International Organizations, Sports, and International Sports Organizations

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Introduction

> *We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.*
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> —Constitution of the United States, Preamble (adopted by convention of States 17 September 1787; ratified 21 June 1788)

The American colonies had thrown off the English a decade before. They did not wish to replace one king with another, but had found the existing contract, the Articles of Confederation, to be too weak to provide for everything their citizens needed. They sought a new contract, a new Constitution, to "form a more perfect union:" one that would limit their freedoms but also would hopefully provide the public goods they desired.

This dilemma is faced by every group of individuals with common interests because there are costs to realizing those interests collectively when not all benefit equally from their achievement (and some would do better with an alternative). Even if the goal

appears more limited than creating a new country, individuals with similar sporting interests face these same dilemmas. Sports enthusiasts must determine whether achieving their individual interest is possible with a weak, local organization or whether it requires an association, confederation or strong union. Some form of association among individuals or regional groups may enable them to improve the performance of the sport, standardize its rules, and perhaps benefit economically from increased efficiency. However, there might be real costs to such an association—not only the costs of negotiating the particulars of their association, but also costs arising from the compromises of each other's interests that occur in the process of associating. Transnational populations of sporting individuals face additional hurdles identifying sufficiently valuable benefits to international confederation.

I argue that local sporting organizations should only consider broader and deeper organization if doing so provides clear benefits to their membership. I first discuss a number of factors that are relevant to the costs and benefits of creating transnational sporting organizations, such as sporting associations and federations, and then examine several examples of sporting organizations for their success in organizing and the benefits they offer to their constituencies. I then present a first cut at evaluating the utility to negotiating and implementing a national or international yongmudo federation. I find that while stronger transnational organization of yongmudo would bring significant benefits to yongmudo enthusiasts, most of these benefits could be

accomplished primarily through a weak association. A strong yongmudo union is necessary for the singular, but perhaps individually sufficient, purpose of certifying yongmudo-related expertise.

Benefits and Costs of International Organizations

When an individual is unable to achieve his or her interests—economic, social, or other—he or she must seek the active assistance of others in order to succeed. While many sports allow some solitary training, the purpose of soccer, baseball, and martial arts is social: the joint production of "play." For martial arts in particular, the purpose is not only social but also the advancement of skills for self-defense or combat.

Sports enthusiasts can benefit from the institutionalization of sports play in the adoption of norms, rules and procedures. Sports institutions include the play-related rules and facilities, the people who play, and the interaction of these elements; sports organizations have a common purpose from which their pattern and coherence result.[1] Individual clubs can organize sports practice among themselves, including training and competition, when they agree upon rules and criteria for expertise. When play is institutionalized beyond the individual club level, whether into increasingly larger forms of association or even empowering others with substantial authority over the future direction of cooperation, sports practice can become translocal: organized among local units to the regional, national or international level.

The joint production of sports play through some form of institutionalization benefits enthusiasts by expanding the opportunities for play, expanding the quality of play, and reducing the costs of play. Opportunities expand through the participation of greater numbers of individuals at any one time or by expansion of the number of times and locations in which play may occur. The quality of play can expand through training with, or instruction by, other skilled persons, or by investment in expertise-building capacities such as training devices. A related benefit is certification of expertise offered directly (instruction, training) or indirectly (manuals, DVDs). The difficulty with some sports, including most martial arts, is the absence of simple criteria for expertise. Most sports use competition-related statistics to determine expertise, although this represents limited aspects of martial arts and individual expertise continues to develop long after one's competition days have concluded. A certification process is more useful when expertise is harder to observe, because of the absence of simple measures. Parallel to certification is branding: the mode of play can acquire an image or reputation that distinguishes it from other, similar modes.

Finally, the costs of play can be reduced through economies of scale in the production of play. Cost savings are realized when fixed costs are distributed over a larger population of consumers or with the elimination of redundant spending, reducing the cost of play to individuals. Examples include the ability to acquire larger or better access to play locations (workout spaces or dojos/dojangs), distribute costs

of play management (accounting, administration, janitorial services, etc.), and decreasing costs with bulk numbers for equipment purchases, insurance, etc.[2] In some countries, these incentives are magnified by government regulation and the granting of subsidies to sports federations, usually to encourage an efficient federation that improves participant satisfaction with the level and quality of competition.[3] These three aspects of joint production may also benefit the participants by attracting not only more individual participants, but also more skilled participants capable of improving performance and enjoyment. However, there is a threshold for each benefit beyond which more is not necessarily better and could even be worse.

