



IBM z/OS Connect Enterprise Edition


Security

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Contents



- Introduction
- API provider security
 - Authentication
 - Authorization
 - Audit
 - Encryption
 - Flowing identities to back end systems
- API requester security
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- More information

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General considerations for securing REST APIs





- Know who is invoking the API (**Authentication**)
- Ensure that the data has not been altered in transit (**Data Integrity**) and ensure confidentiality of data in transit (**Encryption**)
- Control access to APIs (**Authorization**)
 - End user
 - Application
- Know who invoked the APIs (**Audit**)



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z/OS Connect EE API provider security overview




1. Authentication (basic, client certificates, 3rd party authentication)
2. Encryption (aka "SSL" or "TLS")
3. Authorization (role and group access)
4. Audit
5. Configuring security with SAF
6. Back end identity propagation (CICS, IMS, D)

See Dev Center article "Securing APIs with z/OS Connect EE" overview of z/OS Connect EE security

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
z/OS Connect EE security options



<http://ibm.biz/zosconnect-security>

The actions which can be controlled by authorization (see Note 1 in the diagram above) are: deploying, querying, updating, starting, stopping and deleting of APIs, services and API requesters.
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Typical z/OS Connect EE security flow



1. The credentials provided by the client
2. Secure the connection to the z/OS Connect EE server
3. Authenticate the client. This can be within the z/OS Connect EE server or by requesting verification from a third party server
4. Map the authenticated identity to a user ID in the user registry
5. Authorize the mapped user ID to connect to z/OS Connect EE and optionally authorize user to invoke actions on APIs
6. Audit the API request
7. Secure the connection to the System of Record (SoR) and provide security credentials to be used to invoke the program or to access the data resource
8. The program or database request may run in the SoR under the mapped ID

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Security is configured in server.xml



Excerpt from server.xml

```
<featureManager>
  <feature>appSecurity-2.0</feature>
  <feature>zosSecurity-1.0</feature>
  <feature>transportSecurity-1.0</feature>
</featureManager>

<sslDefault sslRef="defaultSSLConfig"/>
<ssl id="defaultSSLConfig"
  keyStoreRef="defaultKeyStore"
  outboundSSLRef="defaultKeyStore" />

<keyStore id="defaultKeyStore" fileBased="false"
  location="safkeyring:///Keyring.LIBERTY"
  password="password" readOnly="true"
  type="JCERACFKS" />

<webAppSecurity allowFailOverToBasicAuth="true" />

<safRegistry id="saf"/>
<safAuthorization id="safAuth"/>
<safCredentials profilePrefix="BBGZDFLT"
  unauthenticatedUser="WSGUEST" />
```

Features

SSL repertoire


Key Store

Authentication

Authorization

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Common challenges



- **End-to-end security** is hampered by the issue of how to provide secure access between middleware components that use disparate security technologies e.g. registries
 - › This is a driver for implementing open security models like OAuth and OpenID Connect and standard tokens like JWT
- z/OS Connect security is implemented in many products including z/OS Connect, Liberty z/OS, SAF/RACF, CICS, IMS, DB2 ...
 - › And these are all documented in different places
- Often security is at odds with **performance**, because the most secure techniques often involve the most processing overhead especially if not configured optimally

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
Authentication

Obtaining an identity

Authentication

Several different ways this can be accomplished:


Basic Authentication



Server prompts for ID/PW
Client supplies ID/PW
Server checks registry:


- Basic (server.xml)
- LDAP
- SAF

Client Certificate




Server prompts for cert.
Client supplies certificate
Server validates cert and maps to an identity

Third Party Authentication






Client authenticates to 3rd party sever
Client receives a trusted 3rd party token
Token flows to Liberty z/OS across trusted connection and is mapped to an identity

Security token types by z/OS Connect EE 			
Token type	How used	Pros	Cons
LTPA	Authentication technology used in IBM WebSphere	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Easy to use with WebSphere and DataPower 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IBM Proprietary token
SAML	XML-based security token and set of profiles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Token includes user id and claims Used widely with SoR applications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tokens can be heavy to process No refresh token
OAuth 2.0 access token	Facilitates the authorization of one site to access and use information related to the user's account on another site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Used widely for SoE applications e.g with Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter ... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Needs introspection endpoint to validate token
JWT	JSON security token format	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More compact than SAML Ease of client-side processing especially mobile 	
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OpenID Connect Overview

- OpenID Connect (OIDC)** is built on top of OAuth 2.0
- Flexible user authentication for Single Sign-On (SSO) to Web, mobile and API workloads
- Addresses European **PSD2** and UK **OpenBanking** requirements for authorization and authentication

Title
jwt-generate

Description

JSON Web Token (JWT)
idtoken

Runtime variable in which to place the generated JWT. If not set, the JWT is placed in the Authorization Header as a Bearer token.

