

# Dial One for Scam: A Large-Scale Analysis of **Technical Support Scams**



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# What are Tech Support Scams?

# Tech Support Scam Evolution

3

2008

Fake support cold calls

2013

A Twist: Scammers started to use malvertising

2014

IC3 issued a public service announcement

2014

Microsoft sued several campaigns

2015

FTC took down several big campaigns


2016

IC3 issued a public service announcement

2017

Got more aggressive and still an increasing threat

# Tech Support Scam (Cold Calls)



# Tech Support Scam Evolution

5

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# Tech Support Scam (malvertising)




locked concealed significant page password response continue com  
engineering trick cause  
theft technical cause  
response continue com  
identity major  
copyright  
warning technicians visit  
situation services visit  
blocked classified reserved  
caused connection fix  
disk attack oops logs live  
leaked tracking auto apply  
attack contacting based  
oops unknown logs apply  
breach breach carry  
location attention logs run  
tcp location worms hacked  
stalkers using email desk  
actions registry worms www port  
calling dear pop communications webcam  
current acts administrator adware  
viruses suspended prevent inject  
right harmful info restart program warriors  
sharmful crash computing often  
browsing browser details especially causing  
type logins something containing  
harmfull useful reason anonymous terms hard  
form malware social software



# Tech Support Scam Page(I)

```
* Starting System V initialisation compatibility[ OK ]
* Stopping flush early job output to logs[ OK ]
* Starting D-Bus system message bus[ OK ]
* Starting SystemD login management service[ OK ]
* Starting Bridge file events into upstart[ OK ]
* Starting system logging daemon[ OK ]
* Starting early crypto disks...
[ OK ]
* Starting Handle applying cloud-config[ OK ]
Skipping profile in /etc/apparmor.d/disable/
* Starting AppArmor profiles
[ OK ]
* Stopping System V initialisation compatibility[ OK ]
* Starting System V runlevel compatibility[ OK ]
* Starting save kernel messages[ OK ]
* Starting configure network device security[ OK ]
* Starting OpenSSH server[ OK ]
* Starting ACPI daemon[ OK ]
* Starting regular background program processing daemon[ OK ]
* Starting deferred execution scheduler[ OK ]
* Stopping save kernel messages[ OK ]
* Starting CPU interrupts balancing daemon[ OK ]
* Starting configure virtual network devices[ OK ]
* Starting automatic crash reporting daemon[ OK ]
Cloud-init v. 0.7.5 running '
```



Potential breaking attempt!

please call:

+1-866-793-2591



# Tech Support Scam Evolution

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# Tech Support Scam Evolution

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# Growth of 200%

10

**ars technica**

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## A neverending story: PC users lose another \$120M to tech support scams

Court stops alleged scamming operations, but an end to the problem is elusive.

by Jon Brodkin - Nov 19, 2014 2:33pm EST

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## Technology

## Microsoft takes on tech support scammers

19 December 2014 | Technology

**NETWORKWORLD**  
FROM IDG

Home > Security

 **LAYER 8**  
By Michael Cooney | Online News Editor | Follow

**OPINION**  
**FTC takes out “tech support” scammers; \$5.1 million in fines, retribution**  
Fraudsters masqueraded as Dell, Microsoft, McAfee, Norton and others

# Growth of 200%

The screenshot shows the Ars Technica website. On the left, there's a sidebar with a red circular logo containing the letters "ars", followed by the word "technica". Below the logo are links for "MAIN MENU", "MY STORIES: 25", "FORUMS", "SUBSCRIBE", and "JOBS". A large, semi-transparent overlay on the page features a line graph titled "Tech support scams" on the y-axis (labeled "MILLION") and months from JAN 2015 to DEC on the x-axis. The graph shows a general upward trend with some fluctuations. The data points are approximately as follows:

Month	Scams (Millions)
JAN 2015	3.5
FEB	2.8
MAR	3.5
APR	6.8
MAY	5.5
JUN	10.5
JUL	6.5
AUG	6.2
SEP	11.5
OCT	16.0
NOV	13.5
DEC	15.5

The main content area has a background image of a computer keyboard and a red circular seal with the text "Ars Technica". The title of the article is "Symantec Report (2016)".

The screenshot shows a news website with a red header bar containing the word "NEWS" and navigation links for "Home", "Video", "World", "US & Canada", "UK", "Business", "Tech", and "Sci". Below the header, the word "Technology" is visible. The main article title is "Symantec Report (2016)". The article discusses a court stopping an alleged scamming operation and mentions a \$120M fine. It includes a line graph showing the growth of tech support scams from January to December 2015. The graph has a y-axis labeled "MILLION" and an x-axis from JAN to DEC. The data points are approximately as follows:

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DEC	15.5

Below the graph, there's an opinion piece about the FTC taking out "tech support" scammers, mentioning fines of \$5.1 million. The author is Michael Cooney.

