International Organizations, Sports, and International Sports Organizations

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Abstract: Individuals seeking to cooperate to produce shared interests, whether to make national security or practice sports, must overcome barriers to this cooperation created by differences in their interests and differences in their ability to contribute to joint production. The formation of translocal martial arts organizations to facilitate the joint production of martial arts practice is analyzed in this paper using theories of international organizations. In particular, this paper analyzes the conditions under which translocal – and transboundary (international) – organization of Yongmudo would prove beneficial to those interested in its joint production.

Introduction

> "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
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> -- Constitution of the United States, Preamble (adopted by convention of States 17 September 1787; ratified 21 June 1788)

The American colonies had thrown off the English a decade before. They did not wish to replace one king with another, but had found the existing contact, the Articles of Confederation, to be too weak to provide for everything their citizens needed. They sought a new contract, a new Constitution, to "form a more perfect union": one that would limit their freedoms but also would hopefully provide the public goods they desired.

This dilemma is faced by every group of individuals with common interests because there are costs to realizing those interests collectively when not all benefit equally from their achievement (and some would do better with an alternative). Even if the goal appears more limited than creating a new country, individuals with similar sporting interests face these same dilemmas. Sports enthusiasts must determine whether achieving their individual interest is possible with weak, local organization or whether it requires association, confederation or strong union. Some form of association among individuals or regional groups may allow them to improve the performance of the sport, standardize its rules, and perhaps benefit economically from increased efficiency. However, there may be real costs to such an association created not only by the costs of negotiating the particulars of their association but also due to compromises of each other's interests that occur in the process of associating. Transnational populations

of sporting individuals face additional hurdles identifying sufficiently valuable benefits to international confederation.

I argue local sporting organizations should only consider broader and deeper organization if doing so provides clear benefits to their membership. I first discuss a number of factors that are relevant to the costs and benefits of creating transnational sporting organizations, such as sporting associations and federations, and then examine several examples of sporting organizations for their success in organizing and the benefits they offer to their constituencies. I then present a first cut at evaluating the utility to negotiating and implementing a national or international Yongmudo federation. I find that while stronger transnational organization of Yongmudo would bring significant benefits to Yongmudo enthusiasts, most of these benefits could be accomplished primarily through a weak association. A strong Yongmudo union is necessary for the singular, but perhaps individually sufficient, purpose of certifying Yongmudo-related expertise.

Benefits and Costs of International Organizations

All people have a variety of interests that they seek to advance: economic, social, and otherwise. When an individual is unable to achieve an interest without the active assistance of others, this assistance is necessary if that interest is to be achieved. While many sports allow some solitary training, the purpose of soccer, baseball, and martial arts is social: the joint production of "play". For martial arts in particular, the purpose is not only social but also the advancement of martial skills for self-defense or combat.

Sports enthusiasts can benefit from the institutionalization of sports play in the adoption of norms, rules and procedures. Sports institutions include the play-related rules and facilities, the people who play, and the interaction of these elements; sports organizations have a common purpose from which their pattern and coherence result (Skinner, Stewart, and Edwards 1999:176). Individual clubs can organize sports practice, including training and competition, among themselves when they agree upon rules and criteria for expertise. When play is institutionalized beyond the individual club level, whether into increasingly larger forms of association or even empowering others with substantial authority over the future direction of cooperation, sports practice can become translocal: organized among local units to the regional, national or international level.

The joint production of sports play through some form of institutionalization benefits enthusiasts by expanding the opportunities for play, expanding the quality of play, and reducing the costs of play. Opportunities are expanded by the participation of greater numbers of individuals at any one time or by expansion of the number of times and locations in which play may occur. The quality of play can be expanded through training with or instruction by other skilled persons or by investment in expertise-building capacities such as training devices. A related benefit is certification of expertise offered directly (instruction, training) or indirectly (manuals, DVDs). The difficulty with some sports, including most martial arts, is the absence of simple criteria for expertise.

Most sports use competition-related statistics to determine expertise, though this represents limited aspects of martial arts and individual expertise continues to develop long after one's competition days have concluded. A certification process is more useful when expertness is harder to observe because of the absence of simple measures. Parallel to certification is branding: the mode of play can acquire an image or reputation that distinguishes it from other, similar modes.

Finally, the costs of play can be reduced through economies of scale in the production of play. Cost savings are realized when fixed costs are distributed over a larger population of consumers or with the elimination of redundant spending, reducing the cost of play to individuals. Examples include the ability to acquire larger or better access to play locations (workout spaces or *dojos/dojangs*), distribute costs of play management (accounting, administration, janitorial services, etc) and decreasing costs with bulk numbers for equipment purchases, insurance, etc.[1] In some countries, these incentives are magnified by government regulation and granting of subsidies to sports federations, usually to encouraging an efficient federation that improves participant satisfaction with the level and quality of competition (Barros 2003:33).[2] These three aspects of joint production may also benefit the participants by attracting not only more individual participants, but also more skilled participants capable of improving performance and enjoyment. However, there is a threshold for each benefit beyond which more is not necessarily better and may even be worse.