☒ JWT ID Claim

Indicates whether a JWT ID (jti) claim should be added to the JWT. If selected, the jti claim value will be a UUID.


Issuer Claim
iss.claim

Runtime variable from which the Issuer (iss) claim string can be retrieved. This claim represents the Principal that issued the JWT.

Subject Claim
oidc-credential

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Why JWT with z/OS Connect EE?




- Token validation does **not** require an additional trip and can be validated locally by z/OS Connect server
- Parties can easily agree on a specific set of **custom** claims in order to exchange both authentication and authorization information
- Widely adopted by different Single Sign-On solutions and well known standards such as **OpenID Connect**
- **Message-level** security using signature standard
- JWT tokens are **lighter** weight than other XML based tokens e.g SAML

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

JWT (JSON Web Token)



- JWT is a compact way of representing claims that are to be transferred between two parties
- Normally transmitted via HTTP header
- Consists of three parts
 - Header
 - Payload
 - Signature



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Configuring authentication with JWT



z/OS Connect EE can perform user authentication with JWT using the support that is provided by the *openidConnectClient-1.0* feature. The **<openidConnectClient>** element is used to accept a JWT token as an authentication token

```
<openidConnectClient id="RS" clientId="RS-JWT-ZCEE" inboundPropagation="required"
  signatureAlgorithm="RS256" trustStoreRef="JWTTrustStore"
  trustAliasName="JWTapicSign" userIdentityToCreateSubject="sub"
  mapIdentityToRegistryUser="true"
  issuerIdentifier="https://10.3.20.92:9090/jwt" authnSessionDisabled="true"
  audiences="zCEE" />
```

- **inboundPropagation** is set to required to allow z/OS Connect EE to use the received JWT as an authentication token
- **signatureAlgorithm** specifies the algorithm to be used to verify the JWT signature
- **trustStoreRef** specifies the name of the keystore element that defines the location of the validating certificate
- **trustAliasName** gives the alias or label of the certificate to be used for signature validation
- **userIdentityToCreateSubject** indicates the claim to use to create the user subject
- **mapIdentityToRegistryUser** indicates whether to map the retrieved identity to the registry user
- **issuerIdentifier** defines the expected issuer
- **authnSessionDisabled** indicates whether a WebSphere custom cookie should be generated for the session
- **audiences** defines a list of target audiences

See Dev Center article "Using a JWT with z/OS Connect EE" for full description of scenario

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Using authorization filters with z/OS Connect EE



Authentication filter can be used to filter criteria that are specified in the **authFilter** element to determine whether certain requests are processed by certain providers, such as OpenID Connect, for authentication.


```
<openidConnectClient id="RS" clientId="RS-JWT-ZCEE" inboundPropagation="required"
  signatureAlgorithm="RS256" trustStoreRef="JWTTrustStore"
  trustAliasName="JWTapicSign" userIdentityToCreateSubject="sub"
  mapIdentityToRegistryUser="true" issuerIdentifier="https://10.3.20.92:9090/jwt"
  authnSessionDisabled="true" audiences="zCEE" authFilterRef="API Gateway" />

<authFilter id="API Gateway">
  <remoteAddress id="ApiAddress" ip="10.7.1.*" matchType="equals" />
</authFilter>
<authFilter id="PhoneBook">
  <requestUrl id="URL" urlPattern="/phoneBook/*" matchType="equals" />
</authFilter>
```

Some alternative filter types

- A **remoteAddress** element is compared against the TCP/IP address of the client that sent the request.
- The **host** element is compared against the "Host" HTTP request header, which identifies the target host name of the request.
- The **requestUrl** element is compared against the URL that is used by the client application to make the request.