Many benefits of joint production do not require agreement on basic rules like the size or shape of the ball they play with, if they play with a ball at all: translocal organization provides the collective resources to purchase fields for play and permits efficiencies such as large-scale purchase of uniforms, group rates on liability insurance, and other goods. Many municipalities (and colleges) have recreation directors that coordinate play this way: one field can serve baseball, football and soccer as long as they play at different times; players purchase uniforms and other equipment from the same suppliers; and insurance companies might agree to cover all players. For example, two (or more) individuals might value practicing martial arts but require someone else's participation to do so. When the interests and resources of two or more actors are a good match, they may be able coordinate to achieve their shared

(martial) interests. Such ad-hoc coordination is sufficient for joint production of early morning tai chi, pick-up basketball games, and many weekend softball matches.[4]

The problem is that they also possess interests that vary at least slightly (that is, different values regarding work, family and other recreational interests) and possess different resources useful to achieving that shared interest (such as time or expertise). At the most superficial level, institutionalization of sports requires agreement on rules of play and extends to include any process put in place to achieve play. Examples of processes include congresses in which sports practitioners meet to formally negotiate rules, or organizations formed to facilitate play more actively.

Cooperation and the Reduction of Risk

While it may appear counterintuitive, deep cooperation through institutions (like clubs or associations) is necessary not when there are large prospective benefits, but when there are benefits and substantial risks. Assuming the gains from coordination described above exist and are significant for a group of sports enthusiasts, barriers to coordination from different interests and capabilities are risks created by hold-up problems, differences in the gains received by the actors, and agency slack.

Hold-up problems exist when multiple actors are required to commit significant investments separately and fear others will not invest as promised. There are several recent examples of professional sporting teams demanding the construction of new stadiums as a condition for the

team not moving to another city, a promise that that is difficult to enforce for municipalities. This is also the reason why most youth team sports utilize public facilities for play rather than, perhaps, a soccer league purchasing land in the hope nearby football and baseball/softball leagues will rent space during their respective seasons. For most martial arts, these investments may be less significant because there are few and relatively cheap modifications required to facilities and the facilities themselves are either provided free by community or educational centers or are cheap to rent.[5] In all of these cases, joint production is held up by the possibility that others will not fulfill their end of the bargain and will try to achieve a free ride from the efforts of others.

Second, differences in the interests of actors usually result in differences in the gains received by the actors. In some cases this is because actors do not agree on the rules for play. This disagreement may stem from basic beliefs about the goal of the game, or from individuals becoming invested in some specific aspect of their pursuit such that accommodating the demands of another actor is too costly. The split in English sports between the games known today as rugby and soccer, for example, reflected differences between working-class and middle-class players over the style of game they preferred.[6] As another example, the technical differences in the execution of a similar technique among various karate or taekwondo experts may appear superficial. However, small differences in the execution of a kick reflect larger differences in how and when that kick is used because of differences in

the rules of play: power versus speed, point- versus continuous-play competition, or competition versus self-defense.

Third, the bargain may also be destabilized by changes in the relative power of individuals or subgroups. Asymmetries or large and unexpected shifts in the balance of power among actors is one factor that makes breaking (or demanding renegotiation) of a commitment possible.[7] Just as peace treaties between countries can be destabilized by one country becoming much more powerful, so would a bargain amongst sports enthusiasts such as an organization that must carefully balance the interests of sparring competitors and forms competitors. Returning again to the example of the municipal football-soccer league above, the increasing popularity of football relative to soccer can upset the existing bargain and requiring a change in the distribution of the benefits of their association. Finally, bargains can also be subject to external shocks. External shocks to sports can include anything from changes in government regulation of sports, insurance company evaluations of the risk of coverage, the popularity of video games, and even the effect of global warming upon fields of play.

Even in martial arts associations that agree on the goals and rules, there are a large number of fracture lines among enthusiasts. For example, splits in demographics of the participants by age or gender can create subpopulations with distinct interests: should children have separate classes and should age be a criterion in competition and promotions? Another common fracture is along competition orientation: does an emphasis on competition detract from non-

competition techniques and training? Among competitors, does an emphasis on forms detract from sparring, or vice versa? A final example of an important fracture line is the profit orientation: those seeking income from their expertise will perceive different benefits to recognizing greater stratification of levels of expertise.[8] If enthusiasts are contributing equally, any policy change relevant to these differences can leave some actors—individuals in a club or clubs within an organization—with the feeling that they are being exploited or their interests ignored.

To summarize: coordination for joint production of sporting interests can be sufficient under certain conditions and can result in substantial gains to interested individuals. However, the joint production requires some cooperation.[9] When large differences in the interests or capabilities among a set of actors creates hold-up problems, differences in gains relative to contributions, or the risk from shifts in interests and capabilities can destabilize an existing bargain.

Delegation and Divergent Preferences

Under these types of conditions, in which cooperation is difficult to produce, sports play can take two basic forms. One of these forms is commoditization of play: an actor (individual or corporate) plays the role of the entrepreneur by selecting the rules and providing the opportunities for play, for a fee. In this form, sports play is like any other commodity in which participants become passive consumers of a product that they have no power to affect (outside the arms-length effects of supply and demand upon the market). I put aside the

commodity model because the incentives of multiple independent (and profit-motivated) producers to cooperate are similar to the dynamics of the second, participatory model. In the participatory model, sports organization is like the organization of democratic politics: individuals form collective bodies such that they acquire sufficient resources (enough people, money or other resources) to support their sporting interests. The model is participatory because sports enthusiasts remain active participants in a process of sports organization that is sufficiently encompassing to achieve their shared interests.

