

CS33, Spring 2023

The Attack Lab: Understanding Buffer Overflow Bugs

Due Date: 23:59, May 19th, 2023

1 Introduction

This assignment involves generating a total of five attacks on two programs having different security vulnerabilities. Outcomes you will gain from this lab include:

You will learn different ways that attackers can exploit security vulnerabilities when programs do not safeguard themselves well enough against buffer overflows. Through this, you will get a better understanding of how to write programs that are more secure, as well as some of the features provided by compilers and operating systems to make programs less vulnerable. You will gain a deeper understanding of the stack and parameter-passing mechanisms of x86-64 machine code. You will gain a deeper understanding of how x86-64 instructions are encoded. You will gain more experience with debugging tools such as GDB and OBJDUMP. Note: In this lab, you will gain firsthand experience with methods used to exploit security weaknesses in operating systems and network servers. Our purpose is to help you learn about the runtime operation of programs and to understand the nature of these security weaknesses so that you can avoid them when you write system code. We do not condone the use of any other form of attack to gain unauthorized access to any system resources. You will want to study Sections 3.10.3 and 3.10.4 of the CS:APP3e book (Computer Systems: A Programmers Perspective) as reference material for this lab.

2 Get Your Files

Remember, sometimes you may find the server to be offline. Please be patient, start early, and if the server is offline, send an email to

`robertchang25@g.ucla.edu`

Please do the lab on either `lnxsr01`, `lnxsr07`, `lnxsr09`, or `lnxsr10`. For other `lnxsrvs` there can be a version mismatch of the required `libc`. So please work on one of these servers.

You can obtain your files by pointing your Web browser at:

`http://lnxsr06.seas.ucla.edu:18213/`

The server will build your files and return them to your browser in a tar file called targetk.tar, where k is the unique number of your target programs.

Note: It takes a few seconds to build and download your target, so please be patient. Save the targetk.tar file in a (protected) Linux directory in which you plan to do your work. Then give the command:

```
linux> tar -xvf targetk.tar.
```

This will extract a directory targetk containing the files described below. You should only download one set of files. If for some reason you download multiple targets, choose one target to work on and delete the rest.

2.1 Warning

If you expand your targetk.tar on a PC, by using a utility such as Winzip, or letting your browser do the extraction, you'll risk resetting permission bits on the executable files. The files in targetk include:

- README.txt: A file describing the contents of the directory
- ctarget: An executable program vulnerable to code-injection attacks
- rtarget: An executable program vulnerable to return-oriented-programming attacks
- cookie.txt: An 8-digit hex code that you will use as a unique identifier in your attacks.
- farm.c: The source code of your targets gadget farm, which you will use in generating return-oriented programming attacks.
- hex2raw: A utility to generate attack strings. In the following instructions, we will assume that you have copied the files to a protected local directory, and that you are executing the programs in that local directory.

2.2 Logistics

As usual, this is an individual project. You will generate attacks for target programs that are custom generated for you.

2.3 Handin

There is no explicit handin. The system will notify your instructor automatically about your progress as you work on it. You can keep track of how you are doing by looking at the class scoreboard at:

```
http://lnxsrv06.seas.ucla.edu:18213//scoreboard
```

2.4 Getting Started

Once you have the lab files, you can begin to attack. To get started, download the pdf linked below. It is a technical manual which is a guide to completing each section of the lab.

2.5 Important Points

Here is a summary of some important rules regarding valid solutions for this lab. These points will not make much sense when you read this document for the first time. They are presented here as a central reference of rules once you get started.

- You must do the assignment on a machine that is similar to the one that generated your targets.
- Your solutions may not use attacks to circumvent the validation code in the programs. Specifically, any address you incorporate into an attack string for use by a `ret` instruction should be to one of the following destinations:
 - The addresses for functions `touch1`, `touch2`, or `touch3`.
 - The address of your injected code
 - The address of one of your gadgets from the gadget farm.
- You may only construct gadgets from file `rtarget` with addresses ranging between those for functions `start_farm` and `end_farm`.

3 Target Programs

Both `CTARGET` and `RTARGET` read strings from standard input. They do so with the function `getbuf` defined below:

```
1 unsigned getbuf()
2 {
3     char buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
4     Gets(buf);
5     return 1;
6 }
```

The function `Gets` is similar to the standard library function `gets`—it reads a string from standard input (terminated by ‘\n’ or end-of-file) and stores it (along with a null terminator) at the specified destination. In this code, you can see that the destination is an array `buf`, declared as having `BUFFER_SIZE` bytes. At the time your targets were generated, `BUFFER_SIZE` was a compile-time constant specific to your version of the programs.