Many benefits of joint production do not require agreement on basic rules like the size or shape of the ball they play with, if they play with a ball at all: translocal organization provides the collective resources to purchase fields for play and permit efficiencies from large-scale purchase of uniforms, liability insurance, and other goods. Many municipalities (and colleges) have recreation directors that coordinate play this way: one field can serve baseball, football and soccer play as long when they play is different; players purchase uniforms and other equipment from the same suppliers; and insurance companies may be content to cover all players. For example, two (or more) individuals may value practicing martial arts but require someone else's participation to do so. When the interests and resources of two or more actors are a good match, they may be able coordinate to achieve their shared (martial) interests. Such anarchic coordination is sufficient for joint production of early morning tai chi, pick-up basketball games, and many weekend softball matches.[3]

The problem is that they also possess interests that vary at least slightly (i.e.,

[1] Seippel divides the work in sports organizations into the following categories: administration, accountancy, instruction, janitor, organizing volunteers, support functions, miscellaneous practical work, and other (Seippel 2002:260).

[2] Barros describes case of Portugal where there is the government Ministry of Sport and a National Confederation of Sport (an non-governmental organization with 67 associate member federations that lobbies the government); below these two peak institutions are the national and then regional associations of each individual sport.

[3] Of course, municipalities only provide such facilities because individuals overcame their collective action problem at some point in the past to demand, and receive, these public goods.

different value for work, family and other recreational interests) and possess different resources useful to achieving that shared interest (i.e., time, expertise). At the most superficial level, institutionalization of sports play describes agreement on rules of play and extends to include any process put in place to achieve play. Examples of processes include congresses in which sports practitioners meet to formally negotiate rules or organizations formed to facilitate play more actively. While it may appear counterintuitive, deep cooperation through institutions (like clubs or associations) is necessary not when there are large prospective benefits, but when there are benefits *and* substantial risks. Assuming the gains from coordination described above exist and are significant for a group of sports enthusiasts, barriers to coordination from different interests and capabilities are risks created by hold-up problems, differences in the gains received by the actors, and agency slack.

Hold-up problems exist when multiple actors are required to separately commit significant investments and fear others will not invest as promised. There are several recent examples of professional sporting teams demanding the construction of new stadiums as a condition for the team not moving to another city, a promise that that is difficult to enforce for municipalities. This is also the reason why most youth team sports utilize public facilities for play rather than, perhaps, a soccer league purchasing land in the hope nearby football and baseball/softball leagues will rent space during their respective seasons. For most martial arts, these investments may be less significant because there are few and relatively cheap modifications required to facilities and the facilities themselves are either provided free by community or educational centers or are cheap to rent.[4] In all of these cases, joint production is held up by the possibility that others will not fulfill their end of the bargain and will free-ride on the efforts of others.

Second, differences in the interests of actors usually result in differences in the gains received by the actors. In some cases this is because actors do not agree on the rules for play. This disagreement may stem from basic beliefs about the goal of the game whereas in others individuals have become invested in some aspect of their pursuit such that accommodating the demands of another actor is too costly. The split in English sports between the games known today as rugby and soccer, for example, reflected differences between working-class and middle-class players over the style of game they preferred.[5] As another example, the technical differences in the execution of a similar technique among various Karate or Taekwondo experts may appear superficial. However, small differences in the execution of a kick reflect larger differences in how and when that kick is used because of differences in the rules of play: power versus speed, point-

[4]Beginning for-profit martial arts training centers do have some significant start-up costs, though the largest component is probably the opportunity costs of occupying a under-utilized space when other employment opportunities exist.

[5]Or, returning to the example above with a common football and soccer municipal association, the bargain that enables their cooperation could easily breakdown. At one level, they already share different interests over the rules of play. However, cooperation becomes difficult also if they wish to use the field at the same time or if their equipment becomes too specialized for economies of scale in its purchase.

versus continuous-play competition, or competition versus self-defense.

Third, the bargain may also be destabilized by changes in the relative power of individuals or sub-groups. Asymmetries or large and unexpected shifts in the balance of power among actors is one factor that makes breaking (or demanding renegotiation) of a commitment possible (Abbot and Snidal 1998; Gould 2003a; Gould 2003b; Martin 1992; Powell 2006; Smith 2000). Just as peace treaties between countries can be destabilized by one country becoming much more powerful, so would be a bargain amongst sports enthusiasts such as an organization that must carefully balance the interests of sparring competitors and forms competitors. Returning again to the example of the municipal football-soccer league above, the increasing popularity of football relative to soccer can upset the existing bargain and requiring a change in the distribution of the benefits of their association. Finally, bargains may also be subject to external shocks. External shocks to sports can include anything from changes in government regulation of sports, insurance company evaluations of the risk of coverage, the popularity of video games, and even the effect of global warming upon fields of play.