In either model, a form of delegation can be said to have occurred. "Delegation occurs," states Hawkins, et al., "when a principal conditionally grants authority to an agent to act on his or her behalf."[10] Delegated authorities generally include the authority "to make decisions or take actions that bind the [principal] or commit its resources."[11] The act of delegation may be explicit, such as occurs when signing a contract, or implicit, such as the voluntary donation of resources such as time or money to an organization. Explicit delegation is described by some as *institutional legalization*[12] and can be said to have occurred when actors have regularized their relations through obligation, precision and/or delegation.[13]

Domestic legislatures and international congresses have long been seen as serving as more efficient negotiating bodies than decentralized coordination because they provide rules and processes for moving past non-substantive logistical decisions.[14] Delegation, however, entails the transfer of decision-making authority to either a subset of the body or to an

external agent. Delegation occurs in market relationships whenever there is an exchange that occurs over time: individuals hire (and fire!) others for services as diverse as plumbing repair, house cleaning, and martial arts lessons.

Delegation also occurs in democracies when citizens agree through their city charter or national constitution that all decisions will be made by all participating citizens according to a decision rule (that is, majority rule or consensus decisions) or by a panel of their representatives selected by election (and also subject to decision rules). Similar acts of delegation occur in sporting associations. For example, the United States Taekwondo Union proposed governance structure of 3 November 2004 calls for a chain of delegation that culminates in a Board of Directors. The Board is composed of representatives of defined membership constituencies: two of ten Directors are Athlete Directors selected by the Athlete's Advisory Council, which in turn consists of seven elite athletes elected by all athlete members.[15]

Delegation is useful for solving problems that can impede coordination of interests necessary for joint production, regardless of whether the "agent" of delegation is a paid expert or a subset of the interested actors.[16] An agent can be conditionally empowered to propose or set rules of play and serve as a centralized repository of expertise and resources. An agent that has these powers can resolve conflicts over rules of play, resolve conflicts over the distribution of benefits of play, overcome "hold-up" problems, and achieve economies of scale in production and development of expertise.

There may be no minimum level at which delegation magically becomes useful: a small group of individuals negotiating a delegation relationship can expand that relationship to include increasing numbers of individuals and at the same time identify other candidate groups with which to negotiate replacing multiple delegation relationships with a single, aggregate relationship. There are several reasons, though, why deep cooperation appears relatively rare. First, there is a resource cost whenever an agent must be organized and/or provided with resources to fulfill the delegated responsibilities. Fiscal and human resources are scarce and their employment by a collective agent necessarily diminishes their availability to its principals. Individuals who lack the start-up investment costs may therefore be unable to initiate a cooperative solution much less complete it.

Second—and the only cost that is unique to delegation—is the probability of divergent actions by the agent. Agency slack occurs when one actor (the "principal") entrusts or hires another (the "agent") to act in certain ways but the agent instead pursues his or her own interests.[17] Granting discretion to agents in aspects of contract fulfillment requires them to have the resources and autonomy to develop expertise while insulating them from accountability to any individual principal.[18] With this autonomy, the agent may choose policies slightly different than the principal would prefer (or worse, increasingly different) or may engage in shirking or outright malfeasance.[19] While the risk of shirking is present in all organizations, sporting or otherwise, the issue of

divergent preferences is of particular importance to this paper because of the effect upon the incentives to cooperate. Divergent preferences becomes an issue when you are relying on someone else to implement your preferred policies and their preferred policies are different. Cooperation can be undermined, therefore, not only by the presence of hold-up problems, differences in interests among enthusiasts, and agency slack between enthusiasts and their agents, but also when there is uncertainty over the specific significance of these three factors at the point when people must make the decision whether to cooperate or not.

Professionalization of Sports

In addition to the theoretical costs of delegation, the prospective benefits of deep cooperation through association or federation must account for broader societal trends. For sports play in particular, these are the simultaneous, and not unrelated, trends towards commercialization and professionalization of sports.[20] Commercialization of sports, and of martial arts, has occurred as sports have become transformed from an act of participation into one of consumption and as non-commercial sporting organizations have developed commercial activities to finance their non-commercial mission.[21] Professionalization refers to the increasing differentiation of roles in play between experts and laypersons,[22] and implies centralization, specialization and formalization of play.[23] This process has occurred in part because of the willingness of individuals to pay for others to practice (through observation or sponsorship). However, it is related to the spread of the "pay to play" model in which

consumers demand some value for their investment beyond social enjoyment.

To summarize, the necessary organization of sports play therefore should be determined by how the interests of the specific actors in outcomes differ, the resources they have to devote to achieving their interests, and the investments required for individual or collective achievement of their sporting interests. These factors interact not only with the potential benefits of joint production, and the costs of using of agent to facilitate joint production, but also with conditions in the external environment.

