

to ensure accountability  
Authentication

Non-Repudiation  
is there

when we trust 3<sup>rd</sup> party

→ Digital Signature } uses public key encryption  
→ Huge cost

→ MAC

} Uses shared symmetric key  
→ low cost

No dependency on 3<sup>rd</sup> party

Integrity

increasing order of cost  
→ HASH → simple integrity.

→ MAC → Integrity & Auth.

→ Dlg Signon → int, Auth & Non-Repudiation =

DC++

Confidentiality

req. 3<sup>rd</sup> party.

when no. of users are huge

Cost ↑  
→ Public key encryption  
→ Symmetric key  
→ Sg. Encryption

→ Key exchange method.

11<sup>th</sup> Oct 2023


→ Risk Analysis

Cost of Risk Analysis < Loss

# Network Security

11<sup>th</sup> Oct 2023

- \* Static Analysis
- \* Dynamic






Rice Theorem!

# Network Security :

design issues are dealt here.

zero day attacks





12<sup>th</sup> Oct 2023

Tunnel  $\nRightarrow$  Not used for end-to-end.

$\Downarrow$   
Used for Routers / Gateway.

IPsec can't be implemented w/o sender & receiver, it can only be applied to sender ~~for office~~ & receiver ~~for office~~ router.

Can't we do this w/o Machines?



IKE: Establishes key, key

IPSec

Sp: Num bes → for multiple conn

Replay attack


Encrypt → Authen
Authen → Encrypt

which is better?

Task: to achieve CIA

16<sup>th</sup> Oct 2023

IKE Protocol → used for key establishment




$y = g^x$  , if you know 'y' and 'g' then you can't compute 'x' in polynomial time.

"Discrete Log of Assumption"

$y \rightarrow$  public  
 $g \rightarrow$  "

$x \rightarrow$  secret  $\Rightarrow$  No one can hack in polynomial time.





→ first the receiver <sup>verifies</sup> verifies the Digital Signature and then process the key ( $g^x/g^y$ )

$s_{pi}=1, K=(Algo)$

B

A

$s_{pi}=2, K=(Algo)$

C

$s_{pi}=3, K=(Algo)$

D

SPI (sender)				
SPI (Responder)				
Nxt Payload =	IKE Major ver	IKE Minor ver	Payload Type	Play
Msg ID				
length				

# Transport Layer Security

18<sup>th</sup> Oct, 2023

20<sup>th</sup> Oct, 2023

## Protocol stack :

Record protocol : Encryption / Authentication

Handshake : What protocols & stuff.

proton mail

Alert protocol : Pointing the cross out.

→ This is it there in N/w Layer cause it has ICMP

SMIE attack.

SMTP.

→ done at individual level.

23<sup>rd</sup> Oct, 2023

DKIM → Authenticates for Domain identification.

TLS

spoofing attack.

PCIDSS = payment Gateway Security policy.

NIST

Sniff



## \* Access Control :

Authentication  $\rightarrow$  credential ✓

Authorization  $\rightarrow$  what you do after authentication

ways to implement Access control :

Attribute based access control.

MAC - Mandatory Access Control  $\Rightarrow$  Not flexible

$\downarrow$   
To change  
access control  
change the policy itself.

TAC

RBAC - Role Based Access Control

$\hookrightarrow$  Roles will have access control,  
not the individuals

# ABAC (Attribute Based Access Control)

25<sup>th</sup> Oct 2023

Access Control policy is a subset of whole policy

30<sup>th</sup> Oct 2023

## Computer System Security

↳ Planning.  $\Rightarrow$  when we deploy OS

- ① Risk Analysis
- ② Security Policy & procedure.
- ③ Security Awareness Training
- ④ Incident Response
- ⑤ Compliance & Regulation.
- ⑥ Budgeting.

↳ Hardening

- ↳ Operating System & Hardening.
- ↳ N/w Hardening
- ↳ Application hardening.
- ↳ Access Control
- ↳ Data Encryption
- ↳ Patch Management
- ↳ Vulnerability Mngt
- ↳ Security Testing.

## Maintenance

- ① Regular Updates & Patching
- ② Log & Event Monitoring
- ③ Incident response
- ④ Back Up & Recovery
- ⑤ Documentation.

Dec 2nd

## Attack Surface



which allows  
someone to enter

Web Application

1<sup>st</sup> Oct 2023

Following principle of privilege separation will be more secure.

Broken Access Control Vulnerability

3<sup>rd</sup> Nov, 2023

Virtualization

2 kind Hosted Virtualization  
Native

hypervisor

os  
↓  
vm  
↓

vm  
↑ hosted  
↓  
os  
↓

5	9	1
2	2	1
2	2	1
2	2	1
2	2	1
2	2	1

5	9	1
2	2	1
2	2	1
2	2	1
2	2	1
2	2	1

6<sup>th</sup> Nov, 2022

VM1	VM2	VM3
App1	App2	App3
OS <sub>1</sub>	OS <sub>2</sub>	OS <sub>3</sub>
hypervisor		
H/W		


hypervisor directly installed on H/W

Base Model Virtualization

App1	App2	App3
OS1	OS2	OS3
hypervisor		
OS		
H/W		

hypervisor installed over OS

Hosted Virtualization



Docker /

Most vulnerable cause if one container gets access of OS then it can have access of other containers.

lines of code are less



In terms of isolation, Docker is more vulnerable.

