High-Level Modeling and Analysis of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

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Invited Paper

In this paper, we demonstrate a high-level approach to modeling, analyzing, and verifying complex safety-critical systems through a case study on the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) [1]–[3]; an avionics system that detects and resolves aircraft collision threats. Due to the complexity of the TCAS software and the hybrid nature of the closed-loop system, the traditional testing technique of exhaustive simulation does not constitute a viable verification approach. Moreover, the detailed specification of the system software employed to date as a means toward analysis and verification neither helps in intuitively understanding the behavior of the system nor enables the analysis of the closed-loop system behavior. We advocate defining high-level hybrid system models that capture the behavior not only of the software but also of the airplanes, sensors, pilots, etc. In particular, we show how the core components of TCAS can be captured by relatively simple hybrid I/O automata [4], [5], which are amenable to formal analysis. We then outline a methodology for establishing conditions under which TCAS guarantees sufficient separation in altitude for aircraft involved in collision threats. The contributions of this paper are the high-level models of the closed-loop TCAS system and the demonstration of the usefulness of high-level modeling, analysis, and verification techniques.

Keywords*—*Automata, formal verification, hybrid systems, safety critical, TCAS.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) [1]–[3] is an on-board aircraft conflict detection and resolution system used by all carrier aircraft in the United States of more than ten passengers. TCAS's task is to monitor air-traffic in the vicinity of the aircraft, to alert the pilot to nearby aircraft that may pose a collision threat, and to propose maneuvers so as to resolve these conflicts.

In practice, a safety-critical system such as TCAS is designed and implemented by undergoing extensive phases of testing through simulation. Unfortunately, this approach in verifying the correctness of a complex system's implementation has several shortcomings. First, as systems get more complex and their behavior is enriched, the number of simulations required to provide a particular level of confidence increases exponentially. Second, regression testing dictates that when modifications to the system are performed, the complete set of simulations must be reconducted so as to make sure that the modifications did not compromise the safety and performance guarantees of the system. Finally, and most importantly, the safety and performance guarantees obtained through extensive simulations are not absolute; in fact, it is not even possible to provide conditional performance guarantees, e.g., under certain assumptions, the system is guaranteed to perform as required.

In an effort to alleviate the shortcomings of trying *a posteriori* to demonstrate a system's correctness through exhaustive testing, there has been considerable effort in applying formal specification and analysis techniques to evaluate the correctness of such systems. Due to its safety-critical nature and its great exposure, TCAS has been one of the few commercial systems for which formal modeling and analysis has been attempted. Based on informally stated high-level specifications salvaged from the early design stages and the actual software implementation of TCAS, a state-machine model of the behavior of the TCAS system has recently been compiled [6]. After applying software refinement techniques [7] to guarantee that the TCAS software is truly implementing its higher level specifications, the specifications in turn are subsequently used as a basis for analyzing the behavior of the TCAS system. Unfortunately, it is our belief that such techniques, carried out either prior to or after a system's design and implementation, begin specifying the system and modeling its behavior at relatively detailed levels. In so doing,

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the intuitive understanding of the behavior of the system is overshadowed by the details and technicalities present in the detailed low-level specifications. Moreover, such techniques focus their attention only on the software components of the system at hand and, therefore, do not model the system as a whole. It is plausible that this approach neglects to model possibly hazardous aspects of the system's behavior.

In this paper, we demonstrate a high-level approach for modeling and analyzing complex safety-critical systems for which a "certain level of confidence" in the system's performance is insufficient. We advocate obtaining precise mathematical models of all core components of the closed-loop system at hand and reasoning about the system's closed-loop performance at a high level. The advantages of this approach are numerous. First, modeling all components of the system at hand provides a complete characterization of the behavior of the system—behavior not limited to the discrete or software components of the system. Second, modeling the system at a high level of abstraction captures the intuitive understanding of the behavior of the system—often, this intuition is lost when systems are solely specified at extreme detail by the system designers. Third, when analyzing the behavior of the system model, we can take advantage of formal notions of *composition* and *model refinement*. Composition enables the reasoning about a system's components in isolation and the subsequent use of the component-wise results when reasoning about the system as a whole. Model refinement enables the successive refinement of a system's model while guaranteeing that the lower level models are indeed implementations of the higher level models. In so doing, properties shown to be true of the behavior of more abstract models extend to more refined models without any proof obligations. Finally, this approach has several advantages in terms of testing the correctness or performance of the system at hand. The task of producing the mathematical model of the system exposes both assumptions made by the system designers and design errors. Moreover, once a precise system model has been specified, corrections resulting from errors can easily be made without the high overhead of regression testing. Finally, under explicitly stated assumptions, we are able to obtain absolute system safety and performance guarantees. The methodology presented here has already been successfully applied to various safety-critical transportation systems, such as automated highways [8], personal rapid transit systems [9], [10], train gate controllers [11], and the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) [12]. Although our current work concentrates on the verification of systems that have already been designed and implemented, we believe our approach would be more useful during a system's design phase.

The overall TCAS system is *hybrid*, involving both continuous and discrete dynamics; the former arise from the aircraft, sensors, and pilot reaction, and the latter from the thresholds and discrete message passing among aircraft. In order to model both the discrete and continuous aspects of the behavior of TCAS, we use the mathematical formalism of hybrid I/O automata (HIOA) [4], [5]. The verification techniques we use involve a combination of techniques from control theory and distributed algorithms.

We proceed by briefly surveying the prior work in the area of applying formal analysis techniques to air-traffic management systems and then present the hybrid I/O automaton model. In Section IV-A, we describe the TCAS system in more detail and present a HIOA model of each of the core components of the TCAS system. In Section V, we present a conditional safety analysis of an idealized closed-loop system comprised of a pair of aircraft. The proof involves splitting the aircraft encounters into categories and defining safety conditions, for each such category. Finally, by combining the per-category safety conditions, we obtain overall safety conditions. In Section VI, we conclude and suggest future research directions. Earlier versions of this work have been presented in [13] and [14].

II. Prior Work

The safety-critical nature of air-traffic management systems and the inadequacy of current system and software verification techniques have guided system designers toward formal approaches in specifying, modeling, and analyzing system behavior. To our knowledge, formal modeling and analysis techniques have been used to model and verify two systems in the area of air-traffic control and management: the TCAS—an on-board aircraft conflict detection and resolution system used by all carrier aircraft in the United States of more than ten passengers—and the CTAS—a system used at several airports to assist air-traffic controllers in scheduling the arrival and departure of aircraft in the vicinity of the airports.

In an attempt to design a formal specification language for complex software systems and while focusing on TCAS as their primary case study, Leveson *et al.* have developed the *requirements state machine language* (RSML) [6], a formal modeling language designed for requirements specification of process control systems. This language was designed based on prior formalisms for modeling complex systems, such as *StateCharts* [15], etc., and focuses primarily on providing simple system specifications that capture the essence of the systems at hand and are readable, understandable, and primarily usable by the designers and users of the system alike. The RSML specifications of TCAS produced by Leveson *et al.* [6] have actually become the official TCAS specifications. Recently, Leveson *et al.* [16] have been developing a process of producing system specifications, which focus on capturing the high-level system goals and requirements as well as the design decisions and assumptions made during a system's design phase. The resulting specifications, which are coined *intent specifications* to indicate that they capture the intents of the system designers, are geared toward capturing the intuitive understanding of the system being specified while noting the assumptions and rationale behind design decisions. Moreover, their multilevel structure provides an easy description of the system through which high-level reasoning about the behavior of the system is possible. Leveson *et al.* argue that intent specifications

are the preferred specification format that can be used to study, maintain, and revise the design of a complex system. In fact, they are designed so as to be easily readable and understandable by all the people involved in the design and use of such systems—in the case of TCAS, this would involve the designers of TCAS, air-traffic controllers, aircraft pilots, as well as newcomers who may be asked to update and augment the system.

There have been several efforts in studying the CTAS system. From a formal modeling and analysis perspective, Lygeros *et al.* [12] produced a high-level HIOA-based model of the CTAS system. The correctness analysis of the system was, however, deferred to future research. In the area of software analysis, Jackson *et al.* [17] studied the structure of the software involved in the CTAS system and discovered that due to fear of software redesign and to the continuous addition of new functionality, the CTAS's software has become complicated and inefficient. After redesigning a core component of CTAS's software, they concluded that basic software engineering techniques and new technology can make the system much simpler and easier to reason about, maintain, and augment.

III. Hybrid System Modeling Formalism

The modeling formalism used in this paper is the HIOA model [4], [5]. This model is an extension of the *timed I/O automaton* (TIOA) model [18], [19] and allows the explicit treatment of continuous behavior. In this section, we introduce the HIOA model and describe how this model can be used to model, analyze, and verify hybrid systems. For a detailed presentation of the HIOA model, the reader is referred to [4] and [5].

In the HIOA modeling formalism, a system is modeled as a collection of hybrid I/O automata, each of which specifies the discrete and continuous behavior of a particular component of the system. Each of these hybrid I/O automata is a (possibly) infinite state machine whose states are the valuations of a set of variables. The discrete behavior of a system is modeled by "jumps" in the state of its HIOA model, whereby the valuation of the system's state variables changes. These discrete jumps are specified as labeled transitions whose labels are the *actions* that carry out the transition from the initial to the final state of the jump. All possible jumps in an HIOA's state as a result of the execution of an action comprise the set of *discrete transitions* of the HIOA. The continuous behavior of a system is modeled by the continuous evolution of the valuation of the variables of the system model as time advances; that is, the continuous behavior of an HIOA model is specified by the set of *trajectories* of the state variables of the automaton. The external interface of an HIOA with its environment is dictated by the partition of its variables and its actions into three categories: *input, internal*, and *output*. Input variables and actions model the variables and actions of the environment that are exposed to the HIOA and over which the HIOA has no control. Internal variables and actions specify the internal functionality of the HIOA and are not exposed to the environment. In addition to modeling the behavior of the system, internal variables and actions are often used for bookkeeping purposes. Output variables and actions comprise the state and the discrete behavior of the system model that is exposed to the environment and over which the HIOA has control. Thus, the HIOA comprising the system model "communicate" through their shared input and output variables and actions.

In the following sections, we present a more detailed definition of hybrid I/O automata and give a brief comparison of HIOA and other hybrid system modeling formalisms.

A. Hybrid I/O Automata

A hybrid I/O automaton $A = (U, X, Y, \Sigma^{\text{in}}, \Sigma^{\text{int}}, \Sigma^{\text{out}}, \Theta, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{W})$ consists of three disjoint sets U, X, and Y of variables (input, internal, and output variables, respectively), three disjoint sets Σ^{in}, Σ^{int}, and Σ^{out} of *actions* (input, internal, and output actions, respectively), a nonempty set Θ of *initial states*, a set $\mathcal{D}$ of *discrete transitions*, and a set $\mathcal{W}$ of trajectories over V, where $\Sigma = \Sigma^{\text{in}} \cup \Sigma^{\text{int}} \cup \Sigma^{\text{out}}$ and $V = U \cup X \cup Y$. The initial states, the discrete transitions, and the trajectories of an HIOA must satisfy several technical conditions, which are omitted here.

The set of all valuations of V, or equivalently, the set of all states of A, is denoted by $\boldsymbol{V}$, or equivalently *states* (A). The initial states of A denote the states from which the evolution of the system is restricted to begin. When analyzing an HIOA A, it is often useful to define *derived* variables for A. Such variables are functionally dependent on the variables of the automaton A and, although useful in the analysis of A, are not essential in its definition.

Input variables and actions model the variables and actions of the environment that are exposed to the HIOA and over which the HIOA has no control. Thus, the input actions of A are always enabled; that is, an action a in Σ^{in} can be scheduled at any point in time. In order to model the scheduling of an action outside the HIOA A that is unobservable by A except possibly through discrete changes in the valuation of its input variables, the set of input actions Σ^{in} always contains the *environment* action c. When this action is scheduled, the valuation of the input variables of the automaton A may arbitrarily change, in effect modeling the environment's control over the input variables. In the special case when the valuation of the input variables does not change upon the scheduling of an environment action, the environment action is referred to as *stuttering*.

The set of discrete transitions $\mathcal{D}$ is comprised of all triples (s, a, s') (or equivalently $s \xrightarrow{a} s'$), each of which denotes the discrete transition of the HIOA A from a state s to a state s' through the scheduling of the action $a \in \Sigma$. By convention, the set of discrete transitions of A is specified by collectively describing all discrete transitions involving each action a in Σ in *precondition-effect* format. This format is comprised of a *label*, a *precondition*, and an *effect clause*. The *label* corresponds to the label of the action a. The *precondition* is a predicate over the variables of A and specifies the conditions under which the action a is enabled; that is, the precondition defines the set of states in which the action a may be scheduled. However, the scheduling of an action a in Σ is not

required whenever it is enabled. The valuation of the precondition of an action a in a state s is denoted by $s.Pre(a)$. The *effect clause* specifies the pseudocode that must be applied to the prestate of a discrete transition involving the action a so as to yield the poststate of the discrete transition. It follows that in order for (s, a, s') to be a discrete transition of A, the precondition in the specification of the action a must be satisfied by the prestate s, i.e., $s.Pre(a)$ must evaluate to `True`. Moreover, the application of the pseudocode in the effect clause of the specification of the action a to the prestate s must yield the poststate s'. Note that since input actions are always enabled, they have no preconditions, i.e., for any a in Σ^{in}, it is the case that $Pre(a) \equiv \texttt{True}$.

The set of trajectories $\mathcal{W}$ is a set of functions from intervals of time to valuations of the variables of A. For a trajectory w of A, $w \in \mathcal{W}$, and an instant in time t in the domain of w, $t \in dom(w)$, $w(t)$ represents the valuation of the variables of the HIOA t time units into the trajectory w. The *limit time* of a trajectory $w \in \mathcal{W}$, denoted by $w.ltime$, is defined to be the supremum of the domain of w, $dom(w)$. We define the *first state* of w, denoted by $w.fstate$, to be the state $w(0)$. Moreover, if the domain of w is right-closed, then we define the *last state* of w, denoted by $w.lstate$, to be the state $w(w.ltime)$. The set of trajectories $\mathcal{W}$ of A is specified by pseudocode, which describes the properties that any trajectory w involving the variables of A must satisfy in order to be a trajectory of A. By convention, the trajectory pseudocode consists of a collection of predicates, all of which must be satisfied throughout any trajectory w of A.

The evolution of the system as time advances is described by *hybrid executions*—finite or infinite alternating sequences of trajectories and actions. More formally, a *hybrid execution fragment* α of A is a finite or infinite alternating sequence $w_0 a_1 w_1 a_2 w_2 \ldots$, where $w_i \in \mathcal{W}$, $a_i \in \Sigma$, and if w_i is not the last trajectory of α, then w_i is right-closed and the discrete transition $(w_i.lstate, a_{i+1}, w_{i+1}.fstate)$ is in $\mathcal{D}$ (or equivalently $w_i.lstate \xrightarrow{a_{i+1}}_A w_{i+1}.fstate$). The set of all execution fragments of A is denoted by $execs(A)$. If the first state of α is an initial state, i.e., $w_0.fstate \in \Theta$, then α is a *hybrid execution* of A. A hybrid execution α of A is *finite* if it is a finite sequence and the domain of its final trajectory is a right-closed interval. A hybrid execution α of A is *admissible* if $\alpha.ltime = \infty$.