Martial Arts Organizations

Using the discussion above as a guide, there are seven types of benefits that could potentially accrue from a stronger form of association among local martial arts groups:

1. Expanded opportunities for training and competition
2. Facilitate advanced training in areas of relevant expertise
3. Certifying various types of expertise
4. Economies of scale in the provision of training equipment and facilities
5. Economies of scale in logistics and administration
6. Brand recognition
7. Agreement on rules of play

There is a large amount of variation in the depth of association (depth of cooperation and delegation) represented by martial arts organizations. In this section, I offer four brief studies of martial arts

organizations to illustrate this range. Before doing so, however, it is useful to introduce a second analogy (the first being the principal-agent model): network theory. A network is one way of describing the relationship among a group of actors. Each actor, individual or collective is a node and can be represented by not only the number and strength of their connections to other nodes but also by the pattern of these connections in the network. Whereas an individual martial arts school may be a hierarchic network with the head instructor acting as the central but also peak node, a group of schools might or might not be related hierarchically. When considering the depth of cooperation among nodes, then, it is important to consider whether particular nodes are more powerful because they possess better information (expertise) than other nodes or because they control the flow of information of resources to others. Many networks may be both hierarchic and flat depending on the level or location.

Japan Aikido Assocation

Japan Aikido Association (JAA) is the international organization of practitioners of Shodokan or Tomiki Aikido, a mode of aikido modeled on judo where competition is seen as helpful to individual training.[24] The JAA describes itself as bringing aikido clubs together by offering its dues-paying members a number of products and services including newsletters, national insurance coverage, and discounts on JAA books, videotapes, DVD's, and most clinics and tournaments. Opportunities for training and competition are facilitated with clear definitions

of techniques and competition rules. The JAA also certifies expertise through specific rules governing rank promotions and recognition of JAA schools and certified instructors (the website does not describe this certification process). For example, higher-rank promotions (3rd dan and above) under JAA/USA rules require the supervision of at least one person recognized by JAA/Japan as a certified instructor. Further, black belt candidates at all levels must complete a required number of hours of training, attend JAA-accredited instructor and other training clinics, and remit a registration fee to JAA, in addition to any testing fees imposed by the instructor. There are also some economies of scale in administering joint production of training and expertise: local groups must apply for approval to host a sanctioned JAA event, but once received,

> Board and Business Office will provide assistance and guidance as needed to the host club/organization including lead instructors, referees, marketing materials, venue contract review, etc. The host will be responsible for securing the venue, providing maps or directions to the event, suggesting lodging to participants, etc. The Board will reserve the right to cancel recognition of an event if the event's conditions do not meet the standards, requirements and expectations of the JAA/USA.[25]

Aikido Association of America

The JAA is just one of many aikido federations, however. One competitor, offering an entirely different approach to aikido, is the Aikido Association of America.[26] The AAA has 140 affiliated schools in the

United States and is itself a member of the Aikido Association International (based in the US). To expand opportunities for training, the AAA does offer training camps and training classes at its headquarters and coordinates annual cultural trips and training tours to Japan. It also facilitates communication among its members through a black belt association, dojo listings, detailed calendars of events, and online and print newsletters. While the website does not fully detail the rules by which expertise is certified, the AAA appears to put a large emphasis on ensuring "consistent, quality professional instruction"—instructor training and certification seminars, a professional instructor training program, and a National Teaching Committee that also offers training seminars, all under the guidance of a program documented in an instructor's manual.[27] Another means by which it certifies expertise is in the accreditation of schools; the AAA directly certifies directly only students below black belt rank, as black belt certificates are issued by Aikido World Headquarters in Tokyo.[28] Therefore, while the AAA does appear to expand opportunities for training and developing expertise, its standards for certifying expertise are unclear and the organization offers little benefits in terms of economies of scale.

Hapkido

Like aikido, hapkido is divided into several different styles and perhaps dozens more associations. Two examples of extant hapkido associations include the International Hapkido Federation (IHF) and the World Hapkido Federation (WHF). The IHF is headed by James

S. Benko, who also heads the International Taekwondo Association (the IHF website is hosted on the ITA server). The primary focus of the IHF appears to be two-fold: the certification of ranks and schools and the promotion of its "vast DVD video collection of training presentations, audio collection, and an extensive and one-of-a-kind book collection".[29] The IHF appears, therefore, to be focused largely on seminar and books by Mr. Benko (schools may schedule seminars by him with a guaranteed minimum of $1250 and an advance deposit of 50% of the guaranteed minimum), but also may provide value added to those able to claim certification by the IHF. The World Hapkido Federation is a mostly US-based association of hapkido schools (including another organization, the American Hapkido Federation). While both schools and individuals may join the WHF, and while the WHF does hold an annual training camp for those interested, the WHF—like the IHF—appears designed to promote a series of books and videos while offering the member schools some ability to claim affiliation.