Even in martial arts that agree on the goals and rules, there are a large number of fracture lines among enthusiasts even when they share an interest in a single martial art. For example, splits in demographics of the participants by age or gender can create subpopulations with distinct interests: Should children have separate classes and should age be a criterion in competition and promotions? Another common fracture is along competition orientation: Does an emphasis on competition detract from non-competition techniques and training? Among competitors, does an emphasis on forms detract from sparring, or vice versa? A final example of an important fracture line is the profit orientation: those seeking income from their expertise will perceive different benefits to recognizing greater stratification of levels of expertise.[6] If enthusiasts are contributing equally, any policy change relevant to these differences can leave some actors – individuals in a club or clubs within an organization – with the feeling that they are being exploited or their interests ignored.

To summarize, coordination for joint production of sporting interests can be sufficient under certain conditions and can result in substantial gains to interested individuals. However, the joint production requires some mutual adjustment of behavior – cooperation (Keohane 1984; Lake and Powell 1999) – when large differences in the interests or capabilities among a set of actors creates hold-up problems, differences in gains relative to contributions, or the risk from shifts in interests and capabilities can destabilize an existing bargain.

Under these types of conditions, in which cooperation is difficult to produce, sports play can take two basic forms. One of these forms is commoditization

[6]There are multiple reasons for recognizing increasing stratification of expertise. Beyond reaping additional fees from additional belt promotional tests, observers have noted the significance of more proximate targets for goal-oriented performance and the need to differentiate students and teachers when there are larger populations at a practice location.

of play: an actor (individual or corporate) plays the role of the entrepreneur by selecting the rules and providing the opportunities for play, for a fee. In this form, sports play is like any other commodity in which participants become passive consumers of a product over which they have no power to affect (outside the arms-length effects of supply and demand upon the market). I put aside the commodity model because the incentives of multiple independent (and profit-motivated) producers to cooperate are similar to the dynamics of the second, participatory model. In the participatory model, sports organization is like the organization of democratic politics: individuals form collective bodies such that they acquire sufficient resources (enough people, money or other resources) to produce their sporting interests. The model is participatory because sports enthusiasts remain active participants in a process of sports organization that is sufficiently encompassing to achieve their shared sporting interests.

In either model, a form of delegation can be said to have occurred. "Delegation occurs," states Hawkins, *et al.*, "when a principal conditionally grants authority to an agent to act on his or her behalf" (Hawkins et al. 2006). Delegated authorities generally include the authority "to make decisions or take actions that bind the [principal] or commit its resources" (Bradley and Kelley 2006). The act of delegation may be explicit, such as occurs when signing a contract, or implicit, as the voluntary donation of resources such as time or money to an organization. Explicit delegation is described by some as institutional legalization (Goldstein et al. 2001) and can be said to have occurred when actors have regularized their relations through obligation, precision and/or delegation (Abbott et al. 2001).[7]

Domestic legislatures and international congresses have long been seen as serving as more efficient negotiating bodies than decentralized coordination because they provide rules and processes for moving past non-substantive logistical decisions.[8] Delegation, however, entails the transfer of decision-making authority to either a subset of the body or to an external agent. Delegation occurs in market relationships whenever there is an exchange that occurs over time: individuals hire (and fire!) others for services as diverse as plumbing repair, house cleaning, and martial arts lessons.

Delegation also occurs in democracies when citizens agree through their city charter or national constitution that all decisions will be made by all participating citizens according to a decision rule (i.e., majority rule or consensus decisions) or by a panel of their representatives selected by election (and also subject to decision rules). Similar acts of delegation occur in sporting associations. For

[7] Obligation occurs when actors accept rules and commitments in a legally-binding manner such that one can assert established mechanisms and processes when another does not fulfill their stated obligations. Actors impose precision through unambiguous and noncontradictory rules that specify clear standards for behavior, though the level of precision varies by the degree of discretion granted to the actors in interpreting these standards (Abbott et al. 2001).

[8] Non-substantive decisions might include where to meet, at what level to participate in negotiations, who speaks and in what order, and how are negotiations terminated and issues resolve. Of course these are also substantive in that they may privilege specific actors' interests or outcomes.

example, the United States Taekwondo Union proposed governance structure of 3 November 2004 calls for a chain of delegation that culminates in a Board of Directors. The Board is composed of representatives of defined membership constituencies: two of ten Directors are Athlete Directors selected by the Athlete's Advisory Council, which in turn consists of seven elite athletes elected by all athlete members.[9]

Delegation is useful for solving problems the problems that can impede coordination of interests necessary for joint production, regardless of whether the "agent" of delegation is a paid expert or a subset of the interested actors.[10] A martial arts agent can be conditionally empowered to propose or set rules of play and serve as a centralized repository of expertise and resources. An agent that has these powers can resolve conflicts over rules of play, resolve conflicts over the distribution of benefits of play, overcome "hold-up" problems, and achieve economies of scale in production and development of expertise.