The *hybrid trace* of a hybrid execution fragment is defined as the evolution of the input and output variables of the HIOA; that is, the externally visible part of the hybrid execution. More formally, the *hybrid trace* of a hybrid execution fragment α of A, denoted by $h\text{-}trace(\alpha)$, is the sequence obtained by projecting α onto the external variables of A and subsequently removing all inert internal and environment actions. The set of *hybrid traces* of A, denoted by $h\text{-}traces(A)$, is the set of hybrid traces that arise from all the finite and admissible hybrid executions of A.

Since the valuation of the variables of an automaton A can change instantaneously, the variables of A can have multiple valuations at the same instant in time. However, it is possible to specify particular occurrences of states by designating the trajectory within which the state occurs and the time elapsed from the beginning of the trajectory to the point in time of the particular occurrence of the state within the given trajectory. Thus, we introduce the notion of *superdense time* in an execution fragment α of A as a pair (i, t), where $t \leq w_1.ltime$. We totally order superdense times in α lexicographically; that is, superdense times, e.g., (i, t) and (i', t'), are ordered first by the index of the trajectory, e.g., i and i', and then by their trajectory times, e.g., t and t'. Finally, an *occurrence of* a state s *in* α is specified by a triple (i, t, s) such that (i, t) is a superdense time in α and $s = w_i(t)$. State occurrences in α are ordered according to their superdense times.

Two HIOA A_1 and A_2 are said to be *comparable* if they have the same external interface, i.e., $U_1 = U_2$, $Y_1 = Y_2$, $\Sigma_1^{\text{in}} = \Sigma_2^{\text{in}}$, and $\Sigma_1^{\text{out}} = \Sigma_2^{\text{out}}$. In the HIOA model, the notion of an implementation relation is given by inclusion of the sets of hybrid traces; that is, provided that the A_1 and A_2 are comparable, A_1 implements A_2 if every external behavior of A_1 is allowed by A_2, i.e., $h\text{-}traces(A_1) \subseteq h\text{-}traces(A_2)$. In this setting, A_1 and A_2 are referred to as the *implementation* and the *specification*, respectively. We often use the notation $A_1 \leq A_2$ to denote that the hybrid traces of A_1 are included in those of A_2; that is, $A_1 \leq A_2 \triangleq h\text{-}traces(A_1) \subseteq h\text{-}traces(A_2)$ and, thus, $A_1 \leq A_2$ implies that A_1 *implements* A_2.

The composition of two HIOAs is defined as their synchronization on shared input/output variables and input/output actions. Two HIOA A_1 and A_2 can only be composed if they are *compatible*; that is, if $X_i \cap V_j = Y_i \cap Y_j = \Sigma_i^{\text{int}} \cap \Sigma_j = \Sigma_i^{\text{out}} \cap \Sigma_j^{\text{out}} = \emptyset$, for $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, $i \neq j$. If A_1 and A_2 are compatible then their *composition* $A_1 \times A_2$ is defined to be the tuple $A = (U, X, Y, \Sigma^{\text{in}}, \Sigma^{\text{int}}, \Sigma^{\text{out}}, \Theta, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{W})$ given by $U = (U_1 \cup U_2) - (Y_1 \cup Y_2)$, $X = X_1 \cup X_2$, $Y = Y_1 \cup Y_2$, $\Sigma^{\text{in}} = (\Sigma_1^{\text{in}} \cup \Sigma_2^{\text{in}}) - (\Sigma_1^{\text{out}} \cup \Sigma_2^{\text{out}})$, $\Sigma^{\text{int}} = \Sigma_1^{\text{int}} \cup \Sigma_2^{\text{int}}$, $\Sigma^{\text{out}} = \Sigma_1^{\text{out}} \cup \Sigma_2^{\text{out}}$, $\Theta = \{s \in \boldsymbol{V} | s\lceil V_1 \in \Theta_1 \ \wedge \ s\lceil V_2 \in \Theta_2\}$, and sets of discrete transitions $\mathcal{D}$ and trajectories $\mathcal{W}$, each of whose elements projects to discrete transitions and trajectories, respectively, of A_1 and A_2. It is important to note that the composition of two HIOAs results in an HIOA. Moreover, composition respects the implementation relation i.e., supposing B is an HIOA, if the HIOA A_1 implements the HIOA A_2, then the composition of A_1 with B implements the composition of A_2 with B.

Most of the proofs in the HIOA framework use *invariant assertions* and *simulations*. In the case of invariant assertions, the proofs are by induction on the length of a hybrid execution of the HIOA. Such proofs show that a particular predicate on the state of the HIOA is satisfied in every state of the execution. A simulation is a mapping between the states of two HIOAs and is used to prove that one HIOA implements another. The fact that the mapping is indeed a simulation is again done by induction on the length of a hybrid execution of the implementation. This induction matches up individual steps in the implementation with either single steps, or sequences of steps, in the specification; in effect, it is shown that each step of the implementation is allowed by the specification. Simulations are very useful because they promote reasoning about systems at a high level of abstraction. Suppose that we have shown that an abstract HIOA model of

a system exhibits a particular property and that we want to show that the same property holds for a more refined HIOA model of the system. One approach is to start from scratch and try to generate a new proof of the property for the refined model. An alternative approach is to show, through a simulation, that the refined model of the system actually implements the abstract model. In so doing, all the properties that have been shown to hold for the abstract model extend to the refined model without any proof obligations. The latter approach can greatly reduce the amount of work needed to extend results from more abstract to more refined models. This technique often results in multiple models of the system spanning several *levels of abstraction*.

To date, the proofs in all our case studies of hybrid systems have been conducted by hand. However, it is our belief that software support can be employed to assist in the various proof obligations. Moreover, we believe that given a sufficiently detailed HIOA model of a system, the software for the discrete parts of the actual system could be generated automatically such that, by construction, the software is a truthful implementation of its more abstract specifications.

B. Related Modeling Formalisms

The recent interest in the formal verification of real-time and hybrid systems has resulted in a number of techniques to model and analyze their behavior. In particular, the models that are analogous to the timed I/O automaton model [18], [19] are those of Alur and Dill [20], Lamport [21], and Henzinger *et al.* [22]. As is the case with the timed I/O automaton model, these models have also been extended to the hybrid setting; for instance, the timed transition model [22] has been extended to the phase transition model [23], [24]. Hybrid I/O automata are also analogous to phase transition models [23]–[26], from which they were actually inspired—the discrete transitions and the trajectories of hybrid I/O automata correspond to the transitions and the activities of phase transition systems. The hybrid system model [25], [26] is similar to the phase transition model with the distinction that, as in the hybrid I/O automaton model, discrete transitions are labeled, thus allowing the appropriate synchronization of composed automata. The distinction between the hybrid system model [25], [26] and the hybrid I/O automaton model lies in the latter's classification of the variables and discrete transitions into input, internal, and output.

IV. The TCAS System

A common paradigm in managing and controlling safety-critical systems has been to separate the system control into operation and protection. The operation aspect of the control is geared toward the normal operation of the system at hand and is optimized for functionality and performance. For large and complex systems, this translates into large and complex control systems whose reliability is questionable. The protection aspect of the control is responsible for the control of the system in case of emergency; that is, it is responsible for preventing hazards. By keeping the complexity of the protection subsystem low, system designers hope to increase the reliability of the closed-loop system. In the case of air-traffic management and control, the operation of the system is handled by the air-traffic controllers who instruct the aircraft pilots to follow specific flight paths. However, due to the complexity of the system, it was deemed appropriate to design a protection system that alerts pilots to nearby aircraft posing midair collision threats and proposes threat resolution maneuvers. This protection system is denoted the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System.

TCAS has evolved through a series of versions. The first version, TCAS I [1] [originally named the Beacon-Based Collision Avoidance System (BCAS)], issues a proximity warning or *traffic advisory* (TA) to alert a pilot to nearby aircraft that pose a midair collision threat. Airline regulations dictate that pilots should not undertake maneuvers in response to TAs, unless the aircraft posing the midair collision threat has been visually acquired. TCAS I has already been deployed and is mandatory for all carrier aircraft of ten to 30 passengers operating within the U.S. airspace.

The second version of TCAS, TCAS II [1]–[3], extends the functionality of its predecessor by proposing maneuvers that resolve the midair collision threats posed by nearby aircraft. In particular, TCAS II enters one of two levels of alertness. In the lower level, the system issues a TA to inform the pilot of a potential threat, without providing any suggestions on how to resolve the situation. If, however, the danger of collision increases, TCAS II issues a *resolution advisory* (RA); that is, it proposes to the pilot a flight maneuver that is supposed to resolve the midair collision threat. Airline regulations dictate that pilots should abide by the RAs proposed by the TCAS system, unless after visually acquiring the aircraft posing the midair collision threat a better resolution strategy is available. The RAs issued by TCAS II are restricted to the vertical plane. In particular, resolution maneuvers instruct the pilots to refrain from climbing or descending faster than a given ascent or descent rate, respectively. When all aircraft involved in the midair collision threat are TCAS equipped, TCAS II uses a symmetry-breaking communication protocol so as to determine consistent resolution maneuvers for each aircraft. For example, in the case of two aircraft, one of the two aircraft should be instructed not to climb faster than a given ascent rate and the other not to descend faster than a given descent rate. Following the determination of a consistent set of maneuvers, the maneuvers are continuously presented to the pilots until the midair collision threat has been resolved; that is, until TCAS II deems that the aircraft no longer pose a midair collision threat to each other.

Following extensive field testing and feedback from pilots and air-traffic controllers, TCAS II evolved through a series of minor revisions from its initial version to TCAS II-6.04A [2]; the version of TCAS that is currently standard for all carrier aircraft of more than 30 passengers operating within the U.S. airspace. Many of the minor revisions were conducted due to oversensitivity of the system, which would frustrate air-traffic controllers and make pilots reluctant to using the TCAS system.

The functionality of TCAS II-6.04A was further extended to allow RA *reversals*. This version of TCAS, TCAS II-7

[3], [27], continuously monitors and reevaluates the effectiveness of its previously issued RA. If at any point in time TCAS II determines that, while the RA currently being issued fails to resolve the conflict, the reversed RA resolves the conflict, it is capable of reversing the sense of the previously issued RA. In order to avoid situations in which TCAS induces successive reversals, TCAS II-7 is only allowed to reverse once. After recently being tested through extensive simulation [28], TCAS II-7 has been adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as the international standard and is mandatory for all new carrier aircraft.

Future versions of TCAS are already at the conceptual and development stage. TCAS III was intended to augment the functionality of TCAS II-7 by allowing RAs in both the horizontal and vertical planes. However, the complexity of augmenting the already complex TCAS II-7 system and the then inaccurate sensing hardware resulted in the abandonment of TCAS III early in its conceptual stage. The recent advancement in sensor technology and the potential use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) for accurate position measurement has revived the plans of horizontal RAs in the latest version of TCAS, TCAS IV.

It should be stressed that TCAS is a commercial product, intended for use on passenger aircraft. Therefore human factors issues, such as the comfort of the pilot, the passengers, and the air-traffic controllers, also need to be considered. Studies indicate that pilots get uncomfortable when presented with advisories of very short duration or with a sequence of conflicting advisories. The passenger comfort requirement imposes a limit on the accelerations that can be employed in a maneuver. Finally, air-traffic controllers dislike maneuvers that result in large and abrupt changes of altitude, as they conflict with their standard way of arranging air-traffic. Indeed, in all versions of the TCAS system, a substantial fraction of the TCAS functionality is devoted to such objectives.

A. Modeling TCAS Using HIOA

In this paper, we focus our attention on TCAS II-7; the version of TCAS II that is capable of RA reversals. Our model of the TCAS system is based on the low-level specifications of TCAS II-7 [3], [27]. Following the functional breakdown in TCAS's specifications, our model of the closed-loop TCAS system is comprised of the components shown in Fig. 1. While generating the component models, the input and output variables and actions of each of the component HIOA are chosen so as to correspond to the actual interfaces of the closed-loop system components. Since we want to evaluate the resolution aspects of TCAS, we model all aspects of the TCAS system relating to RAs and ignore those relating to TAs. Moreover, in order to keep the analysis tractable, we remove the functionality of TCAS that is devoted to human factors concerns. Finally, even though TCAS II-7 is capable of issuing TAs and RAs for conflicts involving multiple aircraft, our model is restricted to conflicts involving only two aircraft. In the following subsections, we describe the abstract models of each of the components of the closed-loop system shown in Fig. 1. Once again, we stress that the models presented in this section are abstract models of the system components and are intended for reasoning about the behavior of the closed-loop system at a high level of abstraction. As greater familiarity is gained with the system and more specific questions need to be answered, the component models may be refined so as to model the behavior of the system in more detail. Throughout the following subsections, we propose various such refinements for the component models of the closed-loop TCAS system. The formal models of all components are presented in Appendixes A–F. Earlier versions of these models appeared in [13] and [14].

Modeling the closed-loop TCAS system using HIOA has several advantages. First, in contrast with prior modeling approaches, which focus on modeling and verifying only the software components of the closed-loop system, HIOA can be used to model all aspects of the closed-loop system; that is, in addition to the various components comprising the TCAS system, we model the behavior of the pilots, the dynamics of the aircraft, and the communication channels. Second, by modeling each of the functional components of the system as a separate HIOA, we obtain a model that captures the inherent modularity in the system and promotes the understanding of both the system behavior and the component interaction. Moreover, by taking advantage of the formal notion of composition in the HIOA model, results obtained by analyzing the behavior of the component models in isolation, extend directly to the closed-loop system. Finally, using the HIOA model, we can take full advantage of model refinement; that is, properties shown to be true of more abstract models can be extended to more refined models by showing that the more refined models are indeed implementations of their more abstract counterparts. This can greatly reduce the amount of work needed to extend safety results from more abstract to more refined models. Moreover, since each of the components of the closed-loop system is modeled by an HIOA, we can selectively refine only the models of the components whose detailed behavior is essential in the safety and performance analysis. Essentially, by having a modular HIOA-based model of the closed-loop system, we can focus our attention on the components whose behavior is more important.

The following sections make use of the nomenclature, constants, data types, and parameters summarized in Table 1.

1) Aircraft Model: The model of the aircraft is intended to capture the flight of the aircraft and the interface of the aircraft with the sensor automata used to measure each aircraft's state. In so doing, we must adopt flight dynamics for the aircraft, describe the avionics equipment the aircraft, and specify the interface of the aircraft automaton with the sensor automata. In view of simplicity, we adopt very simple aircraft dynamics and assume that the aircraft output their exact state to the sensor automata. We thus defer the introduction of sensor uncertainty to the sensor automata.

Each aircraft, $i \in \{1, 2\}$, is modeled by the HIOA $A_i = (U_{A_i}, X_{A_i}, Y_{A_i}, \Sigma^{\text{in}}_{A_i}, \Sigma^{\text{int}}_{A_i}, \Sigma^{\text{out}}_{A_i}, \Theta_{A_i}, \mathcal{D}_{A_i}, \mathcal{W}_{A_i})$ (Appendix A). At this stage, we assume there are no output



Fig. 1. TCAS system block diagram.

