

# Failure to Share Natural Disaster Risk

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## Why do we care?

- ▶ Financial frictions for intermediaries matter for asset pricing
  - ▶ Theory (Brunnermeier-Pedersen 2009 RFS, He-Krishnamurthy 2013 AER; Brunnermeier-Sannikov, 2014 AER)
  - ▶ Evidence (Adrian-Etula-Muir, 2014 JF; He-Kelly-Manela, 2017 JFE; Haddad-Muir, 2018)
- ▶ Goal: Test if prices reflect risk-exposures of financial intermediaries in a setting that is somewhat cleaner from omitted risk factors

## What the paper does?

- ▶ Focus on catastrophe bonds linked to natural disaster occurrence
- ▶ Arguably, little exposure to traditional macroeconomic risks
  - ▶ Little interest rate or credit risk
- ▶ Argues expected excess returns to cat bonds would be zero if not for risk averse intermediaries

# Main findings

- ▶ Estimates cross-sectional regressions:

$$E_t(R_{i,t+1}^e) = \lambda_{0,t} + \lambda_{cat,t} \hat{\beta}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

<i>t</i>	$\lambda_{0,t}$	( <i>t</i> -stat)	$\lambda_{cat,t}$	( <i>t</i> -stat)	$\lambda_{cat,t} - E_t(R_{cat,t+1}^e)$	( <i>t</i> -stat)	$R^2$	<i>N</i>	$N_{clusters}$	
2003	<b>1.47</b>	16.98	<b>2.14</b>	17.42		<b>-1.45</b>	-11.78	0.73	30	12
2004	0.09	0.12	<b>1.54</b>	3.11		-0.31	-0.63	0.51	36	18
2005	<b>0.84</b>	6.56	<b>1.09</b>	12.08		<b>-0.88</b>	-9.72	0.42	34	16
2006	-2.51	-2.54	<b>7.62</b>	9.62		2.13	2.69	0.82	33	18
2007	<b>1.49</b>	3.10	<b>3.78</b>	5.01		-0.96	-1.27	0.71	40	28
2008	<b>1.53</b>	4.88	<b>2.86</b>	8.11		<b>-1.18</b>	-3.35	0.72	33	27
2009	<b>3.29</b>	5.10	<b>4.03</b>	5.14		<b>-2.97</b>	-3.79	0.71	22	17
2010	<b>3.10</b>	5.51	<b>1.99</b>	5.50		<b>-2.86</b>	-7.90	0.53	30	21
2011	1.07	1.25	2.62	2.54		-0.77	-0.75	0.42	22	15
2012	<b>1.21</b>	3.23	<b>4.08</b>	11.69		<b>-1.58</b>	-4.54	0.84	31	27
2013	<b>0.79</b>	3.75	<b>2.17</b>	8.52		<b>-1.02</b>	-4.02	0.76	42	35
2014	<b>1.15</b>	6.20	<b>1.39</b>	5.09		<b>-1.22</b>	-4.45	0.54	48	39
2015	<b>1.09</b>	7.04	<b>1.23</b>	6.85		<b>-1.12</b>	-6.22	0.60	50	39
2016	<b>0.90</b>	5.56	<b>1.02</b>	5.28		<b>-0.70</b>	-3.65	0.53	40	29
2017	0.53	2.38	<b>1.21</b>	3.64		-0.08	-0.25	0.31	46	32
2018	0.35	1.21	1.15	2.56		0.08	0.17	0.29	44	31
FM	<b>1.23</b>	9.41	<b>2.06</b>	11.67		<b>-1.10</b>	-9.02	0.49	63	

## Contribution

- ▶ Intermediary AP literature has looked at many other asset classes but not cat bonds
- ▶ Cat bonds have been studied extensively by Froot and O'Connell (1999, 2008) and Froot (2001)
- ▶ The paper makes clear a set of assumptions under which the cat bond risk premium can be interpreted as an intermediary risk premium

## Suggestion 1: Independence assumption

- ▶ Central assumption: natural disasters are independent of aggregate wealth
- ▶ Used to reject explanations based on macroeconomic risk factors
- ▶ What about true catastrophes?

# Suggestion 1: Independence assumption

Swiss Re Global Cat Bond Total Return Index (SRGLTTR) vs other relative benchmarks <sup>7</sup>



Source: Swiss Re Capital Markets and Bloomberg LP, as of June 30, 2020

## Suggestion 2: Peso problems

- ▶ But what if we were lucky?
- ▶ Most of the cat bonds in the sample cover North America and Europe
- ▶ What if a natural disaster devastated the US?
- ▶ Manela-Moreira (2017 JFE) find that wars and government-related uncertainty are priced risks
  - ▶ But natural disasters are not! Good news for this paper

## Suggestion 3: Knock on effects

- ▶ Some severe natural disasters can have knock on effects on the economy, markets, and society
- ▶ Jha-Liu-Manela (2020) find that uninsured disasters like severe epidemics and earthquakes tend to worsen public sentiment toward the financial sector
  - ▶ Long-term effects on GDP and credit growth
- ▶ From specialist's perspective, holding an asset that defaults at the same time AUM go out the door and regulatory costs rise
  - ▶ Risky!
- ▶ Channel is related but not quite the He-Krishnamurthy (2013) story

## My take

- ▶ Really nice contribution to our understanding of cat bond pricing
- ▶ Compelling evidence consistent with the intermediary asset pricing model
- ▶ Careful work ruling out many alternative stories

## Other suggestions / minor points

- ▶ The standard errors and t-stats in Table 3 (and others) are hard to believe. For example, the first line has a t-stat of 17 for a cross-sectional regression with 30 assets ...
- ▶ Also, because the betas are simulated and noisy, there are well-known issues with generated regressors here. Can you use the simulated values to account for this noise?