There may be no minimum level at which delegation magically becomes useful: a small group of individuals negotiating a delegation relationship can expand that relationship to include increasing numbers of individuals and at the same time identify other candidate groups with which to negotiate replacing multiple delegation relationships with a single, aggregate relationship. There are several reasons, though, why deep cooperation appears relatively rare. First, there is a resource cost whenever an agent must be organized and/or provided with resources to fulfill the delegated responsibilities. Fiscal and human resources are scarce and their employment by a collective agent necessarily diminishes their availability to its principals. Individuals who lack the start-up investment costs may therefore be unable to initiate a cooperative solution much less complete it.

Second, and the only cost that is unique to delegation, is the probability of divergent actions by the agent. Agency slack occurs when one actor (the "principal") entrusts or hires another (the "agent") to act in certain ways but the agent instead pursues their own interests.[11] Granting discretion to agents in aspects of contract fulfillment requires them to have the resources and autonomy to develop expertise while insulating them from accountability to any individual principal (Martin 2002). With this autonomy, the agent may choose policies slightly different than the principal would prefer (or worse, increasingly different) or may engage in shirking or outright malfeasance.[12] While the risk of shirking is present in all organizations, sporting or otherwise, the issue of divergent preferences is of particular importance to this paper because of the effect upon

[9] http://www.usa-taekwondo.us/RevRestructureAnnualMeeting04.pdf (accessed 6 June 2007)

[10] (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2000; Milner 2003)

[11] Using tools for screening, selection, monitoring and motivating agents, the principal(s) should be able to control their agent (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).

[12] While the latter is often characterized by employees slacking on the job or embezzling resources, theoretically there is little theoretical difference between this behavior and the former behavior of choosing to behave in ways the principal would not prefer.

the incentives to cooperate. This concern is in many ways an extension of the divergent preferences concern immediately above because it only results when relying on someone else to implement your preferred policies when their preferred policies are different. Cooperation can be undermined, therefore, not only by the presence of hold-up problems, differences in interests among enthusiasts, and agency slack between enthusiasts and their agents, but also when there is significant uncertainty over the specific significance of these three factors at this point in which the decision must be made whether to cooperate or not.

In addition to these theoretical costs of delegation, the prospective benefits of deep cooperation through association or federation must account for broader societal trends. For sports play in particular, these are the simultaneous, and not unrelated, trends towards commercialization and professionalization of sports (Enjolras 2002; Seippel 2002). Commercialization of sports, and of martial arts, has occurred as sports have become transformed from an act of participation into one of consumption and as non-commercial sporting organizations have developed commercial activities to finance their non-commercial mission.[13] Professionalization refers to the increasing differentiation of roles in play between experts and laypersons (Seippel 2002:262), and implies centralization, specialization and formalization of play (ibid:257). This process has occurred in part because of the willingness of individuals to pay for others to practice (through observation or sponsorship). However, it is related to the spread of the "pay to play" model in which consumers demand some value for their investment beyond social enjoyment.

To summarize, the necessary organization of sports play therefore should be determined by the how interests of the specific actors in outcomes differ, the resources they have to devote to achieving their interests, and the investments required for individual or collective achievement of their sporting interests. These factors interact not only with the potential benefits of joint production, and the costs of using of agent to facilitate joint production, but also with conditions in the external environment.

Marital Arts Organizations

Using the discussion above as a guide, there are seven types of benefits that could potentially accrue from a stronger form of association among local martial arts groups:

1. Expanded opportunities for training and competition
2. Facilitate advanced training in areas of relevant expertise
3. Certifying various types of expertise
4. Economies of scale in the provision of training equipment and facilities

[13] Enjolras argues commercialization through consumerization is a result of individualization of sports as an option (not a collective right to participate) and therefore the user must "pay to play" (Enjolras 2002).

5. Economies of scale in logistics and administration

6. Brand recognition

7. Agreement on rules of play

There is a large amount of variation in the depth of association (depth of cooperation and delegation) represented by martial arts organizations. In this section, I offer four brief studies of martial arts organizations to illustrate this range. Before doing so, however, it is useful to introduce a second analogy (the first being the principal-agent model): network theory. A network is one way of describing the relationship among a group actors. Each actor, individual or collective is a node and can be represented by not only the number and strength of their connections to other nodes but also by the pattern of these connections in the network. Whereas an individual martial arts school may be a hierarchic network with the head instructor acting as the central but also peak node, a group of schools may be related hierarchically or not. When considering the depth of cooperation among nodes, then, it is important to consider whether particular nodes are more powerful because they possess better information (expertise) than other nodes or control the flow of information or resources to others. Many networks may be both hierarchic and flat depending on the level or location.