Women's Self-Defense Council

As a final study of a martial arts organization, I include the Women's Self-Defense Council (WDSC) through a study conducted by Searles and Berger.[30] The WDSC was founded when a martial artist and a former police officer teamed up to offer a "practical" (non-martial arts) self-defense course for women of all types and ages, one taught by expert women and designed explicitly on "the feminist model."[31] One founder utilized her own network to prepare a manual on self-defense law, and together both founders

worked on teaching manuals to standardize instruction. As members moved to new places and wanted to build, a national version started that required a division of labor and specialization. To meet that need, the founders formed a national nonprofit organization with a Board of Directors and non-teaching members in administrative roles, which were financed by 10% of their instructors' net teaching income. The WSDC then added an instructor trainee manual and formal certification process for teachers. The certification process required teachers to take classes, team teach as part of continued training, take advanced workshops, give lectures, conduct research on local criminal justice system, and continue their own martial arts training, including in weapons.[32]

The WSDC became divided as its mission conflicted with organizational needs: instructors giving free classes didn't contribute resources to the organization; instructor certification rules were bent to get more instructors in under-represented areas; and disagreements in tone emerged over the line between "empowerment" and "becoming too radical or feminist." Eventually, the WSDC council was dissolved by its founders and replaced with a for-profit organization to train and license instructors as specialists (for fees), accredit courses, and provide other self-defense training services. This study is interesting because while the WSDC clearly expanded training, certified expertise, pursued brand recognition, and accomplished some economies of scale in administration, the organization also collapsed over its inability to overcome differences in interests among its members.

In addition to the six martial arts associations studied here, I surveyed another 20 or so martial arts associations and federations. While this research is not exhaustive, some broad generalizations appear. First, there are three types of associations. The first, and weakest form of association, is a network association. These associations primarily consist of websites that list affiliated schools under a ranked instructor and have no other information about how unaffiliated local groups can join or gain accreditation and no rules or processes for certifications of rank or instruction. While these associations are weak, they comprise a major population of martial arts organizations. Their shared local constituency may make this sufficient for local economies of scale and brand recognition as long as the association can be dominated and led by that ranked instructor.

A second, intermediate level of organization begins to approach that of true association. These organizations, which would include the hapkido federations discussed above, have some minimal form of rules and requirements for membership (including certification of rank/expertise and standards), although the clear fee-for-service relationship may create conflicts of interest that impede deeper cooperation.

In the third category, organizations appear to arise out of a shared mission to expand the opportunities for student training and advancement of technical and instruction expertise, which in turn creates incentives for standardized certification of expertise, which in further turn requires standardization of the body of knowledge. The JAA and AAA appear to follow this model.

The most well-known of the martial arts organizations are those with strong standards for expertise, but which make only minimal attempts to exploit economies of scale. That is, the organizations that appear strong in the United States have a centralized system for certifying rank and rule compliance (for tournaments and seminars) but they allow their processes to be largely driven by local organizations. One reason this is the case is, perhaps, unique to the US legal environment. For example, it appears that few US martial arts associations offer insurance to their members, whether as individuals, instructors, or training facilities; whereas associations in Australia and the United Kingdom appeared to offer complete liability and accident insurance. Without a legal system that creates incentives for economies of scale in insurance or a corporatist political structure in which governments recognize official peak associations, the economies of scale in the US might be limited to coordinating local efforts.[33]

Yongmudo and International Organization

By most accounts, the martial art called hapkido emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in Korea, with the first generation of hapkido experts beginning to spread the art in a relatively coherent form.[34] Since that time, however, hapkido has splintered into several major different styles and perhaps dozens of associations that all claim some lineage to its founder, Master Choi Young Suhl. By the late 1990s, there has been pressure among a small subset of hapkido practitioners to organize a distinct martial art under a new name. While

the new name evolved over the last decade and settled as yongmudo, the goal of this process was to link a diverse network of hapkido students connected directly and indirectly to Yong-In University in order to ensure the style would survive into its second generation.

Yong-In University is the central node in this network and its power—relative to those inside and outside its network—comes from the relatively large number of students it graduates in its academic martial arts degree programs. However, important nodes in the United States include the UC Martial Arts Program at University of California Berkeley and Iowa State University Martial Arts. Institutionalizing of yongmudo has occurred through negotiations among the major nodes as they are each the top nodes in their separate networks. The mechanisms for formalizing the network were not always clear, and different mechanisms were likely preferred for different individuals and factions. There is theoretically a finite list of benefits of organizing yongmudo practitioners into a form of institutionalized cooperation. Using the discussion above as a guide, there are seven types of benefits that a stronger association of nodes in the Yong-In network could potentially include. In this section I offer a preliminary evaluation of their utility, attempting to determine whether strong or shallow forms of cooperation are required to achieve these benefits. Of course, these benefits may not accrue to all nodes in the network equally and this is taken into account in this discussion.

