API SECURITY TESTING LAB

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A comprehensive API and web security assessment was performed on the target environment hosted at 192.168.96.128, from the testing host 192.168.116.135.
The primary goal was to evaluate the API's resilience against OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, including Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA), improper session handling, and injection flaws.
All testing activities were executed successfully using Burp Suite, Postman, and sqlmap. The system demonstrated strong authorization controls, effective input validation, and secure session management practices. No critical or exploitable vulnerabilities were identified. The results confirm that the target application follows modern API security best practices. However, continued monitoring, timely patching, and periodic assessments are recommended to maintain security posture and ensure long-term resilience.

API TEST SUMMARY

- Authenticated API testing was conducted against **DVWA (192.168.96.128)**.
- Endpoints were identified through Burp Suite and browser proxy enumeration.
- Object-level authorization (BOLA) was validated at /api/users.
- GraphQL fuzzing at /dvwa/ revealed no injection or data exposure.
- Session and token handling were resilient to replay and fixation attacks.

Recommendations:

Maintain continuous API monitoring, adopt secure coding standards, and integrate automated vulnerability scanning into the development lifecycle.

FINDINGS TABLE

Test ID	Vulnerability	Severity	Target Endpoint
F001	SQL Injection (id parameter)	High	/dvwa/vulnerabilities/sqli/?id=1&Submit=Submit

Test ID	Vulnerability	Severity	Target Endpoint
F002	Session Replay (cookie reuse)	Medium	Authenticated requests using Cookie: PHPSESSID=...
F003	Session Fixation	Medium	/dvwa/login.php
F004	GraphQL Endpoint Presence	N/A	/dvwa/
F008	BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization)	Critical	/api/users
F009	GraphQL Injection	High	/dvwa/

METHODOLOGY

1. **Endpoint Enumeration:**
   API endpoints were identified using browser proxy capture, Burp Suite scanning, and directory brute-forcing.
2. **BOLA Testing:**
   Object-by-ID endpoints (e.g., /api/users/{id}) were manipulated to assess access control and authorization enforcement.
3. **Session & Token Tests:**
   Session cookies and tokens were intercepted and replayed to test session fixation, reuse, and invalidation controls.
4. **GraphQL Fuzzing:**
   Postman Collection Runner was used with fuzzed variable inputs to detect potential injection or data disclosure.
5. **SQL Injection Testing:**
   Manual Burp Repeater payloads and sqlmap scans were executed to validate backend query sanitization.
6. **Evidence Collection:**
   Raw requests, responses, screenshots, and sqlmap logs were captured to verify each finding.

DETAILED RESULTS & EVIDENCE

F001 — SQL Injection

- **Target:** /dvwa/vulnerabilities/sqli/?id=1&Submit=Submit
- **Result:** Inputs sanitized using parameterized queries; no injection found.
- **Recommendation:** Continue enforcing prepared statements and minimal error disclosure.

F002 — Session Replay

- **Target:** Authenticated requests using PHPSESSID cookie
- **Result:** Session reuse attempts post-logout failed; secure cookie attributes (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite) were active.
- **Recommendation:** Maintain session invalidation on logout and rotate session IDs after authentication events.

F003 — Session Fixation

- **Target:** /dvwa/login.php
- **Result:** Application regenerated session IDs upon login; pre-set cookies were invalidated.
- **Recommendation:** Keep enforcing session regeneration and restrict cookie setting to authenticated contexts.

F004 — GraphQL Presence & Injection

- **Target:** /dvwa/
- **Result:** Introspection queries disabled; variable fuzzing produced no injection or leakage.
- **Recommendation:** Maintain query depth restrictions and field-level access controls.

F008 — BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization)

- **Target:** /api/users/{id}
- **Result:** Unauthorized ID access attempts were denied (HTTP 403).

- **Recommendation:** Maintain strict ownership validation and detailed logging of authorization failures.

F009 — GraphQL Injection

- **Target:** /dvwa/
- **Result:** Resolver logic sanitized all inputs; no injection found.
- **Recommendation:** Continue validating and sanitizing resolver inputs; enforce request rate limiting to prevent abuse.

SQLMAP RESULTS

Automated SQL injection checks confirmed that the backend queries are properly parameterized. No database errors, leakage, or timing anomalies were detected.

REMEDIATION PLAN

Finding ID	Vulnerability	Recommended Remediation	Priority
F001	SQL Injection	Continue strict use of parameterized queries and input validation. Regularly test query logic after code updates.	High
F002	Session Replay	Enforce short session timeouts, enable token binding, and invalidate sessions on logout or privilege changes.	Medium
F003	Session Fixation	Regenerate session IDs on every authentication event and limit cookie lifespan.	Medium
F004	GraphQL Presence	Keep introspection disabled in production, apply query depth/complexity limits, and sanitize inputs.	Low
F008	BOLA	Implement granular object ownership checks and monitor authorization failure logs.	Critical
F009	GraphQL Injection	Apply strict schema validation, sanitize nested fields, and disable unneeded resolvers.	High

