

SECURITY AUDIT OF

TANKBATTLE TOKEN SMART CONTRACTS



Public Report

Dec 13, 2021

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Driving Technology > Forward

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ABBREVIATIONS

Name	Description		
Ethereum	An open source platform based on blockchain technology to create and distribute smart contracts and decentralized applications.		
Ether (ETH)	A cryptocurrency whose blockchain is generated by the Ethereum platform. Ether is used for payment of transactions and computing services in the Ethereum network.		
Smart contract	A computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify or enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract.		
Solidity	A contract-oriented, high-level language for implementing smart contracts for the Ethereum platform.		
Solc	A compiler for Solidity.		
ERC20	ERC20 (BEP20 in Binance Smart Chain or xRP20 in other chains) tokens a blockchain-based assets that have value and can be sent and received. The primary difference with the primary coin is that instead of running on the own blockchain, ERC20 tokens are issued on a network that supports smart contracts such as Ethereum or Binance Smart Chain.		

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Security Audit Report prepared by Verichains Lab on Dec 13, 2021. We would like to thank the TankBattle for trusting Verichains Lab in auditing smart contracts. Delivering high-quality audits is always our top priority.

This audit focused on identifying security flaws in code and the design of the TankBattle Token Smart Contracts. The scope of the audit is limited to the source code files provided to Verichains. Verichains Lab completed the assessment using manual, static, and dynamic analysis techniques.

During the audit process, the audit team had identified one vulnerable issues in the smart contracts code.

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1. MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

1.1. About TankBattle Token Smart Contracts

Tank Battle is a diverse game that employs tactics in the formation of tank squads to fight and win. The required skillset, combined with the varied tank system, allows players to have the most exciting and wholesome experience only available on the TankBattle.co system.

TankBattle Token is an ERC20 token that Tank Battle players can use in the game.

1.2. Audit scope

This audit focused on identifying security flaws in code and the design of the TankBattle Token Smart Contracts.

The audited contract is the TankBattle Token Smart Contracts that deployed on Binance Smart Chain Mainnet at address 0xcB4530025841D9aF803Ee2710C89eC87A1d9b524. The details of the deployed smart contract are listed in Table 1.

FIELD	VALUE		
Contract Name	TankBattleToken		
Contract Address	0xcB4530025841D9aF803Ee2710C89eC87A1d9b524		
Compiler Version	v0.8.5+commit.a4f2e591		
Optimizati on Enabled	Yes with 200 runs		
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/address/0xcB4530025841D9aF803Ee2710C89eC87A1d9b524		

Table 1. The deployed smart contract details

1.3. Audit methodology

Our security audit process for smart contract includes two steps:

 Smart contract codes are scanned/tested for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities using public and RK87, our in-house smart contract security analysis tool.

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• Manual audit of the codes for security issues. The contracts are manually analyzed to look for any potential problems.

Following is the list of commonly known vulnerabilities that was considered during the audit of the smart contract:

- Integer Overflow and Underflow
- Timestamp Dependence
- Race Conditions
- Transaction-Ordering Dependence
- DoS with (Unexpected) revert
- DoS with Block Gas Limit
- Gas Usage, Gas Limit and Loops
- Redundant fallback function
- Unsafe type Inference
- Reentrancy
- Explicit visibility of functions state variables (external, internal, private and public)
- · Logic Flaws

For vulnerabilities, we categorize the findings into categories as listed in table below, depending on their severity level:

SEVERITY LEVEL	DESCRIPTION
CRITICAL	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning; creates a critical risk to the contract; required to be fixed immediately.
HIGH	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract with high impact; needs to be fixed with high priority.
MEDIUM	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract with medium impact in a specific scenario; needs to be fixed.
LOW	An issue that does not have a significant impact, can be considered as less important.

Table 2. Severity levels

1.4. Disclaimer

Please note that security auditing cannot uncover all existing vulnerabilities, and even an audit in which no vulnerabilities are found is not a guarantee for a 100% secure smart contract.