Table 1
Nomenclature, Constants, Data Types, and Parameters

Nomenclature:
$\perp$ — the undefined element or variable valuation
Constants:
RMAX $= 12$ *nmi*
RDTHR $= 10$ *ft/s*
NomStr $= 1500$ *ft/min*
IncStr $= 2500$ *ft/min*
2NomStr $= 3000$ *ft/min*
Data Types:
Dir $= \{\text{Climb}, \text{Descend}\}$
Dir$_\perp$ $= \text{Dir} \cup \{\perp\}$
Strengths $= \{-2000, -1000, -500, 0, 1500, 2500\}$ *(ft/min)*
Aircraft $= \{1, 2\}$
Others$_i$ $= \text{Aircraft} \setminus \{i\}$, for all $i \in$ Aircraft
Parameters:
ALIM — Minimum Allowable Vertical Separation (*ft*)
DMOD — Threat Minimum Range Threshold (*nmi*)
H1 — Threat Minimum Divergence Threshold (nmi^2/s)
TRTHR — Threat Modified Tau Threshold (s)
ZT — Threat Altitude Threshold (*ft*)

or internal actions and no input action (other than the environment action), that is, $\Sigma^{\text{in}}_{A_i} = \{e\}$, $\Sigma^{\text{int}}_{A_i} = \Sigma^{\text{out}}_{A_i} = \emptyset$. At a later stage, appropriate actions can be added to model discrete changes in the physical system, such as malfunctions.

The avionics hardware with which each aircraft is equipped is specified by the output variable $Equipment_i \in \{\text{None, Report, TCAS}\}$; an aircraft could have no avionics hardware, an altitude reporting transponder, or, finally, an altitude reporting transponder and TCAS. When an aircraft is equipped with an altitude reporting transponder, the aircraft can be identified by its unique transponder identifier, which is specified by the output variable $Mode\_S_i \in \mathbb{N}$. All the aircraft considered in our analysis are assumed to be equipped with an altitude reporting transponder; that is, a $Mode\_S$ variable is defined for all aircraft and $Mode\_S_i \neq Mode\_S_j$, for all $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, $j \neq i$. The unique $Mode\_S$ identifier is used by TCAS for the purposes of symmetry braking; the smaller an aircraft's $Mode\_S$ identifier, the higher the aircraft's priority. At this stage, the variables $Mode\_S_i$ and $Equipment_i$ are assumed to have trivial dynamics: they simply maintain their initial value. At a later stage, more complicated dynamics may be added to model malfunctions that may change the status of the aircraft.

The physical movement of the airplane i is summarized by the trajectories of its position and velocity. Let $p_i = (x_i, y_i, z_i) \in \mathbb{R}^3$, $v_i = (v_{xi}, v_{yi}, v_{zi}) \in \mathbb{R}^3$, and $a_i = (a_{xi}, a_{yi}, a_{zi}) \in \mathbb{R}^3$ be the position, velocity, and acceleration of the aircraft i with respect to some fixed reference frame on the ground. We assume that all trajectories in $\mathcal{W}_{A_i}$ satisfy the differential equations $\dot{p}_i(t) = v_i(t)$ and $\dot{v}_i(t) = a_i(t)$. We assume that the aircraft acceleration is under the direct control of the pilot and set $Y_{A_i} = \{Mode\_S_i, Equipment_i, p_i, v_i\}$, $U_{A_i} = \{a_i\}$, and $X_{A_i} = \emptyset$. The aircraft dynamics we use are very simple and ignore important aircraft characteristics such as the details of the aerodynamic forces, high-frequency modes (due, for example, to flexion of the wings), the effect of structural controls (such as the flaps), and input constraints (such as those imposed by the aircraft engine). As the maneuvers required by TCAS are unlikely to excite high-order dynamics, induce input saturation, etc., these simple aircraft dynamics are deemed sufficient for our analysis.

2) Sensors: Each aircraft is equipped with sensors that return information about its state and the state of neighboring aircraft. In particular, a number of hardware and software components contribute information to TCAS, e.g., the aircraft's radio and pressure altimeters (which measure the aircraft's altitude), the aircraft's radar (which measures the range of neighboring aircraft), and the $Mode\_S$ transponders of other aircraft (which advertise the altitude of their respective aircraft). The information that the sensors receive is quantized spatially and sampled temporally. In fact, the data provided from the measuring devices (altimeters, radar, and transponders) can sometimes be quantized roughly; for example, although the transponders of nearby aircraft quantize the altitudes they report at either 25- or 100-ft increments, the altitude and range measured by each aircraft is typically quantized finer. In order to "smooth" the received data and produce estimates of the range and altitude rates of all aircraft, the data provided by the measuring devices are filtered. These filters are effectively simplified versions of the Kalman filter and are known as the "α-β-γ tracker" for the range data and the "α-β tracker" for the altitude data. If the quantization of the altitude data is coarse (100 ft), a nonlinear filter known as the "level-occupancy-time algorithm" is used instead. In our model of the aircraft sensors, we ignore the operation of these filters and the rules for switching between them.

The sensors of aircraft i are modeled by the HIOA $S_i = (U_{S_i}, X_{S_i}, Y_{S_i}, \Sigma^{\text{in}}_{S_i}, \Sigma^{\text{int}}_{S_i}, \Sigma^{\text{out}}_{S_i}, \Theta_{S_i}, \mathcal{D}_{S_i}, \mathcal{W}_{S_i})$ (Appendix B). The input variables of S_i are the positions and velocities of all aircraft, $U_{S_i} = \{p_j, v_j\}_{j \in \{1,2\}}$. The output variables of S_i are estimates of the altitude $h_{\text{ij}} \in \mathbb{R}$ and vertical rate $\dot{h}_{\text{ij}} \in \mathbb{R}$ for all aircraft and the distance (range) $R_{\text{ij}} \in \mathbb{R}^+$ and its rate $\dot{R}_{\text{ij}} \in \mathbb{R}$, between

aircraft i and the neighboring aircraft j. In other words, $Y_{S_i} = \{h_{ij}, \dot{h}_{ij}\}_{j \in \{1,2\}} \cup \{R_{ij}, \dot{R}_{ij}\}_{j \neq i}$. At this stage, the sensor automaton is assumed to have no input or internal actions ($\Sigma^{in}_{S_i} = \Sigma^{int}_{S_i} = \emptyset$).

We assume that the output variables of the sensor automaton fall within an interval centered at the "correct" values dictated by the actual state of the system. Let n_{Ai}, n_{ARi}, n_{Ri}, and n_{RRi} denote the width of the error intervals for h_{ij}, $\dot{h}_{ij}$, R_{ij}, and $\dot{R}_{ij}$ respectively, and $[a \pm b]$, for $b \geq 0$, denote the interval $[a-b, a+b]$. The output variables of the sensors are updated every T_{S_i} seconds, upon the occurrence of an output action $Sample_i$. We set $\Sigma^{out}_{S_i} = \{Sample_i\}$. An internal variable $t_{S_i} \in \mathbb{R}$ keeps track of the time that has elapsed since the last sample. Upon occurrence of $Sample_i$ the value of h_{ij} is reset to a new value in the interval $[z_j \pm n_{Ai}]$ (and similarly for the remaining output variables of the sensor).

We assume n_{Ai}, n_{ARi}, n_{Ri}, and n_{RRi} are constant; in a more refined model of the sensors, these quantities may constitute internal variables so as to model, for example, the effect of switching between filtering algorithms. In the current TCAS implementation, data can be sampled at either a high ($T_{S_i} = 1$ s) or a low ($T_{S_i} = 5$ s) rate. In our analysis, we assume that $T_{S_i} = 1$ throughout. If changes in the sampling rate need to be modeled at a later stage, T_{S_i} can be considered as an internal variable whose value changes whenever the sampling rate does.

If in future analyzes of the TCAS system a more refined model of the aircraft sensors is required, one may define and subsequently prove that the composition of more detailed automata representing the various sensory components implement the abstract sensor automaton S_i presented in this section.

3) Conflict Detection: The conflict detection automaton models the component of TCAS that is responsible for detecting whether neighboring aircraft pose a midair collision threat and whether previously declared threats have been resolved. The conflict detection automaton monitors the state of the aircraft provided by the sensor automaton and schedules actions that are used to declare and undeclare threats.

The conflict detection module is modeled by the HIOA $D_i = (U_{D_i}, X_{D_i}, Y_{D_i}, \Sigma^{in}_{D_i}, \Sigma^{int}_{D_i}, \Sigma^{out}_{D_i}, \Theta_{D_i}, \mathcal{D}_{D_i}, \mathcal{W}_{D_i})$ (Appendix C). The input variables of D_i are the output variables of S_i, as well as boolean variables $Threat_{ij}$, which indicate whether the conflict resolution module is already aware of the threat. Overall, $U_{D_i} = Y_{S_i} \cup \{Threat_{ij}\}_{j \neq i}$. At this stage D_i is assumed to have no input or internal actions ($\Sigma^{in}_{D_i} = \Sigma^{int}_{D_i} = \emptyset$) and no internal or output variables ($X_{D_i} = Y_{D_i} = \emptyset$). Aircraft j is declared a threat by aircraft i upon the occurrence of an output action $Declare_{ij}$ and ceases to be regarded as a threat upon the occurrence of an output action $Undeclare_{ij}$, i.e., $\Sigma^{out}_{D_i} = \{Declare_{ij}, Undeclare_{ij}\}_{j \neq i}$.

Two derived boolean variables, $Range\_Test_{ij}$ and $Altitude\_Test_{ij}$, are used to determine the preconditions of the $Declare_{ij}$ and $Undeclare_{ij}$ output actions. The $Range\_Test_{ij}$ encodes the conditions that the range and range rate of aircraft j with respect to aircraft i need to satisfy for aircraft j to be declared a threat by aircraft i

$$Range\_Test_{ij} = ((\dot{R}_{ij} > \texttt{RDTHR}) \wedge \hat{R}_1) \vee ((\dot{R}_{ij} \leq \texttt{RDTHR}) \wedge \hat{R}_2))$$

with

$$\hat{R}_1 = (R_{ij} \leq \texttt{DMOD}) \wedge (R_{ij}\dot{R}_{ij} \leq \texttt{H1})$$

and

$$\hat{R}_2 = (R_{ij} \leq \texttt{RMAX}) \wedge \left(\frac{R_{ij} - \frac{\texttt{DMOD}^2}{R_{ij}}}{\min\{\dot{R}_{ij}, -\texttt{RDTHR}\}} < \texttt{TRTHR} \right).$$

RMAX is a system constant equal to 12 nmi. RDTHR is a system constant equal to 10 ft/s. DMOD (or threat minimum range threshold, units of nmi), H1 (or threat minimum divergence threshold, units of nmi^2/s), and TRTHR (or threat modified tau threshold, units of s) are system parameters whose values are determined by the pilot-selected sensitivity and the ground-station-commanded sensitivity of TCAS.

The $Altitude\_Test_{ij}$ estimates the vertical separation between the aircraft i and j at the "time of closest approach;" that is, the vertical separation of the aircraft i and j at the time when their spatial separation is minimum. TCAS's estimate of the time to closest approach τ_{ij} is given by

$$\tau_{ij} = -\frac{R_{ij}}{\min\{\dot{R}_{ij}, -10\}}.$$

Thus, the altitude test $Altitude\_Test_{ij}$ is satisfied if the projected vertical separation of the aircraft i and j is below the system parameter ZT (or threat altitude threshold, units of ft). The parameter ZT depends on the aircraft altitude

$$Altitude\_Test_{ij} = (|(h_{ii} - h_{ij}) - (\dot{h}_{ii} - \dot{h}_{ij})\tau_{ij}| \leq \texttt{ZT}).$$

We assume that an intruding aircraft is declared a threat by TCAS as soon as it satisfies (or "passes") both the range and the altitude tests. In practice, a number of exceptions to this rule are introduced in the TCAS specifications, in order to reduce the number of false alarms and to improve the speed of detection in cases where additional information is available through communicated intents in conflicts involving TCAS equipped aircraft. In our analysis, we ignore all these exceptions. Once the aircraft j is declared a threat by the aircraft i, the aircraft j remains a threat until it fails the range test. At this point in time, the $Undeclare_{ij}$ output action is scheduled.

4) Conflict Resolution: The conflict resolution automaton models the component of TCAS that is responsible for issuing resolution advisories. The conflict resolution automaton gets initially alerted to a threat through either the conflict detection automaton or the intent messages sent by the neighboring aircraft. Following the threat detection and

periodically thereafter, the conflict resolution automaton evaluates its resolution advisory options and issues updated resolution sense and strength advisories. Whenever there is a change in the sense of an RA, the conflict resolution automaton sends a message to the other aircraft involved in the threat communicating its RA intentions. In order to avoid successive RA reversals, the conflict resolution automaton can only change the sense of an RA once.

The conflict resolution module is modeled by the HIOA $R_i = (U_{R_i}, X_{R_i}, Y_{R_i}, \Sigma^{\text{in}}_{R_i}, \Sigma^{\text{int}}_{R_i}, \Sigma^{\text{out}}_{R_i}, \Theta_{R_i}, \mathcal{D}_{R_i}, \mathcal{W}_{R_i})$ (Appendix D). The input variables of R_i are the output variables of the sensor automaton and the $Mode\_S$ and equipment information from the aircraft automata, i.e., $U_{R_i} = Y_{S_i} \cup \{Mode\_S_j, Equipment_j\}_{j\in\{1,2\}}$. The output variables of R_i are the boolean $Threat_{\text{ij}}$ variables, indicating that aircraft i considers aircraft j as a threat, and a resolution advisory for the pilot, consisting of a $Sense_i \in \{\text{Climb, Descend}, \perp\}$ and a $Strength_i \in \text{Strengths}$ (units of ft/min); negative strengths are referred to as *vertical speed limits* (VSLs), 1500 is referred to as the *nominal strength* (`Nomstr`), and 2500 as the *increased strength* (`IncStr`). The $Sense_i$ indicates whether aircraft i should try to pass above ($Sense_i = \text{Climb}$) or below ($Sense_i = \text{Descend}$) the intruding aircraft. The $Strength_i$ determines whether this goal is to be achieved by asking the pilot to avoid "bad" maneuvers (take no action that will force the vertical speed to exceed a particular VSL) or by asking the pilot to actively pursue "good" maneuvers (increase the vertical speed to 1500 or 2500 ft/min). $Sense_i = \perp$ indicates that no action is needed. In summary, the output variables of R_i are $Y_{R_i} = \{Sense_i, Strength_i\} \cup \{Threat_{\text{ij}}\}_{j\in\{1,2\}}$. R_i maintains three internal variables, the boolean $Reversed_i$ that keeps track of whether the sense selection has already been reversed during the current encounter, the boolean $Crossing_i$, which keeps track of whether the current RA implies that the aircraft would cross in altitude if they were to follow the RA, and $Intent\_Sent_{\text{ij}} \in \{\text{Climb, Descend}, \perp\}$, which keeps track of the last intent message sent by aircraft i to aircraft j. The intent messages can be thought of as "commands" to aircraft j as to which RA it should issue.[1] In summary, the internal variables of R_i are $X_{R_i} = \{Reversed_i, Crossing_i\} \cup \{Intent\_Sent_{\text{ij}}\}_{j\neq i}$.

R_i has no internal actions. Sense selection can happen when aircraft j is first declared a threat (upon the occurrence of the input action $Declare_{\text{ij}}$), whenever an intent message is received from another TCAS-equipped aircraft (upon the occurrence of and input action $Receive_{\text{ij}}(\text{dir})$, with $\text{dir} \in \{\text{Climb, Descend}\}$ being the intent of aircraft j), and whenever the system state is sampled by the sensors (upon the occurrence of input action $Sample_i$). The advisory is retracted whenever the intruding aircraft ceases to be considered a threat (upon the occurrence of the input action $Undeclare_{\text{ij}}$). In summary, the input actions of R_i are $\Sigma^{\text{in}}_{R_i} = \{Sample_i\} \cup \{Declare_{\text{ij}}, Receive_{\text{ij}}(\text{dir}), Undeclare_{\text{ij}}\}_{j\neq i}$. Aircraft i sends its intentions to aircraft j through an output action $Send_{\text{ij}}(\text{dir})$ where $\text{dir} \in \{\text{Climb, Descend}\}$ is the intent of aircraft i.