Japan Aikido Association (JAA) is the international organization of practitioners of Shodokan or Tomiki Aikido, a mode of Aikido modeled on Judo in that competition is seen as helpful to individual training.[14] The JAA describes itself as bringing Aikido clubs together by offering its dues-paying members newsletters, national insurance coverage, and discounts on JAA books, videotapes, DVD's, and most clinics and tournaments. Opportunities for training and competition are facilitated with clear definitions of techniques and competition rules. The JAA also certifies expertise through specific rules governing rank promotions and recognition of JAA schools and certified instructors (the website does not describe this certification process). For example, higher-rank promotions (3^{rd} dan and above) under JAA/USA rules require the supervision of at least one person recognized by JAA/Japan as a certified instructor. Further, black belt candidates at all levels must complete a required number of hours of training, attend JAA-accredited instructor and other training clinics, and remit a registration fee to JAA in addition to any testing fees imposed by the instructor. There are also some economies of scale in administering joint production of training and expertise: local groups must apply for approval to host a sanctioned JAA event, but once received,

> "Board and Business Office will provide assistance and guidance as needed to the host club/organization including lead instructors, referees, marketing materials, venue contract review, etc. The host will be responsible for securing the venue, providing maps or directions to the event, suggesting lodging to participants, etc. The Board will

[14] For more information on the Japan Aikido Federation, see: http://www.tomiki.org/

> reserve the right to cancel recognition of an event if the event's conditions do not meet the standards, requirements and expectations of the JAA/USA."[15]

The JAA is one of many Aikido federations, however. One competitor, offering an entirely different approach to Aikido, is the Aikido Association of America.[16] The AAA has 140 affiliated schools in the United States and is itself a member of the Aikido Association International (based in the US). To expand opportunities for training the AAA does offer training camps and training classes at its headquarters and coordinates annual "Cultural Trips and Training Tours" to Japan. It also facilitates communication among its members through a black belt association, dojo listings, detailed calendars of events, and online and print newsletters. While the website does not fully detail the rules by which expertise is certified, the AAA appears to put a large emphasis on ensuring "consistent, quality professional instruction": instructor training and certification seminars, a professional instructor training program, and a National Teaching Committee which also offers training seminars, all under the guidance of a program documented in an instructor's manual.[17] Another means by which it certifies expertise is in the accreditation of schools; the AAA certifies directly only students below black-belt as black belt certificates are issued by "Aikido World Headquarters" in Tokyo.[18] Therefore, while the AAA does appear to expand opportunities for training and developing expertise, its standards for certifying expertise are unclear and the organization offers little benefits in terms of economies of scale.

Like Aikido, Hapkido is divided into several different styles and perhaps dozens more associations. Two examples of extant Hapkido associations include the International Hapkido Federation (IHF) and the World Hapkido Federation (WHF). The IHF is headed by James S. Benko, who also heads the International Taekwondo Association (the IHF website is hosted on the ITA server). The primary focus of the IHF appears to be two-fold: the certification of ranks and schools and the promotion of its "a vast DVD video collection of training presentations, audio collection, and an extensive and one-of-a-kind book collection".[19] The IHF appears, therefore, to be focused largely on seminar and books by Mr.

[15] http://www.tomiki.org/files/JAAUSArecognitionpolicy1.pdf

[16] http://www.aaa-aikido.com/index2.htm

[17] The AAA website also states that the "AAA believes that professional, full-time Aikido instructors are the means by which the art will be successfully transmitted to future generations", though the definition of "full-time" may be weakly defined as having classes "that meets consistently at least three times per week".

[18] It is unclear from the website which body this is; the AAI website does state there is a close affiliation with Aikikai Honbu Dojo.

[19] The IHF website states: "The International Hapkido Federation™ offers its members the following benefits: International Black Belt Rank Certification, International Gup (Grade) Rank Certification, International School/Instructor Certification, Comprehensive Hapkido training DVD video collection, Official IHF book collection, Official IHF Hapkido seminars, International Hapkido Computer Registry, Special Rank Examinations (External Testing Program), Standardized Rank Promotion Requirements, Standardize Testing Procedures." The "External Testing Program" is described as a "test via video and written examination".

Benko (schools may schedule seminars by him with a guaranteed minimum of $1250 and an advance deposit of 50% of the guaranteed minimum), but also may provide value added to those able to claim certification by the IHF. The World Hapkido Federation is a mostly US-based association of Hapkido schools (including another organization, the American Hapkido Federation). While both schools and individuals may join the WHF, and while the WHF does hold an annual training camp for those interested, the WHF like the IHF appears designed to promote a series of books and videos while offering the member schools some ability to claim affiliation.