First, institutionalization of the informal network could expand opportunities for play by coordinating interaction among different nodes of the network. A

translocal yongmudo organization could provide not only processes by which translocal participation could occur through more classes, seminars and tournaments, but also the ground rules for such participation. A weak association centered on web, email, and newsletter communications could be sufficient to improve the information available to any individual local group about both specific opportunities for joint play (for example, an annual tournament) as well as general opportunities (identifying another local group across town with which occasional classes or scrimmages could occur). A slightly stronger organization could solve coordination problems among the various local groups by providing processes for organizing (and committing constituencies to) these events.

Larger nodes might not see the need for such coordinated play because they can draw upon a larger population, but large nodes could also benefit from committing to deeper cooperation with smaller nodes in their networks. Large nodes can benefit from expertise that is developed elsewhere in the network. Also, even the largest node may not be entirely self-sustaining because of the relative rarity that individuals are willing and capable of directing such a node. Many martial arts styles, even those considered successful for a time, have disappeared because they failed to transition their leadership from one generation to the next. It is unclear, for example, what the fate of Bong Soo Han's International Hapkido Federation will be with his death in 2007.[35] Therefore, larger and more central nodes could rely upon smaller nodes in their networks for developing and recruiting expertise and therefore strengthen their overall network.

Second, in addition to expanding the training opportunities for yongmudo students, broader and deeper association could facilitate advanced training. Even the most skilled instructors usually have areas of strengths and weaknesses, whether in technique or pedagogy, for which association with other experts can be useful for improving the quality of their performance. Such expertise is broader than any specific skill and can help instructors refine or develop new techniques, evolve their pedagogical approaches through better understanding of learning processes and changes in the external social environment, and learn more advanced training techniques resulting from advances in exercise sciences. Holding translocal tournaments with consistent rules may also require training of competition referees.

While such opportunities would certainly be useful to smaller nodes, large nodes might possess the resources to produce most of these benefits in-house. However, as also noted above, the massive range of expertise required to perpetuate a mode of play can mean that even the largest nodes may from time to time lack the expertise necessary to continue. These benefits could be a partial basis for stronger association, but realization of these benefits could be accomplished through non-cooperative mechanisms. For example, the two hapkido associations discussed above offer such training on a fee-for-service basis while the aikido associations discussed above do so as an inherent aspect of the larger association process. Groups without a profit motive could offer similar classes and often do: many schools host low-

cost seminars when high ranked instructors visit and the UC Martial Arts Program hosts an annual academic conference that is open to the public.

Third, translocal associations and federations could be useful in certifying play-specific expertise. The certification can be not only with regards to the level of training of an individual but also include compliance with "good practices," as we see with rule-compliant schools and tournaments. In the absence of formal decision-making rules as may be present in a deeply institutionalized organization, certification of expertise can be a useful indicator to other nodes within a network: when a member of a local yongmudo group visits another, expertise certified as rank can be an informational short-cut for that other group.[36] Such certification of expertise is useful not only for emphasizing the interests of those in possession of greater expertise, such as establishing or modifying a curriculum, but also whenever representatives of a node interact with other nodes in their network. Certification of expertise may be of even more use to those outside the network: it is not only prospective students who evaluate on the basis of certified expertise, but host institutions and potential employers also look for such certifications.

Of the benefits discussed so far, the collective certification of expertise could be the most valuable mechanism. However, as demonstrated by the case studies above, certification can be the most abused service of such organizations. Of the organizations surveyed, some appeared little more than the martial arts equivalent of "diploma mills," whereas others suffered splits in their organizations over substantive

differences in the certification process.[37] Realizing this benefit within a strong form of cooperation would require first the agreement on rules of play (see the seventh benefit, below) as well as consensus over what other aspects were to be promoted.[38]

Few martial arts associations appear to benefit from economies of scale in, fourth, the provision of training equipment and facilities, including maintenance and cleaning; or fifth, provision of logistical solutions, including administration, costs of compliance with local laws (including liability and other insurance, training required to supervise children, and so on), accounting, and other support functions. In particular, local martial arts groups that are not economically sustainable on their own seek to add more classes in the same facility (separating child, teen and adult classes in the same art and offering classes that the same individuals could realistically attend), add different classes in the same facility (serving new populations by adding new styles), finding other local groups with which to share a facility (separate instructors at the same facility), or acquiring time slots at community facilities.[39]

Sixth, proponents of yongmudo seek to replace the diversity of hapkido groups with a recognizable brand to create positive external economic results. Primarily, these results would include more students attracted to a recognizable product, easier access to new outlets for instruction, and more fee-for-service opportunities with non-members, such as demonstrations or seminars. Marketing a yongmudo brand might be difficult in a highly fragmented marketplace: not only are there dozens of types of hapkido schools and associations,

but these compete in most markets with many other martial, spiritual, or even combative offerings. As a case in point, karate styles attempted to unify behind the goal of becoming an Olympic sport but were unable to bridge gaps in styles and personalities to do so, whereas a large segment of the taekwondo market did cooperate, and delegate authority, to arrive at a coherent brand for the Olympics.