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 z/OS Connect EE


Authorization

Once we have an identity


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Overview of z/OS Connect interceptors



The interceptor framework provides a way to call code to do pre-invoke work and then again to do post-invoke work:



In `server.xml` you can:


- Define 'global interceptors,' which apply to all configured APIs and services
- Define interceptors specific to a given configured API or service

z/OS Connect comes with an authorization interceptor (which user can access which API or service) and an audit interceptor (for SMF recording)


It is also possible to write your own interceptor and have it called as part of request/response processing



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Authorization interceptor



The "authorization interceptor" is a supplied piece of interceptor code that will check to see if the user has the authority to perform the action requested:






 z/OS Connect EE

Audit

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 z/OS Connect EE

Audit (SMF) Interceptor

The audit interceptor writes SMF 123.1 records. Below is an example of some of the information captured:

- System Name
- Sysplex Name
- Job Name
- Job Prefix
- Address Space Stoken

Server Identification Section

- Arrival Time
- Completion Time
- Target URI
- Input JSON Length
- Response JSON Length
- Method Name
- API or Service Name
- Userid
- Mapped user name


User Data Section

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Encryption

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Using JSSE with z/OS Connect EE




- z/OS Connect EE support for SSL/TLS is based on **Liberty server** support
- **Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE)** API provides framework and Java implementation of SSL and TLS protocols used by Liberty HTTPS support
- **Java Cryptography Extension (JCE)** is standard extension to the Java Platform that provides implementation for cryptographic services
- **IBM Java SDK** for z/OS provides two different JCE providers, **IBMJCE** and **IBMJCECCA**

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Using AT-TLS with z/OS Connect EE

z/OS Connect EE




- **Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS)** creates a secure session on behalf of z/OS Connect
- Only define http ports in server.xml (z/OS Connect does not know that TLS session exists)
- Define TLS protection for all applications (including z/OS Connect) in **AT-TLS policy**
- AT-TLS uses **System SSL** which exploits the CPACF and Crypto Express cards via ICSF

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AT-TLS Inbound Scenarios

z/OS Connect EE




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JSSE and AT-TLS comparison



Capability	Description	JSSE	AT-TLS
1-way SSL	Verification of z/OS Connect certificate by client	Yes	Yes
2-way SSL	Verification of client certificate by z/OS Connect	Yes	Yes
SSL client authentication	Use of client certificate for authentication	Yes	No
Support for requireSecure option on APIs	Requires that API requests are sent over HTTPS	Yes	No
Persistent connections	To reduce number of handshakes	Yes	Yes
Re-use of SSL session	To reduce number of full handshakes	Yes	Yes
Shared SSL sessions	To share SSL sessions across cluster of z/OS Connect instances	No	Yes
zIIP processing	Offload TLS processing to zIIP	Yes	No
CPACF	Offload symmetric encryption to CPACF	Yes	Yes
CEX6	Offload asymmetric operations to Crypto Express cards	Yes	Yes

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Configuring TLS Encryption with JSSE

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Cyphers



- During the TLS handshake, the TLS protocol and data exchange cipher are negotiated
- Choice of cipher and key length has an impact on performance
- You can restrict the protocol (SSL or TLS) and ciphers to be used
- Example setting server.xml file

```
<ssl id="DefaultSSLSettings"
keyStoreRef="defaultKeyStore" sslProtocol="TLSv1.2"
enabledCiphers="TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" />
```

- This configures use of TLS 1.2 and two supported ciphers
- It is recommended to control what ciphers can be used in the server rather than the client

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Persistent connections



- Persistent connections can be used to avoid too many handshakes
- Configured by setting the `keepAliveEnabled` attribute on the `httpOptions` element to **true**
- Example setting server.xml file

```
<httpEndpoint host="*" httpPort="80" httpsPort="443"
id="defaultHttpEndpoint" httpOptionsRef="httpOpts" />
<httpOptions id="httpOpts" keepAliveEnabled="true"
maxKeepAliveRequests="500" persistTimeout="1m" />
```

- This sets the connection timeout to **1 minute** (default is 30 seconds) and sets the maximum number of persistent requests that are allowed on a single HTTP connection to **500**
- It is recommended to set a maximum number of persistent requests when connection workload balancing is configured
- It is also necessary to configure the client to support persistent connections