Functions `Gets()` and `gets()` have no way to determine whether their destination buffers are large enough to store the string they read. They simply copy sequences of bytes, possibly overrunning the bounds of the storage allocated at the destinations.

If the string typed by the user and read by `getbuf` is sufficiently short, it is clear that `getbuf` will return 1, as shown by the following execution examples:

```
unix> ./ctarget
Cookie: 0x1a7dd803
Type string: Keep it short!
No exploit. Getbuf returned 0x1
Normal return
```

Typically an error occurs if you type a long string:

```
unix> ./ctarget
Cookie: 0x1a7dd803
Type string: This is not a very interesting string, but it has the property ...
Ouch!: You caused a segmentation fault!
Better luck next time
```

(Note that the value of the cookie shown will differ from yours.) Program `RTARGET` will have the same behavior. As the error message indicates, overrunning the buffer typically causes the program state to be corrupted, leading to a memory access error. Your task is to be more clever with the strings you feed `CTARGET` and `RTARGET` so that they do more interesting things. These are called *exploit* strings.

Both `CTARGET` and `RTARGET` take several different command line arguments:

- h: Print list of possible command line arguments
- q: Don't send results to the grading server
- i FILE: Supply input from a file, rather than from standard input

Your exploit strings will typically contain byte values that do not correspond to the ASCII values for printing characters. The program `HEX2RAW` will enable you to generate these *raw* strings.

Important points:

- Your exploit string must not contain byte value `0x0a` at any intermediate position, since this is the ASCII code for newline (`'\n'`). When `Gets` encounters this byte, it will assume you intended to terminate the string.
- `HEX2RAW` expects two-digit hex values separated by one or more white spaces. So if you want to create a byte with a hex value of 0, you need to write it as `00`. To create the word `0xdeadbeef` you should pass `"ef be ad de"` to `HEX2RAW` (note the reversal required for little-endian byte ordering).

When you have correctly solved one of the levels, your target program will automatically send a notification to the grading server. For example:

Phase	Program	Level	Method	Function	Points
1	CTARGET	1	CI	touch1	10
2	CTARGET	2	CI	touch2	25
3	CTARGET	3	CI	touch3	25
4	RTARGET	2	ROP	touch2	35
5	RTARGET	3	ROP	touch3	5

CI: Code injection

ROP: Return-oriented programming

Figure 1: Summary of attack lab phases

```

unix> ./hex2raw < ctarget.l2.txt | ./ctarget
Cookie: 0x1a7dd803
Type string:Touch2!: You called touch2(0x1a7dd803)
Valid solution for level 2 with target ctarget
PASSED: Sent exploit string to server to be validated.
NICE JOB!

```

Figure 1 summarizes the five phases of the lab. As can be seen, the first three involve code-injection (CI) attacks on CTARGET, while the last two involve return-oriented-programming (ROP) attacks on RTARGET.

4 Part I: Code Injection Attacks

IMPORTANT: Before beginning Part I of this lab, please check the addresses of your touch1, touch2, and touch3 functions. You can use gdb or any other method to do so. If the generated touch1, touch2, or touch3 addresses contain the byte 0a (example: 0x40180a), please email robertchang25@g.ucla.edu ASAP to request a new target file.

For the first three phases, your exploit strings will attack CTARGET. This program is set up in a way that the stack positions will be consistent from one run to the next and so that data on the stack can be treated as executable code. These features make the program vulnerable to attacks where the exploit strings contain the byte encodings of executable code.

4.1 Level 1

For Phase 1, you will not inject new code. Instead, your exploit string will redirect the program to execute an existing procedure.

Function `getbuf` is called within CTARGET by a function `test` having the following C code:

```

1 void test()
2 {
3     int val;
4     val = getbuf();

```

```

5     printf("No exploit.  Getbuf returned 0x%x\n", val);
6 }

```

When `getbuf` executes its return statement (line 5 of `getbuf`), the program ordinarily resumes execution within function `test` (at line 5 of this function). We want to change this behavior. Within the file `ctarget`, there is code for a function `touch1` having the following C representation:

```

1 void touch1()
2 {
3     vlevel = 1;          /* Part of validation protocol */
4     printf("Touch1!: You called touch1()\n");
5     validate(1);
6     exit(0);
7 }

```

Your task is to get `CTARGET` to execute the code for `touch1` when `getbuf` executes its return statement, rather than returning to `test`. Note that your exploit string may also corrupt parts of the stack not directly related to this stage, but this will not cause a problem, since `touch1` causes the program to exit directly.