To predict the vertical separation at the estimated time to closest approach τ_{ij}, TCAS assumes that the intruding aircraft j will maintain its current course, i.e., $a_j \equiv [0\ 0\ 0]^T$. It also assumes that the pilot of aircraft i will respond to the advisory after a delay of exactly d (which depends on whether the advisory is new or a modification to an existing advisory) by applying a constant acceleration a in the vertical direction until the desired vertical rate (given by $Strength_i$) is reached. If the current vertical speed meets the $Strength_i$ requirement or if τ_{ij} is less than the pilot delay, TCAS assumes that aircraft i will also maintain its current course.

More formally, consider the derived variable σ_i which denotes the sense of the aircraft i, i.e., $\sigma_i = 1$ if $Sense_i = \text{Climb}$, $\sigma_i = 0$ if $Sense_i = \perp$, and $\sigma_i = -1$ if $Sense_i = \text{Descend}$. For $\sigma_i \in \{-1, 1\}$ and $Strength \in \text{Strengths}$, consider the derived variable

$$SEP_{\text{ij}}(\sigma_i, Strength) = \begin{cases} \sigma_i[(h_{\text{ii}} - h_{\text{ij}}) + (\dot{h}_{\text{ii}} - \dot{h}_{\text{ij}})\tau_{\text{ij}}], \\ \quad \text{if } (\tau_{\text{ij}} \le d) \vee (\sigma_i \dot{h}_{\text{ii}} \ge Strength) \\ \sigma_i[(h_{\text{ii}} - h_{\text{ij}}) + (\dot{h}_{\text{ii}} - \dot{h}_{\text{ij}})d \\ \quad +(\sigma_i Strength - \dot{h}_{\text{ij}})(\tau_{\text{ij}} - d)], \\ \quad \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The TCAS conflict resolution algorithm assumes that a Climb advisory will produce adequate separation at closest approach if $SEP_{\text{ij}}(1, 1500) \ge \texttt{ALIM}$, where `ALIM` is a system parameter that depends on the current altitude. Similarly, a Descend advisory is assumed to produce adequate separation if $SEP_{\text{ij}}(-1, 1500) \ge \texttt{ALIM}$. Note that in both cases the nominal strength is used. Throughout the following sections, we let $\texttt{NomStr} = 1500$ ft/min and $\texttt{2NomStr} = 3000$ ft/min.

Aircraft i issues an advisory against aircraft j for the first time either when the conflict detection module declares j a threat or when aircraft i receives an intent message from aircraft j, indicating that aircraft j has already issued a RA against aircraft i. In the former case, aircraft i (the first of the two to detect the conflict) chooses an advisory sense independently of aircraft j. If neither a Climb nor a Descent resolution provides adequate separation, the one that produces the largest separation is chosen.[2] If one of the two resolutions produces adequate separation but the other one does not, the one that does is chosen. If both produce adequate separation, preference is given to the noncrossing advisory; that is, the advisory that would result in the aircraft not crossing each other in altitude. For example, if aircraft i is already higher that aircraft j, then aircraft i should prefer a Climb resolution advisory. If aircraft j has already issued an advisory, the complementary sense (encoded by the received intent) is typically chosen. The only exception is if aircraft i has a

[1] In the TCAS code, a Climb intent is referred to as a "Do not Descend" and a Descend as a "Do not Climb."

[2] We conjecture that conflict detection will take place early enough so that this case will never have to be exercised. We include it here mainly for completeness.

lower $Mode\_S$ number, the received intent corresponds to a crossing maneuver and aircraft i deems that a noncrossing maneuver resolves the midair collision conflict.

The sense may be reversed later on if, for example, one (or both) of the pilots thwarts the advisory. If aircraft j is not TCAS equipped, or if it is but has a lower priority (i.e., higher $Mode\_S$ number) and the current advisory is crossing, aircraft i reverses its advisory whenever it is predicted that the current advisory will not lead to adequate altitude separation, while the reversed advisory will. However, aircraft i can only reverse once; the internal variable $Reversed_i$ is used to enforce this requirement. The new intent is communicated to aircraft j, which, due to its lower priority (i.e., higher $Mode\_S$ number), is forced to change its advisory accordingly.

The advisory strength is updated every time the state is sampled by $Sensor_i$; that is, upon the scheduling of each $Sample_i$ action. The choice of $Strength_i$ again depends on the predicted altitude separation of the aircraft at the estimated time to closest approach τ_{ij}. The new strength is chosen to make the derived boolean variable $Strength\_Choice_{\mathrm{ij}}$ true. If $Sense_i = \perp$, then it is the case that $Strength\_Choice_{\mathrm{ij}} =$ True; otherwise $Strength\_Choice_{\mathrm{ij}}$ is given by

$$
\begin{aligned}
&Strength\_Choice_{\mathrm{ij}}\\
&\quad = (SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, -2000) \geq \mathtt{ALIM}\\
&\qquad \Rightarrow Strength_i = -2000)\\
&\qquad \wedge (SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, -1000) \geq \mathtt{ALIM} > SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, -2000)\\
&\qquad\quad \Rightarrow Strength_i = -1000)\\
&\qquad \wedge (SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, -500) \geq \mathtt{ALIM} > SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, -1000)\\
&\qquad\quad \Rightarrow Strength_i = -500)\\
&\qquad \wedge (SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, 0) \geq \mathtt{ALIM} > SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, -500)\\
&\qquad\quad \Rightarrow Strength_i = 0)\\
&\qquad \wedge (SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, 1500) \geq \mathtt{ALIM} > SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, 0)\\
&\qquad\quad \Rightarrow Strength_i = 1500)\\
&\qquad \wedge (\mathtt{ALIM} > SEP_{\mathrm{ij}}(\sigma_i, 1500)\\
&\qquad\quad \Rightarrow Strength_i = 2500).
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that in all cases the weakest (and hopefully least disruptive) strength that guarantees adequate separation is chosen.

5) Pilot: The pilot automaton models the behavior of the pilot of the aircraft. Upon getting alerted to a threat, the pilot either implements the resolution advisory within a predefined implementation delay or ignores the resolution advisory. For reasons of simplicity, pilots are assumed to have direct control over the aircraft's acceleration. Moreover, pilots are assumed to implement the resolution advisories by exerting a constant vertical acceleration until the vertical rate proposed by the resolution advisory is reached.

The pilot is modeled by the HIOA $P_i = (U_{P_i}, X_{P_i}, Y_{P_i}, \Sigma^{\mathrm{in}}_{P_i}, \Sigma^{\mathrm{int}}_{P_i}, \Sigma^{\mathrm{out}}_{P_i}, \Theta_{P_i}, \mathcal{D}_{P_i}, \mathcal{W}_{P_i})$ (Appendix F). The input variables are the sense and strength of the RA issued by TCAS and the vertical rate of aircraft i, i.e., $U_{P_i} = \{Sense_i, Strength_i, \dot{h}_{\mathrm{ii}}\}$. The output variable is the acceleration of the aircraft, i.e., $Y_{P_i} = \{a_i\}$. New advisories issued by TCAS are stored in an internal queue Adv_Q_i. Each element of the queue contains the sense and strength of the corresponding advisory, as well as upper and lower bounds on the time that may elapse before the pilot implements the respective advisory. The internal variables $Last\_Sense_i$ and $Last\_Strength_i$ store the last advisory issued by TCAS. The internal variables $Current\_Sense_i$ and $Current\_Strength_i$ store the last advisory implemented by the pilot; all "in-between" advisories are stored in Adv_Q_i.

The pilot automaton has no input or output actions. An internal action $New\_Advisory_i$ takes place whenever a new advisory is issued by TCAS. The effect of the action is to add the advisory to the tail of Adv_Q_i. The internal action $Implement\_Advisory_i$ takes place whenever an advisory from Adv_Q_i (not necessarily the one at the head) is implemented by the pilot. All earlier advisories are flushed from the queue and the pilot chooses nondeterministically whether to follow the advisory according to the value of the internal variable $Follow_i$. The implementation time for each advisory is guaranteed to be within an interval $[\underline{d}_i, \overline{d}_i]$ from the time it gets issued by TCAS, unless it is "superseded" by the implementation of a later advisory.

We assume that the pilot can exert a range of accelerations in each of the three directions: $a_{xi}(t) \in [\underline{a}_{xi}, \overline{a}_{xi}]$, $a_{yi}(t) \in [\underline{a}_{yi}, \overline{a}_{yi}]$, and $a_{zi}(t) \in [\underline{a}_{zi}, \overline{a}_{zi}]$. We denote this compactly by $a_i \in [\underline{a}_i, \overline{a}_i]$. We also assume that the pilot tries to maintain the vertical velocity within a certain range, $[\underline{v}_{zi}, \overline{v}_{zi}]$. The width of these ranges reflects considerations such as passenger comfort, standard pilot practice, and the capabilities of the aircraft.

If the pilot chooses to follow an advisory, he is assumed to respond by applying a constant vertical acceleration $|a_{zi}| = a$ until the desired vertical rate is reached. A pilot is assumed to do nothing (set $a_{zi} = 0$) if he decides to follow the advisory and the current vertical rate meets the advisory strength. We assume that when no advisory is present or when the pilot chooses not to follow it, he arbitrarily sets the vertical acceleration in the interval $[\underline{a}_i, \overline{a}_i]$, in a way that will not cause the desired limits on vertical speed to be violated. To ensure that all advisories can be followed, we impose the following assumption.

Assumption 1: $\underline{a}_{zi} \leq -a < 0 < a \leq \overline{a}_{zi}$, $[-2500, 2500] \subseteq [\underline{v}_{zi}, \overline{v}_{zi}]$ and at the states $v_{zi} \in [\underline{v}_{zi}, \overline{v}_{zi}]$.

6) Communication Channel: The communication channel automaton models the medium through which an aircraft can send messages to neighboring aircraft. We abstract away the details of the communication medium by assuming that messages are queues within the communication channel and are delivered to their destination within given propagation delay bounds.

Communication of intents is achieved through the communication channel HIOA C_{ij} (Appendix E). The automaton has an input action $Send_{\mathrm{ij}}(\mathrm{dir})$, for $dir \in Dir$, whose effect is to store the intent dir together with time stamps providing lower and upper bounds on the delivery time in an internal queue. The message is delivered (and removed from the queue) upon

occurrence of the output action $Receive_{\mathrm{ji}}(\mathrm{dir})$, for $dir \in Dir$. The delivery time for each message is guaranteed to be within interval $[\underline{d}_{\mathrm{ij}}, \overline{d}_{\mathrm{ij}}]$ from the time the message was sent.

7) TCAS and the Closed-Loop System: We define the HIOA TCAS_i as the composition of S_i, D_i, and R_i with all variables in $Y_{S_i} \cup \{Threat_{\mathrm{ij}}\}_{j \neq i}$ and all actions in $\Sigma^{\mathrm{out}}_{S_i} \cup \Sigma^{\mathrm{out}}_{D_i}$ hidden. The interface of the TCAS_i with the outside world is through the input variables $U_{\mathrm{TCAS}_i} = U_{S_i} \cup \{Mode\_S_j, Equipment_j\}_{j \neq i}$, the output variables $Y_{\mathrm{TCAS}_i} = \{Sense_i, Strength_i\}$, the input actions $Receive_{\mathrm{ij}}(\mathrm{dir})$, for $dir \in Dir$, and the output actions $Send_{\mathrm{ij}}(\mathrm{dir})$. It is important to note that if the aircraft is not TCAS-equipped, no advisories are produced and no messages are sent.

Definition 1: The closed-loop system of two aircraft, denoted by PS, is modeled as the composition of A_i, TCAS_i, P_i, and C_{ij}, *for* $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, $i \neq j$, i.e., $PS = \prod_{i,\, j \in \{1,2\},\, i \neq j} A_i \times \mathrm{TCAS}_i \times P_i \times C_{\mathrm{ij}}$.

V. Safety of a Pair of Well-Behaved and TCAS-Equipped Aircraft

In this section, we present various safety conditions for a simplified version of a closed-loop system involving two aircraft. We begin by defining our system: a pair of well-behaved and TCAS-equipped aircraft. We then determine the maximum time required for the TCAS system to issue consistent RAs and for the pilots to implement these advisories. We proceed by categorizing the executions of this system and by providing safety conditions for each of the execution categories. We conclude by combining the per-category safety conditions into safety conditions for any execution of our system.

Throughout this section, while formally modeling and analyzing the behavior of the closed-loop TCAS system, we make several assumptions, some of which are quite restrictive. Indeed, many of these assumptions may merely be *simplifying assumptions*; that is, assumptions that were made in order to keep the analysis task tractable. However, some of these assumptions may be *intrinsic assumptions*; that is, assumptions that correspond to either undocumented assumptions made during the design phase of the TCAS system, or actual limits of the TCAS system. We argue that the generation of these assumptions is a very important byproduct of the formal analysis using HIOA. These assumptions expose various issues regarding the closed-loop TCAS system that need to be addressed in future research. On one hand, the simplifying assumptions need to be relaxed and, on the other hand, the intrinsic assumptions need to be examined and validated prior to claiming any safety and performance guarantees. An assumption that can be neither relaxed nor validated would indicate that the TCAS system is flawed and, thus, in need of redesign.

In proving the various properties of the closed-loop TCAS system, it was convenient to reason about the discrete and continuous behavior in isolation. For example, we determine the worst case time bound in obtaining consistent resolution advisories and implementing them by only reasoning about the discrete behavior of the system. Conversely, we determine the projected vertical separation obtained by the various RAs by only reasoning about the continuous behavior of the system. An additional advantage of using the HIOA modeling formalism is that the various discrete and continuous properties are stated in formal statements, which can be combined so as to state properties of the hybrid system behavior.

A. A Pair of Well-Behaved and TCAS-Equipped Aircraft

In this section, we define a simple and idealized closed-loop TCAS system WBS. The aircraft are assumed to be TCAS-equipped, their sensors are assumed to be exact, pilots are assumed to always abide by the RAs issued by the TCAS system, and the aircraft are assumed to follow flight paths that have constant horizontal velocities. Moreover, in an effort to simplify the analysis of the TCAS system, we assume that the pilot can apply infinite acceleration in the vertical direction, i.e., $a = \infty$, so as to attain the resolution strength suggested by the TCAS system. Although this assumption is not representative of reality, in effect it corresponds to analyzing a system where the pilot requires some additional delay in responding to a resolution advisory.

Definition 2: A WBS is a TCAS system of two aircraft for which $Equipment_i = \mathrm{TCAS}$, $n_{\mathrm{Ai}} = 0$, $n_{\mathrm{ARi}} = 0$, $n_{\mathrm{Ri}} = 0$, $n_{\mathrm{RRi}} = 0$, $Follow_i = \mathtt{True}$, $a_{xi} = a_{yi} = 0$, for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, and $a = \infty$.