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SSL sessions



- When connections timeout, it is still possible to avoid the impact of full handshakes by reusing the SSL session id
- Configured by setting the `sslSessionTimeout` attribute on the `sslOptions` element to an amount of time
- Example setting server.xml file

```
<httpEndpoint host="*" httpPort="80" httpsPort="443"
id="defaultHttpEndpoint" httpOptionsRef="httpOpts"
sslOptionsRef="mySSLOptions"/>

<httpOptions id="httpOpts" keepAliveEnabled="true"
maxKeepAliveRequests="100" persistTimeout="1m"/>

<sslOptions id="mySSLOptions" sslRef="DefaultSSLSettings"
sslSessionTimeout="10m"/>
```



- This sets the timeout limit of an SSL session to **10 minutes** (default is 8640ms)
- SSL session ids are not shared across z/OS Connect servers



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
Flowing identities to back end systems

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Flowing a user ID with CICS service provider




IPIC connections enforce **bind** security to prevent an unauthorized client system from connecting to CICS, **link** security to restrict the resources that can be accessed over a connection to a CICS system, and **user** security to restrict the CICS resources that can be accessed by a user

Distributed identities can be propagated to CICS and then mapped to a RACF user ID by CICS. You can then view the distinguished name and realm for a distributed identity in the association data of the CICS task. **Important:** If the z/OS Connect EE server is not in the same sysplex as the CICS system, you must use an IPIC SSL connection that is configured with client authentication.

If a SAF ID is used for authentication (e.g. basicauth with a SAF registry) then the SAF ID is passed to CICS.

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CICS IPCONN

 z/OS Connect EE

```

DEFINE IPCONN(ZOSCONN) GROUP(SYSPGRP)
  APPLID(ZOSCONN)
  NETWORKID(ZOSCONN)
  TCPIP SERVICE(ZOSCONN)
  LINKAUTH(SECUSER)
  USERAUTH(IDENTIFY)
  IDPROP(REQUIRED)
        
```

Must match `zosConnectApplid` set in `zosconnect_cicsIpicConnection`

Must match `zosConnectNetworkid` set in `zosconnect_cicsIpicConnection`

Specify name of TCPIP SERVICE


Requests run under the flowed user ID


```

<zosconnect_cicsIpicConnection id="cscvnc"
  host="wg31.washington.ibm.com"
  zosConnectNetworkid="ZOSCONN"
  zosConnectApplid="ZOSCONN"
  port="1491" />
        
```

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Flowing a user ID with MQ service provider

 z/OS Connect EE



Authentication

Liberty Server

z/OS Connect

MQ Service Provider

Flowed RACF ID

MQ

Q1

Q2


CICS

Program



Configuration attributes on the `mqzOSConnectService` element, and the `properties.wmqJMS` sub-element of the `jmsConnectFactory` element affect which user ID and optional password are presented to the queue manager.



Set `useCallerPrincipal=true` to flow the authenticated RACF user ID

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What's different for API Requester?





Configuring OAuth support



For **OAuth**, two grant types are supported:

- Resource Owner Password Credential [a.k.a. password]
- Client Credentials [a.k.a. client_credentials]

The access token is a way for the API provider to validate the client application rights to invoke its APIs.

```
<zosconnect_endpointConnection id="orderDispatchAPI"
  host="https://154.2.45.123" port="443"
  authenticationConfigRef="myOAuthConfig" />

<zosconnect_oAuthConfig id="myOAuthConfig"
  grantType="client_credentials"
  authServerRef="myOAuthProvider" />

<zosconnect_authorizationServer id="myOAuthProvider"
  tokenEndpoint="https://154.2.45.123/oauth2/token"
  basicAuthRef="myAppID" /> ← optional

<zosconnect_authData id="myAppID" user="myClientID"
  password="myClientSecret" />
```


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Summary

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
Summary



- Define clear security requirements before deciding on a security design
- Security design needs to consider
 - Authentication
 - Encryption
 - Authorization
 - Audit
 - Protection against attack
 - Rate limiting
- Because z/OS Connect EE is based on Liberty it benefits from a wide range of Liberty security capabilities
- z/OS Connect EE has it's own security capabilities in the form of the authorization and audit interceptors
- Look at the security solution end to end, including the security capabilities of the API Gateway

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More information



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