# Research Goals


12

- Systematic study of Tech Support Scam ecosystem
- To investigate the:
  - Prevalence
    - # Domains, # Phone Numbers, and #Scam Campaigns
  - Details about the underlying infrastructure
    - Hosting providers, ASes, and Telecommunication companies
  - Evasion and social engineering techniques
    - Tools used, call-center infrastructures, and prices

# Tool Design (Robovic)

# Data Collection Methodology

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# Collected Scam Domains

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- Over 8 months

- Crawled 8 Million domains
- Resolved 5 Million domains
- Detected 22,000 scam URLs
- Extracted 8,600 unique scam domains
- 1500 phone numbers

## Short and readable domains

- computer-warning-message[.]com
- donotclose[.]website
- input-error[.]net

## Long with readable parts


- 10.computerhaveaseriousproblempleasecallon18776431254t  
ollfree.yourcomputerhaveaseriousproblempleasecallon187764  
31254tollfree.yourcomputerhaveaseriousproblempleasecallon  
18776431254tollfree.browsersecurity16[.]club

## URLs from CDNs

- 1073964613.rsc.cdn77[.]org
- 924983738.r.cdnsun[.]net

# Weekly Scam Domains

16




# Scam Domains & phone Numbers

17

- Hiding backend servers (16% used Cloudflare)
- Anonymized registration information (55%)
- Abuse a small number of Telco companies
  - 80% of numbers belong to Twilio, RingRevenue (Invoca), WilTel
  - Prefer those that provide APIs
    - Scalable solution for the scammers' business
- Number of phone numbers is much less than the number of domains
  - Phone numbers can link together domains of the same campaign

# Scam Campaigns

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


● Phone Number

● Domain Name


# Scam Campaigns

19




# Life time of Campaigns

20




# Phone-TLD+1 Relationship

21



# Pay Per Call Marketing

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# Meeting the Scammers



# Environment set up

24


- Obtained permission from our IRB
- 60 interactions with the scammers
- Environment:
  - Artificially aged Windows 7 virtual machine
  - Tunneling the traffic through VPN
  - VoIP software with believable CallerID
  - Capturing network traffic, recording the screen and conversations

# Scammers' Tools & Techniques

25




## Social Engineering Techniques



# Scammer Physical Locations & Profit

# Location of Scammers' Servers

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# Location of Call Centers

28



# Number of Victims

29

- Monitoring Traffic of Scam Servers:
  - Misconfiguration of scam servers revealed their traffic
    - 142 scam domains were found which had misconfiguration
    - We monitored misconfigured servers every one minute over two months
  - Total visits : 1.7 million unique IPs
  - Max #visitors/domain : 138K unique IPs

# Location of Victims

30



# Scammers' Profit

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Average price of Tech Support Scam Package (\$290)

\*

Number of Victims (1.7 million unique IPs)

\*

Conversion Rate (2% as a similar scareware)

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Scammers' profit = ~ \$9.7 million in 2 months


(a lower bound)

## Defense: Sufficiency of Current Blacklists

# Blacklists: Phone Numbers


33

	Database	Coverage	Claimed Size
Website	mrnumber.com	19.9%	1.5 billion numbers
	800notes.com	18.5%	Unknown
	numberguru.com	1.0%	29 million lookups
	badnumbers.info	0.2%	968,639 complains
	callersmart.com	0.1%	5.9 million lookups
	scamnumbers.info	0.1%	31,162 numbers
Mobile App	Should I Answer?	0.5%	640 million lookups
	Truecaller	0.5%	2 billion numbers
	Hiya	0.3%	100 million numbers
	CallDetector	0.1%	100,000 complaints monthly
	Mr. Number	0.1%	1.5 billion numbers
	Together	27.4%	-



# Blacklists: Domain Names

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- Detected Before Robovic
- Detected After Robovic
- Not Blacklisted

6 Blacklists (370K domains and IP addresses Together)

- hpHosts
- SANS suspicious domains
- malwaredomains
- malwaredomainlist
- Malc0de database
- abuse.ch

# Why do blacklists not work?

35

- Tech Support Scams are highly dynamic
  - 30% of the domains are alive less than a day
  - Abusing CDNs to get fresh URLs
  - Majority of phone numbers registered recently
  - Phone numbers are generated dynamically

# Defense against Tech Support Scam

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- User Education
  - Explaining the concept of technical support scams is easier
  - Raising awareness through public services
- Browser Support
  - Average users do not know how to kill the browser process and clearing recent history
  - One universal shortcut to close unsafe pages



# Summary

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- Tech support scams pose a serious threat
- We conducted the first systematic study of tech support scams
- Reported prevalence of the scam and evasion techniques based on the collected corpus of thousands of domains and phone numbers
- Clustered campaigns and estimated their life time
- Interacted with 60 different scammers and identified the social engineering techniques
- Underline the need for user education and support from the browser vendors

# Dial One for Scam: A Large-Scale Analysis of Technical Support Scams

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**Abstract**—In technical support scams, cybercriminals attempt to convince users that their machines are infected with malware and are in need of their technical support. In this process, the victims are asked to provide scammers with remote access to their machines, who will then “diagnose the problem”, before offering their support services which typically cost hundreds of dollars. Despite their conceptual simplicity, technical support scams are responsible for yearly losses of tens of millions of dollars from

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Even though this type of scam costs users millions of dollars on a yearly basis [1], [2], there has been no systematic study of technical support scams from the security community. Thus, while today we know that these scams do in fact take place and that scammers are successfully defrauding users, any details about their operations are collected in an unsystematic way, e.g., by victimized users recalling their experiences, and