring Boot applications that use Spring Security for web security, the `JSESSIONID` cookie is typically set in the `/login` HTML page for session management purposes. Here's why it's done:

1. **Session Management:** When a user accesses the login page of a Spring Boot application, the server typically creates a session for that user. This session is used to maintain stateful information about the user's interaction with the application throughout their session.
2. **Authentication Flow:** In a typical authentication flow, when a user submits their credentials (username and password) via the login form, Spring Security processes these credentials and validates them. If the credentials are valid, Spring Security establishes an authenticated session for the user.
3. **Session Tracking:** The `JSESSIONID` cookie is a mechanism used by the server to track the user's session. It contains a unique identifier (the session ID) that associates the user's subsequent requests with their session data stored on the server.
4. **Secure Communication:** By setting the `JSESSIONID` cookie in the `/login` HTML page, the server ensures that subsequent requests, including the form submission with the user's credentials, are associated with the correct session. This helps maintain the integrity and security of the authentication process.
5. **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Protection:** Additionally, setting the `JSESSIONID` cookie in the login page can also help mitigate CSRF attacks. When combined with CSRF tokens, it adds an extra layer of protection by ensuring that the session associated with the user's authentication is established before any sensitive actions, such as form submissions, are performed.

Overall, setting the `JSESSIONID` cookie in the `/login` HTML page is a standard practice in Spring Security for managing user sessions and ensuring the security of the authentication process.



Other ways to avoid "Basic" user:password credentials ?

using **Dynamic Challenges instead of static Credentials**

using **2FA or MFA (Multi Factor Authentication)**

using **OAuth2**

... then once authenticated, **using JWT Token**

(out of scope for this basic course)

OAuth2 Standard

one password to rule them all

... OAuth2 = internally using an extra indirection level
(but still another user:password at final step)

Using Another level of Indirection...

A screenshot of a Google search results page. The search bar at the top contains the query "any problem can be solved by addind another le". Below the search bar are several filter buttons: Images, Videos, Job sites, News, Books, and Finance. A horizontal line separates the search bar from the results. Below the line, it says "About 1,270,000 results (0.33 seconds)".

About 1,270,000 results (0.33 seconds)

Showing results for [any problem can be solved by adding another level of indirection](#)

Search instead for [any problem can be solved by addind another level of indirection](#)

A famous aphorism of Butler Lampson goes: "All problems in computer science can be solved by another level of indirection" (the "fundamental theorem of software engineering"). This is often deliberately mis-quoted with "abstraction layer" substituted for "level of indirection".



Wikipedia

[https://en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Indirection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indirection) :

[Indirection - Wikipedia](#)

Summary

only a very "short" introduction to "Basic Authentication for Web Apps" using Http status code + Http Headers (Cookie, redirect Location, ...)

much more to discover:

- https (TLS) & Certificates, using Public Key Cryptography
- password Hashes, Managed Identities, KeyVault
- CORS, CSRF
- OAuth2
- Authorizations
- Containers, Sql Injection, VPN, Firewall, DMZ, Dos Attacks, Virus, etc, ...

Questions ?

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APPENDIX

Remark on "_csrf" hidden field
in /login html page

Appendix: Csrf [1/5]

ChatGPT 3.5 ▾

A You

in springboot login html page, explain the input field "_csrf"

ChatGPT

In a Spring Boot login HTML page, the input field "_csrf" is a hidden field used for CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) protection. CSRF attacks involve an attacker tricking a user into unintentionally performing actions on a web application that they are authenticated with. This hidden field helps to prevent such attacks.

Here's how it typically works:

1. When a user requests the login page, the server generates a unique token and stores it in the user's session.
2. This token is then included as the value of the "_csrf" input field in the login form. However, since it's hidden, the user won't see it or interact with it directly.
3. When the user submits the login form, the CSRF token is sent along with the other form data to the server.
4. Upon receiving the request, the server compares the CSRF token submitted with the one stored in the user's session. If they match, the request is considered legitimate, and the login process proceeds.
5. If the CSRF tokens don't match, the server can reject the request, assuming it might be a CSRF attack, thus protecting the user's session from being hijacked.

This mechanism helps to ensure that the form submission originates from the legitimate user and not from a malicious website or script attempting to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

Appendix: Csrf [2/5]

ChatGPT 3.5 ▾

A

You

suppose that there is NO _csrf field checked, can you show me an attack



ChatGPT

Sure, I can describe a potential CSRF attack scenario without the presence of a CSRF token (_csrf) field.

Let's say you have a Spring Boot login form without CSRF protection, and the form looks like this:

```
html
Copy code

<form action="/login" method="post">
    <label for="username">Username:</label>
    <input type="text" id="username" name="username"><br><br>
    <label for="password">Password:</label>
    <input type="password" id="password" name="password"><br><br>
    <input type="submit" value="Login">
</form>
```

An attacker could create a malicious website with the following HTML:

Appendix: Csrf [3/5]

An attacker could create a malicious website with the following HTML:

```
html
Copy code

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
    <title>Malicious Site</title>
</head>
<body>
    <h1>Click the Button!</h1>
    <form action="http://victim-site.com/login" method="post">
        <label for="username">Username:</label>
        <input type="text" id="username" name="username" value="attacker"><br><br>
        <label for="password">Password:</label>
        <input type="password" id="password" name="password" value="password"><br><br>
        <input type="submit" value="Login">
    </form>
    <script>
        document.forms[0].submit(); // Automatically submits the form
    </script>
</body>
</html>
```

Appendix: Csrf [4/5]

Now, if a user who is authenticated on your application visits the attacker's website while still logged in, the form on the attacker's website will automatically submit, sending a POST request to your application's login endpoint (/login) with the user's credentials. Since there's no CSRF token validation, your application will accept the request, thinking it's a legitimate login attempt by the user.

As a result, the attacker can effectively trick the user into unintentionally performing actions on your application, such as logging in with their credentials without their knowledge or consent. This is the essence of a CSRF attack.



Appendix: Csrf [5/5]

A

You

so in which attacks can it occurs ?



ChatGPT

CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) attacks can occur in various scenarios where an attacker can manipulate a user's web browser to perform unintended actions on a different website where the user is authenticated. Here are some common scenarios where CSRF attacks can occur:

1. **Form Submissions:** CSRF attacks often involve crafting malicious forms on attacker-controlled websites. When a user who is authenticated on another site visits the attacker's site, the form submission can trigger actions on the authenticated site.
2. **Clickjacking:** In clickjacking attacks, attackers overlay transparent or opaque elements on top of legitimate buttons or links. When a user clicks on what appears to be a harmless element, they inadvertently trigger actions on a different site where they are authenticated.
3. **Image Tags:** Attackers can embed images in web pages with image tags () that have URLs pointing to actions on a different site. When a user loads the page containing the image, the browser sends requests to the specified URLs, potentially executing unauthorized actions.
4. **Script Injections:** If an attacker can inject malicious scripts into a vulnerable website, these scripts can then manipulate the user's browser to perform actions on other sites where the user is authenticated. This often occurs in the context of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
5. **Malicious Links:** Attackers can distribute malicious links via email, social media, or other channels. When a user clicks on such a link while authenticated on another site, the browser can execute actions on the authenticated site without the user's consent.
6. **Embedded Content:** Content embedded in iframes or other embedded elements can execute CSRF attacks if it contains scripts or forms that trigger actions on authenticated sites when loaded by a user's browser.

These are just a few examples of how CSRF attacks can occur. The common theme is that the attacker exploits the trust established between the user and the authenticated website to perform