For a pair of well-behaved and TCAS-equipped aircraft WBS, the system state is denoted by s, the maximum and minimum pilot delays in implementing RAs are denoted by $\overline{d}_p = \max\{\overline{d}_1, \overline{d}_2\}$ and $\underline{d}_p = \min\{\overline{d}_1, \overline{d}_2\}$, respectively, the maximum and minimum communication delays are denoted by $\overline{d}_c = \max\{\overline{d}_{12}, \overline{d}_{21}\}$ and $\underline{d}_c = \min\{\overline{d}_{12}, \overline{d}_{21}\}$, respectively, and the difference in the aircraft position and velocity components is denoted by $\Delta x = x_1 - x_2$, $\Delta y = y_1 - y_2$, $\Delta z = z_1 - z_2$, $\Delta v_x = v_{x1} - v_{x2}$, $\Delta v_y = v_{y1} - v_{y2}$, and $\Delta v_z = v_{z1} - v_{z2}$. Since the sensors of the aircraft in WBS are assumed to be exact, it is the case that for $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, $h_{\mathrm{ij}} = z_j$, $\dot{h}_{\mathrm{ij}} = v_{zj}$, $R_{\mathrm{ij}} = \sqrt{\Delta x^2 + \Delta y^2 + \Delta z^2}$, and $\dot{R}_{\mathrm{ij}} = dR_{\mathrm{ij}}/dt$ at the times when the action $Sample_i$ is scheduled (similarly for j). As the "views" of the world available to the aircraft are exact, we use z_i instead of h_{ii} and h_{ji}, $R\,(\dot{R})$ instead of R_{ij} and R_{ji} ($\dot{R}_{\mathrm{ij}}$ and $\dot{R}_{\mathrm{ji}}$) throughout the remaining sections. To simplify the notation, we also assume that the maximum ascent/descent rates of both aircraft are equal; that is, $\overline{v}_{z1} = \overline{v}_{z2}$ and $\underline{v}_{z1} = \underline{v}_{z2}$. Thus, we define the upper bound on the magnitude of relative vertical speed as $\overline{\Delta v}_z = -\underline{\Delta v}_z = \overline{v}_{z1} - \underline{v}_{z2} = \overline{v}_{z2} - \underline{v}_{z1}$. Finally, we let $\mathcal{S}$ denote the set of states of WBS and $Admissible\_Execs$ denote the set of admissible executions of WBS, i.e., $Admissible\_Execs = \{\alpha \in execsWBS \mid \alpha.fstate \in \Theta_{WBS} \text{ and } \alpha.ltime = \infty\}$.

We assume that the various parameters used by TCAS remain constant throughout any execution of WBS. As discussed in Section IV, these parameters depend on the altitude of the aircraft and on the sensitivity settings of the TCAS system.

Assumption 2: The parameters ALIM, DMOD, H1, TRTHR, and ZT are constant throughout any execution of WBS.

Without loss of generality, we assume that aircraft 1 is the high-priority aircraft.

Assumption 3: $Mode\_S_1 < Mode\_S_2$

In view of only considering TCAS resolutions that utilize nominal resolutions, we assume that the actions $Declare_{ij}$, $Sample_i$, and $Receive_{ij}(dir)$, for $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, $i \neq j$ and $dir \in Dir$, only set the $Strength_1$ and $Strength_2$ variables to 1500 ft/min. Indeed, since TCAS periodically resets the strength of the RA based on reevaluating the projected vertical separation of the aircraft, this assumption limits the interaction of discrete and continuous behavior in TCAS. We defer the relaxation of this assumption to future research.

Assumption 4: $Strength_1 = Strength_2 =$ NomStr $=$ 1500 ft/min.

Also, we assume that once pilots get alerted to a threat, they do not oppose the RA suggested by TCAS. For example, following the issuing of a RA that instructs the pilot to climb, it is assumed that the pilot will not decrease the aircraft's vertical speed prior to implementing the RA. This assumption is in agreement with our prior assumption that the pilots follow the RAs proposed by the TCAS system.

Assumption 5: Pilots do not oppose advisories, i.e., for any state $s \in \mathcal{S}$, $s.\sigma_i s.a_i \geq 0$, for $i \in \{1, 2\}$.

For any state $s \in \mathcal{S}$, we define a derived variable $s.T$ that denotes the time to closest horizontal approach of the aircraft.

Definition 3: For any state $s \in \mathcal{S}$, let $s.T$ be defined as follows:

$$T = -\frac{\Delta x \Delta v_x + \Delta y \Delta v_y}{\Delta v_x^2 + \Delta v_y^2}.$$

By taking the derivative of T with respect to time, and recalling that $a_{xi} = a_{yi} = 0$, for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, it can be shown that the time to closest horizontal approach is fixed in time.

For any execution $\alpha \in execs(WBS)$ and a state $s \in \mathcal{S}$, let $s \in \alpha$ denote that s is visited along α. By abusing the notation on state occurrences, when we refer to a state s occurring within an execution α of WBS, we refer to a particular state occurrence of the state s within α.

The states visited along an execution are ordered, i.e., for $s_1, s_2 \in \alpha$, we write $s_1 \leq s_2$ to denote that s_1 is visited by the finite prefix of α ending in s_2.

Definition 4: For $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, $i \neq j$, $Conflict\_Imminent_{ij} = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid \exists dir \in Dir$: $(s.Pre(Declare_{ij}) =$ True$) \vee (s.Pre(Receive_{ij}(dir) =$ True$)\}$.

Definition 5: $Conflict\_Imminent = Conflict\_Imminent_{12} \cup Conflict\_Imminent_{21}$.

Definition 6: $Non\_Cross = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid (s.Sense_1 \neq \perp) \wedge (s.Crossing_1 =$ False$)\}$.

Definition 7: $Cross = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid (s.Sense_1 \neq \perp) \wedge (s.Crossing_1 =$ True$)\}$.

Lemma 1: $Non\_Cross \cap Cross = \emptyset$.

We define a history boolean variable $Conflict\_Over \in$ Bool that records the termination of a conflict. Thus, $Conflict\_Over$ is False initially, and becomes True upon the occurrence of either an $Undeclare_{12}$ or $Undeclare_{21}$ action.

Definition 8: $Conflict\_Resolved = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid s.Conflict\_Over =$ True$\}$.

The following assumption states that once either an $Undeclare_{12}$ or $Undeclare_{21}$ action in scheduled by WBS, the aircraft no longer pose a threat to each other—that is, we assume that the TCAS system is conservative in undeclaring a potential threat and that it deems it appropriate to undeclare a threat when indeed it is safe to do so. We realize that this assumption is restricting, but we are interested in analyzing the performance of the TCAS system whenever it is engaged through the time of closest horizontal approach and are not concerned with the cases in which TCAS undeclares prematurely. We defer the analysis of whether the TCAS system actually undeclares prematurely to future research.

Assumption 6: For any state $s \in \mathcal{S}$ of WBS, it is the case that both $s.Pre(Undeclare_{12})$ and $s.Pre(Undeclare_{21})$ imply that $s.T < 0$.

B. Agreement Protocol

We first define the set of execution fragments $Stable\_Resolution\_Frags$ that consists of all execution fragments of WBS in which threats are not undeclared and reversals do not occur, i.e., for any execution fragment α in $Stable\_Resolution\_Frags$, none of the $Sample_1$ and $Sample_2$ actions in α affects the $Sense_1$ and $Sense_2$ variables, respectively, and the $Undeclare_{12}$ and $Undeclare_{21}$ actions are never scheduled within α.

In Table 2, we define sets of states of WBS that represent milestones of the protocol used by TCAS to obtain consistent RAs when two aircraft are involved in a conflict. The following lemma specifies that the milestones of Table 2 correspond to the incremental progress in the agreement protocol between the two aircraft involved in the conflict.

Lemma 2:

1) $Global\text{-}Agreement \subseteq Global\text{-}Resolution\text{-}Sent$;
2) $Global\text{-}Resolution\text{-}Sent \subseteq Global\text{-}Resolution$;
3) $Global\text{-}Resolution \subseteq Local\text{-}Resolution\text{-}Sent$;
4) $Local\text{-}Resolution\text{-}Sent \subseteq Local\text{-}Resolution$;
5) $Local\text{-}Resolution \subseteq Local\text{-}Awareness\text{-}Sent$;
6) $Local\text{-}Awareness\text{-}Sent \subseteq Local\text{-}Awareness$.

The following lemma specifies the time that is needed to progress through some of the milestones of the TCAS agreement protocol, provided that neither RAs get undeclared nor reversals occur. Once any aircraft gets alerted to the threat, the high-priority aircraft gets alerted within $\overline{d}_c$ time units, a consistent advisory is reached within $2\overline{d}_c$, and the protocol terminates within $3\overline{d}_c$. It is important to note that once consistent RAs are obtained, both pilots may implement the RA within $\overline{d}_p$ time units provided they decide to follow the RA. Thus, provided that the pilots follow RAs, $\overline{d}_c + \overline{d}_p$ time units after the high-priority aircraft gets alerted to the advisory, both aircraft have already implemented the RAs.

Table 2
Milestone sets of the TCAS RA protocol

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\textit{Local-Awareness} = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid \\
&\quad (s.\textit{Threat}_{12} \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_1 \neq \perp) \\
&\quad \vee (s.\textit{Threat}_{21} \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_2 \neq \perp)\} \\
&\textit{Local-Awareness-Sent} = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid \\
&\quad (s.\textit{Threat}_{12} \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_1 \neq \perp) \\
&\quad \vee (s.\textit{Threat}_{21} \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_2 \neq \perp \\
&\qquad \wedge s.\textit{Intent\_Sent}_{21} \neq \perp)\} \\
&\textit{Local-Resolution} = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid \\
&\quad s.\textit{Threat}_{12} \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_1 \neq \perp\} \\
&\textit{Local-Resolution-Sent} = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid s.\textit{Threat}_{12} \\
&\quad \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_1 \neq \perp \wedge s.\textit{Intent\_Sent}_{12} = \overline{s.\textit{Sense}_1}\} \\
&\textit{Global-Resolution} = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid \\
&\quad s.\textit{Threat}_{12} \wedge s.\textit{Threat}_{21} \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_2 \neq s.\textit{Sense}_1 \\
&\quad \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_1 \neq \perp \wedge s.\textit{Intent\_Sent}_{12} = \overline{s.\textit{Sense}_1} \\
&\quad \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_2 \neq \perp \wedge s.\textit{mset}_{12} = \emptyset\} \\
&\textit{Global-Resolution-Sent} = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid \\
&\quad s.\textit{Threat}_{12} \wedge s.\textit{Threat}_{21} \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_1 \neq s.\textit{Sense}_2 \\
&\quad \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_1 \neq \perp \wedge s.\textit{Intent\_Sent}_{12} = \overline{s.\textit{Sense}_1} \\
&\quad \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_2 \neq \perp \wedge s.\textit{Intent\_Sent}_{21} = \overline{s.\textit{Sense}_2} \\
&\quad \wedge s.\textit{mset}_{12} = \emptyset\} \\
&\textit{Global-Agreement} = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid \\
&\quad s.\textit{Threat}_{12} \wedge s.\textit{Threat}_{21} \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_1 \neq s.\textit{Sense}_2 \\
&\quad \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_1 \neq \perp \wedge s.\textit{Intent\_Sent}_{12} = \overline{s.\textit{Sense}_1} \\
&\quad \wedge s.\textit{Sense}_2 \neq \perp \wedge s.\textit{Intent\_Sent}_{21} = \overline{s.\textit{Sense}_2} \\
&\quad \wedge s.\textit{mset}_{12} = \emptyset \wedge s.\textit{mset}_{21} = \emptyset\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Lemma 3: For any finite execution fragment α of WBS in $Stable\_Resolution\_Frags$ such that $\alpha.fstate \in Local\text{-}Awareness$, it is the case that:

1) $\alpha.ltime > \overline{d}_c \Longrightarrow \alpha.lstate \in Local\text{-}Resolution$;
2) $\alpha.ltime > 2\overline{d}_c \Longrightarrow \alpha.lstate \in Global\text{-}Resolution$;
3) $\alpha.ltime > 3\overline{d}_c \Longrightarrow \alpha.lstate \in Global\text{-}Agreement$;
4) $\alpha.ltime > 3\overline{d}_c + \overline{d}_p \Longrightarrow (\neg s.Follow_1 \vee (\sigma s.v_{z1} \geq \texttt{NomStr})) \wedge (\neg s.Follow_2 \vee (-\sigma s.v_{z2} \geq \texttt{NomStr}))$, where $s = \alpha.lstate$ and $\sigma = 1$, if $s.Sense_1 = Climb$, and $\sigma = -1$ otherwise.

C. Execution Categorization

We partition the hybrid executions of WBS into the following four categories.

1) $Conflict\_Free\_Execs$, executions for which the TCAS protocol is not invoked.
2) $Non\_Crossing\_Execs$, executions where the TCAS protocol is initiated, a noncrossing RA is issued initially by aircraft 1 and is maintained until the conflict is over. It is important to note that once the high-priority aircraft decides upon a noncrossing RA, its decision cannot be reversed.
3) $Crossing\_Execs$, executions where the TCAS protocol is initiated, a crossing RA is issued initially by aircraft 1 and is maintained until the conflict is over. In this case, it is worth noting that once the aircraft cross in altitude and a sample action is scheduled, the advisory switches from being a crossing RA to a noncrossing RA.
4) $Reversing\_Execs$, executions where the TCAS protocol is initiated, a crossing RA is issued initially by aircraft 1 is reversed to a noncrossing RA before the aircraft cross in altitude, and is maintained until the conflict is over. Recall that it is only possible to reverse out of a crossing RA.

These execution categories of WBS are formally defined below.

Definition 9: $Conflict\_Free\_Execs = \{\alpha \in Admissible\_Execs \mid \forall\ s \in \alpha, s \notin Conflict\_Imminent\}$.

Definition 10: $Non\_Crossing\_Execs = \{\alpha \in Admissible\_Execs \mid \exists\ s_1 \in \alpha, s_1 \in Non\_Cross$: $\forall\ s_2 \in \alpha, s_2 \leq s_1$, it is the case that $s_2 \notin Cross\}$.

Definition 11: $Crossing\_Execs = \{\alpha \in Admissible\_Execs \mid \exists\ s_1 \in \alpha, s_1 \in Cross$: $\forall\ s_2 \in \alpha, s_1 \leq s_2$, it is the case that $(s_2 \in Cross) \vee (s_2.Sense_1 s_2.\Delta z \geq 0) \vee (s_2 \in Conflict\_Resolved)\}$.

Definition 12: $Reversing\_Execs = \{\alpha \in Admissible\_Execs \mid \exists\ s_1 \in \alpha, s_1 \in Cross$: $\exists\ s_2 \in \alpha, s_1 \leq s_2$, such that $(s_2 \in Non\_Cross) \wedge (s_1.Sense_1 s_2.\Delta z < 0) \wedge (s_2 \notin Conflict\_Resolved)\}$.

Definition 13: $Conflict\_Execs = Non\_Crossing\_Execs \cup Crossing\_Execs \cup Reversing\_Execs$.

Lemma 4: The sets $Conflict\_Free\_Execs$, $Non\_Crossing\_Execs$, $Crossing\_Execs$, and $Reversing\_Execs$ are pairwise disjoint.

Lemma 5: $Admissible\_Execs = Conflict\_Free\_Execs \cup Conflict\_Execs$.

We proceed by defining the set of safe executions of WBS. The safe executions are defined to be the executions in which the aircraft are sufficiently separated in altitude at closest horizontal approach.

Definition 14: $Safe\_Execs = \{\alpha \in Admissible\_Execs \mid \forall\ s \in \alpha, (s.T = 0) \Rightarrow (|s.\Delta z| \geq \texttt{ALIM})\}$.