Seventh, and finally, there is general agreement among hapkido practitioners that the term "hapkido" itself has become almost meaningless as a useful descriptive term because hapkido approaches range from practices that would be described by others as aikido to taekwondo to even "mixed martial arts." Arriving at a coherent set of rules—from tournament competition rules to which techniques (and styles of executing them) are recognized as within the accepted bounds—would facilitate many of the benefits discussed above. However, this process does not necessarily require institutionalization of the network. As some examples, a unified vision of yongmudo could emerge from a series of ad-hoc conferences of experts, the success (or failure) of early tournaments arranged through the unilateral action of a major network node, or early producers of texts and other sources of standards that others could adopt as their own. The utility of arriving at common rules is driven more by the other factors than being in itself a benefit, but it might be a necessary process to achieve those other benefits.

Conclusions

Yongmudo enthusiasts, like those in many martial arts, are divided between those who seek to parlay their interests for profits, and those who practice and teach for non-profit motives. The key issue to answer is what level of cooperation and what extent of delegation is required to accomplish the interests of yongmudo enthusiasts? The magnitude of the benefits from deepening yongmudo cooperation through the formation of a strong association depends upon the specific individuals and local groups involved.

Several benefits discussed in this essay are unlikely to hold at all when individuals are too separated by geographic distance or by virtue of residing in different legal jurisdictions. For example, insurance companies may not offer coverage if the individuals extend across different state or national boundaries. Also, shared training facilities are useful only to the extent individuals can travel to them often enough. Other benefits are unlikely to hold if the interests of the participants are too diverse: those more interested in commoditizing their expertise will see greater benefits from branding and certification of expertise and less benefit from costly investments that could be required from mandatory training rules.

Realizing most of the benefits discussed above does not require deep cooperation. For example, even among non-profit groups, expertise-enhancing seminars, tournaments and other exchanges can occur on a fee-for-service basis: smaller university

martial arts clubs can invite similar groups to participate in tournaments that range from informal (scrimmages) to formal (fee-for-entry with each individual accepting the "contract" that defines rules for participation). Yongmudo enthusiasts could invite each other to participate, at their own expense, in scrimmages, training camps, and other events. To invite others to share their particular expertise, one group could pay to visit another group, or pay the expenses of that other group to come to them, all of which can occur without deep cooperation. While deeper cooperation is necessary to produce further gains, the cooperation requirements remain relatively weak to achieve some benefits: communication through the web, email, and print or online newsletters, including lists of affiliated schools and sanctioned events, could produce these gains without delegation to a centralized organization.

This analysis therefore finds that certification of expertise is, as stated above, the basis of the strongest case for stronger yongmudo association. Even the largest nodes in an expertise-based network may be unable to sustain themselves over time without the ability to validate and then draw upon expertise elsewhere in the network. A certification process needs to be perceived as sufficiently unbiased with respect to location in the network (not privileging one major node over another, major nodes over small nodes, or commercial over nonprofit). The process would also need to establish credibility by developing clear and strict standards for certification, possibly also including reliance upon external certifiers (accredited schools and agencies).

In conclusion, there is some case to be made for stronger yongmudo association. In particular, a centralized association could expand opportunities for training, competition, and building expertise. Such benefits, though, could be produced with relatively low-level or even ad hoc cooperation without the costs of negotiating and committing to a deep institution. Some economies of scale could adhere to such an organization that then would then become involved in administering joint production of training, such as the aikido federations that provide assistance to local groups seeking to host seminars, camps, and so on. The realization of economies of scale would likely require greater consensus over rules of play and standards of expertise, but would justify additional delegations of authority to a centralized organization. Finally, the certification of rank and other yongmudo-related expertise makes the strongest case for deep cooperation among yongmudo enthusiasts.

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Endnotes

[1] Skinner, et al., p. 176.

[2] Seippel, p. 260. Seippel divides the work in sports organizations into the following categories: administration, accountancy, instruction, janitor, organizing volunteers, support functions, miscellaneous practical work, and other.

[3] Barros, p. 33. Barros describes the case of Portugal, where there is the government Ministry of Sport and a National Confederation of Sport (an non-governmental organization with 67 associate member federations that lobbies the government); below these two peak institutions are the national and then regional associations of each individual sport.

[4] Of course, municipalities only provide such facilities because individuals overcame their collective action problem at some point in the past to demand, and receive, these public goods.

[5] Beginning for-profit martial arts training centers do have some significant start-up costs, though the largest component is probably the opportunity costs of occupying an under-utilized space when other employment opportunities exist.

[6] Or, returning to the example above with a common football and soccer municipal association, the bargain that enables their cooperation could easily break down. At one level, they already share different interests over the rules of play. However, cooperation also becomes difficult if they want to use the field at the same time or if their equipment becomes too specialized for economies of scale in purchasing it.