As a final study of a "martial arts organization", I include the "Women's Self-Defense Council" (WDSC) through a study conducted by Searles and Berger of the organization (Searles and Berger 1987). The WDSC was founded when a martial artist and an ex-cop teamed up to offer a "practical" (non-martial arts) self-defense course for women of all types and ages, one taught by expert women and designed explicitly on "the feminist model" (Searles and Berger 1987:69). One founder built on her own network to prepare a manual on self-defense law, but together they worked on teaching manuals to standardize instruction. As members moved to new places and wanted to build, a national version started that required a division of labor and specialization: they formed national nonprofit organization with a Board of Directors, non-teaching members in administrative roles, and financed by 10% of their instructor's net teaching income. The WSDC then added instructor trainee manual and formal certification process for teachers, requiring them to take classes, team teach as continued training, take advanced workshops, give lectures, conduct research on local criminal justice system, and continue their martial arts training (including in weapons; Searles and Berger 1987:71-72). The WSDC became divided as the mission conflicted with organizational needs: instructors giving free classes didn't contribute resources to the organization; instructor certification rules were bent to get instructors in under-represented areas; and disagreements in tone emerged over the line between "empowerment" and "becoming too radical or feminist". Eventually, the WSDC council was dissolved by its founders and replaced with for-profit organization to train and license instructors as specialists (for fees), accredit courses, and provide other self-defense training services. This study is interesting because the WSDC clearly expanded training, certified expertise, pursued brand recognition, and accomplished some economies of scale in administration, the organization also collapsed over the inability to overcome differences in interests of its members.

In addition to the six martial arts associations studied here, another 20 or so martial arts "associations" and "federations" were surveyed. While this research is not exhaustive of the full range of such organizations, it appears that some broad generalizations can be drawn. First, there are three types of associations. The first, and weakest form of association, are network associations. These associations primarily consist of websites that list affiliated schools under a ranked instructor and have no other information on joining (or accreditation) of unaffiliated local groups and no rules or processes for certifications of rank or

instruction. While these associations are weak, a major population of martial arts organizations, their shared local constituency may make this sufficient for local economies of scale and brand recognition as long as the association can be dominated and led by that ranked instructor. A second, and intermediate level of organization begins to approach that of true association. These organizations, which would include the Hapkido federations discussed above, have some minimal form of rules and requirements for membership (including certification of rank/expertise and standards), though the clear fee-for-service relationship may create conflicts of interest that impede deeper cooperation as present in true associations. In this third category, organizations appear to arise out of a shared mission to expand the opportunities for student training and advancement of technical and instruction expertise, which in turn creates incentives for standardized certification of expertise, which in further turn requires standardization of the body of knowledge. The JAA and AAA appear to follow this model.

Second, the most well known of the martial arts organizations are those with strong standards for expertise but which make only minimal attempts at exploiting economies of scale. That is, the organizations that appear strong in the United States have a centralized system for certifying rank and rule compliance (for tournaments and seminars) but which make these processes largely locally driven. One reason this is the case is, perhaps, unique to the US legal environment. For example, it appears that few US martial arts associations offer insurance to their members, whether as individuals, instructors, or training facilities, whereas associations in Australia and the UK appeared to offer even complete liability and accident insurance. Without a legal system that creates incentives for economies of scale in insurance or a corporatist political structure in which government's recognize official peak associations, the economies of scale in the US may be limited to coordinating local efforts.[20]

Yongmudo and International Organization

By most accounts, a martial art emerged called "Hapkido" in the 1950s and 1960s in Korea with the first generation of Hapkido experts beginning to spread the art in a relatively coherent form.[21] Since that time, however, Hapkido has splintered into several major different styles and perhaps dozens of associations that all claim some lineage to its founder, Master Choi Young Suhl. By the late 1990s, there has been pressure among a small sub-set of Hapkido practitioners to organize a distinct martial art under a new name. While the new "brand name" has changed over the last decade before arriving at "Yongmudo", the goal of this process was to bring a diverse network of Hapkido students connected directly and indirectly to Yong-In University in order to ensure the style would survive

[20]Local efforts in the US at achieving economies of scale appear to do so more often by individual locations with multi-style offerings in which Karate is offered at a location alongside Aikido or Taekwondo is offered with Hapkido and Judo, and all may be now offered with kickboxing, tai chi and yoga.

[21]A search of the many histories of Hapkido will show that there were several name changes before this point that were coincident with its adaptation by successive individuals to both local needs and these individual's different martial training pre- and post-exposure to Hapkido.

into its second generation.

Yong-In University is the central node in this network and its power – relative to those inside and outside its network – is the relatively large number of students it graduates in its academic martial arts major programs. However, important nodes in the United States include the UC Martial Arts Program at UC Berkeley and Iowa State University Martial Arts. Institutionalizing of Yongmudo has occurred through negotiations among the major nodes as they are the top (hierarchic) nodes in their separate networks. The mechanisms for formalizing the network were not always clear, and different mechanisms were likely preferred for different individuals and factions. There is theoretically a finite list of benefits of organization of Yongmudo practitioners into a form of institutionalized cooperation. Using the discussion above as a guide, there are seven types of benefits that a stronger association of nodes in the Yong-In network could potentially include. In this section I offer a preliminary evaluation of their utility, attempting to determine whether strong or shallow forms of cooperation are required to achieve these benefits. Of course, these benefits may not accrue to all nodes in the network equally and this is taken into account in this discussion.