The following assumption states that the set of conflict-free executions are safe. In this paper, we assume that the TCAS system declares a conflict whenever there is a potential midair collision. We realize that this assumption is restricting, but we are interested in analyzing the performance of the TCAS system whenever it is engaged. Again,

we defer the analysis of whether the TCAS system actually gets engaged in all potential midair collisions to future research.

Assumption 7: $Conflict\_Free\_Execs \subseteq Safe\_Execs$.

D. Safety Conditions

For an execution $\alpha \in Conflict\_Execs$, we define $\alpha.s_0 \in \alpha$ such that $\alpha.s_0 \in Conflict\_Imminent_{12}$ and for all $s \in \alpha$, $s < \alpha.s_0$, it is the case that $s \notin Conflict\_Imminent_{12}$; that is, $\alpha.s_0$ is the state prior to which the high-priority aircraft gets initially alerted to a potential midair collision threat. Also, by abusing notation, let $\alpha.T_0$ denote the time to closest horizontal approach from the state $\alpha.s_0$. We also keep track of the time elapsing from the initial declaration of a threat by the high-priority aircraft through an auxiliary variable $t_{\rm RA}$. Although discrete transitions do not affect the value of $t_{\rm RA}$, along trajectories, it is the case that $\dot{t}_{RA} = 1$. Let D be an upper bound on the delay from the time in which the high priority aircraft gets alerted to the threat up to the time in which both aircraft implement consistent RAs, i.e., $D = \overline{d}_c + \overline{d}_p$. We assume that the bound D is larger than the bound d used by the TCAS algorithm to determine what type of RA to issue.

Assumption 8: $D > d$.

We assume that the TCAS algorithm detects a conflict far enough in advance so as to have enough time to react, i.e., the time of closest horizontal approach occurs more than D time units after the declaration of a midair collision threat by aircraft 1. In view of analyzing the correctness of the TCAS algorithm, this seems to be a reasonable assumption because we should not expect TCAS to be able to prevent collisions in cases where the system as a whole does not have sufficient time to decide upon and implement the RAs issued by TCAS.

Assumption 9: For any execution $\alpha \in Conflict\_Execs$, it is the case that $\alpha.T_0 > D$.

1) Safety of Noncrossing Executions: In the case of noncrossing executions, we define a derived variable P_{NC} that denotes the minimum possible vertical separation of the aircraft at closest horizontal approach under the assumption that both aircraft implement a noncrossing advisory following an initial implementation delay of D time units. For $s \in \mathcal{S}$, we define the derived variable P_{NC} as follows:

$$s.P_{NC} = |s.\Delta z| + s.\underline{\Delta v}_{NC} D + 2\texttt{NomStr}(s.T - D)$$

where $s.\underline{\Delta v}_{NC} = \min(2\texttt{NomStr}, \sigma s.v_{z1} + \max(\underline{v}_z, -\sigma s.v_{z2} - \overline{a}_z \overline{d}_c))$, with $\sigma = \text{sign}(s.v_{z1} - s.v_{z2})$. Intuitively, the worst case vertical separation at the time of closest horizontal approach is the initial altitude separation, minus potential losses during the implementation delay, i.e., the time it takes both aircraft to agree to and to implement the noncrossing advisory, plus the separation that is gained by following the RA at nominal strength once it is implemented.

We proceed by defining the set of states of WBS from which the choice and implementation of a noncrossing RA is guaranteed to result in adequate separation in altitude at closest horizontal approach.

Definition 15: $Non\_Cross\_Safe = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid s.P_{NC} \geq \texttt{ALIM}\}$.

Lemma 6: If $\alpha \in Non\_Crossing\_Execs$ and $s_1 \in \alpha$ such that $D < s_1.t_{\rm RA} < \alpha.T_0$, then it is the case that $\sigma s_1.\Delta z \geq \sigma s_0.\Delta z + s_0.\underline{\Delta v}_{NC} D$, where $\sigma = \text{sign}(s_0.v_{z1} - s_0.v_{z2})$ and $s_0.\underline{\Delta v}_{NC} = \min(2\texttt{NomStr}, \sigma s_0.v_{z1} + \max(\underline{v}_z, -\sigma s_0.v_{z2} - \overline{a}_z \overline{d}_c))$.

Lemma 7: If $\alpha \in Non\_Crossing\_Execs$ and $s_1, s_2 \in \alpha$ such that $D < s_1.t_{\rm RA} < \alpha.T_0$ and $s_2.t_{\rm RA} = \alpha.T_0$, then it is the case that $\sigma s_2.\Delta z \geq \sigma s_1.\Delta z + 2\texttt{NomStr}(s_2.t_{\rm RA} - s_1.t_{\rm RA})$, where $\sigma = \text{sign}(s_0.v_{z1} - s_0.v_{z2})$.

Corollary 8: If $\alpha \in Non\_Crossing\_Execs$ and $s_2 \in \alpha$ such that $s_2.t_{\rm RA} = \alpha.T_0$, then it is the case that $\sigma s_2.\Delta z \geq \sigma s_0.\Delta z + s_0.\underline{\Delta v}_{NC} D + 2\texttt{NomStr}(\alpha.T_0 - D)$, where $\sigma = \text{sign}(s_0.v_{z1} - s_0.v_{z2})$ and $s_0.\underline{\Delta v}_{\rm NC} = \min(2\texttt{NomStr}, \sigma s_0.v_{z1} + \max(\underline{v}_z, -\sigma s_0.v_{z2} - \overline{a}_z \overline{d}_c))$.

Lemma 9: If $\alpha \in Non\_Crossing\_Execs$ and $\alpha.s_0 \in Non\_Cross\_Safe$, then $\alpha \in Safe\_Execs$.

2) Safety of Crossing Executions: In the case of crossing executions, we define a derived variable P_C that denotes the minimum possible vertical separation of the aircraft at closest horizontal approach under the assumption that both aircraft implement a crossing advisory following an initial implementation delay of D time units. For $s \in \mathcal{S}$, we define the derived variable P_C as follows:

$$s.P_C = -|s.\Delta z| + s.\underline{\Delta v}_C D + 2\texttt{NomStr}(s.T - D)$$

where $s.\underline{\Delta v}_C = \min(2\texttt{NomStr}, -\sigma s.v_{z1} + \max(\underline{v}_z, \sigma s.v_{z2} - \overline{a}_z \overline{d}_c))$, with $\sigma = \text{sign}(s.v_{z1} - s.v_{z2})$. Intuitively, the worst case vertical separation at the time of closest horizontal approach is the initial altitude separation minus potential losses during the implementation delay, i.e., the time it takes both aircraft to agree to and to implement the crossing advisory, plus the separation that is gained by following the RA at nominal strength once it is implemented.

We proceed by defining the set of states of WBS from which the choice and implementation of a crossing RA that is carried out to completion is guaranteed to result in adequate separation in altitude at closest horizontal approach.

Definition 16: $Cross\_Safe = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid s.P_C \geq \texttt{ALIM}\}$.

Lemma 10: If $\alpha \in Crossing\_Execs$ and $s_1 \in \alpha$ such that $D < s_1.t_{\rm RA} < \alpha.T_0$, then it is the case that $-\sigma s_1.\Delta z \geq -\sigma s_0.\Delta z + s_0.\underline{\Delta v}_C D$, where $\sigma = \text{sign}(s_0.v_{z1} - s_0.v_{z2})$ and $s_0.\underline{\Delta v}_C = \min(2\texttt{NomStr}, -\sigma s_0.v_{z1} + \max(\underline{v}_z, \sigma s_0.v_{z2} - 2\overline{a}_z \overline{d}_c))$.

Lemma 11: If $\alpha \in Crossing\_Execs$ and $s_1, s_2 \in \alpha$ such that $D < s_1.t_{\rm RA} < \alpha.T_0$ and $s_2.t_{\rm RA} = \alpha.T_0$, then it is the case that $-\sigma s_2.\Delta z \geq -\sigma s_1.\Delta z + 2\texttt{NomStr}(s_2.t_{\rm RA} - s_1.t_{\rm RA})$, where $\sigma = \text{sign}(s_0.v_{z1} - s_0.v_{z2})$.

Corollary 12: If $\alpha \in Crossing\_Execs$ and $s_2 \in \alpha$ such that $s_2.t_{\rm RA} = \alpha.T_0$, then it is the case that $-\sigma s_2.\Delta z \geq -\sigma s_0.\Delta z + s_0.\underline{\Delta v}_C D + 2\texttt{NomStr}(\alpha.T_0 - D)$, where $\sigma = \text{sign}(s_0.v_{z1} - s_0.v_{z2})$ and $s_0.\underline{\Delta v}_C = \min(2\texttt{NomStr}, -\sigma s_0.v_{z1} + \max(\underline{v}_z, \sigma s_0.v_{z2} - 2\overline{a}_z \overline{d}_c))$.

Lemma 13: If $\alpha \in Crossing\_Execs$ and $\alpha.s_0 \in Cross\_Safe$, then $\alpha \in Safe\_Execs$.

3) Safety of Reversing Executions: In the case of reversing executions, a reversal can occur in two distinct parts of the execution, namely, prior to and on or after the time in which the crossing execution gets implemented. We analyze each of these cases separately.

First, we analyze the case in which the reversal occurs prior to the implementation of the crossing resolution. In this case, the reversal occurs prior to D time units after the first declaration of the threat and gets implemented by both aircraft within D of the time of the sense reversal of aircraft 1. Thus, the time elapsing from the state $\alpha.s_0$ to the latest possible time in which the noncrossing RA gets implemented is $2D$. We define a derived variable $P_R^<$ that denotes the minimum possible vertical separation of the aircraft at closest horizontal approach. Note that up to $2D$ time units after the first threat declaration, the aircraft could be engaging in a trajectory that opposes the noncrossing RA sense. For all $s \in \mathcal{S}$, the derived variable $P_R^<$ is defined as follows:

$$s.P_R^< = |s.\Delta z| + s.\underline{\Delta v_R}^<(2D) + 2\texttt{NomStr}(s.T - 2D)$$

where $s.\underline{\Delta v_R}^< = \min(2\texttt{NomStr}, \max(\underline{v_z}, \sigma s.v_{z1} - \overline{a}_z D) + \max(\underline{v_z}, -\sigma s.v_{z2} - \overline{a}_z(D + \overline{d}_c)))$, with $\sigma = \text{sign}(s.v_{z1} - s.v_{z2})$, i.e., σ is the noncrossing RA sense of aircraft 1 is state s.

In this case, the intuitive understanding of the function $P_R^<$ involves realizing that the worst case would be to decide to reverse at the latest possible point in time, i.e., D time units after the initial threat declaration, which would in turn allow the least amount of time for the new advisory to attain the necessary vertical separation at closest horizontal approach. It follows that the state s is safe in this type of an execution if the following inequality is satisfied:

$$s.P_R^< \geq \texttt{ALIM}.$$

Thus, in all reversing executions where the reversal occurs earlier than the point in time when the initial crossing execution gets implemented, the above inequality guarantees that the aircraft will attain the necessary vertical separation by the time of closest horizontal approach.

Lemma 14: Let $\alpha \in Reversing\_Execs$ be an execution of WBS in which the reversal occurs prior to D time units after the first threat declaration by aircraft 1. If $s_0.P_R^< \geq \texttt{ALIM}$, then $\alpha \in Safe\_Execs$.

Second, we analyze the case in which a reversal occurs subsequent to the implementation of the crossing advisory by both aircraft, i.e., the reversal occurs in a state in which both aircraft are following the crossing resolution advisory. Let s be the state in which the first alert declaration is scheduled by aircraft 1, s' be the first state in which both aircraft are implementing the crossing advisory, and s'' be the state in which the sample action resulting in the reversal is scheduled. Note that the maximum time between the occurrence of state s and s' is D. Throughout this section, we will refer to the time to closest horizontal approach from state s as T instead of $s.T$.

Let the crossing and noncrossing senses of aircraft 1 in state s be denoted by $-\sigma$ and σ, respectively, the conditions that would dictate the reversal in state s'' according to the TCAS specifications are as follows:

$$SEP_{12}(-\sigma, \texttt{NomStr}) < \texttt{ALIM} \Rightarrow \sigma\Delta z - \sigma\Delta v_z \tau_{12} < \texttt{ALIM}$$

and

$$SEP_{12}(\sigma, \texttt{NomStr}) \geq \texttt{ALIM} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} \sigma\Delta z + \sigma\Delta v_z d + (\texttt{NomStr} - \sigma v_{z2})(\tau_{12} - d) \geq \texttt{ALIM}, \\ \quad \text{if } \tau_{12} > d \\ \sigma\Delta z + \sigma\Delta v_z \tau_{12} \geq \texttt{ALIM}, \\ \quad \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

i.e., a reversal is warranted only if the crossing advisory is unsafe and the noncrossing advisory is safe. Rearranging each of the inequalities corresponding to $SEP_{12}(\sigma, \texttt{NomStr}) \geq \texttt{ALIM}$, we get

$$\sigma\Delta z \geq \texttt{ALIM} - \sigma\Delta v_z d - (\texttt{NomStr} - \sigma v_{z2})(\tau_{12} - d), \quad \text{if } \tau_{12} > d$$

$$\sigma\Delta z \geq \texttt{ALIM} - \sigma\Delta v_z \tau_{12}, \quad \text{otherwise}.$$

Since we are assuming that the crossing advisory has already been implemented, it follows that $-\sigma v_{z1} \geq \texttt{NomStr}$ and $\sigma v_{z2} \geq \texttt{NomStr}$. Moreover, since reversals can only be considered while the difference in altitude opposes the current RA sense, it follows that $-\sigma\Delta z < 0$. Combining the above conditions, we obtain the pair of conservative inequalities for state s''

if $\tau_{12} > d$, then

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma\Delta z &\geq \texttt{ALIM} - \sigma\Delta v_z d - (\texttt{NomStr} - \sigma v_{z2})(\tau_{12} - d) \\ &\geq \texttt{ALIM} + 2\texttt{NomStr}d - (\texttt{NomStr} - \sigma v_{z2})(\tau_{12} - d) \\ &\geq \texttt{ALIM} + 2\texttt{NomStr}d \\ &> \texttt{ALIM} \end{aligned}$$

else

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma\Delta z &\geq \texttt{ALIM} - \sigma\Delta v_z \tau_{12} \\ &\geq \texttt{ALIM} + 2\texttt{NomStr}\tau_{12} \\ &\geq \texttt{ALIM}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, in order for an aircraft to reverse out of an implemented crossing RA $-\sigma$, it is the case that $\sigma\Delta z \geq \texttt{ALIM}$, i.e., the aircraft altitude separation must be greater than or equal to ALIM. From this condition, we obtain conditions on the latest possible time $\overline{T}_R$ at which a reversal can occur. For any state s in which the first alert declaration is scheduled, the latest point in time at which the reversal could occur corresponds to the latest point in time that the inequality $\sigma\Delta z \geq \texttt{ALIM}$ could be violated, i.e., $\overline{T}_R$ is bounded by the inequality

$$-|\Delta z| + s.\underline{\Delta v_C} D + 2\texttt{NomStr}(\overline{T}_R - D) \leq -\texttt{ALIM}.$$

Solving for $\overline{T}_R$, we have

$$\overline{T}_R \leq \frac{-\texttt{ALIM} + |\Delta z| - s.\underline{\Delta v_C} D + 2\texttt{NomStr}D}{2\texttt{NomStr}}.$$

It is important to note that if the value of $\overline{T}_R$ turns out to be negative, then it follows that the reversal could never have been scheduled in the first place, i.e., we have reached a contradiction. For simplicity, we assume that if $\overline{T}_R$ turns out to be negative, then the execution is safe.