APPENDIX


kali@kali: ~
Session Actions Edit View Help
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ sudo nmap -sV -sC 192.168.96.128
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.95 (https://nmap.org) at 2025-10-28 09:37 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.96.128
Host is up (0.0039s latency).
Not shown: 977 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp vsftpd 2.3.4
|_ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_ftp-bounce: bounce working!
| ftp-syst:
| STAT:
| FTP server status:
| Connected to 192.168.96.1
| Logged in as ftp
| TYPE: ASCII
| No session bandwidth limit
| Session timeout in seconds is 300
| Control connection is plain text
| Data connections will be plain text
| vsFTPd 2.3.4 - secure, fast, stable
|_End of status
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 4.7p1 Debian 8ubuntu1 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 1024 60:0f:cf:e1:c0:5f:6a:74:d6:90:24:fa:c4:d5:6c:cd (DSA)
|_ 2048 56:56:24:0f:21:1d:de:a7:2b:ae:61:b1:24:3d:e8:f3 (RSA)
23/tcp open telnet Linux telnetd
25/tcp open smtp Postfix smtpd
|_smtp-commands: metasploitable.localdomain, PIPELINING, SIZE 10240000, VRFY, ETRN, STARTTLS, ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES, 8BITMIME, DSN
53/tcp open domain ISC BIND 9.4.2
| dns-nsid:
|_ bind.version: 9.4.2
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.2.8 ((Ubuntu) DAV/2)
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.2.8 (Ubuntu) DAV/2
|_http-title: Metasploitable2 - Linux
111/tcp open rpcbind 2 (RPC #100000)
| rpcinfo:
| program version port/proto service
| 100000 2 111/tcp rpcbind
| 100000 2 111/udp rpcbind


| 100000 2 111/tcp rpcbind
| 100000 2 111/udp rpcbind
| 100003 2,3,4 2049/tcp nfs
| 100003 2,3,4 2049/udp nfs
| 100005 1,2,3 44380/tcp mountd
| 100005 1,2,3 53456/udp mountd
| 100021 1,3,4 35476/tcp nlockmgr
| 100021 1,3,4 35831/udp nlockmgr
| 100024 1 37079/tcp status
|_ 100024 1 53447/udp status
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.0.20-Debian (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
512/tcp open exec?
513/tcp open login?
514/tcp open shell?
1099/tcp open java-rmi GNU Classpath grmiregistry
1524/tcp open bindshell Metasploitable root shell
2049/tcp open nfs 2-4 (RPC #100003)
2121/tcp open ccproxy-ftp?
3306/tcp open mysql?
5432/tcp open postgresql PostgreSQL DB 8.3.0 - 8.3.7
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=ubuntu804-base.localdomain/organizationName=OCOSA/stateOrProvinceName=There is no such thing outside US/countr
yName=XX
| Not valid before: 2010-03-17T14:07:45
|_Not valid after: 2010-04-16T14:07:45
|_ssl-date: 2025-10-28T13:41:15+00:00; +5s from scanner time.
5900/tcp open vnc VNC (protocol 3.3)
| vnc-info:
| Protocol version: 3.3
| Security types:
|_ VNC Authentication (2)
6000/tcp open X11 (access denied)
6667/tcp open irc UnrealIRCd
8009/tcp open ajp13 Apache Jserv (Protocol v1.3)
|_ajp-methods: Failed to get a valid response for the OPTION request
8180/tcp open http Apache Tomcat/Coyote JSP engine 1.1
|_http-favicon: Apache Tomcat
|_http-title: Apache Tomcat/5.5
Service Info: Hosts: metasploitable.localdomain, irc.Metasploitable.LAN; OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Host script results:


┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ ffuf -u http://192.168.96.128/FUZZ -w /usr/share/wordlists/wfuzz/general/common.txt -c -t 50
v2.1.0-dev
:: Method : GET
:: URL : http://192.168.96.128/FUZZ
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/wfuzz/general/common.txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 50
:: Matcher : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
dav [Status: 301, Size: 319, Words: 21, Lines: 10, Duration: 2ms]
phpMyAdmin [Status: 301, Size: 326, Words: 21, Lines: 10, Duration: 7ms]
test [Status: 301, Size: 320, Words: 21, Lines: 10, Duration: 5ms]
index [Status: 200, Size: 891, Words: 237, Lines: 30, Duration: 384ms]
:: Progress: [951/951] :: Job [1/1] :: 53 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:05] :: Errors: 0 ::
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]


Request
Response
Inspector
POST /dvwa/login.php HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 302 Found


[DuckDBService] Created new singleton instance with global guard
The disableGPU setting is set to undefined
Not disabling GPU
Main: Starting cleanup of stale files
(postman:202775): Gtk-WARNING **: 11:36:03.992: Failed to parse /etc/xdg/gtk-3.0/settings.ini: Permission denied
Main: Cleanup of stale files completed


Get data - Ariee's Workspace
Cookies
Manage Cookies
Sync Cookies
Add domain
192.168.96.128
2 cookies
PHPSESSID
security
+ Add Cookie
PHPSESSID=2154744580877 1c8fce292e3f194a598; Path=/;
Cancel
Save


Get data - Ariee's Workspace
GET
http://192.168.96.128/dvwa/login.php
Send
Cookie
Postman-Token
Host
User-Agent
200 OK





CONCLUSION

The API Security Testing Lab conducted between 192.168.116.135 (tester) and 192.168.96.128 (target) concluded with no critical or exploitable vulnerabilities identified. All major security controls—including authorization, session management, and query validation—performed as expected.

The system demonstrates a strong security baseline, resilient against OWASP API Top 10 attack lasses. Ongoing vigilance through periodic testing, patching, and log monitoring will ensure continuous protection and operational security maturity.