First, institutionalization of the informal network could expand opportunities for play by coordinating interaction among different nodes of the network. A translocal Yongmudo organization could provide not only processes by which translocal participation could occur through more classes, seminars and tournaments, but also the ground-rules for such participation. A weak association centered on web, email, and newsletter communications could be sufficient to improve the information available to any individual local group about both specific (e.g., an annual tournament) as well as general opportunities for joint play (identifying another local group across town with which occasional classes or scrimmages could occur). A slightly stronger organization could solve coordination problems among the various local groups by providing processes for organizing (and committing constituencies to) these events.

Larger nodes may not see the need for such coordinated play because they can draw upon a larger population, but large nodes may benefit from committing to deeper cooperation with smaller nodes in their networks. Large nodes can benefit from expertise that is developed elsewhere in the network. Also, even the largest node may not be entirely self-sustaining because of the relative rarity that individuals are willing and capable of directing such a node. Many martial arts styles, even those considered successful for a time, have disappeared because they failed to transition leadership from one generation to the next. It is unclear, for example, what the fate of Bong Soo Han's International Hapkido Federation will be with his death in 2007.[22] Therefore, larger and more central nodes may rely upon smaller nodes in their networks for developing and recruiting expertise and therefore face incentives to strengthening their network.

[22]Some of Bong Soo Han's students speculate that his home dojo may not survive, removing the hub of the IHF network (Pers. Com.).

Second, in addition to expanding the training opportunities for Yongmudo students, broader and deeper association could facilitate advanced training in play-specific expertise. Even the most skilled instructors usually have areas of strengths and weaknesses, whether in technique or pedagogy, for which association with other experts can be useful for improving the quality of their performance. Such expertise is broader, of course, than any specific skills taught to martial arts students but of which instructors should still be aware: refinement or development of new techniques; pedagogical approaches evolve with better understanding of learning processes and changes in the external social environment; advances in training techniques as a result of advances in exercise sciences; and the holding trans-local tournaments with consistent rules may require training of competition referees.

While such opportunities would certainly be useful to smaller nodes, large nodes may possess the resources to produce most of these benefits in-house. However, as also noted above, the massive range of expertise required to perpetuate a mode of play can mean that even the largest nodes may from time to time lack the expertise necessary to continue. These benefits could be a partial basis for stronger association, but realization of these benefits could be accomplished through non-cooperative mechanisms. For example, the two Hapkido associations discussed above offer such training on a fee-for-service basis while the Aikido associations discussed above do so as an inherent aspect of the larger association process. Groups without a profit motive could offer similar classes and often do: many schools host low-cost seminars when high ranked instructors visit and the UC Martial Arts Program hosts an annual academic conference that is open to the public.

Third, translocal associations and federations may be useful in certifying play-specific expertise. The certification can be not only with regards to the level of training of an individual but also include compliance with "good practices", such as rule-compliant schools and tournaments. In the absence of formal decision rules as may be present in a deeply institutionalized organization, certification of expertise can be a useful indicator to other nodes within a network: when a member of a local Yongmudo group visits another, expertise certified as rank can be an informational short-cut for that other group.[23] Such certification of expertise is useful not only for privileging the interests of those in possession of greater expertise, such as in establishing or modifying a curriculum, but also whenever representatives of a node interact with other nodes in their network. Certification of expertise may be of even more use to those outside the network: not only prospective students evaluate on the basis of certified expertise, but host institutions and potential employers look for such certifications.

Of the benefits discussed so far, the collective certification of expertise could be the most valuable mechanism. However, as demonstrated by the case studies

[23]Certification of expertise in this manner may indicate the weight that should be given to their opinion about techniques or other practices; it may also be indicative of bargaining power in negotiations between local groups.

above, certification may be the most abused service of such organizations. Of the organizations surveyed, some appeared little more than the martial arts equivalent of "diploma mills" whereas others suffered splits in their organizations over substantive differences in the certification process.[24] Realizing this benefit within a strong form of cooperation would require first the agreement on rules of play (see the seventh benefit, below) as well as consensus over what other aspects were to be promoted.[25]

Few martial arts associations appear to benefit from economies of scale in, fourth, the provision of training equipment and facilities, including maintenance and cleaning, or fifth, provision of logistical solutions, including administration, costs of compliance with local laws (including liability and other insurance, training required to supervise children, etc.), accounting, and other support functions. In particular, local martial arts groups that are not economically sustainable on their own seek to add more classes in the same facility (separating child, teen and adult classes in the same art and offering classes than the same individuals could realistically attend), add different classes in the same facility (serving new populations by adding new styles), finding other local groups with which to share a facility (separate instructors at the same facility), or acquiring time slots at community facilities.[26]

Sixth, proponents of "Yongmudo" seek to replace the diversity of "Hapkido" groups with a recognizable "brand" to create positive economic externalities. Primarily, these externalities would include more students attracted to a recognizable product, easier access to new outlets for instruction, and more fee-for-service opportunities with non-members such as demonstrations or seminars. Marketing a "Yongmudo" brand may be among the most difficult in a highly fragmented marketplace: not only are there dozens of types of Hapkido schools and associations, but these compete in most markets many other martial, spiritual, or even combative offerings. As a case in point, Karate styles attempted to unify behind the goal of becoming an Olympic sport but were unable to bridge gaps in styles and personalities to do so, whereas a large segment of the Taekwondo market did cooperate, and delegate authority, to arrive at a coherent brand for the Olympics.