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However, auditing allows discovering vulnerabilities that were unobserved, overlooked during development and areas where additional security measures are necessary.

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2. AUDIT RESULT

2.1. Overview

The initial review was conducted in Dec 07, 2021 and a total effort of 3 working days was dedicated to identifying and documenting security issues in the code base of the TankBattle Token.

Table 2 lists some properties of the audited TankBattle Token Smart Contracts (as of the report writing time).

PROPERTY	VALUE
Name	TankBattle Token
Symbol	TBL
Decimals	18
Total 1,000,000,000 ($x10^{18}$) Note: the number of decimals is 18, so the total representation toke be 1,000,000,000 or 1 billion.	

Table 3. The TankBattle Token Smart Contracts properties

2.2. Contract codes

The TankBattle Token Smart Contracts was written in Solidity language, with the required version to be 0.8.5.

TankBattle token contract extends ERC20Snapshot, Pausable and AccessControl contracts.

Token Owner can pause/unpause contract using Pausable contract, user can only transfer unlocked tokens and only when the contract is not paused. The owner also creates a record of the balances and total supply at any time through the snapshot function.

The contract has a mechanism to block accounts through a bunch of Blacklist functions. They support the TankBattle team to reduce the impact of suspect accounts. In addition, the contract implements the burnFrom function. So an allowance account can call this function to remove the owner balances.

2.3. Findings

During the audit process, the audit team found one vulnerability in the given version of TankBattle Token Smart Contracts.

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```
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```



2.3.1. Useless modifier in the contract HIGH

The contract uses notBlackListed modifier to block the suspected address interacts _beforeTokenTransfer function. But it only blocks them when they call it directly. If they approve for other accounts and use that account to call transferFrom and burnFrom function, they may bypass the notBlackListed modifier.

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest use is Backlisted function to check from and to parameters in the _before Token Transfer. It ensures that the suspected address will be blocked.

```
function _beforeTokenTransfer(
          address from,
          address to,
          uint256 amount
    ) internal override whenNotPaused {
          require(!isBacklisted(from)&&!isBacklisted(from), "Address is bl...
          acklisted")
          super._beforeTokenTransfer(from, to, amount);
    }
```

Snippet 1. Recommend fixing in `_beforeTokenTransfer` function

UPDATES

• 2021-12-13: This issue has been acknowledged by the TankBattle team.

2.4. Additional notes and recommendations

2.4.1. Unnecessary usage of SafeMath library in Solidity 0.8.0+ INFORMATIVE

All safe math usage in the contract are for overflow checking, solidity 0.8.0+ already do that by default, the only usage of safemath now is to have a custom revert message which isn't the case in the auditing contracts. We suggest using normal operators for readability and gas saving.

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest changing all methods from SafeMath library to normal arithmetic operator and remove the import SafeMath statement.

UPDATES

• 2021-12-13: This issue has been acknowledged by the TankBattle team.

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APPENDIX ERC20Snapshot (ERC20Snapshot.sel1) is ERC20, IERC20Metadata, IERC20, Contex total Supply view public ERC20.sol:1 symbol view public ERC20.sol:1 TankBattleToken (ZankeBattleToken.s cessControl, Pausable, ERC20Snapsh transfer nonpayable external IEAC20.sol:1 current view internal Pausable (Pausable is Context (default) nonpayable interna Pausable.sol:1 paused view public Pausable sel AccessControl (Access Control revokeRole nonpayable public AccessControl sol:1 grantRole nonpayable public _checkRole view interne AccessControl toHexString pure internal Strings.sol:1 RC165 (IERC165.sol: grantRole nonpayable external IAccessControl.sol:1

Image 1. TankBattle Token Smart Contracts call graph

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3. VERSION HISTORY

Version	Date	Status/Change	Created by
1.0	2021-12-10	Private Report	Verichains Lab
1.1	2021-12-13	Public Report	Verichains Lab

Table 4. Report versions history