In terms of line of code, Hosted

isolation > line of code.

Docker is more vulnerable than Hosted.

→ In hosted & Bare Metal, one OS can communicate with other. iff. one VM has shared resources with other.

→ We measure the <sup>isolation</sup> ~~hypervisor~~ is done with hypervisor.

with accessing hypervisor.

→ How to reduce the surface of attack?

- ① Hardening: without using default settings while installing.
- ② Maintaining:

- ① Vulnerability in host OS
- ② Inter VM connection
- ③ VM-Escape Vulnerabilities
- ④ M. configurations
- ⑤ Outdated sw
- ⑥ physical Access
- ⑦ Privilege Escalation.



## Extreme Uses Authentication

As the no. of factors  $\uparrow$   $\Rightarrow$  security  $\uparrow$   $\Rightarrow$  usability  $\downarrow$

factor: no. of <sup>levels to</sup> ~~characters to access~~ <sup>access smtg</sup> in a password.

like "2-factor verification of Google".

$\rightarrow$  password vs Biometric?

password  $>$  Biometric; Biometric once leaked  
can't be changed

8<sup>th</sup> Nov, 2023

## Electronic User Authentication

- $\rightarrow$  Password Based Authentication
- $\rightarrow$  Token " "
- $\rightarrow$  Biometric " "

## Risk Assurance:

- $\rightarrow$  one factor  $\rightarrow$  load 1 assured
- $\rightarrow$  ~~one~~ 2 factor  $\rightarrow$  load 2 "
- $\rightarrow$  3 factors  $\rightarrow$  load 3 "

① Dictionary Attack: → Dictionary of common passwords  
(available on internet)

② ~~Rainbow~~ table Attack  
Rainbow

Not calculating hash same time at runtime  
Here the maintain the hash of common passwords  
↓  
This removes the solution for Dictionary Attack

To overcome this problem people started to store the hash of passwords instead of normal storage in tables.

Then what should we do?

Now, we can add a "KEY" to the hash, which will be unique for each user.

Adding KEY to the password is called "Salting"  
After this then the whole stuff is hashed.

Adding unique key results in increase in search space.

What to do if the attacker gets to know what key is used for each password?

→ What to do so the key is not disclosed?

Pipper ⇒ we will add another key to not disclose the salt key. and the pepper key is same for all.

## Token Based Authentication:


Ex: Debit Card

Security:  
2-factor (Authentication)  
↳ 1. Card → Gives ID.  
↳ 2. Password

Digital Signature is not the best solution to use for mobiles.  
cause it is complex & stuff..



We use MAC with symmetric key for authentication



What are attacks that are possible here?



Hold on key can cause a problem.

To overcome this we can do encryption, with a key to the table

Can we do Hashing here?

No, hashing doesn't provide confidentiality.  
It only maintains integrity

# Biometric

10<sup>th</sup> Nov, 2023

fingerprint  $\rightarrow$  registered at server.

2 Types  $\rightarrow$  Static : Thumb / Iris  
 $\rightarrow$  Dynamic : Voice

We can convert 2-factor to 3 factor by  
adding fingerprint into the process  
biometric


This is more secure & less usable.

## Applications

\* Mobile



What should be  
done for authentication?




Base Station

There is a key present in the phone  
handshake. There is no need to exchange the key.  
"key exchange is out".

✓ Symmetric / Public-private  $\Rightarrow$  Symmetric key

✓ MAC / Digital Sign  $\Rightarrow$  MAC  $\Rightarrow$  Computational power.  
bc we need 3<sup>rd</sup> party in  
Digital Sign.





15<sup>th</sup> Nov, 2023

Q: A company named X wants to offer a server cloud, based backup system. When the user updates a local file, her client opens a TCP connection to the X-servers and uses the Diffie Hellman protocol to establish a secret symmetric key  $K$  with the server. Then the client guarantees the string  $S$

$$\textcircled{1} \quad S = \{\text{documentName, username, userPassword, randomNumber}\}$$

and sends the following ~~msg~~ message to the X servers.

$$E_K(S, \text{HMAC}_K(S))$$


where  $E_K(m)$  denotes <sup>encrypting</sup> ~~everything~~ messages in using key  $K$ , &

$\text{HMAC}_K(m)$  denotes computing on HMAC message authentication code of msg in using key  $K$ .  $\textcircled{2}$

The server decrypts the msg, verifies the user password and verifies the user password and verifies the integrity of the msg. using the HMAC (3) If all of the checks succeed the server stores the document. How can a H/w ~~also~~ attain obtain the user password.

Ans:

Diffie Hellman exchange



Random No | Time stamp are used to avoid Replay attack.