[7] Abbot and Snidal, 1998; Gould, 2003; Martin, 1992; Powell, 2006; Smith, 2000.

[8] There are multiple reasons for recognizing increasing stratification of expertise. Beyond an institution reaping additional fees from additional belt promotional tests, observers have noted the significance of more proximate targets for goal-oriented performance and the need to differentiate students and teachers when there are larger populations at a practice location.

[9] Keohane, 1984; Lake and Powell, 1999.

[10] Hawkins, et al., 2006.

[11] Bradley and Kelley, 2006.

[12] Goldstein, et al., 2001.

[13] Abbott, et al., 2001. Obligation occurs when actors accept rules and commitments in a legally binding manner such that one can assert established mechanisms and processes when another does not fulfill their stated obligations. Actors impose precision through unambiguous and noncontradictory rules that specify clear standards for behavior, though the level of precision varies by the degree of discretion granted to the actors in interpreting these standards (Abbott et al. 2001).

[14] Non-substantive decisions might include where to meet, at what level to participate in negotiations, who speaks and in what order, and how are negotiations terminated and issues resolved. Of course these are also substantive in that they may promote specific actors' interests or outcomes.

[15] http://www.usa-taekwondo.us/RevRestructure AnnualMeeting04.pdf (accessed 6 June 2007).

[16] Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2000; Milner 2003.

[17] Using tools for screening, selection, monitoring and motivating agents, the principal(s) should be able to control their agent (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).

[18] Martin, 2002.

[19] While the latter is often characterized by employees slacking on the job or embezzling resources, theoretically there is little theoretical difference between this behavior and the former behavior of choosing to behave in ways the principal would not prefer.

[20] Enjolras, 2002; Seippel, 2002.

[21] Enjolras argues commercialization through consumerization is a result of individualization of sports as an option (not a collective right to participate) and therefore the user must "pay to play" (Enjolras 2002).

[22] Seippel, p. 262.

[23] Seippel, p. 257.

[24] For more information on the Japan Aikido Federation, see: http://www.tomiki.org/

[25] http://www.tomiki.org/files/JAAUSArecognitionpolicy1.pdf

[26] http://www.aaa-aikido.com/index2.htm

[27] The AAA website also states that the "AAA believes that professional, full-time Aikido instructors are the means by which the art will be successfully transmitted to future generations," though the definition of "full-time" may be weakly defined as having classes "that meets consistently at least three times per week."

[28] It is unclear from the website which body this is; the AAI website does state there is a close affiliation with Aikikai Honbu Dojo.

[29] The IHF website states: "The International Hapkido Federation™ offers its members the following benefits: International Black Belt Rank Certification, International Gup (Grade) Rank Certification, International School/Instructor Certification, Comprehensive Hapkido training DVD video collection, Official IHF book collection, Official IHF Hapkido seminars, International Hapkido Computer Registry, Special Rank Examinations (External Testing Program), Standardized Rank Promotion Requirements, Standardize Testing Procedures." The "External Testing Program" is described as a "test via video and written examination."

[30] Searles and Berger, 1987.

[31] Searles and Berger, p. 69.

[32] Searles and Berger, pp. 71-72.

[33] Local efforts in the US at achieving economies of scale appear to do so more often by individual locations with multi-style offerings in which karate is offered at a location alongside aikido or taekwondo is offered with hapkido and judo, and all may be now offered with kickboxing, tai chi and yoga.

[34] A search of the many histories of hapkido will show that there were several name changes before this point that were coincident with its adaptation by successive individuals to both local needs and these individual's different martial training pre- and post-exposure to hapkido.

[35] Some of Bong Soo Han's students speculate that his home dojo may not survive, removing the hub of the IHF network (personal communication, unnamed source).

[36] Certification of expertise in this manner may indicate the weight that should be given to their opinion about techniques or other practices; it may also be indicative of bargaining power in negotiations between local groups.

[37] An open letter posted on the website of Birankai International, for example, indicated this Aikido group split with the IAF and USAF over those organizations reluctance to promote non-Japanese to the highest instructor levels. Read "the Birth" as posted at http://www.birankai.org/BirankaiInternational.html.

[38] I noted above that the AAA puts a premium on "professional" martial arts instruction, implying instructors who focus on martial arts as their occupation not merely avocation. Though the AAA sets a low bar, the point being suggested is that profit-oriented martial arts schools perceive different benefits from certification and training than others do.

[39] Sports play can also occur if individuals exist who are willing to provide the "public goods" necessary for play (Keohane 1984): Morihei Ueshiba was reputed to have built a dojo for Daitoryu-Aikijujitsu instructor Sokaku Takeda, and Yong Sul Choi's first start at teaching what became known as hapkido began in a small office above a brewery provided by his first student, Bok Sup Suh. A public goods provider helps overcome the barriers to entry created by up-front costs.