Some Advice:

- All the information you need to devise your exploit string for this level can be determined by examining a disassembled version of `CTARGET`. Use `objdump -d` to get this disassembled version.
- The idea is to position a byte representation of the starting address for `touch1` so that the `ret` instruction at the end of the code for `getbuf` will transfer control to `touch1`.
- Be careful about byte ordering.
- You might want to use GDB to step the program through the last few instructions of `getbuf` to make sure it is doing the right thing.
- The placement of `buf` within the stack frame for `getbuf` depends on the value of compile-time constant `BUFFER_SIZE`, as well the allocation strategy used by GCC. You will need to examine the disassembled code to determine its position.

4.2 Level 2

Phase 2 involves injecting a small amount of code as part of your exploit string.

Within the file `ctarget` there is code for a function `touch2` having the following C representation:

```

1 void touch2(unsigned val)
2 {
3     vlevel = 2;          /* Part of validation protocol */
4     if (val == cookie) {
5         printf("Touch2!: You called touch2(0x%.8x)\n", val);

```

```

6         validate(2);
7     } else {
8         printf("Misfire: You called touch2(0x%.8x)\n", val);
9         fail(2);
10    }
11    exit(0);
12 }

```

Your task is to get CTARGET to execute the code for `touch2` rather than returning to `test`. In this case, however, you must make it appear to `touch2` as if you have passed your cookie as its argument.

Some Advice:

- You will want to position a byte representation of the address of your injected code in such a way that `ret` instruction at the end of the code for `getbuf` will transfer control to it.
- Recall that the first argument to a function is passed in register `%rdi`.
- Your injected code should set the register to your cookie, and then use a `ret` instruction to transfer control to the first instruction in `touch2`.
- Do not attempt to use `jmp` or `call` instructions in your exploit code. The encodings of destination addresses for these instructions are difficult to formulate. Use `ret` instructions for all transfers of control, even when you are not returning from a call.

4.3 Level 3

Phase 3 also involves a code injection attack, but passing a string as argument.

Within the file `ctarget` there is code for functions `hexmatch` and `touch3` having the following C representations:

```

1 /* Compare string to hex representation of unsigned value */
2 int hexmatch(unsigned val, char *sval)
3 {
4     char cbuf[110];
5     /* Make position of check string unpredictable */
6     char *s = cbuf + random() % 100;
7     sprintf(s, "%.8x", val);
8     return strncmp(sval, s, 9) == 0;
9 }
10
11 void touch3(char *sval)
12 {
13     vlevel = 3;          /* Part of validation protocol */
14     if (hexmatch(cookie, sval)) {
15         printf("Touch3!: You called touch3(\"%s\")\n", sval);
16         validate(3);

```

```

17     } else {
18         printf("Misfire: You called touch3(\"%s\")\n", sval);
19         fail(3);
20     }
21     exit(0);
22 }

```

Your task is to get CTARGET to execute the code for `touch3` rather than returning to `test`. You must make it appear to `touch3` as if you have passed a string representation of your cookie as its argument.

Some Advice:

- You will need to include a string representation of your cookie in your exploit string. The string should consist of the eight hexadecimal digits (ordered from most to least significant) without a leading “0x.”
- Recall that a string is represented in C as a sequence of bytes followed by a byte with value 0. Type “`man ascii`” on any Linux machine to see the byte representations of the characters you need.
- Your injected code should set register `%rdi` to the address of this string.
- When functions `hexmatch` and `strcmp` are called, they push data onto the stack, overwriting portions of memory that held the buffer used by `getbuf`. As a result, you will need to be careful where you place the string representation of your cookie.

5 Part II: Return-Oriented Programming

Performing code-injection attacks on program RTARGET is much more difficult than it is for CTARGET, because it uses two techniques to thwart such attacks:

- It uses randomization so that the stack positions differ from one run to another. This makes it impossible to determine where your injected code will be located.
- It marks the section of memory holding the stack as nonexecutable, so even if you could set the program counter to the start of your injected code, the program would fail with a segmentation fault.