Seventh, and finally, there is general agreement among Hapkido practitioners that

[24] An open letter posted on the main page of the website of Birankai International, for example, indicated this Aikido group split with the IAF and USAF over those organizations reluctance to promote non-Japanese to the highest instructor levels (http://www.birankai.org/).

[25] I noted above that the AAA puts a premium on "professional" martial arts instruction, implying instructors who focus on martial arts as their occupation not merely avocation. Though a low-bar is set by the AAA, the point being suggested is that profit-oriented martial arts schools perceive different benefits from certification and training than do others.

[26] Sports play can also occur if individuals exist who are willing to provide the "public goods" necessary for play (Keohane 1984): Morihei Ueshiba was reputed to have built a dojo for Daitoryu-Aikijujitsu instructor Sokaku Takeda, and Yong Sul Choi's first start at teaching what became known as Hapkido began in a small office above a brewery provided by his first student, Bok Sup Suh. A public goods provider helps overcome the barriers to entry created by up-front costs.

the term “Hapkido” itself has become almost meaningless as a useful descriptive term because approaches range from practices that would be described by others as Aikido to Taekwondo to even “mixed martial arts”. Arriving at a coherent set of rules - from tournament competition rules to which techniques (and styles of executing them) are recognized as within the accepted bounds – would facilitate many of the benefits discussed above. However, this process does not necessarily require institutionalization of the network. As examples, a unified vision of Yongmudo could emerge from a series of ad hoc conferences of experts, the success (or failure) of early tournaments arranged through the unilateral action of a major network node, or early producers of texts and other sources of standards that others could adopt as their own. The utility of arriving at common rules is driven more by the other factors than being in itself a benefit, but this may be a necessary process for achieving other benefits.

Conclusions

Yongmudo enthusiasts, like those in many martial arts, are divided between those who seek to parlay their interests for profits, and those who practice and teach for non-profit motives. The key issue to answer is what level of cooperation – what extent of delegation – is required to accomplish the interests of Yongmudo enthusiasts? The magnitude of the benefits from deepening Yongmudo cooperation through the formation of a strong association depends upon the specific individuals and local groups involved.

Several benefits discussed are unlikely to hold at all when individuals are too separated by geographic distance or by virtue of residing in different legal jurisdictions. For example, insurance companies may not offer coverage if the individuals extend across different state or national boundaries. Also, shared training facilities are useful only to the extent individuals can travel to them often enough. Other benefits are unlikely to hold if the interests of the participants are too diverse: those more interested in commoditizing their expertise will see greater benefits from branding and certification of expertise and less benefit from costly investments that could be required from mandatory training rules.

Realizing most of the benefits discussed above do not require deep cooperation. For example, even among non-profit groups, expertise-enhancing seminars, tournaments and other exchanges can occur on a fee-for-service basis: smaller university martial arts clubs can invite similar groups to participate in tournaments that range from informal (scrimmages) to formal (fee-for-entry with each individual accepting the “contract” that defines rules for participation). Yongmudo enthusiasts could invite each other to participate, at their own expense, in scrimmages, training camps, and other events. To invite others to share their particular expertise, one group could pay to visit another group, or pay the expenses of that other group to come to them, which all can occur without deep cooperation. While deeper cooperation is necessary to produce these gains, the cooperation requires remains relatively weak: communication through the web, email, and print or online newsletters, including lists of affiliated schools and sanctioned events, could produce these gains without delegation to a centralized

organization.

This analysis therefore finds that certification of expertise is, as stated above, the basis of the strongest case for stronger Yongmudo association. Even the largest nodes an expertise-based network may be unable to sustain themselves over time without the ability to validate and then draw upon expertise elsewhere in the network. A certification process would need to be perceived as sufficiently unbiased with respect to location in the network (not privileging one major node over another, major nodes over small nodes, or commercial over nonprofit). The process would also need to be credible by developing clear and strict standards for certification, possibly also including reliance upon external certifiers (accredited schools and agencies).

In conclusion, there is some case to be made for stronger Yongmudo association. In particular, a centralized association could expand opportunities for training, competition, and building expertise. Such benefits, though could be produced with relatively low-levels (and even ad hoc) cooperation without the costs of negotiating and committing to a deep institution. Some economies of scale could adhere to such an organization that then becomes involved in administering joint production of training, such as the Aikido federation's that provide assistance to local groups seeking to host seminars, camps, etc. The realization of economies of scale would likely require greater consensus over rules of play and standards of expertise, but would justify additional delegations of authority to a centralized organization. Finally, the certification of rank and other Yongmudo-related expertise makes the strongest case for deep cooperation among Yongmudo enthusiasts.

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