In order for such a state to be safe, the worst case trajectory must be safe; that is, given an altitude separation of ALIM, the worst case would be to follow a trajectory of minimum vertical velocity until the noncrossing RA gets implemented and then carry on with a nominal strength noncrossing RA. We define a derived variable $P_R^{\geq}$ that denotes the minimum possible vertical separation of the aircraft at closest horizontal approach given that aircraft 1 reverses its sense $\overline{T}_R$ time units after its initial declaration of a threat. For all $s \in \mathcal{S}$, the derived variable $P_R^{\geq}$ is defined as follows:

$$s.P_R^{\geq} = \texttt{ALIM} + s.\underline{\Delta v}_R^{\geq} D + 2\texttt{NomStr}(T - \overline{T}_R - D)$$

where $s.\underline{\Delta v}_R{}^{\geq} = \min(2\texttt{NomStr}, \max(\underline{v}_z, \sigma s.v_{z1} - \overline{a}_z\overline{T}_R) + \max(\underline{v}_z, -\sigma s.v_{z2} - \overline{a}_z(\overline{T}_R + \overline{d}_c)))$ with $\sigma = \text{sign}(s.v_{z1} - s.v_{z2})$, i.e., σ is the noncrossing RA sense of aircraft 1.

Plugging in the value for $\overline{T}_R$ and simplifying, we get

$$\begin{aligned} s.P_R^{\geq} = {} & 2\texttt{ALIM} - |\Delta z| + (s.\underline{\Delta v}_C + s.\underline{\Delta v}_R^{\geq})D \\ & + 2\texttt{NomStr}(T - 2D). \end{aligned}$$

It follows that the state s is safe in this type of an execution if the following inequality is satisfied:

$$s.P_R^{\geq} \geq \texttt{ALIM}.$$

Thus, in all reversing executions where the reversal occurs no earlier than the point in time in which the initial crossing execution gets implemented, the above inequality guarantees that the aircraft will attain the necessary vertical separation by the time of closest horizontal approach.

Lemma 15: Let $\alpha \in Reversing\_Execs$ be an execution of WBS in which the reversal occurs no earlier than D time units after the first threat declaration by aircraft 1. If $s_0.P_R^{\geq} \geq$ ALIM, then $\alpha \in Safe\_Execs$.

We continue by defining a set of states from which any type of reversing execution would result in sufficient altitude separation at closest horizontal approach. Our approach is to take the conjunction of the safety properties for the two types of reversing executions. When doing so, however, we must be cautious because the second condition is only valid if the reversal occurs after the crossing advisory gets implemented.

Definition 17: $Reverse\_Safe = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid (s.P_R^{<} \geq \texttt{ALIM}) \wedge ((s.P_R^{\geq} \geq \texttt{ALIM}) \vee (\overline{T}_R < D))\}$.

Lemma 16: If $\alpha \in Reversing\_Execs$ and $\alpha.s_0 \in Reverse\_Safe$, then $\alpha \in Safe\_Execs$.

E. Safety of Executions in Summary

In the previous section, we derived safety conditions for each of the categories of executions of WBS. In particular, we defined sets of states from which the choice and execution of a noncrossing, crossing, and reversing execution, respectively, would result in sufficient altitude separation at closest horizontal approach. In this section, we provide three ways in which these safety conditions can be combined in order to provide overall safety conditions.

1) Conjunction of Per-Category Safety Properties: In this section, we define our overall safety property to be the conjunction of the per-category safety properties. The following theorem states that if the initial state of a conflict satisfies all per-category safety conditions, then the execution is a safe execution.

Theorem 17: If $\alpha \in Conflict\_Execs$ and $\alpha.s_0 \in Non\_Crossing\_Safe \cap Crossing\_Safe \cap Reverse\_Safe$, then $\alpha \in Safe\_Execs$.

Albeit simple, Theorem 17 is conservative since in order for an execution of WBS to be deemed safe, it must satisfy the safety conditions of all types of executions.

2) Isolating Noncrossing Executions: In this section, we remove some of the conservatism of Theorem 17 by isolating the noncrossing execution advisories. The inherent bias in the TCAS system toward noncrossing RAs dictates that the majority of RAs issued by TCAS will be noncrossing RAs. Thus, by isolating the set of noncrossing executions and distinguishing them from the crossing and reversing executions, we obtain less conservative results.

We begin by defining a necessary condition for initially choosing a crossing advisory. In order for a crossing advisory to be chosen, at the point in time of the advisory declaration by the high-priority aircraft, the TCAS algorithm should deem it appropriate. According to the conflict resolution automaton R_i, the declaration occurs through either a $Declare_{12}$ or a $Receive_{12}(\text{dir})$ action, where dir $\in$ Dir. In the case of a $Declare_{12}$ action, the crossing advisory is selected only when the estimated altitude separation at closest approach resulting from a crossing and a noncrossing advisory is sufficient and insufficient, respectively. In the case of a $Receive_{12}(\text{dir})$ action, where dir $\in$ Dir, a crossing advisory is chosen only in the case when the RA suggested by the low-priority aircraft is a crossing RA and the high-priority aircraft agrees with it. For any execution α of WBS, we let the state from which the high-priority aircraft gets alerted to the threat by a $Declare_{12}$ or a $Receive_{12}(\text{dir})$ action, where dir $\in$ Dir, be denoted by $\alpha.s_0$ and the state following the scheduling of the action as $\alpha.s_0'$. Moreover, we define the derived variable C to denote whether the choice of a crossing RA is possible from the perspective of aircraft 1, which is the high-priority aircraft

$$\begin{aligned} s.C = {} & \exists\, \sigma \in \{1, -1\} \text{ such that} \\ & (\sigma s.\Delta z < 0) \\ & \wedge\, (Sep_{12}(\sigma, \texttt{NomStr}) \geq \texttt{ALIM} \\ & \wedge\, Sep_{12}(-\sigma, \texttt{NomStr}) < \texttt{ALIM}). \end{aligned}$$

Since $s.C$ is a necessary condition for the aircraft to engage in a crossing RA, the negation of this condition is a sufficient condition for choosing a noncrossing RA.

Definition 18: $Cross\_Impossible = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid s.C = \texttt{False}\}$.

Lemma 18: If $\alpha \in Conflict\_Execs$ and $\alpha.s_0 \in Cross\_Impossible$, then $\alpha \in Non\_Crossing\_Execs$.

Theorem 19: If $\alpha \in Conflict\_Execs$ and $\alpha.s_0 \in (Cross\_Impossible \cap Non\_Cross\_Safe) \cup (Non\_Cross\_Safe \cap Cross\_Safe \cap Reverse\_Safe)$, then $\alpha \in Safe\_Execs$.

3) Aircraft Close in Altitude: In this section, we specify safety conditions for a set of executions that are defined parametrically with respect to the altitude separation of the aircraft at the point in time when the conflict is initially declared by aircraft 1. This approach was suggested to us by engineers actively involved in the design and analysis of the TCAS system. The intuition behind this approach is that crossing advisories will most likely be chosen when the aircraft are close in altitude, so it is very useful to consider and reason about the performance of TCAS is such executions.

If the aircraft are close in altitude when the threat gets declared, then the type of execution to be carried out is finalized by the time the aircraft would cross in altitude had a crossing advisory been chosen initially and carried out to completion. On one hand, if a noncrossing RA is declared initially by aircraft 1, the execution type is known immediately. On the other hand, if a crossing RA is declared initially by aircraft 1, the RA is either carried out to completion, or reversed before the aircraft cross in altitude. Thus, by the time the aircraft cross in altitude, it is known whether the execution is crossing or reversing.

We proceed by defining the set of executions of WBS in which the aircraft are separated in altitude by at most K ft when aircraft 1 is alerted to a threat.

Definition 19: $Close\text{-}in\text{-}Alt\_Execs = \{\alpha \in Conflict\_Execs \mid s = \alpha.s_0, |s.\Delta v_z| \leq K\}$.

The safety condition for executions in $Close\text{-}in\text{-}Alt\_Execs$ is obtained in a very similar fashion to the way the safety condition is obtained for the second type of reversing executions. In particular, the separation obtained by any type of execution is bounded from below by the separation obtained by a reversing execution in which aircraft 1 reverses its sense just as the aircraft cross in altitude. We denote the latest possible crossing time by $\overline{T}_C$. For any state $s \in \mathcal{S}$ in which the threat declaration is scheduled by aircraft 1, the latest point in time at which the aircraft could cross in altitude corresponds to the latest point in time that the inequality $\sigma\Delta z \geq 0$ could be violated, i.e., $\overline{T}_C$ is bounded by the inequality

$$-K + s.\underline{\Delta v}_C D + 2\texttt{NomStr}(\overline{T}_C - D) \leq 0.$$

Solving for $\overline{T}_C$, we have

$$\overline{T}_C \leq \frac{K - s.\underline{\Delta v}_C D + 2\texttt{NomStr}D}{2\texttt{NomStr}}.$$

If $-K + s.\underline{\Delta v}_C D > 0$, then the above calculation for $\overline{T}_C$ will result in a negative value. However, such cases imply that the reversal would have occurred prior to D time units following the initial declaration of a threat by aircraft 1. Thus, in such cases we can use the value of D time units as an upper bound on the delay in reversing.

In order for a state s to be safe, the worst case altitude separation would be obtained by an execution in which the aircraft follow a trajectory of minimum vertical velocity until the reversal gets implemented and then carry on with nominal strength. We define a derived variable P that denotes the minimum possible vertical separation of the aircraft at closest horizontal approach given that aircraft 1 starts to implement a noncrossing advisory $\max(D, \overline{T}_C)$ time units after the initial threat declaration by aircraft 1. For all $s \in \mathcal{S}$, the derived variable P is defined as follows:

$$s.P = s.\underline{\Delta v}_R D + 2\texttt{NomStr}(T - \max(D, \overline{T}_C) - D)$$

where $s.\underline{\Delta v}_R = \max(\underline{v}_z, \sigma s.v_{z1} - \overline{a}_z \max(D, \overline{T}_C)) + \max(\underline{v}_z, -\sigma s.v_{z2} - \overline{a}_z(\max(D, \overline{T}_C) + \overline{d}_c))$, with $\sigma = \text{sign}(s.v_{z1} - s.v_{z2})$, i.e., σ is the noncrossing RA sense of aircraft 1.

It follows that the state s is safe in this type of an execution if the following inequality is satisfied:

$$s.P \geq \texttt{ALIM}.$$

We proceed by defining the set of states of WBS from which a close in altitude encounter results in adequate separation in altitude at closest horizontal approach.

Definition 20: $Close\text{-}in\text{-}Alt\_Safe = \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid s.P \geq \texttt{ALIM}\}$.

Theorem 20: If $\alpha \in Close\text{-}in\text{-}Alt\_Execs$ and $\alpha.s_0 \in Close\text{-}in\text{-}Alt\_Safe$, then $\alpha \in Safe\_Execs$.

VI. Conclusions and Future Research

We demonstrate how high-level modeling techniques involving the HIOA model can be used to model and analyze complex safety-critical hybrid systems such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System. In our presentation, we define HIOA models of the core components of closed-loop system involving aircraft, pilots, TCAS system components, and the communication channels used by the aircraft to communicate among themselves. Then, we define an idealized system involving two TCAS-equipped and "well-behaved" aircraft—that is, aircraft that do not accelerate in the horizontal plane and whose pilots follow the RAs issued by their TCAS system. We proceed by splitting the aircraft encounters into categories and providing safety conditions for each such category. Finally, we combine the per-category safety conditions into overall safety conditions. The contributions of this paper are the high-level models of the TCAS system, which may be used as a basis for studying a wide range of TCAS properties, and the demonstration of the usefulness and practicality of high-level modeling and analysis techniques.

Clearly, this paper constitutes the first step toward a comprehensive analysis and verification of TCAS. The analysis presented in this paper needs to be extended by relaxing several of the restricting assumptions of the pair of well-behaved and TCAS-equipped aircraft and extending the model to describe more detailed and realistic views of the closed-loop system components. In the case of the pair of well-behaved and TCAS-equipped aircraft, we need to consider cases in which multiple aircraft are simultaneously involved in a conflict, pilots accelerate in the x and y directions, and pilots thwart TCAS's resolution advisories. In the case of the TCAS model, we ought to progressively

remove the various simplifications in the aircraft dynamics, the TCAS algorithm, and the pilot response. When relaxing the various assumptions and removing the various simplifications made in our analysis, model refinement may be used to extend the results of the high-level models to their more refined counterparts; that is, by showing that the more refined system model actually implements the high-level model, the properties shown in this paper extend to the more refined model. Finally, it would be interesting to see whether, given a sufficiently detailed system model, the software for the discrete parts of the system could be generated automatically such that, by construction, the software generated is a truthful implementation of the higher level specifications.

Appendix A
Aircraft Automaton A_i

Variables:
Input:
$a_i \in \mathbb{R}^3$.
Output:
$Mode\_S_i \in \mathbb{N}$, initially arbitrary;
$Equipment_i \in \{\text{None}, \text{Report}, \text{TCAS}\}$, initially arbitrary;
$p_i \in \mathbb{R}^3$, initially arbitrary with $z_i \geq 0$;
$v_i \in \mathbb{R}^3$, initially arbitrary.
Actions:
Input:
e, the environment action.
Discrete Transitions:
e:
Effect: Arbitrarily reset the input variables.
Trajectories:
Input variables follow arbitrary trajectories.
$Mode\_S_i$ and $Equipment_i$ remain constant.

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{p}_i(t) \\ \dot{v}_i(t) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} v_i(t) \\ a_i(t) \end{bmatrix}.$$

Appendix B
Sensor Automaton S_i

Variables:
Input:
$p_j \in \mathbb{R}^3$ for all $j \in \text{Aircraft}$;
$v_j \in \mathbb{R}^3$ for all $j \in \text{Aircraft}$.
Internal:
$t_{S_i} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, initially 0.
Output:
$R_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, for all $j \in \text{Others}_i$, initially 0;
$\dot{R}_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$, for all $j \in \text{Others}_i$, initially 0;
$h_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, for all $j \in \text{Aircraft}$, initially 0;
$\dot{h}_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$, for all $j \in \text{Aircraft}$, initially 0.
Actions:
Input:
e, the environment action.
Output:
$Sample_i$.
Discrete Transitions:
e:
Effect: Arbitrarily reset the input variables.
$Sample_i$:
Precondition:

$$t_{S_i} = T_{S_i}.$$

Effect:

$$\begin{aligned} t_{S_i} &:= 0 \\ h_{ij} &:\in \left[z_j \pm \frac{n_{Ai}}{2} \right] \\ \dot{h}_{ij} &:\in \left[z_j \pm \frac{n_{ARi}}{2} \right] \\ R_{ij} &:\in \left[\sqrt{(x_i - x_j)^2 + (y_i - y_j)^2 + (z_i - z_j)^2} \pm \frac{n_{Ri}}{2} \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\dot{R}_{ij} :\in \left[\frac{(x_i - x_j)(v_{xi} - v_{xj}) + (y_i - y_j)(v_{yi} - v_{yj}) + (z_i - z_j)(v_{zi} - v_{zj})}{\sqrt{(x_i - x_j)^2 + (y_i - y_j)^2 + (z_i - z_j)^2}} \pm \frac{n_{RRi}}{2} \right].$$

Trajectories:
Input variables follow arbitrary trajectories;
$\dot{t}_{S_i} = 1$;
Output variables remain constant;
Trajectories stop once the $Sample_i$ action is enabled.