Fortunately, clever people have devised strategies for getting useful things done in a program by executing existing code, rather than injecting new code. The most general form of this is referred to as *return-oriented programming* (ROP) [1, 2]. The strategy with ROP is to identify byte sequences within an existing program that consist of one or more instructions followed by the instruction `ret`. Such a segment is referred to as a *gadget*. Figure 2 illustrates how the stack can be set up to execute a sequence of n gadgets. In this figure, the stack contains a sequence of gadget addresses. Each gadget consists of a series of instruction bytes, with the final one being `0xc3`, encoding the `ret` instruction. When the program executes a `ret` instruction starting with this configuration, it will initiate a chain of gadget executions, with the `ret` instruction at the end of each gadget causing the program to jump to the beginning of the next.

A gadget can make use of code corresponding to assembly-language statements generated by the compiler, especially ones at the ends of functions. In practice, there may be some useful gadgets of this form, but not



Figure 2: Setting up sequence of gadgets for execution. Byte value `0xc3` encodes the `ret` instruction.

enough to implement many important operations. For example, it is highly unlikely that a compiled function would have `popq %rdi` as its last instruction before `ret`. Fortunately, with a byte-oriented instruction set, such as x86-64, a gadget can often be found by extracting patterns from other parts of the instruction byte sequence.

For example, one version of `rtarget` contains code generated for the following C function:

```
void setval_210(unsigned *p)
{
    *p = 3347663060U;
}
```

The chances of this function being useful for attacking a system seem pretty slim. But, the disassembled machine code for this function shows an interesting byte sequence:

```
0000000000400f15 <setval_210>:
  400f15:    c7 07 d4 48 89 c7    movl    $0xc78948d4, (%rdi)
  400f1b:    c3                  retq
```

The byte sequence `48 89 c7` encodes the instruction `movq %rax, %rdi`. (See Figure 3A for the encodings of useful `movq` instructions.) This sequence is followed by byte value `c3`, which encodes the `ret` instruction. The function starts at address `0x400f15`, and the sequence starts on the fourth byte of the function. Thus, this code contains a gadget, having a starting address of `0x400f18`, that will copy the 64-bit value in register `%rax` to register `%rdi`.

Your code for `RTARGET` contains a number of functions similar to the `setval_210` function shown above in a region we refer to as the *gadget farm*. Your job will be to identify useful gadgets in the gadget farm and use these to perform attacks similar to those you did in Phases 2 and 3.

Important: The gadget farm is demarcated by functions `start_farm` and `end_farm` in your copy of `rtarget`. Do not attempt to construct gadgets from other portions of the program code.

A. Encodings of movq instructions

movq S, D

Source S	Destination D							
	%rax	%rcx	%rdx	%rbx	%rsp	%rbp	%rsi	%rdi
%rax	48 89 c0	48 89 c1	48 89 c2	48 89 c3	48 89 c4	48 89 c5	48 89 c6	48 89 c7
%rcx	48 89 c8	48 89 c9	48 89 ca	48 89 cb	48 89 cc	48 89 cd	48 89 ce	48 89 cf
%rdx	48 89 d0	48 89 d1	48 89 d2	48 89 d3	48 89 d4	48 89 d5	48 89 d6	48 89 d7
%rbx	48 89 d8	48 89 d9	48 89 da	48 89 db	48 89 dc	48 89 dd	48 89 de	48 89 df
%rsp	48 89 e0	48 89 e1	48 89 e2	48 89 e3	48 89 e4	48 89 e5	48 89 e6	48 89 e7
%rbp	48 89 e8	48 89 e9	48 89 ea	48 89 eb	48 89 ec	48 89 ed	48 89 ee	48 89 ef
%rsi	48 89 f0	48 89 f1	48 89 f2	48 89 f3	48 89 f4	48 89 f5	48 89 f6	48 89 f7
%rdi	48 89 f8	48 89 f9	48 89 fa	48 89 fb	48 89 fc	48 89 fd	48 89 fe	48 89 ff

B. Encodings of popq instructions

Operation	Register R							
	%rax	%rcx	%rdx	%rbx	%rsp	%rbp	%rsi	%rdi
popq R	58	59	5a	5b	5c	5d	5e	5f

C. Encodings of movl instructions

movl S, D

Source S	Destination D							
	%eax	%ecx	%edx	%ebx	%esp	%ebp	%esi	%edi
%eax	89 c0	89 c1	89 c2	89 c3	89 c4	89 c5	89 c6	89 c7
%ecx	89 c8	89 c9	89 ca	89 cb	89 cc	89 cd	89 ce	89 cf
%edx	89 d0	89 d1	89 d2	89 d3	89 d4	89 d5	89 d6	89 d7
%ebx	89 d8	89 d9	89 da	89 db	89 dc	89 dd	89 de	89 df
%esp	89 e0	89 e1	89 e2	89 e3	89 e4	89 e5	89 e6	89 e7
%ebp	89 e8	89 e9	89 ea	89 eb	89 ec	89 ed	89 ee	89 ef
%esi	89 f0	89 f1	89 f2	89 f3	89 f4	89 f5	89 f6	89 f7
%edi	89 f8	89 f9	89 fa	89 fb	89 fc	89 fd	89 fe	89 ff

D. Encodings of 2-byte functional nop instructions

Operation		Register R			
		%al	%cl	%dl	%bl
andb	R, R	20 c0	20 c9	20 d2	20 db
orb	R, R	08 c0	08 c9	08 d2	08 db
cmpb	R, R	38 c0	38 c9	38 d2	38 db
testb	R, R	84 c0	84 c9	84 d2	84 db

Figure 3: Byte encodings of instructions. All values are shown in hexadecimal.

5.1 Level 2

For Phase 4, you will repeat the attack of Phase 2, but do so on program `RTARGET` using gadgets from your gadget farm. You can construct your solution using gadgets consisting of the following instruction types, and using only the first eight x86-64 registers (`%rax-%rdi`).

`movq` : The codes for these are shown in Figure 3A.

`popq` : The codes for these are shown in Figure 3B.

`ret` : This instruction is encoded by the single byte `0xc3`.

`nop` : This instruction (pronounced “no op,” which is short for “no operation”) is encoded by the single byte `0x90`. Its only effect is to cause the program counter to be incremented by 1.

Some Advice:

- All the gadgets you need can be found in the region of the code for `rtarget` demarcated by the functions `start_farm` and `mid_farm`.
- You can do this attack with just two gadgets.
- When a gadget uses a `popq` instruction, it will pop data from the stack. As a result, your exploit string will contain a combination of gadget addresses and data.

5.2 Level 3

Before you take on the Phase 5, pause to consider what you have accomplished so far. In Phases 2 and 3, you caused a program to execute machine code of your own design. If `CTARGET` had been a network server, you could have injected your own code into a distant machine. In Phase 4, you circumvented two of the main devices modern systems use to thwart buffer overflow attacks. Although you did not inject your own code, you were able to inject a type of program that operates by stitching together sequences of existing code. You have also gotten 95/100 points for the lab. That’s a good score. If you have other pressing obligations consider stopping right now.

Phase 5 requires you to do an ROP attack on `RTARGET` to invoke function `touch3` with a pointer to a string representation of your cookie. That may not seem significantly more difficult than using an ROP attack to invoke `touch2`, except that we have made it so. Moreover, Phase 5 counts for only 5 points, which is not a true measure of the effort it will require. Think of it as more an extra credit problem for those who want to go beyond the normal expectations for the course.

To solve Phase 5, you can use gadgets in the region of the code in `rtarget` demarcated by functions `start_farm` and `end_farm`. In addition to the gadgets used in Phase 4, this expanded farm includes the encodings of different `movl` instructions, as shown in Figure 3C. The byte sequences in this part of the farm also contain 2-byte instructions that serve as *functional nops*, i.e., they do not change any register or memory values. These include instructions, shown in Figure 3D, such as `andb %al, %al`, that operate on the low-order bytes of some of the registers but do not change their values.

Some Advice:

- You'll want to review the effect a `movl` instruction has on the upper 4 bytes of a register, as is described on page 183 of the text.
- The official solution requires eight gadgets (not all of which are unique).

Good luck and have fun!

References

- [1] R. Roemer, E. Buchanan, H. Shacham, and S. Savage. Return-oriented programming: Systems, languages, and applications. *ACM Transactions on Information System Security*, 15(1):2:1–2:34, March 2012.
- [2] E. J. Schwartz, T. Avgerinos, and D. Brumley. Q: Exploit hardening made easy. In *USENIX Security Symposium*, 2011.