Appendix C
Conflict Detection Automaton D_i

Variables:
Input:
$Threat_{ij} \in \mathtt{Bool}$ for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$;
$R_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$;
$\dot{R}_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$;
$h_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Aircraft}$;
$\dot{h}_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Aircraft}$.
Derived:
$Range\_Test_{ij} \in \mathtt{Bool}$ (see text);
$Altitude\_Test_{ij} \in \mathtt{Bool}$ (see text).
Actions:
Input:
e, the environment action.
Output:
$Declare_{ij}$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$;
$Undeclare_{ij}$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$.
Discrete Transitions:
e:
Effect: Arbitrarily reset the input variables.
$Declare_{ij}$:
Precondition: $(\neg Threat_{ij}) \wedge Range\_Test_{ij} \wedge Altitude\_Test_{ij}$.
$Undeclare_{ij}$:
Precondition: $Threat_{ij} \wedge \neg Range\_Test_{ij}$.
Trajectories:
Input variables follow arbitrary trajectories.
Trajectories stop once any output action is enabled.

Appendix D
Conflict Resolution Automaton R_i

Variables:
Input:
$Mode\_S_j \in \mathbb{N}$ for all $j \in \mathtt{Aircraft}$;
$Equipment_j \in \{\mathtt{None}, \mathtt{Report}, \mathtt{TCAS}\}$ for all $j \in \mathtt{Aircraft}$;
$R_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$;
$\dot{R}_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$;
$h_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Aircraft}$;
$\dot{h}_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Aircraft}$.
Internal:
$Reversed_i \in \mathtt{Bool}$, initially False;
$Crossing_i \in \mathtt{Bool}$, initially False;
$Intent\_Sent_{ij} \in \mathtt{Dir}_\perp$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$, initially $\perp$.
Output:
$Sense_i \in \mathtt{Dir}_\perp$, initially $\perp$;
$Threat_{ij} \in \mathtt{Bool}$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$, initially False;
$Strength_i \in \mathtt{Strengths}$, initially 0.
Derived:
$SEP(\mathtt{dir}, \mathtt{str}) \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\mathtt{dir} \in \mathtt{Dir}$, $\mathtt{str} \in \mathtt{Strengths}$ (see text);
$OK(\mathtt{dir}) \in \mathtt{Bool}$ with $\mathtt{dir} \in \mathtt{Dir}$;
$OK(\mathtt{dir}) := (SEP(\mathtt{dir}, 1500) \geq \mathtt{ALIM})$;
$Indep\_Choice_{ij} \in \mathtt{Dir}$
if $(OK(\mathtt{Climb}) \wedge OK(\mathtt{Descend}) \wedge (h_{ii} \geq h_{ij}))$ then $Indep\_Choice_{ij} = \mathtt{Climb}$
if $(OK(\mathtt{Climb}) \wedge OK(\mathtt{Descend}) \wedge (h_{ii} < h_{ij}))$ then $Indep\_Choice_{ij} = \mathtt{Descend}$
if $(OK(\mathtt{Climb}) \wedge \neg OK(\mathtt{Descend}))$ then $Indep\_Choice_{ij} = \mathtt{Climb}$
if $(\neg OK(\mathtt{Climb}) \wedge OK(\mathtt{Descend}))$ then $Indep\_Choice_{ij} = \mathtt{Descend}$
if $(\neg OK(\mathtt{Climb}) \wedge \neg OK(\mathtt{Descend}) \wedge (SEP(\mathtt{Climb}, 1500) \geq SEP(\mathtt{Descend}, 1500)))$ then
$Indep\_Choice_{ij} = \mathtt{Climb}$
if $(\neg OK(\mathtt{Climb}) \wedge \neg OK(\mathtt{Descend}) \wedge (SEP(\mathtt{Climb}, 1500) < SEP(\mathtt{Descend}, 1500)))$ then
$Indep\_Choice_{ij} = \mathtt{Descend}$
$Strength\_Choice_{ij} \in \mathtt{Bool}$ (see text).
Actions:
Input:
e, the environment action;
$Declare_{ij}$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Aircraft}$;
$Undeclare_{ij}$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Aircraft}$;
$Receive_{ij}(\mathtt{dir})$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$, with $\mathtt{dir} \in \mathtt{Dir}$;
$Sample_i$.
Output:
$Send_{ij}(\mathtt{dir})$, for all $j \in \mathtt{Others}_i$, with $\mathtt{dir} \in \mathtt{Dir}$.
Discrete Transitions:
e:
Effect: Arbitrarily reset the input variables.
$Declare_{ij}$:

Effect:
if $Equipment_i = \texttt{TCAS}$ then
if $\neg Threat_{ij}$ then
$Threat_{ij} := \texttt{True}$
$Sense_i := Indep\_Choice_{ij}$
if $(Sense_i = \texttt{Climb} \wedge h_{ii} < h_{ij} - 100$ ft$) \vee$
$(Sense_i = \texttt{Descend} \wedge h_{ii} > h_{ij} + 100$ ft$)$
then $Crossing_i := \texttt{True}$
Choose $Strength_i$ so that
$Strength\_Choice_{ij} = \texttt{True}$.

$Undeclare_{ij}$:
Effect:
if $Threat_{ij}$ then
$Sense_i := \perp$
$Threat_{ij} := \texttt{False}$
$Reversed_i := \texttt{False}$
$Crossing_i := \texttt{False}$
$Intent\_Sent_{ij} := \perp$.

$Receive_{ij}$(dir):
Effect:
if $Equipment_i = \texttt{TCAS}$ then
if $(Mode\_S_i > Mode\_S_j)$ then
if $\neg Threat_{ij}$ then $Threat_{ij} := \texttt{True}$
$Sense_i := \texttt{dir}$
if $(Sense_i = \texttt{Climb} \wedge h_{ii} < h_{ij} - 100$ ft$) \vee$
$(Sense_i = \texttt{Descend} \wedge h_{ii} > h_{ij} + 100$ ft$)$
then $Crossing_i := \texttt{True}$
Choose $Strength_i$ so that
$Strength\_Choice_{ij} = \texttt{True}$.
if $\neg Threat_{ij} \wedge (Mode\_S_i < Mode\_S_j)$
then $Threat_{ij} := \texttt{True}$
if $(\texttt{dir} = \texttt{Climb} \wedge h_{ii} \geq h_{ij})$
then $Sense_i := \texttt{Climb}$
elseif $(\texttt{dir} = \texttt{Descend} \wedge h_{ii} \leq h_{ij})$
then $Sense_i := \texttt{Descend}$
else $Sense_i := Indep\_Choice_{ij}$
if $(Sense_i = \texttt{Climb} \wedge h_{ii} < h_{ij} - 100$ ft$) \vee$
$(Sense_i = \texttt{Descend} \wedge h_{ii} > h_{ij} + 100$ ft$)$
then $Crossing_i := \texttt{True}$
Choose $Strength_i$ so that
$Strength\_Choice_{ij} = \texttt{True}$.

$Sample_i$:
Effect:
if $Equipment_i = \texttt{TCAS}$ then
if $Threat_{ij}$ then
if $(Equipment_j \neq \texttt{TCAS} \wedge OK(\texttt{Climb}) \wedge$
$\neg OK(\texttt{Descend}))$then $Sense_i := \texttt{Climb}$
if $(Equipment_j \neq \texttt{TCAS} \wedge \neg$
$OK(\texttt{Climb}) \wedge OK(\texttt{Descend}))$ then
$Sense_i := \texttt{Descend}$
if $(Equipment_j = \texttt{TCAS} \wedge Mode\_S_i <$
$Mode\_S_j \wedge \neg Reversed \wedge Crossing_i)$ then
if $(Sense_i = \texttt{Descend} \wedge OK(\texttt{Climb}) \wedge$
$\neg OK(\texttt{Descend}))$ then
$Sense_i := \texttt{Climb}$
$Reversed_i := \texttt{True}$
if $(Sense_i = \texttt{Climb} \wedge \neg OK(\texttt{Climb}) \wedge$
$OK(\texttt{Descend}))$ then
$Sense_i := \texttt{Descend}$
$Reversed_i := \texttt{True}$
if $(Sense_i = \texttt{Climb} \wedge h_{ii} > h_{ij} - 100$ ft$) \vee$
$(Sense_i = \texttt{Descend} \wedge h_{ii} < h_{ij} + 100$ ft$)$
then $Crossing_i := \texttt{False}$
Choose $Strength_i$ so that
$Strength\_Choice_{ij} = \texttt{True}$.

$Send_{ij}$(dir):
Precondition:
$(Equipment_i = \texttt{TCAS} \wedge Equipment_j = \texttt{TCAS}) \wedge$
$([Sense_i = \texttt{Climb} \wedge Intent\_Sent_{ij} \neq \texttt{Descend} \wedge$
$\texttt{dir} = \texttt{Descend}] \vee$
$[Sense_i = \texttt{Descend} \wedge Intent\_Sent_{ij} \neq \texttt{Climb} \wedge$
$\texttt{dir} = \texttt{Climb}])$.
Effect:
$Intent\_Sent_{ij} := \texttt{dir}$.

Trajectories:
Input variables follow arbitrary trajectories.
Internal and output variables remain constant.
Trajectories stop once any $Send_{ij}$(dir) action, for dir $\in$ Dir, is enabled.

Appendix E
Communication Channel Automaton C_{ij}

Variables:
Internal:
$t_{C_{ij}} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, initially 0;
$mset_{ij}$ = queue of $(\texttt{dir}, \underline{t}, \overline{t})$, with dir $\in$ Dir, $\underline{t}, \overline{t} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, initially $\emptyset$.
Actions:
Input:
e, the environment action;
$Send_{ij}$(dir), with dir $\in$ Dir.
Output:
$Receive_{ji}$(dir), with dir $\in$ Dir.
Discrete Transitions:
e:
Effect: None.
$Send_{ij}$(dir):
Effect: Append $(\texttt{dir}, t_{C_{ij}} + \underline{d}_i j, t_{C_{ij}} + \overline{d}_{ij})$ to the tail of$mset_{ij}$.
$Receive_{ji}$(dir):
Precondition: $t_{C_{ij}} \in [\underline{t}, \overline{t}]$, where $(\texttt{dir}, \underline{t}, \overline{t})$ is the head of $mset_{ij}$;
Effect: Pop $(\texttt{dir}, \underline{t}, \overline{t})$ from the head of $mset_{ij}$.
Trajectories:
$mset_{ij}$ remains constant;
$\dot{t}_{C_{ij}} = 1$;
Trajectories stop once $t_{C_{ij}} \geq \overline{t}$, where $(\texttt{dir}, \underline{t}, \overline{t})$ is the head of $mset_{ij}$.

Appendix F
Pilot Automaton P_i

Variables:

Input:
$Sense_i \in \mathtt{Dir}_\perp$;
$Strength_i \in \mathtt{Strengths}$;
$\dot{h}_{\mathbf{ii}} \in \mathbb{R}$.
Internal:
$t_{P_i} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, initially 0;
$Q\_Size_i \in \mathbb{N}$, initially 0;
$Current\_Sense_i \in \mathtt{Dir}_\perp$, initially $\perp$;
$Current\_Strength_i \in \mathtt{Strengths}$, initially 0;
$Last\_Sense_i \in \mathtt{Dir}_\perp$, initially $\perp$;
$Last\_Strength_i \in \mathtt{Strengths}$, initially 0;
Adv_Q queue of $(i, sns, str, \underline{t}, \overline{t})$, initially empty,
with $i \in \mathbb{N}$, $sns \in \mathtt{Dir}_\perp$, $str \in$, $\mathtt{Strengths}$ $\underline{t} \in \mathbb{R}^+$, $\overline{t} \in \mathbb{R}^+$;
$Follow_i \in \mathtt{Bool}$, initially True.
Output:
$a_i \in \mathbb{R}^3$, initially $[0\ 0\ 0]^T$.
Derived:
$\sigma \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$, such that

$$\sigma := \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } Current\_Sense_i = \mathtt{Climb} \\ 0, & \text{if } Current\_Sense_i = \perp \\ -1, & \text{if } Current\_Sense_i = \mathtt{Descend}. \end{cases}$$

Actions:
Input:
e, the environment action.
Internal:
$New\_Advisory_i$;
$Implement\_Advisory_i$.
Discrete Transitions:
e:
Effect: arbitrarily reset the input variables.
$New\_Advisory_i$:
Precondition:
$Last\_Sense_i \neq Sense_i \vee Last\_Strength_i \neq Strength_i$.
Effect:
$Q\_Size_i := Q\_Size_i + 1$;
Add $(Q\_Size_i, Sense_i, Strength_i, t_{P_i} + \underline{d}_i, t_{P_i} + \overline{d}_i)$ to Adv_Q;
$Last\_Sense_i := Sense_i$;
$Last\_Strength_i := Strength_i$.
$Implement\_Advisory_i$:
Precondition:
There exists $(i, sns, str, \underline{t}, \overline{t}) \in Adv\_Q$ such that $t_{P_i} \in [\underline{t}, \overline{t}]$.
Effect:
Remove $(i', sns', str', \underline{t}', \overline{t}')$ with $i' \leq i$ from Adv_Q;
Replace $(i', sns', str', \underline{t}', \overline{t}')$ with $(i' - i, sns', str', \underline{t}', \overline{t}')$ in Adv_Q, for all $i' > i$;
$Q\_Size_i := Q\_Size_i - i$;
$Current\_Sense_i := sns$;
$Current\_Strength_i := str$;
$Follow_i :\in \{\mathtt{True}, \mathtt{False}\}$.

Trajectories:
Input variables follow arbitrary trajectories.
All internal variables except t_{P_i} remain constant.
$\dot{t}_{P_i} = 1$.
Output variables satisfy:

$$a_{xi}(t) \in [\underline{a}_{xi}, \overline{a}_{xi}]$$
$$a_{yi}(t) \in [\underline{a}_{yi}, \overline{a}_{yi}]$$
$$a_{zi}(t) \in \begin{cases} [\underline{a}_{zi}, \overline{a}_{zi}], & \text{if } [Current\_Sense_i = \perp \vee (\neg Follow_i) \vee \sigma\dot{h}_{\mathbf{ii}} \geq Current\_Strength_i] \wedge \dot{h}_{\mathbf{ii}} \in (\underline{v}_{zi}, \overline{v}_{zi}) \\ [0, \overline{a}_{zi}], & \text{if } [Current\_Sense_i = \perp \vee (\neg Follow_i) \vee \sigma\dot{h}_{\mathbf{ii}} \geq Current\_Strength_i] \wedge \dot{h}_{\mathbf{ii}} \leq \underline{v}_{zi} \\ [\underline{a}_{zi}, 0], & \text{if } [Current\_Sense_i = \perp \vee (\neg Follow_i) \vee \sigma\dot{h}_{\mathbf{ii}} \geq Current\_Strength_i] \wedge \dot{h}_{\mathbf{ii}} \geq \overline{v}_{zi} \\ [\sigma a, \sigma a], & \text{if } Current\_Sense_i = \perp \wedge Follow_i \wedge \sigma\dot{h}_{\mathbf{ii}} < Current\_Strength_i. \end{cases}$$

Trajectories stop once the $New\_Advisory_i$ action is enabled.
Trajectories stop once there exists $(i, sns, str, \underline{t}, \overline{t}) \in Adv\_Q$ with $t_{P_i} \geq \overline{t}$.

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

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